CASES FROM THE SYLLABUS

• BELEN V BELEN
related canons:
Section 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
Section 8. Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance their private
interests, or those of a member of their family or of anyone else, nor shall they convey or
permit others to convey the impression that anyone is in a special position improperly to
influence them in the performance of judicial duties.

The respondent judge wrote letters to several government authorities and employees to
secure public information regarding the complainant’s piggery and poultry business.

In writing these letters, respondent judge’s use of his personal stationery with letterhead
indicating that he is the Presiding Judge of RTC, and stating that the letter was “from [his]
chambers,” clearly manifests that respondent judge was trying to use the prestige of his office
to influence said government officials and employees, and to achieve with prompt and ease the
purpose for which those letters were written.

• MACIAS V MACIAS
related canon:
Section 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions
that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and
willingly. In particular, judges conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the
dignity of the judicial office.

The respondent judge was seen having dinner with his alleged paramour and entering a
bedroom with her may not satisfactorily prove the charge of immorality, but this act certainly
suggested an appearance of impropriety, since the respondent judge was a married man and
such behavior undeniably constituted unbecoming conduct; the circumstances affects not only
the reputation of Judge Macias himself but the image and reputation of the whole judiciary as
well.

• BURIAS V VALENCIA
Section 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.

Respondent judge borrowed money from the complainant during the pendency of the case.

OTHER RELEVANT CASES

• LORENZANA V AUSTRIA
She displayed her photographs in a social networking website called "Friendster" and posted
her personal details as an RTC Judge, allegedly for the purpose of finding a compatible
partner. She also posed with her upper body barely covered by a shawl, allegedly suggesting
that nothing was worn underneath except probably a brassiere.

• AREVALO V MANTUA
Respondent used the Hall of Justice as his residence and openly brought his mistress in court
as observed by his staff, especially by a former Utility Worker of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
the same station, Dyndee Nuñez; used the court process server, Benjamin Pepito, as his
personal driver; delegated his work load to his legal researcher, Atty. Elmer Mape, because he
could no longer attend to the same due to his many vice.

• MERCELO V BARCILLANO
Respondent judge’s act of demanding for complainant's firearms and ARE in an aggressive
manner effectively harassed the already nervous police officer.

• LOPEZ V LUCMAYON
The respondent’s acts of: (1) making the complainant sign at least 2 documents – consisting of
SPA and Waiver of Rights – without the presence of a counsel; and (2) allowing the notarization
of the documents outside the presence of the executor.

• DECENA V MALANYAON
During a hearing of a case, Judge Malanyaon sat beside his daughter, Atty. Ma. Kristina
Malanyaon, the counsel of Dr. Amelita. During the early stage of the hearing, Judge Malanyaon
coached his daughter in making manifestations/motions before the hearing officer, by
scribbling on some piece of paper and giving the same to the former, thus prompting her
daughter to rise from her seat and/or ask permission from the officer to speak, and then make
some manifestations while reading or glancing on the paper given by Judge Malanyaon.

[3H1819 CASE DIGESTS DOCTRINES]

Propriety

Lorenzana v. Austria AM No. RTJ-09-2200 April 2, 2004

Quick facts:

She displayed her photographs in a social networking website called "Friendster" and posted
her personal details as an RTC Judge, allegedly for the purpose of finding a compatible partner.
She also posed with her upper body barely covered by a shawl, allegedly suggesting that nothing
was worn underneath except probably a brassiere.

While judges are not prohibited from becoming members of and from taking
part in social networking activities, they do not thereby shed off their status as
judges. They carry with them in cyberspace the same ethical responsibilities
and duties that every judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday activities.
In communicating through social networks, judges must bear in mind that what
they communicate – regardless of whether it is a personal matter or part of his
or her judicial duties – creates and contributes to the people’s opinion not just
of the judge but of the entire Judiciary. As the visible personification of law and
justice, judges are held to higher standards of conduct and thus must
accordingly conduct themselves. Judges necessarily accept this standard of
conduct when they take their oath of office as magistrates.

Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that

judges are entitled to freedom of expression but in the exercise thereof, they
should always conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of
the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary.

168. Arevalo v. Mantua AM No. RTJ-13-2760 November 19, 2014

SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92 explicitly states that the Halls of Justice
may only be used for functions related to the administration of justice and for
no other purpose. The Halls of Justice may be used only for purposes directly
related to the functioning and operation of the courts of justice, and may not be
devoted to any other use, least of all as residential quarters of the judges or
court personnel, or for carrying on therein any trade or progession.

Immorality has been defined "to include not only sexual matters but also
conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency,
depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct
showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the
community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public
welfare." There is no doubt that engaging in an extra marital affair is not only a
violation of the moral standards expected of the members and employees of
the judiciary but is also a desecration of the sanctity of the institution of
marriage.

169. Re: Anonymous Letter Complaint v. Samson AM No.MTJ-16-1870

June 6, 2017

CANON 2 - A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND APPEARANCE

OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES

Rule 2.01 - A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public

confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. xxx

Rule 2.03 - A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to
influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not
be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit
others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence
the judge.

170. Mercelo v. Barcillano AM No. RTJ-16-2450 June 7, 2017

Motives behind the filing of an administrative complaint are irrelevant. That a

complaint is alleged to be instigated or retaliatory is not a ground which will
deter the Supreme Court from exercising its power to discipline officers of the
court.

