Policy review

Urban Studies
1–20
Ó Urban Studies Journal Limited 2015
Industrial townships and the policy Reprints and permissions:
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facilitation of corporate DOI: 10.1177/0042098014562318
usj.sagepub.com
urbanisation in India

Ashima Sood
School of Public Policy and Governance, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Hyderabad, India

Abstract
New policy and legislative initiatives in India over the last decade, from the Special Economic
Zones Act 2005 to subnational state-level counterparts, have encouraged processes of corporate
urbanisation, by facilitating the development of ‘industrial townships’ largely by private actors.
This emerging policy architecture places a range of municipal functions, infrastructures and ser-
vices in the domain of the (private) township, paralleling processes of urban gating and enclave
growth worldwide. This paper analyses the relevant policies and laws to examine the role of the
state in facilitating the growth of such urban clubs in India and fostering privatised provision of
public goods. With few evaluations of the scope and impacts of such urban development in India,
the case of Jamshedpur, an early prototype of corporate urbanisation, highlights how such sites
may encourage patterns of unplanned and under-provisioned growth around the core.

Keywords
gated enclave, India, Jamshedpur, policy, Special Economic Zones, townships

Received November 2013; accepted September 2014

Introduction and the ways in which it is transforming gov-

Policy and legislative initiatives over the last
decade have sought to facilitate ‘corporate
urbanisation’ in India –‘settlements devel-
oped by the corporate (private or public) sec-
tor, often as part of concomitant industrial
activity’ (Denis et al., 2012). These new
townships are characterised not only by non-
elected governance frameworks, but also by
the provision of key infrastructure, security
and spatial planning functions outside the
rubric of local and regional governments.
This paper attempts to analyse the forces
shaping such ‘corporate urbanism’ in India,
ernance processes within and around these
settings.1 Drawing on the clubs goods frame-
work in public economics, which has been
widely applied to urban gating internation-
ally, I argue that corporate urbanism fosters
the development of urban clubs that transfer
key municipal functions to ‘private . gov-
ernments’ (Glasze, 2005). Further, such club
Corresponding author:
Ashima Sood, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Roda Mistry
College of Social Work & Research Center, Gachibowli,
Hyderabad, Telangana–500008, India.
Email: asjsood@gmail.com

