Journal of Cleaner Production 288 (2021) 125526

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Journal of Cleaner Production

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An integrated approach for modelling and quantifying housing

infrastructure resilience against flood hazard
Mrinal Kanti Sen a, Subhrajit Dutta a, **, Golam Kabir b, *, Nikil N. Pujari c,
Shamim Ahmed Laskar d
a
Department of Civil Engineering, National Institute of Technology Silchar, Assam, 788010, India
b
Industrial Systems Engineering, University of Regina, Regina, SK, Canada, S4S 0A2
c
WTW Global Delivery and Solutions India Private Limited, India
d
District Project Officer, District Disaster Management Authority (DDMA), Silchar, Assam, 788010, India

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Housing infrastructure is a basic human need and thus should be resilient against natural disasters.
Received 23 July 2020 Therefore, an effective resilience-based framework for housing infrastructure is required to enhance the
Received in revised form endurance capacity of housing and for effective recovery. Involving an expert opinion is also required for
8 December 2020
the representation of the nonlinear, complex relationship between the flood resilience parameters for
Accepted 9 December 2020
housing infrastructure. In this work, initially, a hierarchical flood resilience model for housing infra-
Available online 22 December 2020
structure is developed using the decision-making trial and evaluation laboratory (DEMATEL) and the
^as de
Handling editor: Cecilia Maria Villas Bo interpretive structure modeling (ISM) methods. The relationships among various resilience parameters
Almeida related to flood hazards are obtained using integrated DEMATEL and ISM following the data received
from expert opinions. Next, a flood resilience-based decision-making framework is developed integrating
Keywords: DEMATEL, ISM, and Bayesian Network (BN) methods. A field survey collects all the postdisaster data to
Resilience feed in the BN model, capturing the interrelationship among the resilience parameters. Finally, the
Housing infrastructure developed framework is implemented for a community in northeast India for flood resilience assessment
Flood hazard
and risk-informed decision making. It has been observed from the result that the resilience of the
Decision-making
housing infrastructure for most of the surveyed places are extremely low, which means houses of those
DEMATEL
ISM areas should be immediately strengthened. The evaluated resilience values provide the vulnerable sce-
Bayesian network narios of housing infrastructure of that community against flood hazards, which help the public au-
thority of that community. Additionally, the identification of the most sensitive parameter/s among all
considered parameters helps in decision making for future hazards.
© 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
Natural disasters may occur in the form of flood, earthquake,
volcanos, and hurricanes. These potentially dangerous occurrences
cannot be stopped by human means, but a strong defensive
framework can be created by applying the concept of resilience,
where resilience refers to the strength of a community to resist the
effect of any hazard and to return to the desired level of function-
ality in that community after the disaster occurs (Bruneau et al.,
* Corresponding author.
** Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: mksen88@gmail.com (M.K. Sen), subhrajit.nits@gmail.com
(S. Dutta), golam.kabir@uregina.ca (G. Kabir), nikil.pujari@willistowerswatson.com
(N.N. Pujari), ddmacachar@gmail.com (S.A. Laskar).
2003).
In Fig. 1, point A represents the initial reaction of any community
to a disaster, with respect to the time it takes this reaction to
degrade due to aging effects. At point B, due to the onset of any
natural disaster, community performance sharply drops (B1), then
with time (T1T2) the community recovers its functionality and at-
tains the desired level, which is denoted by point C. Here, BB1
represents the damage path, B1T1 represents the reliability, CC1
represents the recovery, B1C represents the recovery path, and T1T2
represents the recovery time of the community, where damage
path depends on the type of hazard, and the recovery path depends
on the type of infrastructure (and also the availability of resources).
From Fig. 1, it can be observed that the main parameters of resil-
ience are reliability and community recovery (Cimellaro et al.
2010a,b, 2016), where reliability depends on strength of the

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.125526
0959-6526/© 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
M.K. Sen, S. Dutta, G. Kabir et al. Journal of Cleaner Production 288 (2021) 125526

Fig. 1. Performance of a community during the service life.

community and recovery depends on the availability of resources.
There are many definitions of resilience in the literature (Hosseini
et al., 2016), and this concept is discussed in many related areas
such as ecology, social science, engineering, among others. Engi-
neering resilience is a relatively new topic of discussion, although
this is an area constantly developing and improving the existing
codes and regulations of its own domain (Gardoni and Murphy
2020). Evaluation of resilience value for a community has become
an active research area for engineers as well as scientists. A com-
munity comprising different types of infrastructure systems is
shown in Fig. 2 (Cimellaro et al., 2016), with the interdependencies
among these systems being given.
Infrastructure acts as the lifeline of a community. Thus, it is
necessary to focus on infrastructure systems to make a community
more resilient. As a result, resilience is discussed in various types of
infrastructure such as social (Hall and Lamont 2013; Pelling 2003)
and physical infrastructure (Sen and Dutta 2020). Physical infra-
structure, such as housing is the basic need for living and due to
hazards, this infrastructure gets damaged at regular intervals. As
discussed that the occurrence or impact of any hazard cannot be
destroyed or reduced. So, it is very important to implement the
concept of resilience for housing infrastructure to make the

Fig. 2. Community with different infrastructure system.

