International Organization Foundation, Cambridge University Press International Organization

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Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties

Author(s): Brett Ashley Leeds
Source: International Organization, Vol. 57, No. 4 (Autumn, 2003), pp. 801-827
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the International Organization
Foundation
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Alliance Reliability in Times of War:
Explaining State Decisions
to Violate Treaties
Brett Ashley Leeds
Abstract Understanding the conditions under which state leaders are willing t
honor alliance commitments in war will increase knowledge about the escalation an
diffusion of conflict and about the propensity of states to fulfill agreements unde
anarchy. New data analysis provides evidence that alliance commitments are fu
filled about 75 percent of the time. But how can one understand the failure of alli
ance partners to act as promised in the remaining 25 percent of cases? Formal modeler
have deduced that because of the costs associated with alliances, state leaders who
form alliances are likely to fulfill them; those alliances that are formed should b
fairly reliable. I argue, therefore, that one can best account for violations of allian
agreements either through an understanding of the factors that reduce the costs o
violation or through changes that have occurred since the alliance was formed. Usin
detailed data on alliance commitments between 1816 and 1944, I find evidence com
mensurate with this argument. Changes in the power of states or in their policymak-
ing processes are powerful predictors of the failure to honor past commitments; an
nondemocratic states and major powers, sets of states that I argue suffer lower cos
from reneging on agreements, are more likely to violate treaties.
The Reliability of Allies in War
Traditional theorizing in international relations has suggested that in a s

centric world order in which national leaders retain ultimate authority, reliance
Previous versions of this article were presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Politica
ence Association, April 25-28, 2002, Chicago, Illinois; the annual meeting of the International St
Association, March 24-27, 2002, New Orleans, Louisiana; and the annual meeting of the Am
Political Science Association, August 31-September 3, 2000, Washington, D.C. This research wa
ported by the National Science Foundation (grant SES-0095983) and the Committee on Faculty
search Support at Florida State University. The author would like to thank Matt Baum, Chris B
David Davis, Erik Gartzke, Kristian Gleditsch, Andrew Kydd, David Lake, Andrew Long, Lanny
tin, Lisa Martin, Sara Mitchell, Will Moore, Cliff Morgan, Glenn Palmer, Dan Reiter, Jeff Ritter, M
Sanders, Randy Stevenson, Ric Stoll, and Suzanne Werner for helpful advice on this research. Da
replication can be obtained at (www.ruf.rice.edu/-leeds).
International Organization 57, Fall 2003, pp. 801-827

@ 2003 by The IO Foundation. DOI: 10.1017/S0020818303574057
802 International Organization
promises can be dangerous. Because there is no governing authority to manage

and enforce relations among states, agreements among states are particularly prone
to opportunistic behavior. Some scholars have gone so far as to argue that prom-
ises made without enforcement have no independent force; treaties are mere "scraps
of paper" that will be violated if state interests change.' In the realm of military
security, where honoring past commitments involves significant costs and risks,
treaties should be particularly vulnerable to violation.2
Recent theorizing, however, has called this view into question. Several scholars
have wondered why, if international agreements are useless, do state leaders in-
vest so much time and effort in negotiating and designing them? Despite the warn-
ings of some political scientists, state leaders continue to form and appeal to military
alliances, and some leaders make alliances a significant part of their security pol-
icy. This recognition has caused a number of scholars to reevaluate the role of
formal international agreements for security cooperation.
Morrow, Smith, and Fearon view military alliances as a means by which state
leaders can provide credible signals of their future intentions.3 These theorists de-
duce that because of the costs that are associated with alliances, only states that
are fairly likely to fulfill their alliance obligations are likely to form them; bluff-
ing should be rare. As a result, alliances serve as reliable indicators of the behav-
ior of the state should war occur. Lake and Conybeare, on the other hand, view
alliances as a means of enhancing security through the exploitation of joint pro-
duction economies.4 Lake notes, however, that the specialization and coordination
necessary to produce joint gains will only be possible when leaders feel confident
about the reliability of their partners; alliance relationships will develop when fears
of opportunism have been overcome. These arguments are similar to the broader
theories of cooperation presented by Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom; Fearon; and
Leeds-all of which predict that leaders are most likely to form cooperative agree-
ments that they believe are self-enforcing, implying that the cooperative agree-
ments that one observes should exhibit a high degree of compliance.5
Whether one views formal alliances as primarily serving as costly signals of
intentions or as mechanisms for coordinating economies of scale in security pro-
duction, dominant theories predict that alliances should be effective instruments
of policy and that state leaders are likely to fulfill the alliance commitments they
make most of the time. Recent empirical evidence seems to support these claims.
While studies by Sabrosky and by Siverson and King report that state leaders as-
sist their allies in war in approximately 25 percent of cases, a recent study by
1. In a famous quotation, German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg reportedly referred

to the guarantee of Belgian neutrality as "a scrap of paper" when preparing to invade in August 1914.
See Cooke and Stickney 1931, 382.
2. For example, Mearsheimer 1995.
3. See Morrow 1994; Smith 1995 and 1998a; and Fearon 1997.
4. See Lake 1996 and 1999; and Conybeare 1992 and 1994.
5. See Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996; Fearon 1998; and Leeds 1999.
Alliance Reliability in Times of War 803
Leeds, Long, and Mitchell reevaluates this question using new, more detailed data
and an improved operationalization of the concept of reliability.6 Leeds, Long,
and Mitchell report that when the conditions invoking alliance commitments arise,
state leaders fulfill their commitments in 74.5 percent of cases.
Yet, states abrogate 25 percent of their alliance commitments when war occurs.
What accounts for the fact that states honor some commitments but not others?
Were these alliances formed as bluffs by leaders who gambled that they cou
deter aggression and avoid fulfilling their commitments? If so, can one identify
likely "bluffers"? Did leaders recognize the possibility that these alliances we
vulnerable to violation when they formed them? Or were these agreements formed
under conditions in which leaders believed they would be reliable, but new con-
ditions created different incentives? Alliances are neither always violated nor al-
ways fulfilled. The goal of this article is to elucidate factors that increase th
probability that leaders will fail to comply with treaty commitments.
In this article, I investigate the conditions under which leaders are most likely
to violate their alliance commitments in the face of war. I argue that alliance com
mitments are most vulnerable to violation when either the costs a leader expects
to incur from formation and violation are comparatively low (conditions that en-
courage bluffing and risk taking), or when significant factors have changed be-
tween the time the alliance was formed and invoked, causing leaders to reevaluat
their interests. Analyzing the population of alliances and wars during the period
1816-1944, I find statistical support linking nondemocratic states and major pow-
ers, two groups of states for whom the costs of reneging on agreements may be
comparatively low, with a tendency to violate alliance commitments. The stron-
gest evidence, however, supports the claim that dynamic factors predict alliance
violation. Variables representing changes in the power of a state and changes in
the domestic policymaking processes of a state are the best predictors of the fail
ure to fulfill alliance commitments. It seems possible as well that challengers ma
use these factors to assess the reliability of alliances. Targets with allies who
commitments are questionable may be vulnerable to attack.
This study helps to illuminate both the promise and the difficulty involved in
international cooperation. On the promise side, the high probability of allian
fulfillment suggests that one can be optimistic about contractual efficacy in the
international system. State leaders can design agreements that they have incen-
tives to fulfill, and alliance treaties can be a useful tool in international politics.
Most alliances are formed by sincerely committed states. At the same time, rely-
ing heavily on the commitments of others can be dangerous. Under some condi-
tions leaders are willing to bluff and accept risky commitments, and state leader
are sometimes willing to break contracts when past agreements do not suit present
interests.
6. See Sabrosky 1980; Siverson and King 1980; and Leeds, Long, and Mitchell 2000.
The Formation and Fulfillment of Alliance

