INSTITUTION OF HEIRS Section 703 provides that actions to recover title or
possession of real property, actions to recover damages for
1SANTOS VS MANARANG, 27 PHIL 209 (1914)
FACTS:
Don Lucas de Ocampo, who died on November 18, 1906,
possessed real and personal properties, which he left to this
three (3) children by his last will and testament. The fourth
clause of the said will stipulated he had a list of debts that he
wanted his wife and executors to pay. Among the debts
mentioned are in favor of Isidro Santos, the plaintiff of this
case.
A probate of Don Lucas de Ocampo’s was then conducted
where a committee was appointed to hear and determine
claims against the estate. The committee submitted its report
to the court, but the claim of Isidro Santos as regards to the
late de Ocampo’s debt to him was excluded in the same.
Santos filed a petition to the court asking that the committee
be required to reconvene and pass upon (note: “pass upon,”
defined in legal terms means to be conveyed or transferred
by will, deed, or other instrument of conveyance) his claims
against the estate which were recognized in the will of
testator. He argued that he was not given due notice by the
committee to present his claim. The court denied the petition.
Aggrieved, Santos instituted proceedings against Leandra
Manarang, the administratrix of de Ocampo’s estate to
recover the sums mentioned in the will as due him. However,
the court ruled in favor of Manarang. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the lower court erred in refusing to reconvene
the committee for the purpose of considering plaintiff's
claims. (NO)
Whether or not the court erred in dismissing his petition
wherein he asks that the administratrix be compelled to pay
over to him the amounts mentioned in the will as debts due
him. (NO)
RULING:
As to the first issue, the Supreme Court held that the lower
court did not err in refusing to reconvene the committee for
the purpose of considering plaintiff's claims because his
claims were not included among those that the said
committee was authorized by law to pass upon (please refer
to above definition).
The Court pointed out the following provisions of the law as
regards to the determination if the claims of Santos really
deserved a reconvening of the committee that was appointed
to hear and determine claims against the estate of Don
Lucas de Ocampo:
Section 686 empowers the committee to try and decide
claims which survive against the executors and
administrators, even though they be demandable at a future
day "except claims for the possession of or title to real
estate."
Section 700 provides that all actions commenced against the
deceased person for the recovery of money, debt, or
damages, pending at the time the committee is appointed,
shall be discontinued, and the claims embraced within such
actions presented to the committee.
injury to person or property, real and personal, and actions to
recover the possession of specified articles of personal
property, shall survive, and may be commenced and
prosecuted against the executor or administrator; "but all
other actions commenced against the deceased before his
death shall be discontinued and the claims therein involved
presented before the committee as herein provided."
Section 708 provides that a claim secured by a mortgage or
other collateral security may be abandoned and the claim
prosecuted before the committee, or the mortgage may be
foreclosed or the security be relied upon, and in the event of
a deficiency judgment, the creditor may, after the sale of
mortgage or upon the insufficiency of the security, prove
such deficiency before the committee on claims.
There are also certain provisions in section 746 et seq., with
reference to the presentation of contingent claims to the
committee after the expiration of the time allowed for the
presentation of claims not contingent.
The claims of Santos did not fall within any of these sections
because they are described in the will as “debts”. There is
nothing in the will to indicate that any or all of them are
contingent claims, claims for the possession of or title to real
property, damages for injury to person or property, real or
personal, or for the possession of specified articles of
personal property. Nor is it asserted by Santos that they do.
The conclusion is that they were claims proper to be
considered by the committee.
So when and under what circumstances may the committee
be recalled to consider belated claims?
The Supreme stressed the provisions of Section 689:
That court shall allow such time as the
circumstances of the case require for the creditors
to present their claims the committee for
examination and allowance; but not, in the first
instance, more than twelve months, or less than six
months; and the time allowed shall be stated in the
commission. The court may extend the time as
circumstances require, but not so that the whole
time shall exceed eighteen months.
It cannot be questioned that thus section supersedes the
ordinary limitation of actions provided for in chapter 3 of the
Code. It is strictly confined, in its application, to claims
against the estate of deceased persons, and has been
almost universally adopted as part of the probate law of the
United States. It is commonly termed the statute of
nonclaims (note: it is defined as neglect or failure to make a
demand within the time limited by law), and its purpose is to
settle the affairs of the estate with dispatch, so that residue
may be delivered to the persons entitled thereto without their
being afterwards called upon to respond in actions for
claims, which, under the ordinary statute of limitations, have
not yet prescribed.
The object of the law in fixing a definite period
within which claims must be presented is to insure
the speedy settling of the affairs of a deceased
person and the early delivery of the property of the
estate in the hands of the persons entitled to
receive it. (Estate of De Dios, 24 Phil. Rep., 573.)
The Supreme also highlighted the provisions of Section 690:
 On application of a creditor who has failed to
present his claim, if made within six months after
the time previously limited, or, if a committee fails to
give the notice required by this chapter, and such
application is made before the final settlement of
the estate, the court may, for cause shown, and on
such terms as are equitable, renew the commission
and allow further time, not exceeding one month,
for the committee to examine such claim, in which
case it shall personally notify the parties of the time
and place of hearing, and as soon as may be make
the return of their doings to the court.
If the committee fails to give the notice required, that is a
sufficient cause for reconvening it for further consideration of
claims which may not have been presented before its final
report was submitted to the court. But, as stated above, this
is not the case made by the plaintiff, as the committee did
give the notice required by law.
Where the proper notice has been given the right to have the
committee recalled for the consideration of a belated claim
appears to rest first upon the condition that it is presented
within six months after the time previously limited for the
presentation of claims. In the present case the time
previously limited was six months from July 23, 1907. This
allowed the plaintiff until January 23, 1908, to present his
claims to the committee. However, the petition of Santos
was presented on July 14, 1909.
The Court concluded the first issue by saying that the maxim
“ignorantia legis neminem excusat” or ignorance of the law
excuses no one since in this case, Santos took too long to
realize his mistake and now seeks to assert his right when
they have been lost through his own negligence. 
As to the second issue, the Supreme Court ruled that the
court did not err in dismissing the petition of Santos wherein
he asks that the administratrix be compelled to pay over to
him the amounts mentioned in the will as debts due him.
While the Court concedes to the maxim, dicat testor et erit
lex or "the will of the testator is the law of the case," the law
imposes certain restrictions upon the testator, not only as to
the disposition of his estate, but also as to the manner in
which he may make such disposition.
Obviously, the plaintiff is not seeking possession of or title to
real property or specific articles of personal property.
When a committee is appointed as herein provided, no
action or suit shall be commenced or prosecute against the
executor or administrator upon a claim against the estate to
recover a debt due from the state; but actions to recover the
seizing and possession of real estate and personal chattels
claimed by the estate may be commenced against him. (Sec.
699, Code Civ. Proc.)
The sum of money prayed for in the complaint must be due
the plaintiff either as a debt of a legacy. If it is a debt, the
action was erroneously instituted against the administratrix.
Is it a legacy?
It is clear that this committee has nothing to do with legacies.
It is true that a debt may be left as a legacy, either to the
debtor (in which case it virtually amounts to a release), or to
a third person. But this case can only arise when the debt is
an asset of the estate. It would be absurd to speak of a
testator's leaving a bare legacy of his own debt. (Arts. 866,
878, Civil Code.)
The creation of a legacy depends upon the will of the
testator, is an act of pure beneficence, has no binding
force until his death, and may be avoided in whole or in
part by the mere with whim of the testator, prior to that
time. A debt arises from an obligation recognized by law (art.
1089, Civil Code) and once established, can only be
extinguished in a lawful manner. (Art. 1156, id.) Debts are
demandable and must be paid in legal tender.
Legacies may, and often do, consist of specific articles of
personal property and must be satisfied accordingly. In order
to collect as legacy the sum mentioned in the will as due
him, the plaintiff must show that it is in fact a legacy and not
a debt. As he has already attempted to show that this sum
represents a debt, it is an anomaly to urge now it is a legacy.
Was it the intention of the testator to leave the plaintiff a
legacy of P7,454? We have already touched upon this
question. Plaintiff's claim is described by the testator as a
debt. It must be presumed that he used this expression in its
ordinary and common acceptation; that is, a legal liability
existing in favor of the plaintiff at the time the will was made,
and demandable and payable in legal tender. Had the
testator desired to leave a legacy to the plaintiff, he
would have done so in appropriate language instead of
including it in a statement of what he owed the plaintiff.
The decedent's purpose in listing his debts in his will is set
forth in the fourth clause of the will, quoted above. There is
nothing contained in that clause which indicates, even
remotely, a desire to pay his creditors more than was legally
due them.
2HEIRS OF PM URITA, SR. VS HEIRS OF LM URITA, 657
SCRA 555 (2011)
FACTS: In his lifetime, Alfonso Ureta (Alfonso) begot 14
children (Policronio, Liberato, Narciso, Prudencia, Vicente,
Francisco, Inocensio, Roque, Adela, Wenefreda, Merlinda,
Benedicto, Jorge, and Andres) The children/heirs of
Policronio, are opposed to the rest of Alfonso’s children and
their descendants (Heirs of Alfonso). Alfonso was financially
well-off during his lifetime. He owned several fishpens, a
fishpond, a sari-sari store, a passenger jeep, and was
engaged in the buying and selling of copra. Policronio, the
eldest, was the only child of Alfonso who failed to finish
schooling and instead worked on his father’s lands.
Alfonso, Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, and Francisco, met
at the house of Liberato. Francisco, who was then a
municipal judge, suggested that in order to reduce the
inheritance taxes, their father should make it appear that he
had sold some of his lands to his children. Accordingly,
Alfonso executed four (4) Deeds of Sale covering several
parcels of land in favor of Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia,
and his common-law wife, Valeriana Dela Cruz. The Deed of
Sale in favor of Policronio covered six parcels of land, which
are the properties in dispute in this case. Since the sales
were only made for taxation purposes and no monetary
consideration was given, Alfonso continued to own, possess
and enjoy the lands and their produce.
When Alfonso died, Liberato acted as the administrator of his
father’s estate. He was later succeeded by his sister
Prudencia, and then by her daughter, Carmencita Perlas.
Except for a portion of parcel 5, the rest of the parcels
transferred to Policronio were tenanted by the Fernandez
Family. These tenants never turned over the produce of the
lands to Policronio or any of his heirs, but to Alfonso and,
later, to the administrators of his estate.
Policronio died. Except for the said portion of parcel 5,
neither Policronio nor his heirs ever took possession of the
subject lands.
Alfonso’s heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition,
which included all the lands that were covered by the
aforementioned four (4) deeds of sale. Conrado, Policronio’s
eldest son, representing the Heirs of Policronio, signed the
Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in behalf of his co-heirs.
After their father’s death, the Heirs of Policronio found tax
declarations in his name covering the six parcels of land and
they obtained a copy of the Deed of Sale executed by
Alfonso in favor of Policronio. Not long after, the Heirs of
Policronio allegedly learned about the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition involving Alfonso’s estate when it was published in
the Aklan Reporter. Believing that the six parcels of land
belonged to their late father, and as such, excluded from the
Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, the Heirs of Policronio
sought to amicably settle the matter with the Heirs of
Alfonso. Earnest efforts proving futile, the Heirs of Policronio
filed a Complaint for Declaration of Ownership, Recovery of
Possession, Annulment of Documents, Partition, and
Damages9 against the Heirs of Alfonso before the RTC
where the following issues were submitted: (1) whether or
not the Deed of Sale was valid; (2) whether or not the Deed
of Extra-Judicial Partition was valid; and (3) who between the
parties was entitled to damages.
RTC: dismissed the Complaint of the Heirs of Policronio and
ruled in favor of the Heirs of Alfonso. It found that, among
others, the Heirs of Alfonso clearly established that the Deed
of Sale was null and void; that although tax declarations
were issued in the name of Policronio, he or his heirs never
took possession of the subject lands except a portion of
parcel 5; and that all the produce were turned over by the
tenants to Alfonso and the administrators of his estate and
never to Policronio or his heirs; that there was no money
involved in the sale, even granting that there was, as claimed
by the Heirs of Policronio, P2,000.00 for six parcels of land,
the amount was grossly inadequate; and that the aggregate
area of the subject lands was more than double the average
share adjudicated to each of the other children in the Deed
of Extra-Judicial Partition. The Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition, on the other hand, was declared valid as all the
heirs of Alfonso were represented and received equal shares
and all the requirements of a valid extra-judicial partition
were met.
CA: it affirmed the finding of the RTC that the Deed of Sale
was void but annulled the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
due to the incapacity of one of the parties to give his consent
to the contract. It held that before Conrado could validly bind
his co-heirs to the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, it was
necessary that he be clothed with the proper authority. The
CA ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for the proper
partition of the estate, with the option that the parties may
still voluntarily effect the partition by executing another
agreement or by adopting the assailed Deed of Partition with
the RTC’s approval in either case. Otherwise, the RTC may
proceed with the compulsory partition of the estate in
accordance with the Rules.
MRs by the respective parties were denied by the CA for
lack of merit. Hence, the present Petitions for Review on
Certiorari.
The Heirs of Policronio argued that, among other things,
even assuming that the Heirs of Alfonso have an interest in
the Deed of Sale, they would still be precluded from
questioning its validity. They posited that the Heirs of Alfonso
must first prove that the sale of Alfonso’s properties to
Policronio substantially diminished their successional rights
or that their legitimes would be unduly prejudiced,
considering that under Article 842 of the Civil Code, one who
has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided
that he does not contravene the provisions of the Civil Code
with regard to the legitime of said heirs. Having failed to do
so, they argued that the Heirs of Alfonso should be
precluded from questioning the validity of the Deed of Sale.
ISSUE: W/N Article 842 is applicable in the case at bar.
RULING: No.
Article 842 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 842. One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose
by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person
having capacity to succeed.
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate
provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code
with regard to the legitime of said heirs.
This article refers to the principle of freedom of disposition by
will. What is involved in the case at bench is not a disposition
by will but by Deed of Sale. Hence, the Heirs of Alfonso need
not first prove that the disposition substantially diminished
their successional rights or unduly prejudiced their legitimes.
(Preterition (Art. 854) has been defined as the total omission
of a compulsory heir from the inheritance. It consists in the
silence of the testator with regard to a compulsory heir,
omitting him in the testament, either by not mentioning him
at all, or by not giving him anything in the hereditary property
but without expressly disinheriting him, even if he is
mentioned in the will in the latter case. Preterition is thus a
concept of testamentary succession and requires a will. In
the case at bench, there is no will involved. Therefore,
preterition cannot apply.)
3DEL ROSARIO VS DEL ROSARIO, 2 PHIL 34 (1903)
FACTS: Don Nicolas del Rosario died in this city on July 14,
1897, leaving a last will, the eighth, ninth, eleventh, and
eighteenth clauses of which are as follows:
"Eighth. The testator declares that the 5,000 pesos which he
brought to his marriage he hereby bequeaths to his nephews
Enrique Gloria y Rosario and Ramon del Rosario, natural
children of his brother Clemente del Rosario,
notwithstanding the fact that they purport to be the issue of
the marriage of Escolastico Gloria and Rosendo del Rosario,
successively.
"Ninth. The testator declares that the said sum of 5,000
pesos is to be divided, 3,000 pesos for the first named and
2,000 pesos for the second named, the delivery of the said
sums to be effected by the wife of the testator, provided that
these young men behave themselves as they have done up
to the present time, and do not cease to study until taking
the degree of bachelor of arts, and then take a business
course, if their health will permit, their support to be paid out
of the testamentary estate and they to live in the house of
the widow.
"Eleventh. The testator declares that in case the said young
men should be still engaged in study at the time of the death
of the testator’s wife, they shall continue to be supported at
the expense of the testamentary estate, without deducting
such expenses from their legacies, if they should desire to
continue the same studies.
"Eighteenth. The testator further states that although his wife
is at the present time fifty-five years of age, and
consequently is not likely to marry again, as she herself
says, nevertheless it is possible that the opposite of what
she asserts might occur, and, if so, then it is to be regarded
as sufficient reason to authorize the young men Ramon and
Enrique, so often referred to, to separate from their aunt, in
which event they are to be supported by the testamentary
estate on a small allowance of twenty-five pesos per month,
provided that they continue their studies or should be in poor
health, this without in any respect reducing the amount of
their shares."
Don Ramon del Rosario, one of the persons mentioned in
these clauses, brought this action in 1902 against Don
Clemente del Rosario, the then executor, asking, among
other things, that the said executor pay him an allowance
from the death of the widow of the testator at the rate of 75
pesos a month, and that the executor allow him to live in the
house in which the widow was living at that time. The widow
of the testator, Doña Honorata Valdez, died on July 7, 1900.
The court below ordered judgment in respect to this
allowance, and the right to live in the house as prayed for by
the plaintiff.
While by the eighth clause the support of the plaintiff and of
Don Enrique Gloria is charged against the estate, yet the
eleventh clause makes it plain that this unconditional right
was to last only during the lifetime of the widow. After her
death the right to this allowance is made to depend on the
continuance of their studies. That this is the correct
construction of the will is made more plain by the eighteenth
clause above quoted. In the case of their separation from
their aunt by her remarriage, they were entitled to the
specified allowance of 25 pesos a month only on condition
that they were pursuing, their studies or were in poor health.
The plaintiff was still pursuing his studies. On the contrary,
he found that the plaintiff had fulfilled the condition by
obtaining the degree of bachelor of arts in 1898.
The right to live in the house of the widow terminated at her
death.
The seventh clause of the will of Don Nicolas is was later
modified by a codicil, as follows:
"That in the seventh clause of said testament he desires and
wills that in the distribution of his property and that of his wife
among the male children of his brothers, Clemente and
Rosendo del Rosario, and those of his sister, Luisa del
Rosario, in such distribution his nephews Enrique Gloria and
Ramon del Rosario must be understood to be included, in
addition to the legacies mentioned in his said testament."
The thirteenth clause of his will was modified by the codicil
as follows:
"That in the thirteenth clause the testator provided that upon
the death of his sister, Luisa del Rosario, her male children
were to inherit from her up to the sum of 1,000 pesos, and
this he rectifies, for better understanding, to the effect that it
is his will that the remainder of all her portion should be
divided into equal parts, one-third to go to his brother Don
Clemente del Rosario and the other two thirds to be divided
equally among his said nephews, Enrique Gloria and Ramon
del Rosario."
Doña Honorata Valdez made her will three days after that of
her husband. The seventh clause is as follows:
"The testatrix declares that she institutes her beloved
husband, Don Nicolas del Rosario y Alejo, as her heir to all
the property which she may have at her death, and in the
unexpected case of the death of her said husband then she
institutes as heirs her brothers-in-law, Don Rosendo and
Don Clemente del Rosario y Alejo, and her sister-in-law,
Doña Luisa del Rosario, who shall enjoy the usufruct during
their lifetime of all the revenue of the said property. Upon the
death of any of them, then the property shall pass to the
male children of her said brothers-in-law and sister-in-law,
the issue of lawful marriage or natural children who may be
known; but upon the death of her sister-in-law, Doña Luisa,
then her share shall not pass in its entirety to her male
children, except the sum of 1,000 pesos, and the remainder
shall be paid to her nephews, Don Enrique Gloria and Don
Ramon del Rosario, natural children of her brother-in-law
Don Clemente del Rosario."
Doña Luisa died one year after Don Nicolas and two years
before the death of Doña Honorata, which, as has been said,
occurred on July 7, 1900. Don Enrique Gloria died on July 6,
1900.
Don Ramon del Rosario claims in this action that he is now
entitled, by virtue of both wills, to a certain part of the share
of the estates left to said Doña Luisa during her life, and he
asks that the defendant be directed to render accounts and
to proceed to the partition of the said estates. The
controversy between the parties upon this branch of the case
is as follows:
Defendant: The defendant claims that the plaintiff is entitled
to nothing under the wills, because the gift to him was
conditional, the condition being that he should be the natural
son of Don Clemente, recognized by the latter as such in
one of the ways pointed out by the Civil Code; that he cannot
prove such recognition, the parol evidence presented at the
trial being prohibited by said Code, and that he has therefore
not complied with the condition.
Plaintiff: The plaintiff claims that such evidence was proper,
that both wills state that Don Ramon del Rosario is the
natural son of Don Clemente, and that in any event the
bequests are made to the plaintiff by name.
The court below, holding the parol evidence immaterial,
ordered judgment for the plaintiff as prayed for.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled as an heir
RULING: Yes. Where legatees are pointed out by name in
the will the fact that they are referred to as the natural sons
of a third person does not make the legacy conditional upon
proof of such relationship but is descriptive merely.
So far as the disposition of that part of the inheritance left in
the aunt’s will to Doña Luisa for life is concerned, the
question is free from doubt. It is distinctly declared that
Ramon del Rosario and Enrique Gloria shall take certain
parts of it after 1,000 pesos have been deducted. They are
pointed out by name as the legatees. It is true that they are
called the natural sons of Don Clemente. But this is merely a
further description of persons already w ell identified, and, if
false, can be rejected in accordance with the provision of
article 773 of the Civil de, which by article 789 is applicable
to legatees.
4BELEN VS BPI, 109 PHIL 1008, 1960

