CRIMINAL LAW

- Physical Injuries; elements; RA 9262 (VAWC) v. RPC

The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or
series of acts to be considered as a crime of violence against women through physical
harm, namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the
offender's wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or
with whom he has a common child; and 2) it results in or is likely to result in physical
harm or suffering. Xx Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual
or dating relationship with the offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not
indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in
the law can such limitation be inferred. Hence, applying the rule on statutory construction
that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the
punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against women with whom the offender has or
had a sexual or dating relationship. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial
whether the relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the
past or present existence of such relationship between the offender and the victim when
the physical harm was committed.

Dabalos v. RTC; GR 193960; Perlas-Bernabe

Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5 (a) of RA 9262 before the RTC of
Angeles City, Branch 59, in an Information which states:

That on or about the 13th day of July, 2009, in the City of Angeles, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then
the boyfriend of the complainant, . . . did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously use personal violence [on] the complainant, by pulling her hair, punching
complainant's back, shoulder and left eye, thereby demeaning and degrading the
complainant's intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being, in violation of Section 5(a) of
the Republic Act 9262.

After examining the supporting evidence, the RTC found probable cause and
consequently, issued a warrant of arrest against petitioner on November 19, 2009. Xx

In her affidavit, private respondent admitted that her relationship with petitioner had
ended prior to the subject incident. She narrated that on July 13, 2009, she sought payment of the
money she had lent to petitioner but the latter could not pay. She then inquired from petitioner if
he was responsible for spreading rumors about her which he admitted. Thereupon, private
respondent slapped petitioner causing the latter to inflict on her the physical injuries alleged in
the Information.

The RTC denied petitioner's motion. It did not consider material the fact that the parties'
dating relationship had ceased prior to the incident, ratiocinating that since the parties had
admitted a prior dating relationship, the infliction of slight physical injuries constituted an act of
violence against women and their children as defined in Sec. 3 (a) of RA 9262. Hence the instant
petition. Xx

Petitioner insists that the act which resulted in physical injuries to private respondent is
not covered by RA 9262 because its proximate cause was not their dating relationship. Instead,
he claims that the offense committed was only slight physical injuries under the Revised Penal
Code which falls under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.

The Court is not persuaded.

Sec. 3 (a) of RA 9262 reads:

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act,

(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a
series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former
wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is
likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic
abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty. . . .

The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of
acts to be considered as a crime of violence against women through physical harm, namely: 1) it
is committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the offender's wife, former wife, or
with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a common child; and
2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering.

In Ang v. Court of Appeals (618 SCRA 592), the Court enumerated the elements of the
crime of violence against women through harassment, to wit:

1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended
woman;

2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of

acts of harassment against the woman; and
 3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological
distress to her.

Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship
with the offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of
violence be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be
inferred. Hence, applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not
distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of
violence against women with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship. As
correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long as
there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of such relationship between
the offender and the victim when the physical harm was committed. Consequently, the Court
cannot depart from the parallelism in Ang and give credence to petitioner's assertion that the act
of violence should be due to the sexual or dating relationship. Xx

Accordingly, the Information having sufficiently alleged the necessary elements of the
crime, such as: a dating relationship between the petitioner and the private respondent; the act of
violence committed by the petitioner; and the resulting physical harm to private respondent, the
offense is covered by RA 9262 which falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC in accordance with
Sec. 7 of the said law xx . Petition dismissed.

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- illegal sale of dangerous drugs; material element

To prove the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution's evidence should
establish the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, object and
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. Absent any of these two
elements, the prosecution's case must fail. Xx It is material in illegal sale of dangerous drugs that
the sale actually took place. What consummates the buy-bust transaction is the delivery of the
drugs to the poseur-buyer and, in turn, the seller's receipt of the marked money. While the
parties may have agreed on the selling price of the shabu and delivery of payment was intended,
these do not prove consummated sale. Receipt of the marked money, whether done before
delivery of the drugs or after, is required.

