Hume's Explanations of Meaningless Beliefs

Author(s): Louis E. Loeb

Source: The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-) , Apr., 2001, Vol. 51, No. 203 (Apr., 2001),
pp. 145-164
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Association
and the University of St. Andrews

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 The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 5, .No. 203 April 2001
ISSN oo3i-8o94

The Philosophical Quarterly

HUME'S EXPLANATIONS OF MEANINGLESS BELIEFS

BY Louis E. LOEB

In this paper I raise some puzzles in regard to Hume's reliance on empir

icism about meaning. Most fundamentally, Hume's arguments to meanin
lessness are often too strong for his purposes. They are accompanied
psychological explanations of why we believe in the existence of entities tha
fall under the meaningless expressions, explanations which presuppos
the meaningfulness of the relevant terms. Drawing on his treatment of the
notion of substratum and other examples, I propose a solution based on
sources in Hume's texts. I also apply the solution to suggest a reconstruction
of Hume's treatment of necessary connection.

The puzzles I have in view are best introduced against the background
of two theses from Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding: first, the
meaning of a word, term or expression in its 'primary or immediate Signi-
fication' (Essay, III ii 2) is the idea for which it stands; and second, all ideas are
ultimately derived from simple ideas, those received passively in experience.1
Taken together, these theses constitute Locke's 'empiricism' about meaning.
It is an upshot of Locke's theory that an expression is meaningless if it does
not stand for an idea derived from experience (see Essay, III ii 2, 7).
1 I use the following abbreviations for references within the text: EHU - Hume, Enquiries
Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. P.H. Nidditch
(Oxford UP, I975), with references to the marginal section numbers, not to pages; Essay -
Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, I975);
T- Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. Nidditch (Oxford UP, I978).

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 I46 LOUIS E. LOEB

One tendency in Locke is to employ m

against the notion of substratum. A mater
subject or substance in which the qualiti
figure, and so forth - inhere or subsist. In
Locke is emphatic that we have 'no Idea' (I
not to read a number of other sections (II
as registering at least ambivalence with
notion of substratum.2
On the face of it, Hume is committ
meaning, as the earliest sections of A Trea
Hume introduces an account of the rela
ideas. At pp. 2-3 he claims that simple i
he applies his Lockean theory of mean
substance, concluding that 'We have ... n
that of a collection of particular qualitie
when we either talk or reason concern
meaning is also in place in An Enquiry con
section II Hume introduces a distinction
claims that simple ideas copy experienc
we entertain, therefore, any suspicion tha
without any meaning or idea (as is but t
from what impression is that supposed idea
mention specific applications, he does dr
and does so, presumably for emphasis, in
There are, however, a number of puz
his theory of meaning. As a general obser
to meaninglessness are cursory in char
paragraphs, often filled with rhetorical ch
argument.3 There are a number of other m
way with these arguments.
For example, according to Locke, comp
ideas by combining or compounding, com
(see Essay, II xii). By contrast, Hume co
formed only by compounding parts (T
version of the simple/complex distinction
Locke's account, allowing fewer resources
logical operations for deriving complex ide
What is more, in his destructive argum
sometimes writes as if he is bent on findi
2 Cf.J. Bennett, 'Substratum', History of Philosophy
3 Cf. E. Craig, The Mind of God and the Works of M

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 HUME'S EXPLANATIONS OF MEANINGLESS BELIEFS I47

target idea is derived.4 (By a 'target idea' I mean an idea whose existence
in question.) En route to the claim that we have no idea of the self or soul, h
observes 'It must be some one impression, that gives rise to every real idea.
But self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several
impressions and ideas are suppos'd to have a reference' (T, p. 251). To th
extent that Hume searches for a single impression that is the source o
the target idea, he seems to overlook the possibility that the idea of the sou
is complex. It is the simple constituents of complex ideas, not the compl
ideas themselves, that need to represent simple impressions exactly.5
Why is Hume content to advance destructive applications of his empi
icism about meaning which are so perfunctory? Barry Stroud has suggested
that Hume 'adopts [the theory of ideas] without criticism from his pre
decessors' and that this accounts for his 'quick, not very careful or thorough
exposition of the theory'.6 In this spirit, it might be suggested that Hume c
make do with a truncated version and streamlined applications specifical
of the Lockean theory of meaning. Locke's empiricism about meaning
would be familiar to readers. Hume could rely on Locke's work without pro-
viding detail that would otherwise be necessary.
There is, however, a nastier problem. At pp. I5-I6 of the Treatise Hum
declares 'substratum' meaningless. In I iv 3 he sets out to explain why t
ancient philosophers believe in the existence of material substrata. These sec-
tions work at cross purposes. How can Hume consistently set out to expla
the psychological causes of a belief that is without meaning or content in th
first place? As Robert Fogelin writes, 'what is the content of the false philo
sopher's belief in substance? Hume's answer seems to be that it is conten
less, but then what does the belief amount to?'7
Granted, Hume might try to explain why the ancient philosophers believe
that their belief is meaningful. Fogelin observes that Hume does try t

4 See B. Aune, Knowledge of the External World (London: Routledge, I991), p. 62.
5 Craig (p. II9) notes that 'Hume spends no time on an issue that must surely be absolutel
vital to his argument: whether the idea of the self might not be a complex idea'. The puzzle
not simply that Hume does not consider whether the idea is simple or complex, but that
seems to assume it is simple. If so, Craig's explanation (p. I20), that Hume's real concern
with the evidence for the belief, and hence with the existence of an actual impression (wheth
simple or complex) of the self, is not fully responsive to the problem.
6 B. Stroud, lIume (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, I977), p. 17.
7 RJ. Fogelin, Hume's Skepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1985), pp. II-I2, cf. p. 7. For the puzzle in the related context of immaterial substan
cf. Craig, p. II4. Stroud (pp. I20-I) writes in regard to immaterial substance 'The fiction o
substance is also unintelligible, according to Hume, since it requires us to have an idea o
something of which no idea can be formed.... Furthermore, we do not need the notion of su
stance in order to explain how we come to attribute identity to things.' But Hume does need
some notion of substance for the purpose of his explanation of how we come to believe in t
existence of a soul (T, pp. 253-5).

