119

Historiography Between Scholarship and Poetry

Reflections on Hayden White's Approach to Historiography
Georg G. lggcrs
University of New York, Buffalo

My occupation with Hayden White's work, not only with Metahistory, but also with the essays which
followed, has a very practical side to it. For quite a number of years now I have been occupied with a work of
synthesis on historical thought and writing since che eighteenth century. I chose the eighteenth century as the
scare because ac that junction, as I shall explain below, a reorientation took place in che quality and character
of historical perception and conceptualization which distinguished modern from pre-modern historical
discourse. I have researched and written considerable portions of the book, yet as I proceeded I became
increasingly aware chat traditional forms of writing a history of historiography, which were essentially
informative rather than analytical, such as the readable works of Eduard Fueter, George P. Gooch, James
Westfall Thompson, Harry Elmer Barnes and more recently Ernst Breisach, no longer suffice. Despite rhe
critical notes which especially Fueter and Barnes contain, they are essentially discussions of individual writers
and their works. White's attempt in Metahistory to seek "a deep structural content" (p.ix) in che historical
writing of nineteenth-century Europe constitutes an important contribution to a more critical and analytical
approach to the history of historiography. The completion of my book has been delayed by my search for a
satisfactory conceptual framework.
I
My own work in recent years has been located between two orientations from which I have received
important impulses but with which I also have very profound differences. On the one hand there is the attempt
by Jorn Riisen and his students, particularly Horse-Walter Blanke and Friedrich Jaeger (see bibliography), who
seek to deal with historical writing since che eighteenth history within che framework of the history of a
scholarly, or in their term scientific, i.e. wissenschaftlich, discipline, and on the other hand, White's commitment
to deal with historical writing primarily as a form of literature. There is justification for both approaches, for
historical writing can be viewed from the perspective of scholarship and of literature. Moreover, there is
common ground between Ri.isen and White in their treatment, to use White's formulation of "the historical
work as a verbal structure in the form of a narrative prose discourse" (Metahistory, ix). Boch Rusen and his
students as well as White, moreover, privilege written history at che neglect of other forms of historical memory
and reconstruction which are not written but nevertheless important aspects of historical consciousness. But
within the written history of the nineteenth century, they deal with very different subjects; only Ranke,
Droysen, and Burckhardt occur in both of them and are approached very differently.
One fundamental difference between the two approaches lies in the views of objectivity and truth. For
RUsen, Blanke, and Jaeger, hiscory is foremost a science in the German sense of the term Wissenschaft, for White
it is foremost an arc. Riisen and his students seek to apply the Kuhnian concept of the paradigm or the
disciplinary matrix to the study of history. To be sure chis involves a modification of the traditional concept of
historical objectivity by which historical discourse refers co a real past. Every historical narrative, they
acknowledge, only indirectly recaptures the past. Riisen and White agree that ideological factors enter inco
historical cognition. For Riisen and his students this means chat historical study always reflects the life world
of the historian. For him as for Kuhn scientific knowledge, and chis for him includes historical knowledge, is
always a construct, never a direct reflection of reality. Both science, including historical science, presuppose a
scientific community which shares a common language and common standards of what constitutes scientific
method and criteria of truth. While the history of science for Kuhn emphatically does not consist in the
cumulation of knowledge, and Kuhn thus denies the reality of progress in the history of science, che idea of a
progressive development in historical studies returns through the back door. Although the substitution of one
 HISTORIOGRAPHY BEIWEEN SoiolARsHIP AND Poem.
RmEC110NS ON HAYDEN WHITE AS APPROACH TO HISTORJOGIWHY
120 Georg. G. lggc:ra: Hisroria a Dcbarc. Torno Ill. pp. 119-128

