1) PANGANDAMAN VS.

CASAR

G.R. No. 71782 April 14, 1988

Doctrine: “Warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be seized”

Facts:

On July 27, 1985, a shooting incident occurred in Pantao, Masiu, Lanao del Sur, which left at least five persons dead and two
others wounded. On the following day, Atty. Mangurun Batuampar filed a letter-complaint with the Provincial Fiscal at Marawi City,
asking for a "full blast preliminary investigation" of the incident.

No case relative to the incident was, however, presented to the respondent Judge until Saturday, August 10, 1985, when a criminal
complaint for multiple murder was filed before him by P.C. Sgt. Jose L. Laruan. On that same day, the respondent Judge "examined
personally all (three) witnesses (brought by the sergeant) under oath thru .. (his) closed and direct supervision," reducing to writing
the questions to the witnesses and the latter's answers. 9 Thereafter the Judge "approved the complaint and issued the
corresponding warrant of arrest" against the fourteen (14) petitioners (who were named by the witnesses) and fifty (50) "John
Does."

The petitioners question the validity of the warrant of arrest and assert that issuance of the same warrant against fifty (50) "John
Does" transgressed the Constitutional provision requiring that such warrants should particularly describe the persons or things to be
seized.18

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrant of arrest is valid.

RULING: NO It is of the nature of a general warrant, one of a class of writs long proscribed as unconstitutional and once
anathematized as "totally subversive of the liberty of the subject." Clearly violative of the constitutional injunction that warrants of
arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be seized, the warrant must, as regards its unidentified subjects, be
voided.

ALTERNATIVE ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Judge had the power to issue the warrant of arrest without completing the
entire prescribed procedure for preliminary investigation. Stated otherwise, is completion of the procedure laid down in Section 3 of
Rule 112 a condition sine qua non for the issuance of a warrant of arrest?

There is no requirement that the entire procedure for preliminary investigation must be completed before a warrant of arrest may
be issued. What the Rule 20 provides is that no complaint or information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court may
be filed without completing that procedure. But nowhere is it provided that the procedure must be completed before a warrant of
arrest may issue. Indeed, it is the contrary that is true. The present Section 6 of the same Rule 112 clearly authorizes the municipal
trial court to order the respondent's arrest even before opening the second phase of the investigation if said court is satisfied that a
probable cause exists and there is a necessity to place the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice.

Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.-

xxx xxx xxx

(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. If the municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary investigation is satisfied after an examination
in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching question and answers, that a probable cause
exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice,
he shag issue a warrant of arrest.

This was equally true under the former rules, where the first phase of the investigation was expressly denominated "preliminary
examination" to distinguish it from the second phase, or preliminary investigation proper. Thus, the former Section 6 of Rule 112
provided:

SEC. 6. Warrant of arrest, when issued. — If the judge be satisfied from the preliminary e petition conducted by him or by the
investigating officer that the offense complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that the
accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order for his arrest.

2. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

DAVID SALVATIERRA y EGUIA, accused-appellant.

G.R. No. 104663 July 24, 1997

FACTS:

At around 4:30 in the afternoon of August 17, 1990, Charlie Fernandez, a vendor of "palamig" was walking along M. de la Fuente
Street,2 going towards the direction of Quiapo at the opposite side of the street.3 Suddenly, three (3) persons met him. One of them
was appellant David Salvatierra, who lunged a pointed instrument at Charlie. The latter was able to parry the thrust but appellant
swung the instrument anew hitting Charlie at the left breast. Thereafter, all three persons scampered away.4 Charlie still managed to
walk home to tell his father about the incident but suddenly collapsed.5 He was taken immediately to the hospital where he was
operated on.

The assault was witnessed by Milagros Martinez, an ambulant vendor of fish and salted eggs who stopped by to rest at the right side
of J. Fajardo St. in Sampaloc, Manila near the Trabajo Market. Milagros told the incident only to her daughter. 6 She did not
immediately report the incident to the police authorities because she was afraid.

Charlie's father, Marciano Fernandez, reported the crime to the police at Station No. 4 at about 5:40 that afternoon. Since the victim
could not be interviewed as he was then undergoing operation, the police and Marciano Fernandez proceeded to the crime scene to
get information about the incident but their effort was fruitless as no one in the area would volunteer to identify the culprits. 7 A
relative of the victim informed the police that appellant was one of the suspects in the crime.8

The next day or on August 18, 1990, 20-year-old Charlie expired. His death was caused by hemorrhage secondary to the stab wound
on the anterior chest wall.

Marciano Fernandez went back to Police Station No. 4 to inform the authorities that his son had died. He was advised to report the
matter to the Homicide Section of the Western Police District (WPD) 11 where an "advance information" was prepared indicating
that four (4) unidentified persons perpetrated the crime. 12

On November 15, 1990 at about 4:35 in the afternoon, Police Station No. 4 received a complaint that appellant was creating a
commotion along Miguelin Street, Sampaloc, Manila. He was thereby taken in custody by Pat. Celso Tan and two other policemen
who later found out that appellant was a suspect in the killing of Charlie Fernandez. 13 Later that day, appellant was turned over to
the WPD.

Milagros Martinez and Marciano Fernandez proceeded to the Western Police District station where Milagros executed a sworn
statement implicating appellant to the crime. 14 In a police line-up, Milagros pinpointed appellant as the person who stabbed
Charlie. Thereafter, Pat. Amores prepared a booking sheet and arrest order which appellant signed. 15

On November 19, 1990, appellant was charged with murder in an information. At his arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged. 17

Appellant put up the defense of alibi alleging that at 4:30 in the afternoon of August 17, 1990, he was having merienda with his wife
and children at their home in 459 Miguelin Street, Sampaloc, Manila and could not possibly be near the Trabajo Market. 18

Appellant further testified that in the afternoon of November 15, 1990, he had an altercation with a woman in their neighborhood
who caused his arrest for the crime of malicious mischief. He was detained for a few hours at Police Station No. 4. Later, police from
WPD arrived and picked him up and brought him to the Homicide Section where he was investigated, interrogated and detained for
the stabbing of one Charlie Fernandez on August 17, 1990. 19 After two (2) days, he was brought out of his cell where a man and
two (2) women were made "to view" him. One of the women was the mother of the victim while the other one was someone he was
not acquainted with. The latter was the witness against him who pointed to him as the killer of Charlie in the police line-up. 20 Two
days later, he was made to sign a document the contents of which he was not allowed to read. When he insisted on reading the
document, his head was hit with a key and he was forced to sign it. The document was the booking and information sheet. 21

ISSUE: Whether appellant David Salvatierra’s constitutional right against warrantless arrests was violated because there is nothing
on record to show that his arrest for the minor offense of malicious mischief was effected by virtue of a warrant.

RULING: YES. Indeed, appellant's arrest on suspicion that he was involved in the killing of Charlie Fernandez was made almost three
(3) months after the commission of the crime on August 17, 1990 and only after he had been taken in police custody for a minor
offense. As such, because no warrant had been obtained during the 3-month intervening period between the commission of the
crime and his apprehension, his arrest would have ordinarily been rendered unconstitutional and illegal inasmuch as even
warrantless arrests made within shorter periods like ten (10) days 26 are illegal. The element of immediacy between the time of the
commission of the offense and the time of the arrest had not been complied with. It should be stressed that Section 5(b) of Rule 113
of the Rules of Court has excluded situations under the old rule which allowed a warrantless arrest provided that the offense "has in
fact been committed."