- illegal sale of dangerous drugs; possession included

Appellant's exoneration from the sale of prohibited drugs does not spell freedom from all
criminal liability as they may be convicted for illegal possession of prohibited drugs under
Section 8 9 of R.A. 6425. This Court has consistently ruled that possession is necessarily
included in the sale of illegal drugs. Xx The elements of illegal possession of prohibited drugs
are as follows: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the prohibited drug.

People v. Hong Yen; GR 181826; Abad

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Special Investigator (SI) Roy Rufino C.
Suñega (Suñega) testified that Atty. Ruel Lasala, Chief of the Narcotics Division, ordered him to
place accused Yen E under surveillance and arrange a possible buy-bust involving him.
Subsequently, Suñega went to Jollibee, Masangkay Branch, together with SI Noel C. Bocaling
for a pre-arranged meeting with Yen E. At that meeting, Yen E agreed to sell two kilograms of
shabu to Suñega for P600,000.00 per kilogram. He was to deliver the shabu in the evening of the
following day at the same place.

Suñega caused the preparation of boodle money, consisting of 24 bundles of 100 10-peso
bills with four 500-peso bills to cover the top and the bottom of each bundle. He had the 500-
peso bills marked with "RS-1," "RS-2," "RS-3" and "RS-4" at the right top portion. As agreed,
the NBI agents met with Yen E again on the evening of September 5, 2001. Yen E arrived but
requested the police buyers to meet him at Lai-Lai Restaurant. Before he left, Yen E took a peek
at the money.

At the Lai-Lai Restaurant, Chua and Ang arrived and approached Yen E. Upon the latter's
instruction, Chua handed over the plastic bags she had to Suñega. Convinced that these contained
shabu, Suñega lit his cigarette, the signal that the buy-bust had been completed. After the arrest
of the three, Suñega placed the shabu in plastic bags and marked these with "H.YEN-1" and
"H.YEN-2" with the date "9-06-2001." The police then submitted the suspected shabu for
laboratory examination. Yvette Ylao, an NBI forensic analyst testified that, upon examination,
the contents of the plastic bags proved to be methamphetamine hydrochloride.

Accused Chua denied the charges and testified that it was a case of "hulidap" and they
tortured her. They divested her of her jewelry and demanded P2 million for her release. Yen E
also denied the charges and complained of being a victim of "hulidap." He testified that the
arresting officers demanded P2 million for his release. Ang, on the other hand, jumped bail and
thus waived his right to adduce evidence.

On April 29, 2004 the RTC found the three accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged xx. On appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 02168, the
latter affirmed in toto the RTC Decision. It also denied the accused's motion for reconsideration
on August 6, 2007, hence, this appeal.
 The sole issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in finding that the prosecution
succeeded in proving beyond reasonable doubt the consummation of the illegal sale of prohibited
drugs. Xx

To prove the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution's evidence should
establish the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, object and
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. Absent any of these two
elements, the prosecution's case must fail.

Here, while SI Suñega claimed that Yen E offered to sell to him two kilograms of shabu
for P1.2 million and that he agreed to buy the same, the sale was not consummated. Xx

During the re-cross examination, SI Suñega admitted that the back-up team immediately
arrested the appellants before he could deliver the buy-bust money to the appellants xx.

It is material in illegal sale of dangerous drugs that the sale actually took place. What
consummates the buy-bust transaction is the delivery of the drugs to the poseur-buyer and, in
turn, the seller's receipt of the marked money. While the parties may have agreed on the selling
price of the shabu and delivery of payment was intended, these do not prove consummated sale.
Receipt of the marked money, whether done before delivery of the drugs or after, is required.

In an attempt to prove a consummated sale, the prosecution heavily relied on the

testimony of SI Suñega that Yen E took a peek at the money before they went to the restaurant
for the swap with shabu. But looking at a thing does not transfer possession of it to the beholder.
Such a tenet would make window shoppers liable for theft.

Appellant's exoneration from the sale of prohibited drugs does not spell freedom from all
criminal liability as they may be convicted for illegal possession of prohibited drugs under
Section 8 9 of R.A. 6425. This Court has consistently ruled that possession is necessarily
included in the sale of illegal drugs.

