VIVEKANANDA INSITITUTE OF PROFESSIONAL STUDIES, VSLLS

VIVEKANANDA INSITITUTE OF
PROFESSIONAL STUDIES, VSLLS

LEGAL POSITIVISM: AN ANALYSIS OF AUSTIN

AND BENTHAM

NAME OF THE STUDENT: SWATI

ENROLLMENT NO.: 22017703818

SEMESTER/SECTION: 6TH-D

NAME OF FACULTY MEMBER AS SUPERVISOR:

MR. AASH MOHAMMAD

1
 Abstract

Key words- Austin, Bentham, Criticism of Positivist School, Indian Perspective of Positivist School, Legal
Positivist School.
The school of Legal Positivism has developed between the period of 18th and 19th century through the works of
many influential jurists such as John Austin and Jeremey Bentham. They through their great work are mainly
responsible for the Legal Positivist School to gain such importance in the field of legal jurisprudence. Jurists like
H.L.A.Hart then carried their work forward.
Although not free from shortcomings, the Legal Positivist School is regarded as the most influential school of
thought in jurisprudence. Judges have made their decisions based on this school of thought across various
countries, including India. Judges in India have been greatly influenced by the thoughts of legal positivists and
have applied their jurisprudence while giving landmark judgements
While not without flaws, the legal positivist school is considered the most influential school of thought in
jurisprudence. Judges have made decisions based on this idea in several countries, including India. The judges
from India have immensely influenced by their Positivist perspectives and their application of jurisprudence in
historical decision-making such as A.K.Gopalan v. State of Madras to name one of them.
The basic idea behind legal positivism is to treat the law as it should be, not as it should be. The positivists
have separated ethical principles from legal principles. They believe that the law is the will of the superior
backed by sanctions.
John Austin and Jeremy Bentham are the two of the most famous authors of this school of thought, legal
positivism. Although, the two basic ideas of both of them are similar, but there are some obvious
differences which will be explained in detail.
In addition to that, Legal positivist schools are being considered from an Indian perspective and their role in
influencing the judiciary while giving judgements in India.
 Introduction: Legal Positivism

Legal positivism is considered one of the most influential schools of thought in legal
jurisprudence around the world and most of its theory was developed by a great extent by
jurists such as John Austin and Jeremy Bentham in the 18th and 19th century. Afterwards, this
school of thought was taken forward by other influential jurists such as Joseph Raz
Adolphus Hart and Herbert Lionel.

The above-mentioned jurists have substantial differences in their views but the basic idea
that all of the above jurists got is that they analyse law as it is.1Therefore, they have a
common objective of helping the public comprehend the concept of law of the land as it
is and not as it should be. Thus, the legal positivist school solitary aims to classify the
law as it is laid down by a superior body and not how it should have been.

In addition to that, the other similarity between all the jurists of the legal positivist school
was that they used to keep law and moral principles on a completely distinct footing. The
positivists had a belief that the law had no relation with the moral principles.2However, they
had the opinion that law every so often mirrors the morality of the people that it controls.
Thus, they said that the law doesn’t have to be in harmoniousness with the principles of
morality and ethics and rather law is what is laid by the superior body.

Legal positivists can be divided into positive positivists and negative positivists depending
upon the weight given to the moral principles. Positive positivists like Hart had the opinion
that the moral principles exist in the universe but it isn’t required for the law to abide by
them. Hart writes that ‘it is in no sense a necessary truth that law satisfy demands of morality, though
in fact they have often done so’.3 Therefore, they do not deny the existence of moral principles,
but negative positivists are those who have completely denied the existence of moral and
ethical principles, and therefore do not believe in moral principles. into the existence of
moral principles. This includes jurists like John Austin.

Therefore, It is clear that the legal positivist jurisprudence does not completely deny the
existence of moral principles and asserts to some extent that the law can be based on legal
principles, morals and ethics. His point of view is that even ethical standards acquire legal
status. Only through official issuance form. 4

Positivist legal schools attempt to delimit the current state of law from what it should be, but
they focus on the nature of the censorship of the law, that is, the law made by the law, rather
it is the law to analyze in doing so.

