Prior Restraint Doctrine

Prior restraint means official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of
expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination.4 Its most blatant form is a
system of licensing administered by an executive officer. (Chavez vs. Gonzales; Times Film
Corp vs. City of Chicago)
Prior restraint means official government restrictions on the press or other forms of
expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. (Joaquin G. Bernas The
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary 205, 1996)
The freedom of expression, as with the other freedoms encased in the Bill of Rights, is,
however, not absolute. It may be regulated to some extent to serve important public
interests, some forms of speech not being protected. As has been held, the limits of the
freedom of expression are reached when the expression touches upon matters of
essentially private concern. (Lagunsad v. Soto vda. De Gonzales, No. L-32066, August 6,
1979, 92 SCRA 476.)
Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical
fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life
of a reality already on ground. (INC vs. CA)

Overbreadth Doctrine

A principle of Judicial Review that holds that a law is invalid if it punishes constitutionally
protected speech or conduct along with speech or conduct that the government may limit
to further a compelling government interest.

The overbreadth doctrine is an exception to the prohibition against third-party standing.

It permits a person to challenge a statute on the ground that it violates the First
Amendment (free speech) rights of third parties not before the court, even though the law
is constitutional as applied to that defendant. In other words, the overbreadth doctrine
provides that: "Given a case or controversy, a litigant whose own activities are unprotected
may nevertheless challenge a statute by showing that it substantially abridges the First
Amendment rights of other parties not before the court." (Erwin Chemerinsky,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, p. 86, 2nd Edition, 2002)
The doctrine of overbreadth applies generally to statutes that infringe upon freedom of
speech. On the other hand, the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine applies to criminal laws, not
merely those that regulate speech or other fundamental constitutional right. (not merely
those that regulate speech or other fundamental constitutional rights.) (Romualdez vs.
Sandiganbayan)

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free
speech cases. (Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan)

By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of
invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under
situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially
overbroad regulation. (SPARK vs. Quezon City)

Void for Vagueness

The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.
(Romualdez vs. COMELEC)

The void for vagueness doctrine expresses the rule that for an act to constitute a crime,
the law must expressly and clearly declare such act a crime. A related doctrine is that
penal statutes are construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the accused.
(Romualdez vs. COMELEC)
The doctrine of void for vagueness is a ground for invalidating a statute or a governmental
regulation for being vague. The doctrine requires that a statute be sufficiently explicit as
to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to
its penalties. (Dissenting Opinion: J. Leonen, GR 238467)

It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its
prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague laws offend several important values. First,
because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we
insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know
what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by
not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be
prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law
impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and
discriminatory application. Third, but related, where a vague statute "abut[s] upon
sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms," it "operates to inhibit the exercise of
[those] freedoms." Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to "`steer far wider of the
unlawful zone' . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked."
(Romualdez vs. COMELEC)

Void for Vagueness vs. Overbreadth Doctrine

The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of
law." (Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan)

The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may
not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the
area of protected freedoms.'' (Estrada vs. SB)