2018 CIVIL LAW BAR QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Sidley and Sol were married with one (1) daughter, Solenn. Sedfrey and Sonia were another couple with
one son, Sonny. Sol and Sedfrey both perished in the same plane accident. Sidley and Sonia met when
the families of those who died sued the airlines and went through grief-counseling sessions. Years later,
Sidley and Sonia got married. At that time, Solenn was four (4) years old and Sonny was 5 years old.
These two (2) were then brought up in the same household. Fifteen (15) years later, Solenn and Sonny
developed romantic feelings towards each other, and eventually eloped. On their own and against their
parents’ wishes, they procured a marriage license and got married in church.

(a) Is the marriage of Solenn and Sonny valid, voidable, or void? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The marriage is voidable for lack of parental consent. At the time of their marriage, Solenn and Sonny
were only 19 and 20 years old, respectively. Assuming their marriage was under the Family Code, Article
14 provides that parental consent is required where either or both of the parties are between 18 and 21
years old at the time of marriage.

In the absence of such parental consent, Article 45 of the Family Code provides that the marriage is
voidable. Since the marriage was against their parents’ wishes, their marriage is voidable. Unlike in the
Civil Code, their being step-siblings is immaterial under the Family Code and will not render the marriage
void since such is not considered incestuous nor against public policy.

(b) If the marriage is defective, can the marriage be ratified by free cohabitation of the parties? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, it can be ratified by free cohabitation. Article 45(1) of the Family Code provides that such voidable
marriage may be ratified by free

cohabitation of the party/ies over 18 years old but below 21 who married without the consent of his/her
parents, by living together as husband and wife after attaining the age of 21.
Here, Solenn and Sonny freely cohabitated and lived as husband and wife after attaining 21 years, then
the marriage is considered ratified, provided that the parents have not filed an action for annulment
before the parties reached 21 years old.

II

After finding out that his girlfriend Sandy was four months pregnant, Sancho married Sandy. Both were
single and had never been in any serious relationship in the past. Prior to the marriage, they agreed in a
marriage settlement that the regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their property
relations during marriage. Shortly after the marriage, their daughter, Shalimar, was born.

Before they met and got married, Sancho purchased a parcel of land on installment, under a Contract of
Sale, with the full purchase price payable in equal annual amortizations over a period of ten (10) years,
with no down payment, and secured by a mortgage on the land. The full purchase price was PhP
1million, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum. After paying the fourth (4th) annual installment,
Sancho and Sandy got married, and Sancho completed the payments in the subsequent years from his
salary as an accountant. The previous payments were also paid out of his salary. During their marriage,
Sandy also won PhP1million in the lottery and used it to purchase jewelry. When things didn’t work out
for the couple, they filed an action for declaration of nullity of their marriage based on the psychological
incapacity of both of them. When the petition was granted, the parcel of land and the jewelry bought by
Sandy were found to be the only properties of the couple.

(a) What is the filiation status of Shalimar? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Shalimar is a legitimate child. Children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the
marriage because of psychological incapacity under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be

considered legitimate (Article 54, Family Code). Since Shalimar was born before the judgment granting
the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of Sancho and Sandy under Art. 36 became
final and executory. Shalimar is a legitimate child.

(b) What system of property relationship will be liquidated following the declaration of nullity of their
marriage? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The property regime that will be liquidated is co-ownership under Article 147 of the Family Code. When
a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal
shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership (Article 147, Family Code). Sancho and Sandy were capacitated to marry each
other; however, their marriage was declared void under Article 36.

(c) In the liquidation, who should get the parcel of land? The jewelry? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Sancho should get the parcel of land while Sandy should get the jewelry. According to Article 147 of the
Family Code, property acquired through their work or industry by a man and a woman, who are
capacitated to marry each other and who cohabited under a void marriage, shall be governed by rules
on co-ownership and in the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they live
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry.

In the given case, Sancho bought the parcel of land and paid for it using his salary while Sandy used her
winnings from the lottery to purchase the jewelry.

It was not established that Sandy cared for or maintained the family; hence, she should not be deemed
to have contributed to the acquisition of the parcel of land. The jewelry was acquired by Sandy using her
lottery winnings which she obtained not by work or industry but by chance.

(d) Is Shalimar entitled to payment of presumptive legitime? If yes, how much should be her share and
from where should this be taken? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, Shalimar is not entitled to presumptive legitime. The liquidation of the co-ownership under Article
147 did not provide for the obligation to pay the presumptive legitime of the common children. Said
obligation applies only to the liquidation of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains
pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code, which provisions are inapplicable to a void marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the parties
should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership [Dino v. Dino, 640
SCRA 178 (2011); Valdes v. RTC, 260 SCRA 221 (1996)].
III

Silverio was a woman trapped in a man’s body. He was born male and his birth certificate indicated his
gender as male, and his name as Silverio Stalon. When he reached the age of 21, he had a sex
reassignment surgery in Bangkok, and, from then on, he lived as a female. On the basis of his sex
reassignment, he filed an action to have his first name changed to Shelley, and his gender, to female.
While he was following up his case with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, he met Sharon Ston, who
also filed a similar action to change her first name to Shariff, and her gender, from female to male.

