Wiley-Blackwell The International Studies Association

Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration of Difference: Critical Social Theory and International
Relations
Author(s): Jim George and David Campbell
Reviewed work(s):
Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 3, Special Issue: Speaking the Language of
Exile: Dissidence in International Studies (Sep., 1990), pp. 269-293
Published by: Wiley-Blackwell on behalf of The International Studies Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600570 .
Accessed: 08/10/2012 12:42
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Wiley-Blackwell and The International Studies Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve
and extend access to International Studies Quarterly.
http://www.jstor.org
International
StudzesQuarterly
(1990) 34, 269-293
Patternsof Dissent and the Celebrationof

Difference:Critical Social Theory and
InternationalRelations
JIM GEORGE
Australian
NationalUniversity
DAVID CAMPBELL
TheJohnsHopkinsUniversity
The voices of dissentproliferating in internationalstudiesover the past

decade are frequentlyunderstoodby negation,thatis, in termsof their
criticismsand refusalsof positivist/empiricistcommitments and political
realistperspectives,
so long dominantin thediscipline.To understandcon-
temporarydiscoursesof dissentin thisway,however,is to impose upon
theman undue semblanceof unityof perspectiveand purpose-one that
mirrorstheillusoryunitiesof positivism and realism.It is to failto acknowl-
edge the varietyof dissidentvoices thathave called to accountthe given,
axiomaticand taken-for-granted "realities"of prevailingdisciplinarydis-
courses.Concentrating upon whatmightbe called the "agenda of dissent"
in internationalstudies,thispaper celebratesthatvariety,thatdifference,
amongcriticalvoicesin international studies.In particular,itlocatespromi-
nentthemesin criticalinternational relationsthinkingwithinthewiderarc
of debates in Western social theory-interdisciplinary, intercontinental
debates whose questionsinclude the Enlightenment conceptsof history,
and truth;the subject/object
rationality, and agent/structure oppositions;
the relationshipbetweenlanguage and social meaning; the relationship
betweenknowledgeand power; the characterand functionof the human
sciences;and the prospectsforemancipatory politicstoday.These debates
pointto no necessaryconclusion.They mandateno singleposition.Instead,
theysuggestthe openingup of "thinkingspace,"a space of thoughtthatis
exploitedby a varietyof dissidentvoiceswho would speak in replyto the
dangersand opportunitiesof politicallifein the late twentieth century.
Introduction
Over the past decade, InternationalRelationshas been subjectto the proliferating
voices of dissent.Resistingsynthesisto a discreteand fixedapproach,the creative
tensionsto be found in these disparateendeavorshave led to the celebrationof
difference.Some scholarshave locatedthemselvesamidstthesepatternsof dissent
byattempting to explain the natureand "potentially
powerfultransformationalim-
?) 1990 InternationalStudies Association

270 CriticalSocial Theoryand International
Relations
plications"(Lapid, 1989:7) of criticalapproaches to the "theoryquestion."' Some

have identifiedthe dissensionin paradigmatictermsas an exemplaryglobalexpres-
sion of FrankfurtSchool thinking(Hoffmann,1987). Othershave questionedthe
appropriatenessof this paradigmaticdesignation,emphasizinginstead important
contrastsbetweenthe CriticalTheoryinfluencesof,in particular,Habermas and a
"radicalinterpretivism" (Rengger,1988) derivedfroma poststructuralist perspective
(see also Hoffmann,1988).2 The latteris portrayedas a fundamentaland long
overdue attackon the metatheoretical heartlandof the discipline'sorthodoxy,set
upon thefoundationalunities(subject/object, fact/value, of post-Enlight-
self/other)
enmentWesternthinking(Der Derian, 1988). Alternatively, froma positionmost
influencedby sociologyof sciencedebates,the enhanced theoreticalinsightof the
1980s has been identifiedas part of an "acute bout of self doubt and heightened
metatheoretical ferment"characteristic of scholarshipacrossthe human sciencesin
era (Lapid, 1989:2; see also Campbell,1988).
the "postpositivist"
This metatheoretical fermenthas been integralto a widersearch for "thinking
space" withincontemporarysocial theorycenteredon a broad "agenda of dissent"
(George, 1989). From this perspective,the contendingattitudesand the tensions
betweenthemshare four major interdisciplinary elementsof criticalanalysis.The
firstassertsthe inadequacy of positivist/empiricist approaches to knowledgeand
society.The second addresses,in more explicitterms,the actual processof knowl-
edge construction in repudiatingexternalsourcesof understanding. This involvesa
rejectionof all attemptsto secure an independentfoundation,or Archimedean
point,fromwhichto orientand judge social action.It stressesinsteadthe need to
groundall knowledgeof social lifein human history, culture,and powerrelations.
The thirdelementconcentrateson the language debate and stressesthe linguistic
construction of reality.The fourthinvolvesan extensionof theseissuesto the con-
structionof meaningand identityin all itsforms,and places particularemphasison
the questionof subjectivity.
We willconcentrateupon thisagenda of dissentin order to explicatethe debate
surroundingthe new wave of criticalthinkingin InternationalRelations.We willdo
so fromwhat Lapid (1989:2-5) has describedas a "celebratory"perspective,one
whichseeks to counterthe simplecoherenceand illusoryunityof positivist/empiri-
cistapproaches,dominantforso longin International Relationscircles,witha critical
socialtheoryapproach thatstressestheneed foran open-ended,genuinelypluralis-
tic,and contestedapproach to knowledgeand society.3We seek, in particular,to
' While we acknowledge the controversialnature of the term,in its capitalized form,"InternationalRelations"
will referhere to the studyof global life as traditionallycarried out in Westernuniversities.
2
Der Derian (1988:192) has noted thatthe termpoststructuralism has become the "sponge" word fora varietyof
approaches derived fromContinentalscholars such as Barthes,Baudrillard, Foucault, and Derrida. As Callinicos
(1985) has explained, there are subtle differencesbetween poststructuralist and postmodernistperspectives.But,
as both writersmake clear, there is a shared acknowledgmentof the "constitutivenature of language" and an
antipathytoward "closed" systemsof knowledge "in which analysisand identityare reducible to binaryopposi-
tions" (Der Derian, 1988:192). It is on this basis that the term poststructuralism
will be used here. The diverse
approaches it representsare in thissense part of the broad agenda of dissentin contemporarysocial theory.The
termCriticalTheory, in itscapitalized form,refersto the workof the FrankfurtSchool. The concern withcritical
social theoryand internationalrelationsin thispaper, however,is not the same as thatassociated withHoffmann
(1987, 1988), whichseeks primarilyto 'fit'FrankfurtSchool scholarshipinto the narrow paradigmaticconfinesof
InternationalRelations as outlined by Banks (1985).
3The notion of a criticalsocial theoryemployed here is another analyticallyuseful termwhich incorporatesa

range of meanings. As Anthony Giddens (1982:5-6) has argued, social theory"is a body of theoryshared in
common by all the disciplines concerned with the behavior of human beings. It concerns . . . sociology . . .
anthropology,economics, politics,human geography,[and] psychology. . . it connects throughto literarycriti-
cism on the one hand and to the philosophy of the social sciences on the other." On the positivist/empiricist
domination of the discipline in both its predominantlyNorth American scientificrealist manifestationand its
largelyBritishtraditionalistcounterpartsee Walker (1980), Banks (1985), and Frost (1986).
JIM GEORGE AND DAVID CAMPBELL 271
supplementthe criticalliteratureof the "thirddebate" witha particularkind of

analyticalattitudewhichis concernedlesswiththedemandsof convention, tradition,
and dominance,and more withthe voices of the marginalized,the excluded, the
dissident.
To fullyappreciatethe significanceof criticalsocial theoryand interpretive ap-
proachesto InternationalRelations,we acknowledgetheinfluencesupon contempo-
rarythoughtof a varietyof dissidentvoiceswhich,in thepresentcentury, have called
to accountthe given,axiomatic,and taken-for-granted "realities"of theirdominant
disciplinarydiscourses.4The firstsectionof the paper willintroducesome of the
more prominentthemesto be foundin criticalInternationalRelationsthinkingby
locatingthemwithinan ongoinginterdisciplinary debate of Westernsocial theory,
whichhas soughtto problematizesome of the entrenchedlegaciesof an Enlighten-
mentconceptof history, therelationbetweenknowledgeand power,and thecharac-
terof the human sciences(see Bernstein,1976, 1983; Craib, 1984; Hekman, 1986;
Ball, 1987; Giddens and Turner, 1987).
We highlightquestionsconcerningthe relationshipbetweenlanguage and social
meaning,and the issue of an interpretivist theoryof understanding.Here we ac-
knowledgethe significance of debatessurroundingthe effortsof Wittgenstein and
Winch to go beyond the metatheoretical limitsset by logical positivism.5On the
broaderquestionof positivist/empiricistthoughtand itsinfluenceupon the Anglo-
Americanintellectualcommunity, we suggestthatthe debate sparkedby Thomas
Kuhn, forall its ambiguity,representsan importantpointof dissensionwhichhas
providedspace forcritiqueand thesubsequenttransgression of positivist
boundaries
acrossthe disciplines.
At the forefrontof the criticalsocial theorydebates has been the concern to
ground meaningas unambiguouslysocial,historical,and linguisticin construction,
and to connectknowledgeto power.As a consequence,the CriticalTheory of the
FrankfurtSchool, and the "willto power"perspectivesand intertextual insightsof
poststructuralism,have generatedincreasinginterest.Acknowledging thecomplexi-
tiesassociatedwiththese approachesand the debate betweenthem,we offerbrief
summariesof the contribution of Frankfurt School scholarship,particularly thatof
4 We are not alone in believingthata returnto some fundamentalissuesof earliermetatheoretical debates can be
illuminatingfor InternationalRelations.Kratochwil(1988) returnsto theepistemologicalissues associated withthe
debate over the possibilityand desirabilityof a social "science" to explain some of the themesto be considered in
regime theory.
5 This is of course too complex an issue to be covered here. We acknowledge,forexample, the contributionto
theseissues over a number of yearsof figuressuch as Austin,Ryle,Strawson,Searle, and othersassociated withthe

school of thoughtknown as AnalyticalPhilosophy.There is also no doubt that much of the impetus for critical
social theoryin InternationalRelationshas come fromthe worksof Continentalscholarssuch as Sassure, Derrida,
and Barthes. Our claim here, however, is that for Anglo-Americanscholarshipin general it was the dissent of
Wittgenstein in the earlypartof the centurythatwas mostinfluentialin opening an effectively closed philosophical
debate on language and reality,and in so doing helped create the conceptual space and intellectualatmospherein
which theoriesof ordinarylanguage and speech acts mightflourishand in whichserious analysisof Continental
scholarship might take place. The same general argument applies to the choice of Kuhn's contributionto the
philosophyof science over someone like Bachelard.
It is also importantto note that more continuityis to be found at the intersectionsof contemporarycritical
debates than mostdetractors(and some advocates) care to admit. For all theirdifferences,the post-Wittgensteinian
tradition,philosophical hermeneutics(Gadamer, Ricouer), the CriticalTheory of Habermas, and poststructural-
ism repudiate positivist/empiricist approaches which privilegethe mind of an objectifiedsubject.All define social
activityas intrinsicto meaning and identity.Engendered historicallyand culturally,it precedes the intentional
activityof speakers and authors, and serves to constituteand interpret(via language games, paradigms, or
discourses) the "reality"of the world. One of the implicationsof thisintersectionbetween Anglo-Americanand
Continentalscholarshipis thatit becomes possible to do what manydetractorssuggestis necessary-to presenta
work on criticaltheoryand InternationalRelations in a language thatcan be understood. It followsthat having
done so, self-respecting criticscannotexcuse theirneglectofcriticalliteraturesbyprotestingtheneed fora thorough
groundingin Continentalphilosophyto comprehend the arguments.
Relations
Habermas,and poststructuralist approaches to modernity.We then seek to locate

theseand othernarrativesof dissentas theyhavebeen articulatedin thedisciplineof
InternationalRelationsin the 1980s.We do so in thehope thatin readdressingsome
of the most importantthemesin modern, post-CartesianWesternthought-the
questfora scientific
philosophyof humansociety;questionsof rationality,objectivity
and truth;of agencyand structure, subjectand object;the prospectsforemancipa-
torypoliticsand the issue of power-we mightunderstanda littlebetterhow and
whywe thinkand speak as we do about InternationalRelationsin thelate twentieth
century.6
From a New Theory of Language to a New Language of Theory
to Foucault
DissentfromWittgenstein
Ludwig Wittgenstein's contributionto contemporary social theoryis commonlyac-
knowledged.His later work,particularly Philosophical
Investigations,
representsthe
textualbridgebetweenlogicalpositivism and thedialecticalsociologyof thelanguage
debate followingthe "linguisticturn"(Phillips,1977; Giddens, 1979; Thompson,
1981; Bernstein,1983).7
The logicalatomismat theheartof theworkof theearlyWittgenstein and others,
such as BertrandRussell,providedthe positivist orthodoxyof theday itsrationality
and (social) scientific At the metatheoretical
credibility. levelthiswas achievedvia a
sophisticatedempiricistepistemologywhichallowed for the propositionthat lan-
guage and the "real" worldcorrespondin a logicalsense.Wittgenstein's earlywork,
consequently,was characterizedby a simple configuration centeredon the direct
sensorycorrespondencebetweenelementarypropositionsand theindependentob-
jectsof theworld,whileRussellattemptedto explainthisessentialcorrespondenceas
resultingfroma mathematicalmatrixin whichthe real meaningof an objectwas
derivedfromits linguisticsymbolor name (Thompson, 1981:220; Pears, 1987).
It was withthe publicationof Wittgenstein's later works,however,that the in-
terpretivistthemein the language debate became thecentraltenetof counter-posi-
tivistdissent.It underminedthe logical positivistunderstandingof language and
realityat its metatheoreticalcore-its empiricistepistemology.More specifically,it
6 We are cognizantof criticisms thatmightbe aimed at a projectsuch as this.It mightbe argutedthatreturningto