paradigm by another for Kuhn involves extrascientific elements such as changed world views, ic nevertheless
constitutes an advance in problem solving. The same is true for Rilsen's view of changes in what he calls
"disciplinary matrices." At chis point Rilsen embeds the history of historical study into a broader historical
. framework linked co the Weberian conception of rationalization as a key characteristic of the Occidental world.
Ranonalizafioo in the sphere o( historical inquiry cakes the form of "scientificacion" ( Verwissenschafilichrmg),
the tran'Sfumtation of history into a scientific enterprise, not only in the sense of rigorous scientific
conceptualization but also professional organization. Although the science ofhiscory, for example in the sense
-of Droysen who spoke of "elevating history co the rank of a science (Wissenschafi)" (Droysen, 451-469), is
different from the hard sciences in the soft~):· kind of explanations and conceptualization it employs, ic is
nevertheless more than merely historical scholarship. For Riisen three concepts are closely related,
"scientification", "professionalization", and "modernization". For him, Blanke, and Jaeger the foundations for
the transformation of history from historiography ( Geschichtsschreibung) to historical science
(Geschichtswissenschaft were laid in the Enlightenment; in nineceench-century historicism the new scholarly
outlook found its high point. Historicism went hand in hand with the emergence of a professional ethos in
historical studies. But while it overcame the static vie~of human nature of the Enlightenment, and saw all
cultural phenomena in ·rheir changing, historical settings, it in their opinion placed coo great a stress on high
politics and with its stress on individuality and uniqueness in history sacrificed rigorous conceptualization.
Thus che combination of history and the analytical social sciences in the mid-twentieth century conscicuces
for chem not only a replacement of the historicist matrix but also an advance.
While professionalizacion plays an important role in historical studies in the nineteenth and twentieth
century not only in Germany but generally in the world, it constitutes, as White convincingly showed, only
one aspect of nineteenth (or for that matter twentieth) century historical studies. The concept of a disciplinary
matrix assumes that there is agreement on how history is to be researched and written but as White's examples
of Michelet, Tocqueville, and Burckhardc demonstrate, none of whom fit che paradigm, historical writing has
gone in very diverse directions. Although Riisen in recent years has turned his attention co comparative studies
of historical discourse including the historiographies of non-Western cultures, the works of Blanke and Jaeger
still early in the 1990s focused narrowly on Germany. I myself when asked co contribute a paper, "Why Did
che Verwissenschaftlichtmg of Historical Studies Occur Earlier in Germany than in Other Countries?", co che
Historical Discourse conference in 1992 on the modernization of historical studies in che nineteen ch century
changed the tide to "Did the Verwissenschaft/ichung of Historical Studies in Fact Occur Earlier in Germany
than in Other Countries?" (lggers). My reason for this was my conviction chat professionalizacion by no means
guaranteed the objectivity and impartiality which it prescribed. Here I fully agree with White regarding che
ideological aspects of historical scholarship. It is striking that the new professional historical studies were
generally highly ideological. In the case of Ranke the ideological implications were concealed and denied but
easily recognizable, in the case of Sybel, Droysen, or Treicschke they were openly acknowledged. The new
historical profession in Germany preceding and following unification, and in France in the Third Republic
served political and national aims. Droysen, who by Riisen and White is praised as one of the greatest historical
minds of the nineteenth century, was also the creator of che myth of che German mission of che Hohenzollerns
since the Middle Ages.
II
Turning now co White's work and more directly co the question of cextualism and hiscorical discourse:
While Riisen stresses the scientific and scholarly side of hiscorical inquiry which, wichouc denying che literary
and aesthetic qualities of historical qualities of historical narrative, nevertheless aims at a realistic reconscruccion
of the past, White minimizes the distinction beween historical scholarship, speculative philosophy of history,
and imaginative literature. Every attempt co reconstruct the past by scholarly means is primarily a "poetic act"
(Metahistory, x, 31). I shall concentrate on Metahistory, although White has later viewed it as representing an
earlier stage of his chinking, because it interests me particularly as a history of historiography, and because che
 H1sTOR10GRAPHY BmYEEN ScHolAllSHIP AND Pomv.
RmECllONS ON HAYD£N WHIYE AS APPROACH TO HISTORIOGRAPHY