Agreements
History is full of examples of cases in which state leaders considered forming

alliance agreements but chose not to because they recognized that they or their
partners might be unwilling to fulfill their promises should conflict arise. In the
1920s and most of the 1930s, for instance, Great Britain was repeatedly ap-
proached by France and the Soviet Union about forming an anti-German alliance
with Germany's eastern neighbors, particularly Czechoslovakia. Despite the fact
that the British government had a definite interest in deterring German aggression
in the East as well as the West, the British leaders refused to sign any Eastern
pacts. They knew that they were unwilling to endure the costs of fighting Ger-
many over Czechoslovakia, and this proved to be the case in 1938.7
After the breakdown of the Munich agreement and the Nazi invasion of Czecho-
slovakia, when it became clear that Adolf Hitler's appetite for expansion had not
been satiated, protracted negotiations took place over several months among Great
Britain, France, and the Soviet Union regarding an anti-German alliance for joint
defense of the remaining eastern states. While all three powers had shared inter-
ests in deterring (and if necessary defeating) Hitler, their negotiations failed and
they did not form a joint anti-German front. Soviet leaders expressed serious doubts
about the willingness of the western powers, and especially Britain, to fulfill the
commitment were Hitler to attack, and British and French leaders were uncertain
that the Soviets would protect smaller states in Eastern Europe.8 Because of their
joint distrust, Hitler's eastern and western enemies were unable to reach an agree-
ment, and instead, the Soviet Union agreed to an independent nonaggression pact
with Germany in which the two powers agreed to divide Poland and the Soviets
promised to remain neutral should Germany decide to attack in the West.9
Why did Hitler's enemies avoid these commitments? Why were these states so
reluctant to form agreements that might go unfulfilled? In forming military alli-
ances, state leaders consider the actions that will be required in the event the alli-
ance is invoked. If it is unlikely that their partners will fulfill the agreement or if
the state leaders believe they may not be willing to fulfill the commitment them-
selves, they may expect to endure costs but gain limited advantage from the treaty.
This becomes more apparent when one considers the motivations of states to com-
mit to alliances.1'
7. See, for example, Ross 1983, 58, 62, 101; Parker 1969, 307; and Gantenbein 1975, 367.
8. See Adamthwaite 1977, 207-8, 218-19; and Parker 1969, 326-29.
9. Grenville 1987, 195-96.
10. I distinguish here between alliances, which are "written agreements, signed by official represen-
tatives of at least two independent states, that include promises to aid a partner in the event of military
conflict, to remain neutral in the event of conflict, to refrain from military conflict with one another, or
to consult/cooperate in the event of international crises that create a potential for military conflict"
(Leeds et al. 2002, 238), and alignments, which are "expectations of states about whether they will be
There are two primary reasons for state leaders to commit to formal alliances."
First, alliances can serve as signals of intention, providing information that allies
hope will deter enemies from challenging them or compel enemies to accede to their
demands. Second, the institutionalized security cooperation that may be associ-
ated with alliances may produce economies of scale in the provision of defense,
allowing individual states to reduce their defense burdens, and may also improve
the war fighting ability of a coalition. I will discuss each of these advantages in turn.
One main purpose of creating formal alliance agreements is to provide informa-
tion to both allies and adversaries regarding a state's intentions. State leaders hope
that making their commitments to their allies clear will discourage potential ad-
versaries from attacking their coalition in recognition of its strength, or that it will
compel adversaries to comply with coalition demands rather than risking war. Thus,
a main purpose of alliances is to prevent war through increased ability to deter
conflict. 12
Why does facing an alliance influence the decisions of potential adversaries?
Because there are costs associated with alliances at formation and/or at invoca-
tion, under most conditions only leaders who believe they will have incentive to
fulfill their alliance commitments are likely to form alliances.13 At formation, lead-
ers incur the costs of negotiating and instituting the agreement. Throughout the
duration of the alliance leaders incur the costs of policy coordination and the cor-
responding loss of autonomy. At invocation, the leaders must either accept the
costs of fulfilling their commitment, which may involve active fighting, or the
costs of reneging on a commitment, which can have negative reputational effects
and can cause domestic and international audiences to question not only the lead-
ers' reliability, but also their competence.14 Because alliances are costly, potential
adversaries can expect that most states that form alliances are sincerely commit-
ted to fulfilling their commitments.
The ability to influence the beliefs and behavior of an adversary, however, may
create a temptation for leaders to bluff. Leaders might choose to form alliances
supported or opposed by other states in future interactions" (Snyder 1997, 6). An alliance is a formal
contract specifying obligations to which more than one state expressly accedes, while an alignment is
an informal coalition.
11. I limit myself to discussing the international security benefits derived from alliances. Some schol-
ars have argued that leaders may form alliances for reasons other than to enhance their security. For
instance, more powerful states may offer security alliances to less powerful states in return for influ-
ence over the domestic and/or foreign policies of their weaker partners (for example, Schroeder 1976;
and Morrow 1991). Less powerful states may agree to join a coalition to obtain economic or military
aid. While these arguments suggest that not all alliance members are motivated by the security benefits
of alliances, each theory also suggests that at least one alliance member is motivated by the security
benefits. These arguments can best be thought of as specific cases of issue linkage-the security ben-
efits of alliances are linked with other issues to create bargains that are attractive to all potential mem-
bers. Thus, these deals depend at least in part on the security motivations discussed here.
12. See Morrow 1994; and Smith 1995 and 1998a.
13. See Morrow 1994; Fearon 1997; and Smith 1998a.
14. See Morrow 1994; Smith 1995, 1998a,b; and Fearon 1994 and 1997.
that they may not fulfill in the hope of deterring potential challengers and avoid-
ing conflict altogether. Under what conditions are leaders likely to take this gam-
ble? If bluffing does occur, it should only happen when (1) the costs of forming
the alliance are relatively low, and (2) the costs of breaking the alliance commit-
ment if the ally is attacked are viewed as low (in comparison to the expected de-
terrent benefit). If forming an alliance requires a large initial investment, for instance
to establish and staff new bases and coordinate military activities, states that are
not sincerely committed are less likely to form alliances. The sunk costs of alli-
ance formation and maintenance create a screening process that deters bluffing.
Thus, states that are insincere are more likely to form alliances that do not require
a large initial investment. Second, leaders will weigh the benefits to be gained
from the bluff against the costs that will be incurred if the bluff is called. When
leaders expect to experience high costs from reneging on an agreement and are
unwilling to fulfill the commitment should conflict arise, it is less likely that they
will take the chance of bluffing.
Thus, low-cost alliances and comparatively low costs of reneging on agree-
ments should encourage bluffing. The same factors, however, should reduce the
credibility of the alliance in the eyes of adversaries. Deterrence and compellence
depend crucially on the credibility of the joint threat. Alliances will only be suc-
cessful at changing the behavior of adversaries if adversaries believe that allies
will fulfill their commitments. Factors that decrease the costs of alliance forma-
tion and/or reneging on a past commitment should increase the incentive to bluf
and the corresponding probability that an alliance commitment will be violated.
These same factors, however, should decrease the probability that the alliance de-
ters challengers and thus decrease the value of the alliance to members.'5
Morrow, Smith, and Fearon have modeled these strategic interactions.'6 Their
models lead them to conclude that there is only a small range of parameter value
for which bluffing is an equilibrium strategy.'7 They conclude that most of the
15. There is a potential tradeoff, however. Costly alliances should improve deterrence and reliabi
ity, but they may also introduce the potential for entrapment. States that feel assured of allied suppor
may engage in more aggressive and risky foreign policies, exposing allies to an increased risk of un
wanted war. See, for example, Snyder 1984 and 1997. Fearon 1997 suggests that this moral hazard
sometimes leads states to send "half-hearted signals." It is also possible, however, that states may
control moral hazard by specifying clearly the conditions under which an alliance may and may not be
invoked. For instance, many alliances specify that partners will provide defensive support only if t
ally is attacked without provocation, and/or that an alliance is only relevant when an ally is attacke
and not when any member of the alliance initiates conflict against another state. See Leeds 2003.
16. See Morrow 1994; Smith 1995 and 1998a; and Fearon 1997.
17. More specifically, Fearon 1997 and Smith 1995 deduce from their models that all alliances shou
be reliable; there are no equilibria in which insincere states form alliances. Both authors suggest th
aspects of international politics that were not included in their models may account for observed v
lations. Smith's model assumes complete and perfect information. With incomplete information, bluff-
ing might be an equilibrium strategy under some circumstances, but he is doubtful that this accoun
for all observed violations. See Smith 1995, 418. Smith 1998a allows for incomplete information. O
the seven types of equilibria in the model, only one (E3) supports bluffing. See Smith 1998a, 329-3
Morrow 1994 finds two semi-separating equilibria in which some states that will not intervene shou
time, alliances should be reliable, and bluffing should be rare. Yet, none of these
studies includes any empirical assessment of how often real-world events fall into
the range of parameters that encourage bluffing. Should one expect bluffing to
occur 2 percent of the time, 12 percent of the time, or 20 percent of the time? One
of the purposes of this study is to assess whether most of the alliances that are
violated when conflict occurs were probably bluffs that were called. This will help
one to judge the prevalence of bluffing. Perhaps the 25 percent of alliance com-
mitments that are violated when war occurs represent the percentage of cases for
which bluffing is in equilibrium and the bluff fails to deter conflict. On the other
hand, if another explanation for alliance violation seems to account systematically
for the decisions of states to violate their past commitments, one can assume that
the observed commitment violations are not all gambles gone bad.
While one reason leaders choose to form military alliances is to influence the
behavior of adversaries, a second motivation for forming alliances with other states
is the attraction of economies of scale and the benefits of coordination in the pro-
vision of security. If state leaders can count on assistance from allies in the event
of war, each state can transfer some portion of individual defense spending to
other purposes, for instance, welfare spending or promotion of economic growth.
By maintaining smaller individual forces and/or joint research and arms pro-
grams, states can free some portion of their defense budgets for other uses. 1 Lead-
ers may also believe that coordination will result in a stronger and more successful
combined force should war occur. If a coalition coordinates military activities and
plans ahead for joint action, the strategic benefits of capability aggregation can be
maximized. States may have complementary comparative advantages; sea power
and land power, for instance, can be integrated to enhance joint security. With
coordination, the joint forces are likely to be a more formidable adversary than
they would absent joint planning.'9
When the commitment of allies is questionable, however, joint production of
arms, integrated forces, defense specialization, and reduction of individual de-
fense burdens are likely to be deemed too risky. Economies of scale in the provi-
sion of defense are unlikely to arise in the absence of considerable confidence and
trust. Basing one's security policy on reliance on others requires great faith that
the commitment of one's allies is secure.20 Thus, Lake argues that leaders will
only attempt to exploit potential joint economies in security production when they
have satisfied themselves that the risks of opportunism are sufficiently low.21 If
war occur form alliances to influence the beliefs of an adversary in the hope of deterring conflict.
There are also separating and pooling equilibria in the model, however; and Morrow notes that with-
out knowing the distribution of values of parameters in the model, one can not know the frequency
with which each equilibrium holds in the real world. See Morrow 1994, 293.
18. See Lake 1999; and Conybeare 1994.
19. Morrow 1994.
20. McGinnis 1990.
21. Lake 1999.
the threat of opportunism is significant and cannot be ameliorated at reasonable