thinkersand themesonce at the centerof dissentbut now marginalizedis somewhatincon-grtuous in the present
context.It mightalso be argued (see Biersteker,1989) thatwe don't need "anotherpreface,"thatitis time"to move
beyond introductions. . . to concrete applications . . . [to workson] some concrete issue or subject." Two brief
responses are in order. First is that for all the currentcentralityof the debates sparked off by figuressuch as
Wittgenstein,Winch, and Kuhn, there is littleevidence that they have received anythingbultthe scantiestof
attentionby mainstreamInternationalRelations specialists. Indeed, as Frost (1986) has charged, International-
Relations remainsan intellectualbackwaterof the main currentsof Westernsocial theory.Consequently,promi-
nent scholarsof the "classical"realistperstuasioncan speak in the late 1980s of "factdriven theory"(Holsti, 1989),
and assert that a crucial test of any new paradigm is whetheror not the criticalquestions it generates have a
"reasonable correspondencewiththe observed factsof internationalpolitics"(Holsti, 1985:vii). The second issue,
concerningthe need for more "concrete" research,is dealt withbelow. But perhaps for those uirgingquick-fire
concreteapplicationof theoreticalapproaches, the followingis worthpondering. Speaking of the "god's-eyeview"
of those who want "hard nosed, concrete soltutionsto particularproblems,"Walker (1988b:7) arguiesthat it is an
"arrogance that is inconsistentwiththe empirical evidence" of contemporaryglobal life. Such evidence, he sug-
gests,"requiresa willingnessto face up to the uncertaintiesof the age, not withthe demand forinstantsoltutions.
. . [or] concrete policyoptions . . . but mor-ecrucially,for a seriotusrethinkingof the ways in whichit is possible
for human beings to live together."
7The Wittgensteinian critiquewas not the onlycontributionto the dissentagainst positivistorthodoxyin Anglo-
Americanintellectualcirclesthroughoutthe late nineteenthcentury.For a broader viewwhichtakes into account,
among others,the contributionsof phenomenological and hermeneuticscholars,see Bernstein(1976).
underminedthe phenomenalistlogic of an approach to knowledgewhichtook as

giventheatomisticnatureof therelationshipbetweentheobjectsof "theworld"and
theirmeaningas expressedin elementarylinguisticpropositions.Wittgenstein, con-
cerned to explain the way thatsuch sentencesare actuallyused in social activity,
concluded thatto understandrealitythroughlanguage was to engage in complex
explanations
socialpracticeswhichdefiedtheatomizedlogicand positivist/empiricist
of the empiricalmomentin understanding.It was necessary,he argued,to concen-
tratenot on the logical independenceof things,but on the systemicrelationship
betweenthemwhichinveststhemwithsocial meaning(Wittgenstein, 1968: section
65).8
This dissentagainst the atomized foundationof logical positivismwas compli-
mentedby Wittgenstein's critiqueof essentialism.This argumentwasjust as devas-
tatingfor positivistthinkingbecause it underminedthe perceivedcorrespondence
betweena synthetic, factuallyverifiablestatementand the "objective"situationit
described(Wittgenstein, proposed thata
1968; see also Austin,1970). Wittgenstein
general theoryof language which sought to reduce everydayunderstandingsof
termsto a singularessentialistmeaningmissedthe point about the multiplicity of
meaningsto be found in social activity.Accordingly, the meaningof a term/word/
symbolcould notbe assumedto correspondto some essentialand externally derived
foundationor object,but was dependent upon the particularconstitutive role it
playedin socio-linguistic
systemsor "languagegames."
Wittgenstein'slaterposition,pregnantwithimplications forcounter-positivist
ap-
proachesacross the disciplines,was centeredthuson a set of interlockingproposi-
tionswhichmaintainedthat:
There are no independent or objective sources of support outside of human
thoughtand human action . . . There is no standardor objectivereality(always
fixed,never changing) against which to compare or measure a universeof dis-
course . . . nothingexistsoutside of our language and actionswhichcan be used
tojustify,for example, a statement'struthor falsity.The only possiblejustifica-
tion lies in the linguisticpracticeswhich embody them: how people thinkand
speak, and how theylive. (Phillips, 1977:30)
Language conceivedthisway-not as an exclusivelydescriptivemediumbut as a

"formof life,"a processintrinsicto human social activity-represents a significant
alternativeto mainstreamsocial scientificthinking(Giddens, 1979:240-48; Men-
delson, 1979:40-55). To understandlanguage in thissense is, in effect,to convert
nouns intoverbs.9To "speak"in thissense is to "do": to engage in a speech act is to
givemeaningto theactivities whichmakeup socialreality.Language thusno longer
describessome essentialhidden reality;it is inseparablefromthe necessarilysocial
construction of thatreality.In thiscontext,thestartingpointforan investigation of
realityis the relationshipbetweenthe rules and conventionsof specific"language
games"or "formsof life"and theirsocio-historical and culturalmeaning.
The Wittgensteinian dissentagainstlogical positivistorthodoxythusopened up
forcriticalinquirymuch thathad been effectively closed offunder the intellectual
imperialismof the modern,post-Cartesian approach to knowledgeand society.His
sociologyof language perspectiverepresentsmorethana discourseof words,some-
how detached fromthe nondiscursiverealm. Rather,the rules governingthe way
8 The connectionwithSassure here is veryclear. See the discussionby Macdonell (1986) on the transferenceof
to a broader readership in the 1960s.

his Coursein GeneralLznguzstacs
9 This themefiguresprominentlyin poststructuralist theory.As Michael Shapiro has put it,the "substitutionof a
verb fora noun . . . [turnsa] factabout the world into somethingimposed, into the makingof a world" (Shapiro,
1987:52-53, emphasis added).
274 Relations
CriticalSocial Theoryand International
speech acts both constituteand limita specificunderstandingand organizationof

social life. Consequently,the studyof language (broadlydefined)and its rules of
grammarbecome,simultaneously, of realityin the world.'0Impor-
an investigation
tanttoo in castingdoubtupon thecorrespondencetheoryof truthand therelation-
ship betweenthe thinkingsubject and the externalobject,analyticalattentionis
focusedaway fromindividualcognitionand psychologicalprocesses,and towarda
theoryof actionforthe wayin social circumstances people describeand enacttheir
reality.In thiscontext,the propositionthattherecan be no purelyprivatelanguage
has had importantcriticalimplicationsforthe hackneyedbut powerfulliberalaxi-
oms concerningthe real nature of individualsand the notionof a public/private
dichotomy.
The QuestionofRationality:Winchand theSearchfor "PracticalWisdom"

An importantdimensionwas added to the Wittgensteinian legacyby the contribu-
tionsof PeterWinch(1972) and thedebatebegunbyhis workthroughoutthefields
of philosophy,sociologyand anthropology (Beehlerand Drengson,1978; Hollisand
Lukes, 1982). The "languagegames"at thecenterofWinch'sargumentreferredto a
complexweb of activity connectedbyan adherenceto particularrulesof interpreta-
tionwhich,in different cultures,identifiedand directed"normal"and/or"rational"
thatWinch'sworkis of mostrelevancein the
behavior.It is on thisissueof rationality
presentcontext,foritis herethatpost-Wittgensteinian thinking and an interpretivist
sociologyof modernity(derivedfromtheVerstehentraditionof Diltheyand Weber)
are mostpotentlyenjoined as part of a critiqueof the dominantAnglo-American
socialscienceorthodoxy.The pointof Winch'sdissentwas,it seems,loston manyof
his criticswho concentratedon the frailtiesof the Verstehenapproach in order to
buttresstheirfaithin hypothetico-deductive analysis.But Winch'sappeal for"practi-
cal wisdom"(1972:43) was more than a reformulation of the conflictbetweenNa-
It was concerned less with any logical in-
and Geisteswissenschaften.
turwissenschaften
compatibilitybetween scientificand social interpretationand more with what
Maclntyre(1971:252) has called the "genre"of interpretation or, in contemporary
criticalterminology,the interpretive
strategy used to categorizeand classifytheway
"we" understandthe social activitiesof "they."More specifically, Winchsoughtto
underminepositivist/empiricist approaches to knowledgeand societyby proble-
matizingthemodernWesternscientific genreofinterpretation as a universally
appli-
cable standardof rationality.
His focusin thissensewas primarily metatheoretical:
to
questionthe way that''we" in the processof constructing and definingthe "other"
close off so much that mightallow a more completeunderstandingof different
"realities"in the world.
If the dissensiondiscussed above sowed the seeds of discontentwithinAnglo-
Americanacademiccircleson thequestionoflanguageand therelationship between
10 In InternationalRelations the workof Kratochwiland Ruggie on regimesinvokesa number of these themes.
As Ruggie (1982) has argued, regimesare akin to language, known not by a descriptionof theirelementsbut by
theirgenerativegrammar-the underlyingprinciplesof order and meaningthatgive rise to internationalarrange-
mentsand conditiontheirtransformation. They are whatAndrews(1979) has called "the language of stateaction."
but produces a conflictwiththe positivistepistemologyof most
This gives regimesan ontologyof intersubjectivity
regimetheorists.While startingfroma metatheoreticalpositionassociated withordinarylanguage philosophyand
found in the work of Friedreich Kratochwil(1982, 1984, 1989), the positivistepistemologythen transferredthe
analyticorientationof regimes to a concern withthe inferenceof intersubjectivemeaning fromactors' behavior
(Kratochwiland Ruggie, 1986:764). For Kratochwiland Ruggie, thismeant thatthe positivistepistemologyhad to
open up to insightsfromthe "interpretivesciences" (1986:771), but the extentof interpretiveinfluencewas to be
severelyconstrained. They noted, in termsakin to the "Cartesian anxiety"(discussed below), that their analysis
should not be taken as "advocating a coup wherebythe reign of positivistexplanation is replaced by exploratory
anarchy"(1986:768).
the naturaland social sciences,Thomas Kuhn's workincreasedthe criticalmomen-

tumand gave it a more explicitdirection.
The Kuhnian Challenge: Towardsa Sociologyof Science

In The Structureof ScientificRevolutions(1970), Kuhn challengedthe authorityof
scienceand the scientificmethodwithan explanationof the processof knowledge
construction thatdid not emphasizeatheoreticalexperimentaltechniquesor meth-
odological directives.His focus,instead,was on the shared rules of paradigmatic
interpretation whichprovidedscientific communities, in different timesand places,
withan a prioriframeworkof meaningand understandingabout the "real" nature
of theworldthattheirobservations, hypotheses,and testingostensibly discovered."I
Kuhn's centralproposition-thai knowledgeis constructed bysocialcommunities
followingagreed upon norms,traditions,and rules of readingand interpretation,
and not byan atheoreticalprocessof testingtheory-impregnated observations-has
obviousimplicationsfora criticalapproach acknowledgingthe philosophicalissues
raisedbyWittgenstein and Winch.Equallyimportant, thoughperhapsless obvious,
is Kuhn's propositionthatparadigms(likeWinch'srule-governed linguistic
commu-
nities)are notconnectedbysome externalrealmof scientific fact,but have a funda-
mentalincommensurability (Kuhn, 1970:92- 111). For theless discerningof Kuhn's
(and Winch's)critics,the incommensurability notionrepresentsnothingless than a
retreatinto meaninglessrelativism(see Gutting,1980). But, as in the case against
Winchon culturalrelativism, itis thechargeratherthanitsintendedtargetthatlacks
meaning.The distinctionbetweenparadigms,as presentedby Kuhn, does not ex-
clude comparisonand criticalevaluationanymorethandoes thedistinction between
societiesand culturesas understoodbyWinch.Whatis excludedin bothcases is the
possibilityof comparisonand evaluationin termsof some neutral,atheoretical,or
non-normative methodologyreflecting an "independent"realmof factualevidence.
Kuhn sought to explain that differentparadigmsexplain the world in waysthat
correspondnot to some illusoryexternalrealm but to the knowledgerules at its
metatheoretical heart.The notionof incommensurability, in thissense, soughtto
establishthe parametersand grounds that enabled comparisonacross time and
space, rather than to declare such comparison impossible (see Kuhn, 1970:
175-2 10).12
The incommensurability theme in Kuhn's work is integralto his discussionof
change, which-again, despite its problems-has opened a varietyof conceptual
doors forcriticalsocialtheorists.Rejectingthenotionof a cumulativeand incremen-
talmodelof progresstowards"truth"or ultimate"reality," Kuhn'sargumentcompli-
mentedthoseofWittgenstein and Winchin emphasizingtheimportanceoflanguage
or, more precisely,the conflictsbetween"different language-culture communities"
(Kuhn, 1970:205). Progressin thislanguage-culture contextwas dependentnot on
the effortsof "independent"scientistsengaged in a process of observationand
" There is no doubt that much of what Kuhn has said on these issues is ambiguous and controversial(see
Masterman, 1970; Suppe, 1977; Gutting,1980; Ball, 1987). But, keeping the problemsin mind, thereis much in
Kuhn thatis of significancefor the presentdiscussion,particularlythe questions his work opened up for debate.
On the question of rationality,for example, his criticalattitudeis well representedwhen he suggests (in terms
similar to Winch) that "if historyor any other empirical discipline leads us to believe that the development of
science depends . . . on behavior thatwe have previouslythoughtto be irrational,then we should conclude, not
that science is irrational,but that our notion of rationalityneeds adjustment"(quoted in Bernstein,1983:59).
12
If one substitutes"discourse" for "paradigm" here, then one of the simplestyetmost powerfultechniquesof
dismissalused againstpoststructuralism-thatin not privilegingone discourseover anotheritslipsintothe mireof
relativism-is, at least, rendered problematic.
276 Relations
testing,but on the scientificcommunityas a whole acknowledgingthemselvesas

