Prudence and Morality in Greek Ethics

Author(s): T. H. Irwin
Source: Ethics , Jan., 1995, Vol. 105, No. 2 (Jan., 1995), pp. 284-295
Published by: The University of Chicago Press

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 Prudence and Morality
in Greek Ethics*

T. H. Irwin

This article is a selective discussion of Annas and White; it does not

attempt a proper treatment of the large questions suggested by the
title. Both Annas and White raise fundamental questions about the
interpretation of Greek ethics, and about the place of Greek ethics in
the history of ethics. Both reject some central elements of what may
fairly be called a "traditional" view of Greek ethics. I will defend these
elements of this traditional view. To begin with, then, I will state the
traditional view and some of their objections to it.
In the Republic Plato tries to say what we should do in order to
achieve happiness. He says that this question about happiness is about
how one ought to live or about how one can live best.' He is not
simply asking us to construct some plan for our lives that will include
everything that is valuable; for he is looking for the life that is good
and beneficial for the agent who lives it, and there is no reason to
assume that whatever is good and valuable from some point of view
is thereby good for the agent who possesses it. Since he is concerned
about what is good for the agent, Plato speaks not only of a good life,
and of how one ought to live, but also of how it is most expedient and
advantageous to live.2 The good that is realized in a happy life must
be relative to the interests of the particular agent. Plato takes the
question about one's own happiness to be the supremely important
practical question, so that the reasonableness of different courses of
action and of the cultivation of different traits of character is to be

* I commented on earlier versions of Annas's and White's papers when they were
presented at the annual meeting of the American Pacific Philosophical Association, San
Francisco, March 1993. I benefited from their replies, from remarks by the chair, David
Reeve, and from comments by participants in the lively discussion on that occasion.
1. Plato Republic 352d5-6.
2. Ibid., 344e 1- 3.

Ethics 105 (January 1995): 284-295

X 1995 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0014-1704/95/0502-2003$01.00

284

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 Irwin Prudence and Morality in Greek Ethics 285

assessed by reference to one's own happiness, not by reference to

some point of view external to the interests of the agent. Plato is
therefore a eudaemonist about ethics. The same is true of Aristotle.
Plato and Aristotle, therefore, seem to make prudence prior to
morality, in the sense that an acceptable defense of the reasonableness
of morality must ultimately appeal to prudential considerations, refer-
ring to the agent's own interest. Moreover, they seem to claim that a
defense of morality by appeal to prudence can be expected to remove
the initial appearance of conflict between an agent's own happiness
and the demands of other-regarding morality.
Annas and White accept and reject different parts of this tradi-
tional picture. In Anna's view, it is wrong to present Greek moralists
as appealing ultimately to considerations of prudence in order to justify
morality, since the considerations they appeal to are not really pruden-
tial. She does not deny, however, that they seek to justify morality.
In White's view, it is wrong to present Greek moralists as appealing
ultimately to considerations of prudence in order tojustify morality, since
the considerations they appeal to are not meant to undermine the
belief that an agent's happiness conflicts with the requirements of
morality. He does not deny, however, that they appeal ultimately to
considerations of prudence.
If both Anna's and White's objections are right, then the tradi-
tional picture is radically wrong. Since I believe the traditional view,
when correctly understood, is correct, I will discuss their reasons for
rejecting it, and in the course of doing that I will try to say what I
think is the correct way to understand it.
I will follow White and Annas in contrasting "ancient" with "mod-
ern" views, but I am not at all sure that this is the best contrast to
draw.3 Some medieval moralists have quite a bit to say on the topics
discussed by Annas and White. If we took proper account of what
they say, we might be less inclined to suggest that certain trends in
the interpretation of Greek ethics are the result of specifically modern
philosophical or cultural influences.