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2 Urban Studies
provisioning of key public service infrastruc-
tures affects access to basic services in the
wider (urban) region.
The legislative foundation for these new
forms of corporate urbanism lies in the
Constitutional provision of ‘industrial town-
ship’, incorporated as an exception to the
representative municipal framework envi-
saged under India’s 74th Constitutional
Amendment in 1992. The earliest prototypes
of this model, such as Jamshedpur in East
India, pre-date India’s Independence in
1947, and include several public-sector settle-
ments developed post-Independence. What
is new is the refinement and application of
this framework on a far larger scale across
the country. The broader model, with or
without formal invocation of the legislative
provision, has been adopted and elaborated
through special economic zones (SEZs) and
the national investment and manufacturing
zones (NIMZ) at the all-India level, as well
as at the subnational state levels.
Under the SEZ framework alone, some
576 zones, ranging in area from under 10 ha
to almost 5000 ha (in Mundra, Gujarat)
have received formal approval. 2 According
to recent data from the Department of
Commerce, 173 SEZs were in operation.
Another 49 were listed as having received
‘in-principle approval’.3 The scope for insti-
tutional and ‘recreational’ facilities in SEZs
appears under the rubric of ‘non-processing
zones’, which can be as large as 50% of the
total area or up to 500 ha in ‘multi-product
SEZs’.4 However, 70% of SEZs are under
100 ha in size, according to Mukhopadhyay
and Pradhan (2009).
In addition, recent news reports suggest
that NIMZ have been proposed across
several north Indian states, Kerala and
Karnataka (Raghunandan, 2013; Rediff,
2013).5 Proposed NIMZ along the Delhi
Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC) well
exceed 5000 ha in size, with the Gujarat site
proposed to be 90,000 ha (Rediff, 2013).
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Finally, states such as Gujarat have pro-
posed Special Investment Regions to be set
up as industrial townships.6 When upcoming
NIMZ as well as state-level townships are
considered, the SEZ figures appear to repre-
sent lower bounds on the spread of such cor-
porate urbanisation.
The corporate urbanisms analysed in this
paper show striking parallels not only with
processes of gating occurring worldwide
(Sassen, 2010; Webster and Glasze, 2006)
but also with emergent ‘enclave urbanisms’
in Asia (Douglass et al., 2012). Being devel-
oped at a variety of scales from gated com-
munities to ‘satellite cities’ (Percival and
Waley, 2012: 2873) and ‘urban integrated
mega-projects’ (Shatkin, 2011: 77), such sites
have largely been defined as functionally
‘self-contained’ units (Douglass and Huang,
2007: 19), with ‘scale and scope large
enough’ to allow autonomy from the larger
surrounding region.
Private capital has been recognised as the
key means for realising state ambitions for
improving urban infrastructure in cities such
as Phnom Penh (Paling, 2012); the state has
helped ease land acquisition for such develop-
ments. Broadly however, urban policy pro-
cesses in Southeast Asia remain largely
opaque or loosely defined (Dieleman, 2011;
Percival and Waley, 2012). The relatively
public and transparent nature of Indian
policy pronouncements and legislative action
appears unique against this background.
India thus offers an unusual macro-laboratory
for analysing the state’s role in and allocation
of functions to the private township.
City and enclave-level case studies have
dominated the literature on private urban-
isms in Asia. The policy survey attempted
here is a different methodological approach,
but its advantage lies in offering clearer
insight into policy intent, a critical determi-
nant of outcomes. I argue that a macro pol-
icy survey view of the phenomenon offers
insights missed in single city or enclave-level
Sood
case studies. Although previous case studies
in Asia and elsewhere have highlighted the
privatisation of functions such as urban and
regional planning (Shatkin, 2011), infra-
structure (Douglass and Huang, 2007;
Percival and Waley, 2012) or security
(Douglass and Huang, 2007), this policy
review reveals how these multiple processes
may be interconnected as part of the larger
phenomenon of ‘club’ urbanism.
Conceptual framework
The club goods framework from public
economics has been widely applied to
gated enclaves internationally (Glasze, 2005;
Webster, 2001; Webster and Glasze, 2006) but
has been rarely considered in the context of
private townships in Asia. One contribution
of this paper lies in connecting these litera-
tures and understanding township develop-
ment through the lens of club urbanisms.
Public goods are typically defined by fea-
tures of non-rivalry and non-excludability,7
but many urban or local public goods such
as roads or public amenities may be prone
to congestion if the number of users rises
beyond certain levels. Urban clubs such as
gated communities or enclaves at larger
scales (Roitman et al., 2010) emerge from
exclusions placed on public goods provision,
with higher levels of public services main-
tained through access restrictions to prevent
congestion. Privatised governance mechan-
isms in these clubs determine allocation lev-
els for public goods and amenities, such as
open and recreational spaces. In developing
country settings, they can also include
infrastructure such as roads, power supply,
solid waste management and water supply
sources, among others (Ruet, 2009).
In taking over key functions of local gov-
ernments, viz, the provision of excludable or
local public goods through privatised admin-
istrative and security arrangements, indus-
trial townships and other sites of corporate
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3
urbanism can be understood as ‘private .
governments’ (Glasze, 2005: 222). I argue
that the allotment of four functional areas of
local government – executive and representa-
tive functions, infrastructure and services
provision, urban planning, and security – is
key to defining the role of these private gov-
ernments .
These functional areas are drawn from
extant definitions of urban clubs which
include features such as private ownership
and governance (Webster, 2001), 8 collective
goods provision (Glasze, 2005), fee for ser-
vice models for such provision (Webster,
2001), as well as access restriction (Glasze,
2005). Spatial planning determines the allo-
cation of public amenities such as open and
recreational space, and is another function
these private governments often assume
(Shatkin, 2011; Webster, 2001).
This disaggregated understanding of
urban clubs further suggests approaches to
parsing their impacts internally and vis-a-vis
the larger (urban) region. These impacts
have been carefully analysed within the
clubs goods conceptualisation (Webster
and Glasze, 2006) but this framework
remains to be fully sketched out with respect
to Asian settings. This analysis represents a
second contribution of this paper.
I distinguish between internal and external
governance processes drawing on definitions
of urban governance adopted and proposed
by Tawa Lama-Rewal (2009: 9) and Pierre
(1999). Internal governance refers to the
actors, institutions and mechanisms available
for the realisation of collective goals within
the corporate township, in matters such as
collective goods provision, long-term infra-
structure maintenance and common property
management, dispute resolution and deci-
sion-making, among others (Roitman et al.,
2010). Studies in China, the USA and else-
where (McKenzie, 2006a, 2006b; Webster
and Glasze, 2006) have highlighted the con-
tractual nature of these issues.
4 Urban Studies
In contrast, external governance com-
prises institutional frameworks and pro-
cesses that mediate the corporate township’s
relationship with its surrounding region on
issues such as public infrastructure and col-
lective goods provision, regional and spatial
growth planning and management, public
finances, natural resource allocation, among
others. These issues take on special signifi-
cance in Asian settings because of the range
of infrastructures placed under the domain
of the private township, and deserve sys-
tematic analysis.
The key implication of club provisioning
of public goods in India is that it redefines
entitlements to basic urban services and
infrastructures in terms of membership in
the club, implicitly in terms of ‘capacity to
pay’ (Ruet, 2009). Allocating key local gov-
ernment functions to the township affects
their provision outside the township, making
issues of external governance ever more sali-
ent. By investigating urban growth in the
case of Jamshedpur, this paper adds to an
understanding of these issues.
Assessing corporate urbanisms in
India
Led by ministries and departments of indus-
try and commerce, policy frameworks that
facilitate corporate urbanism give pride of
place to the objectives of investment promo-
tion and manufacturing sector growth.
Urban development remains an important
secondary object but the external govern-
ance issues highlighted here have received
only cursory attention. It is not therefore
surprising that official evaluations, such as
audits of SEZs conducted by the office of
the Comptroller and Auditor General of
India (CAG), have overlooked urban
impacts.9 Research on SEZs has indeed
helped flag some relevant spatial implica-
tions (Aggarwal, 2012; Jenkins, 2011;
Kennedy, 2014; Mukhopadhyay, 2009;
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Sivaramakrishnan, 2009; Vaidya and Dhar,
2008). The relative newness of these policy
interventions, however, makes it difficult to
assess their spatial impacts over longer time
periods.
Jamshedpur, the earliest Indian prototype
of such corporate urbanisation and an
inspiration for newer models of the indus-
trial township in India,10 offers a laboratory
for understanding the external governance
issues, especially patterns of under-
provisioned urban growth, and the long-
term evolution of political interests within
the company town.
The next section places the Indian policy-
scape in the context of urbanisation trends in
the country. The following section analyses
key features of this policy-scape, and shows
how it promotes club forms of urbanism.
The case of Jamshedpur next helps delineate
the longer term impacts of township-led
urban development. The final section dis-
cusses some of the implications of the policy
framework and attempts to highlight direc-
tions for future research.
Context
It must be noted at the outset that gated
enclaves – whether military cantonments,
university campuses or public-sector housing
‘colonies’ – have a long-standing lineage in
colonial and post-colonial India (Spodek,
2013). Even corporate urbanisation dates to
pre-Independence decades (Sivaramakrishnan,
2009). Thus, such club urbanisms have been
familiar to Indian policy-makers. What,
then, explains the new policy momentum
gathering around these forms of urban
development? Three factors appear relevant
– industrialisation policies that emphasise
infrastructure development, the inadequacy
of public monies in meeting growing urban
infrastructure gaps, and the availability of
policy models of (private) urbanisation from
elsewhere in Asia.
Sood
A large part of the policy rationale for
corporate urbanism stems from the impera-
tives of industrial development. The exten-
sively investigated SEZ (Kennedy, 2014;
Sivaramakrishnan, 2009; Vaidya and Dhar,
2008), defined as a ‘self-contained area with
high-class infrastructure for commercial as
well as residential inhabitation’ (Menon and
Mitra, 2009: 20) has an avowed objective of
helping export-oriented financial services
and manufacturing industries circumvent the
infrastructural and bureaucratic hassles that
plague entrepreneurial activity elsewhere.
Evolving from export processing zones (EPZs)
first introduced in the 1960s, the SEZ policy
consolidated a decade of deregulation and
delegation of powers, as well as extension of
fiscal and non-fiscal benefits (Kennedy, 2014;
Menon and Mitra, 2009).
Similarly, the National Manufacturing
Policy (NMP) (2011: 4–5) proposes that
NIMZ ‘be developed in the nature of green-
field industrial townships, benchmarked
with the best manufacturing hubs in the
world . These will also help us to meet the
increasing demand for creating world class
urban centres in India’. Similar forces driv-
ing industrial policies at state level have had
an important role in shaping peri-urban
dynamics and gated developments in cities
such as Hyderabad (Kennedy, 2007, 2014).
As the NMP indicates, however, the
urban context that justifies corporate urban-
isms is no less important. A widely cited
McKinsey report (Sankhe et al., 2010) pro-
jected that the share of India’s urban popu-
lation would be 40% in 2030, up from 30%
in 2008. It estimated capital expenditure
requirements at $1.2 trillion by 2030, with
the need for 30–40 new ‘cities’ to house 20
million of the projected 590 million urban
residents in India at that time. Private capi-
tal inflows into urban infrastructure devel-
opment in the form of townships are seen as
one of the key channels for meeting these
needs (Joshi, 2009).
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5
Last, but not least, the sharply increased
policy interest in corporate urbanism owes a
debt to the models for policy transfer pro-
vided by private townships and cities across
Asia. Dieleman (2011) has highlighted the
role of multinational real estate developers
as institutional entrepreneurs that not only
shape the policy and planning environment
in their home countries but also serve as vec-
tors for transferring ‘innovations’ such as
township development expertise across
national boundaries. In the context of India,
Bunnell and Das (2010) have documented
the role of multinational consulting firms
such as McKinsey in transferring policy
paradigms to cities such as Hyderabad.
Indeed, the SEZs owe a well-acknowledged
debt to the Chinese SEZs such as Shenzhen
(Menon and Mitra, 2009). While an explora-
tion of these antecedents is beyond the scope
of this paper, the analysis of the Indian pol-
icy architecture presented below attempts to
shed light on their nature and impacts.
Indian policy-scape
The Ministry of Industry and Commerce at
the national level and corresponding minis-
tries and departments at the subnational
state level have played the leading role in
devising and implementing this policy archi-
tecture (Table 1; see also Joshi, 2009). 11
The 2002 Guidelines for foreign direct
investment (FDI) in Development of
Integrated Township Including Housing and
Building Material (FDI guidelines hence-
forth) represented perhaps the earliest for-
malisation of this framework. However,
these guidelines envisaged transfer of gov-
ernance functions to urban local bodies. In
this, they presaged a somewhat different pol-
icy trajectory than the one represented by
the industrial township model.
At the state level as well, departments and
ministries of industry have played a pioneer-
ing role in encouraging the growth of new
6 Urban Studies