membersof differentlanguage groups faced with "communicationbreakdown"
(Kuhn, 1970:201-203). When this situationwas recognized,Kuhn proposed, a
wider, more meaningfuldialogue might become possible across paradigmatic
boundaries.Eventuallyscholarswould learn to "translate"rivaltheories,and in so
doing "describe. . . the worldto which[that]theoryapplies" (Kuhn, 1970:202).13
For all theirobvioussignificance,thedissentingvoicesofWittgenstein, Winch,and
Kuhn have rarelybeen directlyechoed in the contemporary critiquesof orthodoxy
proliferating in the InternationalRelationsliteratureof the 1980s.14 Much more
evidenthave been theinfluencesof CriticalTheoryand poststructuralism. Address-
ingsome of theproblemsof post-Wittgensteinian scholarship,Thompson(1981) has
indicatedwhythisis thecase,in termsrelevantto InternationalRelations.The point,
Thompson argues, is that while post-Wittgensteinian scholarshiphas opened up
much closed modern thinking,particularlyby emphasizingthe "meaningfuland
social characterof human action,"it has often"disregardedconsiderationssuch as
power and repression,historyand social change" and has failed to emphasize
stronglyenough theconnectionbetweenthe"problemof understanding" and "con-
siderationsof explanationand critique"(Thompson, 1981:4). The problemis that
language-basedanalysis,particularly of AnalyticalPhilosophy,does not alwaysune-
quivocallygroundits theoryin the practiceand ongoingstrugglesof society.
The problemwiththe Kuhnian-inspired sociologyof scienceperspectiveis similar
in that,whileit has broughtto theforefront of debatethe hermeneutical dimension
researchand analysis,itsunderstanding
of scientific of thehermeneutic traditionhas
generallybeen ratherlimited(see Boucher, 1985; Mueller-Vollmer, 1985; Hekman,
13
Kuhn was well aware of the problems associated with this process of communicationand translation.He
stressed,for example, the distinctionbetween being "persuaded" thatthe process was necessaryand being genu-
inely"converted"to it (1970:203). This latterstate,he noted (in termswhichhave more thana littlerelevanceto the
way the International Relations mainstreamhas reacted to recent criticalworks), tended to elude those who,
throughlong and uncriticaladherence to a particularset of paradigmaticaxioms, have "internalized"its rules of
interpretation.Progresswas more likelyto be achieved, maintainedKuhn, among "thosejust enteringthe profes-
sion, [who] have not yet acquired the special vocabularies and commitmentsof the dominant paradigm.
14
The Kuhnian debate most forcefullyentersthe domain of InternationalRelationswhen calls are made forthe
priorityof an "empiricalresearch agenda" (see Keohane, 1988). This is indicativeof a ritualforgettingof Kuhn's
insightsabout natural science. The call restson an assured understandingthatthe "received view" of the natural
sciences remains both an accurate understandingof scientificpracticeand a suitableguide for the social sciences.
However, an appreciation of the impact of thisdiscussion on social scientists'beliefsabout natural science would
forcea reorientationof many of these criticisms.Consider, forexample, the assessmentby Holsti of the relation-
ship between the two branches: "Unlike the natural sciences,knowledge in our fieldis not like a mine filledwith
pre-existing,unchangingfacts,just waitingto be discovered . . . We cannot throwaway paradigms(or whatpasses
for them) like natural scientistsdo, a la Kuhn, because the anomalies between realities and their theoretical
characterizationare never so severe in internationalrelations as theyare in the natural sciences. None of the
thinkersof the past portrayedthe worldof international(or world) politicsin so distorteda manneras did the analysts
of the physicalor astronomicaluniverse prior to the Copernican revolution"(1989:4-5; emphasis added).
There is a great deal to be criticalof in this understanding.But what stands out is the (mis)understandingof
Aristotelianastronomyas havingdistortedreality,onlyto be correctedbyCopernicus's laterdiscovery,presumably
byobservation,of the waythe world really"is." If anything,the reverseis true.Contraryto the (positivist)viewthat
Copernicus's theoryreplaced the "emptyspeculations"of theAristotelianswithlaws derived fromobserved facts,it
was the Aristotelianwho "couldquotenumerousobservational resultsIn theirfavor" (Feyerabend, 1968:13n). It was
Copernican theorywhich,not possessingindependent observationalsupport (at least forthe firsthundred yearsof
itsacceptance), was inconsistentwithrecorded observationsand entrenchedtheories.As Feyerabenddeclares: "thzs
is how modern physicsstarted;not as an observationalenterprisebutas an unsupported speculatzon
thatwasznconszstent
withhighlyconfirmed laws" (1968; see also Kuhn, 1957; Feyerabend, 1964; Lakatos and Zahar, 1975). The point is
thatone of the mostimportantnatural sciencesbegan as an argumentvalidatedin waysother than by observation.
That being the case, appeals to observationalsupport forrealmsof social and politicalinquirysuch as international
relationsare unsustainable.
1986). For muchpostpositivist analysis(such as thetraditionof Dilthey),hermeneu-

ticactivityis perceivedas the constructionof an alternativenonpositivistsource of
"objective"knowledgeappropriateto the Geisteswissenschaften. Consequently,while
the dichotomizednature of the post-Enlightenment scientificprojectwas signifi-
cantlyproblematizedin the wake of Kuhn's attackupon it, the legacy of what
Giddens (1982) called the "orthodoxconsensus"has oftenremainedintact.15
The continuingone-sidednessof post-Kuhniananalysisand theabstractednature
of muchlinguisticresearchled manycontributors to the broad socialtheorydebate
towardthephilosophicalhermeneutics of Gadamerand Ricouer.16This has been less
obviouslythecase in InternationalRelationswhere,in theearly1980s in particular,
those searchingfor a genuinelydialecticaland sociologically-based alternativeto
thinkingturnedto a particularkindof dissentwithinMarxism.
positivist/empiricist
CriticalTheory,Habermas, and the Politics of Emancipation

The CriticalTheoristsof the early FrankfurtSchool (see Jay, 1973; Held, 1980)
confrontedWesternsocial scienceorthodoxywitha holisticperspective,influenced
by some elementsof Hegelian/Marxism and energizedby a sophisticatednotionof
dialectics(see Horkheimer,1972; Guess, 1981). Thus, whilethetendencyin Hegel to
reduce contradictions(subject/object,fact/value)to an ultimateidentitywas noted
and itsconservativepoliticalimplicationsunderstood,and whiletheproblemsof the
objectified mind(in hermeneutics and phenomenology), thedetachedintellectual (in
Mannheim'ssociologyof knowledge),and the economicallydeterminedindividual
(in orthodoxMarxism)weretakenintoaccount(Horkheimer,1972:205-50;), Criti-
cal Theory advanced a theoryof modern social realitybased on the dialecticof
knowledgeand power.
More explicitly,in repudiatingthepseudo-scientificpretensionsof modernphilos-
ophy,CriticalTheoryanalysisfocusedon thetotalitarian of a particular
potentialities
formof reason-instrumentalreason-which since the Enlightenment has domi-
nated Westernthinkingwithits concernfor technicalcontrolover nature and its
problem-solving capacity.A major taskof a CriticalTheoryapproach,in thesecir-
cumstances,as to liberatemodernpeoples fromtheiralienationin societieswherean
15 This is not to suggestthatall contemporarypostpositivist thinkingis of thiskind. On the contrary,the workof

scholarssuch as Hesse (1980) and Hekman (1983, 1986) representssome of the mostsophisticatedanalysison this
issue currentlyavailable. But the tendencyis stillevident,oftenin otherwisetheoreticallysensitivearguments.In
an International Relations context,see Lapid's (1989) propositionthat the most radical of recent postpositivist
thinking"seriouslyexamines the possibilitythat,withinlimits,diversityof viewpointsmightbe fullycompatible
withscientificrationalityand objectivity."This mightbe the case withthe structurationist argumentbecause of its
debt to scientificrealism.Although it standsas an alternative,it mightbe not so much a resolutionof the problems
withpositivismit recognizes as it is a deferral.The influenceof scientificrealismupon structurationism gives the
latter,despite its calls for a dialectical synthesis,a dichotomized approach that reflectsthe former'sontological
distinctionbetween the natural and social sciences. As Wendt (1987:360) argues, "structurationtheor-y.
conceptualizes agents and structuresas mutuallyconstitutiveyet ontologicallydistinctentities."This provides a
researchprogram forInternationalRelationsthat,althoughcombiningstructuraland historicalresearch,seems to
depend upon the prior isolation of political and economic structuresin the domestic and internationalspheres
(Wendt, 1987:366).
16
Here the process of de-psychologizingthe communicationprocess is taken a significantstage furtherwith
Gadamer's claim thatlanguage is not subject-bound,but is alwaysa communityphenomenon which"unites the I
and the Thou" (Boucher, 1985:37). The purpose of the hermeneuticenterpriseis thus radicallyreformulated.
Instead of an objectivistemphasis on formulatingthe rightmethodin order to retrievefroma textthe author'sreal
meaning, there is a concentrationon the historico-socialprocess of understanding.In this sense hermeneutics
becomes much more than the attemptto empathizeor reexperiencethe mentalprocessesof anothersubject. It has
a more ambitiousaim: to understand the process of understandingin human life.
Relations
understandingof theirhistory,culture,and politicalpowerhad been appropriated

bya dominantmode of knowledge(scientific and thestateinstitutions
rationality) for
projectat the heartof
whichit was utilizedand proliferated.Exposingthe positivist
the ostensiblyneutralknowledgeprocesswas,in thissense,an emancipatory enter-
exposure
prisewithpracticalpoliticalimplicationssimilarto thoseof Wittgenstein's
of the social dimensionsof language, Winch'sinsightinto the constructionof the
cultural"they,"and Kuhn's propositionson thesociologyof scientificpractice.This,
as Horkheimerexplainedin a passage thatremainsintegralto a criticalsocialtheory
perspective,was because "theinterventionofreasonin theprocesseswherebyknowl-
or the subordinationof theseprocessesto con-
edge and its objectare constituted,
scious control, does not take place . . . in a purely intellectual world, but coincides
withthe struggleforcertainreal waysof life"(Horkheimer,1972:245).
This principle,whichassertsthe historicaland politicalnatureof all knowledge
and whichunderstandstheoryas inexorablyconnectedto practice,remainsat the
core of the contributions to criticalsocial theoryof JurgenHabermas.17A central
featureof Habermas'swide-ranging analysisof contemporary society,accordingly,is
the issue of praxis.More precisely,it is the questionof how modernpeoples might
come to understandthe deformedand ideologicalnatureof the language, social
rules,values,and meaningsassociatedwitha dominantmode of understanding-
scientificrationalism-which has successfullytransformedphilosophico-political
problemsinto"technical"and "strategic" ones. Put anotherway,Habermas'sCritical
Theory projecthas, at one level at least,been a continuationby even more eclectic
meansof the attemptbyscholarssuch as Horkheimer,Adorno,Marcuse,and many
othersin the Kantian/Hegelian/Marxian traditionto findemancipatoryand trans-
formationalelementsin the theoryand practiceof modernity.
But the Habermasianproject,emergingin the cold war years,developingin the
briefand headydaysof New Leftradicalism,and maturingduringan age whichhas
seen somethingofa flightfromHegelian/Marxism amongEuropean scholars,has by
necessitydifferedin importantrespectsfromearlierFrankfurt School approaches.
Centralto Habermas'swork,consequently, is an ongoingdebatewithearlierCritical
Theoristsand, since the early 1970s, withthe "radical interpretivism" (Rengger,
1988) of much contemporaryEuropean social theory.These debateshave become
an increasingly influentialpartof thecriticalagenda in InternationalRelationsdur-
ing the past decade.
Habermas'scritiqueof the worksof Adorno,Horkheimer,and Marcuse,and his
response to the multifacetedcritiquesof poststructuralism, are similarin concept
and themeto thetraditionof dissentagainstscientific modernismdiscussedhere.On
the question of emancipation,for example, Habermas has sought to expose the
idealistand utopianelementsof earlierHegelian/Marxist thinkingwhichproduced
bothgranduniversalist theoriesof revolutionary changeand, in thewakeof revolu-
tionaryfailure,a philosophicalcul-de-sacof pessimismand despair(see Habermas,
1974: chapter6). Habermas rejectedthislattertendency,epitomizedby Adorno's
Negative Dialectics,as a one-sidedand negativemisinterpretation of the dialectical
legacyof Hegelian and Marxistthoughtwhichhad resultedin an understandingof
modernity and the powerof itsrulingclassesthatwas a "leftcounterpartto the. .
theoryof totalitariandomination"(Habermas, 1979:72).18 To rekindlethe positive
17
See Habermas (1971, 1976, 1979, 1987). For a broad viewof Habermas's workssee McCarthy(1978), Thomp-
son (1981), Thompson and Held (1982), and Bernstein(1985).
approach of Foucault.
18 This is a charge that,according to Habermas, is equally relevantto the poststructuralist
The claim he makes is thatpoststructuralism has read out emancipatorypotentialin favorof a theoryof power set
upon another form of domination (Habermas, 1987:chapter 10). For readings of poststructuralismthat take
serious issue with Habermas, see Rajchman (1985), Connolly (1987), Shapiro (1987), Ross (1988), and Richters
(1988).
emancipatoryelementin CriticalTheory,while rejectingits universalisttotalizing