Sharon was registered as a female upon birth. While growing up, she developed male characteristics and
was diagnosed to have congenital adrenal hyperplasia (“CAH”) which is a condition where a person
possesses both male and female characteristics. At puberty, tests revealed that her ovarian structures
had greatly minimized, and she had no breast or menstrual development. Alleging that for all intents
and appearances, as well as mind and emotion, she had become a male, she prayed that her birth
certificate be corrected such that her gender should be changed from female to male, and that her first
name should be changed from Sharon to Shariff.

Silverio and Sharon fell in love and decided to marry. Realizing that their marriage will be frowned upon
in the Philippines, they travelled to Las Vegas, USA where they got married based on the law of the place
of celebration of the marriage. They, however, kept their Philippine citizenship.

(a) Is there any legal bases for the court to approve Silverio’s petition for correction of entries in his birth
certificate? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, there is no legal bases for the court to approve Silverio’s petition.

As settled in the case of Silverio v. Republic (G.R. No. 174689, October 22,

2007), our laws do not sanction change of name and correction of entry in the civil register as to sex on
the ground of sex reassignment. Sex reassignment is not one of the grounds for which change of first
name may be allowed under Republic Act No. 9048. The petition for correction of entry as to sex of the
birth certificate of Silverio cannot prosper, because the said document contained no error and it cannot
be corrected. Silverio was born a male. The sex of a person is determined at birth. Considering that
there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the
time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
(b) Will your answer be the same in the case of Sharon’s petition? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, my answer will not be the same.

In the case of Republic v. Cagandahan (G.R. 166676, September 12, 2008), the Supreme Court held that
where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification
would be what the individual, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her
sex. Sharon is considered an intersex, because he has CAH, which means that she has the biological
characteristics of both male and female. Based on that case, Sharon’s petition should be granted since
he has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with
what he was born with. The change of name should also be granted considering that it merely
recognizes Sharon’s preferred gender.

(c) Can the marriage of Silverio (Shelley) and Sharon (Shariff) be legally recognized as valid in the
Philippines? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, it cannot be legally recognized as valid.

Laws relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines even though living abroad (Article 15, Civil Code). One of the requisites of a marriage is that
the contracting parties must be a male and a female (Article 2, Family Code). Since Silverio and Sharon
are Filipino

citizens their status, condition and legal capacity is determined by Philippine law, their marriage abroad
is not a valid marriage under Philippine law, because both contracting parties are males.

IV

Severino died intestate, survived by his wife Saturnina, and legitimate children Soler, Sulpicio, Segundo
and the twins Sandro and Sandra. At the time of his death, the twins were only 11 years of age, while all
the older children were of age. He left only one property: a 5,000 sq. m. parcel of land. After his death,
the older siblings Soler, Sulpicio, and Segundo sold the land to Dr. Santos for PhP500,000 with a right to
repurchase, at the same price, within five (5) years from the date of the sale. The deed of sale was
signed only by the three (3) older siblings and covered the entire property. Before the five (5) years
expired, Soler and Sulpicio tendered their respective shares of PhP166,666 each to redeem the property.
Since Segundo did not have the means because he was still unemployed, Saturnina paid the remaining
PhP166,666 to redeem the property. After the property was redeemed from Dr. Santos, the three (3)
older children and Saturnina, for herself and on behalf of the twins who were still minors, sold the
property to Dr. Sazon, in an absolute sale, for PhP1 million. In representing the twins, Saturnina relied
on the fact that she was the natural guardian of her minor children.

(a) Was the first sale to Dr. Santos, and the subsequent repurchase, valid? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, the sale is valid but only with respect to the shares pertaining to Soler, Sulpicio and Segundo. Upon
Severino’s death, his heirs became the co-owners of the only property he left since the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 777, Civil Code). In a co-
ownership, each co-owner may alienate his part but the effect of the alienation with respect to the co-
owners shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to the co-owner who alienated his share
(Article 493, Civil Code). The repurchase by Soler and Sulpicio was valid up to their respective shares.
The repurchase of Segundo’s share did not make Saturnina the owner of the share redeemed although
she is entitled to reimbursement.

(b) Was the second sale to Dr. Sazon valid? May the twins redeem their share after they reach the age of
majority? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The second sale was valid only as to the aliquot shares of Saturnina and of the three older siblings.
Under Article 225 of the Family Code, the father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship
over the property of the unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment.
This guardianship, however, only extends to powers of administration over the property of the child,
and does not include the power to alienate, which is an act of strict dominion. Saturnina had no
authority to sell the twins’ property, and the sale to that extent is unenforceable. Since it is already
unenforceable, the twins do not need to redeem the property upon reaching the age of majority.