1H.L.A.Hart, The Concept of Law ( 1961, 2ndedn, Clarendon Law Series) 34.
2H.L.A.Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy ( 1983, 1 STedn, Clarendon Press) 112.
3Supra at 1.
4H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (1963) 176.
The two primary attorneys affiliated with Legal Positivist School are John Austin and
Jeremy Bentham. Their main legal ideas are similar, but different in some respects.
Both these jurists played a vast role in evolving this school and are considered to be the
greatest writers in the field of legal positivism.
 Methodology

Scope of Study
The scope of this paper is to study the basic concept of legal positivism in relation with
the comprehension of famous jurists such as Austin and Bentham and their perception of
law. Moreover, also to explore application of positivist school in the Indian context.

Research Questions
The following research questions have been broadly identified:

1. What is Legal Positivism?

2. What is law according to Austin and Bentham?
3. What are the major differences between Austin and Bentham?
4. What is the relevancy of Legal Positivism in the Indian context?
 John Austin’s Analytical Jurisprudence and Legal
Positivism

John Austin (1790-1859) was a prominent British legal philosopher famous for
developing the first systematic alternative to both ‘natural law theories of law’ and
‘utilitarian approaches to law’. Austin’s theory of law is a form of analytic jurisprudence.
He is best known for the development of the theory of legal positivism, he made
attempts to distinctly separate the ‘moral rules’ from what is known as the ‘positive
law’.Austin also incorporated the idea of law being the sovereign command much like
Hobbes and Bentham before him. Austin’s jurisprudence was based on the outlines of
Jeremy Bentham’s thoughts but Austin was in no manner whatsoever Bentham’s intellectual
clone. Austin and Bentham had their differences which we shall also be taken a note of
in this paper.

Austin’s Utilitarianism

John Austin’s reading of utilitarianism, has been the part of his work that has gained the
greatest attention. According to Austin the primary source of moral rules was the law of God
as revealed in the scriptures. Austin, like Thomas Aquinas, had the view that there is a part of
the law of God which is not revealed and must be revealed by resorting to reasoning. As it is
evident that God wills the utmost pleasure of all his creatures, reason brings us to the
principle of utility. Austin believed that utility is the guide for the finding of divine
pleasure. 5 Austin, much like Bentham, also reasoned that aggregate happiness is aided by
recognizing the law with sovereign will. Austin however, included moral dictates of the
scriptures in the category of ‘law’. This led to the creation of a subset of ‘laws properly so
called’ – which was named as ‘positive law’ which was done mainly to signify laws made
by the sovereign and its delegates.

Austin’s Taxonomy

Austin imade ian iattempt ito icategorize iall ithat iwhich ihe ithought iwas ithe iproper isubject
iof ijurisprudence. iAustin, ionly icalled isome iof ithese ilaws ias iwhat ihe icalled i‘laws
iproperly iso icalled’. iWhilst ithe iothers iare ilaws iby iequivalence imeaning ilaws ionly iin
ithe ifigurative isense, ithe icriteria ifor ia ilaw ito ibe i‘properly iso icalled’ iis ithat iit
ioriginates ifrom iauthority.
5 (Austin 1873: Lecture IV, p. 160; see also Austin 1832: Lecture II, p. 41)
Austin ibelieved ithat ilaws iby ianalogy iare inot ilaw iper ise ibut iare ipositive imorality. iThis iis
iinclusive iof irules iwhich iare iof inon-obligatory inature isuch ias irules iof isocial ietiquette,
imoral irules ietc. iIt also covers customary law, international law and constitutional law
which, as per the general opinion, are considered binding.

Laws Properly So Called and Positive Law

There iexist iprimarily itwo ikinds iof iauthority iin iAustin’s ilegal iuniverse: ithe
iauthority iof ithe iChristian iscriptures iand ithe iauthority iof ithe ipolitical isuperior.

Divine ilaw iis iunderstood ito ibe ithat iwhich iis iset iby iGod ihimself ifor ithe icreatures. iThe
iscriptures iare iknown ito ibe ithe isource iof idivine ilaw. iThe ipolitical isuperior iis ithe
idirect isource iof ihuman ilaw iproperly iso icalled iwhich iAustin itermed ias i‘positive
ilaw’.6 iAs iper iAustin, ipositive ilaw iwas ithe iexclusive iconcern iof ijurisprudence iwhereas
ithe ilaw iof igod iwas iprimarily ithe isubject iof itheology.