II

Annas rejects the tradition of interpreting ancient ethics that takes

reasoning about what promotes one's own happiness to be prudential
reasoning. To evaluate this tradition fairly, it is important to assume
a broad view of prudential rationality. According to this view, prudence
is the disposition to act on the basis of correct reasoning about one's

3. When White speaks of "modern" ethical views, he has in mind Butler and later
moral philosophers. I would guess that this is roughly what Annas counts as "modern"
too. When White speaks of modern interpretations of Greek ethics, he has in mind the
ones put forward in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

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286 Ethics January 1995

own interest; therefore prudential rationality is rationality in the pur-

suit of one's own interest. We can say that if you have views about
what it is rational to do in the pursuit of your own interest, you thereby
have a concept of prudence. Your views about the nature of your own
interest will determine the more determinate conception of prudence
that embodies that concept.
It seems plausible to suppose that Greek moralists argue pruden-
tially. They encourage us to reason about what promotes our own
happiness; in reasoning about this we reason about what achieves our
own interest; and so our reasoning is prudential. Most Greek moralists
also argue that genuine moral virtues are parts of the agent's good,
not merely causally effective instrumental means to it. This does not
imply that their defense of virtue is nonprudential. It implies only that
they require us to change our conception of what our interest consists
in, not simply our view of what will be causally effective in securing
our interest, as we previously understood it.
Annas considers the line of interpretation that relies on this broad
view of prudence, but she believes it cannot account for the actual
argument of Greek moralists. She argues her case most fully in consid-
ering the Stoics, focusing especially on their account of moral develop-
ment. I will restrict my comments to the particular passage she adduces
to support her claim.
The Stoics argue that moral development involves what Annas calls
a "change of perspective" (p. 251). Annas describes this change as follows:
"Initially we value reason and its development because of its ability to
deliver the goods-health, wealth and other goods that are valued from
a self-regarding standpoint; but we become able to appreciate it for its
ability to achieve a different, non-self-regarding kind of good" (p. 249).
Two discoveries are described here. (1) We discover that reason is not
simply valuable as a means to getting the goods that we previously valued
but is also to be valued for itself. (2) We discover that reason is not to
be valued simply from a self-regarding point of view, and we cease to
regard our own happiness as our ultimate end.
Interpreters who suppose that Greek moralists appeal to prudence
can readily agree that the Stoics believe in the first of these discoveries.
To refute such interpreters, then, Annas must make it clear that the
Stoics also believe in the abandonment of the prudential point of view,
and therefore that they believe in the second discovery.
The passage she cites in her defense is this: "Again, as all appropri-
ate actions set out from the natural beginnings, it is necessary that
wisdom itself sets out from these same things. But just as it often
happens that someone who has been introduced to someone values
the person to whom he has been introduced more than he values the
one who introduced him, so also it is not at all surprising that we
are introduced to wisdom by the natural beginnings, but afterwards

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 Irwin Prudence and Morality in Greek Ethics 287

wisdom itself becomes dearer to us than are those things from which
we came to it."4 Annas believes that the Stoics are describing the second
discovery, abandoning the prudential point of view. But how can we
tell that they are not simply describing the first discovery? It is clear
from the passage and its context that the Stoics describe the discovery
that practical reason has more than purely instrumental value; but I
do not see where they imply that this discovery involves the rejection
of the prudential point of view.
We may well agree, then, with Anna's claim that for the Stoics
"reasoning has its own characteristic aim, which the agent values for
itself, and is not just valued for the results it assures for the agent"
(p. 251). But we need not infer, as she does, that this fact raises a
difficulty for the prudential interpretation. In order to show that it
raises such a difficulty, Annas would have to show that the discovery
of the noninstrumental value of reason also requires the rejection
of the self-regarding point of view; and I do not see that she has
shown that.
I will not consider a further question that naturally arises-
whether Annas could have cited other Stoic sources that would have
supported her claim better than this passage does. This is a difficult
question to settle. I simply want to suggest that Annas's account of
the Stoic position should not simply be accepted without further
discussion.