V
Sol Soldivino, widow, passed away, leaving two (2) legitimate children: a 25-year old son, Santino (whom
she had not spoken to for five [5] years prior to her death since he attempted to kill her at that time),
and a 20-year-old daughter, Sara. She left an estate worth PhP 8 million and a will which contained only
one provision: that PhP1 million should be given to “the priest who officiated at my wedding to my
children’s late father.” Sara, together with two (2) of her friends, acted as an attesting witness to the
will.

On the assumption that the will is admitted for probate and that there are no debts, divide the estate
and indicate the heirs/legatees entitled to inherit, the amount that each of them will inherit, and where
(i.e., legitime/free portion/intestate share) their shares should be charged. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Santino and Sara are entitled to P3.5 Million each while the priest who officiated at the wedding of Sol
to her children’s father is entitled to receive P1 Million as legacy from the free portion of the Sol’s
estate. 2 Million out of the 3.5 Million comes from their legitime, while the remaining 1.5 Million is from
the free portion.

Santino is not disqualified to inherit from her mother, because an attempt against the life of the
decedent is a cause for unworthiness of an heir only if there is a final judgment of conviction (Article
1032, Civil Code). The given facts do not mention that Santino was convicted of an attempt against the
life of Sol.

Sara is also capacitated to inherit from Sol. The statement found in Article 1027 of the Civil Code that an
attesting witness to the execution of a will shall be incapable of succeeding is qualified by Article 823,
Civil Code, which provides that the devise or legacy in favor of a person who is an attesting witness to
the execution to the will shall be void. Sara is not a devisee or legatee under Sol’s will. She is an intestate
and compulsory heir.

The priest is also capable of succeeding as a legatee, because under Article 1027, Civil Code only the
priest who heard the confession of the testator during his last illness and his relatives within the fourth
degree and the church to which he belongs are disqualified from inheriting from the decedent by will.
The priest only officiated the wedding of the decedent.

VI
Sammy and Santi are cousins who separately inherited two (2) adjoining lots from their grandfather.
Sammy is based overseas but wants to earn income from his inherited land, so he asked a local
contractor to build a row of apartments on his property which he could rent out. The contractor sent
him the plans and Sammy noticed that the construction encroached on a part of Santi’s land but he said
nothing and gave approval to construct based on the plans submitted by the local contractor. Santi,
based locally, and who loved his cousin dearly, did not object even if he knew of the encroachment since
he was privy to the plans and visited the property regularly. Later, the cousins had a falling out and Santi
demanded that the portion of the apartments that encroached on his land be demolished.

Can Santi successfully file legal action to require the demolition? (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, Santi cannot successfully file a legal action to require the demolition.

Since the builder and the landowner both acted in bad faith, their rights shall be the same as though
both had acted in good faith (Article 453, Civil Code). Sammy is not a builder in good faith with respect
to the portion of the apartment encroaching on Santi’s property, because he knew that he was not the
owner of the land when he built the apartment. There is bad faith, likewise, on Santi’s part, because he
did not object to the construction although he had knowledge thereof (Article 453, Civil Code).

In cases where both the landowner and the builder acted in good faith, the landowner does not have
the option to demand the demolition of the work (Article 448, Civil Code).

VII

Sydney, during her lifetime, was a successful lawyer. By her own choice, she remained unmarried and
devoted all her time to taking care of her nephew and two (2) nieces: Socrates, Saffinia, and Sophia. She
wrote a will giving all her properties remaining upon her death to the three (3) of them. The will was
admitted to probate during her lifetime. Later, she decided to make a new will giving all her remaining
properties only to the two (2) girls, Saffinia and Sophia. She then tore up the previously probated will.
The second will was presented for probate only after her death. However, the probate court found the
second will to be void for failure to comply with formal requirements.

(a) Will the doctrine of dependent relative revocation apply? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the said doctrine will not apply.

In the case of Molo v. Molo (G.R. No. L-2538, September 21, 1951), the court stated that the doctrine of
relative revocation is a rule where revocation of the old will is a suspensive condition or depends upon
the efficacy of the new disposition, and if the new will intended as a substitute is inoperative, the
revocation fails and the original will remains in force. This was applied based on the fact that the original
will appears to be lost; hence, the second will was executed with a revocatoty clause, but in both
instances, the wife was instituted as the universal heir.

In this case, however, the revocation of the original was not through the execution of a subsequent will
with a revocatory clause, but through destruction with intent to do so. It does not appear either that the
revocation of the old will operates as a suspensive condition to the efficacy of the subsequent will,
because the testator revoked the 1st original will, as she does not wish to institute the same heirs,
unlike in Molo v. Molo where the wife was the heir in both wills.

(b) Will your answer be the same if the second will was found to be valid but both Saffinia and Sophia
renounce their inheritance? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, my answer will be the same. The doctrine of dependent relative revocation does not apply where
the the new will is rendered ineffective due to the renunciation of the heirs instituted therein.
Renunciation has nothing to do with the validity of the will, but only pertains to whether or not the heirs
accept their share in the inheritance. Since the new will is still valid, the doctrine does not apply (Article
832, Civil Code).