Georg. G. lggen: His1oria a Debate. Torno Ill, pp. 119-128

121

theory of tropes continues basically unchanged into his later work. What is added is a radically
"poststruccuralist" and "postmodernist" -to use White,s terms- theory of language which contrasts with the
"formalism" or "struccuralism", again to use his terms, of Metahistory.
The key assumption on which White,s argument in Metahistory, rests is "that, in any field of study not
yet reduced (or elevated) to the status of a genuine science, thought remains the captive of the linguistic mode
in which it seeks to grasp the outline of objects inhabiting its field of perception,, (Metahistory, xi). The
consequence is chat it is not the purportedly objective investigations of the historian into a real subject matter
which lead co knowledge about history hue rather that the knowledge at which the historian arrives is
conditioned by the linguistic mode in which he/she operates. In "choos(ing) conceptual strategies by which co
explain or represent his data ... the historian performs an essentially poetic act, in which he prefigures the
historical field and constitutes it as a domain upon which to bring to bear the specific theories he will use to
explain 'what was really happening,,, (Metahistory, x). White then sets out co examine the texts of four master
historians of the nineteenth century, Michelet, Ranke, Tocqueville, and Burckhardc, and four speculative
philosophers of history, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and Croce, co show chat the "possible modes of historiography
are the same as the possible modes of speculative philosophy of history" (Metahistory, xi). In so far as the
historical work is "a verbal structure in the form of a narrative prose discourse,, (Metahistory, ix), the same
conditions govern historical narratives and speculative philosophies of history, or for chat matter the historical
novel. All three are confronted with a "choice among contending interpretative strategies" (Mecahiscory, xi).
These strategies White defines as "tropes." "As a corollary of chis (choice), the best grounds for choosing one
perspective on history rather than another are aesthetic or moral rather than epistemological" (Metahistory,
xii).
Going beyond chis, White argues chac once the historian has made his/her choice of strategies or crepes,
he/she is captive of this stacegy. Within che nineteenth-century European setting, four tropes or historical styles
were possible, each of which preconditioned one of four "modes" of "emplocment" (romantic, tragic, comic,
satircal), "argument" (formist, mechanistic, organicist, contextualise), and "ideological implication" (anarchist,
radical, conservative, liberal) (Metahistory, 29). Thus Ranke in his historical optimism employs what White
calls a comic mode of emplotment, in which the plot leads to an happy end, sees society in organicist terms,
and is politically conservative. The historical style thus predetermines the way the historian proceeds, how he
explains historical events, and what political stance he cakes. One may dismiss this categorization, which reflects
the scientiscic structuralism of literary theory in the 1960s, as peripheral to White's epistemological position.
The core of his argument is that "proper" history, philosophy of history, and literary forms of history all have
the same explanatory validity. As he formulated it in an essay published shortly after Metahistory: "Bue in
general there has been a reluctance to consider historical narratives as what they most manifestly are: verbal
fictions, the contents of which are as much invented as found and the forms of which have more in common
with their counterparts in literature than they have with those in the sciences" (Tropics, 82). Using a purely
"formalist" method, White therefore "will not cry co decide whether a given hiscorian,s work is a better, or more
correct account of a specific sec of events or segment of the historical process than some other historian's
account of them,, (Metahistory, 3-4).
To illustrate his point, White proceeds to what he considers a strictly texcual examination of che four
master historians and the four master philosophers of history who for him represent the four tropes with their
implications for emplocment, argument, and ideology as he defines them. His formalism assumes that the texts
are self-concained, that they can be analyzed without reference to a context, that in fact they contain the context
and that "they cannot be 'refuted'," or their generalizations 'disconfirmed', ... by appeal to new data ... Their
scacus as models of historical narration and conceptualization depends, ultimately, on the preconceptual and
specifically poetic nature of their perspectives on history and ics processes" (Metahistory, 5).
The problem with White,s essays on the four historians and che four philosophers of history is that he
does not do what he sets out to do. These essays are largely not textual but contextual analyses. I shall show
 HISTORIOGRAPHY BElWHN Sotol.AasHIP AND Pomv.
Rs\tcnONS ON HAYDEN WHITE AS APPiOAOf TO HISTORIOGRAPHY
122 Ccorg. G. Iggcn: His1oria a Ocb:m:. Torno Ill, pp. 119-128

this in the case of the essays on Ranke, Burckhardc, and Marx which I have examined closely, buc ic also holds
for the remaining five essays. The cexcual approach assumes thac che cexc can be read wichouc reference to a
referent. White in Metahistory had not yec completed his "movement co poscmodernism" of which he spoke
in 1993 when he wrote: "I am inclined co follow people like Foucault and Barches. So I say, che ccxt in some
sense is detached from che author" (Interview, p. 16). In Metahistory, he was scill concerned abouc chc author's
incencionalicy and he soughc co find ic in the texc. Bue he largely failed co read che rexes in which che historians
or philosophers he examined wrote history, to find the understanding of history implicit in chcir hiscorical
narratives. Instead·he restricted himself for the mosc part to reconscruccing their explicit cheorecical stacemencs
and examining influences which ocher thinkers exerted on chem. Using his scheme of chc tropes wich ics
implications for what he called emplocmenc, argument, and ideology, he imposed a consistency on each of
chem which obscured che contradictions or at least lack of systematic coherence in che thought of each of them.
Perhaps the problem with W)lice's analysis arises because che cext only answers che questions which we ask it
and these questions are not inherent in che text. These questions chen lead co authorial intentionalicy, alchough,
of course, the author may not be fully conscious of the implications of his writing. But if we exclude che
author's intentionality from the text and refrain from asking questions seeking to probe his/her intencionalicy,
we are forced to take an absurdist notion of free play which permits the rexes co be interpreced in an infinice
number of ways.
Looking now at the Ranke ch~~cer, it struck me thac White had examined none of Ranke's great
narrative works, neither the History ofthe Popes, nor the History ofthe Reformation in Germany, the History of
Civil ~rs and Monarchy in France, nor che English History in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (although
all of them except the last are listed in his bibliography). It would have been interesting to examine the
ideological implications, the emplotmenc and che forms of argument which interest White in the accual
historical narrative. Instead Ranke is embedded into che intellectual hiscory of the early nineceench cencury by
an analysis of his cheorecical scatemencs. White draws on che brief excerpts from Fricz Stern's Varieties ofHistory,
che famous four-page preface to che Histories ofthe Latin and Germanic Nations, che brief fragments of his
incroduccory lectures, and then che famous essay on the "Great Powers" (bibliography) from che Von Laue
edition. These scacemencs give us a good insight inco Ranke's world view as he consciously arciculaced ic. They
support White's view of ic: the combination of an optimistic vision of che hiscorical process, which Whice
denotes as comic, an organicisc conception of society, and conservative political values. Whice draws heavily
on Humboldt's essay "On the Task of the Historian" to explain Ranke's doctrine of historical ideas and
individuali cy.
Yet it would have been imporcanc co have gone beyond Ranke's megahistorical perceptions in "The
Great Powers" co examine che actual historical narratives. This would have permitted us to look into the accual
cexcure of his texcs, to view his heroes (and villains), his psychology, his comprehension of human behavior,
and che political implications. Although Ranke proclaims his imparcialicy, the policical implicarions wirhin his
rexes become apparent at every seep. His creacment of Luther and Munzer in his chapcer on che German Peasanc
Wars is a good example of chis.
Ranke rejected che historical novel as he saw it exemplified in Walter Scocc but he was very much aware
chat hiscory was also an arc and wroce in che manner of the historical novelists. Here ic would have been
incerescing co explore che commonalities in che discourse and scylc of che scholarly hiscorical work and rhe
work ofliceracure. And then there was, of course, che scholarly side, che cencral role of critical archival research,
which Ranke took very seriously, but White barely mentions, because he considers ic irrelevanc co an
understanding of Ranke,s narrative. Bue it cannot be dismissed, so char ic is important ac lease co examine ics
impacc on che narrative, even if like White we were to consider chis impact minimal.
White is right char much of Ranke,s world can be reconscrucced through a depth analysis, even a
linguistic analysis of hiscorical narratives. He unfortunately docs noc do chis here. Nor is ic clear char che
hiscorical picture Ranke conscruccs results from che choice of a crope. It seems racher that rhe choice of trope
 HISTORIOGRAPHY BETWEEN SoioWSHIP AND POETRY.
R£R£CTIONS ON HAYD£N WHllE AS APPROAOf TO HISTORIOGRAPHY
123
Georg, G. lsgcrs: Hiuoriu Ocharc:. Torno Ill. pp. 119-128