FACTS: Benigno Diaz executed a codicil on September 29,
1944. When Diaz died, the codicil was admitted to probate.
The estate was placed under the administration of BPI.
10 years later, Filomena Diaz died, leaving two legitimate
children, Milagro Olaguera and Onesima Belen Onesima
files a petition in Special Proceedings contending that the
estate of Filomena under the codicil should only be divided
between her and Milagros, to the exclusion of the 7
legitimate children of Milagros. Onesima, as legatee, prayed
that BPI be ordered to deliver her ½ of whatever share is due
to Filomena.
The court denied this petition and held that the share of
Filomena should also be distributed among her
grandchildren. Descendientes include not only children but
also grandchildren.
Onesima appealed and argued that: the term “sus
descendeintes legitimos” as used in the codicil, should be
interpreted to mean descendants nearest in degree to the
original legatee Filomena. In this case, they are her two
daughters, Milagros and Onesima, excluding the 7
grandchildren of said legatee.
ISSUE: Whether the words “sus descendientes legitimos”
(their legitimate descendants) refer conjointly to all living
descendants (children and grandchildren) of the legatee, as
a class.
HELD: YES, it refers to all living descendants
Onesima cited Art 959 (old Art 751) of the Civil Code stating
"A distribution made in general terms in favor of the testator's
relatives shall be understood as made in favor of those
nearest in degree."
The argument fails to note that this article is specifically
limited in its application to the case where the beneficiaries
are relatives of the testator, not those of the legatee. In such
an event, the law assumes that the testator intended to refer
to the rules of intestacy, in order to benefit the relatives
closest to him.
The ratio legis (that among a testator's relatives the closest
are dearest) obviously does not apply where the
beneficiaries are relatives of another person (the legatee)
and not of the testator. There is no logical reason in this case
to presume that the testator intended to refer to the rules of
intestacy, for he precisely made a testament and provided
substitutes for each legatee; nor can it be said that his
affections would prefer the nearest relatives of the legatee to
those more distant, since he envisages all of them in a
group, and only as mere substitutes for a preferred
beneficiary.
Should Article 959 (old Art. 751) be applied by analogy?
There are various reasons against this. The most important
one is that under this article, as recognized by the principal
commentators on the Code of 1889, the nearest exclude all
the farther relatives and the right of representation does not
operate.
The result would be that by applying to the descendants of
Filomena Diaz the "nearest relatives" rule of Article 959, the
inheritance would be limited to her children, or anyone of
them, excluding the grandchildren altogether. This could
hardly be the intention of the testator who, in the selfsame
clause 10 of his codicil (ante), speaks of "cuatro hijos de mi
difunto hermano Fabian" and of "los hijos de Domingo
Legarda," as well as of "descendientes legitimos" of the
other legatees, to us indicating clearly that he understood
well that hijos and descendientes are not synonymous terms.
Observe that, in referring to the substitutes of Filomena Diaz,
Nestor Santiago and Isabel M. de Santiago, the testator,
does not even use the description "sus hijos 6
descendientes," but only "descendientes".
It is suggested that "descendientes legitimos" could mean
the nearest descendant but with right of representation in
favor of the more distant relatives. Unquestionably, the
testator was at liberty to provide a series of successive
substitutions in the order of proximity of relationship to the
original legatee. And he, likewise, was free to ordain that the
more distant descendants should enjoy the right of
representation as in intestate succession. But to arrive at
such conclusion, we must declare that the testator had:
(a) Rejected, or intended to reject, the right of accretion
among co-heirs and co-legatees, as established for
testamentary successions by Articles 1016 (old Art. 982) and
1019, and intended to replace such accretion with
representation:
"Art. 1016. In order that the right of accretion may take place
in a testamentary succession, it shall be necessary:
(1) That two or more persons he called to the same
inheritance, or to the same portion thereof, pro indiviso; and
(2) That one of the persons thus called die before the
testator or renounce the inheritance, or be incapacitated to
receive it.
*******
Art. 1019. The heirs to whom the portion goes by the right of
accretion take it in the same proportion that they inherit."
(b) Refused, likewise, the rule of Article 846 (reproduced
from Article 765 of the Code of 1889) providing that:
"Heirs instituted without designation of shares shall inherit- in
equal parts", which would not obtain if the right of
representation were to apply;
(c) Rejected finally the rule of Article 1022 (old Art. 986), that
vacancies in the free part should be filled according to the
rules of accretion, or substitution (not representation); and in
default of these two, ultimately inherited by the testator's own
heirs intestate:
"Art. 1022. In testamentary succession, when the right of
accretion does not take place, the vacant portion of the
instituted heirs, if no substitute has been designated, shall
pass to the legal heirs of the testator, who shall receive it
with the same charges and obligations."
5MORALES VS OLONDRIZ, 783 SCRA 151, 2016
FACTS: Alfonso Juan P. Olondriz, Sr. (the decedent) died
on June 9, 2003. He was survived by his widow, Ana Maria
Ortigas de Olondriz, and his children: Alfonso Juan O.
Olondriz, Jr., Alejandro Marino O. Olondriz, Isabel Rosa O.
Olondriz, Angelo Jose O. Olondriz, and Francisco Javier
Maria Bautista Olondriz. His widow and children are
collectively referred to as the respondent heirs.
Believing that the decedent died intestate, the respondent
heirs filed a petition with the Las Piñas RTC for the partition
of the decedent's estate and the appointment of a special
administrator on July 4, 2003.
However, on July 28, 2003, Iris Morales filed a separate
petition with the RTC alleging that the decedent left a will
dated July 23, 1991. Morales prayed for the probate of the
will and for her appointment as special administratrix.
The pertinent portions of the decedent's will reads:
Upon my death, IRIS MORALES OLONDRIZ shall be the
executor hereof and administrator of my estate until its
distribution in accordance herewith, x x x
My entire estate shall be divided into six (6) parts to be
distributed equally among and between (1) IRIS MORALES
OLONDRIZ, my children (2) ALFONSO JUAN OLONDRIZ,
JR., (3) ALEJANDRO OLONDRIZ, (4) ISABEL OLONDRIZ,
(5) ANGELO OLONDRIZ, and their mother (6) MARIA
ORTEGAS OLONDRIZ, SR.
Notably, the will omitted Francisco Javier Maria Bautista
Olondriz, an illegitimate son of the decedent.
On January 6, 2004, the respondent heirs moved to dismiss
the probate proceedings because Francisco was preterited
from the will.
RTC RULING:
The RTC observed: (1) that Morales expressly admitted that
Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz is an heir of the
decedent; (2) that Francisco was clearly omitted from the
will; and (3) that based on the evidentiary hearings,
Francisco was clearly preterited. Thus, the RTC reinstated
Alfonso Jr. as administrator of the estate and ordered the
case to proceed in intestacy.
CA RULING:
On May 27, 2011, the CA dismissed Morales' petition for
certiorari. The CA reasoned that while probate proceedings
take precedence over intestate proceedings, the preterition
of a compulsory heir in the direct line annuls the institution of
heirs in the will and opens the entire inheritance into
intestate succession.
Petitioner Contends:
Morales maintains that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it ordered the case to proceed intestate
because: (1) the probate of a decedent's will is mandatory;
(2) the RTC Branch 254 already ordered the case to proceed
into probate; (3) the order setting the case for probate
already attained finality; (4) the probate court cannot touch
on the intrinsic validity of the will; and (5) there was no
preterition because Francisco received a house and lot inter
vivos as an advance on his legitime.
Respondents Contend:
The respondent heirs counter: (1) that it is within the RTC's
jurisdiction to reverse or modify an interlocutory order setting
the case for probate; (2) that the petitioner failed to mention
that she did not appear in any of the evidentiary hearings to
disprove their allegation of preterition; (3) that the RTC and
the CA both found that Francisco was preterited from the
will; and (4) that Francisco's preterition annulled the
institution of heirs and opened the case into intestacy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the pretiration of one of the
compulsory heirs opens the inheritance to an intestate
succession
Held: YES.
Preterition is the complete and total omission of a
compulsory heir from the testator's inheritance without the
heir's express disinheritance.
Article 854 of the Civil Code states the legal effects of
preterition:
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of
the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the
time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises
and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the
testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to
the right of representation.
Under the Civil Code, the preterition of a compulsory heir in
the direct line shall annul the institution of heirs, but the
devises and legacies shall remain valid insofar as the
legitimes are not impaired. Consequently, if a will does not
institute any devisees or legatees, the preterition of a
compulsory heir in the direct line will result in total intestacy
In the present case, the decedent's will evidently omitted
Francisco Olondriz as an heir, legatee, or devisee. As the
decedent's illegitimate son, Francisco is a compulsory heir in
the direct line. Unless Morales could show otherwise,
Francisco's omission from the will leads to the conclusion of
his preterition.
During the proceedings in the RTC, Morales had the
opportunity to present evidence that Francisco received
donations inter vivos and advances on his legitime from the
decedent. However, Morales did not appear during the
hearing dates, effectively waiving her right to present
evidence on the issue. We cannot fault the RTC for reaching
the reasonable conclusion that there was preterition.
6NERI VS AKUTIN, 72 PHIL 322, 1941
FACTS: This is a case where the testator Agripino Neri in his
will left all his property by universal title to the children by his
second marriage, the herein respondents, with omission of
the children by his first marriage, the herein petitioner. The
omission of the heirs in the will was contemplated by the
testator with the belief that he had already given each of the
children portion of the inheritance, particularly a land he had
abandoned was occupied by the respondents over which
registration was denied for it turned out to be a public land,
and an aggregate amount of money which the respondents
were indebted to their father.

