1st Ed Pipelines Manual - PETROBRAS

Arpel Reference Manual
for Pipelines
Integrity Management
actices
Pr
t
s
Be
REGIONAL ASSOCIATION OF OIL, GAS AND BIOFUELS SECTOR COMPANIES

IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
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ARPEL Reference Manual for Pipeline Integrity
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Management
1st revised edition
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Pipelines and Terminals Committee

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ARPEL, May 2011
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ARPEL Reference Manual for Pipeline integrity Management ‐ 1st revised Edition
ARPEL Reference Manual No. 1 ‐ 2011 ARPEL Pipeline integrity Project Team

May 2011 was in charge of the development and
review of this document.
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This manual was developed within the
context of the ARPEL Pipeline integrity ANCAP: Guillermo Boam. ECOPETROL:
Project of ARPEL Pipelines and Terminals Arnulfo Gamarra, Juan Carlos Villegas,
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Committee: Julio Alonso, Francisco Ascencio. EP‐
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Petroecuador: José Sánchez Nuñez.
Julio Alonso ‐ ECOPETROL PEMEX: José Juan Sánchez Ghenno.
Guillermo Boam ‐ ANCAP PETROBRAS: Anibal Fernandes, Ricardo
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Álvaro Castañeda ‐ ECOPETROL (Vice Dias. PETROPERU: Esteban Bertarelli,
Chair) Manuel Tomey. RECOPE: Hanzel
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Juan Carlos Gómez Haedo ‐ ANCAP Rodríguez. RepsolYPF: Arturo Heinke.
Gabriel Grzona ‐ Repsol YPF (Chair) ARPEL: Miguel Moyano.
Arturo Heinke ‐ Repsol YPF
Luis Loría Luna ‐ RECOPE
Luciano Maldonado García ‐ PETROBRAS
Carlos Navarro ‐ ENAP (Vice Chair)
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valuable contribution of the following
professionals:
Paulo Penchiná ‐ PETROBRAS (Vice Chair)
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Carla Pereira Imbroisi ‐ IBP Juan Carlos Gómez Haedo and Raúl
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Jaime Rodríguez Salazar ‐ RECOPE Sampedro (ANCAP), John Glanville (PCJ),

Kelvin Salmon ‐ PCJ Jeter de Freitas, Gutemberg de Souza
Raul Sampedro Farias ‐ ANCAP Pimenta and Mario Pezzi Filho
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José Sánchez Nuñez ‐ EP‐Petroecuador (PETROBRAS), Diana Pizarro (RECOPE),

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José Juan Sánchez Ghenno ‐ PEMEX Félix Hurtado, Henry Requena, Julio

Gaston Schoffield ‐ ENAP Sánchez and Luis Llompart (PETROPERU),
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Brian Taniguchi ‐ Chevron José Luis Martínez González (PEMEX).
Manuel Tomey ‐ PETROPERU

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ARPEL Reference Manual No. 1
The objectives of ARPEL Pipeline integrity Disclaimer
Project Team as established by the Although all efforts were made to ensure
Pipelines and Terminals Committee are the accuracy of the information contained
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the following: in this publication, neither ARPEL nor any
of its Member Companies assume any
 To create a reference manual to responsibility for any use made hereof. No
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develop Integrity Management references made to names or trademarks
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Programs. of equipment manufacturers and/or
 To facilitate the exchange of processes represent any endorsement by
experiences and common criteria on ARPEL or any Member Company.
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Pipeline integrity among ARPEL
Member Companies.
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 To promote the reduction of the
pipeline integrity management gaps
among different companies.
 To share and develop best practices
for excellence in operational integrity
management.
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 To adopt the best practices as
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established by international standards.
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Copyright
The copyright of this document, whether
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in printed version or electronically stored

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or otherwise is held by the Regional

Association of Oil, Gas and Biofuels Sector
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Companies in Latin America and the

Caribbean (ARPEL). Any copy of this
document must include this copyright
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notice. The user shall give—in future use

of this document ‐ full credit to ARPEL for
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being the source of information.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction and Purpose .................................................................................................... 1
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2. Scope .................................................................................................................................... 2
3. Background ........................................................................................................................... 7
4. Glossary of Terms ................................................................................................................. 8
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5. Baseline Assessment Plan .................................................................................................. 23
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5.1. Pipe Material Records ............................................................................................... 24
5.2. Pipeline Construction Records .................................................................................. 24
5.3. Infrastructure Records .............................................................................................. 24
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5.4. Records related to environment aggressiveness (fluids and soil) ............................ 25
5.5. Right‐of‐Way or Easement Records .......................................................................... 25
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5.6. Coating Records ......................................................................................................... 25
5.7. Cathodic Protection System Records ........................................................................ 26
5.8. Preventive Maintenance Records ............................................................................. 26
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5.9. Operational Records .................................................................................................. 26
5.10. Historical Failure Records .......................................................................................... 27
5.11. Corrective Maintenance Records .............................................................................. 27
5.12. Records related to high consequence areas and mitigation of consequences ........ 27
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5.13. Checklist for Baseline Assessment ............................................................................ 29
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6. Risk Assessment and Management .................................................................................... 31
6.1. Definition of Risk ....................................................................................................... 31
6.2. Risk Assessment ........................................................................................................ 32
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6.2.1. Calculation of Probability of Failure (PoF) ...................................................... 33
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6.2.2. Calculation of Consequence of Failure (CoF) ................................................. 34
6.3. Information required for the risk assessment .......................................................... 35
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7. Failure mechanisms due to threats .................................................................................... 36
7.1. Internal corrosion ...................................................................................................... 36
7.1.1. Description of threats of damage due to internal corrosion ......................... 36
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7.1.2. Types of damage caused by internal corrosion ............................................. 37
7.1.3. Checklist for internal corrosion ...................................................................... 39
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7.2. External corrosion ..................................................................................................... 40
7.2.1. Description of threats of damage due to external corrosion ........................ 40
7.2.2. Types of damage caused by external corrosion ............................................. 41
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7.2.2.1. Selective ERW seam corrosion ......................................................... 41
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7.2.2.2. Narrow axial external corrosion ....................................................... 41
7.2.2.3. Bacterial corrosion ‐ Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion
(MIC) ................................................................................................. 42
7.2.2.4. Galvanic corrosion ............................................................................ 43
7.2.2.5. Stress corrosion ‐ stress corrosion cracking (SCC) ........................... 43
7.2.2.6. Parasite or erratic current corrosion ............................................... 44
7.2.2.7. Differential aeration corrosion ........................................................ 44
7.2.3. Checklist for external corrosion ..................................................................... 45
7.3. Natural forces ............................................................................................................ 46
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7.3.1. Description of threats of damage due to the natural forces ......................... 46
7.3.2. Types of damage produced by the natural forces ......................................... 47
7.3.3. Checklist for the natural forces ...................................................................... 48
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7.4. Third‐party actions .................................................................................................... 49
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7.4.1. Description of threats of damage due to third‐party actions ........................ 49
7.4.2. Types of third‐party damage .......................................................................... 49
7.4.2.1. Dents ................................................................................................ 49
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7.4.2.1.1. Plain dents ....................................................................... 50
7.4.2.1.2. Dents with a stress concentrator .................................... 50
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7.4.2.1.3. Double dents ................................................................... 50
7.4.2.1.4. Dents affecting welds ...................................................... 50
7.4.2.2. Scratches .......................................................................................... 50
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7.4.2.3. Arc burns .......................................................................................... 50
7.4.2.4. Illegal perforations ........................................................................... 51
7.4.2.5. Attacks .............................................................................................. 51
7.4.3. Checklist for third‐party actions ..................................................................... 52
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7.5. Operational errors ..................................................................................................... 53
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7.5.1. Description of threats of damage due to operational errors ........................ 53
7.5.2. Types of damage caused by operational errors ............................................. 53
7.5.3. Checklist for operational errors ..................................................................... 55
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8. Action plans and maintenance program ............................................................................ 57
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8.1. Action plans to mitigate risks .................................................................................... 57
8.2. Risk re‐assessment and changes to the action plan ................................................. 60
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8.3. Management of change in a pipeline integrity program .......................................... 61
9. Integrity Program evaluation ............................................................................................. 62
9.1. Performance indicators ............................................................................................. 62
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9.2. Audits ......................................................................................................................... 63
9.3. Continuous performance improvement ................................................................... 64
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10. Standards, regulations and technical documents .............................................................. 65
APPENDIX A – Means, actions and methods to determine and control internal
corrosion ........................................................................................................ 68
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APPENDIX B – Means, actions and methods to determine and control external
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corrosion ........................................................................................................ 77
APPENDIX C – Means, actions and methods to determine and control the
natural forces ................................................................................................. 85
APPENDIX D – Means, actions and methods to determine and control
third‐party damage ........................................................................................ 91
APPENDIX E – Means, actions and methods to determine and control
operational errors .......................................................................................... 98
APPENDIX F – Alternative actions for control and mitigation of threats –
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Acceptable repair and prevention methods ................................................ 101
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1. Introduction and Purpose This Manual is accompanied by an

ExcelTM file with check lists to establish
The integrity of an equipment or facility is the baseline of the pipeline and for each
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its ability to perform the function for threat (internal corrosion, external
which it was designed safely and reliably, corrosion, third party actions, natural
forces and operational errors) with the
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without affecting the security of people or
the environment. Pipeline integrity purpose of facilitating the review and
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management is a set of coordinated compilation of the information required
actions which objective is to maintain to support the assessment of the
during the useful life of a pipeline and its probability and consequences of failures
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facilities, the performance planned as it during the risk analysis exercise.
was designed, while efficiently managing Although these check lists are described
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the risks related to potential threats and in this Manual, the electronic file allows
the consequences of any failure on the the user to print it for field work
environment, health, safety, corporate purposes as well as to include comments
image, customers, economic losses and
physical security, within the social
responsibility, environmental health and
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and distribute it electronically among the
professionals responsible of the integrity
program of the company.

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safety policies of the operating
companies.
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This document aims at providing a general
guideline to ARPEL Member Companies
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and other oil and gas sector operators, so
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that they may check their own

management and/or apply the best
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practices to ensure the integrity of gas,

liquid hydrocarbon and biofuel pipelines in
order to achieve excellence in its
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operational, social and environmental

responsible management. The guidelines
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and practices established in this document
are indicative and not mandatory. This
document does not reflect the legal
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requirements of specific jurisdictions. The

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companies should be aware of the

corresponding requirements applicable to
their respective jurisdictions.

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2. Scope  is a reference on the basic elements to
be studied and recommended to be
This Manual provides ARPEL Member included in an integrity plan, without
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Companies with a set of referential limiting the degree of depth and
instructions and procedures that may be development required in each
particular case;
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modified to adapt them to the specific
situation at each company and to the
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applicable legal or corporate regulations.  analyzes thoroughly the failure modes
This Manual: and risk assessment and management,
with a priority on prevention within
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 covers the main issues to be included the problems to be faced, in order to
in a pipeline integrity management ensure the continuous and safe
operation of the pipelines;
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program;
 includes underground, submarine and  provides management indicators to

companies, which allow them to
aerial operating pipelines, as well as
segments internal to production fields,
refineries or terminals, even if the
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programs; and
specific characteristics of these
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segments require additional  provides the main reference
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considerations beyond the regulations and bibliography to

recommendations of this Manual; develop a pipeline integrity plan.

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Basic elements of the Integrity Management Plan ‐ ARPEL
Chapter 6 ‐ Risk
Chapter 5 ‐ assessment and
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Identification of management:
pipeline baseline  Segmentation
 Data Base  Identification of high
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consequences areas
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Chapter 9 – Integrity
Program Evaluation
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Chapter 7 – Failure modes
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 Threats
Chapter 8 – Action
 Integrity evaluation
plans and
Appendices: Means,
maintenance
program
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determine and control
threats – Toolbox
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This Manual covers the following watersheds, others, sensitivity maps.

elements of an integrity plan:
3. Failure modes
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1. Identification of baseline: pipeline  Total failure or rupture

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characterization, design and  Partial failure or leakage

construction, signaling and geo‐
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referencing, maintenance and 4. Failure mechanisms due to threats

inspection history.  Internal corrosion
 External corrosion
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2. Risk assessment and management:  Natural forces
 Risk levels;  Third party actions
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 Pipeline segmentation;  Operational errors
 Threats: failure probability;
 Consequences: population, 5. Integrity Program evaluation
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environment, economy, image,  Indicators

external and internal customers;
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 Audits
 Mitigation: minimum requirements  Continuous improvement
to mitigate a risk, action plan in
high consequence areas:
environment, populations,

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ARPEL has adopted a model of the Integral framework of the integrity management

Environment, Health and Safety elements described in this document. See
Management System (SIGAS&SI). It helps Figure 1.
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as a reference for companies to adopt it or
adapt it according to the management
system they use to develop their business
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efficiently. The SIGAS&SI is also the
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Figure 1: Integral Environment, Health and Safety Management System (SIGAS&SI) – The
system has three components (human factor, methods and facilities) and 18 elements
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This Manual focuses mostly on the a) between the gathering pipeline of
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application of best practices regarding an exploitation concession plant

element 17 (mechanical integrity) to apply and the oil treatment plant outside
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to the additional pipelines and facilities it;

composing the fixed and permanent b) between the crude oil treatment
facilities of the pipelines transportation plant and the tank farm;
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system according to Figure 21 that allow to c) between tank farms;
duly prevent, minimize or avoid any risk d) from refineries to distribution
condition and the associated undesirable terminals;
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event in the operation of these systems: e) between pump stations;
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f) from the tank farm at the terminal
1 to the oil buoy or to loading and
This document will be periodically revised by
ARPEL Member Companies virtually through unloading piers; or
networks of experts. Besides, there are other g) other points of product
important elements to manage pipeline integrity distribution and receipt.
that are not discussed in detail in this document.
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Consequently, the facilities within the  Below 15 psi (1 bar), regardless

scope of this Manual are the following: of temperature.
a) Main pipeline among pipeline  Above 15 psi (1 bar) if the
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terminals (marine, railroad and design temperature is below –
trucks), pump stations, pressure 30°C (‐22°F) or above 120°C
reduction stations and measuring (248°F).
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stations, including scraper traps d) Pipes or pipelines used in oil wells,
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and testing loops. mounting of wellheads, gathering
b) Interconnection pipelines between pipelines (except if they
storage tanks and shipping tanks transverse HCA), oil and gas
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for pipeline operation. separators, oil production tanks,
c) Submarine pipelines connected to other production facilities and
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piers, buoy charts or single point interconnection pipelines of such
mooring buoys. facilities inside the area of the
d) Capturing pipelines – exploitation concession. Internal
transportation of untreated liquid
hydrocarbons, outside commercial
specifications – beyond the
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plants, storage plants, gas and
gasoline processing plants and
boundaries of Exploitation petroleum refineries.
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Concessions. e) Internal pipelines of crude oil
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treatment plants, storage plants,

This Manual does NOT include the processing gas and gasoline plants
following facilities: and petroleum refineries.
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a) Auxiliary pipelines, such as water, f) Pipelines for distribution of

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air, vapor, lube oil and fuel gas natural gas

pipelines. g) Internal pipelines for refinery
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b) Pressure containers, heat operations

exchangers, pumps, meters and h) Submarine pipelines of off‐shore
other auxiliary circuit equipment. facilities different to the ones
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c) Pipelines designed for internal included as alternative c) above in

pressure: the scope of the Manual.
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Figure 2: Scope of the Manual

Production Field
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Separation station
Pump and/or compression
station

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Storage
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 Refinery
 Gas treatment plant
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 Chemical plant
Distribution
system
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Single point mooring buoy
Terminal Piers
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Multibuoy mooring systems
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Symbols

Pig trap or block valve
Scope of this Manual
Transportation pipeline
Gathering pipeline if they transverse HCA
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3. Background and developing the activities of the oil and
gas sector with the lowest possible
The oil industry operates equipment and adverse effect.
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products entailing certain risk due to their
nature and characteristics. One of their For efficient work in each activity field it is
necessary to care for the assets of the
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multiple operations is fuel transportation
through pipelines and internal distribution companies and the optimization of their
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lines. This operation should comply with facilities. This gives rise to the need to
technical and legal requirements which establish a common work basis which
are increasingly stricter in the whole allows ARPEL Member Companies to apply
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world. Failure to comply with such the best practices for pipeline integrity
requirements may affect the assets of the management in order to achieve
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companies, the environment and the excellence in the operational, socially‐ and
communities related to the facilities, environmentally‐responsible management
either those close to them or those of their assets.
depending on the supply. Therefore, the
operational safety of these systems is
crucial.
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ARPEL Member Companies have already
made important progress to establish
pipeline integrity plans and have agreed to
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Environmental care is a key concern for develop this Manual for Pipeline Integrity
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ARPEL Member Companies, both Management in accordance with their

regarding the countries where they responsibilities. This Manual will
develop their activities and the rest of the contribute to establishing common criteria
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world, as stated in the Statement of and to exchanging valuable experiences to

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Commitments of ARPEL (2005) and in their support the operational, environmental

own environment, health and safety and and social excellence of pipeline
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social responsibility policies. Furthermore, operations, as well as to strengthen their

one of the priorities of the companies is to bonds.
further an improvement in the quality of
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life of the population, preventing pollution
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4. Glossary of Terms Arc burn
Indentation or tear of metal produced on
A the pipeline surface by dragging the
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electrode or due to the perforation of the
ACVG bevel root in the electric arc welding
Alternating Current Voltage Gradient. Very process.
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precise technique to identify major or
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small defects in the coating of a pipeline Assembly
section. Structural component manufactured
through welding and/or flanged from
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Adjacent location pipes and pipeline accessories.
Contiguous properties or physical
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structures which in some cases share a B
common space.
Baseline
Aerial / buried pipeline interface
In this context, it is the section of pipes in
the pipeline that changes from surface or
OFFor purposes of this Manual, baseline
refers to the initial information available
on the characteristics of the pipeline, its
aerial to buried or submerged, and vice condition and the condition of the systems
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versa, where the susceptibility to damage to control the different threats and
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by corrosion due to differential aeration is mitigation of consequences. It involves

high. information on its design, construction,
maintenance and operation. This
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Anode information is the basis for the initial risk

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Metal surface from which the current assessment exercise in each segment of
flows out of the metal into the solution, the pipeline.
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i.e., the area where metal corrosion or

dissolution takes place. Bathymetry or bathymetric method
Implies survey and graph‐drafting of the
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Anodic bed channel of a water current, river, lake or

Anodic system of several sacrifice anodes seabed using conventional topography
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which are placed according to the methods and instruments that may be
quantity, depth and diameter required by combined with the use of echo‐sounding
design specifications. equipment in deeper waters.
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Biocoupon
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Anthropic
Actions, events and physical structures Corrosion coupon. Device to monitor the
carried out by man, which to some extent Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion
alter or modify the natural conditions of (MIC), particularly sulphate‐reducing
the landscape and the earth surface. bacteria (SRB), constructed with the same
material as the pipes (carbon steel). The
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coupon carrier is constructed in stainless Commissioning

steel, facilitating the growth of Operation of part of a pipeline or its
microorganisms for later qualitative and equipment after an action by the
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quantitative characterization. It also Maintenance Sector ensuring the
allows checking the efficiency of biocide conditions that guarantee the absence of
treatments against bacteria. risks to health, safety and/or the
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environment, and preserving pipeline
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BSC integrity. For example: checking
Balanced ScoreCard. Used to follow up completion of a task (caps, bolts), correct
compliance with action plans for risk filling of liquids and draining of pipes,
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mitigation through indicators. setup of instruments, cancellation of
contingency operational procedures, etc.
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By pass
Bypass conduit. Corrective maintenance
Planned or unplanned actions or works to
Cathode
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with the direct purpose of restoring its
operation after a rupture.
Metal surface where the current flows out
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of the solution and into the metal. There is Corrosion
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no metal dissolution at the cathode. Electrochemical process through which

the refined metals tend to form
Cathodic protection thermodynamically stable compounds
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Cathodic protection is achieved through (oxides, hydroxides, etc.) due to the
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galvanic anodes or printed current system interaction with the environment.
to protect metal structures, such as
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equipment or pipelines buried or Corrosion rate

submerged in watersheds against Percentage of metal loss, estimated for a
corrosion. structure exposed to a corrosive
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environment during certain period of

Check valve time.
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Device installed in the pipeline to block

only one way of the flow of the product CRP
transported to any system section. The Cathodic Protection Rectifier consists of
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block valve does enable total blocking of an AC‐DC current rectified, anodic bed,
flow in both ways.
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connection to structure to be protected,

and a transformer or generator.
CIPS (Close Interval Potential Survey)
Measurement of the potential at close
intervals.

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D Dent
Depression or hollow in the pipeline
Dead legs surface produced by an external agent,
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Refers to those pipeline bypasses that may either by impact, scratch or external
or may not contain trapped fluids, whose pressure.
characteristic is their being blocked and,
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therefore, not having the flow present. Derate
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Connections in the lower part of the To set a safe operating pressure for a
pipeline that facilitate the deposit of pipeline while making the repairs that
sediments, water and/or bacteria, favoring limit its maximum operating capacity,
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the internal corrosion processes in the according to its design.
pipeline. Bypasses that cannot be subject
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to pigging (internal cleaning with scrapers) Dielectric oil
are also considered dead legs. Oil with physical and chemical properties
enabling electric isolation and cooling of
De‐Commissioning
Delivery of part of a pipeline or its
equipment by the Operating Sector to the
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and cathodic protection rectifiers.

Maintenance Sector in order to ensure Direct Current Voltage Gradient (DCVG)
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conditions that guarantee the absence of Technique to value the status of buried
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risks to health, safety and/or the pipelines coating. In cathodic protection
environment and preserving pipeline systems, when the current flows through a
integrity. For example: Control of absence steel‐resisting soil exposed in the
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of liquids/gases, de‐energization, protective coating imperfections, a voltage

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independence of pipeline from operating gradient is generated in the soil. The
lines, temporary modification of greater the defect, the higher the current
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operational procedures, etc. (See flowing, and therefore, the voltage

Commissioning). gradient. This is used as a prioritization
technique when repairing defects. The
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Delimit voltage gradient is checked by measuring

To set the limits of an area or specific the difference between two reference
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space. Scope of delimitation may be two‐ electrodes with a specifically designed
dimensional or volumetric. mili‐voltimeter.

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Delivery connection When both electrodes are 1.5 m away in

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Mechanical facilities, that are not the ground of a gradient produced by a
underground, used to join the pipeline defect in the coating, one of the
with the transported product receiving electrodes adopts a more positive voltage
system located along the pipeline. than the other. This allows us to know the
direction of the current flow and,
therefore, to locate the defect.
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In order to simplify the interpretation of environmental impact, reputational
the defect location, the cathodic impact and economic loss.
protection applied is separated from other
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continuous current influences, such as Failure mechanism
telluric movements, continuous current Physical, chemical or other process which
tractions, etc. through an On/Off switch has led to a failure.
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for cathodic protection with asymmetric
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temporary response. This continuous Failure Mode
current switch may come from the Effect observed or geometric
cathodic protection system of the pipeline configuration adopted by a structure
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or from an independent continuous when it fails. It is the result of a cause and
current source, such as a portable effect chain process that eventually leads
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generator or batteries using a temporary to failure (elastic or plastic deformation,
anodic bed transmitting current to the ductile or fragile rupture, fatigue,
pipeline system. corrosion, wearing, impact, etc.).
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FBE
Fusion Bonded Epoxy. Type of protective
ECDA coating to protect buried pipelines from
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External Corrosion Direct Assessment. external corrosion, based on thermally
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Structured inspection method to locate, stable resin (based on phenolic epoxy or
characterize and assess external pipeline on epoxy of any other type) applied
corrosion. electro statically as dust in plant or in
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construction (for welded joints) on the

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Electrolyte surface of the pipeline, which is blasted

Chemical substance, or a mixture thereof, and heated at around 220°C, according to
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either liquid or solid containing ions that the required characteristics and
migrate due to the action of an electric specifications. They are available as stand‐
field. alone coatings and as two‐layer coating.
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The latter are applied when mechanical

ERW protection is required apart from
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Electric Resistance Welding. Used to corrosion protection, or for managing
manufacture pipelines with longitudinal fluids transported at high temperatures
seam weld. (higher than 80°C). It is also used as a
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component of the three layer

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polyethylene (TPE) and three layer

polypropylene (TPP) systems. It is
Failure impact currently used for as interior coating for
Impact of a failure on a system (pipeline or pipelines managing corrosive fluids.
plant) function(s). It can be classified in
the following categories: people safety,
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Flash Point and scope of the geodynamic, geological

The lowest temperature of a liquid at and hydrodynamic processes, their real or
which its vapors form an ignitable mixture potential risks and their effects on a
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in air. certain physical structure or sector of the
land.
Flow
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Amount or volume of the flow of a water Geological fault
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current, river, stream or transportation Fracture of soil or rock massif involving
system during a period of time at a vertical and/or horizontally sliding of one
specific point or section. It is generally side or part with respect to the other,
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measured in m3/second in the case of which causes discontinuity. It may be
water currents and in m3/hours in the case generated by tectonic forces or seismic or
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of transportation systems. volcanic activity.