Given that illegal possession is an element of and is necessarily included in the illegal
sale of prohibited drugs, the Court will now determine appellants culpability under Section 8.

The elements of illegal possession of prohibited drugs are as follows: (a) the accused is in
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is
not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the prohibited drug.

The evidence on record clearly established that appellant Chua was in possession of the
plastic bags containing prohibited drugs without the requisite authority. Applying Section 3 (j),
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, a disputable presumption arises that she is the owner of the bag
and its contents. It may be rebutted by contrary proof that the accused did not in fact exercise
power and control over the thing in question, and did not intend to do so. The burden of evidence
is thus shifted to the possessor to explain absence of animus possidendi. Here, Chua failed to
present evidence to rebut the presumption. She claims that she was a victim of frame-up and
extortion by the narcotics agents of the NBI. This defense is viewed with disfavor for it can be
easily concocted. The defense of frame-up, often imputed to police officers, requires strong
proof when offered as a defense, because of the presumption that public officers acted in the
regular performance of their official duties.

Although the plastic bags containing shabu were found solely in the possession of Chua,
it was evident that Yen E had knowledge of its existence. As the records would show, Yen E
negotiated for the sale of dangerous drugs. When Chua arrived in the vicinity, she approached
Yen E before delivering the shabu to Suñega. These acts of the accused indubitably demonstrate
a coordinated plan on their part to actively engage in the illegal business of drugs. When
conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all conspirators. Direct evidence of conspiracy is
not necessary as it can be clearly deduced from the acts of the accused. [Guilty of illegal
possession of illegal drugs]

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- illegal sale of dangerous drugs; corpus delicti

Sale or possession of a dangerous drug can never be proven without seizure and
identification of the prohibited drug. In prosecutions involving narcotics, the narcotic
substance itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is
vital to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Of paramount
importance, therefore, in these cases is that the identity of the dangerous drug be likewise
established beyond reasonable doubt. Given the unique characteristic of dangerous and
illegal drugs which are indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily susceptible to
tampering, alteration, or substitution, either by accident or otherwise, there must be strict
compliance with the prescribed measures to be observed during and after the seizure of
dangerous drugs and related paraphernalia, during the custody and transfer thereof for
examination, and at all times up to their presentation in court.

People v. Nacua; GR 200165; Leonardo-De Castro

On September 16, 2005, Police Officer (PO) 3 Cirilo R. Luague (Luague) and PO1 Julius
B. Aniñon (Aniñon) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Cebu City executed and filed
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu a Joint Affidavit charging accused-appellant
and his common-law wife, Teresita Villanueva-Nacua (Teresita), of selling and delivering
methamphetamine hydrochloride, also known as shabu, at their residence at 0475 Dela Rama
Compound, D. Jakosalem Street, Sitio Taup, Barangay Cogon Ramos, Cebu City.
 According to their Joint Affidavit, PO3 Luague and PO1 Aniñon were instructed to
conduct a surveillance of the house of accused-appellant and Teresita (Nacua couple) based on
information from a "police asset" that the said couple was illegally trading shabu. The
surveillance commenced on August 26, 2005. PO3 Luague and PO1 Aniñon, with the help of
their informant, executed a "test-buy" operation on September 2, 2005, during which, PO3
Luague and PO1 Aniñon bought and received from the Nacua couple a sachet of suspected
shabu. The police officers immediately submitted the sachet and its contents for forensic
examination at the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office (RCLO), Camp Sotero Cabahug,
Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. Per the PNP-RCLO Chemistry Report No. D-1306-2005 dated
September 2, 2005, the specimen submitted by PO3 Luague and PO1 Aniñon, weighing 0.02
grams, tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

On the strength of the Joint-Affidavit of PO3 Luague and PO1 Aniñon and PNP-RCLO
Chemistry Report No. D-1306-2005 dated September 2, 2005, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Renero
L. Agustin, Sr. (Agustin) applied for a court warrant to search the residence of the Nacua couple
for more evidence. RTC-Branch 7 of Cebu City granted P/Insp. Agustin's application and issued
Search Warrant No. 1535-09-1605-7 on September 16, 2005, authorizing the search of the
residence of the Nacua couple at "Rm. No. 2, 2nd Flr., 0475 Dela Rama Cmpd., D. Jakosalem
St., Sitio Taup, Brgy. Cogon, Ramos, Cebu City" and seizure of "[u]ndetermined quantity of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, locally known as Shabu."

