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Embodied Cognition

Article  in  Wiley interdisciplinary reviews. Cognitive science · May 2013

DOI: 10.1002/wcs.1226

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 Focus Article
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Embodied cognition 4
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6 Lucia Foglia1∗ and Robert A. Wilson2 6
7 7
8 Traditional views in philosophy of mind and cognitive science depict the mind as an 8
9 information processor, one whose connections with the body and the world are of 9
10 little theoretical importance. On the contrary, mounting empirical evidence shows 10
11 that bodily states and modality-specific systems for perception and action underlie 11
12 information processing, and that embodiment contributes to various aspects and 12
13 effects of mental phenomena. This article will briefly review and discuss some of 13
14 this evidence and what it implies. By challenging mainstream accounts of mind and 14
15 cognition, embodiment views offer new ways of conceptualizing knowledge and 15
16 suggest novel perspectives on cognitive variation and mind-body reductionism.  16

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17 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 17
18 18
19 How to cite this article: 19
WIREs Cogn Sci 2013. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1226

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20 20
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22 22

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INTRODUCTION the product of a dynamic interplay between neural
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and non-neural processes. On this view, there is no
AQ125
26
27
I n the western philosophical• tradition, the fact
that we have bodies has been mostly regarded
as irrelevant or peripheral to the understanding of
fracture between cognition, the agent’s body, and
real-life contexts. Consequently, the body intrinsically
25
26
27
constrains, regulates, and shapes the nature of mental
28 knowledge and cognition. Cartesian dualism, the 28
activity. Call this view the embodiment thesis about
view that minds is constituted by a fundamentally
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29 cognition. 29
30 different kind of substance than are bodies, evolved 30
Such constraint, regulation, and shaping need
into an epistemological tradition that has informed
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31 not involve the dependence of cognition on actual 31

32 various strands of cognitive science. One of these 32
states of the body. Indeed, much current research on
33 strands that has been particularly influential in the 33
embodiment emphasizes less the body’s direct role
34 cognitive sciences is computationalism, the claim that 34
in cognition than its implied role in reenactments of
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35 cognition is, in essence, the manipulation of abstract 35

experience in the brain’s modality-specific systems
36 information via formal rules.1–3 On this view, an 36
for perception and action.4–16 The activation of
37 organism’s body and its connection to the mind are 37
sensorimotor functions even in the absence of
38 of little theoretical importance; sensorimotor systems, 38
direct engagement with sensory input and behavioral
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39 although reasonable objects of inquiry in their own 39

output (for example, in imagery, planning, and
40 right, are of interest in understanding cognition only 40
remembering) suggests that, even when decoupled
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41 insofar as they provide sensory input and allow for 41

from the environment, knowledge representation and
42 behavioral output. Ideally, even organisms without a 42
processing continue to be supported by patterns of
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43 body, such as brains in a vat or sophisticated computer 43

embodied responses. As we will explain further below,
44 programs, could in principle exhibit extraordinary and 44
even this articulation of the embodiment thesis marks
sophisticated cognitive skills.
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45 a departure from traditional cognitive science. 45

Proponents of the view known as ‘embodied
46 More radical such departures have been 46
cognition’, by contrast, emphasize the role of sensory
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47 made within the embodied cognition movement 47

and motor functions in cognition itself. By viewing
48 by those appealing to dynamic systems theory to 48
the mind as grounded in the details of its sensory-
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49 advocate explicitly anti-representationalist views of 49

motor embodiment, they model cognitive skills as
50 cognition.17–20 The central idea here is that the body 50
51 ∗ Correspondence to: lucia.foglia@mail.mcgill.ca has a fundamental feedback-driven role in mental 51
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52 1 Department of Philosophy, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, functioning, and as long as a situated agent can sense 52
53 Canada the world and be directly influenced by it, complex 53
54 2 Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta, Alberta, Canada behaviors and adaptive success do not require any 54

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 Focus Article wires.wiley.com/cogsci