Flush Geomorphology
Tangential probe or mass loss coupon of
tangential insertion to the internal wall of
the pipeline.
OFStudy of landforms of a specific area,
considering their origin, nature of rocks
and soils, climate and different external
and internal forces involved.
E
G
US
Geotechnics
Galvanic cells Discipline that studies the geologic,
Electrochemical system transforming geotechnical and geodynamic processes
E
chemical energy into electric energy. They that may cause the external and internal

IV
usually consist in two different electrodes forces of the Earth in a certain area in

joined electrically and submerged in an order to determine the actual or potential
US
electrolyte. The union of two electrolytes risk for works or physical structures
of the same nature submerged in different and/or the planning, calculation and
electrolytes are also considered galvanic design of reinforcement or construction
CL
cells. In the latter case, the ionic union systems that may guarantee, within
between the solutions is required. reliable limits, their safety and stability.
EX

Galvanic pair GIS
Electrical connection between two Geographic Information System.
R
different metallic elements in which, due Integration of hardware, software,
to their nature, one acts as the anode and
FO
geographic data, cartography, images and
the other as the cathode. personnel, designed to capture, store,
manage, analyze and present in any form
Geodynamical assessment the data that refers to a location in order
Estimate, definition or calculation of the to solve complex planning and
characteristics, mechanisms, magnitude management problems. It may also be
12
defined as a model of a part of the reality the operation stage, the systematic

referred to a system of earth coordinates approach consists in evaluating, in all lines
built to meet specific information needs. and in all systems, the consequences of
AS
possible deviations in all the units of the
Gully process, be it continuous or discontinuous.
From the metallurgical viewpoint, it is a The technique consists in systematically
R
mark or pitting produced by bacterial analyzing the causes and consequences of
OB
corrosion. From the geological viewpoint, some deviations in the process
it is the ditch cut on earth surface by parameters through “guidewords."
runoff water. It develops mostly in arid
TR
areas with heavy occasional rainfalls, as a HCA
ditched surface with initially shallow High Consequence Area. Those locations
PE
grooves separated by steep watersheds. where a pipeline release might have a
They have a stronger impact on soft and significant adverse effect on a sensitive
incompact materials, such as clayish and area (the environment or natural
loamy soils.
H
OF
resources of a community), a high
population area or another populated
area. It may also be referred to as Major
Accident Area (MAA) or as each country
E
HAZ may designate it according to its
US
Heat Affected Zone. Used in the electric government regulations or to the social
arc welding processes. It is the portion of and environmental responsibility policy of
base metal that has been melted, but each company, in absence of the former.
E
whose mechanical properties have been

IV
altered by the heat of the welding. Metal Height clearance

Base adjacent to Weld Metal which is not Minimum height at which the platform of
US
melted in the welding process, but that a bridge or aerial structure must be
reaches the steel transformation heat located in the maximum channel of a
(723°C), generating hard structures current or river.
CL
susceptible to corrosion and cracking.
Historical geology
EX
HAZOP Study, interpretation and characterization

HAZard and OPerability. The functional of geologic processes over time which
operability analysis is an operational risk have resulted in the currently existing
R
identification technique based on the model in a determined area or region of
premise that operability risks, accidents or
FO
the Earth.
problems result from a deviation of the
process variables with respect to the
normal operating parameters in a specific
system and at a specific stage. Therefore,
whether applied in the design stage or in
13
I in the electrolyte is performed with inert

anodes whose characteristics and
ICDA application depend on the electrolyte. The
AS
Internal Corrosion Direct Assessment. positive terminal must always be
Refers to a structured inspection method connected to the anode bed, in order to
to localize, characterize and evaluate the force the discharge of protective current
R
internal corrosion of the pipeline. into the structure.
OB

ILI Indentation
In‐Line Inspection. Consists in the use of For purposes of this Manual, indentation
TR
instrumented tools (smart pigs), refers to the mechanical damage on the
ultrasound principles, magnetic flux, video pipe surface and its coating produced by
PE
or mechanical devices that travel through hard objects, such as rocks and other
the interior of the pipeline propelled by structures, leaving the pipe material
the fluid transported or by other different exposed to the corrosion of the
mechanisms or means (for example:
wires), and that enable determining the
geometrical condition, metal losses,
OFenvironment where it is located.

Infrastructure
mechanical damage, stress and/or geo‐ Integrated services or elements (highways,
E
referenced pipeline location. potable water, schools, populations,
US
crops, etc.) which enable the adequate

Impressed current operation of an economy.
Cathodic protection system using anodes
E
(silicon cast iron, titanium oxide, lead‐ Initial boiling point

IV
silver, graphite, etc.) and introducing According to ASTM D 86, the recorded
direct current through an AC‐DC current temperature when the first drop of liquid
US
rectifier. These transformers can be falls from the end of the condenser.

powered by electric energy, solar energy
or gas (thermo‐generators). Interference current
CL
Electric currents disseminated spread in

The impressed current cathodic protection electrolyte. They are particularly found in
EX
system is the system through which the the soils from cathodic protection, trams,
required electron flow originates in a electric trains, welding, electrostatic
source that generates direct current ‐that precipitators, telluric currents. These
R
may be regulated‐ or simply with rectifiers current are also referred to as parasite

FO
powered by alternate current that offer currents, erratic currents, stray currents,
direct current suitable for structure etc.
protection. The external current available
is impressed in the circuit made up of the
structure to be protected and the anodic
bed. The dispersion of the electric current
14
J Landmark
Permanent signal placed to establish or
Joints indicate the line of the pipeline.
AS
Area of the pipeline where two Permanent signal placed to establish the
independent segments of the pipeline boundary lines and limits of estates. Signal
(pipes) have been welded during the place in an uninhabited area to serve as a
R
construction process to avoid release of guide.
OB
the fluid they contain. Joint by heating,
with or without another material to Langelier Index (LI)
manufacture pipes (longitudinal joint) or Indicates the saturation of calcium
TR
to form the pipeline (circumferential joint carbonate in water, which is base in the
between pipes). pH, alkalinity and hardness. If the index is
PE
negative, it indicated that the water is
K corrosive; however, if the Langelier index
Karl‐Fischer is positive, the calcium carbonate may
The Karl‐Fischer method is widely used in
different industrial sector interested in
determining water content in their
OF
precipitate and form scales or “tartar” in
the container or water pipes. It is an index
that reflects the pH balance of water with
respect to calcium and alkalinity; it is used
E
products due to possible deterioration
in water stabilization to control both the
US
reactions and/or quality specifications.
corrosion as the scale of deposition.
Karstic erosion
Produced by indirect dissolution of the
M
E
calcium carbonate in calcareous rocks due
IV
MAA
to the action of slightly acid water. The
Major Accident Area. An area where a
water acidifies when its carbon dioxide
US
major accident might occur.
content is high, for example, when it runs

through a certain soil and reacts to
Magnitude
CL
carbonate forming bicarbonate, which is

In the case of earthquakes: measure or
soluble.
range of the energy released in the event;
EX
in the case of geodynamic processes:

L
scope and destructive effects generated
Land register by the event on the physical infrastructure
R
Detailed textual and graphical census of or area where it occurred.

FO
the characteristics and technical and legal
conditions of urban and rural estate, Mass loss coupon
which may include public works, such as Metal probe of a known weight (corrosion
roads, channels, electricity lines, etc. This coupon) exposed to the corrosive
is complemented with a specific register of environment to be analyzed and
each unit or property. monitored to determine the weight loss
15
suffered during a specific period, after has restrictions to detect narrow
eliminating the corrosion products using anomalies which are longitudinally
adequate techniques. oriented. Also, given that the technique
AS
requires the anomaly to have a volume; it
Metallurgic notch does not detect cracks either. It is
Stress concentrator consisting of a convenient to consult with the service
R
localized change in a metallurgic steel provider the range of validation of the tool
OB
surface (hardening) produced by the and complement it with other techniques
effect of sudden and concentrated heat, should it be required.
such as the heat generated by the electric
TR
arc when the electrode jumps across the MIC
pipeline surface. Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion.
PE

MFL MAOP
Magnetic Flux Leakage. The inspection Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure.
technique is utilized very often to measure
the loss of wall thickness and to detect
defects, such as cracks, pits, and grooves.
OF
Maximum pressure at any point of the
pipeline system when the system is
operating under stationary conditions.
This pressure is equal to the sum of the
E
The MFL inspection technique is used by static head pressure, the pressure
US
passing a PIG through the pipeline, which required to overcome any friction losses
generates a magnetic field axial or and any counter‐pressure.
longitudinal to the pipeline. The walls of
E
the pipeline are uniformly magnetized; MOP

IV
any irregularity transversal to the Maximum Operating Pressure is the
magnetic field produces a variation in the maximum ‐actual‐ operating pressure of
US
field and this variation is recorded by the the pipeline, sometimes different to the
sensors of the tool. design pressure. Established MOP can be
adjusted because it is required to reduce
CL
With this information, the tool quantifies the normal pipeline capacity or for other
the depth proportionally to the thickness reasons.
EX
of the pipe, determines the width and

length and finally records the odometric N
position and the time position of the
R
anomaly detected. NAEC
Narrow Axial External Corrosion. Narrow,
FO
The limitations of the MFL inspection deep corrosion axially oriented, preferably

technique must be known in order to along a longitudinal welding seam.
define between the tools with
circumferential or longitudinal magnetic NDT
field. For example, the tool with axial field Non‐destructive testing.
16
Nital Passivation film
Solution of 1‐5 ml of white nitric acid in Film on the metal surface formed by
100 ml of methyl, ethyl (98% or absolute), corrosion product where the speed of
AS
or amylic alcohol. Substance used in corrosion has very low values and offers
metallographic studies. protection and barrier properties to the
metal substrate. An example is stainless
R
Notches steel.
OB
Mechanical or metallurgical damage of a
metal surface. Stress concentrators Patch
facilitating the fatigue process of the pipe Final application of a patch‐type repairing
TR
material. device to eliminate a leak from a pipe
during the repair process. Rounded patch
PE
O whose chemical and mechanical
characteristics are similar to those of the
On‐Off Technique pipeline steel. It is applied by welding and
Technique used to check the cathodic
protection systems by printed current
whereby the structure potential is
OF
used to repair local damage or damage in
a small area, such as leaks due to pitting.

measured with respect to the soil with a PCM
E
copper/copper sulphate reference Pipe Current Mapper. Consists of a radio‐
US
electrode at the time of interrupting the detection system which enables the
electric supply in the source of the evaluation of the pipeline coating and its
cathodic protection system. cathodic protection and the analysis of the
E
level of protection of the pipeline against

IV
P corrosion. PCM is a pipeline inspection

technique to measures susceptibility to
US
P&ID corrosion.
Pipe and Instrumentation Diagram.
Pearson
CL
Partial pressure Pipeline inspection technique to measure

Pressure of a gas on a liquid which is in susceptibility of pipelines to corrosion and
EX
equilibrium with the solution. In a mixture the condition of coating.
of gases, the partial pressure of a gas is as
many times the total pressure of the PIG
R
fraction of gas in the mixture (by volume Piping Instrument Gauge. Also called
or number of molecules).
FO
scrapper. Gauge used to clean the interior
of a pipeline or to separate two liquids
Passivation transported along the pipeline. There are
Material or chemical inhibitors added others designed for in‐line inspection (ILI),
through the fluid in the pipeline in order diagnosis of the mechanical condition of
to reduce speed of corrosion. the pipeline, and geo‐referencing of its
17
axis. It is inserted in the pipeline through material grades, used in the construction
launching traps and is dragged by the of pipelines.
hydrocarbon flow (oil or gas), and received
AS
in the other trap at the end of the run. Predictive maintenance
There are also bidirectional pigs that may - Predictive maintenance is a technique
be returned to the launching trap to forecast the future point of failure of
R
inverting the flow direction. a segment or section of the pipeline to
OB
be addressed before failure, minimizing
Pig or scraper launching or receiving trap the downtime of the pipeline and
Mechanical device to introduce, launch maximizing its useful life.
TR
and receive internal cleaning tools,
product separation and in‐line inspection - Maintenance mainly based on the
PE
of pipelines in full operation. It may also detection of failures before they occur
be called launching, distribution or to allow time to correct them without
receiving trap. affecting the service or stopping

Piggable pipeline
A pipeline that has been designed with the
OF

production, etc.
Preventive maintenance
elements required to allow the pig to run, Planned actions or works to avoid the
E
as for example the pig trap, or with occurrence of failures, keeping the
US
internal diameter variations smaller than pipeline in good condition and continuous

those tolerable for inspection pigs. operation and correcting in a timely
manner any anomaly detected during
E
Pipeline inspections or technical control and

IV
Transportation system through pipes, monitoring checkups previously

including components such as valves, performed.
US
flanges, cathodic protection, data

communication and/or transmission lines, Probability of Failure
safety or relief devices, where liquid Probability of a leakage or failure to occur
CL
hydrocarbons and gases are transported. in the system in a given period of time. It

They are generally located underground, can also be defined as the level of
EX
in dry, humid soils or under water susceptibility of damage or integrity loss
currents. In some sectors, in order to occurrence for each possible threat in the
overcome depression of the soil they are system.
R
located in aerial structures.
FO
Prospection
Pipes Excavation or vertical well, not very deep
Pipe segments, approximately 6m and and covering a small area, from whose
12m long, manufactured of low‐alloy bottom or walls material samples are
carbon steel, with or without longitudinal extracted for identification and/or
seam, in various diameters, widths and
18
laboratory testing. This is also referred to the “Primary Effect”. Generally, this
as “test drilling”. "Primary Effect" is directly related to
problems identified or sudden failures of
AS
R equipment or processes. Therefore, the
development of this process allows taking
Ratio proper decisions regarding technical,
R
Relation, proportion. management and economic aspects,
OB
ensuring effective solutions according to
RBI the corporate guidelines.
Risk‐Based Inspection Methodology to
TR
establish, from the risk assessment in a Residual life
static equipment (pipeline, tank, It is the period of time remaining until the
container, furnace, boiler, others), the
PE
end of the useful life of a component or
threats and failure modes that said facility, which ends when the capacity to
equipment may present in order to define provide a service under acceptable
the methods and techniques, frequency
and scope, required to make them
evident. Monitoring and inspection
OF
technical, safety and financial standards
reaches a limit.

programs, and mitigation actions, both of Return period
E
threats and consequences, are defined Period of time, generally expressed in
US
based on the RBI. years, when a natural event may occur or
repeat itself such as: earthquake, flood,
RCA rain, swell, etc. It may be estimated for a
E
Root Cause Analysis. Methodology to certain event or calculated assuming its
IV
identify physical, human and latent causes magnitude, and inter‐relating the data or

of any type of failure or incident that the corresponding historical information.
US
occurs once or several times, in order to

adopt the predictive, preventive and/or Right of Way
corrective actions required to avoid them It is the strip of land where the pipeline or
CL
from occurring or happening again and ‐ other components of the system (valves,
thus‐ reduce the costs of the process life signage, power supply, etc.) are located. It
EX
cycle, to improve safety and to increase is established in the construction and
business reliability. operation stages.

R
It is a systematic and structured process Risk

that analyses in detail the chain of events
FO
According to API RP 581, it is the product
and conditions (causes and effects) of the probability of failure and the
resulting from a “Primary Effect”, with the consequence of failure. This product is
exclusive purpose of finding optimal arithmetic when the risk assessment
solutions that in the future will prevent, methodology is quantitative, and may be a
mitigate or eliminate the consequences of
19
matrix combination when the risk Rocky massif

assessment is qualitative. Descriptive term to indicate that certain
space is occupied or formed by rocky
AS
It may also be defined as the material with physical characteristics from
measurement of probability and severity solid and continuous to fractured and
(consequence) of the destructive or weathered rocks, where the presence of
R
adverse effects generated by the soils is not significant.
OB
occurrence of a process or threat to the
life and health of people, stability of Root Cause
physical structures and/or impact on the Circumstances associated with design,
TR
environment. It is quantified as the manufacture, installation, use and
product of occurrence probability by maintenance, which have led to a failure.
PE
consequences, i.e., the combination of
probability (frequency of occurrence) and S
the consequences (severity) of a risk,
confined to an environment or area,
during a specific period of time.

OF Sacrifice anodes
Metal with a normal oxidation potential
higher than that of the metal structure to
Risk assessment be protected, thus consumed when
E
Process used to measure the level of risks emitting protective current. It is used in
US
on life, health, the environment or cathodic protection systems where the
property, including an analysis of metal acting as anode is sacrificed
frequency or probability of failure for each (disintegrated) favoring the cathodic
E
threat, an analysis of the consequences metal. In this type of installation, the
IV
and their integration. Judgment and anodic material is consumed depending
values, either explicitly or implicitly on the demand of the protective current
US
including considerations regarding the of the structure to be protected, the
importance or severity of the estimated electrolyte resistance and the resistance
risks, as well as the related social, physical, of the anodic material during the
CL
environmental and economic consumption process.

consequences, play a role in the decision‐
EX
making process for risk assessment with SCADA

the purpose of identifying alternatives for Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition.
risk mitigation or reliable management.
R
SCC
Stress Corrosion Cracking. Cracking of a
FO
RMU
Remote Monitoring Unit. Used for real‐ material by the combined action of
time visualization of the operating corrosion and tensile stress, which may be
conditions of Cathodic Protection residual, as the one in the zone affected
Rectifiers (CPRs). by welding heat, or applied, as the one

20
produced by the internal pressure of the Site clearing

pipeline or by external loads. Cutting and pruning or green areas (with
vegetation). Action of removing
AS
Scouring vegetation (bushes, grass and trees about
Results of the erosion caused by water. to fall) from the right of way or the strip of
Subsidence may be: general and localized. the pipeline to enable visual inspection,
R
patrolling and maintenance activities.
OB
Sediments
Rocky material residues of diverse sizes Slope
that eventually divide into smaller Inclined surface or grade of steepness of
TR
fragments. Gravity and transport by the the ground with respect to its length; it is
action of water or wind deposit and measured by the angle it forms with the
PE
accumulate them in the lowest areas of horizontal line or by the number of units
the soil relief. When referring to pipeline of rise per each 100 units of length.
corrosion, it is the water and particulate Example: slope of 3:100.
matter that accumulates inside the pipes
causing flow restrictions and promoting
the internal pipeline corrosion.
OF

Soil resistivity
Specific electric resistance of the soil,
expressed in ohm‐cm.
E
Segment
US
Action of dividing a pipeline into Spot height

segments, depending on the HCA or MAA, Height or elevation of a point in the
and on its construction characteristics ground or sea with reference to the sea
E
(diameter, thickness, material grade, level or to a predefined and duly marked
IV
pipeline age, coating condition, coating reference level.

type, aerial and buried stretches, block
US
valves, scraper launching and receiving SRB

traps, and others) to facilitate the risk Sulphate reducing bacteria.
assessment exercise.
CL
Survey
S&W Preliminary study to gather information on
EX
Sediments and water. A material specific or predetermined areas,

coexisting with ‐yet foreign‐ to petroleum characterize them and define their risk
liquid that requires a separate level and vulnerability with respect to any
R
measurement for reasons that include structure or work located therein.

FO
sales accounting. The foreign material may
include Free Water and Sediment (FW&S) Susceptibility
and emulsified or Suspended Water and Easy occurrence of a natural geodynamic
Sediment (SW&S). process based on the local conditions and
characteristics of the soil. The likelihood of
occurrence of a triggering factor, such as
21
rain or earthquake, is not considered. Test drilling

Susceptibility may be evaluated in the Boring by percussion or in general rotatory
following ways: boring to extract samples for identification
AS
of crossed materials and/or laboratory
I. Experience system: Using direct tests. Usually, special instruments may be
information on the characteristics of adapted or installed to perform different
R
the soil and rocks, the geomorphology types of on‐site geo‐mechanical and
OB
of the area, the experience or hydraulic tests. Scope in depth depends
knowledge of the mechanisms that on the type of equipment and/or the
generate these processes and the characteristics of the soil under study and
TR
geotechnical history of the area. These the purpose of the project.
data are inter‐related to characterize
PE
and estimate the scope, inherent or Threat
actual risk, and the magnitude of Environmental, operating, natural or
occurrence of an event; and anthropic condition related or unrelated

II. Theoretical system: The greatest
number of factors in the problem area
OFto the weather, which might cause
deterioration in pipeline integrity and
even pipeline failure. Alternatively, it is
that are deemed to be involved in the the probability of its occurrence in a
E
occurrence of a natural process are certain period of time or the likelihood of
US
mapped and dimensioned. These data occurrence of pipeline damage.

are processed by software to
determine the number of probabilities Trial pit
E
and failure conditions. Terrain excavation to determine the

IV
existence of minerals or the nature of the
For the other threats to which the pipeline sub‐soil.
US
is subject, it is also the highest or the

lowest probability of occurrence of
damage or deterioration of the pipe. W
CL
T Water content
EX
Percentage of water in a solution.
Talus
Mass of detritus or rocky fragments at the
R
base of a hillside.

FO
Talweg
Indicates the deepest part or line of a
water current or river where the current
speed is higher. It also defines the deepest
part of a valley.
22
5. Baseline Assessment Plan the integrity plan, which may result in

changes in frequency or inspection
The integrity of pipeline systems should be methods, and even in pipeline changes.
AS
considered from its initial planning stage
and during design and construction. The first step that the operation should
take to address potential threats that
R
Pipeline integrity management begins
with adequate system design and might affect pipeline integration, at any
OB
construction. The design specifications, point along the pipeline, is to compile
the pipeline construction conditions and information to determine the risks to
the records kept during this stage provide which the pipeline transportation system
TR
information to establish the baseline of an could be subject. At this stage, the
integrity management system. operator compiles, checks and integrates
PE
the data required to know and understand
The integration of such information is key the actual pipeline condition, to identify
to manage an integrity system. Key and locate the specific threats to integrity,
elements of the integrity management
structure are the registration, compilation
and integral management of all the
OF
and to measure the level of the
consequences of pipeline failure. The
factors or type of data required to support
risk assessment include information about
E
information available. This allows the
pipeline operator to determine where the operation, maintenance, pipeline design,
US
highest incident risks are and to take the operation history, failure modes and
corresponding proactive actions to history, inspection report, tests,
mitigate or eliminate them. monitoring of corrosion control systems,
E
and populations and sensitive areas that

IV
Risk assessment as the basis of a pipeline may be affected by the spill, fire and/or
integrity program is an analytical process explosion of the transported product.
US
involving the integration and analysis of

information about design, construction, The compilation of data to establish the
operation, maintenance, assays, testing, pipeline baseline and to support the
CL
monitoring, drawings, right of way and subsequent risk assessment exercise
areas where the pipeline extends. should not only consider the damage
EX
mechanisms that the operator may

The assessment of risks related to pipeline identify as currently affecting the pipeline.
integrity is a continuous process, so the It is also advisable to consider if there are
R
operator shall periodically gather other potential threats that have not
FO
additional information generated from evidenced themselves in the system yet.

his/her experience in the operation of the In any case, in order to facilitate the users
systems. This information, classified by of this Manual the identification of a
factors, and according to its importance pipeline baseline, following are some
and quality, will allow the operator to sources and types of information which is
perform the risk assessment and adjust
23
essential to collect in order to establish a longitude, curves). This information may
pipeline integrity management program. be obtained from design and construction
standards or procedures applied during
AS
5.1. Pipe Material Records pipeline assembly, quality control records
on field welding, construction control
It must be established whether the records, welding records (WPS and PQR),
R
pipeline has a seam or not (seam welding manufacturer's records if the pipe coating
OB
process), steel grade, nominal pipeline was applied in the manufacturer’s plant or
diameter, nominal thickness and current applicator's records if it was applied in the
thickness (if possible), pipeline year and applicator’s plant or in the field, records
TR
manufacturer, material certification on whether the pipe was purchased
records, purchase documents containing stripped and construction drawings. This
PE
technical specifications, reports on information will allow checking pipeline
manufacturing process control and compliance with good design and
records of certification of pneumatic or construction practices in order to
hydrostatic test. This information will
allow determining the design pressure and
the safe operating pressure, valuing the
OF
determine any failure mode to which the
pipeline may be susceptible at any point
and to support segmentation to facilitate
effect of external loads, identifying the risk assessment exercise.
E
potential failure modes to which some
US
pipelines may be more susceptible, tracing 5.3. Infrastructure Records

any failures related to pipe quality and
establishing the correlation of failures of It is necessary to have information about
E
other pipelines as regards the pipeline the location of block valves and check
IV
manufacturer, and identifying the most valves, crossing of other pipes or
suitable inspection methods to determine structures, crossing of unpaved roads,
US
different failure modes. The standard (and railroads, channels or rivers (and whether
its edition) utilized for the pipeline these are tubed or not), crossing or
specification must also be recorded. parallel high tension lines, aerial or buried
CL
pipelines sections, interfaces with aerial or
5.2. Pipeline Construction Records buried pipelines, type of support for aerial
EX
sections, crossing or parallel continuous

Information should be available to current lines or trams or subways, pipe
establish the type and the process of the sections susceptible to external load due
R
circumferential welding used, the type and to heavy traffic, location of launching and
FO
conditions of the anti‐corrosive coating receiving traps for internal cleaning tools,
applied to the pipe and to the location of dead legs or segments with no
circumferential joints, the type of filling flow or stagnation of water and/or
material, the pipeline depth, the sediments and filtering systems). This
arrangement of the pipes along all the information may be obtained from the
pipeline (diameter, thickness, grade, pipeline construction drawings and the
24
monitoring reports of maintenance and 5.5. Right‐of‐Way or Easement Records

safety personnel, and will allow identifying
different threats and damage mechanisms Geological studies, geotechnical analysis
AS
on the pipeline, as well as pipeline and reports on right‐of‐way strips will
segmentation, thus facilitating the risk allow having information on the
assessment exercise. All this information susceptibility of pipelines to be affected by
R
must be available in a GIS database. threats related to natural forces.
OB