Regardless of the reason or motive behind the altercation, Judge Barcillano,

being a magistrate, should have observed judicial temperament which requires
him to be always temperate, patient, and courteous, both in conduct and in
language
[3B1819 CASE DIGESTS]

A.M. No. MTJ-13-1837 September 24, 2014 CONRADO ABE LOPEZ vs. JUDGE
ROGELIO S. LUCMAYON

Conrado Lopez alleged that he inherited from his adop4ve father, Res4tuto
Lopez, Lot 1696 that became the object of an extrajudicial se@lement
involving him, his adop4ve mother and the rela4ves of Judge Lucmayon.
Some4me in October 2004, he and the judge met wherein the la@er allegedly
deceived him into signing an SPA to process the sale of Lot 1696 to Aboi4z
Group of Company. Unknown to the complainant, the said SPA contained at
the bo@om por4on, a so-called "Waiver of Rights" that the respondent had
decep4vely inserted. ARer signing the document (notarized by a certain A@y.
Arturo Mata without the complainant’s presence), the respondent allegedly
told the complainant that he no longer had any right over the property. In
March 2005, the father of the respondent, Pedro Lucmayon, ordered him to
cease cul4va4ng the land because of the Waiver of Rights in the SPA he
signed.

The complainant also asserted that the respondent had caused Pedro and his
siblings to execute a document en4tled "Supplemental Extrajudicial
Se@lement of the Estate of Moises Legaspino and Victoria Lopez" to the
damage and prejudice of the complainant and his adop4ve mother. He alleged
that in the extrajudicial se@lement, his name and the name of his adop4ve
mother were excluded.

The respondent stated that the signing of the Waiver of Rights was done aRer
he discovered that the complainant was not legally adopted. He added that
since there had been no legal adop4on, the complainant could not be
considered as a legal heir and was not en4tled to any por4on of the land.

ISSUE: WON Judge Lucmayon is guilty of acts of impropriety

HELD: YES. On the charge of impropriety, we have repeatedly reminded

members of the Judiciary to keep their conduct beyond reproach and
suspicion, and to be free from any appearance of impropriety in their personal
behavior, both in the discharge of their official du4es and in their everyday
lives.

The respondent’s acts of: (1) making the complainant sign at least 2
documents – consis4ng of SPA and Waiver of Rights – without the presence of
a counsel; and (2) allowing the notariza4on of the documents outside the
presence of the executor, amount to impropriety. While no evidence directly
shows that the respondent had deceived the complainant into signing these
documents, this Court cannot ignore the fact that the documents the
respondent himself prepared greatly prejudiced the complainant. We also
note that the Waiver of Rights benefi@ed the respondent and his family. As a
judge who is more learned in the law than the complainant, the respondent,
at the very least should have taken the appropriate steps (e.g. advise the
former to engage the services of a lawyer who could lend him unbiased legal
advice regarding the legal effects of the waiver) to avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in his dealings. In these lights, the Court finds the
respondent guilty of impropriety.

As a general rule, a judge is prohibited from serving as executor, administrator,

trustee, guardian or other fiduciary. The only excep4on to this rule as set forth
in Rule 5.06 is when the estate or trust belongs to, or the ward is a member of
his immediate family, and only if his service as executor, administrator, trustee,
guardian or fiduciary will not interfere with the proper performance of his
judicial du4es. The Code defines "immediate family" as being limited to the
spouse and rela4ves within the second degree of consanguinity. In this case,
since complainant clearly does not fall under respondent’s "immediate family"
as herein defined, the la@er’s appointment as the former’s a@orney-in-fact is
not a valid excep4on to the rule.

A.M. No. RTJ-10-2217 April 8, 2013 SONIA C. DECENA vs. JUDGE NILO A.
MALANYAON

FACTS: The complainants allege that Rey Decena brought an administra4ve

case before the CSC against Judge Malanyaon’s wife, Dr. Amelita. During the
hearing of said case, Judge Malanyaon sat beside his daughter, A@y. Ma.
Kris4na Malanyaon, the counsel of Dr. Amelita. During the early stage of the
hearing, Judge Malanyaon coached his daughter in making manifesta4ons/
mo4ons before the hearing officer, by scribbling on some piece of paper and
giving the same to the former, thus promp4ng her daughter to rise from her
seat and/or ask permission from the officer to speak, and then make some
manifesta4ons while reading or glancing on the paper given by Judge
Malanyaon.

When the complainants’ counsel inquired regarding his personality, he proudly

introduced himself and manifested that he was the "counsel of the
respondent’s counsel.” He asked that he be shown a rule which prohibits him
from sijng with his daughter and insisted that he was merely assis4ng his
daughter, who just passed the bar, defend the respondent, and was likewise
helping the la@er defend herself. He also replied “And so what?” when he was
asked about his personality to sit at the counsel’s table.

The complainants filed an administra4ve complaint for conduct unbecoming

of a judge against Judge Malanyaon. He filed a comment thereto, reitera4ng
most of what he said during the hearing and alleging that he had previously
helped complainants regarding legal ma@ers but the la@er did not complain.
The court administrator recommended to the court that the judge be found
guilty of gross misconduct. Judge Malanyaon was unable to submit his
compliance because he suffered a stroke. ThereaRer, his wife submi@ed an
urgent mo4on to dismiss, claiming that her husband has already been
pronounced permanently mentally impaired and thus cannot defend himself
anymore.

