See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/15833810

Safety Climate in Industrial Organizations: Theoretical and

Applied Implications

Article  in  Journal of Applied Psychology · March 1980

DOI: 10.1037/0021-9010.65.1.96 · Source: PubMed

CITATIONS READS
2,013 19,912

1 author:

Dov Zohar
Technion - Israel Institute of Technology
58 PUBLICATIONS   10,870 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:

Systematic review of The effect of Safety interventions on work injuries http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/lib/project/222/

View project

Safety Climate Lone Worker project View project

All content following this page was uploaded by Dov Zohar on 25 March 2014.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

Journal of Applied Psychology
1980, Vol. 65, No. 1, 96-102

Safety Climate in Industrial Organizations:

Theoretical and Applied Implications
Dov Zohar
Technion—Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel

A 40-item measure of organizational climate for safety was constructed and

validated in a stratified sample of 20 industrial organizations in Israel. This
climate reflects employees' perceptions about the relative importance of safe
conduct in their occupational behavior. It can vary from highly positive to a
neutral level, and its average level reflects the safety climate in a given company.
It was shown that there is an agreement among employees' perceptions re-
garding safety climate in their company and that the level of this climate is
correlated with safety program effectiveness as judged by safety inspectors.
The two dimensions of highest importance in determining the level of this
climate were workers' perceptions of management attitudes about safety and
their perceptions regarding the relevance of safety in general production proc-
esses. It is proposed that organizational climate, when operationalized and
validated as demonstrated in this article, can serve as a useful tool in under-
standing occupational behavior.

The purpose of this article is to describe In their review article, James and Jones
a particular type of organizational climate (1974) distinguished between measures of
and to examine its implications. This climate organizational climate that are based on (a)
is a climate for safety in industrial organiza- structural properties of organizations such
tions. Writers of organizational climate dis- as size, structure, systems complexity, lead-
tinguish between holistic climate measures, ership style, and goal directions (e.g., Fore-
such as House and Rizzo's (1972) scale, and hand & Gilmer, 1964; Porter & Lawler, 1965)
specific climate measures. Examples for such and (b) perceptions held by employees about
specific climates are Litwin and Stringer's aspects of their organizational environment,
(1968) motivation climate, Schneider and summarized over individual employees (e.g.,
Bartlett's (1970) individual differences cli- Schneider, 1973; Sells, 1968; Tagiuri, 1968).
mate, or Taylor's (1972) creativity climate. In the present article we adopted this second
Obviously, then, any given organization interpretation of organizational climate.
creates a number of different climates, and Namely, climate was viewed as a summary
the term organizational climate has to be of molar perceptions that employees share
supplemented by an appropriate adjective about their work environments. Following
indicating which type of climate it is. To
follow Schneider's (1975) proposal, the term Schneider (1975), it is assumed that these
organizational climate should describe an perceptions have a psychological utility in
area of research rather than a specific or- serving as a frame of reference for guiding
ganizational measure. It is in this spirit that appropriate and adaptive task behaviors.
the concept of safety climate was developed. Based on a variety of cues present in their
work environment, employees develop co-
This study was supported by a grant from the Com- herent sets of perceptions and expectations
mittee for Preventive Action, Ministry of Labor, Israel. regarding behavior-outcome contingencies
The author wishes to thank Ezey Dar-El for his con- and behave accordingly (Dieterly & Schnei-
tinued encouragement through all phases of this work. der, 1974; Fleishman, 1953; Litwin &
Requests for reprints should be sent to Dov Zohar,
Faculty of Industrial and Management Engineering, Stringer, 1968). These coherent sets of or-
Technion, Haifa, Israel. ganizational perceptions, when shared and
Copyright 1980 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0021-9010/80/6501-00%$00.75