2
M.K. Sen, S. Dutta, G. Kabir et al.
infrastructure more robust against the future hazard. There are very
few works of literature, which studied the resilience of houses
against flood hazards. Maximum of the literature studied the risk of
the house against seismic hazard but according to EM-DAT (Inter-
national Disaster Database), due to flood maximum number of
people get affected (EM-DAT). That is why this study is a corrective
to the paucity of research on housing infrastructure resilience. De
Iuliis et al. (2019) calculated the time-varying downtime of the
RCC building structure using fuzzy logic against earthquakes. In
that study, authors have selected several risk parameters against
seismic hazard and used expert judgment for fuzzification of pa-
rameters. Jones (2017) discussed the different factors of housing
resilience and studied the resilience of the housing infrastructure
system of Tamansari, Bandung with the help of experts’ judgement.
Scawthorn et al. (2006) evaluated the losses due to the occurrence
of flood hazard by considering different types of infrastructure
using HAZUS manual, where all the required information are
collected by field survey. This manual is developed by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)) which is mainly for
multi-hazard loss estimation. Ahmed and Charlesworth (2015)
developed a framework for finding housing resilience by using
post-disaster data considering several factors of housing infra-
structure with their aspects. In the existing literature, resilience is
analyzed or evaluated without considering dependency among the
factors, which is a major drawback of the existing studies. Addi-
tionally, in the maximum study, resilience is evaluated based on
experts’ knowledge. Therefore, this study evaluated resilience by
considering dependencies and based on realistic disaster data.
Resilience quantification is a challenging task, as it requires a
different type of qualitative and quantitative information from
different sources. Therefore, a different type of model and frame-
work is needed to avoid such difficulties (Didier et al., 2018;
Gardoni and Murphy 2020; Mahmoud and Chulahwat 2018;
Windle et al., 2011). McClymont et al. (2020) discussed various
methods for quantification of resilience including quantitative and
qualitative approaches, and also reviewed several flood risk man-
agement (FRM) literatures to differentiate the various perspectives
of resilience. As the quantification of resilience involves expert
judgment (Chang et al., 2014), so, there will always be a certain
amount of uncertainty, which can be addressed by different
methodologies, such as probabilistic approaches (Sen et al., 2021a),
graph theory, fuzzy logic (Kabir and Hasin 2013), analytical ap-
proaches and evidence theory (Sen et al., 2020). The functionality of
infrastructure depends upon the functionality of other in-
frastructures (Ellingwood et al., 2016; Masoomi and van de Lindt
2019): for example, without electricity, flood water cannot be
pumped out of a community (Hossain et al., 2020). So during the
resilience quantification process for any community or for any
system, the infrastructure systems of that community or parame-
ters of that system have to be taken care of (Ghorbani-Renani et al.,
2020).
Except for probability and evidence theory, all the above-
mentioned methods represent dependencies in pairwise compar-
ison with a range of influence (Kosko 1986; Saaty 1996). In this case,
experts should generate a comparison matrix that enhances
complexity and uncertainty. Additionally, in evidence theory, the
parameters are combined while quantifying the results, it means
this method does not account for dependencies between the pa-
rameters. Probabilistic methods such as the Bayesian Network (BN)
address the abovementioned difficulties by constructing a condi-
tional probability table (CPT) between the parameter for repre-
senting the dependencies (Lucas 2001). Therefore, in this work, BN
is used for resilience quantification. BN considers the dependency
for analysis but to find out the dependency, either expert judge-
ment or a different methodology can be used. In expert’ judgement,
3
Journal of Cleaner Production 288 (2021) 125526
due to human error, there may be a chance for the involvement of
uncertainty. So, it is better to use a different methodology.
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) provides the cause-effect relationship,
but the drawback is that it does not consider the nonlinear in-
fluences among the parameters; therefore, it is crucial to identify
the critical parameter of the network (Badida et al., 2019; Guo et al.,
2016; Lu et al., 2015). There are several methods available for
overcoming this difficulty, such as the structural equation model
(SEM) (Ferna ndez-Mun 
~ iz et al., 2017; Srekl and Golob 2011),
interpretative structural modeling (ISM) (Chowdhury et al., 2020;
Shohan et al., 2019), and the decision-making trial and evaluation
laboratory (DEMATEL) (Li and Mathiyazhagan 2018; Wu and Chang
2015). For establishing SEM, a large number of questionnaires are
required, but DEMATEL can only provide the cause-effect relation
based on expert judgment. The drawback of DEMATEL is that it
cannot provide a hierarchical structure for a complex network,
which can be ameliorated by integration with ISM. An integrated
DEMATEL-ISM provides an effective interaction among the pa-
rameters and also gives hierarchical structure to a complex
network. Ultimately, this integrated DEMATEL-ISM is combined
with BN to find the resilience of housing infrastructure.
The objectives of this study are to.
(i) identify the resilience parameter for housing infrastructure
against flood hazards;
(ii) construct a hierarchical model for the housing infrastructure
system by using DEMATEL-ISM; and
(iii) propose a method for quantifying the flood resilience of
housing infrastructure by using BN.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, a
framework considering multiple methodologies is discussed. In
section 3, development of a hierarchical model with its de-
pendencies among the parameter resilience for the housing infra-
structure system is discussed in light of the implementation of the
proposed framework in Barak Valley. The quantified resilience
against flood hazards in Barak Valley is discussed in section 4.
Finally, in the conclusion, the limitations of this study and its
original contributions to the literature are discussed.
2. Framework of different methodologies
In this work, three methodologies are used such as DEMATEL,
ISM and BN. The details of each method are discussed below:
2.1. DEMATEL method
The DEMATEL method was developed by Battelle Memorial
Association of Geneva Research Centre. It is based on the concept of
pairwise comparison of decision-making attributes. Using this
method, one can directly compare the relationship of the interac-
tion between the variables of a complicated system to determine
the direct and indirect relationship and influence levels among the
various variables. The various steps in the DEMATEL method are as
follows (Wu and Chang 2015):
Step 1: Initiation of a direct-relation matrix
In this step, the variables (or factors) are compared pairwise in a
matrix A as shown below with a range of influence level between
0 and 4, where 0 ¼ no influence, 1 ¼ low influence, 2 ¼ medium
influence, 3 ¼ high influence, and 4 ¼ very high influence.
M.K. Sen, S. Dutta, G. Kabir et al. Journal of Cleaner Production 288 (2021) 125526

P
n P
n
½aij 
i¼1 j¼1
0 a12 / a1j / a1n l¼
a21 0 / a2j / a2n N
//// //
A¼½  where N is the number of elements.
ai1 ai2 / aij / ain
// ////
Step 6: Casual diagram formation
an1 an2 / anj / 0

Where a represents attributes or factors of matrix A, i ¼ 1,2, …,n. In this step, with the help of the threshold value and T matrix, a
Here, the decision maker compares attributes by providing the casual diagram can be formed that helps to identify the de-
abovementioned influence level. If the number of decision maker is pendencies among the variables, and, to provide the information of
more than one, then the average of all the decision makers can be important variable for the considered problem.
taken.
2.2. ISM method
Step 2: The normalization of the direct matrix (B)
The ISM method is a qualitative research technique that helps
In this step, normalization of matrix A is done by multiplying a establish and build relationships among variables and to discover
factor k with matrix A as shown below. the causality of each relationship. This method has fared better
than regression techniques (Chidambaranathan et al., 2009;
B¼kA Tavakolan and Etemadinia 2017) and various quantitate statistical
techniques, as it captured the nuances and flaws of the relationship,
Where, k ¼ P
1
n ; ði; j ¼ 1; 2; :::; nÞ. understood in its various shades of significance. This method deals
maxð a Þ
j¼1 ij
1in with complex issues and is used mainly for identification and
ranking of different variables and to establish relationships among
Step 3: Estimation of total relation matrix estimate or compre- the variables. The different steps involved in this method are as
hensive influence matrix (T) follows (Chidambaranathan et al., 2009):

In this step, T is estimated with the help of the identity matrix (I)
as shown below. As T is related to the identity matrix, then we can
reason that the size of the identity matrix will depend on the
number of attributes.
T ¼ B(IeB)1
Step 1: Establishment of the contextual relationship between
variables
In this step, a contextual relationship between variables is
determined, representing which element will lead and which
element will follow among several elements.

Step 2: Development of structural self-interaction matrix (SSIM)

Step 4: Evaluate the summation of rows and columns of T matrix
In this step, the influenced degree (Rwi) and influencing degree
(Clj) are determined by the summation of all rows and columns as
shown below. A causal diagram is developed by mapping the
centrality (Pi) and causality (Mi) to find the most critical variables.
The variables with high centrality are treated as the most
important.
In this step, a matrix is developed similar to A matrix in
DEMATEL with a different type of comparison. Here, four symbols
are used in a pairwise comparison such as V, A, X, and O, where V
represents that i affects j, but j does not affect i; A represents j af-
fects i but i does not affect j; X represents that i affects j as well as j
affects i; and O represents that neither i affects j nor j affects i.
Step 3: Reachability matrix development (R)

In this step, the SSIM matrix is modified by replacing all the

X
n elements using 0 and 1 value. The rule for replacing the cell value is
For rows; Rwi ¼ ½ tij n1 ¼ ½ti n1 ; ði ¼ 1; 2; :::; nÞ; and; shown in Table 1.
j¼1 In this step, a level-based partition is done based on the
reachability matrix; but before fixing the reachability matrix,
several transitivities are checked. For example, if node A reaches
node B, and node B reaches node C, then node A should reach C by a
X
n transitive link as shown in Fig. 3.
For columns; Clj ¼ ½ tij 1n ¼ ½tj n1 ; ðj ¼ 1; 2; :::::; nÞ:
i¼1
Table 1
Rule for Conversion from SSIM to reachability matrix SSIM.
Pi ¼ Rwi þ Clj, Mi ¼ Rwi - Clj (i ¼ 1,2, …n) Step 4: Reachability matrix partitioned into several levels

Reachability matrix
where, t represents the elements of T matrix.
(i,j) (i,j) (j,i)
Step 5: Defining the threshold value (l) V 1 0
A 0 1
In this step, the l value is determined by taking the average of all X 1 1
O 0 0
the elements in T matrix, as shown below.
4
M.K. Sen, S. Dutta, G. Kabir et al. Journal of Cleaner Production 288 (2021) 125526

Fig. 3. Direct and transitive link.