ISSUE: WON the judge’s acts cons4tute conduct unbecoming of a judge

HELD: YES. Sec. 35 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibits sijng
judges like Judge Malanyaon from engaging in the private prac4ce of law or
giving professional advice to clients. Sec4on 11, Canon 4 (Propriety), of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct and Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
reiterate the prohibi4on from engaging in the private prac4ce of law or giving
professional advice to clients. The prohibi4on is based on sound reasons of
public policy, considering that the rights, du4es, privileges and func4ons of the
office of an a@orney are inherently incompa4ble with the high official
func4ons, du4es, powers, discre4on and privileges of a sijng judge. It also
aims to ensure that judges give their full 4me and a@en4on to their judicial
du4es, prevent them from extending favors to their own private interests, and
assure the public of their impar4ality in the performance of their func4ons.
These objec4ves are dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to
promote the public interest.

Thus, an a@orney who accepts an appointment to the Bench must accept that
his right to prac4ce law as a member of the Philippine Bar is thereby
suspended, and it shall con4nue to be so suspended for the en4re period of
his incumbency as a judge. To the Court, Judge Malanyaon engaged in the
private prac4ce of law by assis4ng his daughter at his wife’s administra4ve
case, coaching his daughter in making manifesta4ons or posing mo4ons to the
hearing officer, and preparing the ques4ons that he prompted to his daughter.

A judge may not involve himself in any ac4vity that is an aspect of the private
prac4ce of law. His acceptance of an appointment to the Bench inhibits him
from engaging in the private prac4ce of law, regardless of the beneficiary of
the ac4vity being a member of his immediate family.
[LAST MINUTE REVIEWER]

PROPRIETY
Out-of-Court Settlements: A judge is the visible representation of the law. Thus, he
must behave, at all times, in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can
withstand the most searching public scrutiny. The ethical principles and sense of
propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the people's faith in the judicial
system. Because of the meeting, and the subsequent orders issued after the meeting,
respondent Judge Rubia violated the notions of propriety required of his office.
Respondents have relentlessly stood by their position that the meeting was a chance
encounter, and, thus, no impropriety could be attributed to the meeting itself (Sison-
Barias v Rubia).
Legal Basis in Answering: CANON 2 (INTEGRITY): Integrity is essential not only to
the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of
judges.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in
the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be
seen to be done.
CANON 3 (IMPARTIALITY): Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the
judicial office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which
the decision is made.
SEC. 1. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias or prejudice.
CANON 4 (PROPRIETY): Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential
to the performance of all the activities of a judge.
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities.
Gross Immoral Conduct (Bigamy, Womanizing, Gambling, Bribery, etc.): A judge's
official conduct and his behavior in the performance of judicial duties should be free
from the appearance of impropriety and must be beyond reproach. One who occupies
an exalted position in the administration of justice must pay a high price for the honor
bestowed upon him, for his private as well as his official conduct must at all times be
free from the appearance of impropriety. Because appearance is as important as reality
in the performance of judicial functions, like Caesar's wife, a judge must not only be
pure but also beyond suspicion.
Legal Basis in Answering: CANON 2 (INTEGRITY): Integrity is essential not only to
the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of
judges.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in
the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be
seen to be done.
CANON 4 (PROPRIETY): Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential
to the performance of all the activities of a judge.
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities.
Freedom of Expression: Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of
expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall
always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial
office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.
The inclusion of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions was never denied by
Judge Paredes who merely justified his action by invoking his right to freedom of
expression. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that
judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression. Such right,
however, is not without limitation. Section 6, Canon 4 of the Code also imposes a
correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they
should always conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial
office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary. In the exercise of his right
to freedom of expression, a judge should uphold the good image of the Judiciary of
which he is a part. He should have avoided unnecessary and uncalled for remarks in
his discussions and should have been more circumspect in his language. Being a
judge, he is expected to act with greater circumspection and to speak with self-restraint
(Tormis v Paredes).
In using social-networking sites, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to discuss the
propriety of using such by a member of the judiciary in the case of Lorenzana v Austria.
While judges are not prohibited from becoming members of and from taking part in
social networking activities, we remind them that they do not thereby shed off their
status as judges. They carry with them in cyberspace the same ethical responsibilities
and duties that every judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday activities. It is in
this light that we judge the respondent in the charge of impropriety when she posted her
pictures in a manner viewable by the public.
Lest this rule be misunderstood, the New Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit a
judge from joining or maintaining an account in a social networking site such as
Friendster. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that
judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression. This right "includes
the freedom to hold opinions without interference and impart information and ideas
through any media regardless of frontiers." Joining a social networking site is an
exercise of one’s freedom of expression. The respondent judge’s act of joining
Friendster is, therefore, per se not violative of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
In communicating and socializing through social networks, judges must bear in mind
that what they communicate – regardless of whether it is a personal matter or part of his
or her judicial duties – creates and contributes to the people’s opinion not just of the
judge but of the entire Judiciary of which he or she is a part. This is especially true when
the posts the judge makes are viewable not only by his or her family and close friends,
but by acquaintances and the general public.
Thus, it may be acceptable for the respondent to show a picture of herself in the attire
she wore to her family and close friends, but when she made this picture available for
public consumption, she placed herself in a situation where she, and the status she
holds as a judge, may be the object of the public’s criticism and ridicule. The nature of
cyber communications,
particularly its speedy and wide-scale character, renders this rule necessary.
We are not also unaware that the respondent’s act of posting her photos would seem
harmless and inoffensive had this act been done by an ordinary member of the public.
As the visible personification of law and justice, however, judges are held to higher
standards of conduct and thus must accordingly comport themselves.
Legal Basis in Answering: CANON 2 (INTEGRITY): Integrity is essential not only to
the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of
judges.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in
the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be
seen to be done.
CANON 4 (PROPRIETY): Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential
to the performance of all the activities of a judge.
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities.
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal
restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do
so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is
consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
SEC. 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression,
belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always
conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial
office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.
Personal Use of Property of the Judiciary: SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92
explicitly states that the Halls of Justice may only be used for functions related to the
administration of justice and for no other purpose:
All judges and court personnel are hereby reminded that the Halls of Justice may be
used only for purposes directly related to the functioning and operation of the courts of
justice, and may not be devoted to any other use, least of all as residential quarters of
the judges or court personnel, or for carrying on therein any trade or profession (Feh-
Arevalo v Mantua).
Legal Basis in Answering: CANON 2 (INTEGRITY): Integrity is essential not only to
the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of
judges.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in
the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be
seen to be done.
CANON 4 (PROPRIETY): Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential
to the performance of all the activities of a judge.
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities.
CANON 13 - A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND
REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES
THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE COURT.
[AGPALO SUMMARY 5-19]