While these arguments may be valid, appellant's claim that the case against him should be dismissed for violation of his
constitutional rights, must fail. Appellant is estopped (istup) from questioning the legality of his arrest considering that he never
raised this before entering his plea. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure in the acquisition of jurisdiction
over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. 28 This is the
first time that appellant is raising this issue as he did not even move for the quashal of the information before the trial court on the
ground of illegal arrest. 29 Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest, if any, had been cured by his voluntary submission
to the jurisdiction of the trial court when he entered his plea and participated during the trial. 30 Verily, the illegal arrest of appellant
is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint and where the trial was free from
error. 31

Neither may appellant successfully assert that the case should be dismissed on the ground during custodial investigation and the
police line-up he was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel because the extra extrajudicial confessions of the accused during
custodial investigation were not the only bases for conviction, there are other pieces of evidence by the which the culpability of the
appellant may be founded.

In the same vein, appellant may not validly claim that dismissal of the case against him should be a matter of course because he
signed the booking and information sheet without the assistance of counsel. Granting that affixing the signature of an accused is
covered by the constitutional mandate requiring assistance of counsel to an accused during custodial investigation, this piece of
evidence may be disregarded without the least diluting the prosecution's case against appellant. The booking and information sheet
is not the only incriminatory evidence against appellant.

Malicious Misch

3. PEOPLE vs. ZASPA and Galvan

G.R. No. 136396 (September 21, 2000)

FACTS:

RTC Mati Dvo OR charged Zaspa & Galvan was charged with a violation of Dangerous Drugs Act 1972 (Sec 8, RA 6425).

- They feloniously own and possess five point six (5.6) kilos of marijuana dried leaves with stalks, a prohibited dangerous
drugs, without proper license or permit from the authorities.

Upon arraignment –both pled not guilty

Tarragona Police Chief organized and dispatched a buy bust operation upon info that Zaspa and friends brought marijuana leaves.
Police saw Zaspa and friends standing by the side of the road with a big black “loalde” bag in front of them. Zaspa tried to flee, but
was intercepted.

Zaspa denied that the bag belonged to them. (Alibi: hired to cut an Antipolo round timber for 5k, was about to get balance since he
wasn’t paid in full when buy bust happened)

Galvan also raised defense of alibi and denied ownership of the black bag. (Alibi: hired to spray mango trees, went back because he
didn’t finish spraying the trees)

Leaf samples were brought to PNP Davao Crime Lab and confirmed that leaf samples were marijuana.

RTC RULING: Zaspa and Galvan GUILTY – reclusion perpetua, 500k fine

CA: upheld RTC ruling. ““With respect to the alleged unlawful and warrantless arrest, the People manifests that Section 5, Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Court authorizes an arrest without a warrant when the person to be arrested has committed a crime, is
actually committing or about to commit a crime in the presence of the police officers. As the appellants were found to be in
possession of the prohibited drug at the time of their arrest, the same is admissible as evidence.

Peace officers may pursue and arrest without a warrant any person under circumstances reasonably tending to show that such
person has committed or is about to commit any crime or breach of the peace (People vs. Bautista, 227 SCRA 152).

ISSUE: WON the warrantless arrest of Zaspa & Galvan was valid

RULING: YES

RE: VALIDITY OF WARRANTLESS ARREST

“A warrantless arrest and seizure was valid where it was done by the police team dispatched to look for persons responsible
for the crime (People vs. Acol, 232 SCRA 406).

Arrest;  Any objection regarding the regularity of an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea. —On the
validity of the warrantless arrest, along with the corresponding search and seizure, suffice it to say that any objection regarding the
regularity of an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea; otherwise, the defect shall be deemed cured by the
voluntary submission by the accused to the jurisdiction of the trial court.

In the case at bar…

The police informer has particularly mentioned the name of Rolando Zaspa as being one of those who would be bringing the bag
containing the marijuana,7thus paving the way for the authorities to conduct their operation. When Zaspa, indeed, has made an
attempt to run away upon seeing the police officers, he inadvertently has also confirmed the information given to the police. It
bears to repeat that absent any convincing proof of an intent on the part of police authorities to falsely impute a serious crime
against an accused, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty will ordinarily have to prevail. 8

4. People of the Philippines vs. Larry Mahinay

G.R. No. 122485 (February 1, 1999)

FACTS:

Larry, the responded herein is an employee of Elvira Chan, the mother of the Ma. Victoria Chan, 12 years old, who is the owner of
the unfinished big house being built. That on Sunday morning of 8AM, he was with Gregorio Rivera in a drinking spree but went
home when he already was drunk at around 10AM. At about 9PM, the respondent herein showed up in the store of Norgina Rivera,
sister in law of the mother of the accused, to buy lugaw. Norgina asked Larry Mahinay why he appeared to be so uneasy and his hair
was disarranged, he was also still drunk and walking in a zigzagging manner.  Meanwhile, Elvira noticed that her daughter, Ma.
Victoria, was missing.

On the following day, the respondent at about 2AM boarded a jeepney in Talipapa, and alighted at the top of the bridge of the North
Expressway and had thereafter disappeared. 

The same morning, a certain “Boy” found the body of Ma. Victoria Chan, in a septic tank and reported the matter to her parents. 

The parents, with the policemen tried to look for Larry where he worked before, in Caloocan, but to no avail, was not able to find
him. 

It was in Batangas where Larry was apprehended. From then, Larry, with the assistance of the counsel, made an extrajudicial
confession. However, during the arraignment, he retracted his statement and testified that he made it involuntary due to fear, which
according to him that he would be salvage by the policemen who arrested him if he would not admit the crime. Hence this petition. 

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the appellant’s extra-judicial confession was validly taken and in accordance with his rights under Section
12 of the Bill of Rights; and
 2. Whether or not the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

HELD:

The Court ruled that the appellant’s extrajudicial confession was taken within the ambit of the law as evinced by the records and
testimony of the lawyer who assisted, warned and explained to him his constitutionally guaranteed pre-interrogatory and custodial
rights.

As to the second issue, the appellant argues that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is insufficient to warrant
a conviction of his guilt. However, the Court ruled otherwise.

The Court recalled the Rule on Evidence and settled jurisprudence. Absence of direct proof does not absolve the appellant because
conviction may be had with the concurrence of the following requisites as stated in the Rules of Court:

1. there is more than one circumstance;

2. the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

3. the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court recalled the ruling in People v. De Guia, 280 SCRA 141, all circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent
with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with
every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.

And also, in People v. Alberca, 257 SCRA 613 citing People v. Abitona, 240 SCRA 335, that facts and circumstances consistent with
guilt and inconsistent with innocence, constitute evidence which, in weight and probative force, may surpass even direct evidence in
its effect upon the court.

The Court agreed with the trial court’s decision in giving credence to several circumstantial evidence, which is more than enough to
prove appellant’s guilt beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt.