Agripino Neri y Chavez, who died on December 12, 1931,
had by his first marriage six children named Eleuterio,
Agripino, Agapito, Getulia, Rosario and Celerina; and by his
second marriage with Ignacia Akutin, five children named
Gracia, Godofredo, Violeta, Estela Maria, and Emma.
Getulia, daughter in the first marriage, died on October 2,
1923, that is, a little less than eight years before the death of
said Agripino Neri y Chavez, and was survived by seven
children named Remedios, Encarnacion, Carmen, Trinidad,
Luz, Alberto and Minda. In Agripino Neri's testament, which
was admitted to probate on March 21, 1932, he willed that
his children by the first marriage shall have no longer any
participation in his estate, as they had already received their
corresponding shares during his lifetime.
RTC: At the hearing for the declaration of heirs, the trial
court found, contrary to what the testator had declared in his
will, that all his children by the first and second marriages
intestate heirs of the deceased without prejudice to one-half
of the improvements introduced in the properties during the
existence of the last conjugal partnership, which should
belong to Ignacia Akutin.
CA: The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision
with the modification that the will was "valid with respect to
the two-thirds part which the testator could freely dispose of.
"This judgment of the Court of Appeals is now sought to be
reviewed in this petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals
invoked the provisions of article 851 of the Civil Code, which
read in part as follows:
Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause, or for
a cause the truth of which, if contradicted, is not proven, ...
shall annul the institution of the heir in so far as it prejudices
the person disinherited; but the legacies, betterments, and
other testamentary dispositions, in so far as they do no
encroach upon the legitime, shall be valid.
ISSUE: Should there be cancellation of the will, in view of the
omission of heirs? Is there disinheritance in this case?
HELD: Yes. The Court annulled the institution of heirs and
declared a total intestacy on the ground that testator left all
his property by universal title to the children by his second
marriage, without expressly disinheriting the children by his
first marriage but upon the erroneous belief that he had
given them already more shares in his property than those
given to the children by his second marriage. 
Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause, if
contested, shall annul the institution of heirs in so far as it is
prejudicial to the disinherited person. This is but a case of
preterition which annuls the institution of heirs.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the
forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not
mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited (Cf. 6
Manresa, 346.)
In the instant case, while the children of the first marriage
were mentioned in the will, they were not accorded any
share in the hereditary property, without expressly being
disinherited. It is, therefore, a clear case of preterition as
contended by appellants.
7LAJOM VS LEUTERIO, 107 PHIL 651, 1960
FACTS: Maximo  Viola  died  on  September  3,  1933.  1. PEREZ VS GARCHITORENA, 54 PHIL 431, 1930 -
Judicial  proceedings  of  his  testate  estate  were  instituted 
in the  Court  of  First  Instance.  In 1935, an agreement  of 
partition  and  distribution  was  executed  by  and  between
Jose  P. Viola, Rafael Viola and  Silvio  Viola, legitimate 
children of  Maximo  Viola  and  Juana Toura,  where the 
properties  left  by  their  father,  Maximo  Viola,  were 
divided  among  themselves. This was granted and
terminated in 1937.
In 1939, Donato  Lajom  filed  a complaint  praying that he
be  declared  a  natural  child  of  Maximo  Viola,  impliedly
recognized  and  acknowledged  in  accordance  with the 
laws  in  force  prior  to  the  Civil  Code,  thereby  being a 
co-heir  of  Jose  P.  Viola,  Rafael  Viola  and  Silvio  Viola; 
that  the  agreement  of  partition  and  distribution executed
in  1935  by  these  three  legitimate  children of  Maximo 
Viola be  declared  null  and  void, and after collation,
payment of debts and accounting of fruits, a new partition be
ordered adjudicating one-seventh of the estate left by
Maximo Viola to Donato Lajom and two-seventh to each of
the three respondents.
Respondents maintained that they are the sole heirs of
Maximo Viola; that petitioner was fully aware of the
proceedings which was terminated two years before he filed
an action and that without having previously asserted any
right whatsoever to any part of said estate, he is now barred
from doing so; and that assuming the appellee to be an
acknowledged natural child of Maximo Viola, his right of
action had prescribed.
The CFI Nueva Ecija rendered a decision in favor of the
petitioner and was affirmed by CA on appeal. The decision
annulled the partition entered into by the respondents and
ordered the collation of all the properties in question. The
properties in question were described in an inventory
attached to petitioner’s original complaint in case No. 8077
and did not include a certain riceland with an area of 215
hectares. Petitioner instituted this present case and alleged
that the said riceland should be included in the collation of
properties which was denied.
It was also alleged by the petitioner that he was a victim of
preterition, and that the institution of heirs made by the
deceased Dr. Maximo Viola became ineffective, and that
Civil Case No. 8077 was thereby converted into an intestate
proceedings for the settlement of his estate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is a victim of
preterition. 
HELD: NO, this contention is clearly untenable. There might
have been merit if we were dealing with a special
proceedings for the settlement of the testate estate of a
deceased person, which, in consequence of said preterition,
would thereby acquire the character of a proceeding for the
settlement of an intestate estate, with jurisdiction over any
and all properties of the deceased.
But, Civil Case No. 8077 is an ordinary civil action, and the
authority of the court having jurisdiction over the same is
limited to the properties described in the pleadings, which
admittedly do not include the aforementioned riceland.
Without prejudice to the institution of the corresponding
intestate proceedings by the proper party, the petition was
denied.
SUBSTITUTION OF HEIRS
FACTS: The amount of P21,428.58 is deposited in name of
Carmen de Perez (Heiress), with the association known as
La Urbana as the final payment of the liquidated credit of
Ana Maria Alcantara, deceased.
 