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 148 LOUIS E. LOEB

explain this at Treatise, p. 224: 'it naturally

use of terms, which are wholly insignifi
them to be on the same footing with [sig
That is fine as far as it goes, but Hume
the ancient philosophers believe that substra
'wholly insignificant and unintelligible', it is
Hume seeks to explain.
This nastier difficulty cannot be dismis
relying on Locke's results. It involves an
system: on the one hand, he declares the te
the other, he provides a psychological expla
sophers believe that substrata exist. The lat
much so that he supplements his explanatio
separate explanation of the belief in their s
We also cannot dismiss the difficulty on t
Hume's discussion of 'substratum'. Hume of
a number of beliefs formulated with res
declared meaningless: beliefs in material s
souls, external existence and necessary co
have called 'the nastier problem' is far from
This observation generates a variant of th
concepts are the same, just as there is onl
different psychological explanations of the
substrata, souls, external existence and ne
explanations could be appropriate only if th
tent, but they do not differ in content if t
Perhaps strict meaningfulness requires i
accordance with Lockean empiricism abou
must nevertheless possess some surrogate f
features - 'quasi-content'- if Hume's psy
beliefs are themselves to make sense.

II

I believe we can extract an account of quasi-content from Hume's explana-

tion of the belief in material substrata. The explanation takes the form of a
four-stage psychological reaction. Hume considers an uninterrupted succes-
sion of changing, sensible qualities. Descartes' piece of wax slowly changes

8 Fogelin, p. I2: see also his 'Hume's Scepticism', in D.F. Norton (ed.), The Cambridge Com-
panion to Hume (Cambridge UP, I993), pp. 90-II6, at p. iii.

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 HUME'S EXPLANATIONS OF MEANINGLESS BELIEFS I49

its shape, hardness, colour, etc., as it melts. Hume notes that we can co
sider the succession of qualities in either of two ways. One way is to trace th
sensible qualities gradually through time. Hume holds that there is
concept of identity that requires an object which has an uninterrupted a
an unchanging existence (T, pp. 200-I, 219-20, 253, 255).9 Observing th
changes gradually, we are tricked by an imaginative tendency or propensity
to ascribe identity to related objects.10 The successive qualities of the object
are related - uninterrupted and closely resembling. This relation is simil
to that of being uninterrupted and perfectly resembling or unchanging. In
the light of this similarity, the mind is induced to ascribe identity to th
successive qualities of the wax. This is stage (I) of the four-stage reaction
have said that the propensity to ascribe identity to related objects tricks the
mind. Hume is explicit, in a related context one section earlier, that this pro
pensity is based on a 'deception' (T, p. 202) or an 'illusion' (p. 200). This
illusion leads to an outright mistake, taking for an identical object what are
in fact diverse or distinct objects.
There is a second way of considering the succession of sensible qualitie
We can survey or compare the qualities before and after an interval duri
which they undergo considerable change, say, from a hard cube at one time
to a molten mass at another. Since identity requires an uninterrupted an
unchanging object, this way of viewing the qualities makes us recognize that
the earlier and later qualities are not identical. This is stage (2). So we ho
contradictory beliefs, ascribing both identity, at (i), and diversity, at (2), to
the succession of qualities. As Hume says, there is 'a kind of contrariety
our method of thinking' (T, p. 220).
We might expect that in these circumstances the mind corrects and thus
gives up the belief that the earlier and later qualities are identical. After all,
comparing the later sensible qualities with those that are more removed
time, we see that the belief in their identity is false. According to Hum
however, we do not simply relinquish the belief in identity. The psych
logical trick is fairly powerful. We remain in the grip of the propensity to
ascribe identity to related objects even after we recognize that the objec
are not identical.
In the discussion of similar contradictions in the preceding section of the
Treatise (pp. 205-6 and 214-I6), Hume tells us that such conflicts make us
uneasy. Indeed, he portrays the contradictions as resulting in a psychological
9 He thinks this is the notion of identity in its strict sense (T, pp. 200-I, 219-20, 253, 255).
Here I bracket issues about how one acquires the idea of identity. See, for example, Fogelin,
Hume's Skepticism, pp. 70-3.
10 For an extended discussion of the operation of the propensity and its effects, see my
'Stability, Justification, and Hume's Propensity to Attribute Identity to Related Objects',
Philosophical Topics, 19 (I99I), pp. 237-70, esp. ??2-4.