VIII

Sofronio was a married father of two when he had a brief fling with Sabrina, resulting in her pregnancy
and the birth of their son Sinforoso. Though his wife knew nothing of the affair, Sofronio regretted it, but
secretly provided child support for Sinforoso. Unfortunately, when Sinforoso was 10 years old, Sofronio
died. Only Sofronio’s father, Salumbides, knew of Sabrina and Sinforoso. For the purpose of providing
support to Sinforoso, Salumbides gave Sabrina usufructruary rights over one of his properties — a house
and lot — to last until Sinforoso reaches the age of majority. Sabrina was given possession of the
property on the basis of caucion juratoria. Two (2) years after the creation of the usufruct, the house
accidentally burned down, and three (3) years thereafter, Sinforoso died before he could reach the age
of 18.

Will the usufruct continue after the house has burned down? If yes, will it continue after Sinforoso’s
death? (2.5 %)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, the usufruct will continue after the house was burned. If the usufruct is constituted on immovable
property of which a building forms part, and the latter should be destroyed in any manner whatsoever,
the usufructuary shall have a right to make use of the land and the materials (Article 607, Civil Code).
The usufruct over the land and the materials continues. The thing was lost only in part, the right
continues on the remaining parts (Article 604, Civil Code).

No, it will be extinguished after Sinforoso’s death. A usufruct granted for the time that may elapse
before a third person attains a certain age, shall subsist for the number of years specified, even if the
third person should die before the period expires, unless such usufruct has been expressly granted only
in consideration of the existence of such person or contrary intention clearly appears (Article 603, 606,
Civil Code). The circumstances given show that the usufruct was established by Salumbides in
consideration of the existence of Sinfroso. It was meant for his support; hence, his death extinguished
the usufruct even though he died before reaching the age of majority.

IX

Newlyweds Sam and Sienna had contracted with Sangria Hotel for their wedding reception. The couple
was so unhappy with the service, claiming, among other things, that there was an unreasonable delay in
the service of dinner and that certain items promised were unavailable. The hotel claims that, while
there was a delay in the service of the meals, the same was occasioned by the sudden increase of guests
to 450 from the guaranteed expected number of 350, as stated in the Banquet and Meeting Services
Contract.

In the action for damages for breach of contract instituted by the couple, they claimed that the Banquet
and Meeting Services Contract was a contract of adhesion since they only provided the number of
guests and chose the menu. On the other hand, the hotel’s defense was that the proximate cause of the
complainant’s injury was the unexpected increase in their guests, and this was what set the chain of
events that resulted in the alleged inconveniences.
(a) Does the doctrine of proximate cause apply in this case? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the doctrine does not apply. In the case of Spouses Guanio v. Makati Shangri-la Hotel (G.R. No.
190601, September 7, 2011), the doctrine of proximate cause, is applicable only in actions for quasi-
delicts, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a
person where there is no relation between him and another party. Where, however, there is a pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who make law between
them.

Here, there is a contract, the terms and conditions of such contract will govern the rights and obligations
between the contracting parties in case of breach thereof, not the doctrine of proximate cause.

(b) Was the Banquet and Meeting Services Contract a contract of adhesion? If yes, is the contract void?
(2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, it is a contract of adhesion, but the same is not void.

A contract of adhesion is defined as one in which one of the parties imposes a ready-made form of
contract, which the other party may accept or reject, but which the latter cannot modify. Here, the
contract is ready-made by Sangria, as the spouses only chose the menu and provided the number of
guests but they cannot modify the terms thereof; hence, a contract of adhesion.

Although a contract of adhesion, it is not entirely against the law and is as binding as ordinary contracts,
the reason being that the party who adheres to the contract is free to reject it entirely, but the effect, as
ruled in Orient Air v. CA (G.R. No. 76931, May 29, 1991), is that in case of ambiguity it is

construed against the party who caused it to be drafted and could have avoided it by the exercise of a
little more care.

X
Sinclair and Steffi had an illicit relationship while Sinclair was married to another. The relationship
produced a daughter Sabina, who grew up with her mother. For most parts of Sabina’s youth, Steffi
spent for her support and education. When Sabina was 21 years old, Sinclair’s wife of many years died.
Sinclair and Steffi lost no time in legitimizing their relationship. After the 40-day prayers for Sinclair’s late
wife, Sinclair and Steffi got married without a marriage license, claiming that they have been cohabiting
for the last 20 years.

After graduating from college, Sabina decided to enroll in law school. Sinclair said that he was not willing
to pay for her school fees since she was no longer a minor. Sinclair claimed that if Sabina wanted to be a
lawyer, she had to work and spend for her law education.