Table 1. Facilitating corporate urbanisation – Central policies.

Policy Year Agency Size Functional

coverage

Guidelines for foreign 2002 Ministry of 100 acres/2000 units/ Infrastructure;

direct investment (FDI) Commerce 10,000 persons planning
in Development of and Industry
Integrated Township
Including Housing
and Building Material1
SEZ Act 20052 And Rules 2005, 2006 Ministry of Various, 10–5000 Governance;
(SEZ Rules Commerce ha depending on category infrastructure;
incorporating and Industry planning; security
amendments
up to July, 2010)3,4
National Manufacturing 2011 Ministry of Minimum 5000 ha Governance;
Policy (NIMZ)5 Commerce infrastructure;
and Industry planning

Sources: 1Government of India (2002).

2
Ministry of Law and Justice (2005).
3
More detailed ‘Development Norms for Non Processing Areas in SEZs’, outlining instructions regarding allocation of
land to residential, commercial and ‘facilities’ such as ‘schools, college, social cultural institutes, hospitals, medical center’
for different categories of SEZs were issued in 2008–2009.12
4
Ministry of Commerce and Industry (2010).
5
Ministry of Industry and Commerce (2011).

sites of corporate urbanism (see Table 2). In
addition to SEZ Acts and Policies, industrial
policies in states such as Karnataka in the
South, among others, have sought to facili-
tate targeted infrastructural development
and economies of agglomeration through
legislative models of ‘industrial townships’.
The variation in size – from 10 ha to over
5000 ha – is also seen in the state-level poli-
cies described in Table 2. Effectively, this
means that the enclaves emerging through
this policy facilitation range from large gated
communities to private cities.
Facilitating corporate urbanism
In their facilitative role, the state and
national policies promoting corporate urba-
nisation have provided a series of tax incen-
tives, clearances and other forms of support
(Tables 1 and 2). The majority of SEZs have
been developed privately or by public–
private partnerships; this is a key difference
from the Chinese model that inspired the
policy (Jenkins, 2011).
The National Manufacturing Policy of
2011 which proposed the NIMZ (pp. 8–9)
policy allows for regulatory relaxation and
delegation of monitoring powers on a range
of environmental and labour welfare provi-
sions. Significantly, the responsibility for
land acquisition lies entirely with the state
government, rather than the special purpose
vehicle (SPV) responsible for developing the
zone. In addition, the state government is
also responsible for transport and utility
connectivity. The SPVs set up for adminis-
tering the NIMZ may also be empowered to
draw, generate and transmit their own water
and power. In addition, the central govern-
ment is to provide viability gap funding to
private partners for development of infra-
structure. Finally, the central government
also aims to facilitate soft loans and

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Sood 7

Table 2. State policies.