The Court also updated the Miranda rights with the developments in law that provided the rights of suspects under custodial
investigation in detail.

A person under custodial investigation should be informed:

1. In a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any;
Every other warnings, information or communication must be in a language known to and understood by said person;

2. That he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him;

3. That he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his
own choice;

4. That if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be
engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting in his
behalf;

5. That no custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after a valid waiver has
been made;
6. That, at any time, he has the right to communicate or confer by the most expedient means – telephone, radio, letter or messenger
– with his lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister
chosen by him or by any one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly accredited national or
international non-government organization. It shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished;

7. That he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he
understood the same;

8. That the waiver must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void
even if he insists on his waiver and chooses to speak;

9. That he may indicate in any manner at any time or stage of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with warning that
once he makes such indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation must
cease if it has already begun;

10. That his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any
time during the process, regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements;

11. That any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or
exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

5. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS vs. HON. JOSELITO DELA ROSA

G.R. NOS. 95122-23 (May 31, 1991)

FACTS:

 July 1960 - Santiago Gatchalian, an illegitimate child to a Chinese father (Pablo Pacheco) and a Filipino mother (Mariana
Gatchalian), was recognized as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of his mother. He also declared that he
has 5 children with his Chinese wife Chu Gin Tee. One of them was Francisco, William Gatchalian’s father.

 27 June 1961 – 12-year old William, together with his father Francisco, arrived in Manila from Hong Kong. They had with
them certificates of Registration and Identity issued by the Philippine consulate in Hong Kong and they sought admission as
Filipino citizens.

 6 July 1961 – Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 (BSI1) admitted William and his companions as Filipino citizens.

 24 January 1962 – Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all decisions purporting to have been
rendered by the Board of Commissioners (BOC) on appeal or on review. The Secretary of Justice asked the BOC to review all
the cases where entry was allowed on the grounds of the entrant being a Filipino citizen. Among those cases was that of
William.

 6 July 1962 – The BOC reversed the initial decision of the BSI1 and ordered the exclusion of William Gatchalian. A warrant of
exclusion was issued alleging that the BOC decision was final and executory.

 1973 – Respondent Gatchalian, as well as the others covered by the July 6, 1962 filed a motion for re-hearing with the BSI.

 15 March 1973 – Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda issued an order reaffirming the 6 July 1961 decision to admit
Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen. The warrant of arrest was also recalled.

 7 June 1990 – Acting NBI Commissioner wrote to the Secretary of Justice recommending that William be charged with
violation of the Immigration Act of 1940 (Commonwealth Act. No. 613).

 15 August 1990 – order to arrest Gatchalian was issued. He later was released upon posting a Php 200,000 bond.

 BOC contends that William’s arrest follows as a matter of consequence the Warrant of Exclusion issued on 6 July 1962.

 On the other hand, William argues that the Mission Order of Warrant of Arrest does mention that it is issued pursuant to a
final order of deportation or warrant of exclusion.
ISSUE:

 W/N the warrant of arrest by the Board of Commissioners and the Commission on Immigration and Deportation was valid.

HELD:

 Pursuant to §37(a) of the Immigration Act, an arrest can only be effected after a determination by the Board of
Commissioner of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien. 

 Moreover, the mission ordered issued by petitioner only for purposes of investigation. The mission order/warrant of arrest
made no mention that the same was issued pursuant to a final order of deportation or warrant of exclusion.

 Petitioners also omitted the fact that Acting Commissioner Nituda issued a memorandum in 1973 that recommended the
reconsideration of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then Board of Commissioners which reversed the July 6, 1961 decision
of the then Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 and the lifting of the warrants of arrest issued against applicants.

 Such was the last official act of the government that is the basis of which respondent William Gatchalian continually
exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen to the present. Consequently, the presumption of citizenship lies in favor of
respondent William Gatchalian.

 Also took note that the basis for the warrant of exclusion is that the cablegram issued by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
was forged. Even if the applicants could have entered illegally, the mere fact that they are citizens of the Philippines entitles
them to remain in the country.

Hence, petitioners' argument that the arrest of respondent was based, ostensibly, on the July 6, 1962 warrant of exclusion has
obviously no leg to stand on. The mission order/warrant of arrest made no mention that the same was issued pursuant to a final
order of deportation or warrant of exclusion.

Petition of BOC to pursue the arrest and deportation of Gatchalian is DISMISSED.

6. PEOPLE vs. Sanchez G.R. Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993

FACTS: On July 28, 1993, the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the filing of appropriate charges against several persons,
including the petitioner, in connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez.

Acting on this request, the Panel of State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice conducted a preliminary investigation on August
9, 1993. Petitioner Sanchez was not present but was represented by his counsel, Atty. Marciano Brion, Jr.

On August 12, 1993, PNP Commander Rex Piad issued an "invitation" to the petitioner requesting him to appear for investigation at
Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang, Laguna. It was served on Sanchez in the morning of August 13,1993, and he was immediately taken
to the said camp.

At a confrontation that same day, Sanchez was positively identified by Aurelio Centeno, and SPO III Vivencio Malabanan, who both
executed confessions implicating him as a principal in the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez. The petitioner was then
placed on "arrest status" and taken to the Department of Justice in Manila.

The respondent prosecutors immediately conducted an inquest upon his arrival, with Atty. Salvador Panelo as his counsel.

After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez. This warrant was issued on August 13, 1993, by Judge Enrico A.
Lanzanas of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7, in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 93-124634 to 93-124637 for
violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 1, of R.A. No. 6713. Sanchez was forthwith taken to the CIS Detention Center, Camp
Crame, where he remains confined.

On August 16, 1993, the respondent prosecutors filed with the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, seven informations charging
Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon, Pepito Kawit, Baldwin Brion, Jr., George Medialdea and Zoilo Ama with the rape
and killing of Mary Eileen Sarmenta.

On August 26, 1993, Judge Eustaquio P. Sto. Domingo of that court issued a warrant for the arrest of all the accused, including the
petitioner, in connection with the said crime.
The petitioner argues that the seven informations filed against him should be quashed because his warrantless arrest is illegal and
the court has therefore not acquired jurisdiction over him

ISSUE: Whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the accused

RULING: Yes, the agree with the petitioner that his arrest did not come under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, providing as
follows:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escapes from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

It is not denied that the arresting officers were not present when the petitioner allegedly participated in the killing of Allan Gomez
and the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Neither did they have any personal knowledge that the petitioner was responsible
therefor because the basis of the arrest was the sworn statements of Centeno and Malabanan. Moreover, as the rape and killing of
Sarmenta allegedly took place on June 28-June 29, 1993, or forty-six days before the date of the arrest, it cannot be said that the
offense had "in fact just been committed" when the petitioner was arrested.

The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court lawfully acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on August 26, 1993 against him and the
other accused in connection with the rape-slay cases. It was belated, to be sure, but it was nonetheless legal.

Even on the assumption that no warrant was issued at all, we find that the trial court still lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner. The rule is that if the accused objects to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he may move to quash
the information, but only on that ground. If, as in this case, the accused raises other grounds in the motion to quash, he is deemed to
have waived that objection and to have submitted his person to the jurisdiction of that court.14

The Court notes that on August 13, 1993, after the petitioner was unlawfully arrested, Judge Lanzanas issued a warrant of arrest
against Antonio L. Sanchez in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 93-124634 to 93-124637 for violation of R.A No. 6713. Pending
the issuance of the warrant of arrest for the rape-slay cases, this first warrant served as the initial justification for his detention.