Once the reachability matrix is fixed, then leveling is done in Table 3

several iterations. Leveling can be carried out by eliminating the Comparison between different approaches.

element that has the most in common with the reachability (Rei) Attributes ANN ANP BN FCM
and antecedents set (Ani), represented below: EC £ ✓ √√√√ √√√
QL £ √√√√ √√√ √√√√
Rei ¼ frj jrj 2R; rij ¼ 1; j ¼ 1; 2; :::ng; i ¼ 1; 2; :::n QT √√√√ ✓ √√ ✓
Ani ¼ frj jrj 2R; rji ¼ 1; j ¼ 1; 2; :::ng; i ¼ 1; 2; :::n DD √√√ √√ √√√ √√
MC √√√√ √√ √√√√ √√√
LC √√√√ √√√ √√√ √√√
where, r represents the elements of R matrix.
For every iteration or setting of each variable ri ði ¼ 1; 2; :::nÞ,
intersection {Rei ∩Ani ði ¼ 1; 2; ::nÞ} is validated. This intersection
condition can be satisfied by any variable only when other variables represents the capability of controlling qualitative inputs, QT rep-
can reach that variable but cannot reach other variables. In that resents the capability of controlling quantitative inputs, DD repre-
case, that particular variable is considered base level, and the cor- sents the capability of controlling dynamic data, MC represents the
responding row and column is then deleted from the reachability capability of modeling complex systems, LC represents the learning
matrix. Similarly, this process is performed repeatedly until all or training capability, √√√√ represents very high, √√√ repre-
variables are leveled accordingly. sents high, √√ represents medium, √ represents low,
and  represents negligible. BN is one of the most powerful tech-
Step 5: Development of the diagram including all the variables niques for dealing with uncertainty (Fenton and Neil 2001), which
is why this study uses BN for quantification of flood resilience after
In this step, after setting the levels for all variables, a diagram is the development of a hierarchical network model for the housing
prepared along with the different levels and relationships between infrastructure system by an integrated DEMATEL-ISM approach.
the variables. The Bayesian Network is a theoretical model that deals with
reasoning, uncertainty, and parameters (Aven 2008; Fakhravar
et al., 2017; Qin et al., 2011). It defines the graphical model by
2.3. Bayesian Network (BN)
representing the dependencies between the variables (Koller and
Friedman 2009). This network is used to study resilience in
There is a possibility of some uncertainty in the data and data
various engineering systems (Hosseini and Barker 2016a,b; Hossain
scarcity, due to the requirement of a large number of past disaster
et al., 2019; Yodo and Wang 2016). The inference in the network is
data from different sources and expert judgment, for accurate
known as “Bayesian inference.” There are basically two types of
resilience quantification. So, various approaches are available, as
inference: forward and backward. Where forward inference is used
shown in Table 2, to address these kinds of difficulties, where ANN
for determining the probability value of a system based on the
requires a large amount of data for analysis.
probability values of the components of the system, the backward
In ANP and FCM, the comparison between different variables is
inference determines the posterior probability of a system or
done pairwise with a fixed degree range (Kosko 1986; Saaty 1996).
components of that system based on the state of that system
BN shows the relation between the nodes by constructing CPT
(Bouckaert 1995). The joint probability distribution for a node A
without any fixed range (Baumgartner et al., 2008; Nadkarni and
(P(A)) with a different set of variables such as A ¼ (a1, a2, …, an) is
Shenoy 2004), only with a condition that total probability of the
determined as follows:
considered node has to be one, which is the law of total probability
(Evans and Rosenthal 2004). The comparison between different
approaches is shown in Table 3 (modified from Kabir et al., 2018),
where EC represents the capability of expressing causality, QL

Table 2
Different approaches to uncertainty.

Approaches Sources

Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) (Hassoun 1995; Yang et al., 2001)

Analytic Network Process (ANP) (Saaty & Vargas 2006, 2013)
Bayesian Network (BN) (Bouckaert 1995)
Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (FCM) (Papageorgiou and Iakovidis 2012; Salmeron 2009)

5
M.K. Sen, S. Dutta, G. Kabir et al.
Y
n
PðAÞ ¼ Pðxi jP 0 ðxi ÞÞ
i¼1
Where P 0 ðxi Þ represents the parent set of variable xi, then the prior
probability of each variable can be updated with an evidence C by
using Bayes’ theorem as follows (Ang and Tang 1984):
PðCjAÞ PðCjAÞ
PðAjCÞ ¼ ¼P
PðCÞ A PðCjAÞ
This network is based on Bayes’ theorem, which is represented
by a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) (Ang and Tang 1984). It com-
prises two key parameters: nodes and links (Jensen 1996; Koski and
Noble 2011). Nodes represent the variables or factors of the
network, and links represent the relationship among them. The
strength of the relationship among the nodes can be obtained by
using the tool GeNie 2.5 Academic (GeNie 2.5). This network con-
sists of three types of nodes: parent (start node), intermediate node
(middle node), and child node (last node), where prior probability
is assigned in parent node (node A), CPT in intermediate (node B),
and child node (node C) as shown in Appendix 1.
2.4. Proposed framework
Initially, an integrated DEMATEL-ISM approach is used to
develop a hierarchical network model for housing infrastructure
protecting against flood hazards. In the integrated DEMATEL-ISM
method, the first five steps from DEMATEL are selected. That
means in the first three steps, the total relation matrix (T) is esti-
mated, in Step 4, the most important factors are determined using
the DEMATEL approach, and in Step 5 the threshold value is
assigned. ISM is then followed in Step 6, where the overall influ-
ence matrix (H) is determined by adding a unit matrix (I) with T
matrix as follows, H ¼ T þ I. In Step 7, the reachability matrix (R) is
developed by replacing the elements of H matrix with 0 and 1. The
elements of H matrix are replaced with 0 and 1 with a condition
such as if the element value is greater than or equal to the threshold
value then it is replaced by 1, otherwise it is 0 as shown below
1; if hij  l ði; j ¼ 1; 2; :::nÞ
rij ¼ f g;
0; if hij < l ði; j ¼ 1; 2; :::nÞ
Where, h represents the elements of H matrix.
After replacing all elements of H matrix in 0 and 1, the R matrix
is developed. In Step 8, each factor’s level is determined, and the
initial diagram is developed along with the different levels and the
relationship between the variables, and the indirect link is
removed, which is discussed in step 4 and 5 of ISM. Finally, in Step
9, the descriptions of each factor are added to each node, and a
hierarchical network model is developed.
Using the DEMATEL method, first the initial direct relation
matrix is generated, and then the comprehensive influence matrix
is calculated by normalizing the direct relation matrix, which helps
to identify the critical factor of the network. Using the ISM method,
after a comprehensive influence matrix is generated, the overall
influence matrix is prepared, and the threshold value is assumed to
develop the reachability matrix. Next, level-wise factors are clas-
sified and initiate the initial diagram, then indirect links are
removed, and the description of each node is added to develop the
final hierarchical network model. Finally, in the BN method, all the
prior probability of the parent node, and CPT for the intermediate
and child node is provided to quantify the flood resilience. The
proposed framework, including the different methodologies, is
shown in Fig. 4.
6
Journal of Cleaner Production 288 (2021) 125526
3. Methodology
The different steps implemented in the proposed framework for
quantification of flood resilience of housing infrastructure by using
DEMATEL-ISM and BN approaches are as follows:
Step 1: Select experts from different domains related to the
study.
Step 2: Identify accident-cause factors of housing infrastructure
against flood hazards.
Step 3: Assign the initial direct influence matrix A with the help
of experts.
Step 4: Develop matrix B by normalizing matrix A.
Step 5: Develop T matrix.
Step 6: Identify important factors of the matrix.
Step 7: Establish H matrix.
Step 8: Develop R matrix along with the factors of accident-
cause relationship.
Step 9: Assign the different levels for each factor and develop-
ment of the initial diagram.
Step 10: Establish a hierarchical network model for housing
infrastructure.
Step 11: Map hierarchical model to BN by using GeNie 2.5 Ac-
ademic (GeNie 2.5).
Step 12: Validate model through different approaches.
Step 13: Perform field survey for the collection of previous
disaster data.
Step 14: Assign all the prior probability and CPT in the BN.
Step 15: Quantify flood resilience for housing infrastructure
system and obtain the strength of influence by using GeNie 2.5
Academic.
3.1. Selection of expert
Identification of accident-cause factors and development of
initial direct influence matrix requires expert judgment, and this
study mainly deals with resilience, flood hazards, and housing
infrastructure. During the reliance quantification process, the in-
terdependencies among these play a very important role (Sen et al.,
2021b). As a result, the experts should be selected from the related
domain only. They should have sound knowledge of natural di-
sasters, system risk management, vulnerability analysis, reliability,
resilience assessment, interdependent network systems, and mul-
ticriteria decision analysis as it relates to risk and uncertainty. In
this study, experts selected were two field officers from District
Disaster Management Authority (DDMA), one district project offi-
cer (DPO) from DDMA, two academic experts from different in-
stitutes, one assistant engineer (AE) from the Municipality
Department of Assam, India, and five industrial experts from
different companies. The details of each expert are shown in
Table 4.
3.2. Selection of accident-causing Factors for resilience
It has already been discussed that resilience mainly depends on
reliability and recovery, therefore the factors are selected mainly
according to two accident-cause characteristics, such as reliability
and recovery of housing infrastructure system when facing flood
hazards. The factors influencing the resilience were selected by
conducting interviews with different groups of domain experts
who had considerable knowledge and experience in how housing
infrastructure systems fare against flood hazards and were also able
to verify the main contributing main factors in threats related to
housing infrastructure systems. Several meetings were taken with
M.K. Sen, S. Dutta, G. Kabir et al. Journal of Cleaner Production 288 (2021) 125526

Fig. 4. Different steps of the proposed framework.