Defendant Mariano Garchitorena held a judgment for
P7,872.23 against Joaquin Perez Alcantara, husband of
Carmen G. de Perez, the sheriff levied an attachment on
said amount deposited with La Urbana.
 
The plaintiff, alleging that said deposit belongs to the
fideicommissary heirs of the decedent Ana Maria
Alcantara, secured a preliminary injunction restraining the
execution of said judgment on the sum so attached.
 
The defendants contend that the plaintiff is the decedent's
universal heiress, and pray for the dissolution of the
injunction.
 
The court below held that said La Urbana deposit belongs to
the plaintiff's children as fideicommissary heirs of Ana Maria
Alcantara, and granted a final writ of injunction.
 
The clauses of said will relevant to the points in dispute,
between the parties are the ninth, tenth, and eleventh,
quoted below:
Ninth. Being single and without any forced heir, to show my
gratitude to my niece-in-law, Carmen Garchitorena, of age,
married to my nephew, Joaquin Perez Alcantara, and living
in this same house with me, I institute her as my sole and
universal heiress to the remainder of my estate after the
payment of my debts and legacies, so that upon my death
and after probate of this will, and after the report of the
committee on claims and appraisal has been rendered and
approved, she will receive from my executrix and properties
composing my hereditary estate, that she may enjoy them
with God's blessing and my own.
Tenth. Should my heiress Carmen Garchitorena die, I order
that my whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her surviving
children; and should any of these die, his share shall serve
to increase the portions of his surviving brothers (and sisters)
by accretion, in such wise that my estate shall never pass
out of the hands of my heiress or her children in so far as it is
legally possible.
Eleventh. Should my aforesaid heiress, Carmen
Garchitorena, die after me while her children are still in their
minority, I order that my estate be administered by my
executrix, Mrs. Josefa Laplana, and in her default, by
Attorney Ramon Salinas and in his default, by his son
Ramon Salinas; but the direction herein given must not be
considered as an indication of lack of confidence in my
nephew Joaquin Perez Alcantara, whom I relieve from the
duties of administering my estate, because I recognize that
his character is not adapted to management and
administration.
The appellants contend that in these clauses the testatrix
has ordered a simple substitution, while the appellee
contends that it is a fideicommissary substitution.
 
