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Correlaciones Indices 01-03-11 AP
Correlaciones Indices 01-03-11 AP
ACTIONABLE ADVICE FOR FINANCIAL ADVISORS: Newsletters and Databases Focused on Investment Strategy
Many investors continue to expect 10% returns — but these days, are doing well if they earn 5%.
They need to understand why major shifts in the global investment climate are challenging them to
reset return expectations and reboot their plans.
After six decades of double-digit average U.S. stock market returns, many American investors may have
come to expect that they will earn similar returns going forward. And why wouldn’t they? From 1948 to
1978, for example, the U.S. stock market generated an average annualized total return of 10.7%. Over
the next three decades, the period spanning the longest bull market in history, the average was 11.2%. 1
The expectation of 10% annual returns also has roots in academic theory and investment industry
practice. Counseling investors to accept short-run losses as part of a winning long-run strategy, financial
professionals typically used historical return averages as the basis for their financial models and asset
allocation formulas.
Over time, these models and formulas were adjusted in response to changing conditions and periodic
bear markets — more international exposure here, less technology there, and so on. Still, the
conventional wisdom remained the same, based in part on the 10% calculation: “Diversify, buy and
hold, stay the course, and you’ll have a good chance of reaching your financial goals.”
Of course, using the rearview mirror as a guide works only so long as the terrain remains the same.
When the 2008 financial crisis shook the global economy, and somewhere between $5 trillion and $10
trillion in asset value disappeared in a matter of weeks, it showed how suddenly the tectonic plates of the
financial markets could shift.2
Much of the dust has now settled and markets appear to be in recovery mode. Yet the upheaval hasn’t
ended for those investors whose retirement plans are still predicated on 10% average annual returns, but
now find themselves earning perhaps half that amount. For them, the real question is…What now?
After the experiences of the last three years, investors may now be more aware of the potential downside
risks of investing. But they still may not fully understand why markets today are different than in the past
— or why 10% returns may not be the norm going forward. Some of the key reasons why things have
changed:
Average equity market gains over the past 30 years are likely unsustainable.
Look at long-term return averages alone, and it appears that the U.S. stock market performed as well or
better over the past three decades than it did in the immediate postwar era [Figure 2].
But factor in changing price/earnings (P/E) ratios, and a different story emerges.
• In the 30-year period following the end of World War II, market gains were fueled by the
nation’s healthy rate of economic growth. The U.S. economy allowed for strong growth in
dividends and earnings with no rise in P/E ratios.
• Over the next 30 years, average returns were somewhat better. But in part, these gains
reflected expanding P/E multiples. Rising P/E ratios showed that investors were willing to
pay more for equity growth potential, even with slower earnings growth.
• Meanwhile, in the early 1990s, interest rates dropped and, for the most part, stayed
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persistently low.3 Once the cost of borrowing money was below their rates of earning
revenue, companies began relying more and more on external sources of capital. In
hindsight, it now seems clear that many companies had balance sheets that were highly
leveraged relative to historical levels.4 The result was a “sideways” decade for equity
returns — the dismal 2000-2010 period that spawned a global recession and saw some of
the worst years of U.S. stock market performance since the Great Depression. 5
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mainstream markets are more correlated than in the past [Figure 4].
Over the past ten years, sophisticated investors have diversified into both equity and debt instruments of
emerging markets including Brazil, South Africa, India and China.13 They are now turning their
attention to the next tier of developing nations — that is, frontier markets such as Vietnam, Nigeria,
Croatia, and Kuwait. While there are certainly risks associated with investing in undeveloped nations,
their diversity and lack of correlation with other asset classes can help temper those risks, as can
investing through index-based vehicles. The point is that emerging and frontier markets are capturing a
greater share of the world’s growth [Figure 5]. If we are indeed seeing a move to a lower-return global
investment climate, they may be one of the few exceptions.
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involve assessing and rapidly responding to market signals. They are designed to be one way for
investors to be nimble and stay flexible, in an ongoing effort to lower the risks of volatility and
investment loss.
THE ULTIMATE QUESTION
While there is no quick fix for the 10% problem, we believe it can be addressed with an updated,
outcome-oriented approach—one that gears portfolios to the outcomes investors want to achieve in the
future, rather than aligning them with methods and assumptions rooted in the past. No longer need
investors think of themselves as being at the mercy of market forces, passively riding the ups and downs.
Instead, investors should know that they (and their advisors) have at their disposal an ever-widening
range of tools that may help increase the probability of meeting their financial goals.
1 http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm
2 Roger C. Altman. “The Great Crash, 2008 - Roger C. Altman”. Foreign Affairs
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20090101faessay88101/roger-c-altman/the-great-crash-2008.html.
Retrieved Feb 27, 2009
3 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Historical Changes of the Target Federal Funds and Discount
Rates, as of Feb 19, 2010
http://www.ny.frb.org/markets/statistics/dlyrates/fedrate.html
4 Source: Federal Reserve, Forward Management
5 Standard & Poor’s
6 EnCorr; MSCI
7 Morningstar. Forward Management
8 MSCI; Standard & Poor’s
9 Callan 2010 Alternative Investments Survey
10 Morningstar
11 International Monetary Fund, Strategic Insight, Forward Management
12 International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook Database, retrieved October 2010
13 Bloomberg businessweek, Pensions & Investments
14 Standard & Poor’s
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