Strategic Analysis

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Afghanistan: What Everyone Needs to Know

Barnett R. Rubin, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2020, 354 pp., US$74
(Hardback), ISBN 9780190496630

Georgi Asatryan

To cite this article: Georgi Asatryan (2021): Afghanistan: What Everyone Needs to Know,
Strategic Analysis, DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2021.1938947

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2021.1938947

Published online: 28 Jun 2021.

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Strategic Analysis, 2021
Vol. 00, No. 00, 1–3, https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2021.1938947

Book Review

Barnett R. Rubin, Afghanistan: What Everyone Needs to Know, Oxford, Oxford

University Press, 2020, 354 pp., US$74 (Hardback), ISBN 9780190496630

Georgi Asatryan*

B arnett Rubin, a former Advisor to the US Special Representative for

Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as to the UN Special Representative for
Afghanistan, has rich experience in international negotiations with the Taliban. He
was an important member of the negotiating team with the Taliban leaders during
negotiations in 2007–2008, mediated by Saudi Arabia. Often, the leaders of the
radical group communicated their official position to Washington through Rubin
(pp. 276–277). Afghanistan: What Everyone Needs to Know is a historical account of
modern Afghanistan, covering the occupation by the USSR (1978–1989), the civil
war (1992–1996), the functioning of the Taliban Islamic Emirate (1996–2001) and
the War on Terror (since 2001). The book has been enriched by Rubin’s deep
understanding and insights of the Afghan conflict. In the book, Rubin has included
contributions from three well-known Afghanistan experts—Antonio Giustozzi,
David Mansfield and Nematullah Bizhan—making it a unique and invaluable
resource to grasp the complex Afghan problem.
The book is rooted in historicism—the theory that social and cultural events are
determined by history—and is undoubtedly a sound academic work. The authors
have used their vast knowledge to reflect on the broader contours of the Afghan
conflict as well as the microscopic issues afflicting Afghanistan. The book provides
an overview of Afghanistan’s geography, history, and culture and poses the question:
‘peace or more war’ in light of the ongoing negotiations between the Taliban, the
United States, and the Afghan Government.
Rubin analyses the regional context of the US war in Afghanistan in historical
retrospect. He notes that since 2001, all the countries surrounding Afghanistan have
supported the restoration of order in the beleaguered nation and the fight against
terrorism, as this corresponds to their economic interests. Rubin observes, ‘Beyond
combating terrorism, China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Iran seek stability in
Afghanistan and the areas around it for infrastructure projects. Iran, Russia assisted
the US, India applauded, and China was hardly involved’ (p. 266). The regional
response, however, began to evolve after the recognition that the US invasion of
Afghanistan has changed the balance of power in the region in favour of the US and
this led to the regional countries resorting to balancing the US instead of supporting
it (pp. 266–268). As a result, while in the early stages of the war in Afghanistan, all

© 2021 Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

2 Book Review

major countries supported the US, later, the situation changed, forcing the US to
adjust its Afghan policy.
While the aforementioned point may have some merit, Rubin’s argument that
Islamabad sought ‘stability in Afghanistan and the areas around for two reasons: the
fight against terrorism and infrastructure projects’ (p. 266) seems unfounded. On the
contrary, it could be said that Pakistan was forced by the US and the international
community to cooperate in the US war on terror. Rubin emphasizes that the US was
dependent on the powerful regional countries for access to landlocked Afghanistan and
needed to cooperate with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in order to fight
against Al-Qaeda (p. 278). He underlines that this dependence, however, has hampered
the US attempts to wriggle out of the complex Afghan theatre because the negotiations
between the US and the Taliban have repeatedly failed due to pressure from the
Pakistani military and particularly the influence of the ISI on the Taliban (p. 284).
On Iran’s role in Afghanistan, in Rubin’s opinion, US-Iran relations remain the
most significant external threat to the negotiation process; but he does not specify
why so and in what ways (p. 290). Most likely, he is talking about the increased
influence of the Iranian special services in western Afghanistan, in particular, that of
the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and its Quds Force. It is well
known that the Herat province and its surrounding areas are under the heavy
influence of the Iranians. In addition, Tehran has a certain influence on various
terror cells within the Taliban movement.
On Russia, Rubin notes that ‘for the first time since the Soviet withdrawal, it
[Russia] launched a major initiative on Afghanistan, which became known as the
‘Moscow process’ (p. 288) in 2017. Further, he argues that in 2018, ‘Russia and the
USA agreed for the first time that the goal of a peace process was to produce an
agreement that would stabilize Afghanistan’ (p. 288). Rubin concludes that Moscow
is convinced that regional forces can achieve peace without American participation.
Commenting on the peace process in Afghanistan, Rubin emphasizes that a broad
consensus is needed, as ‘Stability requires at least that no regional or global power
with the capacity to destabilize Afghanistan sees the political and military order in
Afghanistan as a threat’ (p. 11).
On the internal dynamics in Afghanistan, Rubin explains that the ‘Paradox of
the Afghan state is that it is both centralized and weak. The extreme centralization
—virtually every decision or expenditure has to be referred back to Kabul—
manifests its weakness. It does not have resources to maintain a presence in all
districts and villages’ (p. 42). He argues that historically many Afghan leaders in
different periods tried power centralization with the help of external forces
(imperial ones) but this often led to uprisings and destabilization (p. 43). Rubin
is convinced that the problem persists today, affecting Afghanistan’s stability. The
long war has weakened the state and the central authorities have great difficulty in
managing the peripheral provinces and districts. Often, the international forces
have had to be deployed to carry out routine military or economic tasks. Hence,
Rubin argues that any agreements between the Afghan central authorities and the
Taliban require additional consent from a wide range of provincial elites.
Despite its merits, the book is not without some drawbacks. In addition to the
lack of adequate references, a key issue missing is the attitude of the Afghan
population to certain processes, personalities, and events. The views of the periphery
in Afghanistan are missing and this is a major lacuna. Moreover, the book
 Strategic Analysis 3

completely ignores the positions of the Central Asian countries that are integrated
into the regional political processes. For example, the policy of Uzbekistan in recent
years is of some interest; and such a discussion could have added value to the book.
Also, the United Kingdom, with its rich history of relations with Afghanistan, is not
mentioned in the book at all. Historically, London had a noticeable influence on
Afghan politics and its own view of what is happening in the country. It would have
been of interest to explore the similarities and differences between the US and the
UK in their approaches to the problems of modern Afghanistan.
These disadvantages aside, the book is a welcome addition to the existing
literature on Afghanistan and will be of great interest for both academic and general
readers who wish to have a complete picture of modern Afghanistan.

ORCID
Georgi Asatryan http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0266-3097

*The Reviewer is Research Fellow at the Plekhanov Russian University of Economics and the
Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences
(INION).