1 reference to computation and representation at all.21 redescription of sensorimotor experience into a list 1
2 Here we do not explore the implications of this of properties represented in propositional way; and 2
3 more radical version of the embodiment thesis and arbitrary because the way in which they are linked to 3
4 its potential problems,22 but simply acknowledge their referents in the world bears no relationship to 4
5 the diversity of work that falls under the heading the physical and functional features of the referents. 5
6 ‘embodied cognition’. On this view, not only is there a clear-cut distinction 6
7 There is a continuing exploration of the between the mental representations processed by, say, 7
8 embodiment thesis within the cognitive sciences. Here language, imagery, and memory, and those processed 8
9 we provide an overview of some of the core empirical by the sensorimotor system, but also the meaning of 9
10 evidence that has been used to argue that the body such ‘central’ representations is completely divorced 10
11 is integral to the nature of cognitive processing itself from embodied experience. 11
12 and that mental activity, instead of being centralized Traditional views, hence, are committed to at 12
13 and sharply distinct from low-level sensorimotor least three fundamental principles that proponents of 13
14 functions, is body-based, sometimes in quite surprising the embodiment thesis reject: 14
15 ways. We begin by elaborating on the general contrast 15
16 we have sketched between traditional and embodied • Information conveyed by a mental representation 16

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17 cognitive science. has no modality-specific features. In this 17
18 sense, representations are autonomous from the 18
19 sensorimotor system, and its operational details. 19
EMBODIMENT VERSUS TRADITIONAL

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20 20
• Knowledge is represented propositionally, and
21 COGNITIVE SCIENCE meaning emerges from the relations among the
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22 22

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Despite the prevalence of robustly physicalist or constituent symbols.
23 23
materialist views within the philosophy of mind and • Internal representations instruct the motor sys-
24 24

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cognitive science, at the heart of mainstream accounts tem, which is essentially separate and indepen-
25 25
lies a particular conception of cognition and mental dent of cognition, and so cognitive processing is
26 26
representation. Central cognitive processing has been not significantly limited, constrained, or shaped
27 typically conceptualized in abstraction from bodily 27
28 by bodily actions. 28
mechanisms of sensory processing and motor control.
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29 The traditional formulation holds that what makes 29
30 The embodiment thesis challenges these princi- 30
something a mental process or event does not depend
ples. Stressing the centrality of the body for cognition
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31 in any deep way on its physical realizer or internal 31

32 has at least three implications: (1) significant differ- 32
constitution, and mental capacities and intelligent
33 ences in embodiment often translate into differences 33
behavior do not arise from any specific bodily form
34 in cognitive processing, (2) algorithms that consti- 34
or features.23–25 Two implications of this formulation
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35 tute cognition sometimes reflect the peculiarities of 35

about cognition highlight its significance.
36 the physical body, and (3) failure to include informa- 36
The first is the commitment to what Susan
37 tion about the body in the description of the mind 37
Hurley26 dubbed the ‘sandwich model’, the view
38 leads to accounts that are fundamentally misleading 38
that the systems responsible for thinking are
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39 and misguided. What advocates of the embodiment 39

neatly segregated from, and ‘sandwiched’ between,
40 thesis aim to show is that systems for sensing, act- 40
the systems responsible for sensing and acting.
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41 ing, and thinking are constitutively interdependent, 41

The second, of more direct relevance to those
42 and modality-specific representations are what our 42
focused on computational intelligence, linguistics,
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43 cognition is made of. 43

and neuroscience, is the commitment to a kind of
44 isolationism about the understanding of cognition: 44
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45 the claim that an explanation of cognitive processing 45

WHAT THE EMBODIMENT THESIS IS
46 should be divorced from an appreciation of the 46
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47 physical realization of that processing. A mind The embodiment thesis is motivated by the following 47
48 portrayed as disembodied is a special realm, kinds of observations about behavior. 48
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49 populated by symbolic structures (representations) 49

50 with quasi-linguistic and combinatorial properties. 1. We typically gesture when we speak and 50
51 These symbols have been taken to be amodal, abstract, gesturing does not just affect both interpersonal 51
52 and arbitrary1,3,24,27,28 : amodal because they are communication and language processing, but 52
53 independent of the brain’s systems for perception can feed back and change the gesturer’s thinking. 53
54 and action; abstract because they result from the Gesturing while describing an action performed 54

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 WIREs Cognitive Science Embodied cognition