A ifurther isubdivision iof ipositive ilaw iwas iintroduced iby iAustin. iAustin iwent ion ito
idistinguish ilaws iset idirectly iby ithe ipolitical isuperior ior iwhat iwas iunderstood ito ibe
ias isovereign ifrom ithe ilaws iwhich iwere iset iby iprivate icitizens iin iquest iof itheir ilegal
irights. iThe ilaws imade iby ithe iones iauthorised ito ido iso ior ithe isubordinate ipolitical
isuperiors ilike iministers, ijudges ietc iconstitute ias ithe ilaws iset idirectly iby ithe
isovereign.

Austin igave iillustrations iregarding iwhat iconstituted ito ibe ithe ilaws imade iby iprivate
icitizens iin ipursuance iof itheir ilegal irights. iOne isuch iillustration iof ithe ilaws imade iby
iprivate icitizen iwas iof irules imade iby ithe iguardians ifor itheir iwards iand ithose irules
iimposed iupon ithe islaves iby ithe islave iowners. iSo, ias iall ithe ilegal irights ihappen ito ibe
ifounded iby ilaws iof ithe isovereign, ithe iultimate isource iof ithese iprivate ipowers
iremains ithe isovereign.7

As iper iAustin, ionly ithose inorms iwhich ihave ibeen iauthoritatively iestablished iby
iGod ior iby isovereign iare iproper ilaws. iLaws iimproperly iso icalled iare igenerally
ibased ion iopinion iand inot iauthority.

6R. Campbell, The Philosophy of Positive Law (1879) 234.

7John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832) 215
Austin’s Positive Law
Austin idefined ipositive ilaw ias icomprising iof icommands iof ia ipolitical isovereign
ibacked iby isanctions ion ithe iones iwho idisobey ithe icommands.

There iare iprimarily ithree ikey iconstituents iof ithis iconcept iof ilaw:

1. Political isovereign
2. Command
3. Sanction

Austin inoted ithat ia isociety iwhich idoes inot ihave ia ipolitical isovereign idoes inot ihave
ilaw iin ithe istrict isense iof ipositive ilaw. iPolitical isovereign iwas iregarded ias ia inecessary
ifeature iof ia ipolitical isociety iwhich iconsiders ior iclaims iitself ito ibe iindependent. iAustin
iwas iof ithe inotion ithat iwhere ithere iis ino isovereign, ithere iis ino iindependent ipolitical
isociety iwhere ias ithe ivice iversa iis ialso itrue.

As ipointed iout iby iAustin, ipositive ilaw iis ithe iresult iof ia isovereign’s icommand. iA
icommand iis ian iimperative ithat icreates ia iduty iby ithe ipresence iof ia isanction iwhich
iwould ifollow iif ithere iis ian
incidence iof inon-compliance.8 i Command iis isomething iwhich iis iof isuch iimportance
ithat iit ican inever ibe idistinguished ifrom iduty iand isanction iand ithey ican iall ibe
iconsidered ito ibe ivaried iaspects iof ia isingle ievent. iWhere iever ithere iexists ia iduty,
ithere iwill ialso ibe ithe ipresence iof ia icommand; iwhile iwhere ithere iis ia icommand,
ithere ialso iis ia iduty. iThe iduty iarises ifrom ithe iexistence iof ipunishment ior isanction
iof isorts iwhich ifollow iin icase iof inon i-compliance ior iwhen ithere iis ia ibreach iof
iduty.

As ipointed iout iby iAustin, ithe ithree ikinds iof icommonly ite irmed ilaws ithat iare inot
iimperative, imeaning, ithey iare inot ilaws iproperly iso icalled ibut istill ithey ican
ijustifiably ibe iincluded iwithin ijurisprudence iare:

1. Declaratory ilaws i– iAustin, iin ithis ipoint, iconceded ithat iimperative irules imay ibe
ienacted iin ithe iguise iof iit ibeing iconsidered ia ideclaration. iThe ideclaratory ilaws
iare ithose iwhich ido inot igo ion ito iform inew iduties ibut ionly iclarify ior
iprovide ithe iinterpretation iof iexisting ilegal irelations.
2. Laws ibrought iin iorder ito irepeal ilaw- iThe iprocess iof irepealing isome ilaws imay
iimpose inew iduties ior ithey ican ieven igo ion ito irevive isome iof ithe iformer
ilaws. iAs iper iAustin, ithe iLaws ito irepeal ilaw iare inot iimperative icommands.
3. Laws iof iimperfect iobligation i– iAustin istated ithat ilaws iof iimperfect iobligation
iare ithose ilaws iwhich ido inot ihave iany isanctions iattached ifor itheir ibreach ior
ipunishment iwhich iwould ifollow iin icase iof ia inon-compliance. iAn
iillustration iof ilaws ifalling iunder ithis icategory iwould ibe: ithe istatutory iduty
iof ithe icity icouncil ito ikeep ithe istreets iclean iand itidy.
As iper iAustin’s idefinition, ithe ilaws icreating irights iand iliberties iare ilaws iproperly iso
icalled ias ithey iare iimperative iin inature. iThey iare iconsidered ias iimperative ias ithey
ihappen ito icreate iduties ithat iare icorrelative ion ithe ipart iof iother ipeople ito ioblige
ito.

Austin ialso iattempted ito ipoint iout ithe idifferences ibetween ipositive ilaw iand ipositive
imorality. iAs iper iAustin, imoral irules ithat iresemble ipositive ilaw imake iup ipositive
imorality.

8 John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence (2002, Vol. 1, Bloomsbury Academic) 135.

9Id.
10Austin, 1832: Lecture V, p. 163 (1995)
iThere iare ivarious irules iof ipositive imorality ithat iare ico-extensive iwith irules iof
ipositive ilaw. iFor iexample: irules iagainst ikilling isomeone, istealing, iraping,
iassaulting.

As iper iAustin, iwhenever ithere iis ia iconflict ibetween ipositive ilaw iand ipositive
imorality, ipositive ilaw iwould iprevail.9 iThough iAustin iwas ia iman iwho imaintained ithat
isovereign iis ibound ito iobey ithe idivine ilaw, ihe iconsidered iit ito ibe ia imoral iduty,
iand istated ithat ieven iif ithe isovereign iever ilegislated iagainst ithe idivine ilaw, iit iwill
istill ibe ithe ilaw. iAustin ifurther iadds ithat iany iother iview iin ithis iregard iwould inot
ionly ibe iwrong ibut iit iwould ibe ipernicious ias iit icould ilead ito ianarchy.10

Jeremy Bentham and the Principle of Utility

Jeremy iBentham, ithe iEnglish ijurist iand iphilosopher, iis iregarded ias ithe igreatest
ifigure iin ithe ihistory iof iBritish iLegal ipositivism. iIn isimple iterms, iBentham’s
idefinition iof ilaw ican ibe igiven ias ithe iwill iof ithe isovereign. iHe iwas iof ithe iopinion
ithat irules iwhich iare iderived iexclusively ifrom ithe icommands iof ia isovereign iauthority
iform ithe ilaw iof ithe iland. iTherefore, ihe istated ithat irules iwhich iare iderived ifrom
ithe iwill iof ithe isovereign iwould iproduce imore iclear ias iwell ias imore icertain ilaws
ithan ithe irules iwhich iare igenerated iwithin ia icommon ilaw isystem.11

Therefore, iaccording ito iJeremy iBentham, i‘law iis idefined ias ian iassemblage iof isigns ideclarative iof
ia ivolition iconceived ior iadopted iby ithe isovereign iin ia istate, iconcerning ithe iconduct ito ibe iobserved iin ia
icertain icase iby ia icertain iperson ior ia iclass iof ipersons, iwho iin ithe icase iin iquestion iare isubject
ito ihis ipower’.

Therefore, iBentham iclearly istates ithat ilaw, iwhich iis ithe iwill iof ithe isovereign,
iregulates ithe iconduct iof ithe ipeople ito iwhich iit iapplies. iTherefore, ithe ilaw iis
iwhat iis ilaid idown iby ithe isovereign. iThe ipeople iwho iare isubject ito ithe ilaw ihave
ito iregulate itheir iconduct iin iaccordance iwith ithis iwill iof ithe isovereign. iMoreover,
iBentham isays ithat ithe ilaw idoes inot ihave ito ibe iin iconsonance iwith ithe
iprinciples iof iethics. iTherefore, ilaw iis iwhatever iis ilaid idown iby ithe isovereign.