Table 4
Details of experts.

Expert Education Designation Experience Expertise and role of work

Expert- Master’s in Social Field officer More than 3 Awareness generation regarding the natural and manmade disaster, preparing of rehabilitation grant lists of
1 work years different villages under their circle area and updating this in every year after the occurrence of any hazards
Expert- Master’s in business Field officer More than 3
2 administration years
Expert- Master’s in business DPO More than Preparation of disaster management plan, monitor on implementation of the different policies and plans,
3 administration 10 years generation of training and awareness against disaster.
Expert- Bachelor in civil AE More than 8 Development and planning for urban and rural areas, regulation of construction of buildings, planning for
4 engineering years economic and social development. He is also authorized to sanctioned housing infrastructure planning and
design.
Expert- PhD in Civil Assistant More than 8 Expert in reliability and risk analysis, uncertainty quantification, infrastructure and community resilience.
5 Engineering Professor years
Expert- PhD in Civil Assistant More than Expert in system risk management, reliability analysis, resilience assessment, interdependent network system
6 Engineering Professor 10 years and multi-criteria decision analysis under risk and uncertainty.
Expert- PhD in Civil Catastrophe More than 4 Vulnerability Specialist
7 Engineering Modeler years
Expert- PhD, Climate Science Catastrophe More than Climate Specialist
8 Modeler 16 years
Expert- PhD in Civil Catastrophe More than 7 Flood Specialist
9 Engineering Modeler years
Expert- PhD in Civil Catastrophe More than 5 Flood Specialist
10 Engineering Modeler years
Expert- PhD in Civil Catastrophe More than 3 Vulnerability Specialist
11 Engineering Modeler years

DDMA engineers, as their work directly deals with the questions of
how to make a reliable structure to withstand disaster and what the
repair/rebuild process would be after the disaster occurs. Many
affected households were asked to give their suggestions regarding
the factor selection, as they are the ones who are victimized during
flood hazards. The affected residents gave their valuable sugges-
tions based on their observation of previous disaster scenarios. The
assistant engineer from the municipality department helped to
identify the accident-cause factors for the reliability of housing
infrastructure and demonstrated sound knowledge of the con-
struction of buildings. By summarizing all the expert opinions and
literatures, more than 50 different types of factors were identified,
7
which were further narrowed down in 12 general factors, such as
six for the reliability of housing infrastructure system against flood
hazards and six for recovery after the occurrence of the disaster.
The description of all the factors is shown in Table 5.
3.3. Development of hierarchical network model of flood Resilience
for housing infrastructure systems
In this section, the contextual relationships between resilience
factors and a hierarchical network model considering de-
pendencies among all selected factors are developed, which forms
the basis for subsequent BN modeling. As there are a total of 12
M.K. Sen, S. Dutta, G. Kabir et al. Journal of Cleaner Production 288 (2021) 125526

Table 5
Flood resilience accident-causing factors for housing infrastructure system.

Category Factors Brief description

Resilience Reliability Rel1: Type of the house (Ahmed and
(Rel) Charlesworth 2015; Jones 2017)
Rel2: Thickness of the wall
Rel3: Age of the building (De Iuliis et al., 2019;
Cutter et al., 2010)
Rel4: Floodwater depth (Proverbs and Lamond
2017)
Rel5: Plinth level of the house w.r.t. adjacent road
top level. (van de Lindt et al., 2020)
Rel6: Availability of drainage in the house.
(Ahmed and Charlesworth 2015)
Recovery Rec1: Income of the householder (Annual). (van
(Rec) de Lindt et al., 2020)
Rec2: House insurance
Rec3: Availability of resources. (Ahmed and
Charlesworth 2015)
Rec4: Relief received (Pham et al., 2010)
Rec5: Approachability condition towards
resources. (Cutter et al., 2010)
Rec6: Education or knowledge level of the
householder. (van de Lindt et al., 2020)
The ability to resist the effect of flood hazard is higher in case of a robust house.
A thicker wall can resist more floodwater pressure as compared to a thinner wall.
The resisting capacity of the newly constructed building is literally high.
With an increase of depth of floodwater reduce the reliability, as it increases the water pressure.
High elevation plinth level reduces the flood depth which reduces the water pressure and also
increases the reliability.
Adequate drainage availability with appropriate slopes force water to drain out, which causing
less damage to Infrastructure as it reduces the depth of the floodwater.
A higher-income householder can recover their houses quickly.
An insured house can recover quickly as the recovery amount is paid by that company.
Non-availability of construction material slows down the recovery process.
By receiving relief from external agencies enhances the recovery profile.
Disturbed approachability reduces the recovery process, as in that case the raw materials cannot
be transported.
Education enhances the awareness of the risk associated with a disaster and also enhances the
preparedness for future disasters.

factors selected, it can become quite complicated to form a single
matrix that considers all factors. If a single matrix is considered,
then experts have to perform a 12  12 (¼144) pairwise compari-
son, which may lead to inaccurate results or relationships. To
overcome these complexities, two different matrices are generated:
one for reliability and another for recovery, where an expert has to
compare a 2  6  6 (¼72) pair. Each expert developed one set (two
matrices) of individual direct influence matrices according to their
knowledge field. In this study, 12 sets of matrices were developed
by the experts. A sample of a direct influence matrix by expert 1 is
shown in Appendix 2. The 12 matrices are then averaged A, which is
shown in Table 6. The average direct influence matrix is normalized
to obtain the normalized direct influence matrix B, shown in
Appendix 3. Next, the comprehensive influence matrix T is ob-
tained as shown in Appendix 4.
In addition to observing the dependencies between the various
resilience factors, DEMATEL provides information regarding the
important factors via a casual diagram. This diagram is developed
by finding the influencing degree (Clj), influenced degree (Rwi),
centrality (Pi), and causality (Mi), which demonstrates the impor-
tance of each factor. This information is crucial to the decision-
making processes preparing for future hazards. The calculated
values of the Clj, Rwi, Pi, and Mi for each factor, Reci and Reli (i ¼ 1,2,
…,6), are represented in Table 7, and the casual diagram of reli-
ability and recovery is shown in Figs. 5 and 6. The casual diagrams
are discussed in the result section (section 4) highlighting the
important parameters.
Next, the overall influence matrix (H) is computed by adding a
unit matrix (I) with T matrix. The average of T matrix for reliability
and recovery are 1.252 and 2.901, so the l value for reliability and
recovery is assumed to be 1.25 and 2.90. After obtaining the H
matrix and l value, the reachability matrix (R) is evaluated as
shown in Table 8.
The reachability set Rei and antecedent set Ani for reliability and
recovery are developed with the help of R matrix. These two sets
helped to assign the different levels of each factor as shown in
Appendix 5 and subsequently helped to develop the initial diagram
for reliability and recovery as shown in Fig. 7, which is represented
by nodes and arcs. The top reliability factors are linked with reli-
ability node and similarly, and the top recovery factors are linked
with the recovery node.
To develop the hierarchical network model, some modifications
are done before finalizing the initial diagram. The modifications are
mainly based on two principles, such as (i) Weaker links between

Table 6
Averaged direct influence matrix (A).