On September 21, 2005, PO3 Luague and PO1 Aniñon, together with Senior Police
Officer (SPO) 1 Elmo Y. Rosales (Rosales) and PO1 Julius S. Regis (Regis), implemented the
search warrant at the house of the Nacua couple. Xx

Consequently, the police officers immediately arrested the Nacua couple.

The PNP-RCLO, after forensic examination of the specimens submitted to it, particularly,
the seven heat-sealed plastic packs containing white crystalline substance with a total weight of
0.17 grams and six plastic packs containing traces of white crystalline substance, issued
Chemistry Report No. D-1415-2005 dated September 21, 2005 reporting that all the specimens
tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. Xx

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu City, after its preliminary investigation, issued
a Resolution 12 dated November 8, 2005 finding probable cause to indict the Nacua couple for
violation of Article 2, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165. The said Office reasoned that the
purpose of a "test-buy operation" is different from a "buy-bust operation;" and that "[t]he former
is conducted for the purpose of applying for a search warrant, and the latter is conducted when it
is difficult to locate the residence of the accused or when [his] identity or name cannot be
determined with absolute certainty." Xx

On March 19, 2008, the RTC promulgated its Decision finding accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Xx
 On the same day, accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal. On April 24, 2008, the
RTC issued an Order committing the person of accused-appellant to the Bureau of Corrections.
Xx In its Decision dated July 28, 2011, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the
RTC judgment, xx hence this appeal. Xx

Accused-appellant's appeal is impressed with merit.

Sale or possession of a dangerous drug can never be proven without seizure and
identification of the prohibited drug. In prosecutions involving narcotics, the narcotic substance
itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a
judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Of paramount importance, therefore, in these
cases is that the identity of the dangerous drug be likewise established beyond reasonable doubt.

Given the unique characteristic of dangerous and illegal drugs which are indistinct, not
readily identifiable, and easily susceptible to tampering, alteration, or substitution, either by
accident or otherwise, there must be strict compliance with the prescribed measures to be
observed during and after the seizure of dangerous drugs and related paraphernalia, during the
custody and transfer thereof for examination, and at all times up to their presentation in court.
Such measures are described with particularity under Section 21 (1) of Republic Act No. 9165
and Section 21 (a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9165
xx.

Moreover, in People v. Coreche (596 SCRA 350), the Court emphasized that the
marking of the seized drugs must be done immediately after they are seized from the accused and
failure to do so suffices to rebut the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties and raises reasonable doubt as to the authenticity of the corpus delicti xx.

In this case, there was a total disregard of the requirements of law and jurisprudence. The
prosecution even admits that the police officers acquired the sachet of shabu presented in court
against accused-appellant in a mere "test-buy" operation by SPO1 Rosales, PO3 Luague, and
PO1 Aniñon. The police officers, after supposedly buying the sachet of shabu from the Nacua
couple for Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00), left the residence of the Nacua couple, without
recovering the marked money or effecting the couple's arrest. The police officers brought the
sachet of suspected shabu all the way back to their police station, and only there marked the said
item, without the presence of the accused and/or other disinterested witnesses.