tendencies,Habermashas engagedin a long-term restructuring
of Hegelian/Marxist
thoughtin termsof a radicalrationalisminfluencedbypost-Wittgensteiniannotions
of "ordinarylanguage" and the symbolically-mediatedinteractionbetweenspeech
communities.
At one levelthishas been an attemptto read back intomoderntheoriesof dialec-
ticsand thesubjectmuchthathas been read out byCriticalTheoristsand indeed by
thelater,conservative, Hegel. Of mostsignificance here,forHabermas,is thenotion
of Spiritin Hegel's Philosophy of Mind, whichwas understoodas the product of
humansocialinteraction, mediatedthroughlanguage (symbolicrepresentation), la-
bor (controlof nature),and the strugglefor recognition.'9This interpretation of
Hegel (or more preciselyof Hegel's readingof Kant) problematizesthe notionof a
unifiedego "I" which comes to know its "objective"self throughself-reflection,
favoringa heterogeneous,historico-social notionof the subjectin whichknowledge
of selfand otherselvesis groundedin therealityof socialinteraction.20On thisbasis,
Habermas has sought to resuscitatefor radical politicsa sociologicallygrounded
rationalism,freeof theabstractedidealismof (orthodox)Hegelianismor the"empir-
icistmetaphysics" of positivism(Gellner,1974:175).2l
In thisquest Habermashas drawnupon a varietyof intellectual sources,theresult
of whichin recentyearshas been the "theoryof communicative action"(Habermas,
1984, 1988). Two of theprincipalinfluencesupon thistheory-influencescentralto
thebroad agenda of dissentin contemporary socialtheory-are the post-Heidegge-
rian hermeneuticsof figuressuch as Gadamer and elementsof the broad analytical
philosophyapproach inspiredbyWittgenstein (see Thompson,1981:83-100; Bern-
stein, 1983:40-49). For all the conflictof the Habermas-Gadamerdispute (see
McCarthy,1978), Habermas integratedinto his reformulatedCriticalTheory the
Aristoteliandistinctionbetweentechne and praxiswhichunderpinnedthe refusalof
Gadamer to reduce politicsto administrative technique,or power to force(Bern-
stein,1983:40-48). Moreover,in accepting(albeitwithreservations) theAristotelian
conceptof phronesis as the basis forsociety,Habermashas attemptedto establishas
the goal of modernsocial theoryand practicea processof understandingbased on
uncoerced,nonideologicaldiscursivereasoning.Drawingupon theinsightsof post-
Wittgensteinian scholarship,Habermashas thussoughtto uncoverwhathe regards
as the "universalconditionsthat are presupposed in all communicativeaction"
(Bernstein,1983:185). This presuppositionthemerestsupon Habermas'snotionof a
"willto reason"withinhuman societywhichis partof everycommunicative interac-
tionand which,in thefaceof hiscritics,he maintainsis thekeystoneto theradicalism
in CriticalTheory.22
19Stressingthe interpenetrationof these elementsin the social constructionof the subject,Hegel explained that
"Spiritis not the fundamentunderlyingthe subjectivityof the self in self consciousnessbut ratherthe medium
withinwhich one 'I' communicateswithanother 'I', and fromwhich,as an absolute mediation,the two mutually
formeach other into subjects" (quoted in Habermas, 1974:145).
20
For an accessiblerearticulationof thistheme,see Flax (1981) and the introductionto Wood (1972). This point
is importantforHabermas's critiqueof Marx in whichhe argues thatwhile Marx was aware of the interpenetration
theme in dialecticalthought,he tended in his later worksto privilegeone element-the mediationof labor-over
the others. See Habermas (1971).
21
It is on thistheme that Habermas mostclearlyrejectsWeber or-more precisely-Weber's attemptto narrow
the scope of modern rationality.In this regard Weber's positivisttendenciescause him to restrictrationalityto
scientificexplanation of the natural world. This excludes fromrationalcalculation normativethemes associated
withcriticalreflection(and understandingthe process of understanding)which,for Habermas, are vitalcompo-
nentsof the process of human emancipation.
22
Habermas argues that "while again and again [the will to reason] is silenced . . . in fantasiesand deeds it
develops a stubbornlytranscendentalpower . . . it is renewed witheach act of unconstrainedunderstanding,with
each momentof livingtogetherin solidarity,of successfulindividuation,and of savingemancipation"(Habermas,
1982:221).
Relations
Habermas'scriticshave been less than convincedby the CriticalTheory project

premisedupon the "willto reason"and thereformulated notionof an "ideal speech
situation."Some of the moststimulatingdebatesof recenttimeshave flowedfrom
the debate betweenHabermas (and thosegenerallyempatheticto his position)and
views of modernity(see Ryan, 1982;
scholars preferringbroad poststructuralist
Poster,1984; Dews, 1987; and Giddens and Turner, 1987).
Theory as Practice: Poststructuralism

and the Critiqueof Modernity
The complexitiessurroundingthe natureof poststructuralist thinkingcan be only
brieflytouchedupon here.23But it is possibleto gain a sense of poststructuralism's
significance forcriticalsocialtheoryapproachesto International Relationsbyinitially
posinga questionof Habermasianthoughtimplicitin poststructuralist approachesto
modernity.The question,simplyput,is: What are the implicationsforpost-Carte-
sian thinkingas a whole if the rationalitypremisein social communicationis not
privileged?Or, put anotherway: What if otherdimensionsof the language issue,
effectively excluded froma rationalist-orientedapproach,are included?More spe-
cifically:What if, instead of privileginga "willto reason,"the nature of modern
theoryand practiceis understoodas an expressionof a "willto power?"
The issuesat stakehere go beyondanydisputewitha singletheorist,even one as
importantas Habermas.They includethelargerprojectin whichscholarsas diverse
as Foucault,Derrida, Lyotard,and Lacan are engaged. The projectis a searchfor
thinkingspace withinthemoderncategoriesofunity,identity, and homogeneity; the
search for a broader and more complex understandingof modern societywhich
accountsforthatwhichis leftout-the "other,"themarginalized, theexcluded.The
targetof thisdissentis the foundationalism and essentialismof post-Enlightenment
scientificphilosophy,itsuniversalist presuppositionsabout modernrationalman,its
hiddenmetaphysics, itsmetatheoretical commitment to dualizedcategoriesof mean-
ing and understanding,itslogocentricstrategiesof identityand hierarchization, its
theorizedpropositionsabout humannature,itsdogmaticfaithin method,itsphilos-
ophiesof intentionand consciousness,and itstendencytowardgrandtheoryand the
implicationsof itsimposition.
Thus, poststructuralism echoes much of CriticalTheory, post-Wittgensteinian
scholarship,and thesociologyof sciencecritique.But itwantsto makeitsreactionto
the philosophicaldogmas of modernismunequivocaland unambiguous.In thisre-
gard,as Rajchman(1985:2-5) has indicated,poststructuralism representsthe great
skepticism(but not cynicism)of our time.If, as traditionalphilosophymaintains,it
was Humean skepticismabout Cartesianand Lockean dogmas that "awoke Kant
fromhis slumbers,"then poststructuralism can be seen as the attemptto "awake"
contemporary Westernthinkingfromthe slumbersKant in turnintroduced.
The differencesof a poststructuralist approach are perhaps best illustratedin
relationto the questionof theoryand practice.Whereas CriticalTheory wantsto
realize in practicalpoliticaltermswhattraditionaltheoryonlycontemplates,post-
structuralism assumes thatsuch theoryis alreadypractice.To understandsociety
and politicsin thissense is to groundtheorynotin practice,butas practice.This has
importantimplicationsfor the attitudeto criticismand the overallpurpose of dis-
sent. CriticalTheory seeks to expose the rottenfoundationsand the ideological
functionoftraditionaltheoryand, via uncoercedcommunication, to enablepeople to
understandand overcomethepowerstructures thatoppressthem.A poststructuralist
23
For overviewsand discussions of the issues central to thisincreasingcorpus of work,see Descombes (1980),
Culler (1982), Dreyfusand Rabinow (1982), Rajchman (1985), and Connolly (1988).
attitudeeschewsthis"hermeneutics of suspicion."It rejectsthe veryidea of "deep"

philosophicalinterestslyingbelow the surface,which are bound by traditionor
restricted byforceand simplyawaitto be realizedin modernsociety.It concentrates,
therefore,less on attemptingto secure emancipationthroughthe unmaskingof
power, oppression,and ideology,and more-via detailed historicalinquiry-on
concreteexamples of the way power is used in all of society'ssites. It is not that
poststructuralism fetishizesthe negativeelementsof power.On the contrary,post-
structuralism regardsthe ever-presentnatureof power relations,and theirconse-
quent role in enablingpracticeas well as oppressingit, as the source of practical
politicalaction.In thissense it takesmore seriouslythanitsdissentingcounterparts
the propositionthatknowledgeis power.It looksforno distinction between"truth"
and power,forit expectsnone. Its perspectiveon history,society,and politicsthus
resonateswiththe voice of Nietzsche.
Poststructuralism, by definition,is an emphaticallypoliticalperspective.But it is
one whichrefusesto privilegeany partisanpoliticalline,foritequates such privileg-
ing withthe grand,universalclaimsforunityand truthin moderntheory,and the
dogma of the hermetically sealed tradition.It is in the act of not privilegingthatit
offersemancipationand liberation.
In InternationalRelationsthis perspectiveis evidentin a subtlebut important
analyticalrefocusing,away fromtraditionalconcernswithindividualizedsubjects
and objectsand theepistemological questionof howwe come to "know,"and toward
an explanationbased in social and historicalprocessesand the ongoing struggles
betweendiscursivepractices.Once focused in this manner,debates over central
issues in contemporaryglobal life become inexorablybound up withquestionsof
language and interpretation, theknowledge/power nexus,theconstruction of mod-
ern "man," and the question of how to effectively resistthe impositionsof power
articulatedvia the privileged"logocentric"discoursesof modernscientific rational-
ity.
The discussionto this point of the intersections betweenthe Anglo-American
philosophicaltraditionand European social theoryis not intendedto suggestthat
these tensionsshould be resolvedinto a coherentand consensualposition.Such a
taskmightbe at leastas impossibleas itwouldbe undesirable.The pointis to exploit
creativelytheimplicationsof thesedebatesforsocialand politicalinquiry.The inter-
disciplinarydebate,however,does have somethingakin to two"mandatory"conse-
quences fora realmof studylike InternationalRelations.First,itis no longerpossi-
ble to innocentlymaintainthe "objectivity" of one's scholarshipby recourseto the
"facts"or the "real world." Second, a space has been created for the pursuitof
researchstrategieswithmetatheoretical commitments that mightonce have been
or "idealist."Withinthisspace manyalternatives
pejorativelylabelled "subjectivist"
could be pursued. No singleresearchstrategyis mandatedas thecorrectand legiti-
mate course to follow.The articulationof these themeswithinInternationalRela-
tionsin recentyears has been testimonyto thiscelebrationof differenceand evi-
dence of resistanceto any narrativeof completion.
Challenges to "The Tradition": InternationalRelations and Critical