This will certainly provides for a substitution of heirs, and of
the three cases that might give rise to a simple substitution
(art. 774, Civil Code), only the death of the instituted heiress
before the testatrix would in the instant case give place to
such substitution, inasmuch as nothing is said of the waiver
of inheritance, or incapacity to accept it. As a matter of fact,
however, clause XI provides for the administration of the
estate in case the heiress instituted should die after the
testatrix and while the substitute heirs are still under age.
And it is evident that, considering the nature of simple
substitution by the heir's death before the testator, and the
fact that by clause XI in connection with clause X, the
substitution is ordered where the heiress instituted dies after
the testatrix, this cannot be a case of simple substitution.
  
ISSUE:  Whether or not there is a fideicommissary
substitution
 
 DISCUSSION:
 
In clause IX, the testatrix institutes the plaintiff herein her
sole and universal heiress, and provides that upon her
death (the testatrix's) and after probate of the will and
approval of the report of the committee on claims and
appraisal, said heiress shall receive and enjoy the whole
hereditary estate.
 The word sole does not necessarily exclude the idea of
substitute heirs; and taking these three clauses together,
such word means that the plaintiff is the sole heiress
instituted in the first instance.
The disposition contained in clause IX, that said heiress shall
receive and enjoy the estate, is not incompatible with a
fideicommissary substitution (it certainly is incompatible
with the idea of simple substitution, where the heiress
instituted does not receive the inheritance). In fact the
enjoyment of the inheritance is in conformity with the idea of
fideicommissary substitution, by virtue of which the heir
instituted receives the inheritance and enjoys it, although at
the same time he preserves it in order to pass it on the
second heir.
The fideicommissary substitution, requires three things:
(according to the quotation from Manresa)
1. A first heir called primarily to the enjoyment of the estate.
2. An obligation clearly imposed upon him to preserve and
transmit to a third person the whole or a part of the estate.
3. A second heir.
To these requisites, the decision of November 18, 1918
adds another, namely that the fideicommissarius be entitled
to the estate from the time the testator dies, since he is to
inherit from the latter and not from the fiduciary.
The fideicommissum arising from a fideicommissary
substitution, which is of Roman origin, is not exactly
equivalent to, nor may it be confused with, the English
"trust."
It should also be noted that said clause IX vests in the
heiress only the right to enjoy but not the right to dispose of
the estate. It says, she may enjoy it, but does not say she
may dispose of it. This is an indication of the usufruct
inherent in fideicommissary substitution. Clause X
expressly provides for the substitution. It is true that it
does not say whether the death of the heiress herein
referred to is before or after that of the testatrix; but from the
whole context it appears that in making the provisions
contained in this clause X, the testatrix had in mind a
fideicommissary substitution, since she limits the
transmission of her estate to the children of the heiress by
this provision, "in such wise that my estate shall never
pass out of the hands of my heiress or her children in so
far as it is legally possible."
 
Another clear and outstanding indication of fideicommissary
substitution in clause X is the provision that the whole
estate shall pass unimpaired to the heiress's children,
that is to say the heiress is required to preserve the
whole estate, without diminution, in order to pass it on
in due time to the fideicommissary heirs.  
Lastly, clause XI more clearly indicates the idea of
fideicommissary substitution, when a provision is therein
made in the event the heiress should die after the
testatrix. That is, said clause anticipates the case where
the instituted heiress should die after the testatrix and
after receiving and enjoying the inheritance.
RULING:
The foregoing leads us to the conclusion that all the
requisites of a fideicommissary substitution, according to
the quotation from Manresa above inserted, are present in
the case of substitution now under consideration, to wit:
1. At first heir primarily called to the enjoyment of the estate.
In this case the plaintiff was instituted an heiress, called to
the enjoyment of the estate, according to clause IX of the
will.
2. An obligation clearly imposed upon the heir to preserve
and transmit to a third person the whole or a part of the
estate. Such an obligation is imposed in clause X which
provides that the "whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her
(heiress's) surviving children;" thus, instead of leaving the
heiress at liberty to dispose of the estate by will, or of leaving
the law to take its course in case she dies intestate, said
clause not only disposes of the estate in favor of the heiress
instituted, but also provides for the disposition thereof in
case she should die after the testatrix.
3. A second heir. Such are the children of the heiress
instituted, who are referred to as such second heirs both in
clause X and in clause XI.
Finally, the requisite added by the decision of November 18,
1918, to wit, that the fideicommissarius or second heir
should be entitled to the estate from the time of the testator's
death, which in the instant case, is, rather than a requisite, a
necessary consequence derived from the nature of the
fideicommissary substitution, in which the second heir does
not inherit from the heir first instituted, but from the testator.
 
By virtue of this consequence, the inheritance in question
does not belong to the heiress instituted, the plaintiff herein,
as her absolute property, but to her children, from the
moment of the death of the testatrix, Ana Maria Alcantara.
Therefore, said inheritance, of which the amount referred to
at the beginning, which is on deposit with the association
known as La Urbana in the plaintiff's name, is a part, does
not belong to her nor can it be subject to the execution of the
judgment against Joaquin Perez, who is not one of the
fideicommissary heirs.
 