Framework Sample policy/legislation Functional coverage

SEZ Policies Jharkhand 2003,1 Uttar Pradesh (UP) Governance;

SEZ Acts
State Industrial Policies
Industrial Township Legislation
Revised 2007, Karnataka 2009,2 Punjab infrastructure; planning
2005,2 Chandigarh 2005, Kerala 2008,
Maharashtra 20012
Gujarat 2004,2 Haryana 2005, Madhya Governance;
Pradesh (Indore SEZ Act) 2003,2 West infrastructure; planning
Bengal 2003,2 Tamil Nadu 2005,3
Punjab 2009
Haryana 2011, Karnataka 2009–14,4 Infrastructure
Industrial Policy of Maharashtra 2013,
Rajasthan Industrial and Investment
Promotion Policy 2010, Uttar Pradesh
Infrastructure and Industrial
Investment Policy 2012, Gujarat
Industrial Policy – 2009, Jharkhand
Industrial Policy – 2012
Karnataka Municipalities (Third Governance
Amendment) Act 2002; Maharashtra
Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats
and Industrial Townships Act 1965;
Jharkhand Municipal Act 2011; West
Bengal Municipal Act 1993; Tamil Nadu
Industrial Township Area Development
Authority Act 1997

Source: For SEZ Policies and Acts, see the Department of Commerce website Special Economic Zones in India.13
Notes:
1
Does not mention the industrial township governance framework. The state’s Municipal Act later included a provision
to recognise the industrial township.
2
Creates special status for Industrial Township.
3
Creates provision for special SEZ Authority similar to an Industrial Township Authority.
4
The draft 2014–19 is now also available for Karnataka: http://www.karnatakaindustry.gov.in/indu-currentplocy.html.

non-sovereign multilateral loans for NIMZ township) to monitor infrastructure provi-

development.14
More broadly, however, most of these
policy frameworks can be placed along a
continuum of facilitation versus regulation.
The requirements for provision of specific
infrastructures and services can, on the one
hand, be seen as regulatory, helping ensure
minimum public goods provision levels in
these settings. Both the central SEZ legisla-
tion and state Acts such as in Gujarat
(Table 3) have created authorities such as
the Development Commissioner and
Development Committee (as industrial
sion. Even the NMP 2011, for example,
which offers a facilitative incentive-driven
framework for the NIMZ, attempts to insti-
tute environmental, water, renewable
energy, and green buildings regulation by
empanelled external auditors, in an attempt
to emulate a the ‘eco-city’ model (Datta,
2012). However, the overall intent and
effect of the SEZ or NIMZ framework is to
render these sites largely autonomous of
the wider urban region. This is why the
issues of external governance become espe-
cially salient.

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8 Urban Studies

Table 3. Allocation of urban government functions in the industrial township: Gujarat and Karnataka.

Policy Gujarat SEZ Act 2004 (and Gujarat Amending Act 24 of 2003 in
SEZ regulation 2007) Karnataka Municipal Act, 1962
(Also called Karnataka
Municipalities (Third
Amendment) Act, 2002)

Physical [Act: VI]: The SEZ developer shall be The industrial township
infrastructure responsible for providing electricity, authority must provide roads
water, waste water and solid wate and bridges, water supply,
treatment, minor ports, roads and public, health, sanitation, solid
bridges, provision of gas distribution waste management and fire
networks, communications and data services, street lighting [364(F)]
network provision; may levy user fees;
[Act: V(12)]: Development committee
shall provide and ensure access to
infrastructure and amenities
[Regulations:6(1)] (Note: The
regulations place the development
committee in more of an oversight
role.)
Social [Act: Definitions: 2] ‘public health, Not specified but the authority
infrastructure education’; [Act V(12)]: ‘public could ‘undertake other
hospitals and dispensaries’; ‘ambulance functions as prescribed’ [364(F)]
service’; ‘places for the disposal of the
dead and disposing of unclaimed dead
bodies’; ‘schools for primary,
secondary and higher education’,
‘maternity and infant welfare houses
and centers’, ‘public parks, gardens,
playgrounds and recreational facilities’,
‘police stations’; ‘any other social
services’. Public vaccinations
[Regulations: 6(1)] (Note: The
regulations place the development
committee in more of an oversight
role in the provision of social
infrastructure.)
Urban [2: Definitions] ‘transport, fire fighting Section 364(F) The industrial
amenities services, township shall provide for urban
public parks, clubs, markets, shops and amenities and facilities such as
outlets and such other facilities or parks, garden and playgrounds;
services as ‘burial grounds and
the State Government may, by crematoriums’; parking lots, bus
notification in the Official Gazette, stops and public conveniences;
specify’; V(11) ‘maintenance of public ‘Urban forestry, protection of
monuments, open spaces and other environment and promotion of
public property’ ecological aspects’
(continued)

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Sood 9

Table 3. (Continued)

Policy Gujarat SEZ Act 2004 (and Gujarat Amending Act 24 of 2003 in
SEZ regulation 2007) Karnataka Municipal Act, 1962
(Also called Karnataka
Municipalities (Third
Amendment) Act, 2002)