According ito ithe iBentham, ia isovereign iis ithe ihighest isuperior ibody iwhich idoes inot
iowe iany iobedience ito iany iother ibody. iIt iis ithe isovereign iwhich iclaims ihabitual
iobedience ifrom ithe ipeople iliving iin ia ipolitically iorganized igroup.12Therefore, ithe
isovereign idoes inot iowe iany iallegiance ito iany iother ibody ior igroup. iIt iis ithe iwill iof
ithis isovereign ibody iwhich iis iknown ias ilaw.

Bentham, ihowever, istates ithat ithe ipower iof ithe isovereign iis inot iabsolute ias iis ithe
iview iof iJohn iAustin. iBentham iis iof ithe iview ithat ithe ipower iof ithe isovereign ican ibe
ilimited ias iwell ias idivided. iTherefore, ihe iis iof ithe iopinion ithat ia isovereign ican, iby
ihis iown iwill, ilimit ihis iown ipowers iby ientering iinto iagreements iwith icertain iexternal
iagencies iwhich iwould iput irestriction ion ithe ipower iof ithe isovereign. iJeremy iBentham’s
iconcept iof isovereignty iis inot iabsolute iin inature iand ican ibe irestricted ito ia icertain
iextent.

Another iimportant ifeature iof ilaw iaccording ito iBentham iis ithat iit ishould ibe
ibacked iby isanctions.13 iTherefore, ithe iwill iof ithe isovereign imust ialways ibe ibacked iup
iby isanctions ifor iit ito ibecome ilaw. iBentham italked iabout ithe ipositive ias iwell ias
inegative iside iof isanctions, iunlike iAustin, iwho ionly italked iabout ithe inegative iside
iof iit. iBentham iwas iof ithe iview ithat irewards ishould ibe igiven ito ithe ipeople iwho
ifollow ithe ilaw iwhile ipunishments ishould ibe iinflicted iupon ithose iwho ibreak ithe
ilaw. iThis iwas ito iencourage ipeople ito ibe ilaw iabiding iand imoreover, idiscourage
ithem ito ibreak ithe ilaw.

Therefore, iaccording ito iBentham, ilaw iis ithe iwill iof ithe isovereign ibacked iby isanctions.

Principle of Utility
Jeremy iBentham ialso igave ihis ifamous itheory iof iutility. iAccording ito iBentham, iany
iperson iis igoverned iby itwo imasters, ithat iis, ipain iand ipleasure. iEvery iman iwants ito
iincrease ithe ipleasure iand idiminish ithe ipain. iTherefore, iany ilaw ishould ibe imade iby
ikeeping iin imind ithis itheory iof iutility. iEvery ilaw ishould ibe ipromulgated iby ithe
isovereign iin isuch ia iway ithat iit idiminishes ithe ipain iand imaximises ithe ipleasure iof
ithe ipeople iwho iwould ibe igoverned iby ithat iparticular ilaw. iTherefore, ievery ilaw
ishould ibe imeasured iby ithe iyardstick iof ipublic iutility, ithat iis, ihow imuch ipain iis iit
icausing ito ithe ipeople iand ihow imuch ipleasure iis ithe iperson igetting ifrom ithe ilaw.
iAny ilaw ishould iaim iat imaximising ipleasure iand iminimising ithe ipain iof ithe ipersons
iwhom iit igoverns.

Along iwith ithe iPrinciple iof iUtility, iJeremy iBentham iproposed ithe icodification iof iall
ithe ilaws iand istated ithat ithe iuncodified ibody iof irules ithat iwas ipart iof ithe iEnglish
iLaw iwas inot iworthy iof ibeing icalled ias ilaw.

Therefore, iJeremy iBentham iplayed ia icrucial irole iin ithe idevelopment iof ithe itheory
iof iLegal iPositivism.
11Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (2008, Read Books) 79.
12Supra at 7.
13Supra at 11
 Differences Between Austin and Bentham

Bentham iwas iagainst ithe iidea ithat iscriptures iwere ia isource iof ilaw; ihe ibelieved ithat
ithe iwill iof iGod iis iunknowable. iConversely, iAustin iregarded ithe ilaw iof iGod ias
irevealed iin ithe iscriptures ito ibe ia iprimary isource iof imoral irules.