III

One might argue that the mere reference to one's own good does not
show that Greek moralists really appeal to prudence; perhaps the
broad view of prudence is too broad to constitute a genuine conception
of prudence, as we understand it. This is a reasonable objection; I will
simply sketch an answer.
In book 2 of the Republic Glaucon and Adeimantus, restating
Thrasymachus's objections to justice, clearly assume that there is such
a thing as a person's interest and that it is reasonable to pursue it.
They assume that it is in a person's interest not to be tortured or
imprisoned, to possess health, physical security, wealth, and so on,
and, on the other hand, that it is difficult to see how beingjust could fit
into a person's interest when it involves a large loss of these recognized
goods. The whole trouble abontjustice is that it appears to be "another
person's good," and a harm to the just person.5

4. Cicero De finibus 3.23. Rackham (Loeb trans., 2d ed. [London: Heinemann,

1931]) translates "principia naturae" as "primary impulses of nature" and "initia natu-
rae" as "primary natural instincts." It seems to be a bit more plausible to take the phrases
to refer to the primary natural (so-called) goods; it is surely for the sake of these, not
for the sake of the impulses leading to them, that we initially value reason.
5. Plato Republic 367c3.

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288 Ethics January 1995

Glaucon and Adeimantus make it clear how Plato conceives com-

monsense views about one's own interest. He assumes that most people
have fairly definite views about it, and that these views make it difficult
to show that justice is in the just person's interest. Now certainly Plato
wants to change people's views about what actually is in their interest;
to this extent Annas is quite right to mention "the change in perspec-
tive achieved by the philosopher-rulers, from whose viewpoint Thrasy-
machus' demand is not something that can be met on its own terms"
(p. 252, n. 20). If Thrasymachus demands to be shown that justice
promotes his interest, as he conceives it, then Plato certainly does not
want to answer this demand "on its own terms." But it does not follow
that he is not engaged in prudential reasoning. For he still seeks to
show that justice contributes more than anything else contributes to
the happiness of just people; we understand why this is so when we
understand what the happiness of just people really consists in.6
Something similar is true about Aristotle. He recognizes that 'wis-
dom' (phrone^sis) is usually taken to refer primarily to consideration of
one's own good, to the exclusion of the good of others.7 He begins
his discussion of self-love by pointing out that people believe that one
cares most about one's own interest;8 he says they regard this as a
matter of regret from the moral point of view, because they believe
that concern for one's, own interest above all causes selfish behavior,
giving too little attention to the interests of others.9 These remarks
about wisdom and about self-love suggest quite strongly that Aristotle
is talking about the commonsense view of prudence. Common sense
holds that prudence involves the sort of exclusive or overriding con-
cern for oneself that makes it difficult to see how morality can be
reconciled with prudence.
These points help us to say a little more about what Plato and
Aristotle mean when they claim to be inquiring about how to achieve
happiness (eudaimonia). Modern critics have emphasized quite cor-
rectly that we should not assume that the appeal to eudaimonia has too
much nonethical content that is fixed before the beginning of ethical
inquiry; it would be wrong, for instance, to suppose that when Plato
or Aristotle invites us to ask, "How can I live happily?" they mean us
to ask, "What can I do to maximize my feelings of pleasure?" Still,
such caution can be carried too far; we must not empty the initial
question of too much content.

6. This claim is disputed. I discuss the dispute in Plato's Ethics (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, in press), chap. 18.
7. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1141b33- 1142alO, hereafter abbreviated EN.
8. Ibid., 1168bl-5.
9. Ibid., 1168a28-35.

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 Irwin Prudence and Morality in Greek Ethics 289