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 I50 LOUIS E. LOEB

battle or war: the opposing belief

other in 'combat' (p. 205) and 'stru
(p. 215; cf. p. 221). In other words,
easiness' (pp. 205, 206; cf. p. 215), di
discomfort and the effort to relieve
Our recourse is to retreat fro
minimally, only so far as is neces
imagine other principles of retr
between opposing beliefs.) This retr
a wholly unobserved object which
and in which sensible qualities inher
logical reaction.
It is important that the belief in
resolution of the conflict. Hume wri
which we endeavour to conceal [the
writes of a similar supposition, that
variation' (p. 254, my italics) in o
tends to obscure the contradiction to which it is addressed.
Though Hume does not pause to explain why the supposition of a
substratum fails to resolve the contradiction, it is not difficult to see what he
has in mind. The propensity to ascribe identity to related objects is triggered
by an observed succession of related sensible qualities, so that at stage (I) we
are inclined to ascribe identity to the observed qualities. The supposition of
a material substratum at (4) locates the identity in an 'unknown and invisible'
object (T, p. 220), a wholly unobserved object. The mind retreats from the
belief at (I) without entirely giving it up. The belief in the identity of
the observed qualities survives in the form of belief in the identity of an
unobserved substratum. Belief in a substratum goes some way towards satisfying
the original inclination, by ascribing identity to something, but does not fully
satisfy the inclination; belief in a substratum mislocates the identity that we
are inclined to ascribe to observed objects, placing it instead in an unob-
served object. For this reason, the supposition of a substratum is an unstable
resolution of the contradiction.

After his explanation of the belief in material substratum is complete,

Hume still writes in a deprecating way about the concept of substratum, as
an 'unintelligible something' (T, p. 220) and as 'incomprehensible' (p. 222;
cf. p. 224). He is here calling attention to a defect in meaning or content.11
1 Craig (pp. 126-7) takes it that Hume started out 'with a theory of the thinkable and then
found himself happy to transform it into a theory of the knowable', so that epistemic consid-
erations supplant semantic ones. I do not think this does justice to the persistence of Hume's
expressions of misgivings about meaning.

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 HUME'S EXPLANATIONS OF MEANINGLESS BELIEFS I51

He does not show how the idea of material substratum is 'derived', in ac

cordance with his Lockean theory of meaning, by approved psychologic
operations on ideas. The notion of material substratum is not, strictly, conten
ful or meaningful.
Yet Hume has just purported to explain the belief in the existence o
material substrata. This takes us back to the nasty puzzle: what is the conten
of the belief to be explained? I suggest that the mistake or illusion at stage (
is transformed or transmuted, under the pressure of the conflict and
uneasiness at (3), into a conceptual confusion. Once (3) is reached, the mi
seeks relief. Unable to remove or resolve the conflict, we 'endeavour to con-
ceal' or 'to disguise' the contradiction. The 'concept' of material substratum,
so far as we have it, emerges at the same stage, stage (4), as the belief i
material substratum. We do notfirst form or acquire the concept and then t
belief.12 Rather the concept and the belief are of a piece. What I have called
'quasi-content' arises together with the belief that obscures the contradiction
at (4); the quasi-content and the belief result from the same set of psych
logical pressures.
In thinking about the explanation of quasi-content which I am attributing
to Hume, it is important to distinguish the mistake or illusion at stage (
from the conceptual confusion at (4). The illusion at (I) consists in ascribi
identity to related, but changing, observed sensible qualities. The conceptual
confusion sets in at (4), when we ascribe identity to unobserved objects
best we can conceive them, thus postulating something 'unintelligible' an
'incomprehensible'. The confused conception of substratum at (4) has content
like features in so far as it is the by-product of a determinate illusion at (I).
It might be objected that Hume is not entitled to the claim that stage (4)
yields any form of content.13 As Hume views it, (4) goes some way to resolv
the conflict to which it is addressed, requiring that it possesses a kind
content. How does he preclude the possibility that at (4) we enter into some
psychological state that simply squelches the uneasiness, in the way a pill or
a drug might squelch tension or discomfort? Such states would reduce
uneasiness, though they lack any sort of content. I take Hume to be assum-
ing that the outcome of the psychological reactions is belief, or somethi
like belief; this is a datum to be explained.
I suggest we have encountered an instance of a recurrent pattern of
explanation in Hume. My general thesis is this: for Hume, quasi-content

12 In his treatment in T, I iv 2, pp. 208-9, of another product of the propensity to ascrib

identity to related objects, Hume provides an explanation of why our idea of the continu
and independent existence of body also constitutes a belief. But his point is not that we firs
form the idea and later form the belief.
13 I owe this objection, and the response to it, to William Taschek.

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I52 LOUIS E. LOEB

the product of a retreat, under t

uneasiness, from an illusion to a c
belief that obscures the conflict.14
of differences in the initial illusions
This thesis generates responses
consistently set out to explain the
strictly meaningless? The answer
meaning, quasi-content in the sen
ate for Hume to give different exp
less beliefs? The answer is that the
differences in the illusions at stag
content of the initial illusion and
the principle that the mind retreats
What are we to make of Hume's
tions of his empiricism about m
Hume's destructive arguments to
generate a presumption that a woul
not derived from experience in ac
meaning. Since Hume has in hand
the concepts, these presumptiv
argument is not complete until he
with an explanation, with reference
quasi-content arises. This places a
target ideas more contentful than
the presumptive argument and t
quasi-content is deficient.