is pare of a broad context which shapes this choice, that ideology, defined here not as political doctrine or false
consciousness in Marx's sense bur in terms of basic views and values, may be a stronger force in determining
the historical styles which White has in mind as tropes than the reverse.
In his essay on Burckhardt, White does in fact occasionally refer to the Civilization ofthe Renaissance,
but only peripherally. And he deals with it to isolate articulated ideas, rather than to lay bare the implications
contained in the narrative. Bue for the most part the sources which White examines are again not historical
narratives - The Age of Constantine is mentioned, but not examined. Instead, great emphasis is placed on the
Letters, The Cicerone, Force and Freedom, and judgements on History and Historians, none of which are historical
narratives. Thus parallel to the discussion of Humboldt in the Ranke chapter as a source of Ranke's idealism,
there is an extensive treatment of Schopenhauer as a source of Burckhard e's pessimism. But this is an external,
contextual element, not found in the narrative. Yee an examination of Burckhardc's historical narrative would
have presented a much more complex picture, not free of contradictions, than the attempt to define Burckhardt
in terms of tropes. There is a contrast between the note of aristocratic pessimism in the face of the industrial
world and mass society reflected in Burckhardt's diaries and letters, especially after 1870, and the aristocratic,
but nevertheless embulliant note of the Civilization ofthe Renaissance. Despite Burckhardt's rejection of Hegel's
philosophy of history as schematic and his written repudiation of the idea of progress in Force and Freedom,
there is a good deal of common ground between him and Hegel, for example in his view of the emergence and
progress of a peculiarly Western conception of liberty with its roots in classical Greek antiquity (See Jaeger).
And for him, as we know, che Renaissance constituted a remarkable progress over the Middle Ages. To be sure
he saw this modern culture threatened by the forces unleashed by the French Revolution and industrialization.
Bue this does not become apparent in The Civilization ofthe Renaissance, which in some ways is a nostalgic
reflection on a past world more glorious in its violence and its repudiation of conventional morality than chat
of his time. A dose reading of the texts thus shows a much less consistent mind than the theory of the tropes
would suggest.
We can show something similar in Michelet and Tocqueville. But the philosophers of history too muse
be read much more closely than occurs here. Thus Marx's writing of history and his philosophy of history is
characterized by White as "mechanistic" and assigned co the "metonymical mode." Bue a careful reading of
The Eighteenth Brumaire ofLouis Bonaparte shows chat its narrative is much too complex to be categorized in
this way. Faced with che failure of his and Engels' predictions in early 1848 about the outcome of the
Revolution they considered co be imminent, Marx introduced faccors in conflict with his general statements
elsewhere about the course of history. The macrohiscorical framework within which Marx places the course of
historical development remains. Bue Marx now draws a much more complex picture of class relations than he
and Engels did in che Manifesto. Even the peasantry, whom Marx disdainfully compares to a "sack of potatoes,"
enter as a historical factor. Marx argued chat "Louis Bonaparce,s victory was a result of bourgeois fear of the
proletariat, combined with peasant resentment of both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat" (Metahistory, 320).
But confronted with the actual events which do not fie into his larger historical scheme, Marx is forced to
introduce factors which are not purely reducible co economic forces. Thus he recognizes the role, however,
negative, which individuals, foremost Louis Bonaparte, played in shaping political events and the powerful
influence which political traditions such as the French Revolution and Bonapartism asserted. And finally, not
only in the assessment of Louis Bonaparte but also of the Lt1mpenproletariat and the Society of December 10.
Marx introduces moral categories which are not compatible with his larger scheme of history.
This is not meant as a repudiation of textual reading hue rather as a call for a much closer textual
reading than White has undertaken here. But it also points co the limits of a narrow cextualism. We cannot
understand the text without understanding the context in which it arose. And the intentions of the author are
an important part of chis context. Ac the same time we must be aware chat these intentions are much more
complex than the author admits or realizes. Here we are driven co do what White has admonished us co do at
the beginning of Metahistory, co dig below the "surface" co the "deep structural content" (Metahistory, ix, x).
 HISTORIOGRAPH'( BElWEEN ScliowsHIP AND PomY.
Rm£cnoNs ON HAYDEN WHITE AS APPROACH TO HISTORIOGRAPHY
124
Georg. G. Iggas: Hisroria a Dcba1c. Tomo Ill, pp. 119-128