AVOIDING IMPROPRIETY OR APPEARANCE THEREOF

Considerations:

1. A judge should be free from impropriety and appearance thereof 2. A
judge should exhibit the cold neutrality of impartial judge.

3. Judge’s demeanor in social functions

- He should in pending or prospective litigation before him, be

scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to
waken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships
constitute an element in determining his judicial action

“Judge’s family” includes a judge’s spouse, son, daughter, son-in- law, daughter-inlaw,
and any other relative by consanguinity or affinity within the sixth civil degree, or person
who is a companion or employee of the judge and who lives in the judge’s household.
ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN DISCHARGE OF JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS
Considerations:
1. Personal or private relations


- The personal behavior of a judge, not only upon the bench but also in
his everyday life, should be above reproach and free from the
appearance of impropriety. He should maintain high ethical principles
and sense of propriety without which he cannot preserve the faith of the
people in the judiciary, so indispensable in an orderly society.

2. Judge should not practice law.


- A judge should not practice law. Section 35, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court prohibits a judge from engaging in private
practice as a member of the bar or giving professional advice to clients.
The prohibition is based on sound reasons of public policy, for there is
no question that the rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office
of an attomey-at-law are so inherently incompatible with the high judicial
functions, duties, powers, discretions and privileges of a judge.
3. Personal investments.

- A judge should abstain from making personal investments in
enterprises which are apt to be involved in litigation in his court; and,
after accession to the bench, he should not retain such investments
previously made, longer than a period sufficient to enable him to
dispose of them without serious loss.
4. Prohibited acts and transactions (memorize, sir asked about
this)
- Section 7 of RA 6713 prohibits public officers from undertaking certain
business transactions or doing certain acts which may compromise his
position as a public official. This provision applies to judges. Section 7
of RA 6713 reads in part:

o “Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. — In addition to acts and

omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the
Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited
acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are
hereby declared to be unlawful.
(a) Financial and material interest. — Public officials and employees
shall not, directly or indirectly, have any financial or material interest in
any transaction requiring the approval of their office.
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. — Public
officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:
(1) Own, control, manage or accept employment as officer, employee,
consultant, counsel, broker, agent, trustee or nominee in any private
enterprise related, supervised or licensed by their office unless
expressly allowed by law;
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized
by the Constitution or by law, provided that such practice will not conflict
or tend to conflict with their official functions; or
(3) Recommend any person to any position in a private enterprise which
has a regular or pending official transaction with their office.
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year
after resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except in
the case of subparagraph (b)(2) above, but the professional concerned
cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter before the
office he used to be in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise
apply.
5. Restriction against accepting certain employment.

- The restriction against a public official from using his public position as
a vehicle to promote or advance his private interests extends beyond
his tenure on certain matters in which he intervened as a public official.

-
6. Prohibition against soliciting gifts. (ito rin memorize)

• - A judge should not accept any presents or favors from

litigants 

or from lawyers practicing before him. 


• - Section 7(d) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and 


employees from soliciting or accepting gifts, thus: 

(d) Solicitation or acceptance of gifts. — Public officials and
employees shall not solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, any gift,
gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of money 


value from any person in the course of their official duties or in

connection with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction
which may be affected by the functions of their office.
As to gifts or grants from foreign governments, the Congress consents
to —
(i) The acceptance and retention by a public official or employee of a gift
of nominal value tendered and received as a souvenir or mark of
courtesy;

(ii) The acceptance by a public official or employee of a gift in the nature
of a scholarship or fellowship grant or medical treatment; or
(iii) The acceptance by a public official or employee of travel grants or
expenses for travel taking place entirely outside the Philippines (such as
allowances, transportation, food and lodging) of more than nominal
value if such acceptance is appropriate or consistent with the interest of
the Philippines, and permitted by the head of office, branch or agency to
which he belongs
7. Restriction against using public office to promote private
interest. 