The idefinition iof ithe iterm isovereignty ias iprovided iby iAustin italks iabout iexternal
iaspects ias iwell ias iinternal iaspects iof isovereignty iwhile ithe idefinition igiven iby
iBentham ispeaks ionly iabout iinternal iaspect iof isovereignty.

Austin ionly italks iabout ithe inegative iaspect iof ithe isanctions; ias iper iAustin, iyou iought
ito ifollow ithe ilaw, ibut iif iyou ihappen ito ibreak ithe ilaw, iyou iwill ibe ipunished
iaccordingly. iBentham ibelieved ithat ias ievery iman iwants ito iincrease ihis ipleasure iand
idiminish ipain iand ithus ito iencourage ipeople ito ibe imore ilaw iabiding iand idiscourage
ipeople ifrom ibreaking ithe ilaw ithere ishould ibe ithe iinclusion iof iawards ias iwell ias
ipunishment ifor ipeople idepending iupon itheir ibehaviour.

As iper iBentham, ia isovereign iby iits iown iwill, imay iput ilimits ion iits isovereignty iby
ientering iinto iagreements iwith iexternal iagencies, ibut iAustin iis iopposed ito ithis iplacing
iof ilimits ion isovereign’s ipowers iand idoes inot iallow ifor iit.

There iwas ianother isphere iwere iAustin ihad ia imajor idisagreement iwith iBentham.
iAs iper iBentham’s iideology, icourts ihave ino irole ito iplay iin ilegal idevelopment.
iHowever, iAustin ihad idifferent iideas. iAustin’s iutilitarianism ileads ihim iinto ithe
ibelief ithat ijudicial ilaw imaking iis inot ionly iinevitable ibut iis ialso ian iunequivocal
ipublic igood.

The icommon ilaw, ias idefined iby iAustin, iis ia ilaw imade iby ithe isovereigns ithrough itheir
idelegates iwho iare ithe ijudges. iAustin ireasoned ithat ijudges iare imere iagents iof ithe
isovereign, iauthorised ito iadjudicate idisputes iand ito isupply ia irule iwhere ithere iexists ia
irequirement iof ione. iAustin ihas ia icomplaint iagainst ithe ijudiciary inot ibecause iof itheir
iact iof ilegislating ibut ibecause iof itheir iact iof ilegislating itoo icautiously. iAustin, iunlike
iBentham, iaccepted ithe iprocess iof ijudicial ilaw imaking iand iconsidered iit ias
iimmensely ibeneficial iand ieven iabsolutely inecessary.14

14Supra at 10.
 Criticism of Austin and Bentham

The iview iof iJohn iAustin iand iJeremy iBentham ithat iLaw iis ithe icommand iof ithe
isovereign ibacked iby isanctions ihad icertain ishortcomings iand itherefore, iwas
icriticized ito ia icertain iextent.

According ito iJohn iAustin, ithe iSovereign iis isupreme iand iowes iallegiance ito
inobody ielse. iHowever, ithe iconcept iof iInternational iLaw iis ia irestriction ion ithe
iexternal isovereignty iof ithe ideterminate isuperior.The isovereign ihas ilimited ipowers idue
ito ithe irules, iregulations iand itreaties iwhich ifor ipart iof ithe iInternational iLaw.
iTherefore, ithe iidea ithat iSovereignty iis isupreme iand iabsolute iis ichallenged iby ithe
iconcept iof iInternational iLaw. iMoreover, ithe ifundamental irights igiven ito ithe ipeople
irestrict ithe ipowers iof ithe isovereign iand itherefore, iare ia ichallenge ito ithe iinternal
isovereignty iof ithe ideterminate isuperior. iThe isovereign ihas ito iexercise iits ipowers
iaccording ito ithe ifundamental irights iof ithe ipeople iand itherefore, ithe isovereign icannot
ibreach ithe irights iof ithe ipeople iwhile iexercising iits ipowers. iTherefore, ifundamental
irights ialso ichallenge ithe iabsolute icharacter iof isovereignty.

John iAustin iand iJeremy iBentham inever italked iabout ithe iconcept iof ia ilegal isystem,
iwhich ii is iprevalent ialmost iall iover ithe iworld iin ithe imodern iera. iThey ionly italked
iabout ithe iconcept iof ia isovereign iand ithe isovereign ibeing ithe isource iof ithe ilaws.
iThe iconcept iof ia ilegal isystem iwas inever idiscussed.