Reliability

Rel1 Rel2 Rel3 Rel4 Rel5 Rel6

Rel1 0 2.6 2.3 2.2 2.7 2.8

Rel2 2 0 2.1 1.7 1 1.7
Rel3 2.8 2.2 0 2.1 2.1 2.6
Rel4 2.2 1.9 2.1 0 1.8 2.3
Rel5 2.5 1.6 1.8 3.5 0 2.6
Rel6 2 1.9 1.5 3.4 2.7 0

Recovery
Rec1 Rec2 Rec3 Rec4 Rec5 Rec6

Rec1 0 3.2 2.2 2 2.3 3.5

Rec2 3.8 0 1.4 2.3 1.8 2.7
Rec3 3.5 1.7 0 2.3 3 2
Rec4 2.2 2.4 2.7 0 2.8 2.1
Rec5 2.3 2.1 3.5 3.3 0 1.8
Rec6 3.1 2.9 1.3 2.1 2.2 0

8
M.K. Sen, S. Dutta, G. Kabir et al. Journal of Cleaner Production 288 (2021) 125526

Table 7 as per the expert suggestion, Rec1 is linked with Rel1. Further,
The Clj, Rwi, Pi and Mi for each factor. reliability and recovery are linked with resilience, as these two are
Factors Rel1 Rel2 Rel3 Rel4 Rel5 Rel6 the key parameters of resilience. The hierarchical network model of
Clj 8.354 5.968 7.920 7.023 8.086 7.723
flood resilience for housing infrastructure is shown in Fig. 8.
Rwi 7.697 6.982 6.734 8.501 7.110 8.048 In the hierarchical network model shown in Fig. 8, Rel3 (building
Pi 16.051 12.95 14.654 15.524 15.196 15.771 age) and Rec5 (approachability) are set at the bottom level, which
Mi 0.656 1.014 1.186 1.478 0.976 0.325 means those factors are purely influencing other factors without
Factors Rec1 Rec2 Rec3 Rec4 Rec5 Rec6 being affected when it comes to the housing infrastructure system
Clj 18.159 16.966 17.599 17.205 18.179 16.414 network; hence, those factors are known as underlying causes. The
Rwi 20.205 17.504 15.783 16.765 16.934 17.331 factors like Rel2 (wall thickness), Rel4 (flood depth), Rec2 (insur-
Pi 38.364 34.470 33.382 33.969 35.133 33.744 ance), and Rec6 (education) are located at the top level, which
Mi 2.046 0.538 1.816 0.440 1.245 0.917 means those factors are not affecting other factors in the network.
These factors are easily recognized in accident analysis, and are
referred to as direct causes. The mid-level factors of the network
the factors should be removed, and, (ii) The factors which are at influence other factors but are also influenced themselves. Hence,
same level, links between those factors should be removed those factors are known as transitive causes.
(Nadkarni and Shenoy 2004). Initially to reduce the complexity in
the network, all the indirect links are removed, and to make the BN
3.4. A field Survey for the collection of postdisaster data
more compatible, the circular relationship is removed, for example,
and the link between two factors at the same level is also removed.
Resilience quantification required an ample amount of post-
According to the first principle, weak links are removed, experts
disaster data, and getting a sense of the vulnerability scenario and
suggested that Rel3 is only slightly related to Rel6, and Rel3 in-
recovery profile for a specific community disaster required a large
fluences Rel5, which in turn influences Rel6. Therefore, as per ex-
amount of information from different sources. Erroneous data leads
perts’ advice, the link between Rel3 and Rel6 is removed. Similarly,
to improper analysis, and this affects preparedness for future di-
different types of weak and indirect links are removed from the
sasters. So, to capture the exact resilience scenario of a community,
initial diagram of reliability and recovery. The removed links from
the collected data should be as specific as possible. In a developing
the initial diagram are as follows: (i) for reliability, Rel3 to Rel4, Rel1
country like India, properly maintained postdisaster data is not
to Rel3, Rel4 to Rel5, Rel4 to Rel6, Rel4 to Rel1, Rel1 to Rel6 and Rel1 to
available. To avoid these kinds of difficulties, several meetings with
Rel5; (ii) for recovery, Rec1 to Rec5, Rec2 to Rec1, Rec5 to Rec2, Rec5
different engineers and DDMA field officers were held, but the
to Rec6, Rec3 to Rec6, Rec6 to Rec1. Next, according to the second
outcome was not adequate for our purposes. This resulted in a field
principle, the link between Rel5 to Rel6, Rec1 and Rec4, are removed.
survey being conducted by visiting vulnerable areas. The informa-
The final diagram for reliability and recovery after the modification
tion about the vulnerable areas is provided by DPO and DDMA field
according to expert’s advice is shown in Appendix 6.
officers (Assam State Disaster Management Authority 2019).
Additionally, experts suggest that Rec1 (income) should be
linked with Rel1 (type of house) as income influences house type
(higher-income residents usually live in highly reliable buildings). 3.4.1. Description of the location
Then, after getting the final diagram of reliability and recovery data, The infrastructure resilience calculation is not robust and varies
according to location. For validation of the proposed model and

Fig. 5. Casual diagram for reliability factors.

9
M.K. Sen, S. Dutta, G. Kabir et al. Journal of Cleaner Production 288 (2021) 125526

Fig. 6. Casual diagram for recovery factors.

Table 8
Reachability matrix (R).

Reliability

Rel1 Rel2 Rel3 Rel4 Rel5 Rel6

Rel1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Rel2 0 1 0 0 0 0
Rel3 1 0 1 1 1 1
Rel4 0 0 0 1 0 1
Rel5 1 0 0 1 1 1
Rel6 1 0 0 1 1 1

Recovery
Rec1 Rec2 Rec3 Rec4 Rec5 Rec6

Rec1 1 1 0 1 1 1
Rec2 1 1 0 0 0 0
Rec3 1 1 1 0 0 1
Rec4 1 1 0 1 0 0
Rec5 1 1 1 1 1 1
Rec6 1 0 0 0 0 1

quantification of flood resilience, the model was implemented in
Barak Valley in northeast India. The relevant details of the valley are
(Census 2011).
⁃ coordinates: Longitude varies from 9215ˊN to 9315ˊN, and
latitude varies from 24 8ˊE to 25 8ˊE;
⁃ total population: more than 5 million; and
⁃ total area: more than 1.7 million acres.
This valley is selected based on its geographical vulnerability to
flood and landslides, which adversely affected the valley’s housing
infrastructure. As per the DDMA report (Assam State Disaster
Management Authority 2019), nearly 1600 houses were
completely destroyed, and nearly 0.2 million houses were partially
damaged from 2015 to 2019. Each year the Indian government al-
locates billions of Indian rupees for this valley to restore the
damaged infrastructure after flooding, as the per capita income of
this valley is very low (Census 2011). In 2019, flooding affected
more than 0.2 million people in the valley, more than 1300 ha of
crop area was ruined, and several national highways and railways
remained nonfunctional for a long period. The valley has very low
10
elevation, which varies between 11m and 1116.2m from mean sea
level as shown in Fig. 9a (Bhuvan 2019). It is because of the valley
being such a low-lying area that the probability of flooding is al-
ways high.
3.4.2. Data collection
During the data collection process, of a total of 24 areas visited,
23 were deemed vulnerable and 1 nonvulnerable. The different
areas visited during the data collection process are shown in Fig. 9b.
In the field survey, a number of interviews with members of
affected households were conducted. A resilience assessment form
was generated to record all the required information during the
interview as shown in Appendix 7.
After the collection of required postdisaster data, each of the
factors were defined. As per the expert judgments and field survey
data, the accident-cause factors were divided into two types of
states, for example: (i) Low-L, Medium-M, and High-H; and (ii) Yes-
Y and No-N. The details of each factor state are shown in Table 9.
As the recovery times of affected residents in these areas varied
from ranges of 2e3 weeks, 1e2 weeks, 5e10 days, and so on. Thus,
the percentile is selected from the highest recovery time to the
M.K. Sen, S. Dutta, G. Kabir et al.
Fig. 7. Initial diagram of reliability and recovery.
Fig. 8. The hierarchical network model of flood resilience for housing infrastructure.
lowest recovery time. Finally, all the important information is
gathered and mapped to a BN using GeNie 2.5 as shown in
Appendix 8.
3.5. Model validation
The quantified resilience value of any infrastructure should be
accurate, as it is important to obtain as realistic an assessment as
possible of how an infrastructure fares against natural hazards so
there can be ample preparation for future disasters. In this study,
the proposed model is validated for its realistic observations of how
Barak Valley’s infrastructure coped with flood hazards. Different
types of approaches are developed for the validation of a model
(Kleemann et al., 2017). In this work, 2 qualitative validation ap-
proaches are selected for the validation of proposed model such as
(i) extreme condition test and (ii) scenario analysis test. The field
11
Journal of Cleaner Production 288 (2021) 125526
survey data played an important role in developing and validating
the proposed BN model.
3.5.1. Extreme condition test
In this test, two surveyed places are selected where a vulnerable
area (Burunga) and a nonvulnerable area (Tarapur) are selected.
The vulnerable area is referred to as Extreme1 (E1) and the non-
vulnerable area is Extreme2 (E2). The resilience values for both
places are shown in Table 10. It can be observed from Table 10 that
the probability of resilience is in H state for the nonvulnerable area,
which is much higher than the probability of resilience is in H state
for the vulnerable area. Hence, this test indicated that the proposed
model is valid.
3.5.2. Scenario analysis test
In this test, 4 scenarios are selected for validation of the
M.K. Sen, S. Dutta, G. Kabir et al. Journal of Cleaner Production 288 (2021) 125526

Fig. 9. a Dem of barak valley.