While the Court allows for relaxation of the rules in some cases, there must be
compelling and justifiable grounds for the same and it must be shown that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items have been properly preserved. However, such conditions
are not present in the instant case. [Acquitted]

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 - transport of illegal drugs; corpus delicti
Transport" as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean "to carry or
convey from one place to another." The essential element of the charge is the movement
of the dangerous drug from one place to another. In this case, appellant was
apprehended inside the airport, as he was intending to board his flight bound for Davao
City with a substantial amount or 196.63 grams of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu in his possession, concealed in separate plastic bags inside his oversized Spicer
rubber shoes. While it may be argued that appellant was yet to board the aircraft or travel
some distance with the illegal drugs in his possession, it cannot be denied that his
presence at the airport at that particular instance was for the purpose of transporting or
moving the dangerous drugs from one place to another.

People v. Laba; GR 199938; Perlas-Bernabe

On July 18, 2005, at around 10:45 in the morning, appellant arrived at the Manila
Domestic Airport in Pasay City to take his flight bound for Davao City. When he approached the
initial check-in area, Mark Anthony Villocillo (Villocillo), a non-uniformed personnel (NUP)
frisker assigned thereat, physically searched the person of appellant and suspected that the
latter's oversized white rubber shoes, with the identifying mark "Spicer," seemed to contain
what felt like rice. Upon inspection of the rubber shoes, which Villocillo asked appellant to
remove, the former discovered three (3) plastic sachets containing shabu — two plastic sachets
were inside the left shoe while one was inside the right shoe. Xx

The following day, or on June 19, 2005, upon qualitative examination by forensic
chemist Police Senior Inspector Stella Garciano Ebuen (Police Senior Inspector Ebuen) on the
confiscated sachets, which contained a total of 196.63 grams of white crystalline substance, the
same tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

Consequently, appellant was charged with violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165 xx.

On August 29, 2006, after trial on the merits, the RTC convicted appellant as charged
upon a finding that all the elements for transportation of drugs, i.e., actual physical possession
and control of the prohibited drugs, coupled with the presentation of the corpus delicti in court,
have been established by the prosecution. Xx

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision in toto, holding that the identity of the
seized substance had been adequately proved and that the chain of custody was properly
established, from the time that it was recovered from the person of the appellant, tested at the
laboratory for a qualitative examination, and its actual presentation in court. While the CA
conceded that the arresting officers were unable to strictly comply with the requirements set forth
under Sec. 21, Par. (1) of RA 9165 by failing to photograph the seized items, it nonetheless
found that the evidentiary value of the confiscated substance had been preserved. It also did not
find the non-presentation of the forensic chemist as fatal to the cause of the prosecution. Xx

Appellant was convicted of violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165, which reads:

Sec. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution

and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals. — The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by
law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and
all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall
act as a broker in any such transactions.

Xx The Court sustains appellant's conviction.

"Transport" as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean "to carry or
convey from one place to another." The essential element of the charge is the movement of the
dangerous drug from one place to another.

In this case, appellant was apprehended inside the airport, as he was intending to board
his flight bound for Davao City with a substantial amount or 196.63 grams of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu in his possession, concealed in separate plastic bags
inside his oversized Spicer rubber shoes. While it may be argued that appellant was yet to board
the aircraft or travel some distance with the illegal drugs in his possession, it cannot be denied
that his presence at the airport at that particular instance was for the purpose of transporting or
moving the dangerous drugs from one place to another. (Court of Appeals decision affirmed)

----------------------------------------------------

- RA 3019, Section 3(e); intent

Notably, a violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed either
by dolo, as when the accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by
culpa as when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence. Unlike in the
commission of ordinary felonies however, the law requires that the intent or negligence,
which must attend the commission of the prohibited acts under Section 3 (e) of RA No.
3019, should meet the gravity required by law. Thus, in construing these phrases, the
Court observed that bad faith or partiality, on the one hand, and negligence, on the other
hand, per se are not enough for one to be held criminally liable under the law; that the
 bad faith or partiality is evident or manifest, or, that the negligent act or omission is gross
and inexcusable must be shown.

- RA 3019, Section 3(e); gross inexcusable negligence

Gross inexcusable negligence is negligence characterized by the want of even
slight care; acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to
consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care
which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property; in
cases involving public officials, it takes place only when breach of duty is flagrant and
devious. Xx In requiring the negligence to be both gross and inexcusable, the law
demands the neglect or disregard of duty to be willful and intentional in order for a
violation to exist, although it may fall short of the required degree of bad faith, which
must be evident, or of partiality, which must be manifest.