2RABALLA VS CA, 334 SCRA 522, 2000
FACTS: In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and
Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S.
Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square
meters of that parcel of land. The said Codicil, which was
duly probated and admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046
before the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
contained the following provisions:
"FIRST
I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by
me to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla resident of 141 P. Villanueva,
Pasay City:
(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), which is
registered in my name according to the records of the
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental.
(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the
aforementioned property and the rights which I shall set forth
hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged by the
children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.
FOURTH
(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that
should I die and Jorge Rabadilla shall have already received
the ownership of the said Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod
Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-
4002 (10942), and also at the time that the lease of Balbinito
G. Guanzon of the said lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall
have the obligation until he dies, every year to give to Maria
Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of
Export sugar and Twenty Five (25) piculs of Domestic sugar,
until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies.
FIFTH
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall
give Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shall have
the obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as specified in the
Fourth paragraph of his testament, to Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of December of each
year.
SIXTH
I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No.
1392, in the event that the one to whom I have left and
bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage this
said Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the
obligation to respect and deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED
(100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza,
on each month of December, SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of
Export and TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic, until
Maria Marlina shall die, lastly should the buyer, lessee or the
mortgagee of this lot, not have respected my command in
this my addition (Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela y
Belleza, shall immediately seize this Lot No. 1392 from my
heir and the latter's heirs, and shall turn it over to my near
desendants, (sic) and the latter shall then have the obligation
to give the ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until Maria
Marlina shall die. I further command in this my addition
(Codicil) that my heir and his heirs of this Lot No. 1392, that
they will obey and follow that should they decide to sell,
lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others than my
near descendants and my sister."
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred
to the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and
children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all
surnamed Rabadilla. On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena
Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint gainst
the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce
the provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged that
the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil, in
that:
1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine
National Bank and the Republic Planters Bank in disregard
of the testatrix's specific instruction to sell, lease, or
mortgage only to the near descendants and sister of the
testatrix.
2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their
obligation to deliver one hundred (100) piculs of sugar (75
piculs export sugar and 25 piculs domestic sugar) to plaintiff
Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar crop years
1985 up to the filing of the complaint as mandated by the
Codicil, despite repeated demands for compliance.
3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph
of the Codicil which provided that in case of the sale, lease,
or mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee
shall likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of
sugar per crop year to herein private respondent.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering
defendant-heirs to reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the
surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:
On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and
a certain Alan Azurin, son-in-law of the herein petitioner who
was lessee of the property and acting as attorney-in-fact of
defendant-heirs, arrived at an amicable settlement and
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation
to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar, to the following effect:
"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry
No. 49074 of TCT No. 44489 will be delivered not later than
January of 1989, more specifically, to wit:
75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then
existing in any of our names, Mary Rose Rabadilla y Azurin
or Alan Azurin, during December of each sugar crop year, in
Azucar Sugar Central; and, this is considered compliance of
the annuity as mentioned, and in the same manner will
compliance of the annuity be in the next succeeding crop
years.
That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986-
87, and 1987-88, will be complied in cash equivalent of the
number of piculs as mentioned therein and which is as
herein agreed upon, taking into consideration the composite
price of sugar during each sugar crop year, which is in the
total amount of ONE HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P105,000.00).
That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered
on a staggered cash installment, payable on or before the
end of December of every sugar crop year.
However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid
Memorandum of Agreement except for a partial delivery of
50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop year 1988
-1989.
On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the
complaint. RTC finds that the action is prematurely filed as
no cause of action against the defendants has as yet arose
in favor of plaintiff. While there maybe the non-performance
of the command as mandated exaction from them simply
because they are the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title
holder/owner of the lot in question, does not warrant the filing
of the present complaint.
On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. It argued that
defendants-appellee has an obligation under Aleja Belleza's
codicil, as heirs of the modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to deliver
such amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant.
Petitioner now contends to the Supreme Court that the Court
of Appeals erred in resolving the appeal in accordance with
Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions and in
deviating from the sole issue raised which is the absence or
prematurity of the cause of action. Petitioner maintains that
Article 882 does not find application as there was no modal
institution and the testatrix intended a mere simple
substitution - i.e. the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was
to be substituted by the testatrix's "near descendants" should
the obligation to deliver the fruits to herein private
respondent be not complied with. In addition, since the
testatrix died single and without issue, there can be no valid
substitution and such testamentary provision cannot be
given any effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testamentary institution of Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla is merely a substitution and not a modal
institution within the purview of Article 882 of the New Civil
Code.
RULING: It is a modal institution under Arts. 882 and 883
of the Civil Code.
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or
persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted.
Under substitutions in general, the testator may either:
(1) provide for the designation of another heir to whom the
property shall pass in case the original heir should die before
him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to
inherit, as in a simple substitution; or
(2) leave his/her property to one person with the express
charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or
others, as in a fideicommissary substitution.
The Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of the two. In
simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in
default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease
or renunciation. In the case under consideration, the
provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or
renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would
substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed
in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and
turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.
Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on
this point, petitioner is correct. In a fideicommissary
substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the
property and to transmit the same later to the second heir. In
the case under consideration, the instituted heir is in fact
allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided
the negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of
the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a
fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly
imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the property
and its transmission to the second heir. "Without this
obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his
will, there is no fideicommissary substitution."
The Court of Appeals did not erred in ruling that the
institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is in
the nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article 882 of
the New Civil Code is the provision of law in point.
Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the
application of the property left by the testator, or the charge
imposed on him, shall not be considered as a condition
unless it appears that such was his intention.
That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at
once provided that the instituted heir or his heirs give
security for compliance with the wishes of the testator and
for the return of anything he or they may receive, together
with its fruits and interests, if he or they should disregard this
obligation.
Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution
referred to in the preceding article cannot take effect in the
exact manner stated by the testator, it shall be complied with
in a manner most analogous to and in conformity with his
wishes.
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article
882 is what is known in the law of succession as an
institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal
institution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution,
(2) the purpose or application of the property left by the
testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the
heir. A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or
legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the
succession. On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary
disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order
for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The
condition suspends but does not obligate; and the mode
obligates but does not suspend.
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be
gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended that subject
property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise
clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the
said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver
one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent,
Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter.
However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's
inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee,
dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is
clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied
with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near
descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature
because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without,
however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.
3PHIL. COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK VS
ESCOLIN, 56 SCRA 266, 1974
FACTS: An American citizen from Texas, Linnie Jane
Hodges, died in the Philippines, leaving certain properties,
both real and personal, in our country. In her will, she made
her husband, Mr. Hodges, her only heir. She likewise stated
in the will that upon her husband’s demise, the undisposed
properties from her estate would be given equally among her
own brothers and sisters. Some five years later, Mr. Hodges,
also a citizen of Texas, died.
The administrator of the estate of Mr. Hodges, the PCIB,
claims that the designation of the brothers and sisters of Mrs.
Hodges was an attempted substitution, but cannot be given
effect because it is not a simple nor a vulgar nor a
fideicommissary substitution, and that under American law,
the estate of Mrs. Hodges consists of 1/4 of the total
conjugal estate.
ISSUES:  of said properties, without bond, until his death or until he
1. w/n the designation of Mrs. Hodges’ brothers and
sisters valid? NO
2. If under Texas law, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is
less than 1/4, how much must be regarded as her
estate?
HELD:  will havepower to select the one among them ourselves. The
1. The designation of the brothers and sisters of Mrs.
Hodges is not a valid substitution (not a simple or
vulgar substitution because the will does not say
that said relatives would inherit if Mr. Hodges would
predecease, be incapacitated, or should repudiate
the inheritance; and not a fideicommissary
substitution for Mr. Hodges was not obliged to
preserve and transmit said properties to the
relatives of Mrs. Hodges). But this does not mean
that no effect should be given to their designation,
for the truth is that they were also instituted to said
remaining properties. The institution of Mr. Hodges
partakes of a resolutory condition, this is really a
resolutory term, because Mr. Hodges would surely
die, sooner or later that is, ownership of the
inherited properties would end at his death (that is,
while he was free, as owner, to dispose of the
properties inter vivos, he was not free to do so
mortis causa). The institution of Mrs. Hodges’
brothers and sisters is on the other hand an
institution subject to a suspensive condition (this is
really a suspensive term), their inheritance having
become vested at the time of Mrs. Hodges’ death,
but only operative upon the death of Mr. Hodges. 
2. With respect to the second issue, the allegation of
the PCIB that Mrs. Hodges’ estate is 1/4 of the total
mass is a judicial admission of a fact (the existence
of the foreign law being a fact), and by the principle
of estoppel, would prevent the PCIB from alleging
that Mrs. Hodges’ estate is less than 1/4.
4VDA. DE ARANAS VS ARANAS, 150 SCRA 415, 1987
FACTS: Fr. Teodoro Aranas, a priest of the Roman Catholic
Church, died. He had executed his Last Will and Testament
which was admitted to probate. In said Last Will and
Testament, Fr. Teodoro Aranas stipulated the following:
A. The return to Aniceto Aranas or his heirs of all properties
acquired by Fr. Aranas from his brother Aniceto Aranas and
ten (10) parcels of land described in the Will inherited by the
testator from his parents.
B. The return to Carmelo Aranas or his heirs of all properties
acquired by Fr.Aranas from his brother Carmelo Aranas and
ten (10) parcels of land described in the Will inherited by the
testator from his parents.
C. The special administration of the remainder of the estate
of the testator by Vicente Aranas, a faithful and serviceable
nephew and designating him also as recipient of 1/2 of the
produce of said properties after deducting the expenses for
the administration and the other 1/2 of the produce to be
given to the Catholic Church for the eternal repose of the
testator’s soul. Said pertinent provision reads as follows:
Fourth. It is my will that the lands I had bought from other
persons should be converged and placed under a “special
administrator.” Thes pecial administrator of these lands, for
his office, should receive one half of all the produce from
which shall be deducted the expenses for the administration,
and the other half of the produce should be received by the
Roman Catholic Church and should be spent for my soul,
Vicente B. Aranas (Tingting), because he is a faithful and
serviceable nephew, should be the first special administrator
should not want to hold the said office anymore. Anyone of
the sons of my brother Carmelo Aranas can hold the said
office of special administrator, and none other than they.
Their father, my brother Carmelo Aranas shall be the one to
decide who among them shall hold the said office, but upon
the death of my said brother Carmelo Aranas, his said sons
special administration is perpetual.
ISSUE: Whether or not the properties under Group C of the
testate estate of the late Fr. Teodoro Aranas are subject to
remunerative legacies by way of usufruct of the net proceeds
of 1/2 of the estate after deducting expenses for
administration in favor of Vicente Aranas, during his lifetime
and shall continue an administrator of the estate, and, who,
upon his death or refusal to continue such usufruct, may be
succeeded by any of the brothers of the administrator as
selected by their father, Carmelo Aranas, if still alive or one
selected by his sons if, he, Carmelo, is dead
HELD: Yes. It was the sincere intention and desire of the
testator to reward his nephew Vicente Aranas for his faithful
and unselfish services by allowing him to enjoy one-half of
the fruits of the testator’s third group of properties until
Vicente’s death and/or refusal to act as administrator in
which case, the administration shall pass to anyone chosen
by Carmelo Aranas among his sons and upon Carmelo’s
death, his sons will have the power to select one among
themselves.
Vicente Aranas therefore as a usufructuary has the right to
enjoy the property of his uncle with all the benefits which
result from the normal enjoyment (or exploitation) of
another’s property, with the obligation to return, at the
designated time, either the same thing, or in special cases its
equivalent. This right of Vicente to enjoy the fruits of the
properties is temporary and therefore not perpetual as there
is a limitation namely his death or his refusal.
Likewise his designation as administrator of these properties
is limited by his refusal and/or death and therefore it does
not run counter to Art. 870 of the Civil Code relied upon by
the petitioners. Be it noted that Vicente Aranas is not
prohibited to dispose of the fruits and other benefits arising
from the usufruct.
Neither are the naked owners (the other heirs) of the
properties, the usufruct of which has been given to Vicente
Aranas prohibited from disposing of said naked ownership
without prejudice of course to Vicente’s continuing usufruct.
5PALAD VS GOVERNOR OF QUEZON PROVINCE, 46
SCRA 354, 1972
Plaintiffs-appellants Miguel Palad et.al, alleged that they are
the remaining immediate heirs and/or successors-in-interest
of the deceased Luis Palad, they being the grandchildren of
Policarpio Palad and Victor Palad, both deceased brothers of
the late Luis Palad; that the defendant provincial governor is
the trustee and/or administrator and the defendant
municipality of Tayabas the beneficiary of the lots in
question; that the purpose of the trusteeship of the aforesaid
lots as constituted by the last will and testament of Luis
Palad was to erect or establish a high school in the town out
of the income of the two lots for the benefit of the said town;
that the said trust was duly fulfilled upon the complete
establishment in 1932 of a high school now known as "Luis
Palad High School”, that the town of Tayabas has been
enjoying the income of the said lots as beneficiary for the last
54 years since November 9, 1904 up to the present time,
while the defendant provincial governor continues to be the
trustee and/or administrator of the two lots in violation of
Article 605 of the Civil Code; that the aforesaid lots have a
net annual income of P7,000; and that since the
establishment of the Luis Palad High School in 1932 or since
November, 1904 in accordance with Article 605 of the Civil
Code, the plaintiffs were already entitled to the reversion of
the two lots in their favor and to the dissolution and/or
termination of the trusteeship.
The answer filed by the provincial fiscal alleges that they
have no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth of plaintiffs' claim that they are the immediate
heirs and successors-in-interest of the deceased Luis Palad,
denies the rest of the allegations in the complaint, and
interposes as special defenses the fact that the two parcels
of land were ordinary unconditional devise of realties in trust
contained in the last will and testament of the late Luis Palad
for the establishment and maintenance of a secondary
school for the continued benefit and welfare of the
inhabitants of Tayabas; that Article 605 of the new Civil Code
(on usufruct) does not apply to the case at bar; that to give
effect to the above-mentioned testamentary grant, the
Philippine Legislature enacted Acts Nos. 3232, 3462 and
3757 creating the Luis Palad High School to be established
and maintained with funds coming from said two parcels of
land, which institution is still existing and being maintained
for the benefit of the inhabitants of the said town; that the
testator intended the said testamentary grant or devise of
land for the establishment and maintenance of a high school
to be permanent and not subject to any resolutory or other
condition; that the ownership of the two parcels of land had
been irrevocably vested in the province of Quezon as trustee
with the municipality of Tayabas as cestui que trustent; that
the plaintiffs as alleged heirs of the late Luis Palad are bereft
of any interest in said lots; and that the defendants are
conscientiously devoting the funds from the said two parcels
for the establishment and maintenance of the said high
school in accordance with the will of the testator and they
have not enriched themselves or benefited therefrom; that
the province of Quezon had to appropriate funds for the
maintenance of the said high school when the income from
the disputed lands became insufficient; that the said high
school is not entirely self-supporting; that the alleged
average annual net income (P7,000.00) of the two parcels of
land is exorbitant and unfounded; that the claims or
demands of the plaintiffs had been released or had
prescribed.
In a decision rendered on December 10, 1924, the Supreme
Court held that the said testamentary disposition in the
holographic will of the late Luis Palad created a trust for the
establishment and maintenance of a secondary school to be
financed with the income of the two lots aforesaid for the
benefit of the inhabitants of the town of Tayabas
Implementing the trust thus created, the Philippine
Legislature enacted Act No. 3232, which established the Luis
Palad Rural High School as an agricultural high school, the
expenses for the establishment and maintenance of which
shall be paid out of the funds left by the late Luis Palad and
any other funds which may be donated by the Government
or any of its dependencies or any other persons. The
Director of Education is authorized to receive from the
provincial governor as trustee of the estate of Luis Palad the
sums necessary for the proper operation, construction and
upkeep of the permanent buildings of the School. Act No.
3757 converted the said agricultural school into a regular
high school to be known as the Luis Palad High School.
ISSUES: W/N trial court erred in (1) holding that the
Supreme Court ruled in the case of Government vs. Abadilla
that the trust was a permanent one created for the benefit of
the Luis Palad High School and is a perpetual charge upon
the land devised, 
(2) in not declaring the termination of the usufruct of the trust
estate as provided in Art. 515 of the Spanish Civil Code, and 
(3) in not ordering the dissolution of this trusteeship under
Art. 870 of the New Civil Code.
HELD: NO
As to the nature of the trust created by the last will and
testament of the late Luis Palad, the law of the case is the
decision in Government vs. Abadilla, et al., supra, that "the
testator proposed to create a trust for the benefit of a
secondary school to be established in the town of Tayabas,
naming as trustee ... the civil governor of the province of
Tayabas ..." 4 and that "if the trustee holds the legal title and
the devise is valid, the natural heirs of the deceased have no
remaining interest in the land except their right to the
reversion in the event the devise for some reason should fail,
an event which has not as yet taken place. From a reading of
the testamentary clause under discussion it seems quite
evident that the intention of the testator was to have the
income of the property accumulate for the benefit of the
proposed school until the same should be established." 5
Article 515 of the Old Spanish Civil Code prohibiting the
creation of a usufruct for more than thirty (30) years in favor
of any town, province or association, does not apply to the
instant case; because what was constituted by the last will
and testament of the late Luis Palad is a trust, not a usufruct.
Article 870 of the New Civil Code, which regards as void any
disposition of the testator declaring all or part of the estate
inalienable for more than 20 years, is not violated by the trust
constituted by the late Luis Palad; because the will of the
testator does not interdict the alienation of the parcels
devised. The will merely directs that the income of said two
parcels be utilized for the establishment, maintenance and
operation of the high school.
And even if the trust herein involved falls within the
prohibition of the said Article 870, the same cannot be given
retroactive effect, the testator having died long before the
effectivity of the New Civil Code.
Appellants seem to cling to the statement in the decision in
the Abadilla case that: "From a reading of the testamentary
clause under discussion it seems quite evident that the
intention of the testator was to have the income or the
property accumulate for the benefit of the proposed school
until the same should be established ."  kasama ang "generator" at automovil) hindi maisasanla o
They argue that upon the establishment of the school in
1932, the trust ceased, as the object or purpose thereof had
been accomplished.
The word "established" should not be limited to the initial
construction of the high school, which alone will not serve
the purpose of the testamentary disposition of the testator, if
the maintenance and operation of the school are excluded
from its scope. To give full effect to the intention of the
testator, the said portion of the decision should be read
together with the preceding statement therein that "it seems
evident that by the clause in question the testator proposed
to create a trust for the benefit of a secondary school to be
established in the town of Tayabas," The benefit that could
be derived from a secondary school cannot be enjoyed by
the residents of the town of Tayabas if the school is not in
operation or functioning. It can only function and operate if
the needed funds are provided therefor. This the testator
realized only too well and therefore willed that the income
from the two lots should be utilized for the maintenance and
upkeep of the school.
As We ruled in the Abadilla case, the trust ceases only if the
devise fails — if the maintenance of the high school is
abandoned and its operation stopped. Since the school
continues to operate and is being maintained, with the
income from the two parcels of land subject of the trust, and
donations from the government and other sources, the
devise has not yet failed.
6ORENDAIN, JR. VS TRUSTEESHIP AND ESTATE OF
DOÑA M. RODRIGUEZ, 591 SCRA 285, 2009
FACTS: This petition for certiorari, filed under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, assails the Order of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila which denied petitioners’ (Hilarion, Jr. and
Enrico Orendain, heirs of Hilarion Orendain, Sr.) Motion to
Dissolve the Trusteeship of the Estate of Doña Margarita
Rodriguez.
 