7. People of the Philippines v. Francisco Albior

G.R. No. L-75034 (June 30, 1988)

FACTS: Francisco Albior, Carlos Manalangsang and two unidentified men were charge of the crime of Robbery with homicide with
rape. Based on the prosecution, the four conspired to rob the house of Garces family taking with them valuables amounting to
10,000 pesos. One of the unidentified accused raped and killed Dana Garces. Rodulfo Vasquez, on the other hand was charged as
accessory to the crime, after selling the stolen valuables.

The CIS Investigation Section made investigations which led them to the house of Vasquez. There they "confronted" accused
Manalangsang, Albior and Vasquez and "invited" them to the CIS headquarters for questioning. Recovered from Vasquez’s house
were the stolen items and the victim’s panty. The two other accused were not there.

Agent Jamela, of the CIS Investigation section, testified that he took the statements of the accused Manalangsang, Albior and
Vasquez after their arrest, wherein Manalangsang and Albior, after having been appraised of their constitutional rights, admitted
that they acted as lookouts to the crime.

Upon arraignment, Albior, Manalangsang and Vasquez pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. The two other unidentified accused
remained at large. Subsequently, Manalangsang withdrew his plea of "not guilty" and changed it to "guilty" and he was
correspondingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim.
Accused-appellant Albior and accused Vasquez were duly tried. The trial court found both guilty. As accused Vasquez had already
served the term of his penalty as an accessory to the crime while under preventive detention, he was released while accused-
appellant was transferred to the National Penitentiary for service of his sentence. Albior interposed an appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the sworn statement executed by Albior is admissible as evidence.

RULING: No. With regard to Albior’s sworn statement, the Court finds obvious defects that would render it inadmissible in evidence.

In the case of People v. Galit, the Court, quoting from Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, said:

7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must
be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a
relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be
in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition
either of the detainee himself of by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless
made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

The lack of assistance of counsel in Albior’s waiver of his right to counsel is evident from the testimony of the investigating officer.

“Attorney: Now, after you have informed the accused of his constitutional rights, what else did you do if any?

Investigating Officer: He is willing to give a voluntary statement without assistance of counsel.

Attorney: What else did you do?

Investigating Officer: I then proceeded to get his statement. (TSN, August 29, 1984, p. 17.)”

It must also be noted that although Albior hardly speaks Tagalog, Cebuano being his native dialect, the sworn statement is in
Tagalog. It does not suffice that an interpreter, an agent of the CIS, was present during the interrogation (as stated in the sworn
statement) because by virtue of its being written in Tagalog, Albior was deprived of the opportunity to comprehend through his own
reading what he was signing.

Finally, the testimony of Albior that he agreed to sign the sworn statement because he was promised that he would be released adds
to the conclusion that he did not understand what he was signing. No reasonable person would believe the promise that he would
be released if he knows that he had just signed a statement admitting his participation in the commission of a very serious offense.

In view of the foregoing defects, the Court is constrained to hold Albior’s sworn statement inadmissible in evidence.

8. G.R. No. 102140 April 22, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

ROLANDO MANLULU AND DANTE SAMSON, accused-appellants.

FACTS

GERARDO ALFARO, a NARCOM agent, was stabbed and shot with his service pistol in a drinking spree. He died in the hospital the
following day. His drinking partners, Rolando Manlulu and Dante Samson, were haled to court for his violent death.

The prosecution charges that Manlulu and Samson conspired in the murder of Agent Alfaro. The accused on the other hand invoke
self-defense. They also insist that the non-issuance of a search warrant and warrant of arrest should nullify their arrest and
consequently exclude from judicial consideration the evidence thus obtained.
But the trial court was not convinced. It found accused Dante Samson and Rolando Manlulu "guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principals in the crime of Murder with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender on the part of Dante Samson and no
mitigating circumstance modifying the commission of the offense on the part of Rolando Manlulu. The appellate court raised their
penalties to reclusion perpetua.

Patrolman Reynaldo Perez recounted that at around seven o'clock in the evening of 30 May 1986 he, together with some other
officers, arrested Manlulu on the information given by Manlapaz. He said that he seized from Manlulu the .45 cal. pistol and Casio
wristwatch said to belong to Alfaro, 11 and that Manlulu verbally confessed to the commission of the crime. Patrolman Perez
however admitted on cross- examination that when he arrested Manlulu and seized from him the handgun as well as the
wristwatch, he (Perez) was not with any warrant nor did he inform the accused of the latter's right to counsel. Perez added that at
that time Manlulu was under the influence of liquor.

ISSUE

Whether or not the arrest is valid.

HELD

NO. The reliance of the accused on the Constitution however is warranted. Certainly, the police authorities should have first
obtained a warrant for the arrest of accused Rolando Manlulu, and for the search and seizure of his personal effects. The killing took
place at one o'clock in the morning. The arrest and the consequent search and seizure came at around seven o'clock that evening,
some nineteen hours later. This instance cannot come within the purview of a valid warrantless arrest. Paragraph (b), Sec. 5, Rule
113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the arresting officer must have "personal knowledge" of an offense which
"has in fact just been committed." In the instant case, neither did Pat. Perez have "personal knowledge," nor was the offense "in fact
just been committed." While Pat. Perez may have personally gathered the information which led to the arrest of Manlulu, that is not
enough. The law requires "personal knowledge." Obviously, "personal gathering of information" is different from "personal
knowledge." The rule requires that the arrest immediately follows the commission of the offense, not some nineteen hours later.

However, the flaw, fatal as it may be, becomes moot in view of the eyewitness account of Manlapaz which we find to be credible.
Hence, in spite of the nullification of the arrest of accused Manlulu, and the exclusion of real evidence, i.e., the .45 cal. service pistol
of Agent Alfaro and his Casio wristwatch, as well as his extra-judicial confession which was taken in violation of the provisions of the
Constitution, still the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. After all, the illegality of the
warrantless arrest cannot deprive the state of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability

XXX

10. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROLANDO MANLULU AND DANTE SAMSON

G.R. No. 102140 (April 22, 1994)

FACTS:

GERARDO ALFARO, a NARCOM agent, was stabbed and shot with his service pistol in a drinking spree. He died in the hospital the
following day. His drinking partners, Rolando Manlulu and Dante Samson, were haled to court for his violent death.

The prosecution charges that Manlulu and Samson conspired in the murder of Agent Alfaro. The accused on the other hand invoke
self-defense. They also insist that the non-issuance of a search warrant and warrant of arrest should nullify their arrest and
consequently exclude from judicial consideration the evidence thus obtained.

But the trial court was not convinced. It found accused Dante Samson and Rolando Manlulu "guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principals in the crime of Murder with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender on the part of Dante Samson and no
mitigating circumstance modifying the commission of the offense on the part of Rolando Manlulu. The appellate court raised their
penalties to  reclusion perpetua.