Planning [Act: V(12)]The development Planning for economic and social

Access/security
Executive functions
and representation
committee shall prepare a plan development [364(F)]
according to norms laid out by a state-
level SEZ Development Authority
[Regulations:6(1)] The regulations
instead suggest the plan will be
prepared by the developer and the
development committee will review
and monitor the plan and development
in line with the Authority guidelines.
[Regulations: 6(6), (7), (8) and (13)]
Both the Act and regulations give the
development committee a key role in
enforcing the town planning and
building norms such as ‘reclaiming
unhealthy localities’, ‘removing
obstructions’ on public streets and
places, ‘naming’ streets and ‘public
places’
Not mentioned Not mentioned
[V(11)] ‘(1) Every Zone, having regard All Municipal duties vested in
to the municipal Industrial Township authority
services proposed to be provided in [364(H)] to consist of five
the area of the Zone and such other representatives elected from
factors, shall be owners of Industrial
deemed to be an industrial township establishments, government-
area under the proviso to clause (1) of nominated Commerce and
article 243Q Industries representative, Urban
of the Constitution of India.’; A development representative,
development committee consisting of Town Planning Department
‘Developer or his nominee, representative, resident
Development Commissioner of the nominee, local authority
Zone or his nominee’; ‘may invite nominee [364 (B)]. The
representatives of Units, residents, authority maintains its own
service funds and budgets [364(I)]
providers and other interested including collection and partial
persons in the meeting of the use of property tax [364(J)]; the
committee’; [Regulations: 6(8) and authority can appoint officers
(10); (12)] The Development and staff [364(K)]; It must
committee is also held responsible for regulate and construct buildings,
registration of births, deaths and safeguard interests of ‘weaker
marriages, determining infrastructure sections’, regulate ‘slaughter
charges and [Regulations: 7] levy of houses and tanneries’ and
charges undertake other functions as
prescribed [364(F)]

Source: Gujarat SEZ Regulations 2007 downloaded from website cited above. Government of Karnataka (2003).