5.4. Records related to environment This information is complied in a
aggressiveness (fluids and soil) geotechnical‐geological report which
TR
contains the following data, among
Information on transported fluid, others: soil type and characteristics;
PE
characteristics of fluid (molecular weight, intersection and location of water
initial boiling point, flash point) as stated currents, urban infrastructure, roads, etc.;
in the quality certificate issued by a location and boundaries of segments with
laboratory; characteristics of water or
sediments that may be present in the
transported product or at drainage of
OF
potential risk from natural forces
(geotechnical zoning); and, in pipelines
segments under instability conditions and
pipelines or product supplying tanks risk from natural forces that cannot be
E
through physical, chemical and avoided due to topographic or
US
microbiological analysis; resistivity profile hydrographic constraints, monitoring

of the aquatic environment and soils; reports and/or reports on stabilization or
classification of soils according to strengthening works recommended during
E
configuration; and determination of the construction and maintenance of the right

IV
level of carbonates, sulfates, bicarbonates, of way.
chlorides, pH and bacteria through
US
physical, chemical and microbiological Apart from determining the type,

analysis. characteristics and conditions of the soil
along the pipeline strip of land, it is
CL
It is also important to keep records on the important to know the method to

physical and chemical analysis of the determine easement, the legal procedures
EX
residues obtained during pigging, and on followed and the location of such records.

the results of corrosion coupons and This information allows establishing the
probes. susceptibility of local populations
R
regarding the pipeline.
FO
This information will allow establishing

pipeline susceptibility to internal and 5.6. Coating Records
external corrosion, thus facilitating the risk
assessment exercise and the Apart from the information regarding the
establishment of action plans to type, characteristics and conditions of the
determine and mitigate such risks. coating applied during pipeline assembly
25
and construction, it is important to have 5.8. Preventive Maintenance Records

information regarding coating age,
thermal insulation and current conditions. It is important to determine the cathodic
AS
It is also important to know the conditions protection level, the coating condition, the
of the thermal insulation applied to some pipeline condition, the types and rates of
pipelines operating with hot products, and internal corrosion, the chemical treatment
R
the concrete coating applied to submarine and its effectiveness, the levels of stress
OB
pipelines located under lakes, rivers, due to external load, the condition of
marshes and sea. This information allows prevention signs, the condition of the right
establishing the susceptibility of the of way (floods, landslides, gullies,
TR
pipeline to external corrosion and the subsidence, forest fires), aerial and sub‐
action plans to mitigate it. fluvial crossing condition, level of activity
PE
This information may be obtained from on right of way, populations, high‐
DCVG, Pearson, ACVG or PCM procedures, sensitivity areas. This information, which
or from In‐line inspection Reports. may be obtained with techniques such as

5.7. Cathodic Protection System Records

OF CIPS, DCVG, PCM, ILI, internal corrosion
monitoring, pipeline load or displacement
monitoring, inspections and patrolling of
It is necessary to know the type of right of way, will allow determining the
E
cathodic protection installed (printed susceptibility to internal corrosion,
US
current or galvanic protection), its external corrosion, third‐party damage

location, the anodic bed characteristics and natural forces, as well as the
and whether remote monitoring units are effectiveness of mitigation actions and an
E
available; the condition of the electric assessment of the consequences in case of

IV
insulation among pipelines and plants and failure.
delivery points, aerial crossings, aerial
US
pipelines and location of potential 5.9. Operational Records

measuring point. This information will
allow determining whether an adequate Operational data and operational and
CL
cathodic protection system has been control procedures are necessary to
implemented according to the coating establish the maximum operating
EX
type and condition, and therefore, the pressure, the pressure fluctuation during
susceptibility of the pipeline to external service, the characteristics of the
corrosion. This information may be transported product, the operating
R
obtained from pipeline construction temperatures, the control systems used

FO
records and from periodic inspections for flow and pressure variables, the relief
performed to the cathodic protection and cutoff systems, the communication,
rectifiers. management and control of infrastructure
and operational process changes, the
failures arising from inadequate
operation, the in‐line leak detection
26
systems, and the training and skills of also important to keep historical records
system operators. This information on inspection and maintenance created
supports the assessment of the threats for the pipeline, mostly on those segments
AS
related to internal corrosion and next to the incident or accident.
inadequate operations and the extent of
the effects or consequences in case of 5.11. Corrective Maintenance Records
R
pipeline failure. This information may be
OB
obtained from operation manuals, This information should include the results
operator's duties and responsibilities of pressure tests, pipeline replacement
manuals, HAZOP studies, failure historical segments, construction of by‐passes,
TR
data, historical records on operating mechanical pipeline repairs, anti‐corrosive
variables, P&IDs, audit report on the coating replacement, thermal insulation
PE
quality management system, and incidents replacement, cathodic protection
and accidents report. reinforcement, repair of coating in aerial
or buried pipeline sections, re‐blocking of
5.10. Historical Failure Records

This information is very important to
OFaerial pipelines, updated pipeline
drawings and condition of electric
insulation in stations, delivery points,
determine proved damage mechanisms aerial crossings and support of aerial
E
and actual situations, the level of impact pipelines. Information on maintenance is
US
on spill areas, and in some cases, an necessary to determine which events have

extrapolation of these damage caused such actions, their effectiveness
mechanisms to other pipelines under our and their application to other pipelines, as
E
responsibility, the remediation actions well as the pipeline integrity level. It
IV
taken and their effectiveness, and of directly supports the risk assessment
course, also to know the effectiveness of exercise. Information on maintenance
US
the contingency plans of the company and may be obtained from maintenance

the contingency plans for pipelines management systems, by‐pass
located in a strip containing pipelines of construction reports, records on
CL
more than one operator. The historical replacement and/or reinstatement of
failure information should cover the pipeline segments, records on lessons
EX
failure cause: pipe manufacturing defects, learned and reports on pipeline

internal corrosion, external corrosion, SCC, inspections performed by maintenance
flanged joints, illegal connections, attacks, and safety staff.
R
involuntary third‐party damage,

FO
operational errors and natural forces. The 5.12. Records related to high

historical failure information should also consequence areas and mitigation
contain data on spilled volumes, affected of consequences
areas, damage to people, infrastructure
and the environment, and the costs This information allows establishing which
related to the event management. It is pipeline segments may affect, in case of a
27
failure, high consequence areas on which In the case of gas pipelines, it is important

we should focus our attention as pipeline to know the wind condition mapping of
operators. This information may be the strip of land; and in the case of
AS
obtained from contingency plans, submerged pipelines, the wind and
environmental management plans, current mapping as well as the scouring
environmental agencies and regulatory effect.
R
agencies in each particular country. It
OB
includes the location of especially In the case of old pipelines, the fact of not
sensitive areas and populations where the having all the information on the above‐
communities may be affected by a spill, mentioned items is not an obstacle for the
TR
such as marshes, rivers, lakes, animal and operator to start an initial risk assessment
plant reserves, watersheds for human exercise and develop action plans to
PE
consumption, recreation and tourist areas, maintain the integrity of its pipelines. Not
commercially navigable waterways, knowing the condition of the pipeline may
historical or archaeological sites and any result in a high initial risk, which requires
other sector which the operator,
according to the regulations of each
particular country or its own Policies on
OF monitoring, tests and inspections to ratify
or rectify such risk level. Information may
improve in quality and quantity as the
Social and Environmental Responsibility, methodology presented in this Manual is
E
might consider fit to include in the risk implemented, thus leading to a higher
US
assessment exercise. During pipeline level of confidence in the pipeline integrity

maintenance or construction, any management.
discovery of historical or archaeological
E
sites should be notified to the competent

IV
authorities or entities.
US
CL
EX
R
FO
28
5.13. Checklist for Baseline Assessment

ARPEL REFERENCE MANUAL FOR PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT
AS
CHECKLIST
PIPELINE BASELINE ASSESSMENT
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM:
R
Required Available Location
OB
# Aspect / Item / Characteristic of data Comments
Yes No Yes No
Are there any pipe records? Type of pipe, material grade, nominal and
1.
actual thickness, manufacturing year, manufacturer’s certificate
TR
Are there any records on welding, assembly, construction and
installation of the pipeline and on hydraulic tests? Welding process
2. (WPS and PQR), type of coating, type of filling, type of mechanical
PE
protection, pipeline depth, pipeline arrangement (diameters, grades,
thicknesses, longitudes, curves). Hydrostatic test. Installation year.
Are there any infrastructure records? Location of block valves and check
valves, crossing of other pipes or structures, crossing of unpaved roads,
OF
railroads, channels or rivers (and whether these are tubed or not),
crossing or parallel high tension lines, aerial or buried pipelines sections,
interfaces with aerial or buried pipelines, type of support for aerial
3. sections, crossing or parallel continuous current lines or trams or
E
subways, pipe sections susceptible to external load due to heavy traffic,
location of launching and receiving traps for internal cleaning tools,
US
location of dead legs or segments with no flow or stagnant water and/or
sediments and filtering systems, and information on access roads to
valves and crossings with rivers, roads and railroads.
Are there any records related to environment aggressiveness (fluids
E
and soil)? Type of transported fluid; fluid characteristics (molecular

IV
weight, initial boiling point, flash point), characteristics of water or
4. sediments that may be present in the transported product; resistivity
profile of soils; classification of soils according to configuration; and
US
determination of the level of carbonates, sulfates, bicarbonates,

chlorides, pH and bacteria.
Are there any right‐of‐way or easement records? Geological studies,
CL
geotechnical analysis, reports on right‐of‐way strips, reports on right‐of‐
5.
way maintenance, reports on geotechnical stability monitoring, tenure or
easement negotiation documents.
EX
Are there any coating records? Age, type, characteristics and conditions
6.
of current anti‐corrosive coating and thermal insulation.
Are there any Cathodic Protection System Records? Type of cathodic
protection installed (printed current or galvanic protection), URPC
R
location, anodic bed characteristics, remote monitoring units, electric

7.
FO
insulation among pipelines and plants and delivery points, aerial

crossings, aerial pipelines and location of potential measuring points and
points of interconnection of electric strapping.
29
CHECKLIST
PIPELINE BASELINE ASSESSMENT
AS
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM:
Yes No Yes No
R
Are there any preventive maintenance records? Cathodic protection
OB
levels, coating condition, coating depth, mechanical condition of
pipeline, types and rates of internal corrosion, chemical treatment and
its effectiveness, levels of stress due to external load, condition of
8.
prevention signs, condition of the right of way (floods, landslides, gullies,
TR
subsidence, forest fires), condition and maintenance of pipeline relief
valves and block valves, maintenance of pig launching and receiving
traps, aerial and sub‐fluvial crossing condition.
PE
Are there any operation records? Operational data, operational and
control procedures, pressure fluctuation during service, characteristics of
the transported product, traceability of batches in the pipeline, operating
temperature, control systems used, relief and cutoff systems,
9.
communication, management and control of infrastructure and
operators.
OF
operational process changes, failures arising from inadequate operation,
in‐line leak detection systems, and training and skills of system

E
Are there any historical failure records? The historical failure
US
information should cover the failure cause and be classified according to:
Pipe manufacturing defects, internal corrosion, external corrosion, SCC,
flanged joints, check valves and block valves, illegal connections, attacks,
10.
involuntary third‐party damage, operational errors and natural forces.
The historical failure information should also contain data on spilled
E
volumes, affected areas, infrastructure and people, and the costs related
IV
to the event management.
Are there any corrective maintenance records? Results of pressure tests,
pipeline replacement segments, construction of by‐passes, mechanical
US
pipeline repairs, anti‐corrosive coating replacement, thermal insulation

replacement, cathodic protection reinforcement, repair of coating in
aerial or buried pipeline sections, reblocking of aerial pipelines, updated
11.
CL
pipeline drawings, condition of electric insulation in stations, delivery

points, aerial crossings and support of aerial pipelines, maintenance of
aerial and sub‐fluvial crossings, maintenance of pig launching and
EX
receiving traps and maintenance of relief valves, check valves and block
valves.
Are there any records related to high consequence areas and mitigation
of consequences? Contingency plans, environmental management plans,
R
mutual aid plans, agreements on shared right of way, maps of
environmental organizations and regulatory state agencies of each
FO
12.
country, location of especially sensitive populations and areas: Marshes,
rivers, lakes, animal and plant reserves, watersheds for human
consumption, recreation and tourist areas, commercially navigable
waterways and historical or archaeological sites.

30
6. Risk Assessment and 6.1. Definition of Risk

Management
The methodology to implement an
AS
Integrity management based on risks integrity program is supported by risk
should be considered a global and assessment. Risk is mathematically
defined as the product of the probability
R
continuous process that includes: Risk
assessment, monitoring, inspection and of occurrence of a failure and the
OB
mitigation (maintenance), data consequences of occurrence, as follows:
integration, periodic risk reassessment
and definition and adjustment of action R = PoF * CoF
TR
plans, establishment and measurement of
management indicators, and change Where:
PE
control. R: Risk
PoF: Probability of occurrence of failure.
Risk assessment is the estimate of risk for CoF: Consequences of occurrence of
decision‐making purposes. In risk
assessment, information is usually
computerized to facilitate understanding
OFfailure.

The Probability of Occurrence of Failure
(PoF) derives from the assessment of each
E
of the nature and location of risks along
threat considered and described in
US
the pipeline. Experienced staff with good

knowledge of pipelines (operation and Chapter 7, Failure Modes of this Manual.
maintenance), as well as experts in the
different threats to which the pipeline The consequences of the occurrence of a
E
may be subject, should participate in the failure imply the need to establish High
IV
risk assessment exercise so that the data, Consequence Areas (HCA) or Major

assumptions and results from such Accident Areas (MAA) as stated in Chapter
US
assessment are checked with adequate 5. ‐ Baseline Assessment Plan – Records
criteria for better reliability on the related to High Consequence Areas or
Major Accident Areas and Mitigation of
CL
assessment itself and the corresponding

action plan for mitigation of such risks. Consequences.
The definition of the action plan, its
EX
application, the measurement of its The HCA or MAA are those sites where a
effectiveness, its adjustment and the leakage or spill of a hazardous substance
change control are continuous processes, can occur and the workers, the population
R
and each operator should define the or the environment can become exposed
FO
frequency of such reviews. to a serious, immediate or deferred

hazard. Pipeline operators should be
familiar with the standing regulations on
pipeline integrity systems management
and with the definitions of HCA and MAA
provided by the regulations of the
31
countries where they operate. New HCA 6.2. Risk Assessment

or MAA may appear as new data on
populations and environmental resources Risk assessment is performed by a group
AS
become available. It is important that the of experts. A risk assessment team would
operator makes sure that its integrity be composed by: civil officers in charge of
management program contains the most right of way, operational staff, staff in
R
recent information provided by the charge of pipeline mechanical
OB
government and by its own data maintenance, environmental experts,
compilation methods. physical safety experts, pipeline
engineering experts, pipeline construction
TR
This information allows the pipeline experts, corrosion control experts, experts
operator to consider the need to divide on materials and experts on risk
PE
the pipeline in different segments where assessment and management.
these HCA or MAA would be affected by a
leakage, in order to facilitate the risk There are different methodologies to
assessment exercise and to allocate its
resources to such segments with more
emphasis, as a way to mitigate the threats
OF assess and measure risk levels, such as the
following: open consideration of events
and potential risks; inspections segment
and to focus their contingency response by segment using alignment sheets or
E
plans. The pipeline characteristics, such as maps; checklists with structured groups of
US
the following, may also be the basis for questions to obtain information on
pipeline segmentation: Diameter, potential risks and pipeline integrity
thickness, pipe material grade, type of aspects; risk matrixes to measure
E
coating, pipeline age, coating condition, qualitatively or quantitatively the

IV
block valves, aerial sections, buried probabilities of failure (PoF) and the
sections, etc. consequences of failure (CoF) for each
US
potential threat in the pipe to assess.
As an alternative, the operator may apply
the risk calculation methodology along the One of the techniques commonly used to
CL
pipeline with no segmentation according calculate the probability of occurrence of
to HCA and MAA, considering that the failure and consequence is the indexing
EX
entire pipeline has the same level of technique, following a semi‐quantitative
consequence. For example, pipes on model that reduces the relativity and
animal or plant reserves would require the subjectivity of the calculations. It basically
R
same measures to maintain the PoF at a consists in numerically evaluating the
FO
tolerable level as the rest of the pipes, as a parameters established for each variable

way to minimize the likelihood of directly affecting the PoF and the CoF,
occurrence of accidents at any point along with the risk being the product of the two
the pipeline. ranges of variations. The resulting number
is translated into qualities by means of a
Risk Matrix which compares the PoF vs.
32
the CoF and allows establishing different risk discrimination based on the PoF and
risk assessment levels. CoF.

AS
Risk matrixes like the one shown in Figure
3 are generally used, as they enable higher

R
Figure 3 – Risk matrix for pipelines
OB
VI R2 R2 R1 R1 R1 R1
TR
P O V R3 R2 R2 R1 R1 R1
R
PE
F
O
B IV R3 R2 R2 R2 R1 R1
F
A
B
I
L
A
I
L
III R3 R2 OF R2 R2 R1 R1
U
E
I II R3 R3 R2 R2 R2 R1
R
US
T
Y E
I R3 R3 R3 R3 R2 R2
P
E
o I II III IV V VI
IV
F
CONSEQUENCE OF FAILURE CoF
US
6.2.1. Calculation of Probability of soil, level of activity on the right of
CL
Failure (PoF) way, geological condition of the right

of way).
EX
Different variables are involved in the b. Design, i.e. those aspects considered
assessment of probability of failure. They during the pipeline design and
define the factors to be taken into construction to mitigate threat to
R
consideration. which the pipeline would be subject

FO
according to its layout (for example:

The variables considered are: type of coating, cathodic protection
system, pipeline signage, monitoring
a. Environment, i.e., the environment to system of the geotechnical condition
which the pipeline may be subject (for of the right of way, mechanical
example: type of soil, aggressivity of
33
protection, geotechnics works, greater which the pipeline is subject, and the

thickness, others) variation of the same.
c. Diagnosis (Monitoring and Inspection), 2. Determine the deterioration rate
AS
that are the different means or actions and/or susceptibility.
with their respective frequencies, 3. Quantify the effectiveness of the last
whereby the effectiveness of the integrity assessment and the
R
mitigation measures considered maintenance program.
OB
during the design, construction and 4. Determine if deterioration continues
reinstatement can be proved (for under the current conditions and
example: determination of the predict the rate at which the tolerance
TR
cathodic protection levels, of damage to the equipment or assets
determination of the coating is exceeded causing an imminent
PE
condition, interior corrosion rates, failure.
historical event for each threat,
frequency and results of in‐line 6.2.2. Calculation of Consequence of
inspections (ILI), landslide monitoring,
diagnosis of aerial and sub‐fluvial
crossings, others).
OF
Failure (CoF)
In the calculation of the Consequence of

d. Reconditioning: maintenance actions Failure (CoF), it is necessary to consider
E
resulting from diagnosis (for example: the definition of High Consequence Areas
US
repair and/or reinforcement of the (HCA) or Major Accident Areas (MAA) for
cathodic protection systems, coating the pipeline to be assessed, as stated
repair, ILI repairs, re‐signage of above, in order to assess the severity of
E
pipeline segments, geotechnical the impact of a leakage or rupture on the

IV
stabilization works). safety and health of people, facilities,

communities, the environment, and the
US
Matrices to establish the Probability of company economy.

Failure should consider these variables
and the factors that have a positive or In order to determine the consequence of
CL
negative influence on their failure, two kinds of analysis are usually
implementation. taken into consideration
EX

The following steps have to be taken into a. Qualitative analysis: This method
account in the assessment of the involves the identification of
R
Probability of Failure (PoF): segments as stated above, in terms of
FO
HCA and MAA and physical

1. Identify the deterioration or damage characteristics of the pipeline, and the
mechanism occurring during a specific threats present as a results of
time, considering normal operating operating conditions and transported
conditions or the environment to fluids that may spill. The
consequences of failure
34
(environment, health, safety, image required to support the risk assessment
and financial impact) are assessed for exercise.
each segment in a set: very high,
AS
high, medium and low, according to
the criteria defined in the risk matrix.
b. Quantitative analysis: The
R
quantitative method implies a logical
OB
model with possible combinations of
the effects of failure on the property,
the environment, the personnel and
TR
the company. One or more failure
patterns and results are usually
PE
considered (Leak or Rupture), and the
consequence of failure is calculated
on the basis of:

1. Type of transported fluid.
2. State of process fluids in the
OF
interior of the equipment or
E
assets (solid, liquid or gaseous).
US
3. Key properties of the process

fluid (molecular weight, boiling
point, flash point, density, etc.).
E
4. Operating variables, such as

IV
temperature and pressure.
5. Failure mode.
US
6. State of the fluid when exposed

to environmental conditions
(solid, liquid and gaseous).
CL

Each company using this Manual may
EX
adopt or implement its own risk

assessment model and define the
methodology to rate the PoF and CoF for
R
each possible threat to its pipelines.
FO

6.3. Information required for the risk
assessment

Chapter 5, Baseline Assessment Plan,
presented the sufficient information
35
7. Failure mechanisms due to probability or susceptibility of failure for
threats each of these threats.

AS
This chapter of the Manual describes the 7.1. Internal corrosion
different threats that may affect the
In oil production, refining and
R
pipeline integrity and failure modes, some
dependent on time, others independent transportation, fluids transported through
OB
or stable over time. pipelines usually carry water and
pollutants, where the corrosion potential
If despite monitoring and mitigation is directly related to its physicochemical
TR
actions for such threats, these could characteristics, water/fluid relation and
generate a failure in the pipeline, it is transportation form. In turn, given the
PE
necessary to apply measures to mitigate geographic characteristics and extension
the consequences, among which are of each country, location of cities,
contingency plans, mutual aid plans and different types of soil relief and
leak detection systems. The latter apply
different principles and technologies,
among which are:
OF hydrographic basins, oil and oil byproducts
transportation pipelines present, in
addition to large extensions, different
routes, dimensions and project
E

 Acoustic emission requirements.Taking these two items into
US
 Fiber optics consideration, it is increasingly necessary

 Soil monitoring to pay greater attention to possible
 Ultrasonic flow meters accidents caused by internal corrosion.
E
 Vapor monitoring
IV
 Mass balance It is necessary to develop a master plan to
 Real time transient modeling monitor and control the entire process of
US
 Pressure point analysis pipeline internal corrosion, taking into

account the control of their integrity, and
quality assurance of both the environment
CL
This chapter contains also the Checklist for
each threat with the purpose of facilitating and the product to be delivered to
the review and compilation of the customers.
EX
information required to support the

assessment of PoF and consequences 7.1.1. Description of threats of damage
during the risk analysis exercise. due to internal corrosion
R

FO
The means, actions and methods to detect Corrosion is the deterioration of material

the damages and mitigate threats are by the chemical or electrochemical action
included as Annexes to this Manual in of the environment, and may be
order to help take action on the associated or not to mechanical stress.
Corrosion may affect different types of
materials, whether metallic, such as steel,
36
or non‐metallic, such as plastics, ceramic where they were extracted. It can,
or concrete. This Manual will focus on therefore, be concluded that corrosion in
corrosion of metallic materials. This these cases is the opposite of metal
AS
corrosion is called metallic corrosion. refining processes.