cost, leaders will prefer to forego potential mutual gains and will maintain unilat-
eral defense strategies.
When the benefits of cooperation are quite high, however, leaders may be will-
ing to take greater risks and accept alliances that pose a high risk of violation.
Lake claims that it is hard to assess whether many real-world cases fall into this
risk-taking range because the key concepts in his theory are difficult to measure.
He seems skeptical that many fall into this range, however, because the benefits of
alliances are partially endogenous.22 Because leaders will avoid investment in spe-
cific assets when fears of opportunism have not been overcome, it is unlikely that
alliances that produce high benefits will emerge without highly credible commit-
ments. Alliances that produce greater benefits also come with higher governance
costs and require more credible commitment on behalf of the allies.
Creating self-enforcing agreements is facilitated by the latitude that state lead-
ers have in designing their alliance agreements. When questions of credibility ex-
ist, leaders may be able to find ways to increase the value of the alliance and
improve their incentives to collaborate with their alliance partners in wartime
through provisions that make the alliance more reliable. Alliance agreements may
include provisions for one state to station troops on the territory of another, for
integrated command of military forces, or for joint military planning. Such means
of institutionalizing cooperation are designed to increase the benefits of the alli-
ance by improving the chances that it will be honored and the likelihood that it
will be effective at advancing the goals of the members. Alliances can change the
incentives of state leaders to participate in conflicts on behalf of their allies, and
when necessary, state leaders may turn to provisions for institutionalizing military
collaboration to increase the credibility of their joint commitment.23
Not only are leaders careful in selecting the agreements that they are willing to
make and in designing their agreements to promote fulfillment, but they are care-
ful in crafting the language of the treaties as well. Most treaties contain specific
language regarding the conditions under which the alliance comes into effect and
the actions that the members are required to take under these conditions. Alliances
are often not blanket promises to assist one another in any military conflict, but
rather alliances specify the conditions under which the ally will and will not be
willing to offer aid and the extent of aid that will be provided. Leaders limit their
promises to the instances in which they expect to be willing to intervene on behalf
of their allies and make clear the actions they expect their allies to provide in the
event the alliance comes into effect.24
State leaders recognize the difficulties of cooperating under anarchy and are
careful to form alliances that are specific and credible. Under most conditions,
22. Ibid.
23. See Lake 1996 and 1999; and Leeds 2000.
24. Leeds, Long, and Mitchell 2000.
leaders are reluctant to make promises that they or their partners are unlikely to
uphold. This care in the design of alliance treaties should result in few violated
commitments. Research by Leeds, Long, and Mitchell supports this expectation.
In their study of alliance performance in war from 1816-1944, Leeds, Long, and
Mitchell find that in 74.5 percent of cases, allies fulfill the specific promises they
have made.25
Why Do Violations Occur?
Despite the fact that Leeds, Long, and Mitchell find evidence that the great major-
ity of alliances are fulfilled when war occurs, their study does not answer a major
question. If leaders are so careful to form agreements that they expect to be ful-
filled, then how can one explain the fact that in approximately 25 percent of cases
in which alliances are invoked by war, allies fail to uphold their commitments? Is
this the proportion of real-world cases that fall into the narrow ranges associated
with bluffing and risk taking? If so, can theories of alliance formation help one to
anticipate which alliances will be fulfilled and which will be violated? Or is there
some other factor consistent with these theories that explains these violations?
One possibility is that a selection effect produces a biased observed sample.
Smith has argued that opportunities to prove a state's reliability in war are more
likely to emerge for questionable alliances than for secure ones. Because challeng-
ing states choose conflicts they can win, they are more likely to target states whose
allies they expect will not fulfill their commitments.26 Thus, challengers are more
likely to start wars and test the commitments of allies when they think those com-
mitments are most questionable. This would suggest that while 25 percent of op-
portunities for allies to prove their reliability in war result in alliances not being
honored, one cannot generalize from this sample to those alliances that were not
invoked by war. Instead, one should expect the sample of alliances that success-
fully deter conflict to be more reliable than those that did not succeed at deterring
enemies.
This argument, while certainly a possible explanation, suggests, first, that a class
of unreliable alliances exists and, second, that challengers can identify reliable
and unreliable alliances with reasonable success. One must explain how outsiders
consistently identify alliance promises that will go unfulfilled. Thus, for this argu-
ment to hold, one must be able to identify something observable that distinguishes
alliances that may not be successful from those that most likely will be. I argue
that there are at least two possible avenues that would account both for the exis-
tence of a pool of risky alliances and the ability of challengers to identify ques-
tionable commitments.
25. Ibid.
26. See Smith 1995, 1996, and 1998a. See also Gartner and Siverson 1996.
First, it may be the case that all state leaders are not equally sensitive to the
risks of nonfulfillment. Leaders of states who expect low costs from reneging on
an alliance commitment are more likely to bluff, because the risk of reneging if
deterrence fails is more likely to be balanced by the possibility that the bluff is not
called. Similarly, leaders who can adjust their policies quickly and easily are more
likely to be willing to take risks on policies that may be unsuccessful and will
have to be changed quickly. If one can identify observable characteristics that are
associated with the willingness to form alliances that will go unfulfilled, these
factors should also be associated with a higher rate of alliance violation.
Second, members of alliances could experience changes that affect their will-
ingness to fulfill past commitments.27 Under this scenario, an alliance might be
credible to members and to challengers when it is signed, but it may become less
desirable as changes in the members and/or environment occur. Sometimes, dra-
matic change will cause state leaders to terminate their alliance commitments. For
example, Siverson and Starr find evidence that regime change within states is as-
sociated with alliance changes; Bennett reports that the termination of wars, changes
in power, and changes in security are associated with shorter alliance durations;
and Morrow finds that changes in power are associated with the termination of
alliance commitments.28 The legal doctrine of rebus sic stantibus (as matters stand)
has often been used to justify the unilateral termination of agreements when a
major change in relevant circumstances occurs.29
At the same time, institutions and treaty commitments may continue to exist
even as they become less desirable, because of sunk costs and inertia.30 Only when
the conditions invoking past promises arise might the leaders determine that they
are unwilling to adhere to promises made when circumstances were different. If
environmental and policy changes are visible to challengers, challengers may choose
to target these alliances in recognition of their vulnerability. Again, this condition
could explain both why alliances that prove unreliable exist and why challengers
can identify them successfully.
In order to determine whether changes in relevant conditions between alliance
formation and invocation and/or features systematically associated with lower costs
to abrogation and more willingness to bluff can explain the decisions of some
state leaders to violate their alliance commitments when war occurs, I analyze a
statistical model of the probability of alliance commitment violation. I examine
the relationships between the probability of alliance violation and factors associ-
ated with the alliance members and changes since the alliance was signed. I also
investigate whether the original targets of wars are particularly vulnerable to aban-
donment by their allies to see if challengers are targeting states with questionable
27. Smith 1995.