The decedent, Doña Margarita Rodriguez, died in Manila,
leaving a last will and testament. Said will was admitted to
probate and the RTC Manila approved the project of partition
presented by the executor of Doña Margarita Rodriguez’s
will.
 
At the time of her death, the decedent left no compulsory
or forced heirs but some of Doña Margarita Rodriguez’s
testamentary dispositions contemplated the creation of
a trust to manage the income from her properties for
distribution to beneficiaries specified in the will, to wit:
  
CLAUSULA SEGUNDA O PANG-DALAWA: - x x x
Ipinaguutos ko na matapos magawa ang pagaayos ng aking
Testamentaria at masara na ang Expediente ng aking
Testamentaria, ang lahat ng pagaare ko sa aking
ipinaguutos na pangasiwaan sa habang panahon ay
ipagbukas sa Juzgado ng tinatawag na "FIDEICOMISO" at
ang ilalagay na "fideicomisario" ang manga taong nasabi ko
na sa itaas nito, at ang kanilang gaganahin ay ang nasasabi
sa testamentong ito na gaganahen ng tagapangasiwa at
albacea. x x x x
CLAUSULA DECIMA O PANG-SAMPU: - Ipinaguutos ko
na ang manga pagaareng nasasabi sa Clausulang ito ay
pangangasiwaan sa habang panahon, at ito nga ang
ipagbubukas ng "Fideicomiso" sa Jusgado pagkatapos
na maayos ang naiwanan kong pagaare. Ang
pangangasiwaang pagaare ay ang manga sumusunod:
  
Ang lahat ng pagaaring nasasabe sa Clusulang ito (hindi
maipagbibili kailan man, maliban sa pagaaring nasa Quezon
Boulevard, Maynila, na maaring isanla kung walang fondo na
gagamitin sa ipagpapaigui o ipagpapagawa ng panibago
alinsunod sa kaayusang hinihingi ng panahon.
CLAUSULA DECIMA SEGUNDA O PANG-LABING
DALAWA: - Ang kuartang matitipon sa Banco ayon sa
tagubilin na nasasaysay sa Clausulang sinusundan nito ay
gagamitin sa manga sumusunod na pagkakagastusan; at
ganito din ang gagawin sa lahat ng aking pagaare na
nasasakop ng fideicomiso at walang ibang pinaguukulan.
Ang pagkakagastusan na ito ay ang sumusunod:
  
Herein the Clause 10 of the will explicitly prohibits the
alienation or mortgage of the specified properties.
 
After almost four decades, petitioners Hilarion, Jr. and Enrico
Orendain, heirs of Hilarion Orendain, Sr. who was mentioned
in Clause 24 of the decedent’s will, moved to dissolve the
trust on the decedent’s estate, which they argued had been
in existence for more than twenty years, in violation of
Articles 867 and 870 of the Civil Code.
 
The RTC then ruled which it said that:
 
The above-cited provisions of the civil code find no
application in the present motion to dissolve the trust created
by the testatrix. There is no question that the testamentary
disposition of Doña Margarita Rodriguez prohibiting the
mortgage or sale of properties mentioned in clause X of her
Last Will and Testament forevermore is void after the lapse
of the twenty year period. However, it does not mean that the
trust created by [the] testatrix in order to carry out her wishes
under clauses 12, 13 and 24 will also become void upon
expiration of the twenty year period. 
The question as to whether a trust can be perpetual, the
same finds support in Article 1013, paragraph 4 of the Civil
Code, which provides that "the Court, at the instance of an
interested party or its motion, may order the establishment of
a permanent trust so that only the income from the property
shall be used." Hence, this petition.
 
ISSUE: WON the trusteeship over the properties left by
Dona Margarita Rodriguez can be dissolved applying the
Articles 867 and 870 of the Civil Code as intestacy applies
for her failure to institute an heir in the will?
 
HELD: Yes.
The Court ruled that RTC Manila was mistaken in denying
petitioners’ motion to dissolve and ordering the disposition of
the properties in Clause 10 according to the testatrix’s
wishes. As regards these properties, intestacy should
apply as the decedent did not institute an heir.
 
Article 782, in relation to paragraph 2, Article 960 of the Civil
Code, provides:
 
Art. 782. An heir is a person called to the succession either
by the provision of a will or by operation of law.
Art. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:
(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose
of all the property belonging to the testator. In such case,
legal succession shall take place only with respect to the
property of which the testator has not disposed;
 
In herein case, apparent from the decedent’s last will and
testament is the creation of a trust on a specific set of
properties and the income accruing therefrom. Nowhere in
the will can it be ascertained that the decedent intended
any of the trust’s designated beneficiaries to inherit
these properties. 
 