This is a good reason for supposing that Plato and Aristotle start
out by taking for granted the rationality of a prudential outlook, and
by regarding it as an open question whether the moral virtues, and in
particular justice, can be defended from the point of view of this
prudential outlook. It seems to me, therefore, that the tradition re-
ferred to by Annas, which sees prudential reasoning in Greek ethical
theories, is correct.
Is it, however, perhaps a purely verbal issue whether we call the
type of reasoning found in Greek moralists 'prudential' or not? Given
that many people are used to a narrower conception of prudence,
would it be better to avoid speaking of it in connection with Greek
arguments about the character of eudaimonia?
I am not convinced that the issue is purely verbal. I will simply
mention a historical example to support this claim. When Machiavelli,
for instance, uses prudence with a much narrower reference than Aqui-
nas gives to the term, he does so because of a substantive disagreement
with Aquinas.'0 He rejects Aquinas's view about what many compo-
nents of the human good actually are. And of course Aquinas's use
of the term prudentia is intended to match Aristotle's use of phrone^sis;
he denies, for instance, that bad people can be prudent, because they
have the wrong conception of their good.'1
I doubt, then, whether we would be tempted to take a narrow
view of prudential reasoning unless we were influenced by moralists
who disagreed with most Greek and medieval moralists about the na-
ture of a person's own good. If we choose to think of prudence in
these narrow terms, we are making it more difficult for ourselves to
understand what most Greek moralists and many medieval moralists
have to tell us.
In brief, it seems to me no less plausible to claim that phrone^sis is
prudence than to claim that areti is virtue and that eudaimonia is happi-
ness. In each case the claim needs a bit of explanation if it is not to
be misleading, but a worse error is involved in rejecting the claim than
in accepting it.

10. Two passages from The Prince (trans. J. B. Atkinson [Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1976]) will illustrate the relevant aspect of Machiavelli's view: "I know everyone
will admit that it would be most laudable for a prince to be endowed with all the qualities
mentioned above that are considered good. But since he is unable to possess them, or
comply with them, entirely-the human condition does not permit it-he must be
prudent enough to know how to escape the opprobrium of those vices that do cost him
his power" (chap. 15, p. 257). "Hence a prudent ruler cannot and should not respect
his word, when such respect works to his disadvantage and when the reasons for which
he made his promise no longer exist. If all men were good, this precept would be
invalid; but since they are bad and do not respect their own word, you need not respect
your word either" (chap. 18, p. 281).
11. Aquinas Summa theologiae 2-2.q47.aI3. Aquinas is influenced by Aristotle's dis-
cussion of cleverness, deinotes (EN 1144a20-29).

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290 Ethics January 1995
IV

White rejects a particular account of one of Aristotle's reasons for

holding an "inclusive" conception of happiness. This account suggests
that Aristotle adopts the inclusive conception in order to refute the
natural assumption that concern for one's own happiness conflicts
with the concerns that are properly expected of the morally virtuous
person. White argues that this is no part of Aristotle's reason for
adopting an inclusive conception.
White begins by considering the character of Aristotle's inclusive
conception, and I will say a little about the questions he raises here.
White wants to explain what Aristotle means by claiming that we have
reason to pursue some goods for their own sakes, while still claiming
that we pursue everything for the sake of happiness.12 White considers
and rejects an interpretation of Aristotle that is derived from Mill; I
would like to defend part, though not all, of Mill's view.
Mill's view (in Utilitarianism, chap. 4) about the desire for fame,
health, or virtue in relation to the desire for happiness contains two
suggestions. (1) Sometimes we desire one of these goods other than
happiness not merely as a means to happiness, but as a part of happi-
ness. Mill says of money: "From being a means to happiness, it has
come to be itself a principal ingredient of the individual's conception
of happiness." (2) In these cases the desire for this specific good and
the desire for happiness "are not a different thing."
It is difficult to see exactly what Mill means by his second claim.
He clearly intends it to be a consequence of the first. In the crucial
passage he says,

What was once desired as an instrument for the attainment of

happiness has come to be desired for its own sake. In being
desired for its own sake it is, however, desired as part of happiness
The person is made, or thinks he would be made, happy by its
mere possession; and is made unhappy by failure to obtain it.
The desire of it is not a different thing from the desire of happi-
ness any more than the love of music or the desire of health.
They are included in happiness. Happiness is not an abstract
idea but a concrete whole; and these are some of its parts.