28. See Siverson and Starr 1994; Bennett 1997; and Morrow 1991.
29. Kegley and Raymond 1990, 90.
30. Keohane 1984.
alliance commitments. The research design and specific hypotheses are described
below.
Research Design and Hypotheses
I use data on alliance reliability during war created by Leeds, Long, and Mitchell
to analyze the probability of alliance commitment violation.31 Using the Alliance
Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) data set,32 Leeds, Long, and Mitchell
determine the instances in which alliance commitments are invoked by a given
war and then code each alliance as honored or violated in that conflict based on
whether the leaders took the actions they had promised to take in their treaties
The authors find that of 110 cases in which alliances were invoked by war
tween 1816 and 1944, alliance commitments were honored in eighty-two i
stances, or 74.5 percent of the cases.34
In the Leeds, Long, and Mitchell study, each alliance is judged as an individua
entity. If any alliance member violates the alliance, the entire alliance is consid
ered violated; only if no member is in violation is the alliance honored. Bec
the argument of this article involves evaluating the decisions of individual stat
to honor or violate their commitments, I include each member's decision as an
individual case. Thus, for each war, I determine which alliance member or mem
bers were in a position to choose whether to honor the alliance. For instance, wh
Poland was attacked by Germany in World War II, both Great Britain and Fran
decided to honor their alliance with Poland. When Austria-Hungary attacked Se
bia at the beginning of World War I, Germany honored the Triple Alliance, wher
Italy did not. Neither Poland in World War II nor Austria-Hungary in World Wa
however, decided whether to honor their alliances. Their participation in the t
conflicts created the war performance opportunities for these two alliances. Th
I consider Britain's decision to support Poland, France's decision to support
land, Germany's decision to support Austria-Hungary, and Italy's decision to vi
late the commitment to Austria-Hungary as cases for analysis.
31. Leeds, Long, and Mitchell 2000.

32. Leeds et al. 2002.
33. The ATOP data set and the reliability coding of Leeds, Long, and Mitchell 2000 are availab
(www.ruf.rice.edu/-Leeds/atop.html).
34. The temporal sample is dictated by the fact that ATOP data has only been collected for t
period 1816-1944. It is the detailed information about alliance obligations included in the ATOP
set that makes it possible for Leeds, Long, and Mitchell to evaluate which wars invoked partic
alliance commitments and what actions the members were required to take in that conflict. This in
mation allows them to judge whether the specific promises embodied in the treaties were honor
violated in war. It is important to note that the Leeds, Long, and Mitchell operationalization of
bility is significantly different than that employed in earlier studies (for instance, Sabrosky 1980;
Siverson and King 1980). While previous studies examined the rate at which allies fight togeth
wars regardless of the provisions of the alliance treaty, Leeds, Long, and Mitchell attempt to
whether allies lived up to the actual promises they made.
In most instances, the first member of the alliance to enter a war creates the
opportunity and other members decide whether to honor or violate their commit-
ments. I did, however, consult historical sources on each case to be certain that
the coding of decision makers has face validity. In a small number of cases, I
could not differentiate between alliance members; the decisions to fight together
seem to be made simultaneously. In these few instances, I chose the decision-
making member of the dyad by random draw.
I limit my analysis of alliance reliability to alliances that have provisions for
defensive or offensive cooperation or for neutrality in the event of conflict. Some
alliances only commit leaders to refrain from conflict with one another or to con-
sult in the event of international crises. Because these agreements do not require
active behavior during war, it is not possible to judge their reliability through an
evaluation of war performance. The motivations for alliance formation that I have
discussed (signaling and coordination) are also most directly relevant to alliances
that prescribe and proscribe specific activities in the event of conflict.35
My set of cases, therefore, includes 143 individual state decisions to honor or
violate alliances during wars.36 Of these, 115 (80.4 percent) are honored. The de-
pendent variable is a dummy variable labeled 1 if the alliance commitment is vi-
olated and 0 if the alliance promise is fulfilled. The method of analysis is logit
with robust standard errors.
I test three categories of independent variables in my attempt to explain the
conditions under which state leaders violate their alliance commitments. I con-
sider characteristics of the alliance member that may be associated with lo
35. Defensive, offensive, and neutrality commitments all have the potential to provide inform
to allies and adversaries regarding likely behavior should conflict occur. While the theories of Morr
1994 and Smith 1998a are specifically aimed at explaining defense pacts, Smith 1995 discusses o
fense pacts in a similar manner. Moul 1988 argues that a primary purpose of neutrality pacts
assure others of future intentions. Neutrality pacts can deter attacks on partners if adversaries pre
ously believed that a state might fight against the target in a war, but such pacts can also enco
attacks on outsiders if allies previously feared that a state would aid its intended target. Thus, neut
ity pacts can share signaling characteristics with either defense or offense pacts in different cir
stances. See also Leeds 2003. States committing to defense pacts and offense pacts have the pote
to benefit from the economies of scale associated with joint security economies. Neutrality pacts so
times also involve coordination. When states promise "benevolent neutrality," they often promi
thwart the efforts of enemies to use their territory and resources in the conflict. While states do
promise to enter the conflict, they do promise to protect their neutrality, which may require a
effort. Portugal's neutrality commitment to Britain in World War II, for instance, included promis
provide British access to Portuguese ports and airfields and to defend these facilities. See Great
ain Foreign Office various years, vol. 146, 447-51.
36. Each state's decision to honor or to violate an alliance during a given war is considere
independent case. It is possible, however, and perhaps likely, that the decisions of multiple all
members to fulfill a single alliance are not independent. It is also occasionally true that the sam
ance is relevant to more than one conflict. Decisions to honor or violate an alliance in one war may
be independent from the decision to fulfill that same alliance in another war. Because I recogniz
possibility that these observations are not independent, I designate observations associated wit
same alliance as members of a single group and assume that observations are independent across gro
but not necessarily within groups. This relaxation of the assumption of independence affects the
mated standard errors, but not the estimated coefficients. See Rogers 1993.
costs of nonfulfillment, changes affecting the decision-making state since the alli-
ance was formed, and the ally's role in the conflict.37
Characteristics of the Alliance Member
I test two characteristics of the decision-making state: domestic political structure

