PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.

MARCIAL
MALICDEM
G.R. No. 184601; 12 November 2012

PONENTE: Leonardo-De Castro

SUBJECT:  Murder

FACTS:

Version of the Prosecution:

On the night of August 11, 2002, Bernardo and Joel, as it was their practice after dinner, they met
with Wilson near the artesian well. At around 9:00 p.m., while they were seated on the septic tank,
appellant arrived asking if they knew the whereabouts of his godson, Rogelio Molina (Rogelio). They
6 

answered in the negative. They noticed that appellant was reeking of alcohol and was drunk.
Appellant asked again for the whereabouts of Rogelio. As they stood to leave, appellant suddenly
embraced Wilson and lunged a six-inch knife to the left part of his chest. When appellant moved to
strike again, Wilson was able to deflect this blow which resulted to a cut on his right arm. Intending
to help his friend, Bernardo was hit by the knife in his stomach. In the course of aiding Wilson, Joel
boxed the appellant. During the brawl, Francisco Molina, Rogelio’s father, arrived at the scene, but
was stabbed in the stomach by appellant. Appellant then ran away. Afterwards, Joel brought Wilson
aboard a police patrol car to the Region I Medical Center in Dagupan City where Wilson was
declared dead on arrival

Version of the Defense:

            On the night of August 11, 2002, appellant and his wife Anabel Malicdem were
looking for their godson Rogelio Molina as they were about to have dinner. The couple
passed by the artesian well where Bernardo, Joel and Wilson were loitering. Appellant
inquired from the three if they had seen Rogelio and they replied no. When appellant
voiced his observation that the three were drunk, he was hit with a bottle by Bernardo
and a fistfight ensued. Appellant alleged that it was the victim who brought out the
knife. They grappled for the knife and appellant was able to throw the victim, who was
holding the knife, to the ground and accidentally landed on the said knife causing his
death.

 
ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused can invoke self-defense which would warrant his acquittal

HELD:

No, For the Court to consider self-defense as a justifying circumstance, appellant has to
prove the following essential elements: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and
(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. The
Court has repeatedly stated that a person who invokes self-defense has the burden to
prove all the aforesaid elements. The Court also considers unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim as the most important of these elements. Thus, unlawful aggression
must be proved first in order for self-defense to be successfully pleaded, whether
complete or incomplete. The defense failed to discharge its burden to prove unlawful
aggression on the part of Wilson by sufficient and satisfactory proof. The records were
bereft of any indication that the attack by Wilson was not a mere threat or just
imaginary. Bernardo, Joel and Wilson were just in the act of leaving when appellant
suddenly plunged a knife to Wilson’s chest.

            Moreover, appellant’s act of suddenly stabbing Wilson as he was about to leave
constituted the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Treachery is present when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without
risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

            The appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.

In People v. Clores, this Court had occasion to state that:

22 

When it comes to the matter of credibility of a witness, settled are the guiding rules, some of which
are that (1) the appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower court, unless there is a
showing that it had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight
and substance that would have affected the result of the case, which showing is absent herein; (2)
the findings of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of a witness is entitled to great respect since
it had the opportunity to examine his demeanor as he testified on the witness stand, and, therefore,
can discern if such witness is telling the truth or not; and (3) a witness who testifies in a categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remains consistent on cross-examination is a
credible witness. (Citations omitted.)
Given the factual circumstances of the present case, we see no need to depart from the foregoing
rules. Appellant failed to present proof of any showing that the trial court overlooked, misconstrued
or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result
of the case. Prosecution witnesses positively identified appellant to have stabbed the victim.

We agree that the death of Wilson at the hands of appellant was not occasioned by self-defense. For
this Court to consider self-defense as a justifying circumstance, appellant has to prove the following
essential elements: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person resorting to self-defense. The Court has repeatedly stated that a person who
23 

invokes self-defense has the burden to prove all the aforesaid elements. The Court also considers
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim as the most important of these elements. Thus,
unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for self-defense to be successfully pleaded,
whether complete or incomplete. 24

As stated in People v. Fontanilla :

25 

Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent
unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or
with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the
injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening;
it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be
offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a
knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere
threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was
holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.

x x x It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution for murder or homicide admitted his infliction
of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence the justifying circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability x x x.

Based on the summary of facts by the RTC as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the defense failed
to discharge its burden to prove unlawful aggression on the part of Wilson by sufficient and
satisfactory proof. The records were bereft of any indication that the attack by Wilson was not a
mere threat or just imaginary. Bernardo, Joel and Wilson were just in the act of leaving when
appellant suddenly plunged a knife to Wilson’s chest.

Anent the finding of treachery by the RTC, we agree that appellant’s act of suddenly stabbing Wilson
as he was about to leave constituted the qualifying circumstance of treachery. As we previously
ruled, treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Here,
26 

appellant caught Wilson by surprise when he suddenly embraced him and proceeded immediately to
plunge a knife to his chest. The swift turn of events did not allow Wilson to defend himself, in effect,
assuring appellant that he complete the crime without risk to his own person.

Moreover, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the claim of appellant that accident was the
cause of the death of the victim, cannot be taken into consideration in lieu of self-defense. As we
stated in Toledo v. People :
27 

The petitioner is proscribed from changing in this Court, his theory of defense which he adopted in
the trial court and foisted in the CA – by claiming that he stabbed and killed the victim in complete
self-defense. The petitioner relied on Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code in the trial
and appellate courts, but adopted in this Court two divergent theories – (1) that he killed the victim to
defend himself against his unlawful aggression; hence, is justified under Article 11, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code; (2) that his bolo accidentally hit the victim and is, thus, exempt from
criminal liability under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.

Self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code necessarily implies a
deliberate and positive overt act of the accused to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression of
another with the use of reasonable means.

“The right begins when necessity does, and ends where it ends.”