8. Financial disclosure and divestment. 


- A judge must file his Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Networth:

(a) Within thirty (30) days after assumption of office;

(b) On or before April 30, of every year thereafter; and

(c) Within thirty (30) days after separation from the service.
9. Prohibition against partisan political activities.

- The 1987 Constitution provides that “no officer or employee in the civil
service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or
partisan political activity.”

10. Municipal Judge acting as notary public.

- Municipal judges may not engage in notarial work except as notaries

public ex-officio. As notaries public ex-officio, they may engage only in
the notarization of documents connected with the exercise of their
official functions. They may not, as such notaries public ex-officio,
undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of private documents,
contracts and other acts of conveyances, and pleadings, which bear no
relation to the performance of their functions as judges as they
constitute practice of law.

- However, in far-flung municipalities which have neither lawyers nor

notaries public, municipal judges assigned to those municipalities or
circuits may, in their capacity as notaries public ex-officio, perform any
act within the competence of a regular notary public provided that:
(a) all notarial fees charged be for the account of the Government and
turned over to the municipal treasurer, and

(b) a certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to the
lack of any lawyer or notary public in such municipality or circuit.
A judge who does not turn over the notarial fees to the municipal
treasurer and makes no attestation of lack of any lawyer or notary public
in the place will be disciplined for violation of the rule on the matter.

CANON 4
Propriety

What is “propriety”? Propriety is defined as correct moral behavior or actions; it is behavior that
is accepted as socially or morally correct and proper.

Thus, per the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge is to observe propriety and appearance of
propriety in the performace of all activities. Judges or Justices are held to a higher standard for
they should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence, hence, their conduct
should be above reproach. To quote:

CANON 4: Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of
all the activities of a judge.

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities.

The reason for this is that such exacting standard of decorum is demanded from judges to
promote public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. The public holds judges to higher
standards of integrity and ethical conduct than lawyers and other persons not invested with
public trust.

It must be noted that what the Code prohibits is not only actual impropriety but even the mere
appearance of impropriety. The slightest appearance of impropriety/wrongdoing or misconduct
by a judge may still lead people to believe dishonesty was done.

It can be said that there is an appearance of impropriety when the conduct of a judge would, in
reasonable minds, create a perception that the judge’s ability to carry out judicial responsibilities
with integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired. Attention should also be given to
conduct/acts done by a judge which are not illegal but may still constitute a violation of this rule.
CASE: Belen vs. Belen, 627 SCRA 1

In the case of Belen vs. Belen, the respondent judge wrote letters to several government
authorities and employees to secure public information regarding the complainant’s piggery and
poultry business; to inform addressees of the laws allegedly being violated by complainant; and
to remind the addressees of their duties as government officials or employees and warn them of
the possible legal effects of neglect of public duties.

In writing these letters, respondent judge’s use of his personal stationery with letterhead
indicating that he is the Presiding Judge of RTC, and stating that the letter was “from [his]
chambers,” clearly manifests that respondent judge was trying to use the prestige of his office to
influence said government officials and employees, and to achieve with prompt and ease the
purpose for which those letters were written. In other words, respondent judge used said
letterhead to promote his personal interest.

*while respondent judge did not actually use the court’s official letterhead but his own personal
stationery, his letters indicated that he is the presiding judge of an RTC in Calamba City, and
even stated that his letters were “from the chambers of” the presiding judge. It is apparent from
the acts of respondent judge that he intended to use the prestige of his judicial position to
promote his personal interest.

Citing the case of Ladignon v. Garong: “use of the letterhead and his designation as a Judge in a
situation of potential dispute gave “the appearance that there is an implied or assured consent of
the court to his cause.” This circumstance, to our mind, was what marked the respondent Judge’s
use of his letterhead and title as improper. In other words, the respondent Judge’s transgression
was not per se in the use of the letterhead, but in not being very careful and discerning in
considering the circumstances surrounding the use of his letterhead and his title. The use of a
letterhead should not be considered independently of the surrounding circumstances of the use—
the underlying reason that marks the use with the element of “impropriety” or “appearance of
impropriety”.

CASE: Burias vs. Valencia, 581 Scra 24

In Burias vs Valencia, respondent judge borrowed money from the complainant during the
pendency of the case. The impression that the judge would rule in favor of complainant because
he is indebted to the latter is what the Court sought to avoid. Again, judges as models of law and
justice are mandated to avoid not only impropriety, but also the appearance of impropriety,
because their conduct affects the people’s faith and confidence in the entire judicial system.

SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal

restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so
freely and willingly. In particular, judges conduct themselves in a way that is consistent
with the dignity of the judicial office.
Dignified conduct is best described as conduct befitting men and women possessed of
temperance and respect for the law and for others.