Social Theory
Those who recentlyhave soughtto challengethe orthodoxapproachesto Interna-
tionalRelationsare under no illusionsas to the magnitudeof theirtask.As Walker
(1980:2) has suggested,the new criticalapproachesinvolvea fundamentalreassess-
mentof "imagesand assumptionsabout man and societywhich[were]crystallized in
the European Enlightenment" and whichsubsequentlyhave become the dominant
theoreticalaxiomsof European and NorthAmericanexperience.The stiltednature
Relations
of thislegacywas obviousduringthe discipline's"greatdebate"of the 1960s,which

merelyserved to furtherisolate InternationalRelationsfromdebates developing
elsewhereon broad philosophicalissues,particularly the conceptof "realism."Pro-
posingthat,despiteall thepronouncedelecticismof theperiod,nothingfundamen-
tal has changed withinthe discipline,and acknowledgingthe crisisfaced by realist
scholarshipas it has struggledto come to gripswithwhatis perceivedas a changing
power configuration in the world,increasingnumbersof scholarshave turnedto
previouslyalien modes of explanationin order to understandin a more profound
way the processesby which the "realities"of contemporarylife are made mean-
ingful.24
In the early 1980s, in particular,worksof thisilk paid explicitattentionto the
relationshipbetweenthatmatrixof theoreticaltensionsbroughtto thesurfacein the
post-Enlightenment quest fora scienceof humansocietyand the realisttraditionin
InternationalRelations. In the works of Robert Cox (1981, 1987) and Richard
Ashley(1981, 1984),therealistperspectivewas presentednotas a cohesive,hermeti-
callysealed theoreticaltradition,but as the focusof major unresolvedtensionsin
modernwesterntheory(see also Walker,1987). Primaryamongthesetensions,itwas
argued, was thatbetweena tendencytowardsanalyticalclosureand reductionism,
derivedfromAnglo-American positivist/empiricist
influences,and a historically
sen-
sitiveand criticalopenness derived frombroad hermeneuticsources. This was a
tensionpersonifiedin thefiguresof seminalrealistssuchas Morgenthau(via Weber)
and E. H. Carr (via Mannheim),whose "great texts"had receiveda "privileged"
readingin the cold war yearsand whichin the period since had underpinnedan
orthodoxyat the North Americandisciplinarycenterthatacknowledgedas valid
onlyone formof knowledge(scientific rationalism),one methodology(deductivist
empiricism), and one researchorientation(problem-solving). The criticaltaskin this
circumstance was to "realize"in a Habermasiansensethepotentialwithinrealismfor
an understandingof global life"freedfromunacknowledgedconstraints, relations
of domination,and [the] conditionsof distortedcommunication. . . that deny
humans the capacityto make the futurethroughfree will and consciousness"
(Ashley,1984:227).
Ashley's"PoliticalRealismand Human Interests"(1981) is the mostexplicitat-
temptto addressthemetatheoretical contradictionswithinrealismforthisemancipa-
tory end. Employingconcepts from Habermas's Knowledge and Human Interests
(1971), Ashleysoughtto expose theinherentlimitations of an understandingof the
worldthatprivilegesone particularinterest-an interestin technicalknowledgeand
theoreticalendeavour-"as a basisforextendingcontroloverobjectsin thesubject's
environment" (Ashley,1981:208). In suchcircumstances, he proposed,an approach
to InternationalRelations is needed which emphasizes criticalself-reflection, to
countertheprivileging formsof technicalrationality
of sophisticated and instrumen-
24
The key term here is "fundamental,"meaning a change to what Lijphart (1974) termed the "traditional"
paradigm in International Relations. The most prominentelement of this tradition,the realist approach, has
undoubtedly taken on many dimensions since its seminal articulationin Morgenthau'sPoliticsAmongNations.In
recentyearsimportantcontributionshave been made on behalfof theoriesof transnationalism, interdependence,
regimes,and hegemonicstability,and have been understoodbysome as representinga supercessionof basic realist
principles.For overviews,see the debates in Holsti, Siverson,and George (1980), Maghoori and Ramberg (1982),
and Krasner (1983). However, othershave remainedunconvincedthatthebasic assumptionsand representationsof
the tradition have been altered by all this activity.Vasquez (1983) has undermined much of the postrealist
argument for the period to the 1970s. Since that time some of the most severe skepticismhas come not from
"radicals" but fromrealistswho have had to findnovel ways of dealing withwhat theyperceive as anomalies. To
thisend, the literaturedealing withthe dilemmas of "cooperation under anarchy" (see Oye, 1986) is instructive.
The claim of neorealism to fundamental change has been considered by Ashley (1984). Notwithstandingthe
ensuing debates (see Keohane, 1986a), there is littleevidence that those Ashley portrayedas neorealists have
seriouslyexamined the positivist/empiricistmetatheoreticalframeworkunderlyingtheirperspectives.
tal reasonwhicheffectively detachknowledgefromotherhumaninterests-namely

intercommunity understandingand emancipation.
As a preliminarystep towardsa more adequate understandingof global life,
argued Ashley,scholarsmustrejectthenotionthatthevalue of theoretical inquiryis
limitedto thepragmatistcriterionof instrumental usefulness,a themecentralto the
"technicalrealism"of influentialfiguressuch as Waltz (1979). Sketchingout a re-
formulatedapproach to theoryand practice,he attackedthe means-endslogic of
orthodoxrealismand thewholetheoreticaledificewhich"conceivesof international
politicsin termsof some fixedstructureofbeingwhichchannelsobjectiveforcesand
constrainsoutcomes"(Ashley,1981:220). To begin to "realize"the potentialfor a
moreadequate realistapproach,bothAshleyand Cox emphasizedthe need to look
criticallybut empatheticallyat elements withintraditionalistscholarshipwhich
soughtknowledge,not simplyto bettercontrolan "objective"environment but to
understandhow in the modernworldof statesit is possibleto "behaveas a worthy
memberof one's traditionalcommunitywithits intersubjective and consensually
endorsednorms,rights,meanings,purposesand limitations" (Ashley,1981:212).
In "The Povertyof Neorealism"(1984), Ashleywas concernedto expose further
theinadequaciesof technicalrealismby settinghis sightson an influential group of
NorthAmericanscholars,who in the attemptto scientifically bolsteran ailingrealist
orthodoxyhad betrayedthe "richdialecticalcontent"of traditionalrealistthought
(1984:226). Ashleycharged the neorealistswithhavingreplaced "subjectivist veils
and dark metaphysics" (1984:233) withan "objectivist"variant,set upon a seriesof
flawedassumptionsabout thenatureand purposeof theorizing.The end resultwas
a one-sided,positivistmetatheoretical perspective,articulatedas an ahistoricalra-
tionalactorapproach,thatwas unable to questionthehistoricaland culturalcontin-
gency of its own theoryor (except in superficialterms)that of its social actors
(sovereignstates).
Cox's dissentwas articulatedin slightlydifferent terms,inspiredas it was byVico
and Gramsci.Proposingthat since the cold war realistthinkinghad largelybeen
synonymous withthe narrow"problem-solving" perspectiveof the NorthAmerican
discipline,Cox (1981:130-34) emphasizedthesignificance of itsother,marginalized
side,a latentcriticaltheoryfoundin thepowerpoliticsapproachof figuressuchas E.
H. Carr and Ludwig Dehio (Cox, 1981:131). "Problem-solving" realism,he main-
tained, was characterizedby a "fixedorder" dogma acknowledgingan enduring
"real" worldrackedby endemicand systemicviolence.Withhistoryobjectifiedin a
cold war context,realistthinkinghad become littlemore than a "concernfor the
defenceof Americanpoweras a bulwarkof the maintenanceof order"(1981:131),
itspotentialforunderstandingthe complexitiesof globalliferestricted to "thepre-
vailingsocial and powerrelationshipsand theinstitutions intowhichtheyare orga-
nized" (1981:128).
The emancipatorytaskforCox was, in the firstinstance,to remindmainstream
scholarsof some basic intellectualprinciplesthat,in the wake of interdisciplinary
debates going on elsewhere,mightbe consideredaxiomatic.Primaryamong these
was the propositionthat,in not reflecting upon theprocessbywhichit understands
its "reality,"realistthinkingeffectivelyblindsitselfto the prospectand nature of
changegeneratedbythecomplexdialecticof theoryand practice.A CriticalTheory
perspectivewas deemed necessarybecause it does reflectupon the processof theo-
rizingand, in reconnecting theoreticalknowledgeto humansocio-political interest,it
opens up the otherwiseforecloseddebate on the constructionof "reality."More
explicitly,a CriticalTheoryperspectivewoulddrawattentionawayfroma "continu-
ing present"towardsthe notionof a "continuingprocessof historicalchange." It
would,similarly, not simplyaccordthe statusof "fact"or "given"to existinginstitu-
tionsand relati6nsof power,but critically questionthemby investigating theirori-
Relations
gins"and howand whethertheymightbe in theprocessofchange"(Cox, 1981:129).

Ratherthanreducingtherelationshipbetweenstatesto a simplepowerstruggleover
predeterminedends, it would concentrateon interstatebehaviorin more compre-
hensiveterms,as a "historicalstructure"energizedby particularconfigurations of
"social forces,"and understoodas a complexinterpenetration of materialcapabili-
ties,institutions,
and ideas (1981:135).
This finalthemeis centralto Cox's mostrecentcontribution to the debate,which
seeks to develop furtherthe propositionthatorthodoxInternationalRelationsap-
proachescannotdeal adequatelywiththeplurality of stateformationsnowemerging
(Cox, 1987). Cox's aim is to investigatehow social forcesgeneratedby changing
productionprocesses are helping to reshape formsof stateand world order. At
anothermoreradicallevelhis concernis Habermasian:to enhancethe potentialfor
counter-hegemony byidentifyiiigthebases of radicalsupportand cohesionthatare
made possibleby changesunderwayin theworldwidesocialrelationsof production
(Cox, 1987:393-403).
While Cox and scholarslike Andrew Linklater(1982, 1986) have carriedtheir
CriticalTheory perspectivesinto the late 1980s, generally-as in the broader de-
bate-critical InternationalRelationsthinkinghas takenon thestyle,language,and
theoreticalconcernsof poststructuralism.
The titleof a recent collection, International/Intertextual
Relations:Postmodern
Read-
ingsof WorldPolitics(Der Derian and Shapiro, 1989), quite literallyspells out the
natureof the challengethe disciplinefacesfrompoststructuralist scholarship.The
referenceswithinthe work-to Foucault, Derrida, Lacan, Kristeva,Barthes and
Baudrillard-are, in more than the obvious ways,"foreign"to a disciplinedomi-
natedbyitsAnglo-American of theclassicaltexts.Der
center.So too is thetreatment
Derian, for example, concentratingon mainstreamconceptsof "international the-
ory" as understoodby Wightand Bull, begins where they"leftoff" in order to
"interrogate present knowledge . . . through past practices, to search out the mar-
gins of politicaltheory,to listenfor the criticalvoicesdrownedout by officialdis-
course . . . to undertake a theoretic investigation of the textual interplay behind
powerpolitics"(1989:7). This perspective,alien as it mustsound to thosewho have
internalizedthe dominantinterpretative genre of the discipline,is perhaps best
understoodin termsof post-Wittgensteinian theoryor, moredirectlyin some cases,
as a responseto the workof Saussure and its subsequentcritiqueby Derrida (see
Descombes, 1980).25
25 The conceptionof language thatinformsthe workof mostof those Keohane (1988) identifiedas "reflectivists"
is more indebted directlyto the position of Saussure than it is to Wittgenstein.The distinctionbetween langue
(language) and parole (speech) at the heart of Saussurian linguisticsis a dichotomized perspectivethat invokesa
structuraldifferentiation betweendepth and surface.Althougha positionthatis somethingof a step back fromthe
socially constitutivenotion of language is in the "Language games" and "formsof life" of Wittgenstein,it has
nonetheless given rise to a formalisticstrain of discourse analysis that has offered insightsinto international
relationsforeclosedby the positivisttendenciesof the orthodoxy.Examples of thisimportantalbeitlimitedformof
dissentinclude the uncoveringof commitmentsin the language of participantson all sides of the nuclear debate,
particularlythe strategicstudies community(Hook, 1984; Chilton, 1985; Cohn, 1987). In tones more sensitiveto
the power and language issue, Alker (1988) has utilized a formaldialogical approach to textualinterpretationto
consider how a seminal work in the realist tradition-Thucydides' Melian Dialogue-has been appropriated in
waysthathave severelylimitedthe considerationof politicaloptions in the present.Alker and Sylvan(1988) have
employed similartechniques to examine the way alternativeswere framed in the policydebates surroundingthe
deploymentof U.S. troops to Vietnam. The same approach has been used to examine the "windowof vulnerabil-
ity"thesisin strategicdebates of the 1960s (see Homer-Dixon and Karapin, 1987). For an impressiveinvocationof
Saussure's languelparole dichotomyin the contextof InternationalRelations,particularlyin the understandingof
foreignpolicy,see Andrews (1984). This built on earlier work (Andrews, 1975) thatsought to creditstate forms
withless determinismand homogeneitythan Realism had done. Not all of Andrews'swork,however,shies away
from the influencesof poststructuralism.In a reviewof world-systems theory,he employs Foucault's notions of
power to argue thatthe global politicaleconomyshould be seen as a disciplinarysocietythatgivesrise to statesas a
productof the relationsof power (Andrews, 1982). For a workthatcombinesboth a formaldiscourse analysiswith
a Foucauldian understandingof discursivepractices,see Shapiro, Bonham and Heradstveit(1988).
On thequestionof how knowledge,truth,and meaningare constituted, the focus