Fig. 9b. Different visited places.

Table 9
State of different factors.

Factors State Description Factors State Description

Rel1 L Bamboo Rel4 L 30.48 cm

M Masonry M 30.49 cme91.44 cm
H R.C.C. H >91.44 cm
Rel2 L >5 cm Rel5 L >200 cm
M 5 cme10 cm M 100e200 cm
H >10 cm H <100 cm
Rel3 L 10years Rel6 Y Drainage available
M 11e20 years N Drainage not available
H >20 years
Rec1 (Indian rupee) L <0.01 million Rec2 Y Insured
M 0.01 to 0.02 million N Not insured
H >0.02 million
Rec3 L Not available Rec6 L Below 10th Std.
M Available but price increased by > 10% M 12th Std.
H Available but price increased by up to 10% H Graduate
Rec4 Y Received Rec5 Y Disturbed
N Not received N Not disturbed
Reliability (Rel) L The structure is fully damaged.
M Floodwater damaged furniture, electrical appliances, doors and windows of the house.
H Minor damages like floodwater damaged the flooring.
Recovery (Rec) L 10 days, which is  25 percentile of total recovery time of the surveyed area.
M 11 yo 35 days, which is 26e75 percentile of total recovery time of the surveyed area
H >35 days, which is > 75 percentile of total recovery time of the surveyed area
Resilience (Res) L Action should be taken immediately by stakeholders for rebuilt or strengthen the system.
GOAL (2019) M Capacity to act improved and substantial, but for long term functionality of the system, development and
implementation of solutions is necessary.
H Safety exists in the system for future hazard.

12
M.K. Sen, S. Dutta, G. Kabir et al.
Table 10
Quantified resilience of Burunga and Tarapur.
Flood resilience
Vulnerable area (Burunga)
L M H L
0.82 0.13 0.05
Table 11
Quantified resilience of different scenarios.
Flood resilience
S1 S2
L M H L M H
0.14 0.17 0.69 0.40 0.24 0.36
proposed model. Scenario1 (S1) indicates the safe condition, sce-
nario2 (S2) is relatively less safe than S1, scenario3 (S3) is relatively
less safe than S2, and similarly, scenario4 (S4) is less safe than S3.
This tells us that with an increase in scenario numbers, safe states
are becoming increasingly fewer in number. In S1, the probability of
resilience for Tarapur is calculated, and then the probabilities for all
nodes are assigned as per field survey data. Then the posterior
probability of all nodes are calculated. In S2, the posterior proba-
bility of Rec5, Rel3, and Rel5 is changed to N-100%, L-100%, and L-
100%. In S3, the posterior probability of Rec3 is also changed to L-
100%. In S4, the posterior probability of Rec1 and Rec4 is also
changed to L-100% and N-100%. The details of each scenario are
shown in Appendix 9. The resilience values for all scenarios are
shown in Table 11.
It can be observed from the above table that with an increase in
scenario numbers, the probability of resilience in the L state also
increases, which is true according to the assumed condition for all
scenarios. The probability of resilience in L state in a safe scenario
will be always less than in an unsafe scenario. Hence, the evaluated
values validated the proposed model.
Additionally, the field survey data validate the proposed model’s
effectiveness and applicability. For example, consider the survey of
Lalaghat. Initially the prior and conditional probability of each
factor is assigned according to survey data and the posterior
probability of each factor is calculated. But when the probability of
Rel1 and Rec1 in L state is changed to 100%, then the prior proba-
bility of bottom-level factors also changes; this is due to BN’s
capability, known as “backward analysis.” This means that from this
analysis the targeted resilience can be achieved. The posterior
probability of any factor is more accurate compared to prior
probability (Hu et al., 2016).
4. Results and discussions
4.1. Flood resilience quantification
In this section, the probabilities for all the factors are assigned as
per the field survey data for different surveyed areas in the hier-
archical model, and the reliability, recovery, and resilience values
for all the different areas are calculated by using GeNie 2.5. Initially,
the prior probabilities for all bottom-level factors are assigned.
The CPT between the accident-cause factors is assigned based
on field survey data, but the CPT between the key resilience factors
13
Journal of Cleaner Production 288 (2021) 125526
Non-vulnerable area (Tarapur)
M H
0.14 0.17 0.69
S3 S4
L M H L M H
0.61 0.21 0.18 0.69 0.19 0.18
is assigned based on expert knowledge. The experts gave their
valuable opinions during the construction of CPT between the key
resilience factors. Next, the developed CPT is checked and modified
by the DPO of DDMA. The modification process continued until all
the experts came to the same conclusion. In the proposed model, a
total of 304 CPT values were assigned out of which 72 CPT values
were based on experts’ judgment and 232 CPT values are assigned
as per the field survey data. The quantified reliability, recovery, and
resilience values for all surveyed places are shown in Appendix 10.
As per the evaluated values, places like Burunga, Poschim Kumra-
para, Rajnagar, Bhatirkupa, and Panchgram are the most vulnerable
places among those surveyed. The probability of reliability in the L
state of those areas is 84%, 84%, 82%, 78%, and 77% respectively.
which means that in those areas,  77% of housing infrastructure
has low reliability. The ability to resist the flood hazard effect for
those areas is much lower. Similarly, the probability of recovery in
the L state of those areas is 80%, 72%, 70%, 71%, and 70%, which
means that 70% of housing infrastructure in those areas have low
recoverability. The recovery process for those areas is also very
slow. As reliability and recovery are the key parameters of resil-
ience, it can be observed that those areas have low resilience. The
probability of resilience in the L state for those areas is 82%, 80%,
78%, 77%, and 75% which means  75% of the housing infrastructure
has low resilience. For those with low resilience housing infra-
structure, stakeholders should take action immediately. The prob-
ability of a low resilience state in Jamira is 52%, which is the lowest
probability of L state compared to all vulnerable places. Among all
the surveyed places only Tarapur is nonvulnerable as the resilience
of 80% of the house is high, 12% of house is medium and only 8% of
the house is low, which means only 8% of the house needs imme-
diate attention.
As resilience of most of the surveyed places is low. So, in order to
judge the high clarity of housing infrastructure resilience scenario
with the flood hazard threat of the study area, the low resilience
state is further divided into 3 categories such as “low,” “moderately
low,” and “extremely low.” Where “low” represents the 0 to 33
percentile of the total evaluated resilience value, “moderately low”
represents the 34 to 67 percentile of the total evaluated resilience
value, and “extremely low” represents the 67 to 100 percentile of
the total evaluated resilience value. The resilience map for the
study area is shown in Fig. 10.
From the resilience map and evaluated resilience results, it is
clear that places like Kanakpur, Borbond, Panchgram, Bhatikupa,
M.K. Sen, S. Dutta, G. Kabir et al.
Fig. 10. Resilience map for Barak valley.
Poschim Kumrapara, and Burunga of Barak Valley are at extremely
low resilience. It means the resisting capability and recovery pro-
cess of housing infrastructure of the abovementioned areas are
extremely low. Therefore, stakeholders, decision makers, and pol-
icymakers should take immediate action in rebuilding or
strengthening the housing infrastructure in these areas.
4.2. Identification of important factors of the model
Figs. 5 and 6 shows the casual diagram for reliability and re-
covery. As shown in the figures, the factors above the horizontal
axis with a positive causality value are considered causal factors.
The be-influenced degree of those factors is relatively lower
compared to their pure influence on other factors. Similarly, the
factors below the horizontal axis are considered effective factors.
14
Journal of Cleaner Production 288 (2021) 125526
Moreover, the factors with higher causality such as the following
are considered key causes that impact other factors: (i) for reli-
ability, Rel3 (building age), Rel5 (plinth level) and Rel1 (type of
house); and (ii) for recovery, Rec3 (resource availability), Rec5
(approachability), and Rec4 (relief received). The factors given on
the right side of the casual diagram are the more important factors
compared to the right side: (i) reliability, Rel1 (type of house), Rel4
(flood depth) and Rel6 (drainage); (ii) recovery, Rec1 (income), Rec5
(approachability) and Rec2 (insurance). Therefore, those factors
should be given full attention during the construction of resilient
infrastructure. Those factors are the most important of the pro-
posed BN model. The factors that have high causality value as well
as high centrality value such as Rec5 (approachability), Rel3
(building age), Rel1 (type of house) and Rel5 (plinth level), should
also be given importance particularly for risk control against flood
M.K. Sen, S. Dutta, G. Kabir et al.
Fig. 11. The results calculated by the BN model for Burunga.
hazards.
By combining the identified important factors with their level in
the hierarchical network model, it can be concluded that the critical
factors are distributed at each level of the model. Thus, it is
necessary to focus on each level of the model instead of focusing
solely on the direct cause of the flood resilience of the housing
infrastructure system.
4.3. Strength of the influence Among the factors
The influence strength among the accident-cause factors can be
calculated by clicking on the tool “Strength of influence” in GeNie
2.5. The strength is discerned by observing the thickness of arc. The
result shows a comment box when the mouse’s cursor is placed on
the head of the arrow. For example, Fig. 11 shows the calculated
resilience value of the BN model for Burunga (surveyed area) with
influence strength between the factors Rel2 and Rel1. In Fig. 11, the
strength of dependence among node Rel1 (type of house) and Rel2
(wall thickness) is calculated as 0.7035. The calculated value is high
because reliability is influenced by Rel2 and Rel4, but Rel2 is
conditioned by only Rel1 as per the BN model. Thus, the relation-
ship is very important. Similarly, the influencing strength can be
calculated for all surveyed places.
5. Conclusions
This paper presents a framework for quantifying housing
infrastructure network resilience against flood hazards by sys-
tematically combining the DEMATEL, ISM, and BN. Initially, the
accident-causing factors of housing infrastructure networks pro-
tecting against flood hazards are identified. The DEMATEL and ISM
approach provided both the dependencies among the factors and
the different levels between the considered factors. By integrating
DEMATEL-ISM, the cause-effect diagram among the considered
factors is obtained, and then a hierarchical network model is
developed. The most important factors of the proposed model are
identified by the causal diagram. This model is then mapped with
BN with a tool GeNie 2.5, and the BN model is then implemented in
15
Journal of Cleaner Production 288 (2021) 125526
a study area to validate and quantify resilience. The BN model is
validated by different approaches. For the collection of postdisaster
data, an extensive field survey is conducted in various vulnerable
areas. All the collected data is then compiled in the nodes of BN
model to calculate the strength of the influence between the
accident-cause factors of the model and the resilience of the
housing infrastructure system against flood hazards.
It has already been discussed how many authors have evaluated
resilience for different infrastructure systems against different
hazards, but none have studied how parameter-based housing
infrastructure systems hold up against flood hazards. Therefore,
observing the current development in resilience studies, the nov-
elty of our work can be characterized as follows: (i) an integrated
DEMATEL-ISM and BN framework is developed for quantifying the
resilience of housing infrastructure systems against flood hazards;
(ii) a hierarchical network model with different levels of factors is
developed for housing infrastructure networks; (iii) the most
important accident-cause factors of the model are identified; (iv) a
BN model for housing infrastructure resilience against flood haz-
ards is developed; (v) the resilience value is quantified by imple-
menting the proposed BN model in a study area; and (vi) the
strength of influence among factors is also calculated.
The framework will be useful for a new case study as well as for
any other infrastructure against the same hazard. This study pro-
vides a realistic scenario of the housing infrastructure of Barak
Valley northeast India and how it has fared against flood hazards.
This study helps the public authority, stakeholders, and decision-
makers to identify the valley’s most vulnerable areas, which also
helps to prepare for future hazards. We have observed that the
proposed BN model has various factors. It means if the public au-
thority, stakeholders, and decision-makers focus on every factor to
strengthen an area, then renovation may become uneconomical.
Therefore, this study set out to identify the most important factors
of the model, which will help in the decision-making process for
future hazards. The public authority, stakeholders, and decision-
makers can tend to those important vulnerability factors so that
needy areas become more resilient and the cost of making these
communities safer will be affordable as well. Additionally, this
M.K. Sen, S. Dutta, G. Kabir et al. Journal of Cleaner Production 288 (2021) 125526