(a) What is Sabina’s filiation status? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Sabina is an illegitimate child of Sinclair and Steffi because she was conceived and born outside a valid
marriage (Article 165, Family Code). She was not legitimated by the subsequent marriage between
Sinclair and Steffi. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be
legitimated (Art. 177, Family Code). At the time of Sabina’s conception, her parents were disqualified by
an impediment to marry each other, because Sinclair was married to someone else.

(b) Is Sinclair legally required to finance Sabina’s law education? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, he is legally required to finance Sabina’s education. Support comprises everything indispensable for
education among other things in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. The education of the
person entitled to be supported shall include his schooling or training for some profession even beyond
the age of majority (Art. 194, Family Code). Parents and their illegitimate children are obliged to support
each other (Article 195,

Family Code). Considering the foregoing rules, Sinclair is enjoined by law to finance Sabrina’s law
education even beyond the age of majority.

XI
Samantha sold all her business interest in a sole proprietorship to Sergio for the amount of PhP 1
million. Under the sale agreement, Samantha was supposed to pay for all prior unpaid utility bills
incurred by the sole proprietorship. A month after the Contract to Sell was executed, Samantha still had
not paid the PhP 50,000 electricity bills incurred prior to the sale.

Since Sergio could not operate the business without electricity and the utility company refused to
restore electricity services unless the unpaid bills were settled in full, Sergio had to pay the unpaid
electricity bills. When the date for payment arrived, Sergio only tendered PhP 950,000 representing the
full purchase price, less the amount he paid for the unpaid utility bills. Samantha refused to accept the
tender on the ground that she was the one supposed to pay the bills and Sergio did not have
authorization to pay on her behalf.

(a) What is the effect of payment made by Sergio without the knowledge and consent of Samantha?
(2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The payment by Sergio resulted in the extinguishment of the obligation of Samantha to the utility
company and Sergio was legal subrogated to the utility company’s credit. Sergio, thus, became
Samantha’s new creditor.

Under Article 1302 (3), Civil Code, it is presumed that there is legal subrogation when, even without the
knowledge of the debtor, a person interested in the fulfillment of the obligation pays, without prejudice
to the effects of confusion as to the latter’s share. A person interested in the fulfillment is one who will
benefit from the extinguishment of the obligation.

Here, Sergio is an interested person since he was the business successor-in-interest of the Samantha and
he cannot conduct his business without paying the debtor of Samantha. Since there is legal subrogation,
Sergio stepped into the shoes of the utility company as the new creditor to the P50,000 credit; thus
there can be valid partially legal compensation of the two credits between him and Samantha who are
principally debtors and creditors of each other up to the concurrent amount of P50,000 (Art. 1279, NCC).

(b) Is Samantha guilty of mora accipiendi? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, Samantha is guilty of mora accipiendi.

The requisites for mora accipiendi are: (i) offer of performance by the debtor; (ii) offer must be to
comply with prestation as it should be performed; and (iii) the creditor refuses to accept the
performance without just cause.

Here, Sergio validly made an offer to comply with the prestation of payment, albeit for P950,000 only.
Sergio’s offer is justified based on the concept of partial legal compensation up to the amount of
P50,000, since Sergio and Samantha are in their own right principal debtors and creditors of each other.
Samantha’s refusal was without just cause as she cannot be permitted to benefit or use as a defense her
own failure to fulfill her part of the obligation to pay the electricity bills.

XII

Saachi opened a savings bank account with Shanghainese Bank. He made an initial deposit of
PhP100,000. Part of the bank opening forms that he was required to sign when he opened the account
was a Holdout Agreement which provided that should he incur any liability or obligation to the bank, the
bank shall have the right to immediately and automatically take over his savings account deposit. After
he opened his deposit account, the Shanghainese Bank discovered a scam wherein the funds in the
account of another depositor in the bank was withdrawn by an impostor.

Shanghainese Bank suspected Saachi to be the impostor, and filed a criminal case of estafa against him.
While the case was still pending with the Prosecutor’s office, the bank took over Saachi’s savings deposit
on the basis of the Holdout Agreement.

(a) What kind of contract is created when a depositor opens a deposit account with a bank? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

A contract of simple loan is created when a depositor opens a deposit account with a bank. Fixed,
savings and current deposits of money in banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the
provisions concerning simple loan (Article 1980, Civil Code]. The creditor is the depositor, while the
debtor is the bank.

(b) In this case, did the bank have the right to take over Saachi’s bank deposit? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the bank did not have the right to take over Saachi’s bank deposit. In the case of Metropolitan Bank
& Trust Co. v. Rosales (G.R. No. 183204, January 13, 2014), it was held that the “Hold Out” clause, which
was similar to the Holdout Agreement in the instant case, can be invoked only if there was a valid and
existing obligation arising from any of the sources of obligation enumerated in Article 1157 of the Civil
Code, to wit: law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delict, and quasi- delict. The only possible source of
obligation of Saachi to Shanghainese Bank based on the given facts is delict. As the criminal case filed by
the bank against Saachi was still pending and no final judgment of conviction has been rendered, Saachi
had no valid and existing obligation to the bank; thus, the bank had no right to take over the deposits of
Saachi.