Now perhaps Mill means to commit himself to the general claim that
desiring X for its own sake is always the same as desiring X as a part
of happiness. If he does mean this, then his view is different from
Aristotle's; on this point I agree with White. But disagreement with
Mill on this point does not require us to reject his first claim-that it
is possible to desire some things for their own sakes as parts of happi-
ness; for we might believe that Mill is right about this even if we also

12. EN 1097a34-b6.

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 Irwin Prudence and Morality in Greek Ethics 291

believe that it is possible to desire some things for their own sakes
without desiring them as parts of happiness. It seems to me that for
purposes of interpreting Aristotle Mill's first suggestion is more plausi-
ble than his second suggestion.13
White remarks quite fairly that since Aristotle actually distin-
guishes choosing X for X's own sake from choosing X for the sake of
happiness, he probably does not endorse Mill's second suggestion.
This does not show, however, that Aristotle does not agree with Mill's
first suggestion. To settle this question we must ask, Does Aristotle
suppose that we can choose some things both for their own sakes and
for the sake of happiness because we choose them as parts of happi-
ness, and not just as instrumental to happiness?
White seems to give an affirmative answer to this question, since
he takes Aristotle to hold that "these things are desired both as parts
of happiness and for themselves." To take this view, however, is not
to imply that we ought to be concerned for friendship, say, partly for
its own sake and partly for its contribution to happiness. For the very
features of it that make it choiceworthy for its own sake also make it
a part of happiness; in choosing it for the features that make it a part
of happiness we are also choosing it for its own sake. There are some
features of friendship that would make it choiceworthy even if it did
not belong to a life that achieved happiness; when we choose it for
the sake of happiness, we choose it for the sake of those features.
Can we be sure that Aristotle believes that choosing an intrinsic
good for the sake of happiness is so closely connected with choosing
it for its own sake? We can understand his position better if we remem-
ber that these issues do not arise simply in trying to interpret his claims
about happiness (presented esp. in EN, bk. 1); they also arise if we
try to interpret his claims about virtue. He claims that it is characteristic
of the virtuous person to decide on (prohaireisthai) the virtuous action
for its own sake. 14 Some readers have found this claim difficult, because
decision is concerned, according to Aristotle's own explicit account in
book 3, with things that contribute to ends, and not with the ends
themselves.15 We can solve this familiar problem by arguing that wh
Aristotle speaks of decision in connection with virtue, he is not using
the term in his technical sense. Alternatively, we can avoid this rather
desperate solution by arguing that when we decide on something as
a constituent of happiness, and regard it as contributing to happiness
for this reason, we thereby decide on it for its own sake, choosing it

13. White cites me (Plato's Moral Theory [Oxford: Clarendon, 1977], p. 341) among
the interpreters who have used Mill's suggestion in explaining Plato and Aristotle. None
of the passages cited by White, however, endorses or exploits Mill's second suggestion.
14. Aristotle EN 1105a32.
15. Ibid., 111lb26-30.

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292 Ethics January 1995

as a good in itself. If this is right, then Aristotle's account of virtue

shows not only that he believes we can consistently choose something
both for its own sake and as a part of happiness, but also that he
believes we can show how something is worth choosing for its own
sake by showing how it contributes to happiness.
I am not sure how far White wants -to disagree with the account
that I have sketched. I am inclined to suppose that he does not believe
that (in Aristotle's view) choosing X for its own sake is part of choosing
X for the sake of happiness (in the case of intrinsic goods that we
recognize as such), and that on this point he disagrees with what I
have said. At any rate, if he agrees with what I have said, the view of
Aristotle that he calls the "Kantian" interpretation ought to seem less
plausible than White thinks it is.

I come now to White's main reason for believing that Aristotle does
not appeal to prudence to defend morality. Before reading White's
paper, I would have been inclined to assume that in Nicomachean Ethics,
book 9, chapter 8, on self-love and the good of others, Aristotle sets
out to show that if we correctly understand the components of our
own good, we will pursue the good of others in the ways required by
morality. I was surprised, then, to see that White cites this chapter for
exactly the opposite purpose, claiming that in Aristotle's view virtuous
people are self-seeking in the sense that they try to outdo other people
in grabbing more of a scarce resource for themselves. In this case
the scarce resource is noble action. Aristotle says virtuous people will
sometimes allow their friends to do fine actions, because it is sometimes
finer to be responsible for one's friend's doing a fine action than to
do it oneself."6 White suggests that Aristotle is representing this a
competitive situation in which virtuous people seek to outdo their
friends in grabbing noble action for themselves; in this case, if you
can induce me to do the noble action myself, you have outwitted me
and won the contest in nobility because you have managed to do
something nobler than I have done.
I cannot find a basis in the text for this picture of friends engaged
in a cutthroat competition in nobility.17 First, it does not fit Aristotle's
aim in this chapter. He is seeking to show that the best type of self-
love is not open to the common criticism that self-lovers cannot be
trusted to show the appropriate sort of concern for their friends or
(more generally) for the fine.8 This common criticism would not be