Moreover, ithe iidea iof ithe isovereign igiven iby iboth ithe ijurists igives irise ito ian
iautocratic iregime isince ithe isovereign iis isupreme iand ihas iabsolute ipowers. iSince ithe
isovereign idoes inot iowe iany iallegiance ito iany iother iperson ior igroup iof ipersons, iit
ihas ithe ipower ito iact ias iit iwants iand itherefore, ithere iare ino irestrictions ion ithe
ipowers iof ithe isovereign. iTherefore, ithe iconcept iof isovereign igave irise ito ithe iidea
iof iautocratic iregime.

One iof ithe iprimary ishortcomings iof ithe itwo ijurists iwas ithe ifact ithat ithey iregarde id
isanctions ias ithe ionly ibasis iof ilaw. iThey ibelieved ithat ithe iexistence iof ilaw iis inot
ipossible iwithout iit ibeing ibacked iby isanctions. iTherefore, iif ithe iwill iof ithe isovereign
iis inot ibacked iby isanctions, iit iwould inot ibe icalled ias ilaw.
 Legal Positivism: Indian Perspective

The itheory iof iLegal iPositivism ihas ibeen iused iby ithe ijudiciary iin iIndia iwhile ideciding
ilandmark icases. iTherefore, ithere ihave ibeen icases iin iIndia iwhere ithe ijudiciary ihas ibeen
iinfluenced iby ithe ilegal ipositivist ischool iwhile igiving ithe ijudgement. iTherefore, ithere
iare icases iwhere ithe ijudges ihave iinterpreted ithe ilaw ias ihas ibeen ilaid idown iby ithe
ilegislature. iTherefore, ithe ilegal ipositivist ischool ihas iplayed ia igreat irole iin ithe
iIndian iperspective ialso.

In ithe ilandmark ijudgement iof iA.K.Gopalan iv. iState iof iMadras15, ithe ipetitioner iwas
idetained iunder ithe iPreventive iDetention iAct. iThe ipetitioner ichallenged ithe
iconstitutionality iof ithe isaid iact ion ithe iground ithat ithe iact iinfringed iArticle i19 ias
iwell ias iArticle i21 iof ithe iConstitution iof iIndia. iThe iargument iput iforward iby ithe
ipetitioner iwas ithat ilaw inot ionly imeans i‘ ilex’ ibut ialso i‘jus’. iTherefore, ithe ilaw iis inot
ionly iwhat iis ilaid idown iby ithe ilegislature ibut ishould ialso ibe ijust iand ifair. iThe
iSupreme iCourt iupheld ithe ivalidity iof ithe iPreventive iDetention iAct ia ind istated ithat
ilaw iis i‘lex’ iand inot i‘jus’. iTherefore, iwhat iis ilaid idown iby ithe ilegislature iis ito ibe
iregarded ias ithe ilaw iof ithe iland ieven iif iit iis inot ijust. iThis ijudgement iclearly
ireflected ithe ithinking iof ithe ipositivist ischool.

Moreover, iin ithe icase iof iR.K.Garg iv. iUnion iof iIndia16, ifamously iknown ias ithe iBearer
iBond icase, ithe ilegislature, iwhich iis ithe isupreme iauthority iwhich iis ientrusted iwith ithe
ipower iof imaking ilaws, ipassed ia ilaw ithat iif iblack imoney iwas iinvested iin icertain
igovernment ibonds iwithin ia istipul iated iperiod iof itime, ithe igovernment iwould inot
iquestion iwith iregard ito ithe isource iof ithe iblack imoney. iThis ilaw iwas
ichallenged ion ithe iground iof iarbitrariness iunder iArticle i14 iof ithe iConstitution iof
iIndia17 iand iit iwas iargued ithat ithis iparticular ipiece iof ilegislation iwas iencouraging ithe
ievasion iof itaxes. iThe icourt iupheld ithe ivalidity iof ithe ilaw ias iit iis iand isaid ithat
ithere iis ian iintelligible idifferentia ibetween ithose iwho iinvest iin ibonds iand ithose
iwho ido inot. iMoreover, iit iapplied ithe iDoctrine iof iPith iand iSubstance18, iand istated
ithat ithe ipurpose iof ithe ilegislation iwas inot ito iencourage ithe ievasion iof ithe itaxes ibut
ito iuse ithe iblack imoney ifor iproductive ipurposes. iTherefore, ithe ilaw ias iit iis iwas
iheld ito ibe ivalid iby ithe iSupreme iCourt.