XIII

Sonny Inc., (SI) purchased several heavy machineries from Single Equipment Philippines, Inc. (SEP) for
PhP 10 million, payable in 36 monthly installments. A chattel mortgage was constituted on the same
machineries as security for the amount. As additional security, the President of SI, Stan Smith,
mortgaged his personal house and lot. SI failed to pay the 16th and succeeding monthly installments.
SEP then commenced a collection suit against SI, and in the course of the proceedings, a writ of
attachment was issued against SI’s properties, including the mortgaged machineries. The attached
properties were subsequently sold at public action, but the proceeds thereof were insufficient to satisfy
the judgment credit.

(a) Can SEP legally recover the deficiency? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, SEP can legally recover the deficiency. The prohibition against further collection under Article 1484
of the Civil Code, or the Recto Law, only applies if the seller chooses to foreclose the chattel mortgage
and not when the seller opts to exact the fulfilment of the obligation (Tajanlangit v. Southern Motors,
G.R. 10789, May 28, 1957). SEP chose to exact the

fulfillment of the obligation by commencing a collection suit against SI. SEP did not opt to foreclose the
chattel mortgage over the equipment. The machineries were sold in an execution sale and not in a
foreclosure sale; hence, the prohibition against further collection does not apply.

(b) Instead of collecting the deficiency, can SEP commence extrajudicial proceedings to foreclose the
mortgage on Stan’s house and lot in order to recover the deficiency? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, SEP can commence extrajudicial proceedings to foreclose the mortgage. SEP may choose to
foreclose the mortgage on Stan’s house and lot. What SEP is prohibited to do, based on the case of Cruz
v. Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation (G.R. No. L-24772, May 27, 1968), is to extrajudicially
foreclose the mortgage after it has extrajudicially foreclosed the chattel mortgage on the machineries
sold on instalment, because if such is allowed, the protection given by Article 1484 would be indirectly
subverted, and public policy overturned. In this case, SEP has not foreclosed the chattel mortgage over
the machineries.

XIV

Socorro is the registered owner of Lot A while Segunda is the registered owner of the adjoining Lot B.
Lot A is located at an elevated plateau of about 15 feet above the level of Lot B. Since Socorro was
allegedly removing portions of the land and cement that supported the adjoining property, Segunda
caused the annotation of an adverse claim against 50 sq. m. on Lot A’s Transfer Certificate of Title,
asserting the existence of a legal easement.

(a) Does a legal easement in fact exist? If so, what kind? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, a legal easement of lateral and subjacent support exists. According to Article 684 of the Civil Code,
no proprietor shall make such excavations upon his land as to deprive any adjacent land or building of
sufficient lateral or subjacent support. In the given case, an easement of lateral and subjacent support
exists in the property of Soccoro in favor of the property of Segunda.

In the case of Castro v. Monsod, (G.R. No. 183719, February 2, 2011) in which the situation of the
properties of the two landowners were similar to that in the given problem, the Supreme Court held
that an easement existed in favor of the property of higher elevation, because it was the owner of the
said property which sued to have the easement recognized. Such finding, however, does not mean that
no similar easement exists in favor of the property of lower elevation, since Article 684 does not make a
distinction as to the elevation of the property.
(b) If a legal easement does in fact exist, is an annotation of an adverse claim on the title of the servient
estate proper? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. The annotation of an adverse claim over registered land under Section 70 of Presidential Decree
1529 requires a claim on the title of the disputed land Castro v. Monsod, 641 SCRA 486, Feruary 2,
2011). Segunda is not claiming ownership over the property of Socorro. She only wanted a judicial
recognition of the existence of the easement. According to the Supreme Court in the cited case, an
annotation of the existence of the lateral and subjacent support is no longer necessary, because it exists
whether or not it is annotated or registered in the registry of property. A judicial recognition of the same
already binds the property and the owner of the same, including her successors-in-interest.

XV

Simon owned a townhouse that he rented out to Shannon, a flight attendant with Soleil Philippine
Airlines (SPA). They had no written contract but merely agreed on a three (3)-year lease. Shannon had
been using the townhouse as her base in Manila and had been paying rentals for more than a year when
she accepted a better job offer from Sing Airlines. This meant that Singapore was going to be her new
base and so she decided, without informing Simon, to sublease the townhouse to Sylvia, an office clerk
in SPA.

(a) Can Simon compel Shannon to reduce the lease agreement into writing? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, Simon can compel Shannon to reduce the agreement into writing. While an agreement for the
leasing of real property for a longer period than one year is covered by the Statute of Frauds, thus,
requiring a written memorandum of its essential provisions under Article 1403, Civil Code. According to
Article 1406 of the Civil Code, the parties may only avail themselves of the right under Article 1357 of
the Civil Code if the contract is enforceable under the Statute of Frauds. The contract was taken out of
the operation of the Statute of Frauds under the Doctrine of Part Performance.