96
 SAFETY CLIMATE
summarized for individual employees, are
defined here as organizational climates.
Determining Safety Climate Dimensions
To determine the various dimensions of
safety climate, a review of safety literature
was undertaken. The purpose of this review
was to define organizational characteristics
that differentiate between high versus low
accident-rate companies. It was assumed
that such organizational features characterize
individual plants and the global perception
of these by production workers, hence, form
the safety climate of that factory.
One of the most consistent findings in the
reviewed literature was that in factories hav-
ing successful safety programs, there was a
strong management commitment to safety.
This commitment was exhibited in a variety
of ways. Cohen, Smith, and Cohen (1975),
Mobley (Note 1), and Shafai-Sahrai (1971)
have all found that in low-accident com-
panies, top management was personally in-
volved in safety activities on a routine basis,
whereas such commitment was conspicu-
ously absent in high-accident companies.
Cleveland, Cohen, Smith, and Cohen (1978)
and Shafai-Sahrai (1971) have reported that
in low-accident companies safety matters
were given high priority in company meet-
ings and production scheduling, based on
the conviction that safety is an integral part
of production systems and accidents are ac-
tually symptoms of design faults in that
system.
Another expression of management com-
mitment found to discriminate between
companies was the rank and status of safety
officers; in the better companies they had
a higher status. This finding was reported
by the Accident Prevention Advisory Unit
in the United Kingdom (1976), Cohen et al.
(1975), Davis and Stahl (1964), and Planek,
Driessen, and Vilardo (1967). A second highly
consistent organizational characteristic dis-
criminating between companies was empha-
sis put on safety training. In better com-
panies it was designed as an integral part
of new workers' training (Cohen et al., 1975;
National Safety Council, 1969; Mobley,
Note 1) or as a follow-up and periodic re-
training for workers and supervisors (Davis
97
& Stahl, 1964; Planek et al., 1967). A third
characteristic was the existence of open
communication links and frequent contacts
between workers and management (Accident
Prevention Advisory Unit in U.K., 1976;
Cohen et al., 1975). Another expression of
this free flow of information was found to
be the carrying out of frequent safety in-
spections by appropriate personnel (Davis
& Stahl, 1964; Planek et al., 1967). General
environmental control and good housekeep-
ing was the fourth characteristic appearing
consistently. Orderly plant operations, con-
trolled environmental conditions, and high
usage of safety devices comprised this or-
ganizational characteristic in low-accident
companies (Shafai-Sahrai, 1971; Smith,
Cohen, Cohen, & Cleveland, 1975).
A fifth characteristic was a stable work
force with less turnover and older workers
(Cleveland et al., 1978; Cohen et al., 1975;
Davis & Stahl, 1964). Although not specifi-
cally studied, this factor probably reflected
better industrial relations and elaborate
personnel development practices in these
factories. Finally, successful companies
had distinctive ways of promoting safety.
These included guidance and counseling,
rather than enforcement and admonition. In
addition, it included individual praise or
recognition for safe performance and enlist-
ing workers' families in safety promotions
(Cleveland et al., 1978; Davis & Stahl, 1964;
National Safety Council, 1969).
When all these organizational charac-
teristics are integrated, it is possible to form
a coherent organizational pattern of a highly
safe company: Management is actively in-
volved in safety management and creates a
general administrative control climate (Gri-
maldi, 1970) in which work is to be performed.
This climate results in increased perform-
ance reliability of workers, good housekeep-
ing, and high design and maintenance stan-
dards for work environments. There are
well-developed personnel-selection training
and development programs in which safe
conduct is an integral part. Communication
links between workers and management are
kept open, enabling a flow of information
regarding production as well as safety mat-
ters. Finally, general management philosophy
is not strictly production oriented but also