Patrolman Reynaldo Perez recounted that at around seven o'clock in the evening of 30 May 1986 he, together with some other
officers, arrested Manlulu on the information given by Manlapaz. He said that he seized from Manlulu the .45 cal. pistol and Casio
wristwatch said to belong to Alfaro, 11 and that Manlulu verbally confessed to the commission of the crime. Patrolman Perez
however admitted on cross- examination that when he arrested Manlulu and seized from him the handgun as well as the
wristwatch, he (Perez) was not with any warrant nor did he inform the accused of the latter's right to counsel. Perez added that at
that time Manlulu was under the influence of liquor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the arrest is valid.

HELD:

NO. The reliance of the accused on the Constitution however is warranted. Certainly, the police authorities should have first
obtained a warrant for the arrest of accused Rolando Manlulu, and for the search and seizure of his personal effects. The killing took
place at one o'clock in the morning. The arrest and the consequent search and seizure came at around seven o'clock that evening,
some nineteen hours later. This instance cannot come within the purview of a valid warrantless arrest. Paragraph (b), Sec. 5, Rule
113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the arresting officer must have "personal knowledge" of an offense which
"has in fact just been committed." In the instant case, neither did Pat. Perez have "personal knowledge," nor was the offense "in fact
just been committed." While Pat. Perez may have personally gathered the information which led to the arrest of Manlulu, that is not
enough. The law requires "personal knowledge." Obviously, "personal gathering of information" is different from "personal
knowledge." The rule requires that the arrest immediately follows the commission of the offense, not some nineteen hours later.

However, the flaw, fatal as it may be, becomes moot in view of the eyewitness account of Manlapaz which we find to be credible.
Hence, in spite of the nullification of the arrest of accused Manlulu, and the exclusion of real evidence, i.e., the .45 cal. service pistol
of Agent Alfaro and his Casio wristwatch, as well as his extra-judicial confession which was taken in violation of the provisions of the
Constitution, still the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. After all, the illegality of the
warrantless arrest cannot deprive the state of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their
culpability.

11. People vs. Escordial

G.R. Nos. 138934-35
(January 16, 2002)

FACTS:

The complainant, Michelle Darunday, was living with Erma Blanca, and Ma. Teresa Gellaver. On the night of the incident, Erma was
awakened by the presence of a man. The man had his head covered with a t-shirt to prevent identification and carried a knife about
four inches long and asked where the money was. Erma Blanca and Michelle Darunday gave the money because they were
threatened by the man to be killed.

The assailant then blindfolded Michelle and began to rape her. After satisfying his lust, the assailant conversed for a while with
complainants. The accused, threatening to call his companions, then, again, raped the complainant in the other orifice of the
complainant’s nether regions. Accused then warned the women not to report or else they would be killed. After 30 mins. The
complainants told their neighbor of what happened. Then they told the owner of the boarding house what happened who then told
the police.

Physical description of the assailant was given by the complainant at the police station. Police found that the descriptions given by
the complainant fit that of a worker in the Coffee Break Corner, where the accused was employed. Heading there, the police asked
of the accused whereabouts which was, as they were told, watching a basketball game. The police arrested the accused (w/o
warrant) and proceeded to the police station where he saw the complainant and inadvertently blushed. Complainant then identified
him based on the marks on the neck and matched other physical descriptions. Court of first instance ruled that accused is found
guilty of robbery and rape with no mitigating circumstances and is hereby sentenced with maximum penalty of death.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest was valid?

HELD: NO.
The accused-appellant was watching a basketball game when he was seized therefore he was not 1.) In flagrante delicto 2.) He was
not an escaped convict 3) the arrest was not after direct consummation of the crime.

The question here is whether these cases fall under paragraph (b) because the police officers had personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would lead them to believe that accused-appellant had just committed a crime. The phrase “personal
knowledge” in paragraph Section 5(b) of Rule 113 has been defined that personal knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant
must be based upon “probable cause” which means “an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.

The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person
to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be
founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officer making the arrest.

Here, in question of the “Personal Knowledge”, the police were not at the scene of the crime when it happened, therefore “Personal
Knowledge” does not apply. Furthermore, there was ample time for police to procure a warrant and no reason for them not to
obtain one. This deficiency is, however, cured once accused-appellant submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court and not
questioning the invalidity of the arrest. 

The accused-appellant, having been the focus of attention by the police after he had being pointed by a Ramie as the possible
suspect of the crime, was already under custodial investigation when these out-of-court identifications were conducted by the
police. Thereby all questions answered by accused-appellant is hereby deemed as hearsay. Furthermore, his right to counsel was
violated. Hence, evidence is inadmissible in court.

Hence, it is found that the prosecution has failed to meet the degree of proof beyond reasonable doubt required in a criminal case.

In lieu of the above mentioned, the Supreme Court hereby reverses the sentence and acquits the accused-appellant

12. ROGER POSADAS, ROSARIO TORRES-YU, and MARICHU LAMBINO, petitioners vs. HON. OMBUDSMAN, THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, and ORLANDO V. DIZON, respondents

G.R. No. 131492 (September 29, 2000)

FACTS:

Dennis Venturina, a member of Sigma Rho at the University of the Philippines, was killed in a rumble between his fraternity and
another fraternity.

Petitioner Roger Posadas, then Chancellor of U.P. Diliman, asked the Director of the NBI for assistance in determining the persons
responsible for the crime. In response to the request, respondent Dizon, Chief of the Special Operations Group of the NBI, and his
men went to U.P. and attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag, officers/members of the Scintilla Juris
Fraternity, as suspects in the killing of Venturina. Petitioners Posadas, Marichu Lambino, and Rosario Torres-Yu, also of U.P., and a
certain Atty. Villamor, counsel for the suspects, objected on the ground that the NBI did not have warrants of arrest with them.

As a result of their intervention, Taparan and Narag were not arrested by the NBI agents on that day. However, criminal charges
were filed later against the two student suspects.

Dizon then filed a complaint in the Office of the Special Prosecutor, charging petitioners with violation of P.D. 1829, which makes it
unlawful for anyone to obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders.

Later, on motion of petitioners, the Special Prosecutor's Office recommended the dismissal of the case. But the recommendation
was disapproved. In a memorandum, the Office of the Ombudsman directed the Special Prosecutor to proceed with the prosecution
of petitioners in the Sandiganbayan.

Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the resolution of the Ombudsman's office ordering the prosecution of
petitioners

ISSUES:

(1) Whether the attempted arrest of the student suspects by the NBI could be validly made without a warrant; and

(2) Whether there was probable cause for prosecuting petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829.
RULING:

(1)

In view of Art. III, §2 of the Constitution, the rule is that no arrest may be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after
examining the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and after finding probable cause to believe that the person to be
arrested has committed the crime. The exceptions when an arrest may be made even without a warrant are provided in Rule 113, §5
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

This case does not fall under any of the cases provided in Rule 113, §5.

The NBI agents in the case at bar tried to arrest Narag and Taparan four days after the commission of the crime. They had no
personal knowledge of any fact which might indicate that the two students were probably guilty of the crime. What they had were
the supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, which is insufficient to justify the arrest without a warrant by the
NBI.