III

My response to the various puzzle

contents are not derived from
strictures on the origin of ideas tha
important objection: if, as traditi
are lively ideas, and if quasi-cont
14 David Pears finds 'two separate thrus
fulness of his opponent's views and the o
attribute equal importance to each of them': D
Book of his Treatise (Oxford UP, I990), p. Io
insufficiently sensitive to the tensions betw
these thrusts are 'closely interdependent'
form to the general schema outlined in my

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 HUME'S EXPLANATIONS OF MEANINGLESS BELIEFS I53

impressions that copy experience, then we cannot have genuine belief i

these cases. I have no objection to taking the psychological reactions to yield
a state that falls short of genuine belief, quasi-belief. If one insists that, for
Hume, beliefs are lively ideas, the best course is perhaps to identify quas
contents with 'quasi-ideas', thus allowing for quasi-belief. It would be we
however, to locate an alternative to the admission of quasi-ideas.
The pressure in the direction of saying that stage (4) of the psychological
reaction yields quasi-belief arises from the interpretation that identifies belie
with lively ideas. On this traditional interpretation, the propositional
attitude of belief has a mental vehicle, lively ideas, whose constituents d
termine the content of the attitude. Lively ideas are thus 'the language
thought' for belief. Applying this model to quasi-content, we have th
problem of identifying a lively idea, or a constituent of a lively idea, which
corresponds to a quasi-content. Hume's Lockean empiricism about meanin
however, makes this problem intractable.
My own view is that beliefs, for Hume, are not lively ideas, but rathe
(sufficiently) steady dispositions. A number of commentators have recognize
dispositional strands in Hume's account of belief.15 To quote just o
passage from Hume, belief is 'that act of the mind, which renders realit
more present to us than fictions, causes them to weigh more in the thought
and gives them a superior influence on the passions and imagination' (
p. 629, cf. pp. 624 and 654 and EHU, ??40, 41, 46). Genuine beliefs a
steady dispositions to display characteristic manifestations or typical effects
on thought, the passions and action - verbal and non-verbal actions, an
conscious episodes, including lively ideas. Lively ideas are, for Hume, th
occurrent thoughts in which (dispositional) beliefs are sometimes manifested
Lively ideas thus retain a role within the dispositional account of belief
giving the traditional interpretation its due.
The dispositional account of belief makes room for quasi-beliefs associated
with quasi-contents. Within the dispositional framework, lively ideas are the
vehicle of occurrent thoughts which manifest (dispositional) belief, thou
not the vehicle of dispositional belief itself. Lively ideas are one, but on
one, of the characteristic manifestations of genuine (dispositional) belie
Quasi-beliefs are steady dispositions to characteristic manifestations, apa
from lively ideas. Quasi-beliefs have a variety of typical effects on thought,
the passions and action, but lively ideas are not among them.
15 For example, H.H. Price credits Hume with 'a hint or suggestion' of a disposition
analysis of belief: Belief (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969), p. 187; cf. pp. 165 and I8
D.M. Armstrong maintains that Hume 'wavers' between dispositional and occurrent accoun
of belief: Belief, Truth, and Knowledge (Cambridge UP, I973), p. 7I. Stephen Everson, in 'The
Difference between Feeling and Thinking', Mind, 97 (1988), pp. 40I-I3, adopts a relat
'causal' and 'functional' interpretation of Hume's theory of belief.

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 I54 LOUIS E. LOEB

There is one element missing fro

should allow that quasi-beliefs are
thoughts, even though these thought
that we can press into service Hum
(in part) in ?1 on p. I48 above:
For it being usual, after the frequent use
intelligible, to omit the idea, which we w
the custom, by which we recal the idea
after the frequent use of terms, which a
fancy them ... to have a secret meaning, w

Strictly meaningless terms serve as p

Hume can appeal to the sub-vocaliz
'material substratum') that do not sta
ingful, words. Such inner speech se
quasi-belief. Furthermore, the express
associated with the quasi-content at s
the context of the observations (of a
ually changing sensible qualities) that
to the illusion at (I). In this way, diff
'immaterial substratum', 'external exi
not strictly meaningful, are associate
different quasi-contents. Which qu
context in which these expressions ar
can express different meaningless con
This completes a sketch of how quasi-
theory of belief.
I can only summarize the evidence
of belief to Hume. My position is tha
in this paper, we must construe belie
place, this interpretation is require
enthusiasm can exceed belief in viv
'counterfeit belief (p. 123) or 'the m
(p. 630). In such cases the actions an
characteristic manifestations of genu
steady dispositions, sources that mim
internal episodes include lively idea
required to accommodate Hume's r
from a process of infixing (T, pp. 86,
16 My interpretation of Hume's account of
lief', has been influenced by that of D.G.C. M
Morality (Oxford: Blackwell, I95I), esp. pp. 7I-

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 HUME'S EXPLANATIONS OF MEANINGLESS BELIEFS I55

and that they arefast, firm, settled, solid and steady (T, pp. 97,
121, 624, 625, 626, 627, 629, 631), rather than momentary, flo
(pp. 97, io6, IIo, II6, I23, 595, 624, 625). Such notions as 'st
more naturally to dispositions than to occurrent states.17