We must try co find this structural content through a close, critical reading of the texts, but it is not generated
by che texts. My criticism of White in Metahistory, is not that he relied too heavily on che texts, hue that in
contrast to the textualism he advocates he relied on chem coo little.
In fact the texts can tell us a great deal about the age which goes beyond the author himself because
the· auth_<>r is embedded in a context. White recognizes chis in his essay, "The Context in the Text: Method and
IdeQlq&f in lntellectuatHisiory", published in 1982, almost a decade after Metahistory. We should leave aside
White's espousal of post-Saussurean linguistics and look at what he actually does in his masterful treatment of
The Education ofHenry Adams. Here White recognizes chat "considered as historical evidence, all texts are
regarded as being equally shoe through wjf!i ideological elements". "To the historian equipped with the proper
cools", he continues, "any text or artifact can figure forth the thought-world and possibly even the world of
emotional investment and the praxis of its time and place of production" (Content, p. 187). And in his analysis
of The Education ofHenry Adams, he closely considered contextual aspects, such as the conditions under which
the work was published and the world of an American aristocracy ouc of which Adams came. Far from seeing
the work as a unit, White points at the deep disjunctur~ in discourse and ouclook between the part dealing
with the early years of Henry Adam and the lacer ~rs. Considering his analysis co be "semiological" rather
than "linguistic", White wants to go beyond the "conventional approach" of"identify (ing) generic elements,
themes, arguments, and so forth, in the interest of establishing what the text is about" {Content, p. 194), co
take us to the "process of meaning production that is the special subject of intellectual history" (Ibid, 209).
"By unpacking the rich symbolic content of Adams' work". White concludes, "we return it to its status as an
immanent product of the culture in which it arose". "It is the typicality of Adams' discourse that makes it
translatable as evidence of his own age that a reader can comprehend, receive as message, understand" (p. 213).
I agree. The result is a convincing demonstration of the interplay of text and context.
III
Textualism as understood by White, however, raises not only the question of the relation of text to
context but also the related question of the relation of the text to an extracexcual reality and with it the question
to what extent the text conveys fact or fiction.
There are several points on which I can agree with White:
1) Few persons would question White's intention to treat the historical work, certainly in its classical
form in nineteenth-century Western culture which he examines, as "a verbal structure in the form
of a narrative prose discourse" (Metahistory, ix). Historical accounts normally take the form of
stories.
2) Few persons would disagree with him that the conception which he ascribes co nineteenth-century
academic history, that the story emerges unproblematically from the documentary evidence, is
untenable. Incidentally none of the great historians, certainly not Ranke, held this conception. The
coherence of the accounts requires the historian to construct a story which goes beyond the raw
data. Tnis account, at lease i? th~ classical form which not only nineteenth-century European
historiography, but much ofh1stor1og~phy before then in the West and in ocher cultures, assumed,
requires emplotmenr of the data. In thts sense every historical account has a literary dimension, as
incidencally also Ranke recognized.
3) Most persons today would ag~ee with. White that the historian does not proceed without
presuppositions in the construcaon of thts story. In White's words: "Before the historian can bring
to bear upon the data of the historical field the conceptual apparatus he will use to represent and
to explain it, he must first prefigure th~ field" (Metahistory, 30). I further agree chat explicit or
implict ideological considerations enter mto every construction of a historical account. Moreover,
I agree that there is a philosophy of history implicit in every historical account.
4) Further I would agree that the sharp distinction between history and literature which dominated
 HISlORIOGllAPHY BrnvtEN ScHolAaSHIP AND PomY.
RmECllONS ON HAYDEN WHITE AS APPROAOI to HISTORIOGRAPHY
125
Georg. G. lggcrs: Histo.U a Odmc. Torno Ill, pp. 119-128