Moreover, ithe itheory iof ilegal ipositivism iwas ialso iapplied iby ithe iapex icourt iin ithe
icase iof iJolly iGeorge iVerghese iv. iThe iBank iof iCochin19, iwere ia ilaw iwhich istated ithat
ithere iwould ibe iimprisonment iin icase ia iperson ifails ito irepay ia idebt iwas iheld ito ibe
ivalid iby ithe iSupreme iCourt idespite iit ibeing iagainst ithe iUnited iNation iConvention.
iTherefore, ithe iSupreme iCourt ianalysed ithe ilaw ias ilaid idown iby ithe ilegislature iand
igave ithe idecision.
Therefore, iin iall ithe iabove icases, ithe icourt idid inot ilook iinto ithe imatter iwhether ithe
ilaw iis ijust ior inot; iit ionly iconsidered iwhat ithe ilaw iis. iTherefore, ithe ithinking iof ithe
iLegal iPositivist iSchool ihas ibeen iincorporated iby ithe iIndian iJudges iwhile igiving
ijudgements iand itherefore, ilegal ipositivism iplays ia icrucial irole iin ithe iIndian
icontext ias iwell.

15A.K.Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27.

16R.K.Garg v. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 1559.
17E.P.Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC
555. 18State of Bombay v. F.N.Balsara, AIR 1951 SC
318.
19Jolly George Verghese v.The Bank of Cochin, AIR 1980 SC 470.
 Conclusion

Legal iPositivism, ias iwe ihave ialready iseen, iis ione iof ithe imost iinfluential
ischools iin ithe ijurisprudence iof ilaw iand irelies ion ithe ilaw ias ia ifact. iThe ijurists iof ithis
ischool ionly ianalyse ithe ila iw ias iit iis iand ido inot iconsider ihow iit ishould ihave ibeen.
iAccording ito ithe iviews iof igreat ijurists isuch ias iJohn iAustin iand iJeremy iBentham, ithe
imoral iprinciples ido inot idetermine ithe ilaw iof ithe iland. iHowever, ithere iare icertain
ipositivists iwho ido ibelieve iin ithe iexistence iof ithe iprinciples iof iethics iand imorality
iand imoreover, ithey iare iof ithe iopinion ithat ithese imoral iprinciples iare iresponsible, ito
isome iextent, iin ishaping ithe ilaws. iTherefore, iit ican ibe iclearly iseen ithat ialthough ithe
ioverall iidea iof ithe ijurists iof ithis ischool iis isimilar, ibut icertain idifferences iin itheir
ithinking idoes iexist. iThe icommon inotion iof iall ithe ijurists ibelonging ito ithe iLegal
iPositivist iSchool iis ithat ilaw iis iwhat iis ilaid idown iby ithe isuperior iand ibacked iby
isanctions. iMoreover, ithey iare iof ithe icommon iopinion ithat ithe imoral iprinciples iare
inot ito ibe itaken iinto iaccount iwhile ijudging ithe ivalidity iof ilaws. iAll ilaws iare ivalid
iwhich iflow ifrom ithe ideterminate isuperior iand iis ibacked iby isanctions.

However, ithere iare icertain ishortcomings iof ithe iLegal iPositivist iSchool isuch ias
iit ifails ito ielucidate iupon iany ikind iof ilegal isystem iand isees isanctions ias ithe ionly
ibasis iof ilaw. iMoreover, ithe iconcept iof iabsolute isovereignty igiven iby iJohn iAustin iis
ichallenged iby iInternational iLaw ias iwell ias ifundamental irights ithat iare iavailable
iwith ithe iindividuals.

Although ithere iare icertain ilimitations, iLegal iPositivism iis iregarded ias ithe imost
iinfluential ischool iof ithought iin ijurisprudence.
 References

1. The Concept of Law, H.L.A.Hart.

2. Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, H.L.A.Hart.
3. Law, Liberty and Morality, H.L.A.Hart.
4. The Philosophy of Positive Law, R.Campbell.
5. The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, John Austin.
6. Lectures on Jurisprudence, John Austin.
7. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Jeremy Bentham.