Under Article 1357 of the Civil Code, the contracting parties may compel each other to observe the form
of contract required by law.
(b) Does the sublease without Simon’s knowledge and consent constitute a ground for terminating the
lease? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, it does not constitute a ground for terminating the lease. In the contract of lease of things, if there is
no express prohibition, the lessee may

sublet the thing leased (Article 1650, Civil Code). In this contract, there appears to be no prohibition
regarding subleasing; thus, there is no violation of the contract which can be used as a ground for
terminating the contract. The act of a lessee in subleasing the thing without notifying the lessor leased is
not one of the causes for which the lessor may terminate the lease and judicially eject the lessee (Article
1673, Civil Code).

XVI

Selena was a single 18-year old when she got pregnant and gave birth to Suri. She then left to work as a
caregiver in Canada, leaving Suri with her parents in the Philippines. Selena, now 34 years old and a
permanent resident in Canada, met and married Sam who is a 24-year old Canadian citizen who works
as a movie star in Canada. Sam’s parents are of Filipino ancestry but had become Canadian citizens
before Sam was born. Wanting Suri to have all the advantages of a legitimate child, Selena and Sam
decided to adopt her. Sam’s parents, already opposed to the marriage of their son to someone
significantly older, vehemently objected to the adoption. They argued that Sam was not old enough and
that the requisite age gap required by the Inter-Country Adoption Act between Sam as adopter and Suri
as adoptee was not met.

Are Sam’s parents correct? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, Sam’s parents are incorrect. Under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8043 or the Inter-Country Adoption
Act of 1995, the requirement that the adopter must be at least twenty-seven years of age and at least
sixteen years older than the adoptee does not apply if the adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature
of the adoptee. Since, Sam is the spouse of Selena, who is the parent by nature of Suri, Sam may adopt
Suri even if he is below twenty-seven years of age and is not at least sixteen years older than the
adoptee. [NOTE: The Inter-Country Adpotion Act of 1995 requires that only a child who is below 15
years of age and is voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the Department of Social Work and Services
(DSWD) may be adopted under the inter-country adoption law, and the adopter must be at least 27
years of age and at least 16 years older than the child to be adopted at the time of application unless the
adopter is the natural parent of the child to be adopted or the spouse of such parent.

XVII

Sofia and Semuel, both unmarried, lived together for many years in the Philippines and begot three
children. While Sofia stayed in the Philippines with the children, Semuel went abroad to work and
became a naturalized German citizen. He met someone in Germany whom he wanted to marry. Semuel
thereafter came home and filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for partition of the
common properties acquired during his union with Sofia in the Philippines. The properties acquired
during the union consisted of a house and lot in Cavite worth PhP 2 million, and some personal
properties, including cash in bank amounting to PhP 1 million. All these properties were acquired using
Semuel’s salaries and wages since Sofia was a stay-at-home mother. In retaliation, Sofia filed an action,
on behalf of their minor children, for support.

(a) How should the properties be partitioned? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(a) The properties should be divided equally between Sofia and Semuel. The property relations of Sofia
and Semuel is governed by Article 147 of the Civil Code, because they lived exclusively with each other
as husband and wife and they were capacitated to marry each other. Under the said provision, the
wages and salaries of Sofia and Semuel shall be owned by them in equal shares; hence, the cash in the
bank from Semuel’s salaries and wages is co-owned by Semuel and Sofia in equal shares. Article 147 also
provides that the property acquired by the partners through their work or industry shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership and in the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired during the
cohabitation shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry and shall
be owned by them in equal shares.

Article 147 provides further that if the efforts of one of the parties consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household, he or she is deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition of the property even if he or she did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of
the said property. Sofia, as a stay-at-home mother, cared for and maintained the family, consequently,
she is deemed to have contributed in the acquisition of the house and lot. As co-owner, Sofia is entitled
to one-half of the property.

(b) Should Semuel be required to support the minor children? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(b) Yes, Semuel should be required to support the minor children. Parents and their illegitimate children
are obliged to support each other (Article 195, Family Code). Semuel is required to support his
illegitimate children with Sofia. The children are illegitimate, because they were conceived and born
outside a valid marriage [Article 165, Family Code].

XVIII

Shasha purchased an airline ticket from Sea Airlines (SAL) covering Manila-Bangkok-Hanoi-Manila. The
ticket was exclusively endorsable to Siam Airlines (SMA). The contract of air transportation was between
Shasha and SAL, with the latter endorsing to SMA the Hanoi-Manila segment of the journey. All her
flights were confirmed by SAL before she left Manila. Shasha took the flight from Manila to Bangkok on
board SAL using the ticket. When she arrived in Bangkok, she went to the SAL ticket counter and
confirmed her return trip from Hanoi to Manila on board SMA Flight No. SA 888. On the date of her
return trip, she checked in for SMA Flight No. SA 888, boarded the plane, and before she could even
settle in on her assigned seat, she was off-loaded and treated rudely by the crew. She lost her luggage
and missed an important business meeting. She thereafter filed a complaint solely against SAL and
argued that it was solidarily liable with SMA for the damages she suffered since the latter was only an
agent of the former.