The decedent’s will did not institute any heir thereto, as
clearly shown by the following:
1. Clause 2 instructed the creation of trust;
 2. Clause 3 instructed that the remaining income from
specified properties, after the necessary deductions for
expenses, including the estate tax, be deposited in a fund
with a bank;
 
3. Clause 10 enumerated the properties to be placed in
trust for perpetual administration (pangasiwaan sa
habang panahon);
 
4. Clauses 11 and 12 directed how the income from the
properties ought to be divided among, and distributed to the
different beneficiaries; and
5. Clause 24 instructed the administrators to provide medical
support to certain beneficiaries, to be deducted from the fund
deposits in the bank mentioned in Clauses 2 and 3.
 
Also, the Court found the RTC’s holding as erroneous in
paragraph 4, Article 1013 of the same code specifically
allows a perpetual trust, because this provision of law is
inapplicable.  This article is among the Civil Code provisions
on intestate succession, specifically on the State
inheriting from a decedent, in default of persons entitled
to succeed. Under this article, the allowance for a
permanent trust, approved by a court of law, covers
property inherited by the State by virtue of intestate
succession. The article does not cure a void testamentary
provision which did not institute an heir. Accordingly, the
article cannot be applied to dispose of herein decedent’s
properties.
The Court further said that it is not unmindful of its ruling in
Palad, et al. v. Governor of Quezon Province, et al. where
we declared, thus:
 
Article 870 of the New Civil Code, which regards as void any
disposition of the testator declaring all or part of the estate
inalienable for more than 20 years, is not violated by the
trust constituted by the late Luis Palad; because herein
the will of the testator does not interdict the alienation of
the parcels devised. The will merely directs that the income
of said two parcels be utilized for the establishment,
maintenance and operation of the high school.
 
But in the present case, however, the Court reached a
different conclusion as the testatrix specifically prohibited
the alienation or mortgage of her properties which were
definitely more than the two (2) properties. The herein
testatrix’s large landholdings cannot be subjected indefinitely
to a trust because the ownership thereof would then
effectively remain with her even in the afterlife.
 
In light of the foregoing, therefore, the trust on the testatrix’s
properties must be dissolved.
 
CONDITIONAL TESTAMENTARY CONDITIONS AND
WITH A TERM
1MORENTE VS DE LA SANTA, 9 PHIL 387, 1907
FACTS:
The will of Consuelo Morente contains the following clauses:
1. I hereby order that all real estate which may belong to me
shall pass to my husband, Gumersindo de la Santa.
2. That my said husband shall not leave my brothers after
my death, and that he shall not marry anyone; should my
said husband have children by anyone, he shall not convey
any portion of the property left by me, except the one-third
part thereof and the two remaining thirds shall be and remain
for my brother Vicente or his children should he have any.
3. After my death I direct my husband to dwell in the camarin
in which the bakery is located, which is one of the properties
belonging to me.
Her husband, Gumersindo de la Santa, married again within
four months of the death of the testatrix. Elena Morente, a
sister of the deceased, filed a petition in the proceeding
relating to the probate of the will of Consuelo Morente
pending in the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Tayabas in which she alleged the second marriage of
Gumersindo de la Santa and asked that the legacy to him
abovementioned be annulled. Objection was made in the
court below by the husband to the procedure followed by the
petitioner.
ISSUE: WON the will of Consuelo contained modal
institution
HELD: No. Article 790 of the Civil Code provides that
testamentary provisions may be made conditional and article
793 provides that a prohibition against another marriage may
in certain cases be validly imposed upon the widow or
widower. But the question in this case is, Did the testatrix
intend to impose a condition upon the absolute gift which is
contained in the first clauses of the will?
It is to be observed that by the second clause she directs
that her husband shall not leave her sisters. It is provided in
the third clause that he must continue to live in a certain
building. It is provided in the second clause that he shall not
marry again. To no one of these orders is attached the
condition that if he fails to comply with them he shall lose the
legacy given to him by the first clause of the will. It is
nowhere expressly said that if he does leave the testatrix's
sisters, or does not continue to dwell in the building
mentioned in the will he shall forfeit the property given him in
the first clause; nor is it anywhere expressly said that if he
marries again he shall incur such a loss. We are bound to
construe the will with reference to all the clauses contained
therein, and with reference to such surrounding
circumstances as duly appear in the case, and after such
consideration we cannot say that it was the intention of the
testatrix that if her husband married again he should forfeit
the legacy above mentioned. In other words, there being no
express condition attached to that legacy in reference to the
second marriage, we cannot say that any condition can be
implied from the context of the will.
In order to make a testamentary provision conditional, such
condition must fairly appear from the language used in the
will.
2SANTOS VS MANARANG, 27 PHIL 209, 1914
FACTS: Don Lucas de Ocampo died on November 18,
1906, possessed of certain real and personal property which,
by his last will and testament dated July 26, 1906, he left to
his three children.
The fourth clause of this will reads as follows:
I also declare that I have contracted the debts detailed
below, and it is my desire that they may be religiously paid
by my wife and executors in the form and at the time agreed
upon with my creditors.
Among the debts, two in favor of the plaintiff, Isidro Santos.
In his petition, asking that the committee be reconvened to
consider his claims, plaintiff states that his failure to present
the said claims to the committee was due to his belief that it
was unnecessary to do so because of the fact that the
testator, in his will, expressly recognized them and directed
that they should be paid.
He alleges that the committee on claims should have been
reconvened to pass upon his claim against the estate. It is
clear that this committee has nothing to do with legacies. It is
true that a debt may be left as a legacy, either to the debtor,
or to a third person. But this case can only arise when the
debt is an asset of the estate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testator intended to leave the
plaintiff a legacy or a debt?
HELD: The creation of a legacy depends upon the will of the
testator, is an act of pure beneficence, has no binding force
until his death, and may be avoided in whole or in part by the
mere with whim of the testator, prior to that time. A debt
arises from an obligation recognized by law and once
established, can only be extinguished in a lawful manner.
Debts are demandable and must be paid in legal tender.
Legacies may, and often do, consist of specific articles of
personal property and must be satisfied accordingly. In order
to collect as legacy the sum mentioned in the will as due
him, the plaintiff must show that it is in fact a legacy and not
a debt. As he has already attempted to show that this sum
represents a debt.
The testator left the total net assets of his estate, without
reservation of any kind, to his children per capita. There is no
indication that he desired to leave anything by way of legacy
to any other person. These considerations clearly refute the
suggestion that the testator intended to leave plaintiff any
thing by way of legacy. His claim against the estate having
been a simple debt, the present action was improperly
instituted against the administratrix.
But it is said that the plaintiff's claims should be considered
as partaking of the nature of a legacy and disposed of
accordingly. If this be perfect then the plaintiff would receive
nothing until after all debts had been paid and the heirs by
force of law had received their shares. From any point of
view the inevitable result is that there must be a hearing
sometime before some tribunal to determine the correctness
of the debts recognized in the wills of deceased persons.
This hearing, in the first instance, cannot be had before the
court because the law does not authorize it. Such debtors
must present their claims to the committee; otherwise their
claims will be forever barred.
3MICIANO VS BRIMO, 50 PHIL 867, 1927
Topic/Doctrine: SUCCESSIONS; CONDITIONAL
LEGACY; CONDITION CONTRARY TO LAW; NULLITY
OF.— If the condition imposed upon the legatee is that he
respect the testator’s order that his property be distributed in
accordance with the laws of the Philippines and not in
accordance with the laws of his nation, said condition is
illegal, because, according to article 10 of the Civil Code,
said laws govern his testamentary disposition, and, being
illegal, shall be considered unwritten, thus making the
institution unconditional.
FACTS: The partition of the estate left by the deceased
Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case. The judicial
administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre
Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The
court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are: (1)
The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) the denial of his
participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion
for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4)
the approval of the purchase made by Pietro Lanza of the
deceased’s business and the deed of transfer of said
business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are
impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone the
approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the
deceased’s business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the
depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
The appellant’s opposition is based on the fact that the
partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph
G. Brimo’s will which are not in accordance with the laws of
his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as
being in violation of article 10 of the Civil Code.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said
testamentary dispositions are not in accordance with the
Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence
showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the
absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be
the same as those of the Philippines.
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the
Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he
desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on
this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of the
court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of
partition until the receipt of certain testimony requested
regarding the Turkish laws on the matter. The refusal to give
the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does
not constitute an error, It is discretionary with the trial court.
and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted
ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find
no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this
particular.

There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the

national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in
the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being
contrary to our laws in force must be complied with.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in approving the

scheme of partition of the estate of Joseph G. Brimo?

HELD: No. The approval of the scheme of partition in

respect was not erroneous. In regard to the first assignment
of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein
appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons
designated as such in the will, it must be taken into
consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of
the second clause of the will.

The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the

condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the
testator’s will to distribute his property, not in accordance
with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the
laws of the Philippines.

If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any

legatee who fails to comply with it, as the herein oppositor
who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected
the will of the testator, as expressed, is prevented from
receiving his legacy.

The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being
contrary to law, for article 792 of the Civil Code. And said
condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the
testator’s national law when, according to article 10 of the
Civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is
the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.

Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above

cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees
in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and
effective even as to the herein oppositor. Gomez vs. North
Negros Sugar Co.

It results from all this that the second clause of the will
regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the condition
imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary
to law. All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their
dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective it
not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator’s
national laws.

The orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that

the distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to
include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the
legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the
judicial administrator is approved in all other respects,
without any pronouncement as to costs.