- RA 3019; liability of head of office

We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too

common problems — dishonest or negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple
assignments or positions, or plain incompetence — is suddenly swept into a conspiracy
conviction simply because he did not personally examine every single detail,
painstakingly trace every step from inception, and investigate the motives of every person
involved in a transaction before affixing his signature as the final approving authority. xx
There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval appearing on a
voucher to sustain a conspiracy charge and conviction. [Arias v. Sandiganbayan (259
Phil 794)]

- RA 3019; finding on administrative case independent of criminal case

That an administrative case is independent from the criminal action, although both
arose from the same act or omission, is elementary. Given the differences in the quantum
of evidence required, the procedure observed, the sanctions imposed, as well as in the
objective of the two proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not
necessarily be binding on the other. Thus, as a rule, exoneration in the administrative case
is not a bar to a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts which were the subject
of the administrative complaint or vice versa. Xx The Court is not unaware of the rule
that if there was a categorical finding in the administrative case that expressly rules out
one (or more) of the essential elements of the crime for which the respondent is likewise
sought to be held liable, then his exoneration in the administrative case can be pleaded for
his acquittal in the criminal case.
Jaca v. People;GR 166967; Brion

The petitioners occupied appointive positions in the different divisions of the Cebu City
government at the time material to the controversy: Gaviola was the City Administrator; Cesa
was the City Treasurer; Bacasmas was the Chief Cashier of the Cash Division, which is under
the Office of the City Treasurer, and Jaca was the City Accountant. Xx

On March 4, 1998, City Auditor Rodolfo Ariesga created a team of auditors, with the task
of conducting a surprise audit of the cash and other accounts handled by all accountable officers
assigned at the Cash Division, Office of the City Treasurer. Among these disbursing officers was
Rosalina G. Badana, who was the paymaster in charge of paying the salaries of the employees in
eight (8) different departments or offices in the Cebu City government. Xx

Xx The audit team reported that Badana incurred a cash shortage of P18,527,137.19.
Based on the procedure in the processing of cash advances, the audit team found out that the
failure of the petitioners to observe the provisions of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1445, RA
No. 7160 and the rules and regulations governing the grant, utilization and liquidation of cash
advances under Commission on Audit (COA) Circular Nos. 90-331, 92-382 and 97-002
"facilitated, promoted, if not encouraged, the commission of malversation of public funds[.]"

On March 13, 1998, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas (Ombudsman) a complaint against Badana for malversation of public
funds and for violation of RA Nos. 3019 and 6713. The complaint resulted in administrative
and criminal investigations. Xx

On July 1, 1998, the Ombudsman charged the petitioners and Bacasmas with violation of
Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019 19 before the Sandiganbayan xx.

On arraignment, 25 the accused pleaded not guilty. Xx

The prosecution presented Ariesga and Chan as its witnesses. Relying on the audit team's
findings, the prosecution claimed that the shortage was incurred due to the failure of Badana and
of the petitioners to comply with the laws, rules and regulations governing the granting,
utilization and liquidation of cash advances. Xx

Meanwhile, the Ombudsman rendered a decision in the administrative aspect of the

case, finding Jaca and Cesa guilty of simple neglect of duty and imposed on them the penalty of
suspension for six (6) months. The case against petitioner Gaviola was dismissed for being moot
and academic. On Cesa's appeal, the Court of Appeals and, eventually, this Court sustained the
Ombudsman's ruling.
 On December 16, 2004, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its decision finding the
petitioners and Bacasmas guilty as charged. The Sandiganbayan held the petitioners solidarily
liable to the Cebu City government for the amount of P18,527,137.19.