Depending on the action of the corrosive As no liquid water is needed in chemical
R
means on the material, corrosive corrosion, it is also called dry corrosion; it
OB
processes may be classified in to major usually takes place at high temperatures.
groups, which cover all the cases of
deterioration by corrosion.  They are oxidation and reduction
TR
processes taking place in the same
 Electrochemical corrosion (aqueous area, directly between the metal and
PE
corrosion); the aggressive environment on the
 Chemical corrosion (high temperature metal: they are less frequent in nature,
oxidation or high temperature involving high temperature operations.
corrosion)

Electrochemical corrosion is more
OF  Absence of liquid water, also known as
dry corrosion;
 It usually takes place at high
frequent in nature and is characterized temperatures, always above the water
E
basically by: dew point.
US

 The presence of water, in liquid state, 7.1.2. Types of damage caused by
of dissolved ions (dissociated cations internal corrosion
E
and anions);
IV
 Working at temperatures below the Forms of corrosion are defined mainly by
water dew point, which in most cases the appearance of the corroded surface.
US
is the room temperature; The main forms are:
 The formation of a corrosion cell with
circulation of electrons on the metal  Uniform corrosion: when corrosion is
CL
surface. Involving partial oxidation and processed almost evenly in the entire

reduction reactions. surface affected. This form is common
EX
in metals that do not form protective

As the electrolyte needs liquid water, layers as a result of the attack.
electrochemical corrosion is also called  Corrosion in layers: corrosion products
R
aqueous corrosion. are formed in layers that detach

FO
gradually. It is usual in metals that

In corrosion processes, metals react with form an initially protective layer, but
non‐metallic elements or compounds when they turn thick, they fracture
present in the environment, O2, S, H2S, and lose adherence, exposing metal to
CO2 among others, producing compounds a new attack:
similar to those found in nature from
37
 Alveolar corrosion: wear caused by stainless steels in environments

corrosion that is localized and has the containing chlorides. The presence of
appearance of craters. It is frequent in microorganisms such as sulfate‐
AS
metals forming semi‐protective layers reducing bacteria also helps to trigger
or when there is under‐deposit and accelerate the localized corrosive
corrosion, as is the case of differential process;
R
aeration corrosion;  Intragranular corrosion: the attack is
OB
 Pitting corrosion: wear that is very on the grain boundaries, as is the case
localized and highly intensive; of sensitized austenitic stainless steels
generally its depth is greater than its exposed to corrosive environments;
TR
diameter and has angled borders.  Transgranular corrosion: the
Pitting corrosion is frequent in metals phenomenon is evidenced by cracks
PE
forming protective layers, in general that extend through the interior of the
passive, which are destroyed in material grains, as is the case of stress
localized points by certain aggressive corrosion of authentic stainless steels.
agents, which become active, thus
enabling a very intense corrosion. A
common example is authentic
OF

E
US
E
IV
US
CL
EX
R
FO
38
7.1.3. Checklist for internal corrosion

AS
CHECKLIST
INTERNAL CORROSION
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
R
OB
Yes No Yes No
Are there procedures to determine the severity of the
1. internal corrosion and the identification of the
TR
corresponding corrective measures?
Has a procedure and program been implemented to
run a pig in order to detect internal corrosion for the
PE
2. case of non‐piggable / piggable pipelines? If this is the
case, how is the frequency of this inspection
established?
Has an inspection procedure and program been
3.
implemented to determine the loss of internal
pipeline that do not have the necessary facilities to run
OF
thickness for non‐piggable / piggable pipelines, or for
an instrumented pig? If this is the case, how is the

E
frequency of this inspection established?
US
Is there a procedure and program of internal cleaning

and/or removal or water or condensate through the
4.
run of pigs? If this is the case, how it the frequency of
this activity established?
E
Is there a corrosion inhibitor injection program

5. (automated pump – controlled dosage – efficiency
IV
assay) available for all pipelines, wherever required?
Have routine tests been implemented to measure the
US
content of water in the products transported? If this is
6.
the case, how is the frequency of this activity
established?
Have routine tests been implemented to monitor and
CL
analyze the corrosivity of the products transported

7.
(corrosive residues, water and gases)? If this is the
case, how is the frequency of this activity established?
EX
Are there procedures and routine tests to determine

the rate of corrosion by corrosion coupon, biocoupons
8.
and electric resistance probes? If this is the case, how
R
is the frequency of this activity established?
Is feedback on the results obtained with testing
FO
equipment and fluid and residue tests being provided

9. to the corrosion management system (use of software
– trend graphs – change in the variables of preventive
measures – identification of the corrosive process)?
Are there training and rating procedures for the
10.
experts working in the corrosion activity?
39
7.2. External corrosion appears. Although there are several

different forms of corrosion, each share
External corrosion is one of the threats to some common factors. There is corrosion
AS
which any transportation pipeline of if there is:
hydrocarbon or any other hazardous
product, whether in liquid or gaseous  An anode
R
state, is subject.  A cathode
OB
 A metallic conductor connecting the
This Manual does not intend to address in anode and the cathode (typically, the
depth each type of corrosion that may pipeline itself).
TR
occur in a pipeline. However, it is  An electrolyte (typically, the soil, the
necessary to list them and present a basic environment and underground or
PE
explanation of damage mechanisms, with surface affluents, etc.)
the purpose of facilitating its identification
and establish the most appropriate Regardless of the type of corrosion, each
inspection techniques to make it evident,
and the aspects that may be considered
for its mitigation.
OF
of the four above‐mentioned elements
should always be present for corrosion to
occur. Then, the corrosion control
program will consist in eliminating one of
E
7.2.1. Description of threats of damage the four factors to stop the
US
due to external corrosion electrochemical reaction.

Metal corrosion is the tendency of metals External corrosion may occur both in
E
to return to their original stable state as aerial and buried or submerged pipelines.

IV
when found in nature (oxides) from where
they were extracted. Corrosion is defined When pipelines are aerial, corrosion likely
US
as the deterioration or degradation of a to occur is atmospheric. The extent of
material, usually a metal, or the reaction corrosion depends on the climate
to the surrounding environment. The rate conditions where the pipeline runs ‐ it is
CL
at which metal is deteriorated or corroded greater in coastal and industrial areas –

is primarily determined by the and on the coatings applied to insulate the
EX
environment to which it is exposed and metallic substrate from the environment.
also by the preventive measures taken in Aerial pipelines require, in addition to the
that site to mitigate the corrosion process. coating system, an adequate support to
R
avoid direct contact with the soil or

FO
Almost all types of external corrosion watersheds. The pipe‐support contact
attacks may be listed under several major area should be insulated to avoid leakage
categories. Perhaps, the strongest of the cathodic protection current, which
characteristic of corrosion is the huge limits its extent.
variety of conditions where it occurs and
the great number of forms in which it
40
The aerial‐buried pipeline interfaces cells may cause localized pittings.

represent one of the most favorable Localized corrosion causes concern for the
conditions for corrosion. This is due to the integrity of a pipeline, since the area being
AS
effect of the solar ultraviolet light and attacked may be, in general, very small
exposure to rain to which the coating is and the corrosion rate, in some situations,
subject. The coating usually cracks and may be extremely high, thus resulting in
R
detaches, thus facilitating accumulation of leakage of the product.
OB
moisture between the coating and the
metal surface. When this damage 7.2.2. Types of damage caused by
mechanism is not evidenced and mitigated external corrosion
TR
early enough, catastrophic failures
(ruptures) of pipelines occur. The type of corrosive attack that may be
PE
found in a pipeline depends primarily on
When pipelines are buried or submerged the environment and on the area of the
in water, water usually produces anodic pipeline exposed. Following is a
and cathodic areas, which were created by
the steel manufacturing process, due to
the surrounding environment, other
OF description of the most common types of
corrosion of pipelines:

buried facilities, structures transporting 7.2.2.1. Selective ERW seam corrosion
E
direct current, foreign cathodic protection
US
systems, and other factors. The pipeline The selective ERW seam corrosion, also
itself is the metallic conductor, and the called preferential seam corrosion, is
soil is the electrolyte. created when the pipe is experiencing
E
corrosion caused metal loss, either

IV
Normally, external corrosion may be internal or external, across or adjacent to
classified as general corrosion or as an ERW (Electric Resistance Weld) seam.
US
pittings; these can be localized or general. The corrosive action attacks the seam

bond region (the ferritic line and/or Heat‐
General pitting is usually confined to a Affected Ares – HAA) at a higher rate that
CL
small area or several interconnected small the surrounding metal. The result of this

areas. Localized corrosion or localized selective attack is often a V‐shaped crevice
EX
pitting may be in the form of individual or or groove within the bond line. Selective

multiples pittings. Localized corrosion is seam corrosion creates a serious defect
evaluated using depth and length that is more likely to cause a rupture than
R
measurements, which allows the coincident corrosion in the body of the
FO
determination of the remaining strength pipeline.

of steel.
7.2.2.2. Narrow axial external corrosion
Bacteria, oxygen concentration
differentials, erratic interference current Narrow axial external corrosion (NAEC) is
or simply interaction between galvanic often found in Heat‐Affected Areas of
41
circumferential welds between pipelines can contribute to conditions that cause
and at longitudinal double submerged arc external and internal corrosion of
welded seams coated with polyethylene pipelines.
AS
tape. The tape, due to the bulge or excess
thickness of the weld seam, leaves a space Typically, a number of microorganisms
between the welding metal limit and the influence the corrosion of ferrous metals.
R
base metal; when the oxygen is trapped in These bacteria are hydrogen‐consuming,
OB
this space, it promotes the attack of this sulfate‐reducing bacteria and are
area likely to be corroded. In addition, if commonly referred to as SRB. The bacteria
the tape detaches or wrinkles due to soil do not directly attack the metal, but
TR
stress or because it was deficiently create changes in the electrolyte that
applied, it allows water in and provides an increases corrosion activity. Not only do
PE
environment favorable to the attack of the they convert sulfides into sulfuric acid,
HAA which cannot be mitigated through which attacks the pipeline, but they also
cathodic protection due to the shielding consume hydrogen, which destroys the
effect of the tape to the current provided
by the anodes of the cathodic protection
system. The resultant groove‐like defect
OF
polarization of the passivation film on
cathodically protective structures and
increases the current requirement for
facilitates the axial rupture of the pipe effective cathodic protection.
E
under internal pressure, or cut or
US
detachment between pipelines under Anaerobic bacteria are found in stagnant
flexure stress. bodies of water, both fresh and salt, in
heavy clay soils, swamps, bogs and in most
E
7.2.2.3. Bacterial corrosion – areas that have moisture, organic

IV
Microbiologically Influenced materials, low oxygen and some form of

Corrosion (MIC) sulfates.
US

Bacteria are found in essentially every soil Aerobic bacteria can also create corrosive
and water. While some of them do not environments for buried steel structures
CL
present problems as far as corrosion of when sufficient organic matter is available

metals is concerned, they are important for a food supply. Various organic acids
EX
exceptions. The two basic categories of can be formed depending on the type of
bacteria are aerobic (oxygen using) and bacteria and the available organic
anaerobic (non‐oxygen using). Both types material. When bacteria produce carbon
R
can be present in the same environment dioxide, it combines with the available
FO
depending on temperature, moisture, water to form carbonic acid and ammonia

nutrient supply, etc. Aerobic bacteria are compounds, which are oxidized into nitric
more abundant where oxygen is plentiful, and nitrous acid. Other acids that can be
and anaerobic bacterial are more formed under the proper conditions are:
abundant in oxygen deficient lactic, acetic, citric, oxalic and butyric,
environments. Members of both groups among others.
42
Aerobic bacteria are known to attack pipeline surface, or in a pipeline that has
some pipeline coating materials made been scratched during excavations.
from organic materials and use them as a
AS
food source; these include asphalt coating The presence of concrete in portions of
and primers, tape adhesives, kraft paper the pipeline, such as those present in the
and felts. interface of segments with ballast and
R
without ballast, may cause galvanic
OB
Morphology of bacterial corrosion consists corrosion. Soils with different chemical
of pittings or gullies which, depending on composition or significant changes in their
their orientation with respect to the resistivity promote galvanic corrosion.
TR
pipeline axis, create leaks or ruptures.
7.2.2.5. Stress corrosion ‐ stress
PE
7.2.2.4. Galvanic corrosion corrosion cracking (SCC)

It is defined as corrosion associated with It is a form of environmentally assisted
the current resulting from the coupling of
two o more dissimilar metals in contact
with a common electrolyte. On metal will
OF
cracking wherein small cracks lengthen
and deepen slowly over a period of years.
The individual cracks, which may occur in
be anodic (the anode) and the other colonies, may eventually join together to
E
cathodic (the cathode). As mentioned form larger cracks. SCC may be present on
US
above, a piece of steel has anodic and a pipeline for many years without causing

cathodic areas due to the level of problems, though once a crack becomes
impurities that may be present in the large enough, it could leak or rupture.
E
metal. Among the factors having influence on this
IV
type of anomaly are the age of the

These areas are created when different pipeline, electrolyte chemical
US
alloys, such as copper and stainless steel composition, type of coating, levels and
are in contact with carbon low‐alloy steel conditions of the cathodic protection
or a new piece of pipe inserted into an system, soil stress, type of drainage and
CL
older pipeline, as when pipes are replaced pressure cycles.
due to maintenance, where the new pipe
EX
behaves as the anode. Corrosion galvanic These factors together with data obtained

cells can also be created due to different from excavations, if any, will enable the
metals used when welding a pipeline. identification of any susceptibility of the
R
pipeline. Fracture mechanics based

FO
In addition, galvanic corrosion can also models and the crack growth rate may be

occur if stress is applied to the pipeline, used to assess the need and time of
such as stress produced in welded joints, inspection if the pipeline has low stress
mechanical curvatures in the pipeline, arc corrosion cracks.
burns or metallurgic notches generated
when the electrode jumps across the
43
Three conditions should be present for to occur within a wide cathodic potential
SCC to occur: a susceptible microstructure, range and at a local pH over 9. This is
a corrosive environment, and a tensile associated with increased pipeline
AS
stress operating temperatures. Cracks tend to be
narrow and primarily intragranular. The
 Microstructure: All commonly used pipeline with coal tar and asphalt coating
R
line pipe steels are susceptible to SCC, is sometimes susceptible to this type of
OB
though susceptibility may increase cracking.
with tensile strength.
 Environment: Specific forms of SCC Near‐neutral pH SCC tends to occur at a
TR
are associated with specific terrain and local pH of 5.5 to 7.5; it is associated with
soil types, particularly those having mild concentrations of CO2 in ground
PE
alternating wet/dry conditions, and water and cold climates. Cracks are
those that tend to damage or disbond generally transgranular, wide and more
coatings. While SCC may occur in corroded than those found in high‐pH SCC.
almost soil types, it may be avoided by
isolating the local electrochemistry at
the pipeline surface from of the
OF Generally, tape coated systems are
susceptible to this type of environment.

surrounding conditions by applying 7.2.2.6. Parasite or erratic current
E
coating. Thus, pipeline coating and corrosion
US
condition are important factors in the

mitigation of this damage mechanism. Parasite current corrosion, usually in the
 Stress level: Susceptibility to SCC form of pittings, is caused by the influence
E
increases with stress level though of external sources of electric alternating
IV
there may be no lower threshold or direct currents as those generated by
stress level. Conducive stress levels telluric movements, medium and high
US
may occur at local structural tension lines, and sources of direct
discontinuities, as for example weld current, with those produced by cathodic
toes or sites of deformation due to protection systems of pipelines or foreign
CL
outside forces, such as dents. Some structures or mass transportation systems,

amount of stress cycling can promote such as subways or electric locomotives.
EX
SCC growth by breaking the oxide film
that forms on the crack surface, re‐ 7.2.2.7. Differential aeration corrosion
exposing the crack to the
R
environment. Cyclic loading seems to It occurs in the pipeline segments where
there are different oxygen concentrations
FO
be an important factor in the initiation
of SCC. as in the aerial‐buried interfaces or in the
pipeline segment with supporting
Two forms of SCC have been identified: structure clamps.
high‐pH, called classical, and near‐neutral
pH, non‐classical. The high‐pH form tends
44
7.2.3. Checklist for external corrosion

AS
CHECKLIST
EXTERNAL CORROSION
R
Required Available Location of
# Aspect / Item / Characteristic Comments
OB
Yes No Yes No data
1. Is the age of all pipeline segments known?
Is the temperature of the transported product and of the surface
TR
2.
along the pipeline known?

Is there information available on the soil or environment
3.
resistivity where the pipeline runs?

PE
Is there information available on the soil or environment l
4.
aggressivity where the pipeline runs?

Is there information available on the type of soil or environment
5.
6.
where the pipeline runs? (clay, mud, rocks or watershed)
segment?
OF
Is there information on the type of coating for each pipeline
Is there information available on the condition of coating for each

7.
E
pipeline segment?
US
Is there information available on the location and characteristics

8.
of the Cathodic Protection Rectifiers (CPRs)?

Is there information available on the condition of pipeline electric
9.
insulation with initial plant, delivery point and final plants?

E
Is there information available on the condition of the aerial
10.
structure insulation (landmarks, H frames, turnbuckles)?

IV
Is there information available on the condition of the coating of
11.
aerial‐buried pipeline interfaces?

US
Are the levels of the pipeline cathodic protection (post to post on
12.
/ off technique or CIS)?

Is there information available on the effective real time of
13.
CL
operation of CPRs?
Is cathodic protection monitored according to the frequency
14.
stated in the external corrosion control plan?

EX
Is there information available on the pipeline mechanical

15.
condition as a result of running in‐line inspection (ILI) tools?

Have repairs been made as indicated in the ILI been made
16.
R
according to level of severity?
Have adjustments been made to the cathodic protection as a
FO
17.
result of post to post on / off inspection or CIS)?

Have repair been made to the pipeline coating as a result of visual
18.
inspections or DCVG/PCM/ACVG?

19. Is the record of failures due to external corrosion available?
Are there training and rating procedures for the experts working
20.
in the external inspection activity?

45
7.3. Natural forces 7.3.1. Description of threats of damage

due to the natural forces
As they are broad lineal development
AS
works, pipelines transporting liquid The occurrence of natural processes
hydrocarbons and gas run through areas (threats) is caused by the combination of
with topographic, geological, several factors, some of them acting as
R
hydrographic, climatological and seismic determinant factor, as is the case of
OB
conditions with varied characteristics, geomechanical properties of materials
behavior and susceptibility. Consequently, (soil and rocks), abrupt topography,
they are exposed –in the short and long location and fluctuation of the freatic
TR
term‐ after start‐up of operations and level, others such as earthquakes, rain or
eventually in the construction stage to the human intervention as triggering
PE
threats and natural processes. factors of the process. Conventionally,
they are classified and characterized as
The construction of a pipeline demands follows:
large‐scale excavation works, soil
movement or removal, deforestation,
which alter and/or modify to a greater or
OF
Those related to hydro‐meteorological
processes
lower extent and magnitude the natural  Rainfalls (medium, high or
E
conditions of geotechnical and/or concentrated intensity)
US
hydrodynamic stability of the route – right  Snowfalls and thaw
of way (RoW) or Easement – where the
pipeline runs and its environment. These Those related to external geodynamics
E
land disturbances should be taken into processes

IV
consideration for the maintenance and  Landslides or slope rocks

operation of the pipeline.  Land creep
US
 Liquefaction, solifluction and

For this reason, in order to make an tubification in sandy‐muddy soils
adequate geotechnical investigation,  Differential settlements
CL
diagnosis and interpretation, it is of  Alluviums

utmost importance to properly interpret  Gullies and erosion caused by surface
EX
the local and regional geology. Due runoff

consideration should be given to trial pits,
trenches and other taks of direct and Those related to internal geodynamics
R
indirect exploration that allow for the processes

FO
reliable sampling, visualization and/or  Seismic activity

interpretation of the type of rocky soils  Reactivation of local and regional
and materials, considering in situ or geological faults
laboratory assays.  Volcanism (very rare)

46
Those related to fluvial hydraulics and characteristics of the elements, and the
coastal engineering natural variables involved, it is only
 Riverside erosion and subsidence of possible to define their tendencies and
AS
the bottom of the river channel assess the risks to which the right of way,
(degradation) its environment and the pipeline are
 Erosion and/or sediments in marine subject.
R
beaches
OB
 Swells. With respect to the effects, i.e. damage,
caused by these threats on the pipeline
In the pipeline segments buried in soils integrity, they are in proportion to the
TR
with dissimilar physicochemical type, extent, form of occurrence in time –
composition, corrosive properties, they may occur suddenly and violently
PE
changing electric resistivity, alternating (landslides and/or slope rocks), while
moisture conditions (wet/dry), and/or other act gradually (land creep,
intersection with chemically deficient or settlements, etc.) ‐ magnitude (pressure
aggressive drainage sources of surface or
freatic water and location on rocky soils, it
is necessary to study and assess on a
OFand stress generated) and materials
involved in the natural process, the impact
and severity of damage are generally
periodic basis the alterations or damage classified as follows:
E
that this type of soil/pipeline interface
US
conditions may cause to the external  Modification and geometry

coating, and the efficient behavior of the degradation of the right of way (RoW)
cathodic protection installed to protect  Destabilization and collapse of the
E
the pipeline against external corrosion. right‐of‐way strip and its environment
IV
 Destabilization of the right of way with
7.3.2. Types of damage produced by the geometric pipeline deformation
US
natural forces  Destabilization of the right of way and
pipeline rupture (product leakage)
In the case of natural threats resulting
CL
from the complex and random

EX

R
FO
47
7.3.3. Checklist for the natural forces

AS
CHECKLIST
NATURAL FORCES
R
Required Available Location of
OB
# Aspect / Item / Characteristic data Comments
Yes No Yes No
Are project documents and drawings available according
1.
to pipeline works?
TR
Are there maps and drawings (topographic, road systems
2. and other sketches, aerial photographs, satellite images)
of the pipeline alignment available?
PE
Does the pipeline have a geotechnical zoning and/or risk
3.
analysis?
information system (GIS)? OF
Has the information on the design, construction and
4. works done to date been integrated in a geographical
Have areas subject to natural processes been delimited

5.
E
and has the risk they represent been assessed?
US
Is there a physical inspection program for the right of

6.
way available?
Has the pipeline been zoned according to seismic
7.
sensitivity?
E
Is there historical information and data available on the

IV
seismic and hydro‐meteorological activity in the region

8.
where the pipeline runs? (historical record of seismic
sensitivity)
US
Are coordination meetings with public utilities

9. administrators and populated areas adjoining the
pipeline periodically held?
CL
Is there an updated record of past and current actions
10.
taken as regards each threat?
EX
Is there minimum equipment required to gather field

11. information available? GPS navigator, compass, echo
sounders, topographic instruments, others.
R
Are drawings, maps, aerial photographs, satellite images
12. of the operating pipeline segments or difficult‐to‐handle
FO
occurrence of natural threats periodically updated?
Are the results of the record obtained from inertial
13. pigging after mitigation or strain‐relieving actions
compared?
Is there information available on location and type of
14. regional geophysical (seismic) and hydro‐meteorological
stations?
48
7.4. Third‐party actions involuntary damage caused by the so‐

called anthropic factors, due to the
Third‐party actions are another threat to construction of urban, industrial,
AS
which any pipeline transporting agricultural, road and energy
hydrocarbons or hazardous products, infrastructure, and other type of
either liquid or gaseous, may be subject. human intervention near the pipeline
R
These third‐party actions, which cause usually produces environments
OB
losses, damage and product leakage, may favorable to the occurrence of damage
be voluntary or involuntary. While for associated with third‐party actions.
facility and for construction and
TR
maintenance savings reasons there is a 7.4.2. Types of third‐party damage
tendency to run pipelines close to
PE
unpaved roadways, railways, rivers or These third‐party actions produce
channels, this implies a greater perforations, ruptures, scratches or
vulnerability to third‐party actions. On the notches, and dents. The actions to control,
other hand, human settlements tend to be
established near the pipelines.

OF mitigate and determine them require
various methodologies depending on their
origin, whether they are caused
7.4.1. Description of threats of damage voluntarily or involuntarily.
E
due to third‐party actions
US
7.4.2.1. Dents
This threat may be voluntary or
involuntary. Dents are usually produced in starting
E
rupture or crack points, even more so if

IV
 Voluntary are those caused by persons accompanied by a stress concentrator

who attack against infrastructure, as is such as scratches or notches. Dents may
US
the case of blasting or perforating a be classified in several types, depending
pipeline to steal the product. on whether they have an associated stress
 Involuntary are those caused by concentrator or not, and according to
CL
persons working in companies that their location with respect to the
share the right of way of the pipeline, longitudinal or circumferential pipeline
EX
such as: owners of other pipelines, weld. In addition, their critical condition
companies of other services, such as and need for repair also depend on their
aqueducts, communications, sewer location in the pipe with respect to the
R
systems, home gas networks, clock panel. The assessment and care
FO
waterways and roadways, and housing criteria to be used are those established in
construction, when excavations are the company’s procedures or codes or
made for maintenance or standards stated in the bibliography in
constructions works, and they are Chapter 10.
unaware of the existence of pipelines
in such common pieces of land. This Following are some types of dents:
49
7.4.2.1.1. Plain dents 7.4.2.2. Scratches

Plain dents are a local change in the Scratches are the mechanical removal of
AS
surface, but not accompanied by a stress metal with well‐defined borders,
concentrator, produced by rocks in the produced by excavation or perforation
filler, tree roots or trunks, or mechanical machinery or transportation vehicles
R
impact. impacting on superficial pipelines,
OB
elevation ropes or supports, or by attacks
7.4.2.1.2. Dents with a stress with explosives. These are stress
concentrator concentrators that should be assessed and
TR
repaired. All scratches exceeding 12.5% of
This type of defect is a dent with stress the nominal pipeline thickness should be
PE
concentrator, such as corrosion, cracks, repaired or removed. When choosing to
gouges, grooves or arc burns located grind the pipeline in order to remove the
within the dent. Attacks with explosives scratch or gouge, it is necessary to check
and the machines used for excavation or
perforation of soils usually cause this type
of dents. Dents with stress concentrators
OF
that the remaining pipeline thickness can
support the stress produced by internal
pressure. Otherwise, the scratch should be
should be repaired as soon as possible. filled up by welding by applying a qualified
E
welding procedure, install a type B
US
7.4.2.1.3. Double dents reinforcement sleeve, apply a

reinforcement system of compound
Double dents consist of two dents that material or replace the pipeline section.
E
overlap along the axis of the pipeline While the repair has not been completed,

IV
creating a central area of reverse it should be assessed whether it is
curvature in the longitudinal direction. necessary to modify the Maximum
US
Fatigue cracks develop in the saddle Operating Pressure.

region between the two dents and often
develop to critical proportions fasters than 7.4.2.3. Arc burns
CL
fatigue cracks in single dents.
They occur when due to negligence,
EX
7.4.2.1.4. Dents affecting welds deficient supervision, failure to apply

procedures, lack of knowledge in works
These are dents affecting longitudinal or involving welding, the electrode is dragged
R
circumferential seam welds. Welds on the pipeline surface or because of
FO
themselves represent a stress deficient grounding. They represent a

concentrator. Therefore, when associated metallurgic notch, which should be
with a dent, they represent an increased removed by changing the pipeline section
risk for the pipeline integrity and require or removing the affected material by
immediate attention. grinding. This may be controlled through
the application of Nital 5 to 10 after each
50
grinding, until it disappears. In the latter the pipe and install a valve to take out
case, the remaining thickness should be illegally the product transported in the
checked with ultrasound to determine pipeline. The repair of this type of damage
AS
whether the pipeline can support the requires the application of rubble
maximum service pressure at that point. (patches), type B sleeves, hot tapping
Otherwise, it is necessary to fill it up by and/or replacement of the pipeline.
R
welding using a qualified welding
OB
procedure (WPS and PQR) for such 7.4.2.5. Attacks
purpose or reinforce it mechanically with
type B sleeves, apply a reinforcement This type of voluntary third‐party action
TR
system of compound material or replace causes scratches, dents, perforations
the pipe section. and/or complete ruptures of the pipeline.
PE
Repair of these types of damage require
7.4.2.4. Illegal perforations mechanical reinforcement of the pipeline
with reinforcement sleeves, or
This type of damage is caused by persons
who steal hydrocarbons. They perforate

OF
replacement of the pipeline section.