and power status in the international system. Several scholars have argued that
leaders of democratic states are particularly sensitive to the costs of breaking com-
mitments and are thus more likely to uphold their promises.38 Their sensitivity to
failed policies may make democracies particularly reluctant to bluff or to form
risky agreements.39 This conclusion can be derived from two different features of
democratic states-the accountability of leaders to a broad constituency and the
lack of policy flexibility available to leaders working under strong institutional
constraints.
Because democratic leaders are accountable for their actions to a large segment
of the population and can be replaced at regular intervals at fairly low cost, they
tend to be particularly concerned with providing good public policy and proving
their competence to their constituents.40 Several scholars have argued that policy
vacillation and called bluffs lead people to question their leader's competence.41
Also, because leaders operating in democratic political systems must share power
with others in the policymaking process, these leaders tend to find it more difficult
to shift policy rapidly. As a result, their commitments to fulfill their promises may
be more credible, but they may also be very wary of making deals that will be
unsuccessful, because changing policy to account for new realities may be chal-
lenging.42 If democratic leaders find reneging on agreements particularly costly
and risky commitments particularly undesirable, nondemocratic states may accept
riskier commitments and in turn may violate alliances more frequently.
The costs associated with abandoning an ally may also differ depending on the
power of a state. Major powers may have more to lose reputationally for failing to
support an ally, because they tend to have more numerous and extensive inter-
national commitments than minor powers.43 If reneging on one treaty calls others
into question, major powers might be wary of the ancillary costs to abrogation. At
the same time, major powers also have more latitude in their foreign policy deci-
sion making.44 A minor power may fear retribution from stronger states for failing
37. I used the EUGene computer program to assemble some of the independent variables for analy-
sis. See Bennett and Stam 2000.
38. See Fearon 1994; Gaubatz 1996; Leeds 1999; and McGillivray and Smith 2000.
39. See Fearon 1994; and Leeds 1999.
40. See, for example, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; and Smith 1998b.
41. See Przeworski 1991; Fearon 1994; and Smith 1998b.
42. See, for example, Morgan and Campbell 1991; Leeds 1999; and Martin 2000.
43. In the ATOP data set, major powers average 2.77 alliances per year, while minor powers aver-
age 0.48 alliances per year. This difference in means is statistically significant at the .0001 level.
44. Morgan and Campbell 1991.
to fulfill a commitment and may be unwilling or unable to resist pressure from

other powers to fulfill obligations. When Iraq and Iran resisted honoring their com-
mitments for use of their territory to Great Britain and the Soviet Union during
World War II, British and Soviet leaders used force to attain compliance.45 Minor
powers are also more likely to be highly dependent on alliances for security
provision and thus unwilling to risk the termination of an alliance because of
nonfulfillment.
The effect of allied assistance on conflict outcome is also likely to vary sys-
tematically between major and minor powers. All else equal, stronger states should
have more impact on the outcome of a conflict. The models developed by Smith
and Morrow suggest that allies with a greater probability of winning the war are
more likely to intervene.46 If the leader of a minor power knows that he or she
would be joining a losing effort, avoiding the conflict might be particularly ap-
pealing. By this logic, it is not surprising that the Little Entente, an alliance formed
by Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania after World War I to defend each
other in light of Hungarian revisionism, proved impotent when Germany and
Russia emerged as bigger threats. In most instances, however, small states will
avoid committing themselves to treaties that would require them to join conflicts
that their coalition has little chance of winning. Instead, they will design treaties
that specify the circumstances under which they will and will not aid their part-
ners. Thus, they should not often find themselves in the position to renege be-
cause of the futility of the effort; that eventuality would have been anticipated
earlier.47
Previous studies have been inconsistent in their findings regarding the relation-
ship between power status and alliance violation: Krause and Singer find that ma-
jor powers are less likely to join their allies in war; Bolks finds no relationship
between power status and the probability of fulfilling an alliance commitment;
and Sabrosky finds that alliances between major and minor powers are most vul-
nerable to violation, whereas major-major and minor-minor alliances are indistin-
guishable.48 Because I link the probability of violation to the costs associated with
reneging, the most relevant question is whether on average, major powers or mi-
nor powers suffer greater costs from breaking past commitments. Because minor
powers are more dependent on continuing alliances for security and are more likely
to suffer material punishment for failing to fulfill alliance obligations, the costs of
reneging should be particularly high for minor powers.
45. Langsam 1943, 801-2.

46. See Smith 1995 and 1998a; and Morrow 1994.
47. The Little Entente is an excellent example. The alliance specified that the members were obli-
gated to assist a partner only if threatened by Hungary or Bulgaria. League of Nations various years,
vol. 6, 211, 217, and vol. 54, 259. Because Germany and Russia were certainly viewed as the most
threatening states to the signatories at the time the alliance was formed, it is telling that these states
were excluded from the casus foederis.
48. See Krause and Singer 1997; Bolks 1998; and Sabrosky 1980.
To summarize, I test two hypotheses linking characteristics of states and their

propensities to violate alliances. Both hypotheses are motivated by the fact that
states with different characteristics may have different degrees of sensitivity to the
costs of broken commitments. If this is true, some states may be more willing to
form alliances and later abandon them; thus, one may witness more violated alli-
ances among states with these characteristics. In other words, these may be the
states that are tempted to bluff and/or to accept treaties with a greater risk of
abrogation.
H1: Nondemocratic states are more likely to violate alliance commitments during
war than democratic states.
H2: Major powers are more likely to violate alliance commitments during war
than minor powers.
I evaluate the first hypothesis by including a dummy variable in my analysis

that is coded 1 if the state deciding whether to fulfill the alliance commitment
scores a five or higher on the Polity III democracy scale.49 I select a relatively low
threshold of 5 because during the time period under consideration, 1816-1944
democratic characteristics were relatively rare institutional features, and the
general levels of democracy in the international system were much lower than in
recent years. Maoz argues that one should recognize a moving threshold for de-
mocracy over time.50 Even with a threshold of 5, only 19 percent of decision-
making states included in this study are democratic.51 I evaluate H2 by including
a dummy variable representing whether the decision-making state was a major
power according to data provided by the Correlates of War (COW) project.52
Changes Since Alliance Formation
I have argued above that changes experienced by the decision-making state be

tween the date that the alliance is formed and the date that the war begins may
make past alliance commitments vulnerable to violation.53 I examine two types of
49. Jaggers and Gurr 1996. I also conducted the analysis using the full twenty-one point scale cre-
ated by subtracting the polity autocracy score from the democracy score and with varying threshold
levels for democracy. These results are reported below. While I obtained yearly democracy and autoc-
racy scores from Polity III, I adjusted some scores if a change in institutional structure occurred during
the year. I used Polity 3d to match regime scores to the date of alliance formation and the beginning of
war. See McLaughlin et al. 1998.
50. Maoz 1996.
51. Frequencies of this independent variable and all others are listed in the appendix.
52. Small and Singer 1982. I test not only the major power dummy variable, but also
measures of power. Results for both are reported below.
53. If an alliance is formed after a war begins, I code the start date of the alliance-war pe
opportunity to be the date on which the alliance is formed.
changes-changes in domestic institutional structure and changes in power. Be-