98 DOV ZOHAR
people oriented, as evidenced by various
supportive policies described above. All the
organizational characteristics described
above were corroborated in a comprehen-
sive review article published by Cohen
(1977). (Although his article was published
after the present study was completed, it
was used in preparing this article.)
Based on the reviewed literature, it was
decided that the safety climate questionnaire
would include the following dimensions: (a)
perceived management attitudes towards
safety, (b) perceived effects of safe conduct
on promotion, (c) perceived effects of safe
conduct on social status, (d) perceived or-
ganizational status of safety officer, (e) per-
ceived importance and effectiveness of
safety training, (f) perceived risk level at
work place, and (g) perceived effectiveness
of enforcement versus guidance in promot-
ing safety.
These dimensions, therefore, included
those organizational characteristics found to
discriminate between high versus low ac-
cident-rate companies.
Based on the literature of organizational
climate and the literature of organizational
safety practices, two hypotheses were for-
mulated: (a) Workers in different companies
share common perceptions regarding safety
in their organization. The sum of these per-
ceptions is the safety climate in each or-
ganization, (b) Safety climate can vary from
a less favorable to a more favorable one.
Its level in each company is expected to
be correlated with that company's safety
record.
Table 1
Principal-Components Factor Analysis of the Safety Climate Questionnaire
Factor
Perceived importance of safety training programs
Perceived management attitudes toward safety
Perceived effects of safe conduct on promotion
Perceived level of risk at work place
Perceived effects of required work pace on safety
Perceived status of safety officer
Perceived effects of safe conduct on social status
Perceived status of safety committee
Method
Questionnaire Development
Based on the industrial safety literature described
above, seven organizational dimensions were included
in the initial version of the safety climate questionnaire.
Each of these climate dimensions was represented by
seven items that were short statements with 5-point
scales for evaluating subjects' agreement with them.
All items were phrased positively so that full agreement
resulted in a higher score in this dimension. This pro-
cedure resulted in a questionnaire of 49 items. The
questionnaire was then given to a pilot sample of 120
production workers in four factories. Workers were
interviewed by a team of three interviewers who read
each item aloud and recorded subjects' agreement to
it on the 5-point scale. These data were then factor
analyzed using a principal-components factor analysis
with varimax rotation.
This procedure resulted in eight factors that largely
overlapped the original ones, thus confirming the valid-
ity of the theoretical considerations for developing
these questionnaire items. Nine items found to be un-
related to any specific factor were pulled out, resulting
in a 40-item questionnaire. Items assigned to each fac-
tor had a loading greater than .49 on that factor. Table 1
lists these factors with their respective eigenvalues and
the number of questionnaire items representing them.
It should be noted that Factor 8 was retained, despite
the fact that its eigenvalue was less than 1, which is
the lowest recommended value for factor retention
(Guttman, 1954). This was done because in a dis-
criminant analysis that will be referred to below (Table
4), it proved to be of a high discriminant value.
Questionnaire Administration
Twenty factories were selected for questionnaire ad-
ministration. Factory selection was done in a quasi-
random manner. Using a national listing of large in-
dustrial organizations (i.e., those having more than 500
workers), 5 factories were randomly chosen from each
of four production categories: metal fabrication, food
processing, chemical industry, and textile industry. Out
No. of
%of questionnaire
Eigenvalue variance items
9.84 40.9 6
4.63 19.3 9
2.53 10.6 7
2.34 9.7 5
1.66 6.9 3
1.17 4.8 5
1.07 4.4 2
.84 3.4 3
 SAFETY CLIMATE
of the 20 selected factories, 4 declined to cooperate
and were, therefore, substituted by others selected in
the same manner. All factories had a worker popula-