work evaluated the housing resilience of several places, so, now the review & editing, Supervision. Nikil N. Pujari: Methodology, Re-
public authority of this community can get the idea of the most sources, Investigation, Writing - review & editing. Shamim Ahmed
vulnerable places and can strengthen the housing infrastructure of Laskar: Investigation, Data curation, Visualization, Methodology.
those places so that in the future, losses will be less due to flood
hazards. Declaration of competing interest
The limitations of this study are as follows: (i) consideration of
several types of new accident-cause factors is required for the more The authors declare that they have no known competing
comprehensive framework; (ii) more details of each and every financial interests or personal relationships that could have
factor of the proposed BN model more data are required; and (iii) appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.
construction of CPT required involvement of multiple experts from
different disciplines of knowledge. In the future, a different type of
Acknowledgements
approach can be considered for resilience quantification and
compared with the evaluated results. The different types of infra-
The first author (MKS) acknowledges the students’ scholarship
structure systems can be studied for how realistically they protect
received from ministry of human resource and development
against a particular disaster scenario and how resilient they are.
(Government of India), Industrial experts Dr. Mahesh Shinde, Dr.
Those infrastructures can also be analyzed according to their
Ravikumar Ganti, Dr. Anand Kulkarni and Dr. Sumeet Kulkarni, DPO
resiliency against a different type of hazard. As resilience varies
of DDMA Mr. Shamim Ahmed Laskar, AE of Municipality depart-
with time, so the dynamicity of any infrastructure can be captured
ment Mr. Sudipta Das, and, field officers Ms. Monami Bhattacharjee
by using a Dynamic Bayesian Network (Kammouh et al., 2020).
and Ms. Masuma. The third author acknowledge the financial
Moreover, the developed framework can be improved by future
support through Natural Science Engineering Research Council
research such as new literature and new flood documents for
Canada Discovery Grant Program (RGPIN-2019-04704) for profes-
refining the identified factors. Using simulation techniques, the
sional editing and proofreading.
identified key factors can be validated. In addition, the integrity of
the proposed BN model can be improved by the involvement of
more domain expert opinions. Appendix A. Supplementary data

CRediT authorship contribution statement Supplementary data to this article can be found online at
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.125526.
Mrinal Kanti Sen: Conceptualization, Methodology, Software,
Formal analysis, Investigation, Data curation, Visualization, Writing Appendix 1. Simple BN representation
- original draft. Subhrajit Dutta: Conceptualization, Methodology,
Software, Resources, Visualization, Investigation, Writing - review
& editing, Supervision. Golam Kabir: Conceptualization, Method-
ology, Software, Resources, Visualization, Investigation, Writing -

16
M.K. Sen, S. Dutta, G. Kabir et al. Journal of Cleaner Production 288 (2021) 125526

Appendix 2. Direct influence matrix by Expert 1

Reliability

Rel1 Rel2 Rel3 Rel4 Rel5 Rel6

Rel1 0 3 3 1 2 2
Rel2 3 0 4 2 1 2
Rel3 4 3 0 3 2 3
Rel4 2 3 3 0 2 4
Rel5 3 2 2 4 0 2
Rel6 1 2 1 4 3 0