cause changes in domestic policymaking processes and changes in power are likely
to affect the calculations of state leaders in deciding whether to participate in a
war, these factors would seem to be particularly likely to call previously secure
alliance commitments into question. Changes in regime type and power affect the
relationships among the alliance members, the relationships with potential adver-
saries, and the domestic incentives to pursue varying policies internationally. Ben-
nett, Siverson and Starr, and Morrow have demonstrated that these variables
influence the duration and termination of alliance commitments.54 This test will
examine whether they influence the reliability of alliances that continue to exist as
well.
When a previously autocratic state democratizes, or a previously democratic
state experiences an autocratic takeover, one can expect changes in foreign poli-
cy.55 When an entirely new system of governance emerges, leaders may not feel
bound by the commitments of their predecessors. In 1917, for instance, Sovie
leaders declared all previous Russian international commitments null and void
immediately abrogating all existing alliance treaties.56 Other times, however, the
new leadership does not officially abrogate past treaties and may even declare
allegiance to all present international commitments; this may be an important act
in achieving international legitimacy for domestic rule. When it comes time t
fulfill a particular international commitment, however, new leadership may have
a different decision calculus than a predecessor government operating in a differ-
ent institutional structure. Wars in which an autocratic leader might have been
willing to participate may be unpalatable to a democratic leader who is more
accountable to the public and more constrained from unilateral action.5' Auto
cratic leaders may be unwilling to assist a democratic coalition in ousting an
autocratic leader. The reputational costs that are incurred for breaking agree-
ments internationally and domestically also may be muted when the agreement is
associated with the ancien regime. Thus, when a major change in domestic polit-
ical structure occurs (whether toward democracy or toward autocracy), the relia-
bility of past commitments may come into question, even if the leadership does
not officially abrogate the treaties.58
54. See Bennett 1997; Siverson and Starr 1994; and Morrow 1991.
55. Siverson and Starr 1994.
56. Taylor 1954, 566.
57. See, for example, Morgan and Campbell 1991; Russett 1993; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1
58. It is possible that any change in state leadership, even within the same institutional rules
instance, the election of a new party to power), might affect foreign policy decision making. I
study, I do not attribute systematic change in foreign policy to changes in leadership within a
changed domestic institutional structure; any changes in war participation decisions caused by
personality or platform are accounted for in the error term. My argument instead is based on the
that different institutional structures encourage and discourage different foreign policy behavi
the part of all leaders operating within their constraints (for example, Bueno de Mesquita et al.
See Gartzke and Gleditsch 2002 for an alternative argument.
Changes in the relative power of a state may also cause changes in its willing-
ness to fulfill commitments. When states become weaker relative to allies and ad-
versaries, these states may become less willing to join conflicts because their
probability of winning or of affecting the outcome of the conflict declines.59 Their
allies may be less willing to support them for the same reason. When states be-
come stronger, on the other hand, they may be in less need of an ally's support
and come to value the alliance less. When a state no longer needs the cooperation
of an ally, protecting that ally is of less importance. Thus, when states experience
major changes in their power, either because they have become much stronger or
much weaker, they may be less willing to fulfill the alliance commitments they
made under different circumstances. Alliances that were valuable at the time of
formation may lose value as the initial conditions that promoted cooperation chan
Because I argue that most alliances have a high probability of being fulfil
when they are formed, changes in factors affecting the war decision that have o
curred since the alliance was formed are likely to be particularly strong predictor
of alliance violation. Changes in two factors should be particularly importa
domestic policymaking processes and international power.
H3: Significant changes in the power of a state between the time an allianc
signed and the beginning of a war will be associated with a higher probability o
alliance violation.
H4: Changes in the domestic political structure of a state between the time
alliance is signed and the beginning of a war will be associated with a high
probability of alliance violation.
Both of these concepts are captured with dummy variables. If a state is more
than 10 percent stronger or 10 percent weaker according to the COW capabiliti
index at the time of the war than it was when it formed the alliance, I code a
change in the power of the state.60 If the state's democracy or autocracy score
59. See Smith 1995 and 1998a; Morrow 1994.

60. For two reasons I employ a dummy variable operationalization for all cases over this threshold
rather than using the absolute value of the percentage change in power. First, I want to ensure that a
few outliers with very large changes in power do not have undue influence on the results. I performed
the same analysis using the natural log of the absolute value of the percentage change in power. This
resulted in a positive and statistically significant coefficient, but the large number of cases with no
change in power made this coefficient difficult to interpret (because the natural log of zero is un-
defined). Second, it seems reasonable to believe that there is some level of change at which a state will
come to reevaluate earlier decisions. Of course, the choice of this threshold is arbitrary. As a result, I
ran the analysis choosing thresholds of 5 percent, 10 percent, 20 percent, and 30 percent changes in
power. The results are similar in all cases, although the statistical significance declines at 30 percent,
probably because of the small number of cases that experience such a large change in power. I report
only the results using a threshold of 10 percent here. The COW capabilities index measures the power
of a state in relation to the other states in the system; because it is a relative rather than an absolute
measure it is not constantly increasing with time.
changes two or more points on the Polity III scale between the time the alliance
is formed and the time the war begins, I code a change in domestic political
institutions.
Role in War
As noted above, Smith argues that challengers are particularly likely to target states
with unreliable allies.61 In this analysis, therefore, I consider whether the allies of
the original target in a war are more likely to violate their commitments than are
allies of initiators or states that join an ongoing war. If states are more likely to
violate their alliance commitments to original targets than to joiners or initiators,
the data may suggest support for Smith's argument that challengers identify tar-
gets who are less likely to receive allied assistance.62
Yet, Smith's argument is most persuasive if one can understand how challeng-
ers identify alliance commitments that are unlikely to be fulfilled. A fully speci-
fied model of the probability of alliance violation should include the factors that
challengers are likely to look to in evaluating the credibility of alliance commit-
ments. If challengers are able to target states with unreliable allies consistently, it
may be because of their ability to observe changes in states that call past commit-
ments into question and characteristics of states associated with violation. When
one includes these primary factors that influence the probability of violation in the
model, target selection should have a decreased role in explaining the probability
of violation. This does not suggest that targets whose allies are unreliable are not
more likely to find themselves at war; such a claim must be investigated in a model
of war initiation. Rather, I suggest that the targeting variable captures what chal-
lengers know about reliability that is not included in the model. As one identifies
the factors that influence challenger estimates of reliability, targeting should show
up as a less important factor in explaining violation.
H5: All else equal, alliance violation is more likely when a member of the alliance
is the original target in a war. In a fully specified model explaining the decision to
violate an alliance, however, other factors will better explain alliance violation.
61. See Smith 1995, 1996, and 1998a.

62. Ideally, one would be able to place the entire process of alliance formation, the emergence of
conflict, and alliance reliability in one statistical model that accounts for these selection effects di-
rectly. In order for a case to appear in the sample analyzed in this study, states must have chosen to
form an alliance, a state must have initiated a dispute, and that dispute must have escalated to war.
Smith argues that the sample of allied dyads that become involved in disputes is not a random sample
of allied dyads because alliance reliability influences whether disputes are initiated. Yet, because alli-
ance formation also influences dispute initiation and escalation, the sample of allied dyads that be-
come involved in disputes is not a random sample of all dyads either. See Leeds 2003. Thus, to model
the selection effects directly, one would need to account for alliance formation, for dispute initiation,
and for dispute escalation before one could model alliance reliability.
Using data provided by the COW project on international wars and on milita-
rized interstate disputes, I code any state that is listed as an original participant in
a war on the side opposite the initiator of the war as an original target.63
Empirical Results
The results of the analysis are presented in Table 1. The data are supportive of
all five hypotheses.64 Both CHANGES IN POWER and CHANGES IN DOMESTIC INSTI-
TUTIONS increase the probability of alliance commitment violation. Some state
characteristics are also statistically significant predictors of alliance violation. DEM-
OCRATIC STATES are less likely to violate commitments, while MAJOR POWERS are
more likely to fail their allies. While bivariate analysis suggests that alliance part-
TABLE 1. Logit analysis of alliance commitment violation in war, 1816-1944
Estimated coefficient Change in

with associated predicted probability
Variables standard error of violation
DEMOCRATIC STATE -2.799** -0.165