1 on an object, for example, a light disk, brings states and modality-specific systems for perception 1
2 action-related information into the speaker’s and action. First, even when disconnected from the 2
3 mental representations, and components of the environment and its sensory information, cognition 3
4 action reflected in the gesture alter the way is body-scaled, that is, grounded in those systems 4
5 the speaker reasons about and acts toward that that evolved to allow the interactions with the 5
6 object.29 world—namely, the sensory and motor systems. 6
7 2. Gesturing and finger counting help represent Second, there are at least two grades of bodily 7
8 mathematical concepts and their contribution to involvement in cognition: one that requires the 8
9 a fast understanding of number concepts during body directly (online embodiment), and the other 9
10 arithmetical learning and calculation indicates that requires it indirectly, by way of neural 10
11 that an active and direct involvement of the body simulations, (offline embodiment). Third, actual 11
12 in the execution of a cognitive task simplifies its embodied responses can be stored and later used in 12
13 computational workload.30,31 offline processing. In this sense, non-neural parts of 13
14 the body constitute the building blocks of conceptual 14
3. Visual perception is a skillful activity, and bodily
15 knowledge. And fourth only a creature with certain 15
movement and the feedback it generates are
16 bodily features and skills can possess certain kinds of 16

FS
more tightly integrated into visual processing
17 than traditional models of vision acknowledge. cognitive capacities. 17
18 What we perceive is determined by what we A useful way to articulate the embodiment thesis 18
19 do in order to perceive. For example, to be a further is to ask what role or functions the body plays 19

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20 mobile perceiver is to understand that much of in cognition. At the most general level, there are 20
21 the environment can be revealed and explored at least two distinct but related roles, each with its 21
22 own implications for how we think of, and study, 22

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through appropriate movements of the head and
23 limbs, or that to attain novel information one cognition. The first stresses the idea that the body can 23
24 has to turn around in response to an unexpected function as a cognitive constraint: in this sense, talking 24

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25 noise.32–35 or thinking about objects, either concrete or abstract, 25
26 implies the appeal, deployment, or reactivation of 26
4. There are neurons, known as mirror neurons,
27 specific patterns of bodily activity. The second role 27
that activate not only when we observe or under-
28 highlights the different ways in which the body 28
stand an action performed by others, but also
acts as a distributor for cognitive processing, thus
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29 29
when we carry out the same action with our
30 functioning as a partial realizer of cognition. The 30
body.36 The achievement of a motor equivalence
general idea of considering non-neural realizers for
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31 suggests that the understanding of other minds is 31

32 cognitive processing opens the door to more radical 32
based on our capacity to act and would account
33 theories with some philosophical currency, such as 33
for some complex aspects of our social life, such
34 the extended mind thesis, which holds that the mind 34
us the capacity to ‘mentalize’ about others. The
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35 itself extends beyond the boundaries of the individual 35

understanding we have of one another would
36 organism.15,16,46 We discuss each of these roles in 36
thus presuppose one’s own motor system, and
37 more detail in the remainder of this paper. 37
bodily states would provide the building blocks
38 of empathy, social coordination, imitation, and 38
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39 language acquisition.36–40 By way of perform- Body as a Constraint on Cognition 39

40 ing a movement, therefore, we would not simply As a constraint on cognition, the body shapes 40
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41 accomplish an action but accumulate the motor the nature of cognitive activity and the content 41
42 experience necessary to represent the minds of of the representations processed. Consider color 42
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43 others. perception, sound localization, categorization, and 43

44 5. We often perform cognitive tasks, such as spatial metaphor. Concepts and experiences of colors, 44
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45 remembering, problem solving or imagining, for example, reflect the properties of the retinal 45
46 more effectively by using our bodies to off- cells and the features of the visual apparatus; sound 46
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47 load information and simplify the nature of the detection owes its peculiarity to the distance between 47
48 cognitive processing. Holding specific body pos- the ears; and spatial metaphors, whose locus is not 48
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49 tures or facial expressions, for example, causally language but the way we conceptualize the body, 49
50 or constitutively facilitate both access to and heavily draw on embodied experiences.47–50 50
51 retention of memories.5,41–45 An illustration of this idea comes from the 51
52 joint work of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. 52
53 Four implications specify the ways in which Beginning in their Metaphors We Live By,50 Lakoff 53
54 cognition is underpinned both by particular bodily and Johnson argued that many central cognitive 54