Note: In every litigation, the manner and attitude of a judge are crucial to everyone concerned. It
is not for him to indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to the at-times human failing
of yielding to first impressions. He is to refrain from reaching hasty conclusions or prejudging
matters. It would be deplorable if he lays himself open to the suspicion of reacting to feelings
rather than to facts, of being imprisoned in the net of his own sympathies and predilections. His
language, both written and spoken, must be guarded and measured, lest the best intentions be
misconstrued. He should avoid such action as would subject him to suspicion of interest in a case
in his court. It is of utmost importance that a judge must preserve the trust and confidence
reposed in him by the parties as an impartial, unbiased and dispassionate dispenser of justice.
When he conducts himself in a manner that gives rise, fairly or unfairly, to perceptions of bias,
such faith and confidence are eroded. His decisions, whether right or wrong, will always be
under suspicion of irregularity.

CASE: Macias Vs. Macias, 601 Scra 203

Where there is testimony to the effect that the respondent judge was seen having dinner with his
alleged paramour and entering a bedroom with her may not satisfactorily prove the charge of
immorality, but this act certainly suggested an appearance of impropriety, since the respondent
judge was a married man and such behavior undeniably constituted unbecoming conduct; the
circumstances affects not only the reputation of Judge Macias himself but the image and
reputation of the whole judiciary as well.
*Roel Mutia’s (witness hired by complainant’s (Judge’s wife) son) testimony.

CASE: Lorenzana v Austria, AM No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014

In the case of Lorenzana vs. Austria, judge was prohibited from posting a photo of herself
wearing a suggested dress like “off-shouldered” dress and making this available for public
viewing. In communicating and socializing through social networks, judges must bear in mind
that what they communicate regardless of whether it is a personal matter or part of his or her
judicial duties – creates and contributes to the people’s opinion not just of the judge but of the
entire Judiciary of which he or she is a part. This is especially true when the posts the judge
makes are viewable not only by his or her family and close friends, but by acquaintances and the
general public.

SECTION 3. Judges shall, in their personal relations with individual members of the legal
profession who practice regularly in their court, avoid situations which might reasonably
give rise to the suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality.

CASE: Padilla v Zantua, Jr., AM No. MTJ-93-888, Oct. 24, 1994

A judge seen eating and drinking in public places with the lawyer who has cases pending in his
or her sala, public suspicion may be aroused does tending to a road the trust of litigants in the
impartiality of the judge.

SECTION 4. Judges shall not participate in the determination of a case in which any
member of their family represents a litigant or is associated in any manner with the case.

CASE: Ortiz v Jaculbe, AM No RTJ-04-1833, June 28, 2005

The moment the judge’s son-in-law entered his appearance as counsel for the plaintiff in a case
he was presiding, it was imperative upon him to forthwith disqualify himself and have the case
re-raffled to another branch.

SECTION 5. Judges shall not allow the use of their residence by a member of the legal
profession to receive clients of the latter or of other members of the legal profession.

Such scenario will create the wrong impression that the judge and the lawyer are partners in
practice of law or that they are intimate with one another which perceived intimacy will
adversely affect the presumed impartiality of the judge should the lawyer have a case before him.

CASE: J. King & Sons v. Hontanosas [Adm. Matter No. RTJ-03-1802 : September 21, 2004]

It is grossly improper for a judge to meet with a litigant at his home and to frequent the karaoke
bar owned by such litigant, enjoying the use thereof for free.

SECTION 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief,
association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct
themselves
in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the judiciary.

Judges, in the exercise of their civil liberties should be circumspect and ever mindful of their
continuing commitment to uphold the judiciary and its values places upon them certain implied
restraints to their freedom.

CASE: Galang vs. Judge Santos [A.M. No. MTJ-99-1197. May 26, 1999]

The judge as a columnist caused the publication of his works:

I will not seek the annointment of Lito Lapid. Who is he anyway? A nice book with nothing in
between the covers? May pride yata ako. [If I were Bren Z. Guiao, Sun Star Clark, Dec. 2, 1996,
p. 5]
To all those who, supported this maiden issue of the Mirror, Salamat po! To those who did not,
like PROVINCIAL LAWYER BENJIE GALANG, mas maraming salamat!!! [The Mirror, Aug. 19-
Sept. 4, 1996, p. 3]

Respondent judge holds sensitive and demanding positions at The Mirror. Not only does he act
as its contributor or columnist, he is also its publisher, editor and legal adviser.

There is a difference between freedom of expression and compromising the dignity of the Court
through publications of emotional outbursts and destructive criticisms. Respondents writing of
active and vicious editorials compromises his duties as judge in the impartial administration of
justice, for his views printed on newspapers reflect on his office as well as on the public officers
that he challenges.

CASE: Also Lorenzana v Austria, AM No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014

Respondent posted her personal details as an RTC Judge, allegedly for the purpose of finding a
compatible partner. She also posed with her upper body barely covered by a shawl, allegedly
suggesting that nothing was worn underneath except probably a brassiere.

A judge is not prohibited from joining or maintaining an account in a social networking sites
such as Friendster. However, Section 6 Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct also
imposes a correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they
should always conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office in
the impartial independence of the judiciary.

SECTION 7. Judges shall inform themselves about their personal fiduciary financial
interests and shall make reasonable efforts to be informed about the financial interests of
members of their family.

This section direct stretches to keep themselves well informed of their financial standing, so that
they can make better adjustments on their family expense if things are not going well. The rule
is to situate the judges away from the temptations of corruption. By knowing the financial
standing of the family, judges will not be taken by surprise when financial crisis emerges.