is on language,understoodnot as an assetemployedbya preexistingsubjector as a
constraint imposedon thesubject,butas a mediumthroughwhichthesocialidentity
of thesubjectis made possible.This understandingof languageunderliesthenotion
of discoursewhich,forFoucault,involvesnotsimplya groupof signsor symbolsbut
the overallsocial practicesthatsystematicallyformsocialsubjectsand the objectsof
whichtheyspeak (Dreyfusand Rabinow,1982:62; see Foucault,1972).
Discourseforthosedissentingfromtherationalismof realismis notrestricted to a
concernwiththediscourseemployed bythe subjectsof internationalrelations,be they
states,institutions, actors.Discourseforthosewho mightbe consid-
or transnational
ered partof the new dissentis the discourseofInternationalRelations,the practices
thatgive rise to the subjectsof internationalrelationsand constitutethe domain to
whichInternationalRelationstheQryis purportedlyonlyresponding.In thismore
far-reaching conceptionneithertheoristnor theoryescapes attention.For the con-
ception invoked by the rationalistsand realists,theoryremainsa toolfor analysis,
somethingthatmightbe moresensitively honed butthatnonethelesscan continueto
serveus (the theoristsand, of course,the practitioners). For the conceptionassoci-
ated withpoststructuralism, theoryis as much the objectofanalysisas the tool for
analysis.The concern,althoughno less practicalin itsimplications, is how analytic
approaches privilegecertainunderstandingsof global politicsand marginalizeor
excludeothers.It is a reorientation of analysisbestillustrated
by themovefromthe
Kantianquestionof "Whatcan I know"to the Foucauldianquestionof "How have
myquestionsbeen produced?"(Shapiro, 1988:14-15).
It is in thiscontextthatWalker(1989) has investigatedthe waythatmanyrealist
questionsand answershave been produced via a particularreadingof Machiavelli.
His conclusionis thatthedominanttraditionin InternationalRelationshas endorsed
a caricature,a narrowahistoricalreading,of the "paradigmaticrealist,"reduced to
instant formulas on the "priorityof power over ethics . . . the necessityof violence
and intrigue . . . ends justifying means and raison d'etat" (Walker, 1989:32). The
significanceof this kind of analysisis underscoredby Walker'spropositionthat
mainstreaminterpretations of Machiavelliare never "innocent"because, over the
years,theyhave "identifiedthe natureof the problem[s]to be addressedand [have]
situated[them]withina discursivespace thatboth definesand limitsthe legitimate
responseto the problems"(Walker,1989:40).26
Walker(1988a) has also been concernedwiththebroaderimplications of thiskind
of discursivepracticefortraditionalemphasison theconstruction of theworld.Faced
bythedangersand complexitiesof moderngloballife,suggestsWalker,we mustcast
offthelegacyof uncriticaljudgementand "isolatedprivilege"characteristic of West-
ern modernistdiscourseand listen,seriously,to marginalizedvoices,to different
historiesand culturalexperiences(Walker,1988a:22). We mustacknowledgeother
worlds.And in an interesting articulationof intellectualthemes,Walker'sbroadly-
definedpoststructuralistapproachis wedded to a concernwith"criticalsocialmove-
ments"and their"emancipatorypotential"(1988a:3).
The recentworkof those associatedwithpoststructuralist themestakesmanyof
the classicalconcernsand problemsof international relationsand analyzesthemin
termsof the way dominantdiscoursesdisciplinethe ambiguityand contingency of
globallife.Locatingthethemeof anarchyas centralto realistthought,Ashley(1987,
1988, 1989) has soughtto demonstratethatits statusas a givenis a matternot of
factualobservationbut of a particulardiscursivestrategy-thenotionof logocen-
trism-whichdisciplinesunderstanding in theformof dualizedhierarchiesof mean-
ing. This approach to analysistakesthecoherentand uniformappearance of much
26
For a similarreading of the neorealist'sappropriation of Thucydides, see Garst (1989).
Relations
of "reality"and seeks to show in a varietyof waysthatwhatwe take to be "real,"

timeless,and universal"is the arbitraryimpositionof a formof order" (Shapiro,
1987:14). In thiscontext,Der Derian (1987) has historicized thenotionof diplomacy
to demonstratehow,in the absence of centralagencyof powerin the international
system,thepowerof diplomacyhas been constituted and sustainedbythediscursive
practiceof the"diplomaticculture,"themediationof humankind'salienationfroma
sociallyconstructedpower. Shapiro has takenthe fictionof Franz Kafka and Don
DeLillo, withtheirquestioningof the meaningof "fear"and "danger,"to illustrate
howdangeris bureaucratizedin thecontemporary era to suchan extentthatthereis
no longer any correlationbetweenour immediateexperienceand the representa-
tionsof experiencewe consumeas citizensof a modernstate(Shapiro, 1988). In a
piece examiningU.S. foreignpolicytowardsCentralAmerica,Shapiro (1987:Ch. 3)
has shownthatforeignpolicycan be understoodas theprocessof making"strange"
the objectunder considerationin order to differentiate it from"us." In the case of
the constructionof the "CentralAmericanOther,"the resultantcombinationof
moral and geopoliticalcodes in U.S. foreignpolicydiscourseworksto make U.S.
intervention in the regionseem necessary,bothin termsof Americaninterestsand
thoseof thesubjectstate.In thiswayotherdiscoursesare delegitimizedor margina-
lized,therebylimitingthe range of politicaloptionsforpolicy.
On a relatedtheme,Gustersonhas demonstratedhowan "Orientalist" discourseis
at theheartof debatesovernuclearnonproliferation in theThird World.Maligning
Third World statesas the repositoryof poverty,irrationality, or instability
in the
internationalsystem,thisdiscourseservesto projecteverything thatthe Westfears
about itselfand the nuclearworldonto Third World states.27 An argumentthatis
supposedlyabout weaponsand strategy is,thus,a strategy to fixidentity(Gusterson,
forthcoming). Kleinhas argued thatdiscursivepracticesconcerningpeace and secu-
rity(1987, 1988b, 1989) should be seen as part of the largerprojectof modernity
which,by restricting the understandingof human communityto the level of the
state,foreclosesconsiderationof alternatives.In particular,he argues,the"Western
alliance"and NATO should be consideredas a set of politicaland discursiveprac-
ticesseekingto defenda wholewayof liferatherthana spatialentity(Klein, 1988a,
forthcoming). The same case has been made forU.S. foreignpolicy,thatitis a series
of politicalpracticeswhichlocatedangerin theexternalrealm-threatsof "individu-
ality","freedom"and commerce-as a meansof constructing theboundarybetween
thedomesticand theinternational, therebybringingtheidentity oftheUnitedStates
intoexistence(Campbell,forthcoming).
These issuesare of particularsaliencein the changinginternational environment
broughton by the alterationto Sovietforeignpolicyunder Gorbachev.Joenniemi
(forthcoming) has argued thatin no longerlivingup to the strict"otherness"pre-
scribedof it in the Cold War context,the SovietUnion is severelycomplicatingthe
identityof the West which has for so long depended on an "enemy"to contain
potentialchallengesto its own domesticsocial relations.28 Changes of thiskind are
beginningto pose seriousproblemsforcontemporary securitydiscourse,whichhas
restrictedconsiderationsof securityto the spatial exclusionof otherness(Dalby,
1988; Walker, 1988b). Such problemsare evidentin the debates over European
defensestrategiesand thefutureof NATO, as Dillonhas pointedout (1988a, 1988b,
1989) in demonstratinghow specificpolicydebates occur withinshared linguistic
27
For other discussions of the role of discursivestrategiesin the constitutionof the Third World see Escobar
(1984) and Manzo (1990).
28
For a detailed considerationof how the cold war textcame into being in the United States, see Nathenson
(1988).
frameworksthat constitute"formsof life" and therebydirectand limitpolitical

options.These developmentshave led to a reconsiderationof the role of nuclear
weaponswhichfocuseson the textualand interpretative codes thatgivemeaningto
otherwiseinertobjects,as withLuke (1989) employinginsightsfromsemioticsand
symbolicinteractionism to demonstratehow the functionof nuclearweapons is as
much one of signalingand signifying as preparationforactual war.
The impetusforthisnewdissentin InternationalRelationsscholarships, however,
does not restsolelywiththe metatheoretical developmentsof the interdisciplinary
debates.The tensionsof thesupposedlyunifiedtraditions of InternationalRelations
give thosetraditionsan open-endednessthatprovidesspace forcriticalexploration
of theirconstitution. For example,Ashley'sargumentconcerningthestatusof anar-
chyin InternationalRelationsdiscourseis made possiblebytheattention givenin the
mainstreamof the disciplineto nonstateactorsin world politics.29 This attention
servesto problematizethe stateas the rationalunitaryactor.Critiqueswere devel-
oped fromwithinthe mainstream(such as Allison,1971),but theyfailedto displace
the tradition'sfaithin the stateas the "hard core" of international relationstheory
and practice.The argumentmade by Ashleyand others(see Walker,1988b) is not
thatthestateis no longerimportantas eitheran actoror a presencein globalpolitics.
On thecontrary, theyhave recognizedthatthestateremainscentralto international
relations.Its survivalin the face of the internationalization of economicauthority
(among otherglobal changes) makesit worthyof extensiveconsideration,but at a
levelof analysissubstantially differentbut no less practicalthanthatwhichhas gone
before.As Ashleyargues,"theturnto nonstateactorsrendersradicallyunstableany
attemptto representa historicalfigure-the stateor anyother-as a pure presence,
a sovereignidentity thatmightbe a coherentsourceof meaningand an agencyof the
powerof reason in international history"(1988:234). Anydepictionof thestateas a
sovereignidentityin itsown rightis thusrevealedas but one among manypossible
interpretations, all of whichare possibleonlythrough"themanifestly politicalexclu-
sion of others"(Ashley,1988:251).
to overstatetheimplicationsof thisargumentfortheunderstanding
It is difficult
of internationalrelations,because it goes to the veryheartof how "international
relations"are constitutedand understood,and how the disciplineof International
Relationsunderstandsitsown historyand contemporary role. Bull once argued that
the theoryof internationalrelationswas concernedwithgeneral propositionsthat
may be advanced about the politicalrelationsamong states(Bull, 1972). Such a
propositionwould seem to manyto be unobjectionableto thepointof banality,butit
resolvesthe process of understandingglobal life in a particularway, througha
divisionbetweentheoryand practiceso thattheoryis outsideof theworlditpurports
simplyto observe.The interpretive approach,in contrast,sees theoryas practice:the
theoryof internationalrelationsis an instancein one siteof the pervasivecultural
practicesthatserveto disciplineambiguity.Experiencehas to be arrested,fixed,or
disciplinedforsociallifeto be possible.The formthatemergesthroughthisprocess
is thusbotharbitrary and nonarbitrary:arbitrary in thatit is one possibility
among
many,and nonarbitrary in "thesense thatone can inquireintothe historicalcondi-
tionswithinwhichone wayof makingtheworldwas dominantso thatwe nowhave a
worldthatpower has convened" (Shapiro, 1987:93). In thiscontext,international
relationstheoryis constitutive of-though by no meanssolelyresponsiblefor-the
understanding of globallifein termsof sovereignty and anarchy,insideand outside,
29 Kratochwiland Ruggie (1986:771) recognized in a similar vein that the clash between epistemologyand
ontologyin regimetheorywas not a productof theirparticulartheoreticalproclivities,but a Pandora's box opened
up when "the discipline gravitatedtoward an intersubjectiveontologyin the studyof internationalregimes."
Relations
stateand world.The "world"we so oftentakeforgrantedwas not givenbynature,

convenedby God, or planned by theintentionsof statesmen:it came to be through
multiplepoliticalpracticesrelatedas much to the constitution
of varioussubjectivi-
tiesas to the intentionalactionof predeterminedsubjects.
Conclusion
We do not claim here to have addressed all the themesinvokedin a discussionof
modernismand the InternationalRelationsdiscipline.Manyimportantissues have
not been touched on at all, including,forexample,workswhichseek to bringele-
mentsof contemporaryfeminismto the traditionalsubjectmatterof International
Relations(see Elshtain,1986; Millennium,1989). We have soughtin as comprehen-
sivetermsas possibleto touchon some of theintersections of thoughtwhichrecently
have energizedthe theory/practice debates across the Westernsocial sciences,and
whichare now at the heartof the criticalinterpretive debate in InternationalRela-
tions.We have indicatedthatwhiletraditionalnotionsof an alternative grandtheory
or synthesisare not part of the agenda of dissent(even if it were intellectually
possible),thereare commonthemeslinkingthe post-Wittgensteinian tradition,the
contributions of Winch and Kuhn, the perspectivesof CriticalTheory,and post-
structuralism. These broad patternsof dissentcome togetheraround the issue of
praxis,the questionof theoreticalanalysisand globallifein whichpoverty,militari-
zation,and oppressionare the norm. It is a dissatisfaction withthe waythattradi-
tional approaches to InternationalRelations(includingMarxistorthodoxy)have
confrontedthisissue thathas providedtheimpetusforthedissentof thepresent.In
the wake of (among otherdevelopments)the VietnamWar, a restructuring of the
world economy,the rise of religiousfundamentalism, the continuingstrugglefor
survivalof the great majorityof the world's peoples, and the new dangers and
opportunities of thesuperpowerrelationship, inclinedscholarshave looked
critically
withdismayat orthodoxresponsesthatinvokeand replicatethecaricatureddebates
and theoreticalunderstandingof the past. It is ironic,then,if not at all surprising,
that counter-critiques of the new interpretiveInternationalRelationsliterature
shouldallege a lackof "relevancy"to worldpoliticson thepartofthenewdissent(see
Keohane, 1988; Holsti, 1989).3?One scholarhas admonishedthose he termsthe
for leading InternationalRelationsstudyinto "purelytheoreticalde-
"reflectivists"
bate" whichdeflectsearnestresearchersfromthe "real" issues in favorof a "pro-
grammatically diversionary philosophicaldiscussion"(Keohane, 1988:382). Nothing
muchneeds to be said about such a statement, giventheargumentsabove. It simply
underlinesFrost's(1986) observationsabout the "backwardness"of the discipline,
and reaffirms theneed fora moresophisticated, tolerant,and open-endedapproach
to questionsof how we understandand explainglobal life.
This is not in any way to denigratethe effortsof those engaged in "concrete"
empiricalresearch.It is simplyto restatethatsuch researchis neverseparatefrom
the philosophical.It is important,therefore,to acknowledgethe concreteempirical
researchof recentdissentin InternationalRelations.These workshave been con-
cernedwiththepractical,relevantissuesof everydaygloballife:wealthand poverty,
lifeand death,thestruggleto understand,and theneed to change.The new dissent
has dealt withthe traditionalconceptsof global politics:the state,war, anarchy,
30 The "relevance" of mainstreamInternationalRelations scholarshipis much heralded, but its role as a source
of reformfor the recognized problemsof global lifeis a case waitingto be made. Those who claim relevance as a
standard by whichnew work is to be assessed also invariablyinsiston a theory/practice
divide whichautomatically
limitsthe impact of any scholarship.
sovereignty, security,and peace. It has also concerneditselfwiththe traditional