IV

In the remainder of this paper I shall consider some additional examples of

the psychological reaction that gives rise to quasi-content. Hume's explana-
tion of the belief in immaterial substrata or souls in T, I iv 6 follows much the
same pattern as that of material substrata. I turn, however, to consider two
examples that might seem further afield. These will confirm my interpreta-
tion of quasi-content as the result of a four-stage psychological reaction; they
will also play a role in a reconstruction of Hume's treatment of the idea of
necessary connection within my interpretative framework.
I begin with Hume's consideration of taste in T, I iv 5. He claims that
smells, sounds and tastes do not have spatial location, but that they seem to
be spatial (pp. 235-6). His example is the taste of a fig. He observes that
various relations hold between the internal impression of taste and other
qualities of the fig, such as its colour and shape. The taste and the shape are
regularly conjoined and contemporaneous. Hume maintains that 'when
objects are united by any relation, we have a strong propensity to add some
new relation to them, in order to compleat the union' (p. 237). In the light of
this propensity, we 'endeavour to give [the taste and shape] a new relation,
viz that of a conjunction in place'. This yields a stage (i), the supposition that the
taste is conjoined in place to the fig. This is a mistake or an 'illusion', due to
the propensity to add a new relation to related objects.
Indeed, reflection rushes in to uncover a dilemma in (I). Does the taste
only exist in some part of the fig, or in every part? The taste cannot only
exist in some part of the fig, for every part has the same taste; and the taste
cannot exist in every part of the fig, for in that case, Hume says, the
taste would be extended (cf. p. 238). The belief at (i) is thus meaningful but
internally inconsistent. These reflections give rise to a stage (2), the belief
that the taste is not conjoined in place with the fig's extension.
The contradiction at (I) and (2) leads to stage (3): 'Being divided betwixt
these opposite principles, we renounce neither one nor the other' (p. 238).
Here we are genuinely 'divided' or torn. We cannot simply say that the taste
17 I develop these arguments for taking belief in Hume to consist in a steady disposition in
my 'Hume on Stability, Justification, and Unphilosophical Probability', Journal of the History of
Philosophy, 33 (I995), pp. IOI-32, esp. pp. I22-5, and 'Integrating Hume's Accounts of Belief
andJustification', forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

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 I56 LOUIS E. LOEB

is conjoined with the extension, for then

The propensity to add new relations to
strong pull on us. So we retreat from (I
contradiction. This effort to relieve the
suppose that the taste exists in every part
entirety. Every part of the fig has the sam
its entirety in every part of the fig, the t
observes that the belief at (4) is conceptual
'that a thing is in a certain place, and yet
The illusion at stage (I), that the taste is c
is distinct from the claim at (4) that the t
every part of the fig. The belief at (I) has
to expose its incoherence. Under the pressu
the illusion at (I) is transformed into a con
is to conceal the conflict, Hume says, p
subject in such confusion and obscurity, th
position' (p. 238) between stages (I) and (2).
The example of taste follows the sam
substratum. The difference is that in the c
propensity to ascribe identity to related ob
illusion; in the case of taste, it is the pr
objects united by another relation. This
will be important later in my reconstructi
of necessary connection.
My discussion of necessary connection
example of the four-stage reaction, Hu
external existence. He writes in T, I i 6 'sin
mind but perceptions, and since all id
antecedently present to the mind; it fol
much as to conceive or form an idea of an
ideas and impressions' (p. 67; cf. pp. 188,
out to explain the origin of the belief in
confront the nasty problem: if the belie
explain?18

18 Recent interpretations that attribute to Hume the position that it is meaningful to suppose
that external objects and/or necessary connections exist, though we do not know whether they
exist, or that Hume believes in the existence of external objects and/or necessary connection,
must show that he makes room for at least the meaningfulness of these beliefs. Thus, for
example, G. Strawson calls attention to an apparent 'meaning tension' in Hume: see his The
Secret Connexion: Causation, Realism, and David Hume (Oxford UP, I992), pp. I20-2, and the other
entries at p. 290 of his index. For an excellent critical review of this literature, see K. Winkler,
'The New Hume', Philosophical Review, I00 (I992), pp. 541-79, esp. ?2, pp. 552-61.

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 HUME'S EXPLANATIONS OF MEANINGLESS BELIEFS 157

Hume's explanation of the belief in external existence begins with the

common person's belief that the objects that are immediately perceive
have a continued existence when not present to the senses and an existen
independent of the mind and perception (T, p. I88). Philosophers distinguish
external objects from internal perceptions. The common person, accordin
to Hume, does not make this distinction, and believes that the objects th
are immediately perceived, objects that are in fact internal perceptions, have
a continued and independent existence (p. 202).
The common person's belief in the continued and independent existenc
of what are in fact internal perceptions arises as follows. When Hume pe
ceives a mountain, or furniture in his chamber (T, pp. I94-5), the percep
tions before and after he shuts his eyes or turns his head are related in that
they are unchanging, though interrupted (p. 204). This relation is similar to
that of being unchanging and uninterrupted. In the light of this similarity,
the propensity to ascribe identity to related objects (the operative propensity
in the case of substratum) tricks the mind into ascribing identity to the succes
ive perceptions. Identity, however, requires unchanging and uninterrupte
existence. The mind therefore supposes that the perceptions of the moun
tain or furniture are not interrupted. Here is a stage (I), the supposition that
our perceptions have a continued existence during the interruptions whe
they are not perceived. This is an 'illusion' (p. 200), produced by the pro
pensity to ascribe identity to related objects (cf. pp. 199, 205-IO).
The belief at (I) is about the continued existence of perceptions, object
internal to the mind. Our interest is in the idea of external existence. Hume
claims that 'a very little reflection and philosophy' (p. 2I0; cf. 214, 215) leads
us to notice the mistake at (i). For example, if we press one eyeball 'we
immediately perceive all the objects to become double, and one half of them
to be remov'd from their common and natural position' (p. 2I0). Such
experiences show, Hume thinks, that perceptions are dependent on the
mind (cf. pp. 210-II, 214, 215). This yields a stage (2), the belief that per-
ceptions do not have a continued existence when not perceived.
Hume is explicit that the contradiction results in conflict and uneasiness
(cf. T, pp. 214-I6). This is a stage (3). But the philosopher does not simply
sacrifice the belief at (I). The philosopher, as well as the common person, is
in the psychological grip of the propensity that leads to this belief (cf. p. 2I5).
Philosophers accordingly retreat to a stage (4). In order to relieve the dis-
comfort, they suppose 'the double existence of perceptions and objects'
(pp. 211, 215). Philosophers distinguish between internal perceptions and
external objects, and suppose that although perceptions have an interrupted
existence, external objects have an uninterrupted existence (p. 2II). They also
suppose that external objects cause (p. 217) and resemble (pp. 213, 216-I7)
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 I58 LOUIS E. LOEB