(1.143)
MAJOR POWER 1.029* 0.113
(0.640)
CHANGE IN POWER OF STATE SINCE ALLIANCE 2.463*** 0.353
FORMATION (0.551)
CHANGE IN DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS OF STATE 1.554** 0.235
SINCE ALLIANCE FORMATION (0.572)
ALLY IS ORIGINAL TARGET IN WAR 1.157* 0.154
(0.605)
Constant -3.133
N 143
Chi2 30.90
Percent correctly predicted 86%
Notes: Standard errors are calculated assuming potential nonindependence

alliance. Change in predicted probability of violation is the absolute chang
with a change from 0 to I in this independent variable when all other variable
***p < 0.001.
**p < 0.01.
*p < 0.1.
63. See Singer and Small 1994; and Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996.
64. Because I am working with a small number of cases and highly skewed dependent and indepen-
dent variables, I was concerned that a few cases might be having undue influence on my results. I
measured the change in the coefficient vector that would be caused by deleting particular observations
using Pregibon's dbeta. See Pregibon 1981. I reran the analysis deleting the fifteen most influential
cases and found virtually no change in the inferences to be drawn from the study.
ners are particularly likely to abandon ORIGINAL TARGETS, the evidence that states
are targeted because of unreliable commitments weakens in a model including the
factors that allow unreliable alliances to be identified.
I have argued that under most conditions state leaders form alliances that they
believe will be reliable. As a result, when one witnesses violated commitments, it
may be because one or more of the alliance members has experienced significant
changes that affect its decisions regarding participation in war since the alliance
was formed. The data are supportive of this argument. The two variables repre-
senting changes in the decision-making state between alliance formation and the
decision regarding fulfillment are highly significant, both statistically and substa
tively. If a state's power changes 10 percent or more (CHANGES IN POWER), the
probability it violates an alliance commitment rises a full 35 percent.65 In other
words, the probability that a state does not fulfill its alliance commitment, while
mere 6 percent without any change in power (for the state with average values o
all other variables), is a full 41 percent if the state has experienced a change
power of 10 percent or more, nearly a 700 percent increase. Violation is mor
likely whether the state is becoming weaker or stronger. Variables that separate
represent a decrease or increase in power of at least 10 percent are both significan
and positively related to alliance commitment violation. Similarly, if the domest
political institutions of a state change (CHANGES IN DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS), t
state's probability of alliance violation rises 24 percent, a 350 percent increas
Again, separate variables representing more democratic and more autocratic gov-
ernance structures are both statistically significant and positively related to alli-
ance violation.66
In a study by Siverson and King, the age of an alliance was related to violation
older alliances were more likely to be unreliable.67 I tested my model with a
additional control variable representing the number of days since the alliance wa
formed. Notably, variables representing change in power and regime type are mor
powerful predictors of alliance violation than is a simple variable representing th
number of days since an alliance was formed. The correlation between the age of
65. Changes in predicted probabilities are computed holding all other variables constant at thei
mean values. While no state could actually hold the mean characteristics, this is a better theoreti
representation of the "average" state than is a state featuring the modal values on all characteristi
Computing these changes holding all variables constant at their modal values produces substantial
similar results with some attenuation, particularly on the influence of democracy. The baseline pro
bility of violation at the modal values, however, is very low (4 percent), indicating that it is not a goo
representation of an "average" state in the sample.
66. I analyzed whether changes in the domestic institutional structure of the ally that requires su
port (rather than the ally that must make a decision regarding fulfillment of the terms of the allianc
influence the likelihood of violation and found no statistically significant relationship. In addition
evaluated whether changes in the capability ratio between the ally requesting support and the all
deciding whether to fulfill the alliance were related to alliance violation, and found no statistical
significant relationship. Including these variables does not change the magnitude or statistical signi
cance of the variables reflecting changes in the decision-making state's domestic institutions or power
67. Siverson and King 1980.
an alliance in days and changes in power and regime are 59 percent and 70 per-
cent respectively. Age is positively associated with violation of alliance commit-
ments, when the variables representing changes in power and regime are not
included in the model. When included as a control variable with these change
variables, the age of the alliance is statistically insignificant. When age is added
as a control variable, the coefficients associated with change in power and change
in regime are virtually unchanged. Their associated standard errors do increase
(as is predictable with high levels of collinearity), but the coefficients retain sta-
tistical significance. Thus, time alone does not explain a propensity to violate com-
mitments. Changes in relevant factors between the time a commitment is made
and when it must be fulfilled, however, do put the commitment in jeopardy.
One can also identify particular state characteristics that are associated with al-
liance reliability. Several scholars have argued that democracies are less likely to
break their promises.68 The sample of democratic states in this analysis is small,
and I employ a generous threshold value in labeling democracies. However, this
preliminary evidence suggests that even in the sample of alliances that states have
chosen to form, democratic states are particularly reliable partners. This finding
may suggest support for the claim that autocratic states are more willing to form
agreements that they may not fulfill; autocratic states may be more likely to bluff.69
The probability of a democratic state breaking a commitment is 16.5 percent lower
than the probability of a nondemocratic state doing the same.70
In this sample, major powers are more likely than minor powers to break their
alliance commitments." Major powers have an 11 percent greater probability of
violation, all else equal, than minor powers. The statistical significance of this
finding, however, is weaker than that for the other variables. What suggests fur-
ther support for the theory advanced in this article, however, is that the difference
68. See Fearon 1994; Gaubatz 1996; Leeds 1999; McGillivray and Smith 2000; and Martin 2000.
69. See Fearon 1994; and Leeds 1999.
70. The interpretation of the results does not change when the full twenty-one point POLITY scale
(created by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score) is substituted for the dummy
variable. I also performed sensitivity analysis to see whether the results were affected by setting the
threshold for democracy at higher levels. Whether the threshold is set at 5, 6, or 7, the signs and
significance of the independent variables remain unchanged, with the exception of the major power
variable, which loses statistical significance as the democracy threshold is set at higher levels. Only
two democratic states violate alliances in my sample-Yugoslavia violates its alliance to Greece in 1940,
and Greece violates its alliance to Serbia in 1914. Greece scored a 10 on the POLITY democracy scale
in 1914, and Yugoslavia scored a 5 on the POLITY democracy scale in 1940. The correlation between
the democracy variable and the major power variable is 0.26. No major power democracies violated
alliances in this sample.
71. I performed the same analysis substituting the continuous COW capabilities variable for the
dichotomous major power variable. The coefficient for the continuous capability measure is positive,
but it does not achieve standard levels of statistical significance. Interpretations of the other variables
are unaffected. While this study is instructive for helping one to evaluate the varying arguments link-
ing power and status to the propensity to violate commitments, it is worth noting that the major power
result is the least robust to changes in model specification in this study. More research is certainly
warranted.
is particularly evident when commitments exist between major powers and minor
powers. Major powers are particularly likely to break their commitments to minor
powers, whereas minor powers are particularly likely to uphold their commit-
ments to major powers. Promises among major states and among minor states are
neither significantly more nor less likely to be violated than the norm.72
The evidence I present would seem to suggest that in asymmetric commit-
ments, the costs of reneging are not equal for major and minor powers. Major
powers are more willing to abandon past commitments to minor powers than mi-
nor powers are to major powers. Because there is no systematic difference be-
tween major and minor powers in symmetric alliances, this finding may be capturing
the reluctance of minor powers to violate commitments when they fear retribution
from stronger allies. Minor powers find it very costly to abrogate alliances to ma-
jor powers, whereas major powers find it comparatively easy to abandon their com-
mitments to minor powers than to other major powers.
In the full model, the coefficient for the variable representing whether a state's
ally was an original target in the war (ALLY IS ORIGINAL TARGET) is positive and
statistically significant with a 90 percent confidence interval. The data seem to
suggest that there is some evidence that initiators of conflicts are likely to choose
to start wars if the allies of their target are unreliable. Importantly, however, when
the variables representing change in institutions and power and the variables rep-
resenting democracy and major power status are removed from the model, origi-
nal targets appear to be much more frequent victims of abandonment; the variable
representing alliance to an original target is positive and significant at the .01 level.
Perhaps this indicates that this analysis has tapped some indicators that challeng-
ers use to identify targets that are unlikely to receive allied support. Allies of orig-
inal targets are more likely to abandon their partners, but this is because other
factors (particularly changes since the alliance was formed) have placed their com-
mitments in jeopardy. Those states that initiate wars recognize these signs that
alliance commitments may be fragile. The results of this analysis suggest the prof-
itability of further investigation in a more fully specified model of war initiation.
The model as a whole successfully predicts 86 percent of the cases: 96 percent
of the honored commitments and 46 percent of the violated commitments (see
Table 2). Because the sample is highly skewed in favor of honored commitments,
with 80.4 percent honored, improving on a null model is difficult. Yet, this model
does improve the percentage correctly predicted, and more importantly, it allows
one to pick out individual cases that will be violated with some success.73
72. I analyzed separate dummy variables representing decisions by major powers to fulfill or vio-
late commitments to other major powers, decisions by major powers to fulfill or violate commitments
to minor powers, decisions by minor powers to fulfill or violate commitments to major powers, and
decisions by minor powers to fulfill or violate commitments to other minor powers. The coefficients
for the minor-minor and major-major pairs were statistically insignificant. The coefficient for the major-
minor pairs was positive and statistically significant at the .05 level. The coefficient for the minor-
major pairs was negative and statistically significant at the .05 level.
73. I reviewed the cases that were incorrectly predicted and could not discern any pattern.
TABLE 2. Actual versus predicted values
Model predicts Model predicts