Indeed, at the time Dennis Venturina was killed, these agents were nowhere near the scene of the crime. When respondent Dizon
and his men attempted to arrest Taparan and Narag, the latter were not committing a crime nor were they doing anything that
would create the suspicion that they were doing anything illegal.

To allow the arrest which the NBI intended to make without warrant would in effect allow them to supplant the courts. The
determination of the existence of probable cause that the persons to be arrested committed the crime was for the judge to make.
The law authorizes a police officer or even an ordinary citizen to arrest criminal offenders only if the latter are committing or have
just committed a crime. Otherwise, we cannot leave to the police officers the determination of whom to apprehend if we are to
protect our civil liberties.

For the failure of the NBI agents to comply with constitutional and procedural requirements, we hold that their attempt to arrest
Taparan and Narag without a warrant was illegal.

(2)

There is no probable cause to charge Posadas, Torres-Yu, Lambino, Bentain and Atty. Villamor of violating Section 1(c) of P.D. 1829.

The absence of an arrest warrant, the absence of knowledge or reasonable ground on the part of the accused to believe that the
students had committed a crime, the absence of any law punishing refusal to attend an investigation at the NBI, all show that there
is no sufficient ground to charge the accused with Obstruction of Justice. On the contrary, the circumstances show that the accused,
in safeguarding the rights of students, were acting within the bounds of law.

13. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.
FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "NENETH," accused-appellants.

G.R. No. 125299 (January 22, 1999)

PUNO, J.:

FACTS:

On December 7, 1995, accused-appellants Florencio Doria y Bolado and Violeta Gaddao y Catama @ "Neneth" were charged with
violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

In November 1995, members of the North Metropolitan District, Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command (Narcom),
received information from two (2) civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun" was engaged in illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong City.
The Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrest "Jun" in a buy-bust operation.

On December 5, 1995, "Jun" appeared and the CI introduced PO3 Manlangit as interested in buying one (1) kilo of marijuana. P03
Manlangit handed "Jun" the marked bills worth P1,600.00. "Jun" instructed P03 Manlangit to wait for him at the corner of Shaw
Boulevard and Jacinto Street while he got the marijuana from his associate. 5 An hour later, "Jun" appeared at the agreed place
where P03 Manlangit, the CI and the rest of the team were waiting. "Jun" took out from his bag an object wrapped in plastic and
gave it to P03 Manlangit. P03 Manlangit forthwith arrested "Jun" as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the arrest. They frisked "Jun" but
did not find the marked bills on him. Upon inquiry, "Jun" revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate named
"Neneth.6 "Jun" led the police team to "Neneth's" house nearby at Daang Bakal.

The team found the door of "Neneth's" house open and a woman inside. "Jun" identified the woman as his associate. 7 SPO1 Badua
asked "Neneth" about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over "Neneth's" house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed
a carton box under the dining table. He saw that one of the box's flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped in
plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun." His suspicion aroused,
PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained ten (10)
bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.

Simultaneous with the box's discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from "Neneth." 8 The policemen arrested "Neneth."
They took "Neneth" and "Jun," together with the box, its contents and the marked bills and turned them over to the investigator at
headquarters. It was only then that the police learned that "Jun" is Florencio Doria y Bolado while "Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao y
Catama

ISSUE:

(1) WHETHER the buy-bust operation in the apprehension of accused-appellant Doria was valid.

(2) WHETHER the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and house, and the admissibility of the
pieces of evidence obtained therefrom was valid.

RULING:

1. YES

Accused-appellants were caught by the police in a buy-bust operation. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by
peace officers as an effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission of an offense.

We hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as
provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

xxx xxx xxx 103

Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense." Appellant Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is
apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him
even without a warrant.

2. NO

Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest under Section 5
(a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was no occasion at all for
appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit." 114 In fact, she was going about her daily chores
when the policemen pounced on her.

Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule 113. "Personal knowledge" of facts in
arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion."115 The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based an actual facts,  i.e.,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. 116 A
reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers
making the arrest.117

Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her co-accused. PO3 Manlangit,
however, declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria named his co-accused in response to his (PO3 Manlangit's) query as
to where the marked money was. 118 Appellant Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but as
the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao
conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs. Appellant Doria may have left the money in her house, 119 with or without her
knowledge, with or without any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant Doria 's word, the Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds
to believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. If there is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had, in
his own right, knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally
objectionable.120

Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the search of her person and home and the
subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City acting as a Special Court in Criminal Case No.
3307-D is reversed and modified as follows:

1. Accused-appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua  and to pay a fine of five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).

2. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama is acquitted.

PEOPLE v. NASARIO MOLINA

G.R. No. 133917 February 19, 2001

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS:

Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, a member of the Philippine National Police detailed at Precinct No. 3, Matina,
Davao City, received an information regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in the City. The first time he came to see
the said marijuana pusher in person was during the first week of July 1996 when his informer pointed to the motorcycle driver,
accused-appellant Mula, as the pusher. As to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him before the
arrest. Moreover, the names and addresses of the accused-appellants came to the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they
were arrested.

In the morning of August 8, 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information that the alleged pusher will be passing at NHA, Ma-a,
Davao City any time that morning. Consequently, he called for assistance at the PNP, Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, which
immediately dispatched the team of SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2 Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon),
and SPO1 Pamplona.

While the team were positioned in the house of SPO1 Paguidopon, a "trisikad" carrying the accused-appellants passed by. SPO1
Paguidopon pointed to the accused-appellants as the pushers. Thereupon, the team boarded their vehicle and overtook the
"trisikad” and ordered it to stop.

At that point, accused-appellant Mula who was holding a black bag handed the same to accused-appellant Molina. Subsequently,
SPO1 Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked accused-appellant Molina to open the bag. Molina replied, "Boss, if
possible we will settle this."14 SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside.
Thereafter; accused-appellants Mula and Molina were handcuffed by the police officers.

On December 6, 1996, accused-appellants, through counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to Evidence, contending that the marijuana
allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained in violation of their constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The demurrer was denied by the trial court. A motion for reconsideration was filed by accused-
appellants, but this was likewise denied. Accused-appellants waived presentation of evidence and opted to file a joint memorandum.
Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised penal Code and Rule 122, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the case was elevated to this Court
on automatic review.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the marijuana is in admissible in evidence for having been seized in violation of appellants' constitutional rights
against unreasonable, searches and seizures?

2. Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure in the present case fall within the recognized exceptions to the
warrant requirement.

RULING:

FIRST ISSUE: NO. The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried out in a reasonable fashion, that
is, by virtue or on the strength of a search warrant predicated upon the existence of a probable cause. The pertinent provision of the
Constitution provides:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.21

Complementary to the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined under Article III, Section 3, paragraph 2, which bolsters
and solidifies the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.22 Thus:

Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Without this rule, the right to privacy would be a form of words, valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of
inestimable human liberties; so too, without this rule, the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so
neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's
high regard as a freedom implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.

The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is not without exceptions. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant
and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search
of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself
waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures;24 and (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search).25

The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid
warrantless arrest which must precede the search. In this instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search
can be made --- the process cannot be reversed.

SECOND ISSUE: NO. As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest. The Rules of Court,
however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense
(arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit); and (c) when
the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or
is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another ( arrest of
escaped prisoners ).