internal perceptions: 'The relation of cau

the other of resemblance' (p. 217). (Ther
Hume never provides an explicit psycho
causal aspect of the hypothesis of doub
question why he does not do so.) Philos
'philosophical system' (pp. 212, 213), indire
This supposition of the existence of ex
remedy' (p. 211; cf. p. 215), a 'pretext' (p. 2
conflict. By ascribing continued existen
have not been observed, the supposition
to satisfy the inclination to ascribe identit
rupted perceptions. On the other hand, b
the identity that we are initially inclin
placing it instead in objects that are un
he writes that 'each [of nature and reas
all the conditions it desires' (T, p. 215,
symptom, rather than a resolution, of a co
(4) has been reached.
My position should give no comfort to
Hume thinks the idea of external exist
commentators contend that Hume admits 'external existence' as a 'relative'
idea. We have meaningful concepts of internal perceptions and we hav
meaningful concept of causation; external existence is whatever it is that cau
our internal perceptions.19 I do not think this reading consistent with
tenor of a number of passages where Hume writes that external existence,
specifically different from perceptions, is inconceivable or incomprehensi
(cf. T, pp. 67-8, i88, 241), the conception of 'a relation without a relat
(p. 24I).20
More fundamentally, Hume's treatment of external existence parallels his
treatments of substratum and of the local conjunction of taste with matter. In
each case, the relevant 'concept' arises in the service of concealing or ob-
scuring an underlying conflict rooted in an initial illusion or deception. In
each case, conflict and uneasiness transmute an illusion into a confused
quasi-content inherent in a supposition that provides a confused resolution of
19 See, e.g., D.W. Livingston, Hume's Philosophy of Common Life (Univ. of Chicago Press, I984),
pp. 80-I, I55-7; D.E. Flage, Hume's Theory of Mind (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 37-8, 39,
42-51; and Strawson, pp. 49-58, and the other index entries for '"relative" ideas' at p. 291.
For critical discussion of this sort of view, see S. Blackburn, 'Hume and Thick Connexions',
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 50 (I990), Supp., pp. 237-50; Pears, Hume's System,
pp. I94-6; Winkler, 'The New Hume', esp. ?2, pp. 552-61; andJ. Broackes, 'Does Hume Hold
a Regularity Theory of Causation?', British Journal for the History of Philosophy, I (1993),
pp. 99-II4, esp. pp. I04-7, IIo.
20 For a more extended discussion of these passages, see Blackburn, pp. 239-4I.

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 HUME'S EXPLANATIONS OF MEANINGLESS BELIEFS I59

the contradiction. This is not a sympathetic account of the origin of the ide
of external existence. This is the feature of Hume's explanation of thi
idea which will be important later in the paper.

I turn to Hume's treatment of the idea of necessary connection. I take the

Treatise and the first Enquiry to represent substantially the same view, though
the version in the Enquiry is diluted in some respects. I shall state, without
defence, some of my interpretative assumptions.
First, Hume holds that causation consists in regularity or constant con-
junction. Of course, he famously observes 'There is a NECESSARY CONNEXION
to be taken into consideration' (T, p. 77). If the small pot of water has been
on the high flame for fifteen minutes, it must be boiling.
Secondly, Hume has no objection to identifying necessary connection in
the objects with the constant conjunction of instances of the relevant types of
objects. His first definition of 'necessity' does precisely that: necessity 'con-
sists ... in the constant conjunction of like objects' (EHU, ?75; cf. T, p. 409).
But there is no necessary connection in the objects, in the causes and effects,
over and above their constant conjunction.
Thirdly, though we have a conception of necessary connection so far as it
is identified with constant conjunction, we have no legitimate conception of
necessary connection in objects, as distinct from constant conjunction.
Hume begins both the Treatise and first Enquiry sections on necessary con-
nection with statements of his Lockean theory of meaningfulness (T, p. i55;
EHU, ?49; cf. Winkler, pp. 555-6). He subsequently writes in the Treatise
discussion 'when we speak of a necessary connexion betwixt objects, and
suppose, that this connexion depends upon an efficacy or energy ... we have
really no distinct meaning, and make use only of common words, without
any clear and determinate ideas' (T, p. I62; cf. p. I6I). Similarly, in the first
Enquiry, he writes 'we cannot ... point out that circumstance in the cause,
which gives it a connexion with its effect. We have no idea of this con-
nexion, nor even any distinct notion what it is we desire to know, when we
endeavour at a conception of it' (EHU, ?60; cf. 58, 64). These passages
strongly suggest that the conception of necessary connection (in objects, over
and above constant conjunction) is defective with respect to meaning.
My final assumption is that Hume nevertheless wants to explain our
inclination to believe that there is a 'mustness' or 'necessity', a necessary
connection (in objects, over and above constant conjunction). At the same
time, that we have no idea of such a connection, and that the relevant
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 I60 LOUIS E. LOEB