This section of the New Code of Judicial Conduct should be read in conjunction with Section
7(a) and (b) of R.A. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees):
1. Public officials and employees shall not, directly or indirectly, have any financial or
material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of their office.
 1. Public officials and employees during their incumbency and for a period of one year (1)
after resignation, retirement or separation from public office, except in the case of
subparagraph (b) (2), shall not:
(1) Own, control, manage or accept employment as an officer, employee,
consultant counsel, broker, agent, trustee or nominee in any private enterprise
regulated, supervised or licensed by their office unless expressly allowed by law;

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the
constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with their official functions.

(3) Recommend any person to any position in a private enterprise which has a
regular or pending official transaction with their office.

A judge shall refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to adversely reflect on the
court’s impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities, or increase
involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court.

CASE: Catbagan v Barte, AM No. MTJ-02-1452, April 6, 2005

When a judge along with two other people acted as real estate agents for the sale of a parcel of
land for which he agreed to give a commission of P100,000 to each of his companions and after
the transaction was completed only give the complainants P25,000 each, the court held that the
judge violated the code of judicial conduct.

Canon 4 -- Propriety Script ni Pink

Good afternoon, ASG. Good afternoon, everyone. My name is Pinkette
Gaytano and,
I will report on the remaining sections of Canon 4. And, let’s start with
Section 8.

Section 8
Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance
their private interests, or those of a member of their family or of anyone
else, nor shall they convey or permit others to convey the impression that
anyone is in a special position improperly to influence them in the
performance of judicial duties.
 
So, this rule has two parts.
 1. The first is that a judge may not use judicial office to advance
private interests.


2. The second is that a judge may not give the impression that he or she
can be influenced to use the judicial office to advance the private
interests of others.


• In one case, in Javier vs. de Guzman, the Court expounded on the

rationale behind the first part. In that case, the respondent judge took
advantage of his position as a Trial Court judge by filing in the Makati
court a collection case in which he and his wife were the complainants.


The Court ruled that although a stipulation in the contract gave the
judge, as creditor, choice of venue, the judge had nonetheless fallen
short of what is expected of him as a judicial officer. As this case was
decided before the effective date of the new Code, the Court
explained that the reason for the ruling of impropriety was that
peculiar Philippine psyche, personality and culture would lead the
public, and in particular the judge’s adversary in the collection case,
to suspect that the judge would use the choice of venue as a
means to exert influence in favor of himself. This is precisely the
reason behind this particular section of the new Code.

• Similarly, a judge who filed a case for estafa in his own sala and who
assisted in the issuance of the warrant of arrest against the accused
was held guilty of serious misconduct. This was the case of Vistan v.
Nicolas (201 SCRA 524).


• In another case, a judge was found liable for gross misconduct when
he made phone calls to the station commander on behalf of a family
friend who had been detained, and asked her bailiff to look into the
status of the car that had been left in the parking lot when the
friend had been arrested. This was the case of Manansala III vs.
 Asdala. (A.M. No. RTJ-05-1916, May 10 2005).


• In another case, the posting of advertisements for restaurant

personnel on the court bulletin board, using his court address to
receive applications for such positions, and screening applicants in
his court, constitute involvement in private business and improper
use of office facilities for the promotion of family business. This was
in the case of Dionisio v. Escano (302 SCRA 411).


 
Now, let’s go to Section 9 which provides that:

Section 9 as last updated by OCA Cir. 103-06 (2006)

Confidential information acquired by judges in their judicial capacity shall
not be used or disclosed for any other purpose NOT related to their judicial
duties.
 
This section simply states that judges come into possession of various
information in the course of their judicial duties, which of course, should
only be used in arriving at a decision of a case and not for any other use.
Hence, the judge may not use any information for other purposes.

• Overlapping somewhat with Section 8, it is improper for a judge to

allow his wife to have access to court records which are necessarily
confidential, as this practice may convey the impression that she is the
one who can influence the judge's official functions. This was
enunciated in the case of Gordon v. Lilagan, 361 SCRA 690.


• In another case, where respondent appellate justice announced on

television that he lost a confidential draft of an order and publicly
asked the National Bureau of Investigation to investigate, he was
held by the Supreme Court to have been guilty of conduct unbecoming
a judge. In Re Justice Anacleto Badoy, 395 SCRA 231.


 
Now, let us proceed to Section 10 which provides that:

Section 10
Subject to the proper performance of judicial duties, judges may:

1. Write, lecture, teach and participate in activities concerning the

law, the legal system, the administration of justice or related
matters;


2. Appear at a public hearing before an official body concerned with

matters relating to the law, the legal system, the administration of
justice or related matters;


3. Engage in other activities if such activities do not detract from the

dignity of the judicial office or otherwise interfere with the
performance of judicial duties.
 
First and foremost, note that the activities enumerated in this section are
not exclusive under the principle of ejusdem generis, any other activity of
similar nature may be allowed
This section’s tolerance of judicially-related activities is limited by Section
12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which prohibits judges from being
“designated to any agency performing quasi judicial or administrative
functions.”

• In the landmark case of In Re: Designation of Judge Rodolfo U.