In the case at bar, the court a quo anchored its judgment of conviction on a finding that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellants,
and the subsequent search conducted by the peace officers, are valid because accused-appellants were caught in flagrante delicto in
possession of prohibited drugs.

Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.38
In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board a
trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to be committing, attempting to commit or have committed a crime. It matters not
that accused-appellant Molina responded "Boss, if possible we will settle this" to the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag.
Such response which allegedly reinforced the "suspicion" of the arresting officers that accused-appellants were committing a crime,
is an equivocal statement which standing alone will not constitute probable cause to effect an inflagrante delicto arrest. Note that
were it not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon (who did not participate in the arrest but merely pointed accused-appellants to the
arresting officers), accused-appellants could not be the subject of any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise.

While SPO1 Paguidopon claimed that he and his informer conducted a surveillance of accused-appellant Mula, SPO1 Paguidopon,
however, admitted that he only learned Mula's name and address after the arrest. What is more, it is doubtful if SPO1 Paguidopon
indeed recognized accused-appellant Mula. It is worthy to note that, before the arrest, he was able to see Mula in person only once,
pinpointed to him by his informer while they were on the side of the road. These circumstances could not have afforded SPO1
Paguidopon a closer look at accused-appellant Mula, considering that the latter was then driving a motorcycle when, SPO1
Paguidopon caught a glimpse of him. With respect to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon admitted that he had never seen
him before the arrest, which belies the claim of SPO1 Pamplona that he knew the name of accused-appellants even before the
arrest.

The aforecited testimony of SPO1 Pamplona, therefore, is entirely baseless SPO1 Pamplona could not have learned the name of
accused-appellants from SPO1 Paguipodon because Paguipodon himself, who allegedly conducted the surveillance, was not even
aware of accused-appellants' name and address prior to the arrest.

Evidently, SPO1 Paguidopon, who acted as informer of the arresting officers, more so the arresting officers themselves, could not
have been certain of accused-appellants' identity, and were, from all indications, merely fishing for evidence at the time of the
arrest.

Moreover, it could not be said that accused-appellants waived their right against unreasonable searches and seizure. Implied
acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or
coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.41

Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the
search conducted on their person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be
admitted as evidence against accused-appellants, and the Court is thus, left with no choice but to find in favor of accused-appellants.

While the Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our law-
enforcement officers towards this drive, all efforts for the achievement of a drug-free society must not encroach on the fundamental
rights and liberties of individuals as guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which protection extends even to the basest of criminals.

15. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE RAYRAY y AREOLA

G.R. No. 90628 (February 1, 1995)

Facts:

P/Lt. Ramon Ancheta was at the Friendly Shop located at Ortega St., San Fernando, La Union, when accused-appellant Jose Rayray y
Areola approached him offering to sell marijuana.

Making the latter believe that he was interested in buying, Lt. Ancheta asked where the merchandise was and accused-appellant
responded by taking marijuana wrapped in komiks from his pocket. Catching sight of the marijuana fruiting tops and marijuana
cigarette being... offered him, Lt. Ancheta immediately identified himself as a police officer, arrested accused-appellant and brought
him to the San Fernando Police Station where he was turned over to the desk officer, Sgt. Carmelito Leyga, who entered the details
of the arrest in the police... blotter.

Accused-appellant denied making the offer to sell and instead testified that he was at Dodies' Fishing Supply at Ortega Street with
his friend Bonifacio Chan to buy fish hooks when he was suddenly tapped on the shoulder by somebody who whispered, "Don't try
to involve somebody."

After being ordered to undress, he was made to face the stranger who was holding something wrapped in paper and which he tried
to pass off as that of accused-appellant by saying, "You are selling marijuana." Afterwards, accused-appellant was forced into a
tricycle, brought to... the municipal jail and there incarcerated for no reason.
Accused-appellant argues that his arrest was illegal because P/Lt. Ancheta had no authority to arrest persons in San Fernando, La
Union, being then assigned at the Regional INP Command in Baguio City.

Issue:

Whether P/Lt. Ancheta had authority to arrest Rayray

Ruling:

We cannot yield to appellant's view that just because Lt. Ancheta was assigned in Baguio City he could not arrest persons caught in
the act of committing a crime in some other place, especially so where he was the intended victim. A policeman cannot callously set
aside his... essential duty of apprehending criminal offenders and of keeping peace and order on the shallow excuse that he is not in
his place of assignment. His responsibility to protect the public by apprehending violators of the law, especially one caught in
flagrante delicto is... not limited by territorial constraints. It follows him wherever he goes.

Moreover, Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizes a warrantless arrest, otherwise called a
citizen's arrest, "when, in his presence, the person to be arrested... has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense." Thus, although officially assigned in Baguio City, Lt. Ancheta's act of arresting accused-appellant (after the latter
offered to sell him marijuana in San Fernando, La Union) is justified not only... by his duty as a law enforcer but also by Sec. 5 of Rule
113, which authorizes instances of warrantless or citizens' arrests.

16. United States vs. Silvestre Pompeya

G.R. No. L-10255 (August 6, 1915)

Facts:

This case is regarding the complaint filed by the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Iloilo, charging Silvestre Pompeya with
violation of the municipal ordinance of Iloilo for willfully, illegally, and criminally and without justifiable motive failing to render
service on patrol duty, required under a municipal ordinance (Executive Order No. 1, series of 1914, based on section 40 (m) of the
Municipal Code).

Because of the violation, the said accused was sentenced by the justice of the peace of Iloilo to a fine of P2 and payment of the costs
of the trial, from which judgment said accused appealed to the Court of First Instance.

Upon said complaint the defendant was duly arraigned. Upon arraignment he presented the demurrer saying that he demurs to the
complaint filed in this case on the ground that the acts charged therein do not constitute a crime.

In support of said demurrer, the defendant presented the following argument: "The municipal ordinance alleged to be violated is
unconstitutional because it is repugnant to the Organic Act of the Philippines, which guarantees the liberty of the citizens."

The trial judge sustained said demurrer and ordered the dismissal of the complaint.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer of the accused.

Held:

No.

Section 40 of Act No. 82 (the Municipal Code) relates to the power of municipal councils. Act No. 1309 amends said section . The
specific purpose of said amendment empowers the municipal council to authorize municipal president to require each able-bodied
male resident of the municipality, between the ages of 18 and 55 [50], as well as each householder when so required by the
president, to assist in the maintenance of peace and good order in the community, by apprehending ladrones or outlaws, etc., as
well as by giving information of the existence of such persons in the locality. The amendment contains a punishment for those who
may be called upon for such service, and who refuse to render the same.

An ancient obligation of the individual to assist in the protection of the peace and good order of his community is still recognized in
all well-organized governments in the "posse comitatus" (power of the county, poder del condado). (Book 1 Cooley's Blackstone's
Commentaries, 343; Book 4, 122.) Under this power, those persons in the state, county, or town who were charged with the
maintenance of peace and good order were bound, ex oficio, to pursue and to take all persons who had violated the law. For that
purpose they might command all the male inhabitants of a certain age to assist them. This power is called "posse comitatus" (power
of the county). This was a right well recognized at common law. Act No. 1309 is a statutory recognition of such common-law right.
Said Act attempts simply to designate the cases and the method when and by which the people of the town (pueblo) may be called
upon to render assistance for the protection of the public and the preservation of peace and order. It is an exercise of the police
power of the state.