The Sandiganbayan ruled that all the elements under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 were
established by the prosecution: first, the petitioners are all public officials; second, the public
officials committed the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties; third,
based on the audit team's examinations, the undue injury suffered by the government amounted
to P18,527,137.19 — the amount of Badana's accumulated shortage; fourth, the petitioners gave
unwarranted benefits to Badana, which resulted in undue injury to the government, by illegally
allowing her to obtain cash advances; and fifth, the petitioners acted with gross inexcusable
negligence in the performance of their duties. The Sandiganbayan relied largely on the COA
Report to support a finding that the Cebu City government lost the amount of P18,527,137.19
under the petitioners' collective watch.

The Sandiganbayan explained that while the information charged and recited all the
modes of violating Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019, the prosecution is only required to prove any
of these modes to warrant conviction. Xx

Due to the (i) commonality of the factual circumstance that led to the petitioners'
prosecution and conviction, as well as (ii) the different positions occupied by each of the
petitioners, various and varied arguments were submitted. We narrate these arguments based on
the positions of each of the petitioners. Xx

The petitioners invoked good faith in affixing their signatures to the disbursement
vouchers. They deny any knowledge of Badana's shortages until after the surprise audit was
conducted on March 5, 1998. Xx

The petitioners argue that the information is fatally defective for violating their right to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them. The prosecution could not have
validly alleged that the petitioners committed the offense "with deliberate intent, with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith and with gross inexcusable negligence" since these several modes of
committing the crime are inconsistent with each other; the violation is more so when one
considers the prosecution's allegation of conspiracy, which presupposes intent and the absence of
negligence. Because of this serious flaw in the information, the information effectively charged
no offense for which they can be convicted.

Cesa particularly assails the validity of the information because the preliminary
investigation which preceded its filing was allegedly fatally defective. Cesa argued that the
Ombudsman cannot motu proprio require him to submit his counter-affidavit in the preliminary
investigation without any prior complaint against him. Xx

We deny the petition.

 The information is valid. Pursuant to the constitutional right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, the Revised Rules of Court
require, inter alia, that the information state the designation of the offense given by the statute
and the acts or omissions imputed which constitute the offense charged. Additionally, it requires
that these acts or omissions and their attendant circumstances "be stated in ordinary and concise
language" and "in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is intended to be charged and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment." As long as the crime is described in intelligible terms and with such particularity and
reasonable certainty that the accused is duly informed of the offense charged, then the
information is considered sufficient. In particular, whether an information validly charges an
offense depends on whether the material facts alleged in the complaint or information shall
establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined in the law. The raison d'etre of
the requirement in the Rules is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense.

Admittedly, the prosecution could have alleged in the information the mode of
committing a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019 with technical precision by using the
disjunctive term "or" instead of the conjunctive term "and." Nonetheless, in the early case of
Gallego, et al. v. Sandiganbayan (201 Phil 379), the Court already clarified that the phrases
"manifest partiality," "evident bad faith" and "gross inexcusable negligence" are merely
descriptive of the different modes by which the offense penalized in Section 3 (e) of RA No.
3019 may be committed, and that the use of all these phrases in the same information does not
mean that the indictment charges three distinct offenses.

Notably, a violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed either by dolo,
as when the accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa as when the
accused committed gross inexcusable negligence. Unlike in the commission of ordinary
felonies however, the law requires that the intent or negligence, which must attend the
commission of the prohibited acts under Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019, should meet the gravity
required by law. Thus, in construing these phrases, the Court observed that bad faith or partiality,
on the one hand, and negligence, on the other hand, per se are not enough for one to be held
criminally liable under the law; that the bad faith or partiality is evident or manifest, or, that the
negligent act or omission is gross and inexcusable must be shown.

Gross inexcusable negligence is negligence characterized by the want of even slight care;
acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully
and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may
be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail
to take on their own property; in cases involving public officials, it takes place only when
breach of duty is flagrant and devious.