16. Ibid., 1169a32-34.

17. I have learned from the discussion by Annas, "Self-Love in Aristotle,"
Journal of Philosophy 27, suppl. (1988): 1-23, and from Richard Kraut's rep
18. Aristotle EN 1168a32-35.

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 Irwin Prudence and Morality in Greek Ethics 293

answered if White's account of the chapter were right. If A and B are

virtuous friends, but A is always eager to do something finer than B
does, then apparently A may cause B to do something less fine than
B might otherwise have done. In that case A cannot claim to be con-
cerned for B's good for B's own sake; for if A had this concern, would
A not want what is best for B, and would A therefore not want B to
do the finest action that B can do?
Even if the idea of moral competition between friends leaves Aris-
totle open to this objection, we might believe he is committed to the
idea anyhow. In support of this belief we might appeal to this remark:
"If someone were always to be eager to do the just things, himself
most of all, or the temperate things, or any others of the things in
accordance with the virtues, and, in general, always attached the fine
to himself, no one will say that this person is a self-lover or will blame
him.""9 If "himself most of all" means "himself more than anyone
else," then Aristotle suggests that it is legitimate to aim at doing finer
things than anyone else does.20 But there are two ways to do this:
either I can cause other people to do less fine things than they other-
wise would, or I can do finer things than they do even when they
do the finest things they can do. If Aristotle allows the first sort of
competition, then White is right to say that "there is under Aristotle's
view no way for a person both to gain the greatest available amount of
good for himself and to allow someone else to gain the greatest available
amount of good." But if he allows only the second sort of competition,
his view need not have the consequence suggested by White.
What sort of "competition," then, does Aristotle allow? He contin-
ues, "when everyone contends towards the fine, and strains to do the
finest actions, everything that is right will be done for the common
[good], and each person individually will receive the greatest of goods,
since that is the character of virtue."21 Aristotle certainly seems to
allow "moral competition" here if we simply mean that one treats
other people's progress in virtue as a stimulus to oneself to do better.
But the passage does not imply that he allows A to act in such a way
that B acts less finely than B otherwise would.
We must now consider Aristotle's claim that if A and B are virtuous
friends, it is possible that A will let B do the fine action instead of

19. Ibid., 1168b25-28.

20. The translation "himself more than everyone else" takespanton to be masculine,
agreeing with Gauthier. Ross and Dirlmeier take it-to be neuter, and so translate "above
all things." If their rendering is right, then the passage contains no suggestion of
moral competition.
21. Aristotle EN 1169a8-11. Aristotle's term, hamillasthai (translated as "con-
tends"), need not involve reference to victory over another person; sometimes it just
refers (as the English 'struggle' or 'contend' sometimes refers) to effort, rather than to
effort against other people. Plato Republic 490e9 seems a clear noncompetitive use.