expressions are meaningless, a

Here we have a new instance of
Hume's deployment of his Lock
(p. 83), 'If we can have no idea of
and our only idea of it is as som
we cannot even have the false
objectively true of the connec
perience. To have that false be
something true of the connectio
To show how this problem pl
some basic ingredients of his exp
tion. Suppose we have repeatedl
followed by smoke. When we nex
tion to expect smoke to follow. T
smoke is the result of the repe
ditioning - Hume's 'habit' or
the determination of the though
telligible connection betwixt th
mind cannot literally move the
that the mind is induced, at le
resides in external objects. He
determination is 'a quality, wh
when we transfer the felt determination to the causes and effects 'we make
the terms of power and efficacy signify something ... which is incompatible
with those objects' (T, p. I68). As it stands, this is an explanation of why we
have the mistaken, but meaningful, belief in necessary connection between
causes and effects. We have an idea of necessary connection, namely, the
felt determination of the mind to expect one object to follow another. We
transfer this idea to objects, supposing a felt determination between them. In
this we are simply mistaken.
If this is Hume's explanation, what has happened to his theme that the
very conception of necessary connection (in objects, over and above con-
stant conjunction) is defective in meaning? On the explanation Hume has
offered, the belief in necessary connection is false, but not meaningless. So
what is all the fuss about defects in meaning? On the other hand, how could
Hume explain why we believe in necessary connection and also claim that
we have no legitimate conception of it? This problem has a now familiar
structure. Evidently the conception of necessary connection must be defec-
tive with respect to meaning, but also must have sufficient content to permit
an explanation of the origin of the belief in its existence. This explains some
of Hume's qualifications in summary statements about the idea of necessary
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 HUME'S EXPLANATIONS OF MEANINGLESS BELIEFS 161

connection. For example, 'we deceive ourselves, when we imagin

possest of any idea of this kind, after the manner we commonly understan
p. I6I, my italics); 'the necessary conclusion seems to be that we have n
of connexion or power at all, and that these words are absolutely
any meaning, when employed either in philosophical reasoning or
life' (EHU, ?58). His point is not that there is some alternative w
understand the expression which affords it strict meaning, but rathe
has quasi-content.
If this is right, we need to identify, in the context of necessary conn
a relevant instance of Hume's pattern of explanation for quasi-con
order to secure this result, I offer an extension of his explanation of th
in necessary connection. He writes (T, p. 167)
the mind has a great propensity to spread itself on external objects, and t
with them any internal impressions, which they occasion, and which alwa
their appearance at the same time that these objects discover themselves to t
Thus as certain sounds and smells are always found to attend certain visibl
we naturally imagine a conjunction, even in place, betwixt the objects and
tho' the qualities be of such a nature as to admit of no such conjunction, a
exist no where. But of this more fully hereafter.

The mind's transferring the felt determination to external obje

instance of the mind's propensity to spread itself on external objects, t
conjoin with external objects internal impressions which they o
Hume cites another instance: conjoining with external objects sou
smells which they occasion. He writes that he will discuss this mo
later, and provides a footnote reference to the section that cont
discussion of taste, material that also applies to sounds and sm
pp. 235-6). Even in the watered-down treatment in the first Enquiry h
this analogy in view, observing that 'nothing is more usual than to ap
external bodies every internal sensation, which they occasion' (EHU, ?6
The idea of necessary connection, so far as we have it, results fr
same propensity as the idea of taste conjoined in place with exten
the discussion of taste, the mind's propensity to spread itself on
objects is itself explained with reference to the propensity to add
relation to objects that bear another relation to each other. The
propensity to transfer felt determination to external objects thus resul
the more general propensity to add a new relation to related objects.
I shall follow Hume's lead and work through the analogy he as
between taste and necessary connection. In the case of taste, the i
impression is conjoined and contemporaneous with a single object,
We add a new relation, conjunction in place with that object. In th
the felt determination of the mind to expect smoke, the internal imp