E
US
E
IV
US
CL
EX
R
FO
51
7.4.3. Checklist for third‐party actions

AS
CHECKLIST
THIRD‐PARTY ACTIONS
R
OB
Yes No Yes No
Is there information available on the level of activity on each
1.
pipeline segment?
TR
Have points of recurrent voluntary third‐party damage been
2.
identified?
Is there a historical record of voluntary and involuntary third‐
PE
3.
party damage available?
Is patrolling conducted to detect third‐party actions that may
4.
threaten the pipeline?
5.
(Regular line and areas sensitive to third‐party damage, such as:
OF
Is the pipeline route duly identified and signposted in the field?
crossings or lines running parallel to unpaved roadways and

railways, crossings with watersheds, populated areas)

E
Are there integrated maps of the network of own and third‐party
6. pipelines and facilities of other public utilities companies
US
available?
7. Has a single Information Call Center been set up?
In those areas where third‐party actions have been repeated,
have exceptional measure been included, such as installing
E
8.
optical fiber or metal cable, usually 30 to 60 cm above the
IV
pipeline? Are they continuously monitored?
Has the pipeline coating depth along the entire pipeline,
US
9. especially in areas sensitive to third‐party damage, been

identified?
Has a public education and awareness program been
10.
implemented?
CL
Has a program been implemented for maintenance of right of

11.
way and installation of aerial pipelines barriers?
EX
In those areas where third‐party actions have been repeated,

12. have any exceptional measures been implemented, such as
additional mechanical protection for the pipeline?
In those areas that are highly sensitive to third‐party damage, is
R
13.
there a proper relation between thickness and diameter?
FO
Have the sites where warning tapes or security fencing were
14.
installed been identified?
Has a shared right‐of‐way protocol been implemented with
15.
other pipeline, facilities and/or services operators?
Have in‐line inspection (ILI) tools been run to determine metal
16.
loss?
17. Have geometrical calibration tools been run?
52
CHECKLIST
THIRD‐PARTY ACTIONS
AS
Yes No Yes No
R
18. Is there an updated land use plan?
OB
19. Have the maps containing pipeline drawings been updated?
20. Are there any leak detection systems available?
TR
Are there any control systems to analyze the reasons for
21.
unjustified variations in flow or pressure?

PE
7.5. Operational errors These variations indicate there is a serious
problem in the pipeline system and
One of the threats to which the represent abnormal operating conditions
hydrocarbon transportation system is
subject is the occurrence of errors during
the execution of operations that may
OF that threaten its integrity. In this situation,
the problem should be identified and the
response should be fast and decisive.
E
result in damage to facilities, hydrocarbon Otherwise, an emergency could be
spills, gas leaks and/or contamination of
US
generated immediately.
products that are complying with
specifications. These “transient” conditions can make
The geographical extent of facilities and exceed the Maximum Allowable Operating
E
personnel in the various operational units Pressure (MAOP) of the pipeline in some

IV
composing the pipeline transportation of its points, causing its rupture or
system makes it necessary to maximize reducing its useful life due to fatigue.
US
precautions to have all personnel acting in
coordination according to common, Operational error can also result in
specific procedures for each event that incidents without causing structural
CL
may occur. damage to facilities, in spills due to

overflow of sumps, overflow of tanks,
EX
7.5.1. Description of threats of damage spheres overfilling or specified product
due to operational errors contamination.

R
The main threat likely to occur in the 7.5.2. Types of damage caused by
FO
operation of a pipeline system is the operational errors

unjustified variation in pressure (negative
manometric pressure, sudden increased The following table summarizes the most
or reduced pressure, etc.). frequent operational errors and the
resulting damage mechanisms:
53

Operational Error Failure Mode Effect Immediate Cause Basic Cause
AS
 Pipeline start‐up
 Tank/sphere foot
 Flow Change
valve closed
 Tank/sphere
instead of open
R
changes  Erroneous
 Collector valve
 Equipment de‐  High P with operation in field
OB
not opening
commissioning rupture and spill  Erroneous remote
 Overcurrent bypass  Pipeline
 Bifurcated pump
 High P without opening/closure
 Scrapers launching shutdown rupture Fatigue
valve closed
 Lack of preventive
 Erroneous
TR
and receiving  Cavitation operation
maintenance
 Measurement
instruction  Lack of training
 Dual tank/sphere
 Automatic
PE
receiving and
sequence failure
pumping
 Tank/sphere foot
valve open
 Receipt at terminal

station
OF
 Product outside
instead of closed
 Errors in batch
arrival estimate
(only for liquids)  Lack of preventive
E
 Injection of friction  Contamination of specification  Errors in batch maintenance
reducing chemical
US
products under (suspension of detection (only  Task simultaneity

agent specification delivery of fuel to for liquids)  Lack of training
 Tank/sphere customers)  Erroneous
changes instruction from
E
the Distribution
IV
Center
 Instrument error
 Level meter
US
 Control of failure

 Error in tank
sumps/flares  Level alarm
 Spill or gas leak calibration table
 Scraper installation /  Impact on soils failure
CL
 Tank/sphere  Sump pump
 Lack of preventive
removal and environment
overfilling maintenance
 Tank/sphere failure
 Lack of training
 Flare’s pilot
EX
changes
flame failure

R

FO
54
7.5.3. Checklist for operational errors

AS
CHECKLIST
OPERATIONAL ERRORS
R
OB
Yes No Yes No of data
Does it have mechanical protections in pump/compressor and plant
1.
discharges? (PSV and rupture discs)
TR
Does the plant have logic protections? For example, shutdown for high
2.
pressure, bypass opening, bypass to relief tank, bypass to flare, etc.
PE
Does the pump/compressor station have a set point tracking to
3.
minimize transient conditions of high pressure?
Does the pipeline have a global intelligent control strategy of all
4. pump/compressor stations in the event of a pipeline
5.
shutdown/transient condition?
Does the pump/compressor station have emergency shutdown devices
in visible and easily accessible locations?

OF

E
6. Are there safety areas in the pump/compressor stations?
US
The basic cause of many failures is malfunctioning of a field
7.
instrument. Has preventive maintenance been planned?
Is there a Leak Detection System (LDS) to warn of illegal actions and
8.
ruptures?
E
Is there a SCADA system to set high and low alarms in different TAGs of
9.
critical operating variables?
IV
Does it have a SCADA system which warns through “pop ups” any
10.
unplanned change in the process variables?
US
In the event of a failure of the SCADA system, are there other options
11. to keep the pipeline operational coordination uninterrupted? (outside
line, extension, cellular telephone, satellite, VHF radio)
CL
Are block valves in the pipeline periodically tested for correct
12.
operation?
Can high‐level alarms in product receiving tanks, sumps and spheres be
EX
13. set to avoid overflows and overfillings? Are these alarms on measuring
systems which are independent of the operational systems?
Is there staff specialized in incident analysis to learn from errors and
14.
experience?
R
Are there automatic operations sequences, such as scraper

FO
15. launching/receiving, equipment startup/shutdown, line inflow/outflow
of a pump/compressor station?
Is there a list available specifying all critical equipment without which
the operation is not safe, and, therefore, requires authorization by
16. senior management to continue operations by applying contingency
actions that minimize the risk of not having out‐of‐service critical
equipment?
55
CHECKLIST
OPERATIONAL ERRORS
AS
R
Yes No Yes No of data
OB
Is a visual inspection of facilities conducted in each shift change?
17.
(checklist for shift change)
In the event of low response reliability of valve actuators, is there a
18.
field operator who can manually opens/closes the valves if they fail?
TR
Is there a methodical, strict operational incident analysis system to
19. determine the basic cause of a failure, and not only the immediate
cause?
PE
Has a dissemination system or forum of lessons learned, errors,
20.
accidents or operational incidents been implemented?
Has an induction and training program been implemented for
21.
22.
taken?
OF
operators at the time of joining their new job? Are examinations
Has a training and qualification plan for operators and supervisors of
the Distribution Center been implemented?

E
Is there a transient condition simulator available to train plant
23. operators and supervisors of the Distribution Center in the correct and
US
quick response to an emergency?
24. Are operational emergency drills conducted?
Do operators and supervisors of the Distribution Center know the
25.
E
maximum pressure values of every pipeline at every point?
Is there an operation manual and contingency plan available at each
IV
26.
pump/compressor station?
Is the coordination of pipeline operation centralized in a single control
27.
US
office?
Is there a written procedure for de‐commissioning and commissioning
28.
of equipment?
CL
Does the Series number of the plant internal pipes correspond to the
29.
maximum operating pressure?
Is there a robust management and change control system to distribute
EX
30.
changes in instructions and facilities properly to all personnel involved?
Are audits and management inspections conducted to evidence unsafe
31.
operating conditions?
R
32. Are multiples property identified and signposted?
33. Are there updated drawings and P&ID of multiples available?
FO
34. Are the system HAZOPs updated and implemented?
56
8. Action plans and maintenance  Continuous resistivity study.

program  Periodic assessment of Cathodic
Protection Rectifiers.
AS
8.1. Action plans to mitigate risks  Assessment of cathodic protection
post‐to‐post potential (instant on/off
potential), tow fish trailing wire, BLF
R
This stage of the pipeline integrity
program arises from risk assessment and (bottom towed, lateral field, gradient),
OB
consists in the definition of the techniques 3‐electrode plunger, ROV, etc.
and/or methodologies and frequency of  Study of attenuation models to
inspection, monitoring and mitigation to evaluate submarine pipelines.
TR
be applied in order to maintain the  Determination of cathodic protection
integrity of the analyzed segments, as a levels by CIS.
PE
strategy to minimize the risk. These  Electrical insulation of plants, delivery
techniques and/or methodologies are points and aerial structures, including
defined based on the critical nature of the valves and bridges.
threats detected during risk assessment,
and on the morphology and characteristics
of damage mechanisms, establishing the
OF  Installation of Remote Monitoring
Units in the Cathodic Protection
System.
 Reinforcement and/or reinstatement
E
technical and economic reasons for their
of the Cathodic Protection System.
US
use (cost‐benefit ratio). Appendix F

(“Alternative actions for control and  Determination of the coating condition
mitigation of threats – Acceptable repair by DCVG, PCM or ACVG.
and prevention methods”) is a guide to  Study of AC/DC interference with
E
select monitoring, inspection and other structures and tubed crossings.

IV
mitigation activities for each threat. In  Mitigation actions due to electrical
addition, Appendixes A, B, C, D and E AC/DC interference with other
US
provide options to determine, control and structures.
mitigate the damage produced by each  Inspection and coating of aerial‐buried
pipeline interfaces.
CL
threat.
 Visual right‐of‐way inspection.
Some of the techniques and/or  Monitoring and follow‐up of the
EX
methodologies that are commonly used to increase in the anomalies reported by

monitor, inspect and/or mitigate each ILI.
threat and their consequences are the  Execution of mechanical repairs
R
following: resulting from ILI.
FO
 Guided wave inspection of pipelines.
Monitoring and mitigation of external  Replacement of pipelines.
corrosion:  Replacement or reinstatement of
 Soil aggressivity study (type of soil, pH, anticorrosion coating.
chlorides, bacteria).  Replacement or reinstatement of
thermal insulation coating.
57
Monitoring and mitigation of internal  Integral evaluation of special aerial
corrosion: and sub‐fluvial crossings.
 Monitoring of internal corrosion (such  Execution of works to ensure the
AS
as the installation of coupons, geotechnical stability of the pipeline
biocoupons and electric resistance and any special subfluvial and aerial
probes) and solids suspended in water crossings.
R
from tank drainage (physicochemical  Right‐of‐way clearing and cleaning.
OB
analysis of water or sediments related  Diagnosis and installation of protection
to the transported product, pH, against electrical discharges.
chlorides, H2S, bacteria, Langellier  Construction of by‐passes.
TR
index, CO2, electrochemical test, etc.).  Construction of subfluvial and aerial
 Installation of pipeline cleaning crossings.
PE
scraper traps.  Periodic visual right‐of‐way inspection.
 Removal or drainage of dead legs (sites  Availability of georeferenced maps of
were water and sediments the pipelines.
concentrate in the pipeline).
 Adjustment of filtering systems.
 Establishment and execution of a
OF 

Run of inertial and geometry tools.
Identification and characterization of
geotechnically‐sensivite areas.
pipeline interior cleaning program.
E
 Establishment and application of a Monitoring and mitigation of third‐party
US
chemical treatment (biocide, inhibitor, actions:
oxygen scavenger).  Update of pipeline drawings and maps
 Establishment and application of a with GPS.
E
tank drainage program.  Patrolling for surveillance and control

IV
 Establishment, if possible, of turbulent of illegal activities and right‐of‐way

flow pumping systems. conditions.
US
 Application of ICDA methodology.  Social Management Programs in the

 UT Scan B and C in selected points for communities surrounding the pipeline.
periodic measurement.  Pipeline signposting or marking.
CL
 Run of in‐line inspection (ILI) tools,  Public education program.

such as MFL or UT, to determine metal  Emergency call information systems.
EX
loss.  Information Call Center to locate

facilities.
Monitoring and mitigation of natural  Optical or ground intrusion electronic
R
forces: detection.
FO
 Geotechnical diagnosis and/or  Increased depth of cover.

monitoring of pipelines.  Right‐of‐way maintenance and control.
 Protection and stabilization of  Additional mechanical protection to
pipelines in watercourses crossings prevent illegal actions, vandalism and
(rivers, streams, floodable areas, etc.) terrorism.
58
 Establishment and implementation of  Implementation of remote system

a shared right‐of‐way protocol. monitoring and operation.
 Establishment of appropriate  Implementation of audits to the
AS
thickness‐diameter ratios. management system.
 Installation of marker tape or warning  Signposting and identification of flow
mesh over pipeline. lines and accessories in plants.
R
 Periodic right‐of‐way inspections.  Record and investigation of unplanned
OB
 Run of in‐line geometry and metal loss events.
inspection tools.  SCADA systems to control centralized
 Leak Detection System. operation.
TR
 Control logics regarding flow and  Leak Detection System.
pressure.  Control logics regarding flow and
PE
pressure.
Monitoring and mitigation of operational  Emergency shutdown devices (ESD).
errors:
 Maintenance and calibration of block
valves.
 Preventive maintenance of block
OF To mitigate the consequences:
 Establishment, update
dissemination of contingency plans.
and
valves, flanged joints, accessories and  Implementation of contingency plans.

E
vacuum relief valves.  Installation of systems to detect
US
 Implementation of maintenance product leakage.

routines for the plant operational  Installation of motorized and remote
control system. check valves and/or block valves.
E
 Establishment and development of  Implementation of emergency

IV
training plan for operators and shutdown devices (ESD).

maintenance staff.
US
 Certification of operators and To determine pipeline integrity:

maintenance staff skills.  Visual inspection and assessment of
 Development, update and compliance indications in aerial pipelines.
CL
with instructions and operational  Performance of pressure tests.

procedures.  Application of ECDA and ICDA
EX
 Development, update and compliance methodology for corrosion threats.

with duties and responsibilities  In‐line inspection of pipelines with
manual. intelligent vehicles Geometry, inertial
R
 Update, development and availability mapping, metal loss, cracks.

FO
of P&ID in the operation rooms of the  Inspection point control (soil, plungers,
distribution and receiving plants. ROV).
 Use of HAZOP or any other
methodology to determine and The action plan not only considers the
mitigate the operational risks of the determination and mitigation of damage
system. mechanisms produced by threats, but also
59
the mitigation of the consequences of a construction, monitoring and inspection of

leakage or spill. It also includes the actions damage mechanisms generated by each
required to determine pipeline integrity at threat, determination of pipeline integrity,
AS
different periods to be defined by each prevention or mitigation of threats,
pipeline operator, depending on the pipeline repair and/or reinstatement
conditions, history and particular methods, risk assessment methodologies
R
characteristics of each transportation and information integration and
OB
system. management tools. These technologies
should be evaluated and incorporated into
The action plan includes the activities to risk assessment exercises and action plans.
TR
be performed, the period when they
should be performed and the As tools for integration of data collected
PE
corresponding costs. from monitoring, inspection and
mitigation actions are used, it is possible
8.2. Risk re‐assessment and changes to to review the effectiveness of the action

the action plan
Risk assessment is not a one‐time event

OF plans designed and to perform any
required changes, thus establishing a
higher level of reliability of the risk
and there should be an established assessment methodology and of the
E
process to repeat the risk assessment at expected results of the pipeline integrity
US
some operator‐defined frequency. Risk program.

assessment should be a continuous
process, which is more effective if fully Some of the factors that make risk re‐
E
integrated into the daily operations of the assessment necessary are: Results of

IV
pipeline operator. As the monitoring and inspections or monitoring considered in
inspection activities established in the the initial action plan, changes in pipeline
US
action plan are carried out, more and operating conditions, change in the type
better information is obtained about the of product to be transported, new
pipeline conditions. In addition, if technologies for threat and consequence
CL
mitigation actions are applied duly and diagnosis and mitigation, new high
timely, the risk level concerning consequence areas or major accident
EX
probability of failure and consequences areas, the occurrence of events not
must improve. considered initially, and change to risk
assessment methodology, among others.
R
The continuous search for new risk By performing new risk assessment
FO
diagnosis, assessment and mitigation exercises, the operator gains knowledge

technologies should be a priority for and confidence in the desired results.
pipeline operators.

Some of the technologies to consider are
those related to pipeline design and
60
8.3. Management of change in a high consequence areas or major accident

pipeline integrity program areas, different damage mechanisms
derived from threats, consequences,
AS
Once a pipeline integrity program is action plans, and management indicators.
established and during its application, it is
important that such program, resulting
R
from the initial risk assessment, be
OB
continuously monitored to integrate the
changes made to the pipeline
transportation system into de database.
TR
Changes in the pipeline operating
conditions (for example: pressure, flow,
PE
temperature, physicochemical
characteristics of the product, changes in
existing procedures or addition of new
operational procedures, others); pipeline
physical characteristics (for example:
addition of new pump units, a new control
OF
system, shared right‐of‐way with third
E
parties, changes in the type of material,
US
thickness and diameters, variables,

installation or removal of block or check
valves, etc); changes in service (for
E
example, from gas pipeline to oil pipeline,
IV
from system dedicated to a single product
to multipurpose pipelines; new high
US
consequence areas or major accident

area; restarting systems or equipment
that have been out of service for an
CL
extended time: changes in land use; and

new decrees and regulations that may
EX
imply changes in the integrity program,

action plan, and/or require a new risk
assessment.
R
It is important to anticipate such changes.
FO
For this purpose, it is necessary to have

procedures and/or instructions that allow
the operator to evidence, study and
document the impact of such changes on
all stages of the pipeline integrity
program, including to review and redefine:
61
9. Integrity Program evaluation the overall context of its business,

following is the description of some
Integrity management programs should be indicators that may be useful to measure
AS
evaluated on a periodic basis, together the performance of the pipeline integrity
with indicators, performing internal program ARPEL will define some indicators
with which benchmarking among ARPEL
R
reviews that allow ensuring the
effectiveness of the integrity management Member Companies will be conducted.
OB
program and the achievement of its goals.
This should be the practice of the  Performance indicator and a goal to
company's senior management. It is also reduce the total volume of unexpected
TR
possible to use services provided by third leaks and/or ruptures with an ultimate
parties to help during audits of the goal of zero.
PE
management program.
 Inspection Plan Follow up Indicator =
Evaluation should allow the pipeline performed inspection/programmed
operator to determine if the action plan
resulting from the risk assessment
exercise was applied, and if the
OF inspections.

 Performance indicator and a goal that
documents the percentage of integrity
E
application of the different activities
included in such plan was really effective management activities completed
US
in the mitigation of threats affecting the during the calendar year (completed
pipeline integrity. work orders vs. planned work orders).

E
9.1. Performance indicators  Consideration of inspection

IV
recommendations = performed
It is necessary to establish and measure priority recommendations / issued
US
the performance indicators to know if the recommendations.
action plan was applied and the
effectiveness of such plan, in order to  Performance indicator and a goal to
CL
achieve the goal of any pipeline operator, track and evaluate the effectiveness of
which is basically to develop its operations the community outreach activities
EX
in such a way that there are not adverse (public education program).

effects on employees, the environment,
the public and its customers. Performance  Periodic follow‐up of the pipeline
R
indicators are an important part of the integrity management program (BSC),
FO
pipeline integrity management program. including a summary of performance

improvements. (For example, levels of
Even when each company should establish cathodic protection, efficiency of the
and qualify the most appropriate cathodic protection system, level of
indicators for its management on the basis internal corrosion rates in MPY – mils
of the type and size of its operations and
62
per year, effectiveness of the chemical their effectiveness and identifying areas of
treatment, ILI results, among others). improvement. Audit may be performed by
personnel with the organization (self
AS
 Performance indicator based on assessments) or by auditors from outside
operational events that have the organizations. Examples of questions that
potential to adversely affect the integrity management auditing programs
R
pipeline integrity (for example, should address include:
OB
unplanned valve closure, ruptures due
to overpressure, failure in the control  Do you have the integrity
system, failure in the relief and safety management plan as a process in place
TR
systems, others). within your company?
 Are activities being performed as
PE
 Performance indicator to demonstrate outlined in the program
that the integrity management documentation?
program reduces risk over time with a  Are responsibilities clearly assigned in

focus on high‐risk items (initial risk
level vs. actual risk level). OF the integrity program?
 Are there procedures and instructions
for the performance of important
 Performance indicator of history of activities in pipeline operations,
E
failures before and after the integrity maintenance and preservation?
US
program.  Are procedures and instructions

available to those who need them?
 Performance indicator of response to  Are the people who do the work
E
incidents before and after the integrity (operations and maintenance) trained

IV
program. to perform their duties satisfactorily?
 Are qualified and certified people
US
 Indicators to measure the kilometers employed when required by

of pipeline diagnosed by ILI before and regulation?
after the integrity program.  Is there an adequate organizational
CL
structure to implement the established
 Indicators to measures the pipeline integrity management system?
EX
segments not diagnosed by ILI,  Are all activities required within the
pressure tested before and after the integrity program documented?
integrity program.  Is there a logical methodology to
R
develop risk assessment exercises?
FO
 Indicators based on Integrity audits.  Are there established criteria for

repairing, replacing or re‐rating
9.2. Audits damaged pipelines?
 How often is the action plan reviewed
Audits of integrity management programs and the risk re‐assessed?
are an important element of evaluating
63
 Are action plans developed in risk

assessment exercises being duly
applied?
AS

9.3. Continuous performance
improvement
R

OB
Since the details of the operator integrity
management program will vary, so too will
the appropriate set of performance
TR
measures.

PE
Non‐conformities reported in internal and
external audits, and the results of
performance indicator measurements
should be used as additional information
sources for understanding
effectiveness of pipeline integrity
the OF
programs. These results should be
E
considered in risk assessment workshops.
US

The results of performance indicator
measurements and audits of the risk
E
management program, including follow‐up
IV
recommendations, shall be reported to

those individuals who are responsible for
US
pipeline integrity and operations.

Performance of the integrity program
should be reviewed annually, addressing
CL
deviations from measurements and non‐

conformities found.
EX

R
FO
64
10. Standards, regulations and Pipeline. Pipeline Integrity

technical documents Management. Department of
Transportation.
AS
Following are some standards, regulations
and/or technical documents used in the  NACE International RP‐01‐69 ‐
Standard Recommended Practice
R
development of this subject, which may
be applied voluntarily in pipeline integrity Control of External Corrosion on
OB
management. Underground or Submerged Metallic
Piping Systems.
Operators should take into consideration
TR
national regulations and specific  API RP1110‐ Pressure Testing Liquids
procedures of their companies. Pipelines.
PE

 API STANDARD 1160 ‐ Managing  NACE Standard RP0502‐02 Standard
System Integrity for Hazardous Liquid Recommended Practice Pipeline

Pipelines.
 API 570 Piping Inspection Code: In‐

OF
External Corrosion Direct Assessment
Methodology.
 DOT (Department Of Transportation) y
E
service Inspection, Rating, Repair, and
CFR (Code of Federal Regulations) –
US
Alteration of Piping Systems, Third

Edition. USA.

 API RP – 579‐1 ‐ Fitness For Service,  ASME B 31.4 Pipeline Transportation
E
Second Edition. Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and

IV
Other Liquids.
 API RP – 580 ‐ Risk Based Inspection,
US
First Edition.  ASME B 31.8S Gas Transmission And

Distribution Piping Systems.
 ASME B31.8S Managing System
CL
Integrity of Gas Pipeline.  API Publication 1156 Effects of Smooth
and Rock Dents on Liquid Petroleum
EX
 DOT 49 CFR Part 192. Subpart O. ‐ Pipelines.

Transportation of Natural and Other
Gas by Pipeline: Minimum Federal  DOT CFR Part 195 Transportation of
R
Safety Standard. Pipeline Integrity Hazardous Liquids by Pipelines,

FO
Management. Department of Guidelines for the Assessment of

Transportation. Dents on Welds.