tion of 500-1,000 workers and exhibited a wide range
of technologies and safety records. Questionnaire ad-
ministration was limited to production workers only,
and in each plant a stratified random sample of 20 work-
ers was selected. Sample stratification was based on the
relative size of the various production departments in
the factory, resulting in a random sample in which the
various departments were proportionally represented.
Workers were interviewed by one member of the three-
member interviewing team. During the interview, ques-
tionnaire items were read aloud and interpreted if
necessary. Workers' responses were then recorded on
a 5-point scale for each item.
Questionnaire Interpretation
To obtain safety climate scores, responses for each
item in the questionnaire were given values from 1 to 5.
The value 5 was given for high agreement with a state-
ment, and a value of 1 was given for disagreement
with a statement. Each questionnaire could thus be
assigned a single score indicating the safety climate
level for that individual worker. This score was the
sum of values for all items in the questionnaire. The
safety climate level for a given factory was determined
by the average score of all 20 workers interviewed in
that plant. This procedure of representing the climate
by a single score was based on theoretical considera-
tions whereby all climate dimensions described condi-
tions and procedures affecting safety programs' effec-
tiveness. Since these wer,e considered additive in nature,
a high score would indicate more favorable conditions
and procedures.
Results
To test the hypothesis stating that work-
ers' perceptions of their work place safety
were relatively homogeneous, the variance
of safety climate scores within factories was
compared with the variance between fac-
tories using a one-way analysis of variance.
The resulting F ratio was highly significant,
F(19, 380) = 52.4,p < .001, hence support-
ing the notion of a definable safety climate
in industrial organizations.
Using a multiple-range test (Nie, Hull,
Jenkins, Steinbrenner, & Bent, 1975, pp.
427-428), the 20 plants were divided into
four groups based on differences between
their respective group mean climate scores.
Each group included all factory pairs having
scores that differed by a range smaller than
the shortest significant range for the .05 level
of significance. Table 2 lists group means
and respective production categories of
99
Table 2
Multiple-Range Test of Factories Based on
Respective Safety Climate Scores
Production categories
M n of
Group score plants Chem Met Text Food
1 186.6 5 4 1
2 153.3 4 1 1 1 1
3 141.1 4 2 1 I
4 120.8 7 1 2 4
Note. Chem = chemical, Met = metal, Text = textile.
plants in each group. One evident charac-
teristic of this table is that chemical plants
have the highest safety climate scores,
whereas food processing plants have the
lowest scores. Metal processing and textile
factories fall in between. These data could
be expected based on the technologies and
risk levels involved. Chemical plants have
the highest risks in their production proc-
esses, followed by metal fabrication and
textile factories. It is interesting, therefore,
although expected based on our second hy-
pothesis, that the resulting safety program
practices were reflected in the safety climate
levels of these companies.
An attempt to test the second hypothesis
directly by correlating safety climate scores
with standard safety measures such as ac-
cident-frequency rate and accident-severity
rate was terminated due to the apparent lack
of reliability of these measures. This lack of
reliability resulted from the fact that these
measures were based on reports used for
workers' compensation purposes. Because
of different insurance policies and a system
of penalties, some factories had highly in-
flated figures, whereas others had a bias in
the opposite direction. As an alternative,
therefore, four experienced safety inspectors
working at Israel's Institute of Safety and
Hygiene were asked to rank order the se-
lected factories according to safety practices
and accident-prevention programs. Ranking
was done separately in each production
category, since judges otherwise had great
difficulty in comparing various factories.
The textile factories and three others were
not rank ordered because of judges' insuf-
ficient familiarity with their functioning.
100 DOV ZOHAR