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 Focus Article wires.wiley.com/cogsci

1 processes, such as those concerning space and time, interactions, multimodal representations stored in 1
2 are both expressed and influenced by metaphors, and memory assist, control, and facilitate perceptual 2
3 that many metaphors reflect bodily features. Consider processing, reasoning, and situated actions. 3
4 a well-known metaphor that they discuss: that of love The body’s constraining effects on cognition 4
5 as a kind of journey. Here the source domain (journey) can be also seen in relation to language. Sentence 5
6 is informed by our bodily physicality, and information comprehension and construal of meaning are achieved 6
7 about the body (such as its capacity for locomotion) through embodied responses and require knowing 7
8 shapes the way in which love is understood and both the affordances offered by an object and whether 8
9 conceptualized. Metaphors, hence, are not merely they match our sensorimotor capabilities.56–59 Judging 9
10 useful for embellishing communication, but reflect the meaning of a sentence is faster and more accurate, 10
11 the embodied experience that we have as creatures for example, if the text meaning is compatible with 11
12 that move through the world in particular ways. the body’s biomechanical features. 12
13 Spatial concepts provide perhaps a clearer We should expect, therefore, that differently 13
14 example: long and flat creatures would not be capable, embodied agents will diverge in their conceptualiza- 14
15 as we are, of conceiving the world in terms on ‘front’, tion of identical situations and that understanding will 15
16 ‘back’, ‘up’, and down’. These concepts arise and are vary if intelligent systems varied physically. Having a 16

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17 articulated thanks both to the particular body we different sort of body thus facilitates a different kind 17
18 have and the specific ways it navigates in and through of cognitive processing. 18
19 space. Although in these examples the physicality 19

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20 of the body does not directly contribute to mental 20
21 processing, the construction of metaphors shows Body as Distributor for Cognitive Processing 21
22 22

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nonetheless that (1) abstract domains are grounded As a cognitive distributor, the body spreads cognitive
23 in more concrete ones; (2) the grounding aspect of tasks between neural and non-neural structures, and 23
24 the body acts as a scaffold for articulating thoughts functions as partial realizer of mental phenomena. 24

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25 that otherwise would be difficult to communicate; Striking examples of how non-neural, anatomical 25
26 and (3) information about the body is included in the structures and postures subserve cognitive operations 26
27 representations that constitute cognition. come from work on language production, cortical 27
28 Further examples of the body functioning as plasticity, and hand motor skill acquisition. 28
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29 a constraint on cognition come from findings in Although a speaker’s gestures have been mostly 29
30 behavioral psychology. Our judgments about the regarded as communicative, arm and hand movements 30
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31 usability of tools, about the physical properties of in fact play a cognitive role in vocabulary growth and 31
32 stairs, and about the graspability of objects indeed language development.60,61 Cortical representations 32
33 incorporate anticipated embodied interactions, and are also responsive to changes in the course of 33
34 are affected both by our bodily features and the motor motor learning. Subjects practicing over a period of 34
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35 skills that allow us to cope with those objects and three weeks either a gross motor activity, such as 35
36 tools.51–53 squeezing a sponge, or a fine motor task, such as 36
37 Another example exemplifying the role of the sequential movements of the middle three fingers, 37
38 body as a constraint on cognition comes from not only improve on unrelated tests of hand and 38
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39 Lawrence Barsalou’s perceptual symbols theory.8,54,55 wrist performance but also, more importantly, present 39
40 This theory rests on the assumption that human a significant expansion of the primary motor and 40
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41 cognition does not consist of amodal representations somatosensory cortex. The increase of the volume 41
42 that bear arbitrary relations to their referents in the of cortical movement representations in parallel with 42
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43 world, but rather of representations whose activation the acquisition of behavioral abilities suggests that 43
44 patterns include information from various sensory cortical organization is modeled by our embodied 44
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45 modalities. For example, the symbolic structure that experiences, and that body-induced changes regulate 45
46 represents an object in its absence, say, during brain enhancement, information processing, and 46
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47 a memory task, depends upon the same neural cognitive development.62 47