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10
Table 3 compares the allocation of urban
government functions – social and infrastruc-
ture provision, planning, and access or secu-
rity – in two representative state-level
frameworks, from South and West India.
The Gujarat SEZ Act and Rules are interest-
ing because they go the furthest in detailing
an SEZ-specific internal governance frame-
work through the ‘Development Committee’
(Sivaramakrishnan, 2009). These develop-
ment committees in effect serve as the govern-
ing bodies for the SEZ industrial township.
The 2003 Amendment to the Karnataka
Municipal Act 1964, on the other hand, pro-
vides state-level legislative backing for the
Constitutional provision for the industrial
township. Its adoption is seen in the state’s
industrial policy 2009–2014, which calls for
expedited ‘establishment of industrial town-
ship authorities in major industrial areas/
estates’ (Section 5.2.2), especially along pro-
posed freight corridors as well as upcoming
NIMZ in the Tumkur area (CRISIL, 2012).
Executive and representative functions
The defining governance framework for
industrial townships comes from a proviso
in Article 243Q (1) of the Constitution of
India, which states that:
Provided that a Municipality under this clause
may not be constituted in such urban area or
part thereof as the Governor may, having
regard to the size of the area and the munici-
pal services being provided or proposed to be
provided by an industrial establishment in that
area and such other factors as he may deem
fit, by public notification, specify to be an
industrial township.
The NIMZ present the clearest adoption of
the industrial township model in India.
Under the SEZ framework, industrial town-
ship status is conferred not by the 2005
Central Act but by a number of state-level
legislations, rules and policies that followed
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Urban Studies
the central Act (Table 2). The central SEZ
scaffolding allows states to choose whether
to invoke the industrial township provision
or not. In the latter case, the SEZ may con-
tinue under the jurisdiction of the local body
(Sivaramakrishnan, 2009).
Table 2 shows that not all states have for-
mally adopted the industrial township provi-
sion in their state legislation or in their SEZ
policies. However, with the exception of
Kerala, many cede several municipal func-
tions, especially service provision, as well as
the ability to charge levies to developer or
developer-controlled entities, with a
Development Commissioner as monitoring
bureaucrat. The industrial township provi-
sion thus formalises administrative frame-
works with features common to most state-
level SEZ policies.
States such as West Bengal (1993),
Maharashtra (1965), Tamil Nadu (1997)
and Jharkhand (2011) have adopted the
industrial township exception in their own
municipal acts and SEZ frameworks. The
Jharkhand Municipal Act 2011, for example,
gives the state government wide leverage in
prescribing the industrial township author-
ity’s functions. States such as Karnataka
have gone the furthest in some ways in pro-
viding procedural gloss to the industrial
township, with functions ranging from birth
and death registration to broader infrastruc-
ture provision (Table 3).
SEZ legislation in Gujarat adopts the
industrial township model with the author-
ity’s functions accruing to ‘Development
Committees’ (Table 3). The composition of
these bodies is limited to nominees and
‘elected’ representatives from the state gov-
ernment, developers and unit owners.
Two major concerns apply to the indus-
trial township model, especially vis-a-vis
internal governance issues. First, the non-
representative governance mechanisms
enabled by the Constitutional provision and
its state adaptations run against the spirit of
Sood
the 74th Constitutional Amendment, which
has otherwise attempted to introduce more
democratic forms of governance (Kennedy,
2014; Sivaramakrishnan, 2009; Vaidya and
Dhar, 2008).15 Equally, little is said in the
Constitution about statutory and regulatory
functions in these townships (Times Research
Foundation, 2003). State-level legislations go
further in specifying executive and regulatory
functions (or prescribing wide leverage, as in
Jharkhand) but the rule-making functions
remain ill-defined. Appreciating the long-
term evolution of internal governance issues
in the Indian context however requires more
empirical evidence that is often difficult to
obtain given the opaque data practices of
company towns.
Planning
Shatkin (2011: 79) in particular has fore-
grounded the privatisation of planning as
the central feature of the spread of urban
integrated mega-projects (UIMs) across
Asia. Indeed as Tables 1, 2 and 3 show, spa-
tial planning functions are among the most
commonly delegated to the township level
(in Gujarat SEZs, a development committee
oversees the process). Detailed land use
guidelines have been provided by the minis-
try for the allocation of land in these non-
processing zones in SEZs to residential, com-
mercial and (social) infrastructural purposes
as well as ‘open spaces’ and ‘circulation’.
However, regional planning and external
governance issues receive little attention in
these policies and laws. Though SEZs tend to
be concentrated in more urbanised districts
(Mukhopadhyay and Pradhan, 2009), there
are few requirements or mechanisms for
ensuring planning coordination or growth
regulation with the larger city or region
(Mukhopadhyay, 2009; Sivaramakrishnan,
2009; Vaidya and Dhar, 2008).16 These prob-
lems of external governance and larger scale
regional or metropolitan planning are also
illustrated by the case study of Jamshedpur.
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11
Infrastructure
The provision of infrastructure – both physi-
cal and social – and amenities such as open
and recreational spaces is a key feature of
gated enclaves the world over (Webster,
2001). What distinguishes Indian corporate
urbanisms is the range of basic infrastruc-
tures beyond public amenities being placed
in the domain of the enclave (see also
Kennedy, 2014).
These services include not merely recrea-
tional and natural amenities but also power
and water supply, as well as sewerage and
solid waste management (see Table 3). As
the Jamshedpur case below shows, they also
encompass high quality private schooling,
higher education institutions and health and
medical services. The club provisioning of
these infrastructures and merit goods shows
that universal entitlements to basic services
taken for granted in American and
European cities do not apply to Asian and
developing country contexts (Dieleman,
2011). This raises important questions of
equity in public services provision for popu-
lations that remain outside the territory of
these enclaves. While a comprehensive treat-
ment of these external governance issues is
beyond the scope of this paper,
Jamshedpur’s case serves to underline how
they emerge and play out.
Access
Critical to shaping the club character of
public goods provision in these new settings
is the presence of entry restrictions and pri-
vate security. As Table 3 shows, policy or
legislative documents do not always specify
associated security provisions. Yet, the SEZ
Authority Rules 2009 clearly envisage gated
access.
Another more subtle access restriction,
seen in Jamshedpur’s case below, should
be noted: the availability (or rather lack) of
low income housing. The national SEZ
12
framework for example encourages develo-
pers to ‘strive for’ provision of worker hous-
ing (p. 17), allowing considerable leeway for
discretion.17 The absence of low income
housing provision within the townships
increases manifold the likelihood of under-
provisioned and unplanned urban growth
outside it.
It is also worth noting two other stylised
facts. First, urban development in India is
occurring against a backdrop of explosive
growth in the private security industry.
Projected figures of 9.5 million private secu-
rity guards by 2015 (Nagaraj, 2012) do not
entirely capture the ubiquity of private secu-
rity apparatuses as well as risk discourses in
much of urban and metropolitan India.
Second, the history of walled and gated ‘com-
pounds’ through colonial and post-colonial
times in India (Spodek, 2013) – whether can-
tonments or campuses or public-sector colo-
nies – suggests that such restrictions have a
widely accepted presence on the Indian spa-
tial landscape and are certainly key to these
new sites of corporate urbanism.
The case of Jamshedpur
While the SEZ literature has flagged some
internal and external governance issues,18
the recency of these policy frameworks make
a long-term analysis of impacts difficult.
Jamshedpur, India’s first company town, in
many ways offers important clues to the
future of corporate urbanism in India and
poses a series of questions to assess its
impacts.
The Jamshedpur experience has informed
not only a series of similar state-sponsored
townships in post-colonial India but also the
policy and legislative architecture around
the industrial township (Sivaramakrishnan,
2009).19 In 2012, following on provisions in
the long-standing Bihar Municipal Act, the
state’s Jharkhand Municipal Act also
defined the industrial township exception,
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Urban Studies
providing the state government wide lever-
age in prescribing its functions. As a recog-
nised ‘success’ of corporate urbanisation,
Jamshedpur offers less a case study for
impact evaluation as a best case scenario for
tracing some of its long-term impacts, espe-
cially in the realm of external governance.
Founded in the early 20th century in the
remote tribal regions of East India by the
Tata Iron and Steel Company (TISCO)
(Kling, 1998), part of the now-multinational
Tata Group of Companies, Tatanagar town
is a masterplanned development (Sinha and
Singh, 2011). In time, other Tata and related
companies set up ancillary industries and
townships in the surrounding areas. Over the
several decades of its existence, the city has
grown to a Jamshedpur ‘urban agglomera-
tion’ (JUA). The JUA was about double the
population of the Jamshedpur Notified Area
Committee (JNAC) in 2011, and covered an
area nearly three times its size (Figure 1).20
Table 4 draws on the Jamshedpur city
development plan (CDP) (Frischmann
Prabhu, 2006) and CDP appraisal report
that were prepared as part of the condition-
ality for funding under the Jawaharlal
Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission
(JNNURM).21
The Tatanagar company town, the historic
core of Jamshedpur, is a subset of the JNAC.
Although aspects of internal governance
remain hidden from public scrutiny, evalu-
ated on its own terms this core stands out as
an urban success story. Standards of basic
services such as water supply through the
Town Division of Tata Steel and now the
Jamshedpur Utilities and Services
Corporation, a Tata subsidiary, have received
recognition both in India and internationally
by the Asian Development Bank (ADB,
2010) and the United Nations Global
Compact Cities pilot program (Frischmann
Prabhu, 2006).
However, data for the JUA signals
broader external governance issues. The
Sood
Figure 1. JUA, 2006.
Source: Maps of India. Copyright Ówww.mapsofindia.com.
pattern of growth illustrates the uneven
spread of basic urban infrastructure – piped
water supply and sewage treatment – charac-
teristic of enclave-led growth (Table 4). In
regard to other infrastructures, Frischmann
Prabhu (2006) further note that existing
landfills provide only for the JNAC while
the rest of the JUA uses open garbage
dumping sites (p. 65). Similarly reconnais-
sance conducted as part of the CDP pre-
paration showed that stormwater drainage
infrastructure is restricted to JUSCO-con-
trolled areas (p. 61). The same largely holds
for social infrastructure such as schools and
hospitals (FrischmannPrabhu, 2006).
To an extent, widely fragmented public
service provision is built into the Jamshedpur
model: Kling (1998: 74) notes that from the
start, the town was able to provide housing
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13
to no more than one-third of its workforce,
primarily managerial and high skill employ-
ees, and that the company leased land in
poorly provisioned ‘bastees’ to house its other
employees. Even in the 1920s, nearby conur-
bations such as Jugsalai were growing in the
manner of other Indian cities, with non-
existent provisioning and planning capabil-
ities (Dutta, 1977). Segregation of workers
by income and class also remained a con-
stant feature (Heitzman, 2008:145; Kling,
1998).22
The polarised urban form of the JUA is
reflected in and further compounds the
problems of growth management. The cur-
rent administrative structure in the JUA suf-
fers from a multiplicity of authorities
(FrischmannPrabhu, 2006: 105) as Table 4
shows, with no less than three non-
14 Urban Studies