Table 3
Ranking of Factories Within Each Production Category
Metal Chemical Food

Judge Judge Judge

Rank A B C D score A B C D score A B C D score

1 a a a a 156.3 f f f f 156.9 j J 1 j 135.8

2 b b b b 116.2 g g g g 158.8 k k k k 103.2
3 c c c c 124.4 h h h h 155.3 1 1 J 1 108.5
4 d d d d 115.4 i i i : 148.1
5 e e e e 110.4

Note. When different factories share the same rank, the climate score is the one given to the modal factory
in that rank. Factories are represented by lowercase letters.

Due to their geographical dispersion, it was pair of ranks. When fewer factories were
impossible to get the inspectors to visit these ranked, there was a stronger effect of low-
factories, and they had to be omitted. Re- ering the resulting correlation coefficient.
sults of this procedure are given in Table 3. This relatively high agreement between
The agreement between judges' ranking judges' ranking and safety-climate scores
and respective safety climate scores of fac- therefore supported the second hypothesis
tories was tested using Spearman rank cor- and the validity of the safety climate ques-
relation coefficients in each production tionnaire. Agreement among judges was
category. These were rs = .90 (metal), rs also high, as can be seen in Table 3. In
= .80 (chemical), and rs = .50 (food). These the metal category there was complete
correlations are based on small ns ranging agreement between judges, whereas in the
between three and five, hence they should chemical and food categories, disagreements
be interpreted cautiously. Inspection of resulted from interchanges between single
Table 3 indicates that all disagreements pairs of factories, resulting in high overall
between judges' ranking and safety-climate agreement.
ranks resulted from an interchange in a single Finally, a stepwise discriminant analysis
was used to find the smallest number of cli-
Table 4 mate dimensions that are sufficient to dis-
Stepwise Discriminant Analysis of the criminate between different factories based
Safety Climate Questionnaire on their safety climate levels. Results of
this analysis are given in Table 4. Based on
Fto Wilks' lambda criterion (Nie et al., 1975),
enter or Wilks'
climate dimensions accounted for most of
Climate dimension remove lambda
the separation between factories. These di-
Perceived importance of mensions, listed in decreasing discriminant
safety training 141.12 .12 power, are (a) perceived importance of safety
Perceived effects of required training programs, (b) perceived effects of
work pace on safety 81.44 .02
Perceived status of safety required work pace on safety, (c) perceived
committee 58.92 .006 status of safety committee, and (d) perceived
Perceived status of safety status of safety officer.
officer 48.81 .002 The data in Table 4 can be interpreted
Perceived effects of safe as indicating that two climate dimensions
conduct on promotion 16.85 .0009
Perceived level of risk at are most influential in determining safety
work place 7.96 .0006 climate levels. The first dimension is the
Perceived management perceived relevance of safety to job behavior.
attitudes toward safety 6.74 .0005 This relevance is reflected by regarding
Perceived effect of safe
conduct on social status 1.88 .0004 safety training as an important prerequisite
for successful performance and by viewing
 SAFETY CLIMATE
higher work pace as potentially hazardous.
The second climate dimension is the per-
ceived management attitude toward safety,
which can be readily exhibited in workers'
eyes by the organizational status of both
the safety officer and safety committee. The
status of the safety committee can be as-
sessed by the level of those managers who
actively participate in it and by the actual
implementation of its decisions, whereas the
status of the safety officer can be assessed
by executive authority relegated to him (e.g.,
authority to remove workers from produc-
tion hall or to stop production processes
when safety regulations are not followed).
To summarize, then, the data in this study
supported both hypotheses, namely: (a)
Safety climate can be regarded as a char-
acteristic of industrial organizations, and
(b) safety climate is related to the general
safety level in these organizations.
Discussion
Organizational safety climate, as defined
in this article, has both theoretical and ap-
plied significance. The main implication is
that management commitment to safety,
with its multitude of expressions, is a major
factor affecting the success of safety pro-
grams in industry. Such expressions might
be the establishment of job-training pro-
grams, relegation of executive authority to
safety officials, participation of high-level
managers in safety committees, and taking
safety into consideration in job design, in-
cluding required work pace. Often, manage-
ment views safety as a technical and inde-
pendent aspect of the production process,
detached from other management operations.
Yet, not willing to ignore its responsibility
in this regard (and complying with govern-
ment regulations), management assigns all
responsibility to specified safety personnel
without relegating to them any executive
power. The view proposed by this author
as well as others (Cohen, 1977; Grimaldi,
1970) is quite to the contrary. Safety should
be regarded as an integral part of the pro-
duction system closely related to the overall
degree of control management has over pro-
duction processes (Grimaldi, 1970). Hence,
it should not be detached from general man-
agement responsibilities such as environ-
101
mental control, maintenance and house-
keeping, worker selection and training,
information flow, and so forth. Indeed, ac-
cident analyses in most companies reveal
these relationships and the literature re-
viewed points in this direction.
The concept of safety climate implies that
production workers indeed have a unified