nineteenth-century historical thought requires co be modified {See Tropics, 98). Thus I agree chat
the view, according co which "it was possible to believe chat whereas writers of fiction invented
everything in their narratives, ... historians invented nothing hue certain rhetorical flourishes"
(Content, x) is no longer tenable. Nor is che rigid "older distinction between fiction and history, in
which fiction is conceived as the representation of the imaginable and history as che representation
of the actual" tenable without qualifications. Noc only does the historical narrative unavoidably
introduce fictional elements in its construction of a story, but the novel, particularly in its
nineteenth-century form, "wish(es) to provide a verbal image of'reality'", (Tropics, 122) particularly
in its commitment co realism. I would accept White's insistence that there is a continuum between
fact and fiction, and would further accept his observation chat "novelists might be dealing only
with imaginary events whereas historians are dealing with real ones, but the process of fusing events,
whether imaginary or real, into a comprehensible totality capable of serving as the object of a
representation is a poetic process,, (Ibid., 125).
5) I would further agree with White that "'history,' as a plenum of documents that attest co the
occurrence of events, can be put cogether in a number of different and equally plausible narrative
accounts of 'what happened in the past,,, (Metahistory, 283). Thus we should acknowledge "that
there is no such thing as a single correct view of any object under study but that there are many
correct views, each requiring its own style of representation" (Tropics, 47). Comparing chis to an,
he rightly suggests that "we do noc expect that Constable and Cezanne will have looked for che
same thing in a given landscape" (Ibid., 46).
Up to chis point I agree with White and believe that he has made a valuable contribution in
heightening our awareness of the literary and fictional aspects of historical narration. In my opinion White's
error is that he argues that because all historical accounts contain fictional elements they are basically fictions
and not subject to truth controls For him there are not only many different possible accounts of any set of
events and interpretations of any set of documents, but all of them have the same truth value. As we have
already quoted, "grounds for choosing one perspective of history rather than another are ultimately aesthetic
or moral" (Metahistory, xii).
White does not deny that there are historical facts. Pressed on the question of the Holocaust, he admits
that it took place. Thus an "occurrence" like the storming of the Bastille on July 14, 1789, is "simply a matter
of fact" (Content, 77). So is the Holocaust. To claim that ic did not cake place is "as morally offensive as it is
intellectually bewildering" (Content, 76). Here White has a much simpler and more traditional conception of
a fact than he employs elsewhere, e.g. in his agreement with Claude Levi-Strauss that historical facts are
constituted rather then given (Tropics, 5 5) or in his quotation of Roland Barches' sentence: "Le fait n' a jamais
qu'une existence linguistique" which is the motto of The Content of the Form. Similarly he questions the
existence of "raw facts" and suggests that the historian has to constitute the facts by the "choice of the metaphor
by which he orders the world" (Ibid., 47). With specific reference co the Holocaust and contrasting it to the
assercions of the Revisionists who deny that it cook place, White argues: "Obviously, considered as accounts
of events already established as facts, 'competing narratives' can be assessed, criticized, and ranked on the basis
of their fidelity to the factual record, their comprehensiveness, and the coherence of whatever arguments they
may contain" (Probing, 141). But he then immediately qualifies chis by continuing: "But narrative arguments
do not consist of factual statements (singular existential propositions) and arguments: they consist as well of
poetical and rhetorical elements ... Here the conflict between 'competing narratives' has less co do with the
faces of the matter in question than with the different story-meanings with which the facts can be endowed by
emplocment" (Ibid.).
Thus White's turn to factualism in reference to the reality of the Holocaust appears in conflict with his
seance throughout his writings from Metahistory to the interview with Ewa Domanska in 1993 that all historical
writing is fiction. Thus as we have already noted, he considers all historicat narratives "verbal fictions, the
 HISTORIOGlWHY BE1WllN 5cHol.AasHIP AND PoETRY.
RErucnoNs ON HAYDEN WHITE AS APPRoAat 10 H1SToRJOGaAPHY
126
Georg. G. lggcn: H"isioriaa Dcha1c. Tomo Ill, pp. 119-128