commitment honored commitment violated Total
Alliance commitment honored 110 5 115

(95.7%)
Alliance commitment violated 15 13 28
(46.4%)
Total 125 18 143
This empiric
this article. T
tions from the time of formation to the time of fulfillment. It also seems to be the
case that specific characteristics, particularly democracy, are associated with hon-
oring alliance commitments.
Conclusions and Implications for Future Research
The research presented in this article supports two broad positions on inter-
national relations that have often been posed in opposition to one another. Some
scholars stress the promise of international cooperation in overcoming anarchy.
These scholars claim that institutions and contracting create the ability of state
leaders to make credible commitments and avoid the security dilemma inherent in
a self-help world.74 On the other hand, other scholars insist that treaties and insti-
tutions are not constraining, that they do not hold independent force, and that lead-
ers will be willing to sacrifice treaties when their interests change.75 This research
suggests that both may be true. Contracts and institutions are very often fulfilled;
treaties are taken quite seriously by their signatories, and state leaders are reluc-
tant to violate commitments. At the same time, when interests change, treaties
become more vulnerable to violation. State leaders do not uphold treaties under
all circumstances.76
It also appears, however, that the intuition of scholars who doubt the prevalence
of bluffing gains some empirical support.77 Bluffing seems to be a fairly rare phe-
nomenon in alliance politics. Not only do 80 percent of allied states who face a
decision to honor or violate their alliance commitments in war fulfill their com-
74. For example, Keohane and Martin 1995.

75. For example, Mearsheimer 1995.
76. While the results of this test suggest that when interests change alliances are in jeopardy, this
test is silent on whether forming alliances changes behavior. Examining that question would require
comparing behavior at the initial conditions with and without an alliance.
77. For example, Fearon 1997.
mitments, but many of the remaining violations can be accounted for by changed
circumstances between alliance formation and invocation. Because an alternative
explanation accounts well for so many violations, one can draw the conclus
that only a portion of the 20 percent of decisions to violate commitments were
bluffs that were called. It seems increasingly unlikely that states frequently fo
alliances that they are unwilling to fulfill.
Rather, the evidence is supportive of theories of alliance formation that anti
pate that alliances will be reliable. Contemporary theories that find the motiva
for alliance formation in the desire to signal future intentions through costly
tions and those that find the motivation in the gains produced from institutio
ized cooperation agree that most states that form alliances are likely to fulfill th
This study provides further support for these research programs.
Future research should pursue several lines of inquiry. First, the fact that m
alliance treaties are reliable and that state leaders uphold the promises that the
make under most circumstances should encourage the investigation of the cond
tions under which leaders are willing to form agreements and the means
which they design credible agreements. There is efficacy in international coope
ation; designing self-enforcing agreements is possible and worthwhile. Scho
should design research that explains how leaders can overcome the risks of opp
tunism and design agreements that they and their partners will have incentive
fulfill.
At the same time, state leaders should be vigilant regarding crucial changes in
the incentives facing themselves and their partners during the terms of ongoing
agreements. While agreements may exert some independent force on behavior, as
conditions change, violation becomes more likely. Reassessing policy as incen-
tives change remains important.
Thus, this study suggests that recent attempts to move beyond the simple ques-
tion "do institutions matter?" that inspired considerable realist-institutionalist de-
bate78 is worthwhile. Research that focuses more specifically on the conditions
under which institutions are effective and the design of effective institutions will
move the field forward.79 Because institutions are neither always epiphenomenal
nor always constraining, knowing more about the conditions under which leaders
will and will not comply with institutional obligations will help scholars and prac-
titioners to focus their efforts and to bring about and anticipate policy outcomes.
This study also provides information regarding the escalation and diffusion of
conflict. Leaders should assume that under most conditions, allies will fulfill their
promises. This means that engaging a state in war when allies have promised to
intervene is a proposition that entails a significant risk of war expansion. It also
means that the deterrent and compellent properties of alliances should be taken
quite seriously.
78. For example, Mearsheimer 1995; and Keohane and Martin 1995.
79. See, for example, Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001.
While this study raises a number of questions that remain to be answered in

more fully specified studies of alliance formation, war initiation, and war expan-
sion, it also provides significant leverage over questions regarding the reliability
of international agreements and the conditions under which state leaders are most
likely to violate past commitments. The cooperative agreements that state leaders
are willing to form tend to be fulfilled; most promises are upheld, even under
anarchy. At the same time, some types of states may be more willing to violate
commitments than others, and changes in relevant conditions can cause leaders to
reevaluate their policies and abrogate their treaties.
Appendix: Frequencies of Independent Variables
Variable 1 0 Total
DEMOCRATIC STATE 27 116 143

18.9%
MAJOR POWER 57 86 143
39.9%
CHANGE IN POWER OF STATE SINCE ALLIANCE FORMATION 45 98 143
31.5%
CHANGE IN DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS OF STATE SINCE ALLIANCE FORMATION 19 124 143
13.3%
ALLY IS ORIGINAL TARGET IN WAR 26 117 143
18.2%
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International Organization Foundation

Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties

International Organization Foundation, Cambridge University Press are collaborating

Brett Ashley Leeds

The Reliability of Allies in War

Traditional theorizing in international relations has suggested that in a s

International Organization 57, Fall 2003, pp. 801-827

promises can be dangerous. Because there is no governing authority to manage

1. In a famous quotation, German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg reportedly referred

The Formation and Fulfillment of Alliance

History is full of examples of cases in which state leaders considered forming

the threat of opportunism is significant and cannot be ameliorated at reasonable

Why Do Violations Occur?

27. Smith 1995.

Research Design and Hypotheses

31. Leeds, Long, and Mitchell 2000.

Characteristics of the Alliance Member

I test two characteristics of the decision-making state: domestic political structure

to fulfill a commitment and may be unwilling or unable to resist pressure from

45. Langsam 1943, 801-2.

To summarize, I test two hypotheses linking characteristics of states and their

I evaluate the first hypothesis by including a dummy variable in my analysis

Changes Since Alliance Formation

I have argued above that changes experienced by the decision-making state be

changes-changes in domestic institutional structure and changes in power. Be-

59. See Smith 1995 and 1998a; Morrow 1994.

61. See Smith 1995, 1996, and 1998a.

TABLE 1. Logit analysis of alliance commitment violation in war, 1816-1944

Estimated coefficient Change in

DEMOCRATIC STATE -2.799** -0.165

Notes: Standard errors are calculated assuming potential nonindependence

TABLE 2. Actual versus predicted values

Model predicts Model predicts

Alliance commitment honored 110 5 115

Conclusions and Implications for Future Research

74. For example, Keohane and Martin 1995.

While this study raises a number of questions that remain to be answered in

Appendix: Frequencies of Independent Variables

DEMOCRATIC STATE 27 116 143

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