Manzano, a judge sought the Court’s permission to accept
membership in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, an
administrative body. The Court denied his request, ruling that
allowing the judge’s membership would be a violation of the
constitutional provision on the discharge by members of the
judiciary of administrative functions in quasi-judicial or
administrative agencies.


• In this decision, it included the qualification that the constitutional

prohibition should not be construed as a directive to avoid all
 involvement with organizations concerned with judicial interests. 


 
Let us proceed to Section 11 which provides that:

Section 11
Judges shall not practice law whilst the holder of judicial office.
 
This prohibition is based on the inherent incompatibility of the rights,
duties and functions of the office of an attorney with the powers, duties
and functions of a judge.  
 
Land dispute. Carual v. Brusola, 317 SCRA 54. In this case, Brusola was
engaged in giving legal services to the complainant's adversary to the land in
question. In that case Brusola was guilty under this section since judges
cannot practice law while being a holder of judicial office. 
Philippine courts not only prohibit judges from overtly representing clients as
counsel of record, but also from acting more subtly in a way more befitting
an advocate than a judge. For example, a judge may not meet with a
complainant to give him advice. The due process requirement of “the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge” is denied the accused when the court
assumes the dual role of magistrate and advocate by asking many questions
of an accused.
 
Now, let us proceed to Section 12 which provides that:

Section 12
Judges may form or join associations of judges or participate in other
organizations representing the interests of judges.
 
So clearly, this rule recognizes the difference between membership in
associations of judges and membership in associations of other legal
professionals. While attendance at events hosted by lawyers might create an
appearance of impropriety, participation in a judges-only organizations does
not. It is allowed under this section.
 
Now, let us proceed to Section 13 which provides that:

Section 13
Judges and members of their families shall neither ask for, nor accept, any
gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or
omitted to be done by him or her in connection with the performance of
judicial duties.
 
This section should be read in conjunction with Section 7(d) of R.A. 6713
which prohibits public officials from soliciting or accepting gifts. According to
this provision:

Public officials and employees shall not solicit or accept, directly or

indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of
money value from any person in the course of their official duties or
in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any
transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office.

Thus, aside from constituting serious misconduct, the act of demanding and
receiving money or property from a litigant violates this provision of the Act.
9 Legaspi v. Garrete, 242 SCRA 679.
For example:

1. A judge who accepts the free use of a car for a year or utilizes free
battery charging services from the shop of the litigant; Capuno v.
Jaramillo, 234 SCRA 212. 231 


2. Or who allows a litigant to pay for the freight of for personal

acquisitions also violates the Anti-Graft Law. Agpalasin v. Agcaoili, 330
SCRA 250.


 
Now, let us go to the second to the last section which provides that:
 Section 14
Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to their
influence, direction or authority, to ask for, or accept, any gift, bequest,
loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be
done in connection with their duties or functions.
 
This section complements the previous section and assures that what the
judge cannot do directly, may not be done indirectly through the use of
employees or staff members. The high Court held that a judge allowing his
bailiff’s son to store attached property at his house constitutes misconduct.
While sections 13 and 14 cover instances where the judge is clearly the
recipient of money or property from litigants before his court, the sections
are likewise relevant to cases where the transaction between the judge and
interested parties is less obvious.

• In a case involving the financial and judicial audit of the municipal trial
court in Koronadal, a judge was found guilty of gross misconduct for
having violated these provisions. In that case, the judge had
periodically “borrowed” from court funds to pay for a variety of
personal expenses including his children’s tuition and medical expenses
incurred for his parents’ illness. He had also used evidence submitted
to the Court – such as guns and ammunition –for his own protection.


• In Dulay vs. Lelina, the Court suspended the respondent judge for six
months for allowing his daughters to accept a business partnership
offered by persons with pending cases before his court.


 
Now, as for the last section, it is provided that:
 Section 15
Subject to law and to any legal requirements of public disclosure, judges
may receive a token gift, award or benefit as appropriate to the occasion
on which it is made provided that such gift, award or benefit might not
reasonably be perceived as intended to influence the judge in the
performance of judicial duties or otherwise give rise to an appearance of
partiality.

Factors in determining whether the gifts are reasonable:

1. The value of the gift should not be excessive


2. The regularity of the occasion; and


3. The source of the gift


This section qualifies the last two sections by allowing judges to accept token
gifts, awards, or benefits when given as a consequence of a special occasion.
As to gifts and grants from foreign countries, Section 7(d) of R.A. 6713 allows
the following:

The acceptance and retention by a public official or employee of a gift of

nominal value tendered and received as a souvenir or mark of courtesy; 2.
The acceptance by a public official or employee of a gift in the nature of a
scholarship or fellowship grant or medical treatment; or 3. The acceptance
by a public official or employee of travel grants or expenses for travel taking
place entirely outside the Philippines (such as allowances, transportation,
food and lodging) of more than nominal value if such acceptance is
appropriate or consistent with the interest of the Philippines, and permitted
by the head office, branch or agency to which the judge belongs. 

• Notably, under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act: the judge is
liable criminally for directly or indirectly receiving gifts presents or
other pecuniary or material benefit for himself or for another under
 conditions provided in section 2 (b) and (c) R.A. No 3019.


• Exception: Unsolicited gifts or presents of small value offered or given

as a mere ordinary token of gratitude or friendship according to local
custom or usage (R.A. No. 3019 Section 14)