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294 Ethics January 1995

doing it himself: "It is possible that being responsible for his friend's
doing it is finer than doing it himself. In all praiseworthy actions, then,
the virtuous person evidently assigns more of the fine to himself."22 To
see what sort of "competition" Aristotle endorses here, we must con-
sider what is meant by "assigns more of the fine to himself." We might
take this to mean either (1) A assigns to A more of the fine than A
assigns to B (A does a finer action than B and causes B to do less a
fine action than B would otherwise have done), or (2) A assigns to A
more of the fine than of any other goods, or (3) A assigns to A more
of the fine than A would have assigned to A by any other course of
action. If Aristotle's point is (1), he endorses the sort of competition
that White describes; otherwise he does not endorse it.
I see no reason to ascribe (1) to Aristotle in this passage. When
he says that A does the finer thing, he need not mean that A will do
a finer thing than B will do. He may simply mean that A will do a
finer thing than A would do if A insisted on doing the fine action that
in fact A lets B do. Let us suppose that B does a fine action X and A
does a fine action Y (where Y is allowing one's friend to do a fine
action). In this case A's choosing to do Y is A's choosing the finer
action that is open to A, but it does not follow that B is forced to do
a less fine action than A does, or a less fine action than B would
otherwise have done. For if B agrees to do X, B thereby also allows
A to do the finer thing (Y) that is open to A, and (by the principle
already employed) that is sometimes finer for B than it would be if B
insisted on doing Y (by allowing A to do X). Hence there is no reason
why both A and B should not do the finest thing available, and there
is no reason why either action has to be finer than the other.
Aristotle's point may be illustrated by an example. Suppose we
are both going to a debate in the Athenian Assembly, and there is
time for only one of us to make an elaborate speech opposing, say,
the summary execution of the citizens of a captured city. If we are
equally good speakers, it would be inappropriate for me to insist on
making the speech myself, and inappropriate for you to insist on
making it yourself. It would be finer, as Aristotle says, for me to help
you to make an even better speech, and you would have the same
reason to help me rather than make the speech yourself. This does
not mean, however, that neither of us will give the speech. For we
both recognize that one of us ought to; and it would be wrong for
either of us to insist on having the enabling rather than the speaking
role. If there is no other reason for one rather than the other to make
the speech, we should probably just toss a coin to decide who does it
and who helps. In any case, each of us will have done the finest thing
by causing the other to do a fine action.

22. Aristotle EN 1169a33-bl.

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 Irwin Prudence and Morality in Greek Ethics 295

While Aristotle's remark about helping other people to do fine

actions may at first sound odd, even absurd, it should not seem so
absurd when we look at it more carefully. In any case, it does not
imply that Aristotle advocates competition that aims at victory for
oneself at your friend's expense.
If Aristotle's specific remarks do not support White's interpreta-
tion, we are entitled to reject that interpretation once we recall the
main point of the chapter that includes these remarks. As I mentioned
earlier, the whole point of the chapter is to show that if we have
correct self-love, we will not be self-seeking in any way that is open to
legitimate objection. On White's interpretation, Aristotle's argument
would be open to objection; for a virtuous person who seeks to make
his friend do less fine actions than the friend would otherwise do is
not concerned about the friend's good for the friend's own sake. If,
however, the remarks about choosing "more of the fine" are interpre-
ted in the way I have suggested, Aristotle's argument achieves its
purpose; for if the virtuous person allows his friend to do the fine
action, this is allowing the friend to do the finest thing that the friend
can do, and so the virtuous person shows that he is concerned for the
friend's good. The suggestion that virtuous people aim to win moral
victories over their friends is not Aristotle's suggestion.

VI
I have focused on White's view of this chapter, because he raises an
important question about whether Aristotle is doing what we would
expect him to do if he is attempting to justify morality by appeal to
prudence. It seems to me that Aristotle says what we would expect a
eudaemonist to say; he wants to show that some initially plausible
reasons for believing that eudaemonism conflicts with the appropriate
commitment to morality are in fact not good reasons.
In this section of the Ethics, then, Aristotle develops the sort of
argument that the "traditional view" attributes to him. Plato and Aris-
totle do not begin with a concept of happiness that is totally flexible
and hospitable to everything that might be regarded as good from
some point of view or other; it is confined to goods for the agent. To
decide whether some good or other is really part of my happiness, I
must form some conception of what is good for me, and I must decide
whether that good really satisfies my conception of what is good for
me. Any putative part of my happiness has to be shown to meet
appropriate conditions for prudential value.
This brief statement of the traditional view may easily be mis-
leading; the view needs to be further explained and articulated. In
this article I have simply argued that it is this view, not some different
view, that needs to be articulated if we are to understand some central
arguments in Greek ethics.

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