(a) Should either, or both, SAL and SMA be held liable for damages that Shasha suffered? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Only SAL should be held liable for damages.

This case has the same factual milieu with that of China Airlines v. Daniel Chiok (G.R. No. 152122, July
30, 2003), where the court cited British Airways v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 121824 January 29, 1998),
ruling that as the principal in the contract of carriage, the petitioner was held liable even when the
breach of contract had occurred, not on its own flight, but on that of another airline. It also cited
Lufthansa German Airlines v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 83612, November 24, 1994), in which the Court
held that the obligation of the ticket-issuing airline remained and did not cease, regardless of the fact
that another airline had undertaken to carry the passengers to one of their destinations.

In this case, since the contract of air transportation is between Shasha and SAL, the latter as principal
remains liable as the principal despite the fact that the breach occurred in SMA. SMA cannot be held
liable in this case, because the court has no jurisdiction over it. It is imperative and in accordance with
due process and fair play that SMA should have been impleaded as a party in the present proceedings
before this Court can make a final ruling on this matter.

(b) Assuming that one is an agent of the other, is the agency coupled with interest? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, the agency was constituted as a means of fulfilling an obligation which had already been contracted
and also a bilateral contract depends upon the agency [Article 1927, Civil Code]. In the case of Philex
Mining v. CIR, (G.R. No. 148187, April 16, 2008) the Court defined an agency coupled with an interest as
one that cannot be revoked or withdrawn by the principal due to an interest of a third party that
depends upon it, or the mutual interest of both principal and agent.

Here, since the ticket is exclusively endorsable to the agent, SAM, then it has a mutual interest with the
principal, SAL, in the fulfillment of the obligation.

XIX

Sebastian, who has a pending assessment from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), was required to
post a bond. He entered into an agreement with Solid Surety Company (SSC) for SSC to issue a bond in
favor of the BIR to secure payment of his taxes, if found to be due. In consideration of the issuance of
the bond, he executed an Indemnity Agreement with SSC whereby he agreed to indemnify the latter in
the event that he was found liable to pay the tax.

The BIR eventually decided against Sebastian, and judicially commenced action against both Sebastian
and SSC to recover Sebastian’s unpaid taxes. Simultaneously, BIR also initiated action to foreclose on the
bond. Even before paying the BIR, SSC sought indemnity from Sebastian on the basis of the Indemnity
Agreement. Sebastian refused to pay since SSC had not paid the BIR anything yet, and alleged that the
provision in the Indemnity Agreement which allowed SSC to recover from him, by mere demand, even if
it (SSC) had not yet paid the creditor, was void for being contrary to law and public policy.

Can Sebastian legally refuse to pay SSC? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, Sebastian cannot legally refuse to pay. A stipulation in an indemnity agreement providing that the
indemnitor shall pay the surety as soon as the latter becomes liable to make payment to the creditor
under the terms of the bond, regardless of whether the surety has made payment actually or not, is
valid and enforceable; in accordance therewith, the surety may demand from the indemnitor even
before the creditor has paid [Security Bank and Trust Co., Inc. v. Globe Assurance Co., Inc., (58 OG 3708,
1962)]. Under the terms of the contract, Sebastian’s obligation to indemnify became due and
demandable from the moment he has incurred liability and not from the moment of payment.

XX

Simeon was returning to Manila after spending a weekend with his parents in Sariaya, Quezon. He
boarded a bus operated by the Sabbit Bus Line (SBL) on August 30, 2013. In the middle of the journey,
the bus collided with a truck coming from the opposite direction, which was overtaking the vehicle in
front of the truck. Though the driver of the SBL bus tried to avoid the truck, a mishap occurred as the
truck hit the left side of the bus. As a result of the accident, Simeon suffered a fractured leg and was
unable to report for work for one week. He sued SBL for actual and moral damages. SBL raised the
defense that it was the driver of the truck who was at fault, and that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its driver.

(a) Is SBL liable for actual damages? Moral damages? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

It depends on what the source of obligation the action is based.

If based on contract, SBL will be liable for actual damages, but not moral damages. As a common carrier,
SBL is required to observe extraordinary diligence, and the law expressly provides that its liability does
not cease upon proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and
supervising its driver. It is not liable, however, for moral damages as Art. 2220 requires it to have acted
fraudulently or in bad faith, which is not provided by the facts.

If the action, however, is anchored under quasi-delict, SBL will be liable for actual and moral damages.
As a common carrier, it is required to exercise extraordinary diligence. Moral damages also may be
awarded under Article 2219 if the plaintiff suffered physical injuries as a result of a quasi-delictual act.