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 162 LOUIS E. LOEB

occurs just after the observation

smoke. (I have in view cases where
observation of an observed obje
satisfied in all cases, the existence
we locate the felt determination b
it as a connection, tie or bond.)
with both the fire and the smo
related objects will induce us to
objects outside us, and, so far a
them. This account fits neatly
connection, tie or bond 'betwee
163, i66, I68) the causes and effec
thefelt determination exists between
This belief is obviously mistake
p. 237) to suppose that an intern
also writes of 'illusions' (p. 267)
marks about necessary connectio
believe that there is no felt d
resources for this stage are exp
necessary connection is 'a quali
a quality 'incompatible' with the o
There is a contradiction betwe
stage (3), conflict and uneasiness,
Though Hume does not write of
necessary connection, he does s
impression to external objects, 'ob
(T, p. I68, my italics). We have s
treat from an illusion and attendant contradiction.
What is the vehicle of retreat from stage (i)? One version consists in a
stage (4a): we believe that there exists something between the objects that
resembles the internal impression of felt determination. The conception of
something in or between the objects that resembles the internal impression
is confused. We have no idea what that could be like. It is difficult to see
what could resemble the felt determination, except the felt determinati
itself. Perhaps the idea of the felt determination copies and resembles t
impression, but an idea is not a candidate for a necessary connection be
tween objects. As in other cases, (4a) functions to conceal a conflict. We
thinking of something, we know not what, related (by resemblance) to som
thing we experience. The illusion at (i) is thus transmuted, under pressu
of the conflict and uneasiness, into a confused conception, in the service of
obscuring the contradiction. The idea of necessary connection turns out
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 HUME'S EXPLANATIONS OF MEANINGLESS BELIEFS 163

be a confused quasi-concept, on a par with substratum and the local conjunc-

tion of taste with extension.
Might there be a second avenue of retreat, one that puts the idea of
necessary connection in a more favourable light? The most promising can-
didate is (4b): we believe that there exists something between the objects that
causes or produces the internal impression of felt determination. Of course on
Hume's account of causation there is no such thing. The felt determination
is caused by repeated observations of conjoined objects; there is nothing
between the objects, between the fire and smoke on a given occasion, that
causes the internal impression. The issue, however, is whether we have
reached a legitimate conception of necessary connection, rather than a con-
fused quasi-concept.
I believe that Hume would reject the thought that (4b) gives rise to a
concept that is meaningful, strictly speaking. In the first place, there is the
question of how we are to understand the concept of 'causation' in (4b). If
(4b) figures in the explanation of the origin of a concept of necessary
connection (over and above constant conjunction), it cannot rely on that
concept, on pain of circularity. There is the austere concept of constant con-
junction, though it seems odd for the mind pre-reflectively to help itself to an
understanding of causation that emerges from philosophical and psycho-
logical analysis.21
In the second place, Hume would regard (4b) as unstable. In discussing
the 'philosophical system', or indirect realism, he tells us that our adding
resemblance to objects related by causation (T, pp. 213, 216-17) results from
the 'strong propensity to compleat every union by joining new relations to
those which we have before observ'd betwixt any ideas' (p. 217). This is the
propensity that leads to the belief at (i) that the felt determination exists
between the objects in the first place. Even if we somehow form the
supposition (4b), the propensity to add new relations to related objects will
lead us to add resemblance to causation, yielding (4c): the belief that there
exists something between the objects that causes and resembles the internal
impression of felt determination. This version of (4) inherits the confusion
inherent in (4a).
Even putting these worries aside, there is another objection to construing
(4b) as providing a legitimate conception of necessary connection. It is here
that my earlier discussion of the idea of external existence comes into play.
The idea of external existence, in so far as we have it, is the idea of whatever it
is that has an uninterrupted existence and causes our internal perceptions.
This is similar in form to the idea of whatever it is between external objects
21 The point here is similar to the criticism of G. Strawson advanced by Winkler, pp. 558-9,
and Broackes, p. I07.

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 I64 LOUIS E. LOEB

that causes the internal impression of felt

ideas, with a would-be object characterized
to something we experience. Indeed, it is t
the thought that they are legitimate.
I have argued, however, that Hume ass
existence the same status with respect to m
substratum or local conjunction of taste (in
these concepts have the same genesis: they
and uneasiness due to an initial illusion and the associated contradiction. If I
am right that Hume regards the relative idea of external existence as a con-
fused quasi-concept, the relative idea of necessary connection along the lines
of (4b) should suffer the same fate. A treatment of the idea of necessary
connection as arising by the route from (I) to (4b) is every bit as unkind as
the parallel treatment of the idea of external existence. Whether our minds
rely on (4a) or (4b), we land in a quasi-concept.
I conclude that we can attribute to Hume views about quasi-content that
apply to the idea of necessary connection, as well as substratum, the local con-
junction of taste in its entirety with extension, and external existence. In
these cases, the target ideas can be viewed as confused quasi-concepts,
arising from an initial illusion under the pressure of conflict and uneasiness.
This psychological reaction explains both the quasi-content and the quasi-
belief. Hume's meaning-empiricism is thus two-pronged. The first prong is a
presumptive argument against strict content, ideas derived from perceptions
in accordance with Hume's Lockean theory of meaning. This is combined
with an explanation to account for surrogate meaning or quasi-content. This
interpretation explains the perfunctory character of Hume's Lockean
arguments to meaninglessness. It also explains how Hume can consistently
provide psychological explanations of a number of different beliefs which do
not meet Lockean standards for strict meaning.22

University of Michigan

22 I have benefited greatly from reading versions of this paper to audiences at Union
College, Wellesley College, and the Ohio State University Conference on the History of
Modern Philosophy, and from discussion at a meeting of the Propositional Attitudes Task
Force at Smith College. I am indebted to MichaelJacovides and Kenneth Winkler for detailed
written comments; to Diana Raffinan and William Taschek for pressing difficulties in my
account of quasi-content; to David Velleman for helping me to clarify and develop my views
about quasi-belief; and to an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions. I wrote this paper
during a year as Fellow, Center for the Study of Modern Philosophy, University of Massachu-
setts, Amherst. I am grateful to the Department of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts,
for support, and to the University of Michigan for sabbatical leave.

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