subjectsof global politics:nuclear strategy,superpowerforeignpolicy,diplomacy,
the defenseissuesof NATO, international regimesand the difficultiesof interstate
cooperation,the debt crisis,and underdevelopment. But it has done so in keeping
withmanyof the insightsof the interdisciplinary debates,refusingthe universalist
conceitsthatmask the illusoryclaim of a fitbetween"theory"and "reality"for an
appreciationof the role politicaland social practiceshave in makingthe world.
The new dissenthas been concernedwiththediscourseof international relations,
supplementingconcernabout the subjectsof international relationswitha focuson
thediscourseof thosesubjectsthatmakesthem(and notothers)historically possible.
It has done so in the face of whatBernstein(1983:16-20) has called the "Cartesian
anxiety,"the modernistpropositionwhichassertsthateitherwe have some sortof
ultimate"foundation"for our knowledgeor we are plunged into the void of the
relative,the irrational,the arbitrary,
the nihilistic.3'
Faced withthisCartesiananxiety,orthodoxscholarshipin InternationalRelations
willprobablycontinueto forgetthe silences,omissions,and limitations of the tradi-
tionalapproaches. But the ritualforgetting of the insightsof scholarsas diverseas
Wittgenstein, Winch,Kuhn, Habermas, Foucault,and Derrida-a forgetting that
mightbe characterizedas post-Cartesianamnesia-can only increasethe anxiety.
Onlybyexorcisingthe unfoundedbut seductiveidea thatsocialand politicallifehas
tobeorganizedbyrecourseto either one optionoranother,can we equip ourselvesto
deal withtheenormousissuesof praxisthatwe confront in globallife.The dissentof
the criticalsocial theoryand interpretive approaches in the disciplineof Interna-
tionalRelationsoffersa startin thisdirection.
References
ALKER, H. R., JR. (1988) The Dialectical Logic of Thucydides' Melian Dialogue. AmericanPolitical
ScienceReview82:805-20.
ALKER, H. R., JR. AND D. J. SYLVAN (1988) Foreign Policyas Tragedy: Sending 100,000 Troops to
Vietnam. Paper prepared for the XIVth World Congress of the InternationalPoliticalScience
Association,Washington,D.C., August 28-September 1.
ALLISON, G. (1971). The EssenceofDecision:ExplainingtheCubanMissileCrisis.Boston: Little,Brown
and Company.
ANDREWS, B. (1975). The State as Social Actor. WorldPolitics27:521-540.
ANDREWS, B. (1979) The Language of State Action. International Interactions
6:267-89.
ANDREWS, B. (1982) The PoliticalEconomy of World Capitalism.International Organization36:135-
163.
ANDREWS, B. (1984) The Domestic Content of International Desire. InternationalOrganization
38:321-27.
ASHLEY, R. K. (1981) PoliticalRealism and Human Interest.International StudiesQuarterly
25:204-36.
ASHLEY, R. K. (1984) The Povertyof Neorealism. International Organization38:225-86.
ASHLEY, R. K. (1987) The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Towards a Critical Social Theory of
InternationalPolitics.Alternatives
12:403-34.
ASHLEY, R. K. (1988) Untyingthe SovereignState: A Double Reading of the AnarchyProblematique.
Millennium:JournalofInternational Studies17:227-62.
ASHLEY, R. K. (1989) "Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism and War." In Internationall
31 The Cartesiananxietycan be foundevenin thewriting of a scholarwhois awareof theimportance of the

philosophicaldebatesdiscussedhere.Biersteker (1989)hasarguedthat"post-positivist
scholarshipdoesnotoffer
us anyclearcriteriaforchoosingamongthemultiple and competing explanationsitproduces."Biersteker
finds
solacein theevaluativeprocedures oflogicalpositivism
eventhough, as he admits,theyareproblematic.He then
proceedsto callforsomeexplicitdiscussions of evaluative
criteria
beforehe is willing
to takethe"leapfromthe
problematic terrainof positivism
intowhatcouldturnoutto be a post-positivistvoid."
290 Relations
Intertextual Relations:Postmodern Readingsof WorldPolitics,edited by J. Der Derian and M. J.

Shapiro, pp. 259-321. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
AusTIN,J.(1970)PhilosophicalPapers, editedbyJ.Urmsonand G. Warnock.Oxford: OxfordUniversity
Press.
BALL, T., ED. (1987) IdiomsofInquiry:Criticism and Renewalin PoliticalScience.Albany:State University
of New York Press.
BANKS,M. (1985) The Inter-ParadigmDebate. In International Relations:A HandbookofCurrentTheory,
edited by A. J. R. Groom and M. Light, pp. 7-26. London: Frances Pinter.
BEEHLER,R. AND A. R. DRENGSON, EDS. (1978) ThePhilosophy ofSociety.London: Methuen.
BERNSTEIN,R. J. (1976) The Restructuring ofSocial and PoliticalTheory.Londo: Methuen.
BERNSTEIN, R. J. (1983) BeyondObjectivism and Relativism:Science,Hermeneutics and Praxis. Oxford:
Basil Blackwell.
BERNSTEIN, R. J., ED. (1985) Habermasand Modernity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
BIERSTEKER, T. J. (1989) Critical Reflectionson Post-Positivism in InternationalRelations. Interna-
tionalStudiesQuarterly 33:236-67.
BOUCHER,D. (1985) Textsin Context.Dordrecht: Martin Nijhoff.
BULL, H. (1972) "The Theory of InternationalRelations, 1919-1969." In The Aberystwyth Papers:
International Politics1919-1969, edited by B. Porter,London: Oxford UniversityPress.
CAMPBELL, D. (1988) "Recent Changes in Social Theory: Questions for InternationalRelations." In
NewDirections in International edited by R. A. Higgott,pp. 11-67.
Relations:AustralianPerspectives,
Canberra: Department of InternationalRelations.
CAMPBELL, D. (1990) Global Inscription:How Foreign PolicyConstitutesthe United States.Alterna-
tives15(3).
CHILTON, P., ED. (1985) Language and theNuclearArmsDebate: NukespeakToday. London: Frances
Pinter.
COHN,C. (1987) Sex and Death in the Rational World of the Defense Intellectuals.Signs:AJournalof
Womenin Cultureand Society12:687-718.
CONNOLLY,W. E. (1987) Politicsand Ambiguity. Madison: Universityof WisconsinPress.
CONNOLLY,W. E. (1988) PoliticalTheoryand Modernity. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Cox, R. W. (1981) Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond InternationalRelationsTheory.
Millennium:JournalofInternational Studies10:126-155.
Cox, R. W. (1987) Production, Powerand WorldOrder:SocialForcesin theMakingofHistory.New York:
Columbia UniversityPress.
CRAIB, I. (1984) ModernSocial Theory fromParsonstoHabermas.Brighton: HarvesterPress.
CULLER, J.(1982). On Deconstruction: Theoryand Criticism AfterStructuralism. Ithaca:, NY: Cornell
UniversityPress.
DALBY,S. (1988) Geopolitical Discourse: The Soviet Union as Other. Alternatives 13:415-42.
DER DERIAN, J.(1987) On Diplomacy:A Genealogy of Western Estrangment. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
DER DERIAN,J.(1988) Philosophical Traditions in InternationalRelations. Millennium:Journalof
International Studies17:189-93.
DER DERIAN,J. (1989) "The Boundaries of Knowledge and Power in InternationalRelations." In
Relations:Postmodern
InternationallIntertextual Readingsof WorldPolitics,edited by J. Der Derian
and M. J. Shapiro, pp. 3-10. Lexington,MA: Lexington Books.
DER DERIAN,J. ANDM. J. SHAPIRO,EDS. (1989) InternationallIntertextual Relations:Postmodern Readings
of WorldPolitics.Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
DESCOMBES,V. (1980) ModernFrenchPhilosophy, translatedby L. Scott-Fox and J. M. Harding.
Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.
DEWS, P. (1987) Logics of Disintegration: Thoughtand theClaims of CriticalTheory.
Post-Structuralist
London: Verso.
DILLON,G. M. (1988a) Securityand Modernity.Paper prepared for the Universityof California's
Second Annual Conference on Discourse, Peace, Security and International Society, Bally-
vaughan, Ireland, August 6-13.
DILLON,G. M. (1988b) Defense,Discourseand Policymaking. Instituteon Global Conflictand Coopera-
tion, WorkingPaper No. 4. La Jolla: Universityof California,San Diego.
DILLON, G. M. (1989) The Falklands,Politicsand War. London: Macmillan.
DREYFUS, H. AND P. RABINOW (1982). MichelFoucault:BeyondStructuralism and Hermeneutics.Brighton:
Harvester Books.
ELSHTAIN,J. B. (1986) "CriticalReflectionson Realism,JustWar and Feminismin a Nuclear Age." In
NuclearWeaponsand theFutureofHumanity:TheFundamentalQuestions, edited by A. Cohen and S.
Lee, pp. 255-72. Totowa: Rowan and Allenheld.
ESCOBAR, A. (1984) Discourse and Power in Development: Michel Foucault and the Relevance of His
Work to the Third World. Alternatives 10:377-400.
FEYERABEND, P. (1964) "Realism and Instrumentalism:Commentson the Logic of Factual Support."
In TheCriticalApproachtoScienceandPhilosophy, edited byM. Bunge. New York: The Free Pressof
Glencoe.
FEYERABEND, P. (1968) "How to be a Good Empiricist:A Plea forTolerance in MattersEpistemologi-
cal." In ThePhilosophy ofScience,edited by P. H. Nidditch,pp. 12-39. London: Oxford Univer-
sityPress.
FLAX, J. (1981) Why EpistemologyMatters.JournalofPolitics.43:1006-24.
FOUCAULT, M. (1972) The Archeology of Knowledge,translatedby A. M. Sheridan Smith. London:
Tavistock.
FROST, M. (1986) Towardsa Normative TheoryofInternational Relations.Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versityPress.
GARST, D. (1989) Thucydides and Neorealism. International StudiesQuarterly33:3-27.
GELLNER, E. (1974) Legitimation ofBelief.Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.
GEORGE, J. (1989) InternationalRelations and the Search forThinking Space: Another View of the
Third Debate. International StudiesQuarterly 33:269-279.
GIDDENS, A. (1979) CentralProblems in Social Theory.London: Macmillan.
GIDDENS, A. (1982) Profiles and Critiquesin Social Theory.London: Macmillan.
GIDDENS, A. AND J. TURNER, EDS. (1987) Social Theory Today.Cambridge: PolityPress.
GUESS, R. (1981) TheIdea ofCriticalTheory: Habermasand theFrankfurt School.Cambridge: Cambridge
UniversityPress.
GUSTERSON, H. (1989) "Orientalismand the Bomb: The Neocolonial Discourse of Nuclear Non-
Proliferation."Paper presented at the Joint Annual Convention of BISA and ISA, London,
March 28-April 1, 1989.
GUTTING, G., ED. (1980) Paradigmsand Revolutions. South Bend, IN: Universityof Nortre Dame
Press.
HABERMAS, J. (1971) Knowledgeand Human Interests, translatedbyJ. Shapiro. London: Heinemann.
HABERMAS, J. (1974) Theory and Practice,translatedbyJ. Viertel.London: Heinemann.
HABERMAS, J. (1976) Legitimation Crisis,translatedby T. McCarthy.London: Heinemann.
HABERMAS, J. (1979) Communication and theEvolutionofSociety, translatedby T. McCarthy.London:
Heinemann.
HABERMAS,J. (1982) InHabermas:CriticalDebates, editedbyD. Held andJ. B. Thompson, pp.219-283.
London: Macmillan.
HABERMAS, J. (1984) Theoryof Communicative Action,vol. 1, translatedby T. McCarthy. Boston:
Beacon Press.
HABERMAS, J. (1987) The Philosophical DiscourseofModernity. Cambridge: PolityPress.
HABERMAS, J. (1988) Theoryof Communicative Action,vol. 2, translatedby T. McCarthy. Boston:
Beacon Press.
HEKMAN, J. (1983) Beyond Humanism: Gadamer, Althusser and the Methodology of the Social
Sciences. Western PoliticalQuarterly 36:98-115.
HEKMAN, J. (1986) Hermeneutics and theSociologyofKnowledge.Cambridge: PolityPress.
HELD, D. (1980) Introduction to CriticalTheory:Horkheimer toHabermas.London: Hutchinson.
HESSE, M. (1980) Revolutions and Reconstructions in thePhilosophyofScience.Brighton:HarvesterPress.
HOFFMANN, M. (1987) CriticalTheory and the Inter-ParadigmDebate. Millennium:Journal ofInterna-
tionalStudies16:231-49.
HOFFMAN, M. (1988) Conversationson CriticalInternationalRelationsTheory.Millennium:Journal of
International Studies17:91-95.
HOLLIS, M. AND S. LUKES, EDS. (1982) Rationality and Relativism.Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
HOLSTI, K. J.(1985) The DividingDiscipline:Hegemony and Diversityin International
Theory.Boston:
Allen and Unwin.
HOLSTI, K. J.(1989) Mirror on the Wall Which is the Fairest Theory of Them All? International
StudiesQuarterly 33:255-61.
HOLSTI, K. J.,R. SIVERSON, AND A. L. GEORGE, EDS. (1980) Changein theInternational System.Boulder,
CO: WestviewPress.
HOMER-DIXON, T. AND R. KARAPIN (1987) Following Political Debates: A New Approach to the
Window of Vulnerability.Cambridge, MA: MIT Thesis.
HOOK, G. D. (1984) The Nuclearization of Language: Nuclear Allergyas Political Metaphor. The
JournalofPeace Research21:259-75.
Relations
HORKHEIMER, M. (1972) CriticalTheory:SelectedEssays.New York: Herder and Herder.