Considering the countless scenarios that may fall under the provisions of Section 3 of RA
No. 3019, particularly paragraph e, and the avowed purpose of the law to repress certain acts of
public officers constituting graft or corrupt practices or leading thereto, the law considers the
gravity of the bad faith (or partiality) or negligent act or omission as a mode to commit the
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019. In requiring the negligence to be both gross and
inexcusable, the law demands the neglect or disregard of duty to be willful and intentional in
order for a violation to exist, although it may fall short of the required degree of bad faith, which
must be evident, or of partiality, which must be manifest. Xx

Cesa argues that since the Ombudsman found him administratively liable for simple
neglect of duty only, then the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in convicting him under Section 3 (e)
of RA No. 3019 for gross inexcusable negligence.

We disagree with this argument.

That an administrative case is independent from the criminal action, although both arose
from the same act or omission, is elementary. Given the differences in the quantum of evidence
required, the procedure observed, the sanctions imposed, as well as in the objective of the two
proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other.
Thus, as a rule, exoneration in the administrative case is not a bar to a criminal prosecution for
the same or similar acts which were the subject of the administrative complaint or vice versa. Xx

The Court is not unaware of the rule that if there was a categorical finding in the
administrative case that expressly rules out one (or more) of the essential elements of the crime
for which the respondent is likewise sought to be held liable, then his exoneration in the
administrative case can be pleaded for his acquittal in the criminal case. This rule, however,
obviously finds no application in the present case. Xx

In the seminal case of Arias v. Sandiganbayan (259 Phil 794) involving the prosecution
and conviction of a public official for violation of RA No. 3019, the Court ruled:

We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too

common problems — dishonest or negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple
assignments or positions, or plain incompetence — is suddenly swept into a conspiracy
conviction simply because he did not personally examine every single detail,
painstakingly trace every step from inception, and investigate the motives of every person
involved in a transaction before affixing his signature as the final approving authority.

xxx xxx xxx

We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed records, inspected
documents, received procedures, and questioned persons. It is doubtful if any auditor for
a fairly sized office could personally do all these things in all vouchers presented for his
signature. The Court would be asking for the impossible. All heads of offices have to rely
to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare
 bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. . . . There has to be some added reason
why he should examine each voucher in such detail. Any executive head of even small
government agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that must be
signed. There are hundreds of documents, letters, memoranda, vouchers, and supporting
papers that routinely pass through his hands. The number in bigger offices or departments
is even more appalling.

There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval appearing on a
voucher to sustain a conspiracy charge and conviction.

The Arias ruling squarely applies where, in the performance of his official duties, the
head of an office is being held to answer for his act of relying on the acts of his subordinate. In
its Memorandum, the prosecution submitted that the petitioners were the heads of the three
"independent" offices at the time material to the controversy, i.e., the Office of the City
Treasurer, the Office of the City Accountant and the Office of the City Administrator. On this
point alone, Gaviola's reliance on Arias already stands on shaky grounds. xx

Xx Amidst conflicting assertions, the Sandiganbayan gave credence to the prosecution's

evidence that the disbursement vouchers did not have the required supporting documents when
Gaviola affixed his signature. While the vouchers themselves indicate that it had gone through
the Internal Control Office, allegedly for a determination of the completeness of the supporting
documents before Peña finally turned it over to Gaviola, the Sandiganbayan gave emphasis on
Gaviola's failure to present evidence that he indeed requested the submission of the supposed
attachments from the COA and put a premium on Chan's testimony.

We find no reason to reverse the Sandiganbayan. (Sandiganbayan affirmed)

- Criminal procedure; sufficiency of Information (END)

Pursuant to the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, the Revised Rules of Court require, inter alia, that
the information state the designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts or
omissions imputed which constitute the offense charged. Additionally, it requires that
these acts or omissions and their attendant circumstances "be stated in ordinary and
concise language" and "in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged and enable the court to
pronounce proper judgment." As long as the crime is described in intelligible terms and
with such particularity and reasonable certainty that the accused is duly informed of the
offense charged, then the information is considered sufficient. In particular, whether an
information validly charges an offense depends on whether the material facts alleged in
the complaint or information shall establish the essential elements of the offense charged
as defined in the law. The raison d'etre of the requirement in the Rules is to enable the
accused to suitably prepare his defense.

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