Figure 2. Source: Design for Health (under Creative Commons, Attribution-NonCommercial 2.0 Generic
license) (Jamshedpur, India 290 Pond Behind Homes 12 February 2011). Available at: https://www.flickr.
com/photos/designforhealth/6784382972/.

municipal ‘notified area committees’–
Jamshedpur, Mango, Adityapur – and one
Jugsalai municipal council, along with sev-
eral villages or ‘census’ i.e. non-notified
towns (FrischmannPrabhu, 2006: 103) (see
Table 4).
Now that the JUA is a million-plus
agglomeration, both the CDP and JNNURM
conditionalities as well as the state govern-
ment have recommended the formation
of a municipal corporation (Dasgupta, 2006;
FrischmannPrabhu, 2006: 108, 121). Indeed
the city has a history of struggle for elected
government (Kling, 1998). However, these
proposals have been opposed not only by the
Tatas but also by broad popular sentiment
within the company town that fears a
fall in service quality under a municipal
arrangement (Financial Express, 2006). The
company town currently boasts high quality
of life indicators relative to other Indian cit-
ies,23 while nearby municipal governments,
including JUA’s Jugsalai, have had a patchy
record in service delivery (Kling, 1998). Not
surprising then that residents of the company
town have resisted the representative munici-
pal framework that may ensure more equita-
ble urban development for the wider JUA
(Kling, 1998; Kumar, 2012).24
With its model of benevolent ‘welfare
capitalism’ (Kling, 1998: 70) and company
management, Jamshedpur may not be typi-
cal of emerging centres of corporate urbani-
sation in 21st century India.25 Nonetheless in
the fragmented nature of growth around a
well-provisioned core, and the development
of political interests that block administrative
reform towards elected municipal

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Sood 15

Table 4. Comparing JNAC and JUA.

JNAC JUA

Area 56.32 sq.km 149.23 sq. km

Population
Administrative responsibility
Residential land use
Industrial land use
Slum population
(as proportion of total)
Piped water supply coverage
area (% of population)
Sewerage treatment plants
629,659 1,337,131
JNAC Special Officer,2 Nodal Officer for JUA;2 includes
with service provision by Jamshedpur Notified Area Committee
the Jamshedpur Utility and (JNAC); Adityapur Notified Area
Service Company (JUSCO) Committee (ANAC); Mango Notified
Area Committee (MNAC); Jugsalai
Municipality; Village Panchayats of
Bagbera, Gadhra, Ghorabandha, Parsudih,
Kitadih, Sarjamdah, Haldubani and
Chotagovindpur; Adityapur Industrial
Development Authority (AIADA); among
others
18%; TISCO and TELCO 20%
townships and unplanned
bastis (76 in all)
50% 35%
10% 12.41%
60% 25%
Two (both under JUSCO) None1

Note: 1The CDP proposed another four STPs. However it is unclear if any of these are operational. 2See http://
www.jamshedpurnac.com/aboutus.aspx (accessed June 2014).
Source: FrischmannPrabhu (2006), except for population data from Census 2011. Census 2011 population data for the
city and urban agglomeration. Available at: http://www.census2011.co.in/census/city/258-jamshedpur.html (accessed July
2014).

government, Jamshedpur highlights the
dilemmas of external governance vis-a-vis
corporate urbanism in settings such as India.
Conclusion: Cities as clubs?
Large divergences often exist between the
policy statement and its operation on the
ground. The precise forms gating assumes in
Indian cities depend as much on local politi-
cal economy configurations and the exigen-
cies of global capital flows as they do on
national or state-level policy pronounce-
ments (Kennedy, 2014; Shatkin, 2011;
Wissink, 2013). More importantly, methods
of land acquisition and the security regimes
that shape the site’s interface with its vicinity
vary widely on the ground and remain opa-
que relative to policy pronouncements.
Nonetheless, subject to these limitations,
this paper has argued that central and state-
level policy architecture can offer consider-
able insight into the policy intent that shapes
the trajectory and contour of corporate-led
urban development in India. This survey
suggests that corporate urbanism in India
does to a large extent aim to facilitate ‘exclu-
sive consumption of collective goods’ in the
new enclaves (Glasze, 2005). In other words,
the policy reveals a clear emphasis on club
provisioning. In so doing, this paper helps
apply the literature on club urbanisms
(Webster and Glasze, 2006) to understand
the Asian experience. The Asian literature