JOENNIEMI, P. (1989) "The Social Constitutionof Gorbachev: From an Intruder to a Communal
Figure." Paper presentedat theJointAnnual Conventionof BISA and ISA, London, March 28-
April 1, 1989.
KEOHANE, R. 0. (1986a) Neorealism and Its Critics.New York: Columbia UniversityPress.
KEOHANE, R. 0. (1986b) Theory of World Politics:StructuralRealism and Beyond. In Neorealism and
Its Critics,edited by R. 0. Keohane, pp. 158-203. New York: Columbia UniversityPress.
KEOHANE, R. 0. (1988) International Institutions:Two Approaches. International StudiesQuarterly
32:379-96.
KLEIN, B. S. (1987) Strategic Discourseand itsAlternatives.Center on Violence and Human Survival,
Occasional Paper No. 3. New York: JohnJay College of CriminalJustice.
KLEIN, B. S. (1988a) Hegemony and StrategicCulture: American Power Projection and Alliance
Defense Politics.ReviewofInternational Studies14:133-49.
KLEIN, B. S. (1988b) AfterStrategy:Toward a PostmodernPoliticsof Peace. Alternatives 13:293-318.
KLEIN, B. S. (1989) "The Textual Strategiesof MilitaryStrategy:Or, Have You Read Any Good
Defense Manuals Lately?" In InternationallIntertextual Relations:Postmodern Readingson World
Politics,edited by J. Der Derian and M. J. Shapiro, pp. 97-112. Lexington, MA: Lexington
Books.
KLEIN, B. S. (forthcoming)"Beyond the Western Alliance: The Politics of Post-Atlanticism." In
AtlanticRelationsin theReagan Era and Beyond,edited by Stephen R. Gill. Brighton: Wheatsheaf
Books.
KRASNER, S., ED. (1983) International Regimes.Ithaca, NY: Cornell UniversityPress.
KRATOCHWIL, F. (1982) On the Notion of "Interest"in InternationalRelations.International Organiza-
tion36:1-30.
KRATOCHWIL, F. (1984). The Force of Prescriptions.International Organization38:685-708.
KRATOCHWIL, F. (1988) Regimes, Interpretationand the 'Science" of Politics:A Reappraisal. Millen-
nium:JournalofInternational Studies17:263-84.
KRATOCHWIL, F. (1989) Rules,Normsand Decisions.Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.
KRATOCHWIL, F. ANDJ. G. RUGGIE (1986) InternationalOrganization:The State of the Arton an Art
of the State. International Organization40:753-75.
KUHN, T. S. (1957) TheCopernican Revolution:Planetary Astronomyin theDevelopmentofWestern Thought.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress.
KUHN, T. S. (1970) The Structure Revolutions.2nd ed., enlarged. Chicago: Universityof
of Scientific
Chicago Press.
LAKATOS, I. (1970) "Falsificationand the Methodology of ScientificResearch Programmes." In
Criticism and theGrowthofKnowledge,edited by I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, pp. 91-196. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.
LAKATOS, I. AND E. ZAHAR (1975) "Why Did Copernicus' Research Program Supersede Ptolemy's?"
In TheCopernicanAchievement, edited by R. S. Westman.Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress.
LAPID, J. (1989) The Third Debate: On the Prospectsof InternationalRelationsin a Post-Positivist
Era. International StudiesQuarterly 33:235-54.
LIJPHART, A. (1974) The Structureof the Theoretical Revolutionin InternationalRelations.Interna-
tionalStudiesQuarterly18:41-69.
LINKLATER, A. (1982) Men and Citizensin theTheory Relations.London: Macmillan.
ofInternational
LINKLATER, A. (1986) Realism, Marxism and Critical InternationalTheory. Reviewof International
Studies12:301-312.
LUKE, T. (1989) "What's Wrong WithDeterrence?AlternativePerspectiveson InternationalConflict:
Semiotic and Symbolic Interpretationsof National Security."In InternationallIntertextual Rela-
tions:Postmodern Readingson WorldPolitics,edited byJ. Der Derian and M. J. Shapiro, pp. 207-
29. Lexigton, MA: Lexington Books.
MACDONELL, D. (1986) TheoriesofDiscourse.Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
MACINTYRE, A. (1971) AgainsttheSelfImage oftheAge. New York: Schocken Books.
MAGHOORI, R. AND R. RAMBERG, EDS. (1982) GlobalismVersusRealism:International RelationsThird
Debate.Boulder, CO: WestviewPress.
MANZO, K. (1990) Modernist Discourse and the Crisis of Development Theory. Williams College:
unpublished manuscript.
MASTERMAN, M. (1970) The Nature of a Paradigm. In Criticism and theGrowth ofKnowledge, edited by
I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, pp. 59-89. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.
MCCARTHY, T. (1978) The CriticalTheoryofJurgenHabermas.London: Hutchinson.

MEIKSINS WOOD, E. (1972) Mind and Society.Berkeley: Universityof California Press.
MENDELSON, J. (1979) THe Habermas-Gadamer Debate. New GermanCritique18:44-73.
Millennium:Journal of InternationalStudies (1989) Special Issue of Feminism and International
Theory.
MUELLER-VOLLMER, K., ED. (1985) The Hermeneutics Reader: Textsof theGermanTraditionfromthe
Enlightenment to thePresent.Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
NATHENSON, C. E. (1988) The Social Constructionof the Soviet Threat: A Study in the Politicsof
Representation.Alternatives 13:443-83.
OYE, K., ED. (1986) Cooperation UnderAnarchy.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.
PEARS, D. (1987) The False Prison:A Studyof theDevelopment of Wittgenstein's
Philosophy.New York:
Oxford UniversityPress.
PHILLIPS, D. L. (1977) Wittgenstein and ScientificKnowledge:A SociologicalPerspective.London: Mac-
millan.
POSTER, M. (1984) Foucault,Marxismand History. Cambridge: Polity.
RENGGER, N. J. (1988) Going Critical?A Response to Hoffmann.Millennium: JournalofInternational
Studies17:81-89.
RICHTERS, A. (1988) Modernity-Postmodernity Controversies:Habermas and Foucault. Theory, Cul-
tureand Society5:611-43.
Ross, A., ED. (1988) UniversalAbandon?The Politicsof Postmodernism. Minneapolis: Universityof
Minnesota Press.
RUGGIE,J. G. (1982) InternationalRegimes,Transactions,and Change: Embedded Liberalismin the
Postwar Economic Order. International Organization36:379-415.
RYAN, M. (1982) Marxismand Deconstruction: A CriticalArtzculation.
Baltimore:JohnsHopkins Univer-
sityPress.
SHAPIRO, M. J. (1987) ThePolztzcs ofRepresentation: Wrzting Practzces
inBzography,Photography and Polzcy
Analysis.Madison: Universityof WisconsinPress.
SHAPIRO, M. J. (1988) The Politicsof Fear: Don DeLillo's PostmodernBurrow. Strategzes 1:120-14 1.
SHAPIRO, M. J., G. M. BONHAM AND D. HERADSTVEIT (1988) A Discursive PracticesApproach to
Collective Decision-Making.International StudiesQuarterly 32:397-419.
SUPPE, F. (1977) The Structure ofScientific
Theories:Chicago: Universityof Illinois Press.
THOMPSON, J. B. (1981) CriticalHermeneutzcs: A Studyin theThoughtofPaul RzcoeurandJurgenHaber-
mas. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.
THOMPSON, J. B. AND D. HELD, EDS. (1982) Habermas:Critzcal Debates.Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
VASQUEZ, J. (1983) The PowerofPowerPolztzcs: A Critique.London: Frances Pinter.
WALKER, R. B. J. (1980) PoliticalTheory and theTransformation ofWorldPolztics.World Order Studies
Program,Occasional Paper No. 8. Princeton:Center for InternationalStudies.
WALKER, R. B. J. (1987) Realism, Change and InternationalPolitical Theory. International Studies
Quarterly 31:65-86.
WALKER, R. B. J. (1988a) One World/Many Worlds:Strugglesfor ajust WorldPeace. Boulder, CO: Lynne
Reiner.
WALKER, R. B. J. (1988b). The ConceptofSecurity and InternationalRelatzonsTheory.Instituteon Global
Conflictand Cooperation, WorkingPaper No. 3. La Jolla: Universityof California,San Diego.
WALKER, R. B. J. (1989) "The Prince and the Pauper: Tradition, Modernityand the Theory of
InternationalRelations." In InternationallIntertextual Relations:PostmodernReadzngson WorldPoli-
tics,edited byJ. Der Derian and M. J. Shapiro, pp. 25-48. Lexington,MA: Lexington Books.
WALTZ, K. (1979) Theory ofInternationalPolitics.Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
WENDT, A. E. (1987) The Agent-Structure Problem in InternationalRelationsTheory. International
Organization41:335-70.
WINCH, P. (1972) The Idea ofa Social Scienceand Its RelationtoPhzlosophy. New York: Routledge and
Kegan Paul.
WITTGENSTEIN, L. (1968) ThlePhzlosophzcal translatedby G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford:
Investzgatzio7s,
Basil Blackwell.
WOOD, E. M. (1972) Mind and Politics:An ApproachtotheMeaningofLiberaland SocialistIndivzdualism.
Berkeley: Universityof California Press.

Wiley-Blackwell The International Studies Association

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Wiley-Blackwell The International Studies Association

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration of Difference: Critical Social Theory and International

Patternsof Dissent and the Celebrationof

The voices of dissentproliferating in internationalstudiesover the past

?) 1990 InternationalStudies Association

plications"(Lapid, 1989:7) of criticalapproaches to the "theoryquestion."' Some

3The notion of a criticalsocial theoryemployed here is another analyticallyuseful termwhich incorporatesa

supplementthe criticalliteratureof the "thirddebate" witha particularkind of

theseissues over a number of yearsof figuressuch as Austin,Ryle,Strawson,Searle, and othersassociated withthe

Habermas,and poststructuralist approaches to modernity.We then seek to locate

From a New Theory of Language to a New Language of Theory

6 We are cognizantof criticisms thatmightbe aimed at a projectsuch as this.It mightbe argutedthatreturningto

underminedthe phenomenalistlogic of an approach to knowledgewhichtook as

Language conceivedthisway-not as an exclusivelydescriptivemediumbut as a

to a broader readership in the 1960s.

speech acts both constituteand limita specificunderstandingand organizationof

The QuestionofRationality:Winchand theSearchfor "PracticalWisdom"

the naturaland social sciences,Thomas Kuhn's workincreasedthe criticalmomen-

The Kuhnian Challenge: Towardsa Sociologyof Science

testing,but on the scientificcommunityas a whole acknowledgingthemselvesas

1986). For muchpostpositivist analysis(such as thetraditionof Dilthey),hermeneu-

CriticalTheory,Habermas, and the Politics of Emancipation

15 This is not to suggestthatall contemporarypostpositivist thinkingis of thiskind. On the contrary,the workof

understandingof theirhistory,culture,and politicalpowerhad been appropriated

emancipatoryelementin CriticalTheory,while rejectingits universalisttotalizing

Habermas'scriticshave been less than convincedby the CriticalTheory project

Theory as Practice: Poststructuralism

attitudeeschewsthis"hermeneutics of suspicion."It rejectsthe veryidea of "deep"

Challenges to "The Tradition": InternationalRelations and Critical

of thislegacywas obviousduringthe discipline's"greatdebate"of the 1960s,which

tal reasonwhicheffectively detachknowledgefromotherhumaninterests-namely

gins"and howand whethertheymightbe in theprocessofchange"(Cox, 1981:129).

On thequestionof how knowledge,truth,and meaningare constituted, the focus

of "reality"and seeks to show in a varietyof waysthatwhatwe take to be "real,"

frameworksthat constitute"formsof life" and therebydirectand limitpolitical

stateand world.The "world"we so oftentakeforgrantedwas not givenbynature,

sovereignty, security,and peace. It has also concerneditselfwiththe traditional

31 The Cartesiananxietycan be foundevenin thewriting of a scholarwhois awareof theimportance of the

Intertextual Relations:Postmodern Readingsof WorldPolitics,edited by J. Der Derian and M. J.

HORKHEIMER, M. (1972) CriticalTheory:SelectedEssays.New York: Herder and Herder.

MCCARTHY, T. (1978) The CriticalTheoryofJurgenHabermas.London: Hutchinson.

You might also like