 DOT 49 CFR Part 195.452  Pipeline Research Council International
Transportation of Hazardous Liquids by – Project PR ‐ 2189822 ‐ Dec. 99
Rosenfeld M. J.
65
 API Recommended Practice 1162

Public Awareness Programs for
Pipeline Operator.
AS

 Specific corporate procedures of
pipeline operators applicable to this
R
Manual.
OB

 ASME B31.4 Pipeline Transportation
Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and
TR
Other Liquids, 2002 Edition, of the
American Society of Mechanical
PE
Engineers (ASME)

 API Standard 1130, Computational


Pipeline Monitoring.
API Standard 1149, Pipeline Variable

OF
uncertainties and their effects on Leak
E
Detectability
US

 API Standard 1155, Evaluation
Methodology for Software Based Leak
E
Detection
IV

 Current regulations in Latin American
US
and the Caribbean countries:
 Brazil
 Colombia
CL
 Mexico
 Argentina: Technical Regulations
EX
on Transportation of Liquid

Hydrocarbons by Pipelines.
 Perú: Reglamento de Transporte de
R
Hidrocarburos por Ductos ‐ Decreto
FO
Supremo‐ 081‐2007‐EM

66
FO
R
EX
CL
US
IV
E
US
E
OF
PE
TR
OB
RAS
APPENDIX A – Means, actions and as the information and knowledge are not

methods to determine and control necessarily centralized in one single area
or person.
internal corrosion
AS

It is necessary to develop basic guidelines
A.1. Determining the threat
to be complied with for the
R

implementation of the Internal Corrosion
OB
A.1.1 Development of a Master Plan
Management Program. There should also
defining an Internal Corrosion
be a definition of the basic premises, the
Management Program
internal corrosion management strategy
TR

and the internal corrosion assessment
Internal Corrosion Management can be
techniques to adopt.
defined as the systematic assessment of
PE

the corrosion process, correlating the
As a strategy for implementation of the
corrosion form and rate to the process
Internal Corrosion Management Program,
parameters and the physical, chemical and
microbiological properties of the fluid to
avoid or control corrosion, keeping it at
acceptable levels, in order to preserve the
OFmonitoring services provided by expert
companies may be hired, if thus
established by the operator as a program
implementation technique. This requires
E
structural integrity of the pipeline and to
an implementation schedule regarding all
US
guarantee production, product quality and
the necessary monitoring stages, those
environmental quality.
responsible for their execution, the

implementing authorities, the monitoring
E
For the implementation of the Internal

term and the program audit.
Corrosion Management Program it is
IV

necessary to generate a database
There should also be definition of the
containing all the information required for
US
different aspects of the pipelines to be

environmental corrosion treatment and
monitored: quantity, points or sites to be
analysis, in order to determine and
monitored at each pipeline, access
CL
implement corrective and/or preventive

facilities to such points, specification of
actions. This interdisciplinary information
equipment and accessories, and physical,
may vary for different pipelines according
EX
chemical and microbiological

to the specific characteristics of each
characteristics to assess for internal
system, the characteristics of the
corrosion monitoring.
transported fluid, pressure, temperature,
R

etc. A previous study of the whole process
FO
A.1.2 Internal corrosion assessment

is required to develop the database, in
criteria
order to determine the main parameters

to analyze and monitor during equipment
The corrosion potential of the transported
operation. This requires an articulation
fluid may be classified into three types:
with all the areas involved in the process,

68
Type A – Severe; A.1.2.1 Assessment criteria according to

Type B – Moderate; corrosion rate
Type C – Low.
AS
Fluid corrosion assessment is carried out
The corrosion potential types mentioned measuring the corrosion rate with at least
above are based on the analysis of the two different techniques:
R
results obtained by any of the following  Mass loss coupon (gravimetric
OB
items: technique);
A. Corrosion rate;  Corrosion sensor by electric resistance
B. Evaluation of the result of the loss of probe (ER).
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thickness of the instrumented pig;
C. Pipeline historical failure information; The determination of the corrosion
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and potential with the gravimetric technique
D. Conditions of the process and physical should be confirmed by –at least‐ two
and chemical characteristics of the successive measurements or by –at least‐
transported fluid.

The pipeline corrosion potential is
OF one measurement that agrees with the
result of the ER technique. Corrosion rate
assessment with the mass loss coupon
classified as severe if at least one of the technique or with the electric resistance
E
three first three criteria (A, B or C) so probe technique allows classifying fluid
US
indicate it. If there is no evidence about corrosion as stated in Table 1.

the severity from the first three criteria,
then the last criteria or item (D) should be The ideal coupon exposure time should be
E
used for evaluation. determined according to the results of the
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electric resistance probe (if any), and

In criteria C, if the transported fluid was cannot be more than six (6) months. If the
US
already being treated by a chemical first assessment (mass loss coupon
product, inhibitor, biocide and/or oxygen technique) determines that corrosion is
scavenger, the potential will be classified severe, the frequency of withdrawal of the
CL
within the moderate or slight types based following coupons will be shorter (usually

on the evaluation of the effectiveness of between 30 and 45 days).
EX
the injected chemical treatment or the

corrosion rate.
Table 1 – Corrosion potential (NACE RP‐0775)
R

FO
Corrosion Uniform corrosion rate (Coupon) Corrosion rate

potential (mm/year) Type of pitting (Coupon) (mm/year)
Severe > 0.125 > 0.201
Moderate 0.025 to 0.125 0.127 to 0.201
Low < 0.025 < 0.127
69
A.1.2.2 Assessment criteria according to through the instrumented pig is not
pigging report severe, there is no actual guaranty that
there is not severe corrosion, i.e., that the
AS
According to the pig run report, the fluid fluid inside the pipeline has not had a
may be classified as potentially severe severe corrosion potential at different
and/or the pipeline as potentially critical periods.
R
when, after a validation of the defects
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through field measurements, the results It is also important to remember that
reveal severe corrosion rates, i.e., higher inspection tools many times determine
than 0.125 mm/year, calculated based on other defects apart from internal
TR
one of the following criteria: corrosion. In this case, the professional in
charge of assessing pipeline integrity
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 The higher loss of thickness divided should consider the interaction of the
into the time of operation of the defects found in the same area. It is
pipeline or segment (in the case of a important to be able to check the
replacement);
 The higher loss of thickness of the
same defect between the two last
OF corrosion defects found in the field by B‐C
scan presentation mapping to confirm or
confront the data resulting from the pig
inspections (if any). inspection, in order to make proper
E
decisions as regards actual sections and to
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If there are two instrumented pig runs, it determine the most appropriate method
is important to evaluate the technology to repair the pipeline.
used in each case. Preference should be
E
given to the use of pigs with similar A.1.2.3 Assessment criteria according to
IV
technologies, for better comparison of the historical failure information
data obtained from both pig run reports,
US
in order to establish a more reliable Another way to assess the severity of
pipeline corrosion rate. pipeline corrosion is according to the
historical failure information. Table 2
CL
It is important to notice that, as contains a classification of the corrosion
inspections with non‐destructive testing potential according to the historical
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are generally performed at long intervals, information about failures due to internal

a severe corrosion that occurred along a corrosion:
short time may not be evidenced. Thus, if
R
the average thickness loss detected

FO

70
Table 2 ‐ Corrosion potential

If there is historical information about failures due to
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Severe corrosion during the last 5 years or for over 5 years, and
the causes of corrosion have not been eliminated.
R
If there is historical information about failures due to
Moderate corrosion from the last 10 years to the last 5 years, and
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the causes of corrosion have been eliminated.
If there is no historical information about failures due to
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corrosion, or if those failures occurred more than 10
Low
years ago, and the causes of corrosion have been
eliminated.
PE

A.1.2.4 Assessment criteria according to It is considered that the fluid has severe

process conditions and fluid
characteristics OF corrosion potential if it presents at least
one of the conditions noted below,
associated with one or more items of
Even if the corrosion potential has been Table 3.
E
determined as moderate or low according
US
to the above‐stated criteria, it is necessary  Pipeline with presence of free water
to check this classification according to  Gas pipeline with presence of free
process conditions and to the physical and water (gas with no dehumidification
E
chemical characteristics of the transported treatment);
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fluid.  Product flow < carryover flow with

free water present;
US

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EX
R
FO
71
Table 3 ‐ Corrosion potential

Parameter Severe Potential Moderate Potential Low Potential
AS
pH <5.6 5.6<pH<6.9 pH>7
R
5
Concentration of SRB>10 NMP/g or
Bacteria SRB = 102 to 105 SRB<105
NMP/cm2, growth/multiplication
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concentration and growth between 7 growth over 14
between 1 and 6 days and presence
activity and 14 days days
of iron sulfide in the residues
4psia< pCO2< 15 psia,
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pCO2>15 psia, independent from V
Partial pressure of and V<5m/s
or pCO2<4 psia, and
CO2 or
4 psia<pCO2<15 psia and V>5m/s V<5m/s
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from T<60°C pCO2<4 psia, and

5m/s<V<10m/s
Partial pressure of 0.01psia<PH2S<0.75
PH2S>0.75 psia PH2S<0.01 psia
H2S in gas
Content of H2S in
crude
OF
> 300 mg. of H2S per 1 Kg of crude
psia
‐‐‐ ‐‐‐
E
Corrosion of
derivatives
US
C, D and E classification Corrosion B+ and B A and B++

according to NACE
TM‐0172
Content of
E
dissolved oxygen Lower than 50 ppb
Lower than 20
IV
concentration in Higher than 50 ppb and higher than 20

ppb
the water (oil ppb
US
pipeline)

Due to the complexity of the corrosion A.2. Variables required to manage
CL
processes, some severe and moderate internal corrosion

corrosion cases might not be included in
EX
Table 3. In such case, the expert in charge Some data and analysis should be

of managing internal corrosion may monitored to classify the corrosion
classify the pipeline corrosion potential potential. The quality of the monitored
R
according to some other method data and the reliability of the results
(similarity, experience, modelling, etc.) obtained are related to the information
FO
collection and arrangement procedures,

the analysis methodology and the
assessment methodology. It is also
important to determine the frequency of
72
the assessment of the data collected A.2.2 Analysis of fluids and residues

during monitoring.
The chemical and microbiological analysis
AS
The main variables and parameters of fluids and residues is important to
monitored to manage internal corrosion determine the corrosion agents and
are: mechanism. Only with this information
R
 Corrosion rate measured with can the corrective or preventive measures
OB
corrosion testers (coupon and probe); be determined. The analysis should be
 Chemical and microbiological performed in duly qualified and certified
evaluation of the fluid (to determine laboratories using the same testing
TR
the presence of water); methodology at all times.
 Chemical and microbiological
PE
evaluation of the corrosion residue; Another important aspect is the sample
and collection site. Whenever possible, it is
 Operating variables (type of flow, recommended to collect samples in the
pressure and flow rate)

A.2.1 Data collection frequency
OF tank (before pumping), after the injection
pump of the chemical product, if any, and
at the end of product delivery.

E
The frequency of collection and analysis of A.2.3 Corrosion probes – mass loss
US
corrosion coupons, fluids and residues coupon

depends on the corrosion severity and the
process variability. If there are no This is one of the most useful techniques
E
supplementary data, the following to monitor corrosion. The coupons have a

IV
frequencies may be used: specific shape, size and surface area and

are usually made of a metal with a similar
US
Corrosion Maximum frequency chemical composition to that of the

potential recommended process equipment.

CL
Quarterly (fluid and
Severe residue) and 45 days Their weight and surface preparation are
recorded before the flowing process
(coupon)
EX
begins, and after a specific period of

Semiannual (fluid and exposure to the system, they are weighed
Moderate residue) and quarterly and visually inspected again. The
R
(coupon) laboratory analysis provides the corrosion
Semiannual (fluid, residue
FO
Low rate in mpy, as well as inspections (before
and coupon) and after cleaning) and measurements of
visual damage (such as dents).

The coupons provide precise results at a
reasonable cost. They are easy to use and
73
may provide general quantitative and contained in specific procedures within
visual information about several corrosion the adopted Master Plan.
types without depending on theoretical
AS
approximations. The coupons are also A.2.4 Corrosion probes – electric
extremely versatile, as they may be used resistance probe
in any type of corrosion environment.
R
The electric resistance probe is one of the
OB
The determination of the ideal point or corrosion monitoring technique available
site for coupon installation is one of the in the market that provides on line
most arguable items of internal corrosion corrosion data. The advantage over the
TR
monitoring. There is no set rule, but an other techniques is that it offers the
important fact must be considered: possibility to measure the metal loss
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Corrosion will only occur at those regardless of the electrolyte resistance,
locations where there is an accumulation even if water is not in contact with the
of water, or a continuous and probe.
intermittent water film. The expert
should determine this point based on his
knowledge and experience with other
OF
The sensor sensitivity is reversely
proportional to its thickness. The sensor
pipelines, on literature data and on the option, as regards its operating life and
E
use of specific software which determines response time, depends on the estimated
US
whether liquid will be formed, as well as corrosion rate. As the current rate and the

its volume and location. potential process variants are known, this
sensitivity may be modified.
E
Corrosion probes should always be

IV
installed in the lower part of the pipeline, The value of the corrosion rate is a

aligned perpendicular to the pipeline. In qualitative value, i.e., the calculated rate is
US
the case of pipelines carrying dry gas, the not always similar to the one obtained

probes should be installed in the lower from a corrosion coupon for the same
and in the upper parts. exposure period. However, the rate
CL
increase or decrease trend based on time
If possible, the corrosion probe should be is true, indicating the increase or decrease
EX
a flush mounted probe, where the in the corrosion of the transported fluid.
analyzed coupon area is installed along Thus, it may immediately act in the
the interior surface of the pipeline, process, as long as there is instability in
R
simulating actual transportation the corrosion rate, in order to avoid the
FO
conditions and not disrupting pigging. extension of the corrosion damage.

The coupon preservation procedures, The data obtained with the probe,
weight and assessment, as well as the depending on the monitoring equipment
coupon installation sites, should be characteristics, may be transmitted
remotely, by telephone, cell phone, radio
74
or satellite, and therefore become according to the amount of water in
available in a PC in real time. the pipelines and adjusted according
to the results obtained from usage of
AS
A.2.5 Operating variables those pigs. It is also important to
consider the types of cleaning pigs, as
As regards operating parameters, the the carryover efficiency also depends
R
corrosion experts shall define which on the pig quality.
OB
parameters should always be available,
with a priority on online availability. Some  Tank drainage – A structured program
of these parameters are: Product type, to drain water from the tank bottom
TR
temperature, pressure, flow, product should be implemented. It is important
characteristics and flow rate. to consider that a thorough analysis of
the drained fluid should be performed
PE

As far as possible, the experts should during the drainage stages.
know all the treatment units of the
 Filtering – A filtering system that
existing fluids, and as applicable, monitor
some of the equipment involved in the
process. An example of this is the
OF minimizes as much as possible the
passage of solids generated by
automation of chemical product injection cleaning or present in the transported
E
pumps (inhibitors, O2 scavengers, biocides, fluid should be implemented.
US
etc.).
 Chemical treatment injection –

Corrosion inhibitor, biocide and/or
A.3. Internal Corrosion Control –
E
oxygen scavenger ‐ It is important to

Means and Actions
have an injection inlet available in case
IV

it is necessary to inject any chemical
Independently from the corrosion severity
product. Preferably, the whole
US
for each pipeline, the following actions

injection system should be automated
and facilities are recommended during
and controlled inside the operation
operation:
CL
control room. All chemical products

should be tested and their
 Pigs – All the pipelines should have
effectiveness and compatibility with
EX
facilities for pig launching and

the transported fluid should be
receiving, both for pigs for water
evaluated before the laboratory stage,
cleaning and carryover and for
in order to define its efficiency and
R
inspection pigs, which require larger

inhibition dose, then adjusting the
FO
launchers and receivers. The cleaning

concentration in the field. Such
pig run frequency should be defined
evaluation shall be performed using
according to corrosion severity or
protocols to show that the product will
other parameters. The water carryover
not affect the properties of fuels,
pig run frequency should be as low as
especially aviation fuels. The pipeline
possible, should be determined
75
should be cleaned before injection to exercise, the frequencies required for
remove all the residues and ILI of each pipeline or pipeline
undesirable solids that may affect segment, or the application of
AS
treatment efficiency. alternative techniques or methods
with similar reliability in order to
 Flow rate and type – Determining the determine the mechanical conditions
R
flow rate and type required for water of the pipeline.
OB
carryover is also important to control
corrosion. Moreover, it should be
considered that the pipeline slops and

TR
undulations might facilitate the
precipitation of the water transported
together with the oil.
PE
 Pipe wall thickness – In some pipelines
it is impossible to control the corrosion
rate using corrosion probes. In such
cases, it is necessary to use other
OF
nondestructive testing techniques,
E
such as ultrasound and instrumented
US
pigging. It is a common practice to

perform mechanical integrity
assessments of pipelines transporting
E
hazardous liquids with ILI tools every

IV
five (5) years, but alternative methods
are being considered to increase the
US
frequency of inspections, if the

operator has established and applied a
mitigation program that has proved to
CL
be efficient to control internal

corrosion. In some cases, such
EX
frequency may be shorter than five (5)
years if the damage mechanism
generates corrosion rates and
R
morphologies that are not easily

controllable with internal mechanical
FO
cleaning and chemical treatments,

such as CO2 and/or bacterial corrosion.
Consequently, each pipeline operator
should establish, according to its own
failure probability assessment
76
APPENDIX B – Means, actions and to make sure that the arrangement of
methods to determine and control these supports does not facilitate the
accumulation of moisture between the
external corrosion
AS
supports and the pipeline, and that the

coating applied at these points has
B.1. External corrosion control
sufficient mechanical resistance and
R

adherence to assume the weight of the
OB
The most common external corrosion
structure without suffering indentation or
control methods are: Adequate material
being detached. These supports should be
selection, application of protective coating
subject to a thorough inspection to check
TR
and painting, electrical insulation of
the correct control of corrosion and/or
distribution, delivery and receiving plants,
take any necessary remediation actions.
adequate pipeline support and cathodic
PE

protection. Each method has advantages
B.1.2. Corrosion control in pipelines with
and disadvantages, but all of them should
aerial‐buried interface
be considered when planning an effective
and consistent program to control
external corrosion.

OF
In those pipelines with some buried and
some aerial sections due to crossroads,
access roads, sub‐fluvial river crossings
E
B.1.1. Corrosion control in aerial
and other reasons, be them tubed or not,
US
pipelines
corrosion due to differential airing and

moisture is common. In these cases, it is
Atmospheric corrosion control in an aerial
important to apply a kind of coating that
E
pipeline is achieved through the

properly supports the mechanical stress in
application of protective coating to
IV
the buried section and the action of rain

insulate the metal substrate of the
and UV rays in the aerial section, and that
corrosion environment. Among the most
US
remains stable for as long as possible

effective coatings made of paints there is
without cracking and/or detaching. In
a three layer system: the first sacrifice
these cases it is common to use paint
CL
layer of inorganic zinc; the second barrier
systems of high solids with polyurethane
layer of epoxy polyamide polyamine; and
or poly‐siloxane finishing in white color, or
the third finishing layer to protect from
EX
kraft paper or tapes to protect the coating
degradation by UV rays of polyurethane or
from the UV rays.
poly‐siloxane. However, the coating

selection will depend on the proper and
R
These sites require special attention to

specific assessment of the environment
FO
check that the coating is continuous and

where the pipeline is or will be installed.
remains adhered, so that there is no

accumulation of moisture under the
When the pipeline is supported by
coating, as moisture does not vapor itself
concrete supports, H frameworks or
easily and therefore promotes corrosion.
clamps for aerial crossings, it is necessary

77
Non‐tubed crossings are preferred for protection is used in combination with
construction of this type of pipelines, but coating for corrosion control when there
if it is necessary to use tubed crossings, are pores or any damage in the protective
AS
then it is important to make sure that the coating and the steel pipeline is exposed
tube is not in contact with the pipeline, in to the corrosive electrolyte. The cathodic
order to avoid the galvanic pair. protection basically turns anodic areas in
R
the steel surface into cathodic areas,
OB
The separators between the tube and the transferring corrosion to an external
pipe should be made of materials that structure not belonging to the pipeline,
prevent metallic contact and current flow which may be easily and periodically
TR
among them. The seals at the tube ends replaced. These are called sacrifice anodic
must prevent the entrance of water into beds.
PE
the pipe. To mitigate the effect of
corrosion due to differential airing, The cathodic protection may be installed,
dielectric oil is usually applied between monitored and maintained according to
the tube and the pipe.

B.1.3. Corrosion control in buried
OFthe requirements of international or
national standards, or to the corporate
standards of the operating company. The
pipelines data obtained from the cathodic
E
protection systems should be integrated
US
External corrosion in buried or submerged with the data obtained from in‐line

pipelines is controlled by a combination of inspections and with other information
protective coating and cathodic related to external corrosion, in order to
E
protection. For cathodic protection to establish the susceptibility of a pipeline to

IV
reach the required level as regards current corrosion and to establish the probability

and coverage, it is necessary to provide of failure.
US
adequate insulation of the pipeline‐

related structures, such as: distribution It is advisable to perform monthly
plants; delivery connections; support of readings of the operating conditions of
CL
aerial segments; and receiving plants. each Cathodic Protection Rectifier (CPR).

Among other measurements, it is
EX
The protective coating forms a barrier necessary to record the voltage and AC
between the pipeline steel and the soil or current, the adjustment of coarse and fine
water, thus insulating the pipeline from settings of voltage, the voltage and DC
R
the electrolyte. The most common current, the pipe/soil potential next to the

FO
coatings for buried pipelines are: Coal Tar CPR and the anodic bed resistance.
Enamel, Asphalt Enamel, Fusion Bonded
Epoxy (FBE), Extruded Polyethylene, This type of monitoring is currently
Three‐Layer Polyethylene, Three‐Layer facilitated with the installation of Remote
Polypropylene and cold‐applied Monitoring Units (RMU), which also
Polyethylene Tapes. The cathodic
78
facilitate inspections of Instant on‐off post In the case of aerial pipelines, pipeline

to post potentials and CIPS. inspections carried out by duly trained
inspectors allow determining external
AS
External coating systems should be corrosion problems and to evaluate the
assessed, inspected and maintained. need to remove the corrosion products,
Corrosion control is highly dependent on reinstate or replace the coating and define
R
the integrity of the external coating whether mechanical inspections of the
OB
system. The NACE provides vast pipeline are required. These inspections
information on this topic and other are very important in the aerial‐buried
corrosion engineering topics. interfaces and in the supports of the
TR
pipeline, where corrosion is usual due to
Coating integrity should be inspected accumulation of moisture and differential
PE
applying surface technology such as DCVG aeration.
(Direct Current Voltage Gradient) and PCM
(Pipe Current Mapper), which enable For buried pipelines, there are several
decision‐making after implementing
cathodic protection reinforcement or
changing or reinstating the coating.
OF
alternatives to determine damage caused
by external corrosion that might affect
pipeline integrity, such as: Pressure tests,
ECDA methodology and run of in‐line
E
B.2. Determining external corrosion inspection (ILI) tools.
US

When evaluating the need to perform an B.2.1. Pressure test
initial inspection to detect external
E
corrosion, the operator should consider: The pipeline pressure test with product or

IV
Pipeline age; pipeline wall thickness; water has been accepted for a long time
coating type; coating conditions according as method to establish pipeline integrity.
US
to direct or indirect inspections (PCM or It is very complicated to carry on
DCVG) or to cathodic protection current hydrostatic tests to pipelines that have
requirements; conditions of cathodic been in operation because such operation
CL
protection as shown by test readings; should be interrupted and it is difficult to
pipeline‐soil potential readings; current get the permits required to obtain, treat
EX
requirements; anodic consumption; and dispose of water that might have
pipeline operating temperature; soil type, been contaminated by the transported
stating any conditions that might act as a product. The performance of such tests
R
barrier to cathodic protection, such as with product entails a risk of pipeline
FO
rock barriers; soil resistance; physical and failure, with the consequential generation

chemical characteristics of the soil or of environmental pollution.
water (pH, carbonates, sulfates and
bacteria); and historical information about However, the hydrostatic test is still an
previous cracks or rupture caused by alternative for the operator to check
external corrosion. pipeline integrity if it is not possible to run
79
an ILI tool through the pipeline, if the The pressure test may further wall loss by

history data about the pipeline segment corrosion and the growth and/or
show that there have been anomalies interconnection of cracks while the test
AS
undetectable with ILI internal inspection shows no failures. Additionally, the
tools or if inspection with other corrosion defects and existing cracks
methodologies is not sufficiently reliable might continue increasing over time, so in
R
as regards pipeline integrity. The order to prevent future service failures, it
OB
hydrostatic test validates the maximum is necessary to continue with pressure
pipeline operating pressure. The pressure tests at adequate intervals to eliminate
test may be developed according to the defects that have increased over time
TR
international, national and/or corporate or to check that there are no critical
technical regulations of the pipeline defects, before these may reach a
PE
operator. condition that allows any unexpected
release of the transported product.
The pressure test is a valuable tool to
destructively remove critical defects. Not
all the anomalies will be removed during
the pressure tests, as only those with a
OFB.2.2. ECDA methodology

This methodology consists in assessing the
critical size will be detected. These critical parameters that affect and control the
E
defects are pipeline wall loss due to occurrence of external corrosion, such as:
US
overall corrosion or corrosion bursts Soil resistivity, physical, chemical and
where the axial damage component is microbiological characteristics, CIPS
important, such as Stress Corrosion technique, DCVG technique, ACVG or PCM
E
Cracking (SCC), Electric Resistance Weld technique and other characteristics of the

IV
(ERW) or Narrow Axial External Corrosion pipeline and the soil where the pipeline is

(NAEC). installed, in order to select the areas
US
where corrosion might occur and then

The pressure test is not as efficient when perform excavations for direct inspection
it is used to identify localized corrosion. of the pipeline condition.
CL
The localized pits may maintain a high

failure pressure due to the restriction The ECDA methodology consists of the
EX
around the pit and depending on the pit following four (4) stages:

size. Unless the corrosion depth is enough
as to finish consuming the whole pipeline 1. Pre‐Assessment – Consists in
R
wall by the time of the hydrostatic gathering the above‐mentioned data,
FO
pressure, the pipeline will resist. Any defining ECDA application feasibility,
pipeline with localized pitting may resist a selecting indirect inspection tools and
pressure test and maintain the MOP until identifying ECDA areas.
there is a leak.
2. Indirect Inspection – Consists in
indirect inspections measurements,
80
data identification, alignment and B.2.3. In‐line inspection (ILI) tools

comparison, definition and
application of criteria to classify the Internal in‐line inspection is a method to
AS
severity of the evidence found, assess pipeline integrity. There are
comparison of evidence found and different in‐line inspection technologies
comparison of evidenced data with for different types of defects. When
R
pre‐assessment data and historical internal inspection is selected to assess
OB
data. the integrity of a pipeline segment, the
inspection should be carried out using the
3. Direct Examination – Consists in the adequate technology to determine the
TR
performance of excavations and anomalies that the operator believes
collection of data, recording coating there may be in a specific pipeline.
PE
damage and measuring metal loss. Multiple inspection runs using different
The remaining pipe resistance in the tools would be more beneficial than a
areas where defects are found is single inspection run with a single tool to
evaluated, a root cause analysis is
performed and the coating defects
are reclassified and prioritized.
OF
determine defects and anomalies.