set of cognitions regarding the safety aspects
of their organization. As proposed by
Schneider (1975), such perceptions and be-
havior-outcome expectations can guide and
direct job behaviors accordingly. Further-
more, these cognitions are largely related
to perceptions of management attitudes
about safety and its relevance to general
production processes. It can therefore be
concluded that a genuine change in manage-
ment attitudes and increased commitment
are prerequisites for any successful attempt
at improving the safety level in industrial
organizations. Attempting to improve safety
levels, as we often see, with new safety reg-
ulations, poster campaigns, and depart-
mental safety contests without first securing
sincere management commitment might be
missing the forest for the trees. This is the
basic applied implication of the concept of
safety climate in industrial organizations.
Finally, the apparent difficulties the safety
inspectors had in comparing factories from
different production categories points toward
the potential use of safety-climate scores
as a common denominator for comparing
different factories. A major source of dif-
ficulty has been the different technologies
and risk levels involved in the various fac-
tories. Using a measure such as the one pro-
posed here, which is independent of these
factors, can therefore enable such com-
parisons when studying industrial safety
programs.
Reference Note
1. Mobley, W. H. Managerial evaluations of safety
motivation and behavioral hypothesis (Contract
Rep. CDC-74-1815). Cincinnati, Ohio: National In-
stitute for Occupational Safety and Health, 1974.
References
Accident Prevention Advisory Unit. Success and fail-
ure in accident prevention. London: Her Majesty's
Stationery Office, 1976.
Cleveland, R. J., Cohen, H. H., Smith, M. J., & Cohen,
A. Safety program practices in recordholding plants.
102 DOV ZOHAR
Cincinnati, Ohio: National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health, 1978.
Cohen, A. Factors in successful occupational safety
programs. Journal of Safety Research, 1977,9, 168-
178.
Cohen, A., Smith, M., & Cohen, H. H. Safety pro-
gram practices in high vs. low accident rate com-
panies—An interim report (U.S. Department of
Health, Education and Welfare Publication No. 75-
185). Cincinnati, Ohio: National Institute for Occu-
pational Safety and Health, 1975.
Davis, R. T., & Stahl, R. W. Safety organization and
activities of award-winning companies in the coal
mining industry (Information Circular No. 8224.)
Pittsburgh, Pa.: U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau
of Mines, 1964.
Dieterly, D., & Schneider, B. The effect of organiza-
tional environment on perceived power and climate:
A laboratory study. Organizational Behavior and
Human Performance, 1974, / / , 316-337.
Fleishman, E. E. Leadership climate, human relations
training, and supervisory behavior. Personnel Psy-
chology, 1953,6,205-222.
Forehand, G. A., & Oilmer, B. H. Environmental vari-
ation in studies of organizational behavior. Psy-
chological Bulletin, 1964, 62, 361-382.
Grimaldi, J. V. The measurement of safety engineering
performance. Journal of Safety Research, 1970, 2,
137-159.
Guttman, L. Some necessary conditions for common
factor analysis. Psychometrika, 1954, 19, 149-161.
House, R. J., and Rizzo, J. R. Toward the measure of
organizational practices: Scale development and
validation. Journal of Applied Psychology, 1972,56,
388-396.
James, L. R., & Jones, A. P. Organizational climate:
A review of theory and research. Psychological
Bulletin, 1974, 81, 1096-1112.
Litwin, G. H., & Stringer, R. A., Jr. Motivation and
organizational climate. Boston: Division of Re-
search, Harvard Business School, 1968.
National Safety Council. Award-winning programs. In,
Accident prevention manual for industrial operations
(6th ed.). Chicago: Author, 1969.
View publication stats
Nie, N. H., Hull, C. H., Jenkins, J. G., Steinbrenner,
K., & Bent, D. H. Statistical package for the social
sciences (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975.
Planek, T., Driessen, G., & Vilardo, F. J. Evaluating
the elements of an industrial safety program. Na-
tional Safety News, August 1967, 60-63.
Porter, L. W., & Lawler, E. E., III. Properties of
organizational structure in relation to job attitudes
and job behavior. Psychological Bulletin, 1965, 64,
23-51.
Schneider, B. The perception of organizational climate:
The customer's view. Journal of Applied Psychol-
ogy , 1973,57,248-256.
Schneider, B. Organizational climates: An essay.
Personnel Psychology, 1975, 28, 447-479.
Schneider, B., & Bartlett, C. J. Individual differences
and organizational climate. II: Measurement of or-
ganizational climate by the multitrait-multirater
matrix. Personnel Psychology, 1970, 23, 493-512.
Sells, S. B. An approach to the nature of organiza-
tional climate. In R. Tagiuri & G. Litwin (Eds.),
Organizational climate: Explorations of a concept.
Boston: Division of Research, Harvard Business
School Press, 1968.
Shafai-Sahrai, Y. An inquiry into factors that might
explain differences in occupational accident experi-
ence of similar size firms in the same industry (Tech.
rep.). East Lansing, Mich.: Division of Research,
Graduate School of Business Administration, Michi-
gan State University Press, 1971.
Smith, M. J., Cohen, H. H., Cohen, A., & Cleveland,
R. J. On-site observations of safety practices in plants
with differential safety performance. National Safety
Congress Transactions (Vol. 12). Chicago: National
Safety Council, 1975.
Tagiuri, R. The concepts of organizational climate. In
R. Tagiuri & G. Litwin (Eds.), Organizational cli-
mate: Explorations of a concept. Boston: Division
of Research, Harvard Business School Press, 1968.
Taylor, C. W. (Ed.). Climate for creativity. Elmsford,
N.Y.: Pergamon Press, 1972.
Received January 8, 1979 •