Even admitting all of the facts in the complaint in the present case, the court would be unable to impose the punishment provided
for by law, because it does not show (a) that the defendant was a male citizen of the municipality; (b) that he was an able-bodied
citizen; (c) that he was not under 18 years of age nor over 55; nor (d) that conditions existed which justified the president of the
municipality in calling upon him for the services mentioned in the law.

16. People v. Rodriguez

G.R. No. 129211 (October 2, 2000)

FACTS: Artellero was employed as a cement mixer and helper of co-accused Rodriguez, a mason in the construction of the upper
floors of the Far East Bank and Trust Company - Manila. Both were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide for the killing of
the bank security guard, Matias.

On October 11, 1991, early in the morning, at the FEBTC-Manila, a messenger discovered the lifeless body of Matias, inside the bank
premises. At around 6:00 A.M., SPO3 Mendoza and two other officers of the WPD arrived after receiving a report on the incident.
They interviewed the bank janitor, a Mr. Cawagdan, and the other security guard, Vargas. Then they ordered the transfer of the
body of Matias to the morgue.

At around 4:00 P.M., SPO3 Jamoralin and four other WPD policemen conducted a follow-up investigation. They learned from Vargas
that there was an on-going construction on the upper floors of the bank, and that Artellero and Rodriguez had access to the bank
after office hours. SPO3 Jamoralin asked Vargas to accompany them to the barracks of the construction workers where they saw
Artellero at the ground floor of the construction site. On the third floor, they saw Rodriguez, packing his personal belongings. When
asked why he was packing, Rodriguez replied that he had nothing more to do at the site. SPO3 Jamoralin and the other police
officers saw a pair of worn-out maong pants on Artellero's bed, which had reddish stains on the right leg. The police also saw reddish
stains on Rodriguez's shirt. Rodriguez explained that he had a wound on his neck. However, when the police examined his neck, they
found no wound. The police then arrested Rodriguez and Artellero and brought them to the police station for interrogation. The
police took the maong and t-shirt and had them examined by the Chemistry Section of NBI.

On October 15, 1991, Rodriguez executed a sworn statement confessing that he and Artellero together with one Mendoza, and two
other men whose names he did not know, killed Matias. Rodriguez was assisted by the Public Attorneys Office.

Custodio testified that the reddish stains on Artellero's pants and Rodriguez's shirt were positive for type O human blood, which was
also the blood type of Rodriguez.

After presentation of the prosecution's evidence, Artellero filed a Demurrer to the Evidence on the grounds that the prosecution
failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and that testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were
hearsay. Upon the Opposition of the public prosecutor, the trial court denied the demurrer for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of accused Rodriguez is admissible not only against him but also against Artellero

HELD:

No.

The SC find that Rodriguez's confession is constitutionally flawed so that it could not be used as evidence against them at all.
The four fundamental requisites for the admissibility of a confession are (1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) the confession
must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) the confession must be express; and (4) the
confession must be in writing.

Here, the second requisite is lacking. Prosecution witness SPO3 Jamoralin testified that Artellero and Rodriguez were arrested and
brought to the police station at around 5:00 P.M. of October 11, 1991. The records show that the extrajudicial confession of
Rodriguez was taken down by Pat. Tuazon at 2:00 P.M. of October 15, 1991. Atty. Lao confirmed on the stand that the police
investigators called him at around 2:00 P.M. of October 15, 1991, and that he conferred with the accused for about 10 minutes prior
to the execution of the extrajudicial confession.

Evidently, Rodriguez and Artellero were detained for four days, but Atty. Lao of the PAO was called only on the fourth day of
detention when accused was about to put his confession in writing. Under the factual milieu, the moment Artellero and Rodriguez
were arrested and brought to the police station, they were already under custodial investigation.

An accused who is already under custodial investigation, should be accorded his rights under the Constitution. The rights of persons
under custodial investigation is enshrined in Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution which provides:

Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof (right against self-incrimination) shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violation of this section as well as compensation for the rehabilitation of
victims of tortures or similar practices, and their families.

Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but has begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect.

When Rodriguez and Artellero were arrested by the police in the afternoon of October 11, 1991, they were already the suspects in
the slaying of the security guard, Matias, and should have been afforded the rights guaranteed by the Constitution, particularly the
right to counsel. The records do not show that Rodriguez and Artellero, at the time of their arrest in the afternoon of October 11,
1991, were informed of the well-known Miranda rights. Worse, they were not provided with competent and independent counsel
during the custodial investigation prior to the execution of the extrajudicial confession.

Jurisprudence is clear that an accused under custodial investigation must continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very
start thereof. In this case, Rodriguez and Artellero were in the hands of the police for about four days without the assistance of
counsel. The operative act, it has been stressed, is when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime
but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who has been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation
that lends itself to eliciting incriminatory statements, and not the signing by the suspect of his supposed extrajudicial confession.
Admissions obtained during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel although later reduced to writing and signed in
the presence of counsel are still flawed under the Constitution.

The purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial investigation is to curb the uncivilized practice of extracting confession
even by the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. What is sought to be avoided is the evil of
extorting from the very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of an offense, the very evidence with
which to prosecute and thereafter convict him. These constitutional guarantees have been made available to protect him from the
inherently coercive psychological, if not physical, atmosphere of such investigation.

Moreover, so stringent is this requirement that even if the confession of an accused speaks the truth, if it was made without the
assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion, or even if it had been voluntarily given.

Since the extrajudicial confession executed by Rodriguez was given in violation of the safeguards in Art. III, Sec. 12 of the 1987
Constitution, we hold that Rodriguez's confession is totally inadmissible, and it was error for the trial court to use it in convicting
Rodriguez and Artellero.
Insofar as Rodriguez is concerned, the trial court relied on his extrajudicial confession in convicting him. Aside from said extrajudicial
confession, however, there is a dearth of evidence on record, whether direct or circumstantial, linking Rodriguez to the commission
of the crime.

As to Artellero, the trial court convicted him on the basis of two pieces of circumstantial evidence which show conspiracy: (1) the
extrajudicial confession of Rodriguez implicating him as one of the perpetrators and (2) the fact that the maong pants allegedly
belonging to Artellero was found positive of type O blood. The former being inadmissible and the latter being of no probative value
since the blood type of Artellero and the victim were not taken for purposes of comparison, there remains nothing to support
Artellero's conviction.

As pointed out by the OSG, even granting arguendo that the extrajudicial confession of Rodriguez was admissible, Section 33 of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court provides that such confession is only admissible against the confessant. In order to be admissible against
his co-accused, Section 30 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court require there must be independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial
confession to prove conspiracy. In this case, however, no other piece of evidence was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy.

As we have elucidated, the evidence against and the conviction of both Artellero and Rodriguez are inextricably linked. Hence,
Artellero's acquittal, which is favorable and applicable to Rodriguez, should benefit the latter.

The decision of the trial court was REVERSED. Artellero and Rodriguez are ACQUITTED.