In‐line inspection tools are available only
with certain diameters, so it is impossible
E
4. Post‐Assessment – Consists in the to use them in certain pipeline segments,
US
calculation of the pipe residual life, such as bypasses. In such case, alternative

the setup of new inspection intervals, inspection techniques or pressure tests
the assessment of ECDA effectiveness, should be considered to inspect the
E
the establishment of additional integrity of those sections. The accuracy
IV
criteria to determine ECDA and reliability of in‐line inspection tools
effectiveness and feedback and vary according to each tool, pipeline
US
continuous improvement. conditions and other factors. When

running an in‐line inspection program, the
There are areas where it is difficult to operator should evaluate whether the
CL
apply the ECDA methodology and might inspection tools available are suitable for
thus determine the feasibility of it. These the desired application, and develop a
EX
areas are: sectors with cathodic protection plan to validate the results. Sufficient

shielding; sectors with rock filling, paved inspection excavations should be
or concrete areas over the pipeline; areas performed to prove that the tool is
R
where it is impossible to obtain data for a accurate and reliable. Only then can the

FO
certain period of time; areas with buried operator rely on such tool to find critical
metal structures adjacent to the pipeline; anomalies so that they may be removed or
and of course, inaccessible areas. repaired.

The metal loss tools currently available in
the market are based on the principle of
81
Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) with principle. Ultrasonic corrosion tools work
standard resolution or high resolution. by using transmit/receive transducers to
These tools use permanent magnets or transmit an ultrasonic pulse into the
AS
electromagnets to induce a magnetic field pipeline wall and record the times of
axially oriented in the pipeline wall, when reflection from both its internal and
the tool is going through the pipeline external surfaces, allowing for direct
R
interior. The magnetic flux leakage (MFL) measurement of the wall thickness and
OB
is measured by sensors from the pipeline internal/external defect discrimination.
wall to the pipeline interior, and any flow
density deviation is recorded. Ultrasonic tools provide direct and linear
TR
measurement of wall thickness that can
Such deviations indicate a change in be used to approximate, with appropriate,
PE
pipeline thickness or another anomaly the remaining strength of corroded pipe.
that disrupts the magnetic field, such as The tools have the advantage of being a
ferrous materials near the pipeline. This is more direct description of an anomaly as
an inferential method, as the
characteristics of the anomalies should be
inferred from the flux leakage. There are
OFcompared to the magnetic flux tool, which
is an inferred measurement of an
anomaly. With an ultrasonic tool, it is
certain limitations to the determination critical that the signal be acoustically
E
and to the ability to quantify the coupled to the internal diameter (ID) of
US
longitudinally oriented loss of metal. MFL the pipe. This can be an issue in some
tools with standard resolution are crude oil lines with paraffin build on the
different from those with high resolution pipe ID, and some liquids with unsuitable
E
because the latter have more sensors with ultrasonic properties such as ethanol.

IV
smaller space between them to measure With the immersion technique, the US
deviations in the magnetic field, which tools may be less susceptible to the
US
allow them to collect and store more acoustic coupling difficult, as no direct
precise longitudes and depths for each contact of the probes with the internal
anomaly. Using calculations of remaining wall of the pipeline is required. US tools
CL
resistance in corroded areas, the data are not applicable in pipelines
provided by MFL tools can be used to transporting gas, as gas is not a coupling
EX
determine the approximate remaining vehicle enabling the propagation of

resistance of the pipeline. High resolution ultrasound in the pipe wall.
tools can also determine if a corrosion
R
anomaly is internal or external to the In‐line inspection tools have been
FO
pipeline wall. There are limitations to the developed to determine longitudinally
determination of longitudinally oriented oriented cracks and discontinuities similar
loss of metal using this technique. to cracks, such as fractures due to
corrosion under stress, long cracks along
There are also ILI tools to determine the the seam, selective corrosion of ERW
loss of metal based on the ultrasound seam or narrow axial external corrosion
82
(NAEC). These tools use shutdown magnetization that is locally altered in the

ultrasound waves or circumferential stress concentration areas. As a
(transversal) magnetic flux technology. consequence, these areas may be
AS
detected and located measuring the
As these in‐line inspection technologies to magnetic field associated to natural
determine metal loss and cracks are magnetization and its variations from the
R
improving rapidly, it is advisable to do surface of the piece, called magnetic
OB
some market research in order to know leakage field.
the latest solutions in this field.
This is a non‐intrusive method that does
TR
It is also advisable to have direct and not require contact with the pipeline. It
permanent contact with the developers allows inspecting any ferromagnetic metal
PE
and providers of ILI services, in order to pipeline with no need to change its
select the best alternative to determine operating conditions. It is not necessary to
the type of corrosion in each pipeline or have traps or any other facilities in the
segment. Some cases might require the
combination of several tools to determine
all the types of damage in the pipeline.
OF
pipelines for inspection with other
instruments, such as ILI tools.

Some of the advantages of this technique
E
B.2.4. Magnetic Tomography Method are: It allows evaluating the defects in an
US
(MTM) anomaly; does not require advance

preparation other than clear the walking
This is a non‐contact inspection method path; does not require changes in working
E
performed from the surface, based on the conditions; is suitable for any pipeline

IV
natural magnetism of metals. The physical regardless the presence of product, and

principle of this method is related to the does not magnetize the pipeline.
US
magneto‐elastic and magneto‐mechanical

effects when the magnetic field of one Some of the disadvantages of this
piece changes due to the imperfections in technique are: there are low possibilities
CL
the metal structure and the stress applied. to determine minor defects (like isolated

holes or pits smaller than 1mm) in not
EX
Most of the deterioration and mechanic stressed areas; it is not possible to use it in

failure processes in metal surfaces begin pipelines made of plastic materials; the
in areas where there is a concentration of maximum inspection depth is 15 times the
R
stress and local deformities are much pipeline diameter; and it is used with a
FO
greater than average. The mechanical wall thickness from 2.8mm to 22mm.

stress concentrates around imperfections
in the structure of materials, produced This technique enables the identification
during manufacturing or as a consequence of the following groups of anomalies:
of the application of service loads. Metal loss, cracks, geometry changes,
Ferromagnetic pieces have a natural metal discontinuity, weld anomalies,
83
stress‐strained tensional condition, dents assessments of pipelines transporting

and mechanical damage, etc. hazardous liquids with ILI tools every five
(5) years, but the alternative to increase
AS
The report classifies each anomaly the frequency of inspections is being
according to its risk with an F factor. The considered, if the operator has established
meaning of the F factor is the risk of each and applied a mitigation program that has
R
anomaly, which is a qualitative value proved to be efficient to control corrosion.
OB
classifying the anomalies detected In some cases, such frequency may be
according to their magnitude. The F value shorter than five (5) years if the damage
is different for each pipeline and depends mechanism is SCC, or when there are
TR
on its specifications and type of operation. defect in the longitudinal seam of the
This value is calculated from the surface, pipeline that propagate over time due to
PE
and then it is necessary to open one (1) or pipeline fatigue or stress from internal
two (2) ditches for each type of pipeline to pressure. To summarize, each pipeline
define the magnetic contact parameters operator should establish, according to its
and thus clarify the limits among the
categories of anomalies.

OF
own risk assessment exercise, the
frequencies required for ILI metal loss or
cracking diagnosis for each pipeline or
The anomalies are classified into three (3) pipeline segment, or the application of
E
categories according to the F risk index. alternative techniques or methods to
US
The anomalies with a value of F=0.55 or determine pipeline integrity.

higher fall into the 3rd category (green)
and correspond to acceptable metal
E
conditions. The anomalies with a value of
IV
F=0.2 to 0.55 fall into the second category
(yellow) and correspond to preventive
US
conditions; and the anomalies with an F

value lower than 0.2 fall into the 1st
category (red) and correspond to critical
CL
metal conditions, thus requiring

immediate repairing.
EX

When deciding whether to perform an
initial pressure test or to use ECDA, ILI or
R
MTM methodology, and when carrying

FO
out such inspections, the operator should

consider the risk assessment results, the
type(s) of anomaly(ies) suspected and the
physical availability of the pipeline for
inspection. It is a common practice in
some countries to perform integrity
84
APPENDIX C – Means, actions and  The periodical acquisition, assessment

methods to determine and control and interpretation of satellite images
of the pipeline or the segments with
the natural forces
AS
significant critical conditions that

might affect the physical security of
C.1. Control of the natural forces
the pipeline.
R

OB
Based on the geotechnical survey of the
This information is complied in a
right of way and its surroundings done
Geotechnical‐Geological Report which
before the design and construction stage,
contains the following data, among
TR
and before the beginning of the operation
others: soil type and characteristics;
stage, a Geotechnical and Hydraulic
intersection and location of water
Zoning should be developed, that will
PE
currents, urban infrastructure, roads, etc.;
constitute the basis for assessment and
location and boundaries of segments with
implementation of a program that
potential risk from natural forces
includes:

 Periodical inspections along the
pipeline and field inspections in sites
OF(geotechnical zoning); and, in pipelines
segments under instability conditions and
risk from natural forces that cannot be
avoided due to topographic or
E
or areas that were recorded as
hydrographic constraints, monitoring
US
susceptible to the occurrence of

reports and/or reports on stabilization or
geodynamical and/or hydro‐dynamical
strengthening works recommended during
processes, implementation of
construction.
E
topographic or instrumented

monitoring, specific research activities
IV
The execution of these actions and the

such as sampling for in situ or lab tests,
availability of the corresponding
exploratory drilling to check and define
US
documents are essential to establish, plan
the characteristics of the soils,
and optimize systems and methodologies
identification and delimitation of any
to determine, identify and limit corrosion,
CL
(new) right‐of‐way strips that might

as well as the adequate prevention and
present potential or active risks to the
mitigation actions and the objective
physical security of the system;
EX
assessment of the active or potential risk.

 All the topographic, geological,
C.1.1. Topographic and geotechnical
hydrographic, seismic and hydro‐
R
information and construction

meteorological information developed
FO
works drawings
and assessed, which should be

incorporated into the geotechnical
Topographic plans including sections or
zoning to keep it updated;
transversal and longitudinal profiles,

geotechnical, geological and hydraulic
data (geotechnical zoning) performed to
85
select pipeline run and design and to pipeline integrity and the
construction works drawings including implementation of the adequate actions
location of valves, crossing of rivers, for its mitigation, and the collection of
AS
signing posts, crossing of roads, populated information in the stretches by monitoring
centers and landmarks along the pipeline and from the behavior of existing works,
with UTM or geographical coordinates thus optimizing the costs of maintenance
R
constitute an important tool to define the of the right of way.
OB
logistics (equipment, time, etc.) and the
costs required to plan predictive, The information obtained from the
preventive and corrective maintenance inspection of each site showing potential
TR
related to these threats. and/or active threats should be analyzed,
defining their characteristics and scope,
PE
If the geotechnical zoning performed for and the risk that those sites represent for
pipeline construction is incomplete, the stability of the right of way and/or the
proceed to its integration and physical security of the pipeline. According
consolidation, planning and prioritizing
actions to complete such information in
the short or medium term. In any case,
OF to the complexity and magnitude of the
problem, the operator shall design works
and mitigation and control actions, or shall
since the operation begins, the system contract specialized companies to conduct
E
manager should implement plans and additional investigations, which should
US
actions to identify, localize and limit these include the development of the most

types of threats, evaluate them and assess technically‐and economically‐viable
the risk to pipeline integrity, and duly alternative solution.
E
implement the adequate mitigation or

IV
control actions. C.1.3. Special pipeline protections

US
C.1.2. Technical inspections of the right In the crossings of the pipeline with
of way watercourses (rivers, narrow passes or
streamlets) and vehicle transit areas, it is
CL
The periodic performance of land necessary to reinforce the mechanic
inspections made on foot or by road or resistance of the pipeline with a structural
EX
water vehicle, and complemented with concrete ring and to increase the burying
aerial patrolling (by helicopter or plane) by depth (coverage). This may be
duly trained technical staff allows complemented in some cases with natural
R
identifying, locating, characterizing and drainage control and regulation structures

FO
limiting directly, objectively and timely any or periodic topo‐bathymetric surveys to

stretches whose characteristics and assess the development and determine
conditions might make them likely to process trends. This procedure is also valid
generate or reactivate natural processes in non‐permanent watersheds.
(threats). They further allow the
assessment of their potential or active risk
86
In the case of sub‐fluvial rivers, which may fluvial) and aerial patrolling of the

be subject to the frequent carryover of right of way. Preferably it should be
sediments from the river bed, and where done by segment and its frequency
AS
the conventional corrective actions should be defined according to its
(regulation and management of local topographic and geological
hydraulics) have not had satisfactory characteristics, accessibility, type of
R
results, mitigated or eliminated the risk, product transported, level of activity
OB
the alternative to bury (position) the in right of way, and existence of
pipeline under the potential carryover populated areas.
depth of active currents through directed
TR
drilling techniques should be evaluated.  Collection of information in the sites
through control monitoring, according
PE
C.1.4. Inertial instrumented scrapers to established frequency and systems
(topographic, instrumental, etc.).
Inertial or geometrical instrumented
scraper runs are used to determine,
record and locate with UTM coordinates
any anomalies in pipeline geometry, such
OF
 Topo‐bathymetrical control in river
crossings with riverside erosion
and/or subsidence of the bottom of
as dents, ovalities, crushes, wrinkle bends, the river channel.
E
and pipeline sections or points subject to
US
stress generated by the surrounding soil.  Execution of specialized studies in
This information allows identifying and right‐of‐way strips affected by
implementing preventive actions to geodynamical or hydro‐dynamical
E
mitigate, control or timely overcome these recurrent natural processes with

IV
risk conditions. medium or high risk for the physical

safety of the pipeline, including basic
US
C.1.5. Preventive and/or corrective engineering and detail engineering

maintenance of the right of way alternatives technically and
economically viable.
CL
Having an annual preventive‐corrective

maintenance plan for the right of way, Control of performance and maintenance
EX
duly trained staff to manage it and the of mitigation and stabilization works
adequate material resources and constructed.
equipment to execute such program
R
allows the control and management of  Removal of vegetation in the right‐of‐

FO
these threats and an efficient response to way strip according to the width

emergencies. Without limitation, such established by environmental
program should include: regulations and reforestation of strips
affected by superficial erosion with
 Execution of program of direct proper plant species resistant to these
physical inspection (terrestrial and/or processes.
87
 Execution of strain‐relieving works on in the pipeline predictive, preventive and

buried pipeline segments subject to corrective maintenance programs in a
stress generated by the soil. geographic information system (GIS) in a
AS
continuous manner for efficient
 Joint inspection program and management. The GIS is a computing tool
integration of information obtained that, based on the use of all the stored
R
by the external corrosion control area data and within reliable limits, enables risk
OB
regarding the pipeline segments assessment and an evaluation of the
buried in soils with dissimilar consequences of potential or active
physicochemical composition, natural threats, or of threats of any other
TR
changing electric resistance, etc. This type that the pipeline faces, and to state
includes sampling for the and evaluate the corresponding solution
PE
corresponding soil tests and/or alternatives.
measurement of soil strength and
resistivity. Legal regulations on the transportation of


Run of instrumented scrapers, either
inertial, geometrical or for
OF hydrocarbons by pipelines in many
countries establish the implementation of
the GIS to manage integrity. The
determination of thickness loss (due application of this tool is feasible and
E
to internal or external corrosion). viable in new pipelines. However, it is
US
costly to develop it and adapt it to

 Permanent contact with political management of pipelines in operation, so
authorities, state or private officers in its viability should be analyzed according
E
charge of management of public to the cost‐benefit ratio.

IV
works, such as roads, electric lines,

irrigation channels, management of In pipelines which have been in operation
US
waterways, etc., and populated for many years, and on which there is not

centers intersecting or adjacent to the proper information available, the system
right of way, for proper coordination is very costly, and not feasible or reliable
CL
of the execution of new infrastructure to apply.
in the surroundings of the right‐of‐
EX
way and pipeline maintenance As an alternative to the implementation or

activities. availability of a GIS, all the information,
diagnosis, preventive or corrective actions
R
C.1.6. Management and/or planned or implemented in each natural

FO
implementation of a geographic process (threat) should be gathered,

information system integrated and consolidated in a specific
record that should always be kept
It is advisable to integrate all the updated. This dynamic action will enable
information generated and collected continuous and timely assessment
about the activities and actions executed (according to the results obtained) of the
88
planning and prioritization of actions and cause of catastrophic natural processes,
activities for predictive, preventive and such as soil liquefaction, massive
corrective maintenance, and therefore, landslides or rockslides, activation of local
AS
the adjustment and redesign of the scope or regional geological faults, damming of
and baseline objectives for efficient watercourses, etc., which may cause
integrity management. important defects in the pipelines and
R
even break them. The limitation and
OB
C.2. Methods to determine threats of classification of the pipeline according to
damage due to the natural forces the seismic sensitivity and meteorological
data of the area where they are installed is
TR
C.2.1. Geotechnical and/or crucial to propose measures or preventive
hydrodynamic investigation actions to mitigate or reduced the
PE
potential damage.
Once a natural threat has been identified
during the technical inspection of a right C.2.2. Establishment of procedures and
of way, the geotechnical or hydraulic
direct investigation by qualified staff of
the pipeline operator or by specialized
OF

routines
The establishment of procedures and

companies (according to the problem routines to map, classify, inspect, monitor,
E
complexity) is the most objective technical maintain and perform the geological,
US
method to assess, limit and value the risk geotechnical and hydrological

that might entail a natural process (threat) management along the right‐of‐way strip
on the stability of the right of way, its and the surroundings of pipelines in the
E
environment and/or the physical security soil or in watercourse facilitate the
IV
of the pipeline, and to determine the most classification of the natural processes

adequate prevention, control or (threats) and an objective assessment of
US
mitigation actions. the risk they entail to pipeline integrity.

Considering the complexity of failure C.2.3. Verification of anomalies recorded
CL
mechanisms in natural processes (threat), with the inertial scraper

each site shall be surveyed and evaluated
EX
focusing on its particular characteristics, The excavation of the pipeline to verify
which are the most difficult to interpret. any specific geometrical anomalies
recorded with the inertial scraper (dents,
R
An inherent natural aspect to consider ovalities, and pipeline sections subject to
FO
when assessing the risk related to this stress due to the surrounding soil), and
type of threat are the seismic or the consequent observation and direct
meteorological characteristics of the area evaluation of the soil characteristics and
where the pipeline is installed, as the pipeline interrelation with the local
earthquakes and/or anomalous geomorphology allow evidencing or
meteorological phenomena are the main
89
confirming if these anomalies have been

caused by:

AS
 Rock fragments that have not been
removed during construction
(deficient supervision).
R
 Competent/incompetent soils
OB
interlaying (different soil setting).
 Superficial or fluctuating groundwater
level seasonally altering the carrying
TR
capacity of the soil (solifluction).
 Predominance of muddy soils and/or
PE
fine sand (liquefaction).
 Soil creep.

Once the causes have been designed, the
remediation actions will be designed and
implemented.
OF

E
C.2.4. Identification of sensitive areas
US

By consolidating and continuously
integrating geological, geotechnical, geo‐
E
morphological, hydrological seismic

IV
information and information on anthropic
activities, those areas that are sensitive to
US
the occurrence of natural processes

should be defined and delimited in the
drawings of the pipeline run, classifying
CL
their hazard and their risk (high,

moderate, low and no risk, geodynamical
EX
and hydrological) and establishing and

planning the corresponding preventive,
control and mitigation actions.
R

FO
The characterization of the risk of

sensitive areas should be periodically
updated, or if any significant changes
occur, the maintenance activities should
be duly adjusted, adapted and/or
rescheduled.
90
APPENDIX D – Means, actions and provide markings for periodic aerial right‐

methods to determine and control of‐way inspections.

third‐party damage
AS
Line markers should have the following

characteristics: They should be colorful,
D.1. Prevention of third‐party damage
highly visible and resistant to
R

environmental conditions; they should
OB
Third‐party damage is a major cause of
state the pipeline right of way; they
pipeline releases. Any integrity
should bear an identification of the
management program of a pipeline
transported product; they should be
TR
operator should include mitigation
labeled with the pipeline operator’s 24‐
activities to prevent third‐party damage.
hour and seven‐day emergency
The third‐party damage mitigation
PE
telephone number, they should bear an
activities may be identified during normal
”Oil or Gas Pipeline Warning” and display
pipeline operation, during the initial risk
the universal sign for no excavation, and
assessment, during the implementation
of the baseline plan or during the
subsequent test. The results of in‐line
inspections are not mandatorily required
OFprovide, if there are such Information Call
Centers in the country, the corresponding
telephone number. .

E
to establish and carry out mitigation
D.1.2. Pipeline maps
US
actions.

As a minimum requirement, the
The following mitigation activities should
operators should keep the maps
E
be considered:
containing the pipeline networks updated

IV
to facilitate the location of the pipelines

D.1.1. Line marking
in the field and to be able to timely

US
provide information to the community,

Line marking (such as marking posts every
any third party or state agencies that so
kilometer) is part of the first line of
require it.
CL
defense against involuntary third party‐

It is an excellent measure to keep
incidents. Additional markers make the
integrated maps of the network of own
pipeline more visible to third parties
EX
and third‐party pipelines and facilities of

working in the vicinity. Line markers
other public utilities companies, such as:
should generally be required on both
aqueducts, communication or data lines,
sides of each road, highway, railroad, and
R
sewer system, railroads, roads or

water crossing. In areas of high third‐
FO
waterways and land use plans. This will

party activity, intermediate line markers
enable the implementation of an
should be installed such that at least two
Information Call Center and public
markers are visible from any location
education programs.
along the line. Aerial line markers should

also be utilized, where applicable, to
91
D.1.3. Information Call Center to locate  Damage prevention. The system may

facilities reduce the frequency of third‐party
incidents by alerting the operator of
AS
The participation of pipeline operators the location of potential third‐party
and operators of other facilities or intrusions before the pipeline is
services, such as those mentioned above, damaged.
R
organized through an Information Call
OB
Center; is very important to prevent  Prevention of unintended releases. A
underground damage to facilities. In system alarm may reduce the
order for this Information Call Center to likelihood of a leak in the event the
TR
be effective, the pipeline operator should pipeline is damaged. This allows the
make sure that all the pipelines within the operator to respond and perform an
PE
system under his responsibility are immediate inspection and/or repair,
included in jurisdictional documents and at the location the damage occurred.
maps, and that the staff is duly equipped
and trained to locate and identify the
pipeline to reply to the requests for
information made to the Information Call
OF  Spill minimization. In the event third‐
party intrusion results in an
immediate rupture, the intrusion
Center. alarm, coupled with a release alarm,
E
will allow response to occur more
US
D.1.4. Optical or Ground Intrusion quickly, and potentially reducing the
Electronic Detection volume released significantly.