contents of which are as much invented as found." (Tropics, 82) "Viewed simply as verbal arcifaccs, histories
and novels are indistinguishable from one another."(lbid., 122) Similarly "che opposition between mych and
history ... is as problematical as it is untenable." (Ibid., 83)
While rightly pointing ac the elemencs in the construccion of any historical narrative which go beyond
the raw data, White moves on to a position which I find untenable: that every historical account, provided ic
does not violate its fidelity co the faces, possesses equal truth value. Historical narratives, he argues, can be
judged in.terms of their ''consistency, coherence, and illuminary power" but they can no more be "refuted" or
"disconfirmed" than can expositions of speculative history (Metahistory, 4). How one puts a "plenum of
documents" together into a "plausible narrative account" is a matter of "voluncarisc" decision (Metahistory,
283).
White's position is then further radicalized when in his later work he moves co what he calls a "posc-
Saussurian" or "semiological" approach to language. Such an approach rejects che "illusion chat there is a past
out there chat is directly reflected in the texts" (Content, 209) and thus "permits us co moot the qucscion of the
cext's reliability as witness co events, its honesty and objectivity" (Ibid., 192). As a consequence, Whice now
sees the operations of academic schol~hip as "a ritual function". "The kinds of 'honesty' and 'objeccivicy' to
which. historians lay claim really relace"t'o the conventions of erudite scholarship chat obtain in a given time and
place ana within specific domains of different scholarly communities. In other words the 'objectivity' and
'honesty' of historians are, like the 'facts' they purvey, 'relative' to the cultural ideas prevailing in the time and
place of their production" (Rejoinder co Chartier, 65).
IV
One can, of course, deal with history from a literary, aeschecic perspective or a scholarly one. Boch have
their justification. But White in face rejects the second option as an illusion.
He is undoubtedly right that an ideological element enters into every hiscorical account. On che ocher
hand, he in my opinion goes coo far when he asserts chat "there are no extra-ideological grounds on which co
arbitrate among the confliccing conceptions of the historical process and of historical knowledge appealed to
by the different ideologies" (Metahistory, 26). We shall test this, turning co the history of the French Revolution.
As we saw White agrees that there is a factual basis which cannot be disputed, such as the storming of the
Bastille on July 14, 1989, or in the case of the Shoah the existence of the gas chambers. But every attempt to
construct a larger historical account whether of the French Revolution or the Shoah is forced to em plot the
events in such a way chat the story which emerges is at its core fictional. Thus there can be many stories of the
French Revolution -as there can be of the Shoah- among which one cannoc arbicrate on any extra-ideological
ground.
Turning briefly to the hiscory of the French Revolucion: The dominant interprecacions of che French
Revolution from the 1920s to the 1970s were Marxist following Georges Lefebvre's analysis of the outbreak
of the Revolution in terms of class conflict. The key role in che Revolution was assigned co the bourgeoisie
although other classes -aristocracy, peasantry, menus peuples- all played their roles. For White a Marxist
explanation cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed. Precisely because every attempt ac historical explanation
contains an ideological element as well as a "mode of emplocmenc" co "structure" che narrative, chere is "no
way of arbitrating among the different modes of explanation" (Metahistory, 276). Nevertheless if we look ac an
accempc co "explain" the outbreak of the French Revolution, there are aspects which can be reseed against che
documentary evidence. Admittedly this evidence too consists of verbal artifacts which involve interprecacion.
Lefebvre's analysis triggered off a debate among scholars of the French Revolucion regarding che economic and
social composition of the classes involved in it and raised the quescion whether the concepc of class was even
applicable. Although certainly inspired by ideological commitments, che arguments raised in che debace, for
example between Lefebvre and Cobban or Soboul and Furer, reseed on che incerprecacion of accual daca. The
Lefebvre thesis could thus be rested and in part disconfirmed or modified. Out of che discussion came an
 H1s10R10GllAPHY BnwuN Sotowst11P AND Pomv.
REFUCTIONS ON HAYDEN WHm AS APPllOACH to HISTORIOGRAPHY
127
Georg. G. Iggcrs: Historia :a Dc.-hatc. Torno Ill, pp. 119-128

increasing consensus chat the Revolution could not be explained solely or largely in terms of economic factors
but involved accitudcs and cultural values as well. Lynn Hunt and ochers stressed che role of symbols and
language. To an extent the economic and cultural interpretations not only confront each other but cast different
perspectives on a complicated historical complex. There is no one interpretation of the French Revolution nor
can there be, neverchcless chere are racional standards which historians follow in their communication with
each other. I fully agree wich White that "different historians could provide radically different, not to say
antithetical but equally plausible accounts of the same phenomena without distorting 'the facts' or violating
any of the prevailing rules for handling evidence" (Rejoinder, 70). But his reference to "prevailing rules for
handling evidence" suggests chat White coo has co concede a degree of agreement among historians on scholarly
procedure.
White brushes Habermas aside "as having a very naive theory of communication and therefore of
discourse" {Interview, 21 ). But in my opinion the core of Habermas' theory of communication is noc naive.
It recognizes che ideological elements which enter into communication as well as the very complex and in many
ways opaque nature of the reality which surrounds us, yet nevertheless maintains the commitment to
communication among mature individuals, "miindig' in Kant's sense, who agree on standards of rational
discourse. The resulc is never definitive agreement, but rather a continuous dialogue which challenges
ideological distortions. Historical scholarship is pare of chis discourse. This scholarship, which White considers
primarily as a ritual, despite all ideological variations, contains agreement on cercain minimum standards of
evidence and argument. Nocwichstanding the role of imagination in the construction of scholarly accounts,
such accounts arc not purely or primarily imaginative but presuppose hard research, the methods and
conclusions of which arc subject to scrutiny among a community of scholars. While its ability of such
scholarship co achieve consensus on substantive issues is limited, it can contribute to the dismantling of
hiscorical mychs. And thac is an important part of rational discourse.
v
Now co the way in which I wish co mold chc various fragments I have composed during the past several
years into a coherent story of che history of historical thought and writing since the eighteenth century. I am
fully aware that this will be only one perspective alongside with chose which Rusen, Blanke, and Jaeger, on the
one hand, and White on the ocher have provided. Because che historical writing of this period can be viewed
from the perspective of its scholarship or that of "historical imagination," mine will be a middle road which
integrates elements of both perspectives. There are good reasons Rilsen and his students, White, and I begin
our account in the eighteenth century. We all recognize a shift in historical consciousness which took place at
that time and which we might label "modern." One aspect of this new consciousness is a secularization of
thought, the final break with che Bible·oriented chronology. For all three approaches it marks the emergence
of a certain kind of realism which for White consists in the exclusion of"legend, myth, fable" from "potential
evidence for determining the truth about the past" (Metahistory, 52). For Rusen and Blanke it consists in the
emergence of critical historical scholarship. I wish co deal with historical thought in a broader setting than that
of either Rusen and Blanke or White. While especially for Blanke, the focus is on professional historians,
including many minor figures, for White it is on the "master historians," because the "classic text ... gives us
insight into a process which is universal and definicive of human species·being in general, the process of
meaning production" (Content, 211 ).
Yee there is someching narrow to boch foci. The academic historians form only a small segment of
historical consciousness. White's occupation with eight thinkers is not only highly selective, but also
concentrates on fundamental differences in historical consciousness. Michelet, Ranke, Tocqueville, and
Burckhardt represent in many ways irreconcilable standpoints. What I am interested in are both the
commonalities and the differences in historical choughc on a much broader level. There is a point at which
Herder, Voltaire, and Gibbon speak a common language and share assumptions which are part of the mental
climate of che eighccenth century. And the same is true of as diverse thinkers as Burckhardt, Droysen, Taine,
 HISTOIUOGIWHY BE1WEEN Scttowsl!IP AM> PoETRY.
REFl£CTIONs ON HAYDEN WHITE AS AllPaOAOI TO HlsTORJOGaAllHY'
128 Georg. G. lggcn: Historiaa Debate. Torno Ill, pp. 119-128