Recovery
Rec1 Rec2 Rec3 Rec4 Rec5 Rec6

Rec1 0 2 4 2 2 4
Rec2 4 0 1 2 1 3
Rec3 4 3 0 2 4 3
Rec4 3 2 2 0 3 2
Rec5 2 2 3 3 0 1
Rec6 3 3 1 2 3 0

Appendix 3. Normalized direct influence matrix (B)

Reliability

Rel1 Rel2 Rel3 Rel4 Rel5 Rel6

Rel1 0 0.209 0.18 0.173 0.216 0.223

Rel2 0.158 0 0.165 0.137 0.079 0.137
Rel3 0.223 0.173 0 0.165 0.165 0.209
Rel4 0.173 0.151 0.165 0 0.144 0.18
Rel5 0.201 0.129 0.144 0.273 0 0.209
Rel6 0.158 0.151 0.122 0.266 0.216 0

Recovery
Rec1 Rec2 Rec3 Rec4 Rec5 Rec6

Rec1 0 0.243 0.167 0.153 0.174 0.264

Rec2 0.292 0 0.104 0.174 0.139 0.208
Rec3 0.264 0.132 0 0.174 0.229 0.153
Rec4 0.167 0.181 0.208 0 0.215 0.16
Rec5 0.174 0.16 0.264 0.25 0 0.139
Rec6 0.236 0.222 0.097 0.16 0.167 0

Appendix 4. Comprehensive influence matrix (T)

Reliability

Rel1 Rel2 Rel3 Rel4 Rel5 Rel6

Rel1 1.2830 1.3401 1.2744 1.5670 1.3642 1.5246

Rel2 1.0534 0.8363 0.9451 1.1292 0.9244 1.0791
Rel3 1.4031 1.2384 1.0673 1.4898 1.2717 1.4495
Rel4 1.2261 1.1136 1.0859 1.1920 1.1243 1.2810
Rel5 1.4093 1.2454 1.2130 1.5944 1.1508 1.4731
Rel6 1.3226 1.2086 1.1482 1.5284 1.2746 1.2405

Recovery
Rec1 Rec2 Rec3 Rec4 Rec5 Rec6

Rec1 3.3564 3.1049 2.7371 2.9126 2.9569 3.0905

Rec2 3.3626 2.7216 2.5233 2.7428 2.7474 2.8678
Rec3 3.4602 2.9372 2.5305 2.8482 2.8984 2.9247
Rec4 3.3189 2.9019 2.6419 2.6374 2.8444 2.8600
Rec5 3.4839 3.0248 2.9093 2.9729 2.8057 2.9821
Rec6 3.2230 2.8133 2.4404 2.6506 2.6810 2.6052

17
M.K. Sen, S. Dutta, G. Kabir et al. Journal of Cleaner Production 288 (2021) 125526

Appendix 5. Iteration for a different level of factors

Reliability

Factors Rei Ani Rei∩Ani Level Iteration

Rel1 1,2,3,4,5,6 1,3,5,6 1,3,5,6 1

Rel2 2 1,2 2 I
Rel3 1,3,4,5,6 1,3 1,3
Rel4 4,6 1,3,4,5,6 4,6 I
Rel5 1,4,5,6 1,3,5,6 1,5,6
Rel6 1,4,5,6 1,3,4,5,6 1,5,6
Rel1 1,3,5,6 1,3,5,6 1,3,5,6 II 2
Rel3 1,3,5,6 1,3 1,3
Rel5 1,5,6 1,3,5,6 1,5,6
Rel6 1,5,6 1,3,5,6 1,5,6
Rel3 3,5,6 3 3 3
Rel5 5,6 3,5,6 5,6 III
Rel6 5,6 3,5,6 5,6 III
Rel3 3 3 3 IV 4

Recovery

Rec1 1,2,4,5,6 1,2,3,4,5,6 1,2,4,5,6 1

Rec2 1,2 1,2,3,4,5,6 1,2 I
Rec3 1,2,3,6 3 3
Rec4 1,2,4 1,4,5 1,4
Rec5 1,2,3,4,5,6 1,5 1,5
Rec6 1,6 1,3,5,6 1,6 I
Rec1 1,4,5 1,3,4,5 1,4,5 II 2
Rec3 1,3 3 3
Rec4 1,4 1,4,5 1,4 II
Rec5 1,3,4,5 1,5 1,5
Rec3 3 3 3 III 3
Rec5 3,5 5 5
Rec1 5 5 5 IV 4

Appendix 6. Modified initial diagram of reliability and

recovery

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M.K. Sen, S. Dutta, G. Kabir et al. Journal of Cleaner Production 288 (2021) 125526

Appendix 7. Flood assessment form

19
M.K. Sen, S. Dutta, G. Kabir et al. Journal of Cleaner Production 288 (2021) 125526

Appendix 8. BN in GenIe 2.5

Appendix 9. Details of each scenario

Scenario Rec5 Rel3 Rel5 Rec3 Rec1 Rec4 Rel6 Rel2 Rec2 Rel1 Rel4 Rec6

S1 Same as collected field survey data of Tarapur.

S2 No-100% Low-100% Low-100% Same as collected field survey data of Tarapur.
S3 No-100% Low-100% Low-100% Low-100% Same as collected field survey data of Tarapur.
S4 No-100% Low-100% Low-100% Low-100% No-100% Low-100% Same as collected field survey data of Tarapur

Appendix 10. Reliability, recovery and resilience of all

surveyed places

Places Reliability Recovery Resilience

L M H L M H L M H

Algapur 0.67 0.17 0.16 0.66 0.17 0.17 0.66 0.18 0.15
Amjurghat 0.73 0.15 0.12 0.66 0.17 0.17 0.71 0.17 0.12
Anipur Grant 0.51 0.25 0.24 0.54 0.2 0.26 0.53 0.23 0.24
Baleswar 0.6 0.19 0.21 0.59 0.18 0.22 0.59 0.2 0.21
Bhatirkupa 0.78 0.13 0.09 0.71 0.16 0.13 0.77 0.16 0.07
Borbond 0.75 0.14 0.1 0.7 0.16 0.14 0.74 0.16 0.1
Burunga 0.84 0.10 0.06 0.8 0.12 0.08 0.82 0.13 0.05
Dullacherra 0.63 0.18 0.19 0.62 0.18 0.2 0.62 0.19 0.19

20
M.K. Sen, S. Dutta, G. Kabir et al. Journal of Cleaner Production 288 (2021) 125526

(continued )

Places Reliability Recovery Resilience

L M H L M H L M H

Dwarbond 0.74 0.15 0.11 0.67 0.17 0.16 0.72 0.17 0.11
Fanai Cherra Grant 0.65 0.18 0.17 0.64 0.18 0.18 0.64 0.19 0.17
Hailakandi 0.57 0.2 0.23 0.55 0.2 0.25 0.56 0.21 0.23
Jamira 0.51 0.25 0.24 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.52 0.24 0.25
Kanakpur 0.75 0.14 0.11 0.69 0.17 0.14 0.73 0.17 0.1
Katlicherra 0.59 0.2 0.22 0.56 0.19 0.24 0.57 0.21 0.22
Lalaghat 0.66 0.17 0.17 0.65 0.17 0.18 0.65 0.19 0.17
Panchgram 0.77 0.14 0.1 0.7 0.16 0.14 0.75 0.16 0.09
Poschim Kumrapara 0.84 0.11 0.06 0.72 0.15 0.13 0.8 0.14 0.06
Rajnagar 0.82 0.12 0.07 0.7 0.16 0.14 0.78 0.15 0.07
Rakhal Khalerpaar 0.61 0.19 0.2 0.62 0.18 0.2 0.61 0.2 0.19
Rangirghat 0.55 0.21 0.24 0.54 0.2 0.26 0.55 0.21 0.24
Ratnapur 0.55 0.21 0.24 0.55 0.19 0.25 0.55 0.21 0.23
Silchar Municipalty 0.59 0.19 0.21 0.56 0.19 0.24 0.58 0.2 0.22
Tarapur 0.07 0.11 0.82 0.1 0.12 0.78 0.08 0.12 0.8
Uttar Krishnapur 0.69 0.16 0.14 0.66 0.17 0.17 0.67 0.17 0.16

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