E
Another way to prevent third‐party D.1.5. Increased depth of cover

IV
damage includes an optical fiber or metal
cable, usually 30 to 60cm above the Increasing the pipeline depth of cover
US
pipeline, and monitored continuously. (e.g., 1.5 to 2.0 meters below ground
Should the cable become damaged or surface) may place the pipe below many
severed, the monitoring device(s), which normal excavation and agricultural
CL
are integrated into the pipeline activities, thereby reducing the chance of
programmable logic controllers (PLCs) third‐party intrusions. In pipeline sections
EX
and supervisory control and data where fuel is recurrently stolen, the
acquisition (SCADA) system, issue an pipeline should be buried more deeply in
alarm and identify the location of the order to discourage third‐party action and
R
cable damage. make it more difficult, even more so if

FO
combined with additional mechanical

Optical or electronic ground intrusion protection, such as ballasting the pipeline
detection systems may reduce the or installing additional physical barriers.
consequences of third‐party intrusion in
three ways: This is also an important consideration at
stream and other crossings; there may be
92
scour or carryover of sediments. The D.1.7. Right‐of‐way maintenance and
pipeline should then be buried well control
beneath the potential scour depth of
AS
active streams, applying directed drilling Having a plan to protect pipelines and
techniques. When increased depth of rights of way will reduce the chance of
burial or increased cover is desired but not third‐party damage and enhance the
R
practical, mitigation options include ability for response to an emergency. The
OB
concrete caps, increased line marking, following actions are highly beneficial to
electronic warning tapes as well as plastic prevent third‐party damage:
tape and mesh marking above the line or
TR
fencing off areas particularly susceptible  Control of vegetation in the right of
to third‐party damage. way. This activity should be
PE
performed regularly, depending on
D.1.6. Public education the growth of the vegetation on each
pipeline segment. This will enable
Pipeline operators currently implement
educational and public awareness
programs. These programs educate the
OF better visualization of the pipeline,
both for third parties and for the
patrolling and maintenance staff.
public, emergency responders, and
E
persons engaged in excavation‐related  Removal of trash, brush, and other
US
activities as to the whereabouts, potential items near the pipeline. This prevents
dangers, and appropriate emergency damage by forest fire, either
responses associated with the pipeline intentional or unintentional.
E
facilities. These programs can help reduce
IV
a pipeline operator’s exposure to third‐  Establishment, together with the

party action and enhance emergency competent authorities, of a Land Use
US
response in the event of an incident. It is Plan. The right of way should be
advisable to establish a public education identified in such plan and agreed
and awareness program in those places upon for pipeline construction.
CL
where there is a high level of activity on

the right of way and the consequences of  Control of impediments constructed
EX
leakage would be greater. These programs above or below ground near the

should extend to service providers, pipeline (such as buildings, schools,
construction companies, road access roads, engineered structures,
R
construction companies and mining pavement, pools, fish tanks, fences,

FO
companies performing activities on the etc.).

right of way.
 Control of the operation of heavy
equipment over the pipeline, during
maintenance of other engineered

93
structures or facilities of the operator jointly establish safety pipeline corridors

or of third parties. that are respected by the community.

AS
 Control of blasting, excavation or D.1.9. Mechanical pipeline protection
drilling near the pipeline, due to road
improvement, civil works or mining Mechanical protection is designed to
R
works. shield a pipeline from third‐party damage.
OB
This would normally only be considered
 The delimitation or enclosure of some for new pipeline systems, but in those
sections of the right of way might be pipelines that are highly vulnerable to
TR
necessary in some cases to prevent intentional or unintentional third‐party
trespassing by the surrounding damage, it may also be installed in
PE
community. pipelines in operation.

 Control of excavation or construction There are several modes of mechanical
works near the pipeline, which may
cause an increase in pipeline
coverage, generating additional
OFprotection. First, a segment of pipeline can
be coated with reinforced concrete,
installed over the top of the external
external load beyond pipeline design corrosion coating. The external concrete
E
specifications. coating can be installed at most coating
US
plants and is intended to provide

 Establishment of right of way or mechanical protection from excavation
easement and surveillance to control equipment, or from gouges and punctures
E
the preservation of such strip. from other external forces, and even from
IV
the stealing of fuel through illegal

D.1.8. Frequent right‐of‐way inspections perforation, complemented in some cases
US
with additional mechanic protection

These regular inspections enable the barriers made of steel films or meshes.
pipeline operator to identify activities that
CL
may encroach upon their right of way Alternately, a concrete cap can be
before the pipeline facility can be installed above the pipeline, C‐shaped and
EX
impacted. An operator may wish to make at a depth of 30 to 60cm, to provide a
these inspections more frequently, physical barrier to excavation above and
depending on the surrounding conditions. along the sides of a pipeline It is important
R
Such patrolling may be carried out on foot, that the concrete cap not contact the

FO
by car, by boat and/or by aircraft. pipeline, in order to avoid the

deterioration of the external corrosion
Pipeline operators should also be in touch coating and cathodic protection shielding.
with land‐use planners and other
governmental agencies to minimize Selection of this approach needs to
encroachments of right of ways, and to carefully consider the areas of high risk,
94
along with other factors such as reducing This option is generally implemented
access for ordinary repairs. during installation of the pipeline. The
brightly colored tape or plastic mesh
AS
In superficial pipelines running parallel to should typically be installed approximately
and next to, or unpaved roads or railroads, 30 to 60cm above the pipeline and
where it is not economical and/or appropriately labeled (e.g., hazardous
R
practical to bury the pipeline, steel or liquid pipeline/operator name/telephone
OB
concrete barriers may be installed to number).
prevent or mitigate the impact of vehicles
or heavy machinery used for maintenance D.1.12. Shared right‐of‐way protocol
TR
of such roads.
A shared right‐of‐way protocol should be
PE
D.1.10. Additional pipe wall thickness established in writing with other pipeline
operators, facilities and/or service
Additional pipe wall thickness may providers. This will allow the definition of
increase the resistance of a pipeline to
third‐party damage and natural forces.
This option is normally only a
OF
the procedures for excavation and general
pipeline maintenance, including cathodic
protection systems and the right of way
consideration during the initial itself, and the determination of the level
E
construction of a pipeline. The additional of responsibility over the actions of each
US
pipe wall thickness may provide one in its pipelines or facilities. As a
mechanical protection against a puncture fundamental rule, each operator shall
and allow the pipe to be gouged, with less previously notify the others about the
E
chance of immediate leakage. The lower execution of works that might affect the
IV
stress that results with a thicker wall also pipelines of such third parties, so that they

makes the pipe less prone to rupture. may take any required action to control
US
any activity that might affect the

At road crossings, water crossings or immediate or future integrity of their
populated areas, where there is a high pipelines.
CL
level of activity on the right of way,

heavier wall pipe may be considered D.2. Methods to determine third‐party
EX
during construction. damage

D.1.11. Pipeline marker tape or warning D.2.1. Visual inspection
R
mesh installed over pipeline
FO
In the case of aerial pipelines, visual

As mentioned in item 7.4.3.5, if it is not inspection is one of the most effective
possible to bury the pipeline deeper, methods to prevent, determine and assess
marker tape or warning mesh installed third‐party damage. The initial report may
above a pipeline is an additional measure be done by the staff that inspects the
to protect against third‐party damage. rights of way, who is duly trained to
95
identify any risks related to third‐party Caliper tools can determine if a dent is a
damage, and the damage mechanisms smooth dent with no stress concentrator,
produced by this threat. Then, an expert in which is generally not a concern, but it is
AS
damage assessment may perform an necessary to establish the restriction
analysis of each anomaly and establish the percentage and time position, and
corresponding remediation actions. whether it affects the circumferential or
R
longitudinal seam or prevents the passage
OB
D.2.2. In‐line inspection tools to of other tools such as internal corrosion
determine metal loss tools (pigs); or a sharp dent which may be
a concern, particularly if there is an
TR
As mentioned in Appendix B, Chapter associated gouge that could eventually fail
B.2.3, there are in‐line inspection (ILI) due to fatigue.
PE
tools to determine metal loss, which allow
finding perforations, scratches or gouges When considering the need for an initial
in the pipeline wall. From the resulting inspection for dents and wrinkle bends, it
reports, those requiring direct monitoring
are selected, and only then is the decision
on repairs required made.
OF is important to take the following aspects
into account: level of operator and third
party activities on the right of way,
pipeline susceptibility to third‐party
E
D.2.3. Geometry tools damage, line age, filling conditions,
US
diameter‐wall thickness ratio, pipe wall

Geometry tools are typically used to find thickness, interval and number of service
deviations in geometry (deformation), pressure cycles applied to the pipeline and
E
mechanical damage, dents and wrinkle historical information on cracks or
IV
bends. They are used to determine if ruptures caused by dents or wrinkle
passage of in‐line inspection tools such as bends.
US
MFL and ultrasonic tools is possible.
The re‐inspection intervals for geometry
Caliper tools measure deviations in the tools depend on an assessment of the
CL
geometry of a pipeline’s diameter. They probability of additional activity in the
use a set of mechanical fingers (arms) that area that might cause mechanical damage
EX
ride against the ID of the pipe or by third parties, known seismic events and

electromagnetic methods to sense the soil stability problems. Re‐inspection using
ovality of the pipe. Any change in the deformation in‐line inspection tools will be
R
geometry of the diameter of the pipe will based on the results of risk assessment.
FO
cause a relative movement of the arms or
a change in the electromagnetic reading D.2.4. Leak Detection System
and will be recorded. Changes in the pipe
diameter geometry can be due to pipe The introduction of this chapter makes
bends, dents, buckles, gate or check reference to some technologies and
valves, or changes in wall thickness. methods that may be applied to establish
96
and locate any leak: acoustic emission;

fiber optics; soil monitoring; ultrasonic
flow meters; vapor monitoring; mass
AS
balance; real time transient modeling; and
pressure point analysis. Although leaks
cannot be avoided, actions may be taken
R
to mitigate their consequences, activating
OB
the Emergency Shutdown Devices (ESD)
and the contingency and mutual aid plans.
TR
PE
OF
E
US
E
IV
US
CL
EX
R
FO
97
APPENDIX E – Means, actions and pump plants through a centralized

methods to determine and control organization called Distribution Center,
which is responsible for compliance with
operational errors
AS
the programs whose main objective is to

set the execution times for operational
E.1. Control of operational errors
maneuvers.
R

OB
The malfunctioning of equipment and/or
According to the technology available in
instruments in pipeline systems may cause
the pipeline system, the operation might
“transient conditions” that quickly reach
be within a range of operation that is
TR
the operational limits. For this reason,
completely tele‐supervised to a
pump stations and terminals have safety
permanently staff‐assisted operation in
devices and alarms at practically all
PE
each facility.
operational stages. These stages are

controlled by computing systems that
E.1.2. Qualification of operators
allow the elimination or reduction of any
"transient condition" before it can cause
damage to the facilities or the
environment.
OF
The operator should have a system in
place to ensure the adequate training of
all the operational staff, guaranteeing that
E

all the persons know all the descriptive
US
However, the plant operator and the

procedures of the operations under their
Distribution Center supervisor are
responsibility.
responsible for ensuring that the safety

E
conditions of the pipeline system remain

E.1.3. Global protection strategy
unchanged even if the equipment fail.
IV

Therefore, it is very important to receive
When there are unexpected situations
proper training in order to maintain the
US
such as pipeline blocking or shutdown of

safety of system operations until a
pump station, the time available to react
solution is found.
might not be enough for the operator of
CL

the plant or the Distribution Center. Thus,
The methods to minimize operational
it is necessary to develop a sequence of
errors are basically the same as those used
EX
pre‐defined actions that triggers

for operations management of any
automatically at each pump station if any
industrial facility.
of the above‐mentioned events is

R
detected, in order to minimize hydraulic

The most frequent methods are:
FO
transient conditions and therefore,

rupture and/or fatigue risks.
E.1.1. Distribution Center

The operator ensures the coordination

between the receiving, injection and

98
E.1.4. Mechanical protection (PSV) E.1.7. Emergency Shutdown Device

(ESD)
Mechanical protections like PSV and
AS
rupture discs are safety systems that act This is another mechanism to shut down
later than the global protection strategy. the station and set it up safely. All this is
done automatically from the operation
R
E.1.5. Logical protection room or from the field.
OB

Pump stations and the pipe should have E.1.8. Leak detection system
such automatic protection that an
TR
equipment shutdown order, plant bypass The Leak Detection System consists in
opening order and/or relief plant bypass monitoring pipelines from a computer
PE
opening order is triggered if the through mathematical algorithms that
authorized set pressure is exceeded. improve the ability of a Distribution
Center supervisor to recognize abnormal
E.1.6. Set point tracking

If there is an unexpected blocking
OF
conditions that might indicate a potential
product leakage.

downstream a pump station, the E.1.9. Management system for out‐of‐
E
discharge pressure and the suction service protection and critical
US
pressure will increase. As the station elements

control should keep the aspiration suction
pressure constant, it will react to this The senior management should establish
E
event by increasing the velocity of suction general mechanisms to develop

IV
reducing pumps, which in its turn will procedures to manage, record and control

contribute to an increase in the discharge systems and safety protection elements
US
pressure. Until a maximum discharge set that are out of service.

point is reached, the control of the pump
station re‐feeds blocking positively. E.1.10. Operating contingency drills
CL

In order to avoid positive re‐feeding, it is Emergency drills should be conducted
EX
necessary to ensure that the pressure regularly to guarantee that the
discharge set point is not very different operational staff in the facilities has the
from the actual pressure, without being knowledge and training required for
R
necessary for the operator to perform emergency situations due to service and
FO
manual re‐settings frequently. critical equipment failures.

99
E.1.11. Operation manuals E.1.14. Multiples P&ID diagrams

Manuals, procedures and instructions on The P&ID of all the plants within the
AS
each critical operation should be pipeline system should be always updated
developed and made available. and available at the operation room.

R
E.1.12. Audits and management E.1.15. Change management and control
OB
inspections
Any changes that are not duly managed
Periodic and systematic audits and and controlled are an important cause of
TR
management inspections to distribution operational errors, and therefore, of the
plants, intermediate plants and receiving loss of pipeline integrity. It is important to
PE
plants enable to detect any situation that have and systematically apply procedures,
might be a risk to pipeline integrity. instructions and forms to manage and
control the changes to make to the
E.1.13. Identification and signaling of

multiples OF infrastructure and the operating
conditions of the pipelines.

The updated and clear identification and E.2. Methods to determine operational
E
signposting of pump station multiples errors
US
helps the operators not to make

operational errors that might adversely The pipeline operator should ensure that
affect pipeline integrity. the identification of operational errors
E
through a system to analyze unplanned

IV
events and to disseminate the lessons

learned, and through methodologies to
US
assess operational risks, such as HAZOP or
any other.

CL
EX
R
FO
100
APPENDIX F – Alternative actions for control and mitigation of threats –

Acceptable repair and prevention methods

AS
Acceptable repair and prevention methods against threats
Time‐dependent Stable Time‐independent
Third‐party Erron.
R
External Internal SCC Manufacturing Construction Equipment Climate and external forces
Prevention, detection and damage Oper.
repair methods Weld Weld Valv Imm PTP Light
Corrosion Corrosion Corrosion W.S. Pipe B&W J.F Pack Seals Tape Vand. E.O. Frosts Flood Earthq.
OB
Circ. Mfg. es fail. D ning
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Detection and Prevention
Aerial inspection X X X X X X X X
Patrolling on foot X X X X X X X X X
TR
Visual/mechanical inspection X X X X X X
01‐800 Calls X X X
Reliability Audits X
Design specif. X X X X X X X X X X X
PE
Material specif. X X X X X X X
Mfg. inspection X X X X X X
Transportation inspection X X X
Construction inspection X X X X X X X X X X X
Hydrostatic test X X X X X X X
Public education
Op. & Maint. Procedures
Operator training
Marker interval (signposting)
Deformation monitoring

X

X

X

OF
X

X X

X

X

X

X

X

X X

X

X
X

X

X

X

E
X X
(landslides)
External protection (perimetral
US
X X X X
fence, concertina wire)
Right‐of‐way maintenance X X X
Wall thickness increase X X X X X X
Warning tapes or posts X X
Corrosion control monitoring X X
E
Internal cleaning X
Leak control measures X X X X X X X X X
IV
Instrumented inspection X
X X X X X X
equipment
External stress reduction X X X X
US
Heat tracer installation X
Line relocation X X X X X
Reinstatement X X X X X X X
Coating repair X X
Depth increase X X X
CL
Operating temperature
X X x
reduction
Moisture reduction X
EX
Inhibitor injector (control,
X
coupons)
Thermal protection X
Repairs
Pressure reduction X X X X X X X X X
R
Replacement X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Coating X X X
FO
Routine repair X X X X X X X
Weld fillings X X
Type B pressurized sleeve X X X X X X X X X
Type A reinforcement sleeve X X X X X X
Compound sleeve X
Epoxy‐filled sleeve X X X X X X X X X
Mechanical clamp X
Source: PEMEX ‐ September 2007

101
Time‐dependent Stable or resident Time‐independent
external forces
Manufacturing
Manufacturing
Cracking (SCC)
Cyclic fatigue
Data integration required to identify
Climate and
Third‐party
Equipment
operations
Erroneous
Corrosion
corrosion
corrosion
threats
AS
External
damage
Internal
defects
Weld /
Stress
10
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1 Installation year • • • •
R
2 Type of coating • •
3 Condition of coating •
OB
4 Years with adequate CP •
5 Years with questionable CP •
6 Years without Cathodic Protection •
7 Soil characteristics •
8 Pipe inspection reports (holes) • • • •
TR
9 Detected microbiological corrosion (
•
Yes, No, Unknown)
10 Leak history • •
11 Wall thickness • • •
PE
12 Diameter • • •
13 Operating strain level (% SMYS) • • •
14 Previous hydrostatic test data • • • • •
15 Bacteria culture test results •
16 Gas, liquid or solid analysis, especially
17
18
hydrogen sulfur, carbon dioxide,
oxygen, water, chlorides
Corrosion protection devices (probes,
coupons, etc.)
Operating parameters particularly flow
•
•

OF

E
pressure and speed, and especially the •
periods when no flow is present.
US
19 Pipe age •
20 Operating temperature •
21 Distance of segment with respect to
•
compression station
22 Pipeline material • • •
E
23 Manufacturing process (age of

•
manufacture as alternative)
IV
24 Type of seam •
25 Joint factor •
26 Operating pressure history •
US
27 Identification of bent pipes w/wrinkle •
28 Couplings identification •
29 Couplings reinforcement after
•
construction
30 Welding procedures •
CL
31 Circumferential welding reinforcement

•
after construction
32 NDT weld data •
33 Potential external forces • • •
EX
34 Soil properties and filling material

•
depth for bent pipes w/wrinkle
35 Maximum temperature ranges for bent
•
pipes w/wrinkle
36 Curvature radius and bend angle in
R
•
bent pipes w/wrinkle
37 Operating pressure history, incl.
FO
expected pressure and significant • •

cycles, and fatigue mechanisms
38 Year of installation of equipment that
•
failed
39 Data on regulating valve failures •
40 Data on relief valve failures •
41 Data on flanged seal failures •

102
Time‐dependent Stable or resident Time‐independent
external forces
Manufacturing
Manufacturing
Cracking (SCC)
Cyclic fatigue
Data integration required to identify
Climate and
Third‐party
Equipment
operations
Erroneous
Corrosion
corrosion
corrosion
threats
AS
External
damage
Internal
defects
Weld /
Stress
10
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
42 Deviation from calibration point
R
•
(outside manufacturer's tolerance)
43 Deviation from relief calibration point •
OB
44 Data on O‐ring failures •
45 Data on seals / packing •
46 Vandalism incidents •
47 Pipe inspection reports (holes) where
•
pipe was hit
TR
48 Reports on leakage resulting from
•
immediate damage
49 Incidents involving previous damage •
50 Results of in‐line inspection for dents
PE
•
and grooves in the upper half of pipe
51 "Single Call" records •
52 Right‐of‐way encroachment records •
53 Data on procedure review •
54 Data on audits •
55 Erroneous operation failures
56 Joint method (mechanical coupling,
oxyacetylene welding, arc welding)
57 Topography and types of soil (slopes,
water crossings, water proximity, soil

OF

•

•
•
E
liquefaction)
58 Seismic fault lines •
US
59 Soil acceleration profile near fault lines
•
(acceleration >0.2 g)
60 Frost line depth •
61 Calculation of internal strains added to
external load. Total strain should not
•
E
exceed 100% of the Specified Minimum
Yield Strength.
IV
62 Load Conditions •
63 Soil movements •
64 Condition of suspension bridges •
US
Source: PEMEX ‐ September 2007

CL

EX
R
FO
103
ABBREVIATONS
1 Ext. External corrosion
2 Int. Internal corrosion
AS
3 SCC Stress corrosion cracking
4 W.S. Defects in pipe welded seam
5 Pipe Defects in pipe
R
6 Circ.Weld Defects in circumferential welds
OB
7 Mfg. Weld Defects in construction welds
8 B&W Bends and wrinkles in the interior of tube
9 J.F. Joint failures
TR
10 Pack. Packing failures
11 Valves Relief/control equipment failures
PE
12 Seals Seal failures
13 Tape Damage to accessories
14 Imm.fail. Immediate failure due to third‐party damage
15
16
17
PTPD
Vand.
E.O.
Vandalism OF
Previous third‐party damage
Erroneous operation failures
18 Frosts Frosts
E
19 Lightning Reached by lightning
US
20 Flood Floods and heavy rainfalls

21 Earthq Sudden earth movements

E
Source: PEMEX – September 2007
IV

US

CL

EX

R
FO
104
Regional Association of Oil, Gas and Biofuels Sector Companies in Latin America and the Caribbean

ARPEL is a non‐profit association gathering companies and institutions of the oil, gas and biofuels sector in Latin
America and the Caribbean. It was founded in 1965 with the primary purpose of promoting industry integration and
growth as well as seeking ways to maximize its contribution to sustainable energy development in the region. Its
membership represents over 90% of the upstream and downstream activities in the region and includes national and
international oil companies, companies providing technology, goods and services to the industry value chain, and oil,
natural gas and biofuels sector institutions.
Since 1976 ARPEL holds Special Consultative Status with United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). In
2006, the association declared its adherence to UN Global Compact principles.
Mission
To foster and facilitate industry development and integration, continuous operational improvement and effective
management of environmental and social issues, by:
• developing, sharing and disseminating best practices;
• carrying out studies that translate in information of value;
• broadening knowledge and helping build required competencies;
• networking and engaging members and stakeholders in constructive dialogue.
Vision
A growing, competitive and integrated oil, gas and biofuels industry that achieves operational and management
excellence, and effectively contributes to the sustainable energy development in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Value proposition
ARPEL is a well established industry association in Latin America and the Caribbean, offering members a unique means
for networking, sharing knowledge, joining efforts and building synergies in favor of the industry’s competitive and
sustainable development. As a recognized regional body of representation, the association also seeks to advocate in
favor of the common interests of its membership and to enhance the industry’s public image and reputation.
A significant part of ARPEL´s value is reflected in its condition of cost‐effective vehicle for the development of regional
publications on best practices, emerging issues and sectoral studies, of value‐added service center, and of means of
access to non‐reimbursable financial resources for projects related to the social and environmental management
improvement of its member companies.
Socio‐environmental sustainability
Operational excellence
Sectoral development

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Arpel Reference Manual

REGIONAL ASSOCIATION OF OIL, GAS AND BIOFUELS SECTOR COMPANIES

ARPEL Reference Manual No. 1 ‐ 2011 ARPEL Pipeline integrity Project Team

Jaime Rodríguez Salazar ‐ RECOPE Sampedro (ANCAP), John Glanville (PCJ),

José Sánchez Nuñez ‐ EP‐Petroecuador (PETROBRAS), Diana Pizarro (RECOPE),

José Juan Sánchez Ghenno ‐ PEMEX Félix Hurtado, Henry Requena, Julio

in printed version or electronically stored

or otherwise is held by the Regional

Companies in Latin America and the

notice. The user shall give—in future use

1. Introduction and Purpose This Manual is accompanied by an

that they may check their own

practices to ensure the integrity of gas,

operational, social and environmental

requirements of specific jurisdictions. The

companies should be aware of the

 includes underground, submarine and  provides management indicators to

considerations beyond the regulations and bibliography to

This Manual covers the following watersheds, others, sensitivity maps.

1. Identification of baseline: pipeline  Total failure or rupture

characterization, design and  Partial failure or leakage

referencing, maintenance and 4. Failure mechanisms due to threats

environment, economy, image,  Indicators

ARPEL has adopted a model of the Integral framework of the integrity management

application of best practices regarding an exploitation concession plant

to the additional pipelines and facilities it;

Consequently, the facilities within the  Below 15 psi (1 bar), regardless

treatment plants, storage plants,

a) Auxiliary pipelines, such as water, f) Pipelines for distribution of

air, vapor, lube oil and fuel gas natural gas

b) Pressure containers, heat operations

c) Pipelines designed for internal included as alternative c) above in

ARPEL Member Companies, both Management in accordance with their

world, as stated in the Statement of and to exchanging valuable experiences to

Commitments of ARPEL (2005) and in their support the operational, environmental

social responsibility policies. Furthermore, operations, as well as to strengthen their

by corrosion due to differential aeration is mitigation of consequences. It involves

Anode information is the basis for the initial risk

i.e., the area where metal corrosion or

Anodic bed channel of a water current, river, lake or

coupon carrier is constructed in stainless Commissioning

no metal dissolution at the cathode. Electrochemical process through which

equipment or pipelines buried or Corrosion rate

environment during certain period of

Device installed in the pipeline to block

connection to structure to be protected,

of liquids/gases, de‐energization, protective coating imperfections, a voltage

operational procedures, etc. (See flowing, and therefore, the voltage

Delimit voltage gradient is checked by measuring

Delivery connection When both electrodes are 1.5 m away in

construction (for welded joints) on the

Electrolyte surface of the pipeline, which is blasted

The latter are applied when mechanical

component of the three layer

polyethylene (TPE) and three layer

Flash Point and scope of the geodynamic, geological

chemical energy into electric energy. They that may cause the external and internal

usually consist in two different electrodes forces of the Earth in a certain area in

defined as a model of a part of the reality the operation stage, the systematic

whose mechanical properties have been

altered by the heat of the welding. Metal Height clearance

HAZOP Study, interpretation and characterization

I in the electrolyte is performed with inert

crops, etc.) which enable the adequate