and Marx in the mid-nineteenth century. If we look carefully at the language of Burckhardt and Droysen, we
shall find that they share much more of the world view of their time than White's or Rilsen's atcempts to
differentiate them from the main currents of the age suggest. For practical reasons I shall restrict myself to
written workS~ although I am well aware that these are only one part of a broader culture in which historical
consciousness expresses itself in symbolic forms in art, monuments, festivals, etc., and that the West is only a
part of a wider world. To go beyond this would strain the limits of what I can hope to complete competently.
The book proceeds from the assumption that in the eighteenth cencury there emerged a new way of
looking at history which i~volved new ways of writing history. Although never universally accepted, and
increasingly questioned ~ready in the late nineteenth century, this outlook dominated historical writing well
into the second half of the twentieth century when it was effectively challenged and widely modified. Despite
fundamental differences, historians shared with their fellow citizens assumptions regarding the possibility of
an objective representation of the past and the belief in the coherence and meaningfulness of the course of
history with implications for the power relations between races, nations, classes and the sexes. I shall use the
sequence of generations, loosely defined, to give my study a chronological framework. Within each generation
I intend to look carefully at the uses of language. But I shall not only be interested in what these historians
have in common but also in the deep divergences in their thought and their styles.

Bibliography

BLANKE, HORST-WALTER, Historiographiegeschichfe a/s Historik, Stuttgart, 1991.

CHARTIER, ROGER, "Quatre Questions a Hayden White," Storia de/la Storiograjia. no. 24 ( 1993), PP· 133-142.
DROYSEN, JOHANN GUSTAV, "Die Erhebung der Geschichte zum Rang einer Wissenschafr" in Historik. Vorlestmgm iiber
Enzyklopiidie und Methodologie tier Geschichte, ed. Peter Leyh, vol.I. Stuttgart, 1977, pp. 451-469.
IGGERS, GEORG, "1st es in derTat in Deutschland friiher als in anderen europaischen Llindern zur Verwissenschaflichung
der Geschichte gekommen," in Wolfgang Kiittler, Jorn Riisen, and Ernst Schulin, eds., Geschichtsdiskurs, vol. 2,
Frankfurt, 1994.
JAEGER, FRIEDRICH, Biirgerliche Modernisierungskrise und historische Sinnbildung. Kulturgeschichte bei Droysen, Burckhardy
und Max W?ber, Gottingen, 1994.
- and Jorn Rilsen, Geschichte des Historismus. Eine Einfiihrung, Milnchen, 1992.
RANKE, LEOPOLD VON, "The Great Powers" in Th~odore Von Laue, Leopold Ranke: The Formative ~ars. Princeton, 1950.
WHITE, HAYDEN, The Content ofthe Form. Na"ative Discourse and Historical Representation, Baltimore, 1987.
- , "Historical Emplotmenc and the Problem ofTruth" in Saul Friedlander, ed., Probing the Limits ofRepresentation.
Nazism and the Final Solution, Cambridge, MA, 1992, pp. 37-53.
- , "Human Face of Scientific Mind. (An Interview with Hayden White)," conducted by Ewa Domanska, Storia de/la
Storiografia, no. 24 (1993), pp. 5-21.
- , Metahistory. The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe, Baltimore, 1973
- , "A Response to Professor Chartier's Four Questions," Storia de/la Storiografia, no. 27 (1995), pp. 63-70. See Roger
Chartier above.
- , Tropics ofDiscourse. Essays in Cultural Criticism, Baltimore, 1978.