48 system that is recruited when the object is actually Consider also studies indicating that motor 48
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49 perceived or acted upon. Thus, not only does cognitive activity provides individuals with knowledge sub- 49
50 processing essentially reactivate sensorimotor areas sequently used for spatial perception, studies that 50
51 in the activity of remembering, but memory itself motivate a shift in emphasis concerning the primary 51
52 may be built up out of sensorimotor patterns and function of the visual system35,63 : rather than func- 52
53 thus be modal rather than purely symbolic. On such tioning to build an accurate three-dimensional rep- 53
54 a view, besides reflecting the nature of embodied resentation of the world, as traditionally assumed,64 54

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 WIREs Cognitive Science Embodied cognition

1 the visual systems primary function is to guide and CONCLUSIONS 1

2 be guided by action. What we perceive is determined 2
3 Traditional accounts in cognitive science accept the 3
by what we do in order to perceive, not solely by
4 view that cognition is, in essence, the same kind of pro- 4
what happens inside the brain. That we construct
5 cess that one can find in a calculator. Yet if proponents 5
a visual representation of the world by taking into
6 of the embodiment thesis are correct that the body 6
account our own movements suggest that, although
7 does more than conveying input and output to central 7
the brain is still a central part of the visual infor-
8 systems, we should leave behind some methodological 8
mation processing system, neural activity alone is
9 and conceptual commitments of traditional cognitive 9
insufficient to explain how perception is achieved. If
10 science. Furthermore, cognitive scientists can explore 10
we were embodied in a radically different manner,
11 both embodied behavior and neural simulations in 11
we would perceive differently, and in terms of our
12 accounting for cognitive differences across and within 12
new set of bodily characteristics. A view that exclu- species. Two final general points about the cognitive
13 sively locates perceptual processing in the brain and 13
14 sciences are worth making in light of this point. 14
sees the nervous system alone as the beginning and The constraints of embodiment are such that
15 end of mental activity fails to appropriately acknowl- 15
16 substantive cross-species psychological generaliza- 16

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edge that bodily activity forms a stage in cognitive tions are likely to be more limited than traditional
17 processing. 17
18 views in cognitive science, such as functionalism and 18
Bodily states also modulate attitude formation computationalism have led us to expect. Put bluntly,
19 and social information processing. Nodding move- 19
differences in physical realization prevent or limit

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20 ments of one’s head while hearing a message about a 20
21 identities at the psychological level: conversely, dif- 21
topic, as opposed to shaking, increase the likelihood ferences in the kinds of bodies that organisms have
22 22

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to rate the message positively,65 and accuracy in clas- trickle up to create differences in the corresponding
23 sifying facial expressions displayed in photographs 23
24 psychology. Thus, cognitive sciences should aim to 24

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depends on the extent to which individuals are free capture generalizations that reflect bodily variation in
25 to mimic.66 Comprehensive discussion of how bodily 25
ways that, for the most part, they have not.
26 responses modulate processing of emotional stimuli 26
Finally, philosophers have tended to conceive of
27 and increase smoothness of social interaction can be 27
the reduction of mind to body and the autonomy of
28 found elsewhere.6 28
the psychological as mutually exclusive and exhaus-
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29 Viewing the role of the body as a distributor 29
tive alternatives: the autonomy of psychology is true
30 for cognitive processing implies that the body does 30
if and only if reductionism is false. The embodi-
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31 not function merely to transduce perceptual inputs 31

ment thesis provides an alternative perspective on
32 to cognition, and later to produce behavior from 32
mind-body reductionism that does not rely on this
33 internal cognitive processing, but is more integral to 33
assumption. As psychology is embodied and com-
34 the control of cognition. This form of the embodi- 34
putational psychology reflects the peculiarities of our
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35 ment thesis, by allowing that cognitive systems can 35

bodies, psychology cannot but be grounded in the
36 include both non-neural parts of the body and the 36
features of the agent’s body. But as bodily features
37 37
beyond-the-body environment, also invites further constrain or regulate, but rarely strictly determine,
38 38
exploration of the idea of extended cognitive sys- the precise nature of ensuing cognitive activity, there
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39 39
tems, where the realizers for cognitive processing are remains also a kind of autonomy to psychological
40 40
‘wide’.15,46,67–69 processing.
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42 42
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43 43
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38 Wilson RA, Foglia L. Embodied cognition. In: Zalta EN, ed. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition). 38
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