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16
has, with exceptions, focused largely on the
antecedents and forces underlying the pri-
vate urbanism phenomenon (Paling, 2012;
Percival and Waley, 2012; Wissink, 2013).
The application of the club goods frame-
work can also help illuminate pathways for
long-term impact, which I have tried to
parse under the rubrics of internal and exter-
nal governance processes.
While issues of internal governance have
been empirically explored in a number of
settings (Webster and Glasze, 2006), ques-
tions of external governance are liable to be
especially salient in Asian and developing
country settings given the range of public
service infrastructures that are allocated to
the domain of the township in Asia. Access
restrictions operationalised through priva-
tised security and lack of low income hous-
ing as well as the lack of apparatuses for
integration into larger regional or urban
planning systems offer further cause for
concern about how these new spaces will
relate with their neighbouring regions
(Shatkin, 2011; Sivaramakrishnan, 2009).
The case of Jamshedpur underlines the
nature of unplanned growth successful sites
of corporate urbanism can engender and the
resistance they pose to more comprehensive
and inclusive models of public goods provi-
sion through elected municipal government.
These issues deserve closer investigation and
analysis in comparable settings across Asia.
Acknowledgements
A previous and longer version of this paper was
presented at the International Institute for Asian
Studies Seminar on ‘Institutional Voids during
State Re-Scaling’ at the Rotterdam School of
Management in 2013. I am grateful to the partici-
pants for helpful comments, and especially to
Loraine Kennedy, Marleen Dieleman and Rene
Olie. Thanks are also due to Mike Douglass, Tim
Bunnell, Anant Maringanti, Rammanohar Reddy,
Tarun Jain and Anubha Sood for insight and feed-
back. All errors are my own.
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Urban Studies
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any
funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-
for-profit sectors.
Notes
1. The term ‘corporate urbanism’ is also coined
and used by Gotsch (2010). However, it is
used in a different sense here, drawing on
the definition by Denis et al. (2012).
2. ‘Updated list of 576 formal approvals as of
17.7.2013’. Available at: http://sezindia.nic.
in/about-asi.asp (accessed 9 August 2013).
3. ‘In principle approvals granted under the
SEZ Act, 2005’, see above.
4. Ministry of Commerce and Industry (2009).
5. Also see Kerala State Industrial Development
Corporation (KSIDC) ‘Kochi-Palakkad
Corridor: The New Route to Manufacturing
Growth’. Available at: http://blog.ksidc.org/
kochi-palakkad-corridor-the-new-route-to-
manufacturing-growth/ (accessed November
2013).
6. For more on the Gujarat legislation, see:
http://www.gidb.org/cms.aspx?content_id=95
(accessed June 2014).
7. Non-rivalry refers to the property that ‘con-
sumption by one person does not reduce the
quantity that can be consumed by others’;
non-excludability refers to the feature that a
good, once produced, is accessible to all
consumers’ i.e. ‘a consumer can benefit from
[it] even if he [or] she does not pay for it’
(Besanko and Braeutigam, 2008: 675–676).
Lighthouses are a good example of a pure
public good.
8. ‘A proprietary community is a privately
owned and privately governed estate in
which a group of households or firms share
certain communal facilities which they pay
for via ground rent, service fee or some
other device’ (Webster, 2001: 149).
9. The CAG has raised questions on the SEZ
policy about revenues foregone and unmet
export targets (CAG, 2009). However, it has
also had concerns on land deals (The Hindu,
2013).
10. The 1950s, 1960s and 1970s saw the estab-
lishment of several public-sector industrial
townships inspired by Jamshedpur, such as
Sood
Bhilai, Rourkela, Durgapur and Ranchi,
mostly in Eastern India (Sivaramakrishnan,
2009).
11. A note on selection: the attempt has been to
focus on the most recent versions of policy
documents. The details of the provisions are
taken from documents posted on official
departmental and ministry websites. In addi-
tion, although a variety of purely commer-
cial or industrial enclaves are also proposed
under many of these policies, this survey
includes only sites that incorporated a resi-
dential component.
12. See ‘Norms for building infrastructure in the
non-processing area of SEZs’ of 3 August
2009. Available at: http://sezindia.nic.in/
instructions.asp (accessed March 2013).
13. These and other state legislations and poli-
cies are available on Department of
Commerce Special Economic Zones of India
website: http://sezindia.nic.in/state-policies-
ssa.asp?id=3 (accessed January 2013).
14. In addition to the National Manufacturing
Policy 2011, the Department of Industrial
Policy and Promotion has also issued
‘Guidelines for establishment of National
Investment & Manufacturing Zones (NIMZs)’
in 2013, available at: http://dipp.nic.in/English/
Policies/NIMZ_Guidelines_21032013.pdf.
15. This holds true even though processes of
decentralisation and greater democratic
participation inaugurated by the 74th
Amendment remain incomplete and flawed
(Kennedy, 2009).
16. It must be noted that the October 2010
‘Instructions’ ‘Guidelines for Development
of Special Economic Zones (SEZs)’ do
recognise the SEZ role as ‘centre of eco-
nomic activity’ and the concomitant need
for coordination between the ‘Developer’
and state government.
17. The October 2010 ‘Guidelines for
Development of Special Economic Zones
(SEZs)’ makes provision for worker housing
as well as street vendors, in line with other
national level policy and legislation.
However, it is not clear to what extent these
’instructions’ have regulatory bite.
18. Two book-length studies are Aggarwal
(2012) and Jenkins et al. (2014).
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17
19. Sivaramakrishnan (2009) notes that
Jamshedpur was the Ministry’s model for
SEZ governance.
20. Census 2011 population data for the city
and urban agglomeration. Available at:
http://www.census2011.co.in/census/city/258-
jamshedpur.html (accessed July 2014).
21. CDP and appraisal reports for JNNURM
applicant cities are available at: http://
jnnurm.nic.in/citywise-cdp.html (accessed 23
July 2013). The appraisal report is available
at: http://jnnurm.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/
2010/12/Jamshedpur_CEPT.pdf.
22. The discrepancy between the presence of
bastis or slums and the CDP-reported JUA
slum population (12%) may reflect official
definitions of slums, which overlook many
types of settlements (Bhan and Jana, 2013;
FrischmannPrabhu, 2006: 88, 89). Data on
income poverty is not available but levels
appear to be low.
23. A Neilson survey report on the JUSCO site,
places Jamshedpur second after Chandigarh
on the Quality of Life Index among five
Indian cities. Available at: http://www.tat
asteelindia.com/pressrelease/content.asp?id=822
(accessed 6 July 2014).
24. A December 2014 report quotes the
Jharkhand State Minister for Urban
Development as saying that Jamshedpur is
set to get a municipal corporation soon:
http://www.news18.com/videos/jharkhand/
jamshedpur-to-get-municipal-corporation-
status-suresh-paswan-555625.html.
25. Since the CDP, JUSCO has extended water
supply to a much wider swathe of the JUA
population (ADB, 2010: 35). The infusion of
JNNURM funding, following the 2008
Supreme Court judgment (Chandran and
Nayak, 2008), may further ease the more
intractable service quality problems.
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