HRET Dismissal of Election Protest Upheld

2020 Golden Notes
Political Law (J. Leonen Cases)
MARIA LOURDES B. LOCSIN, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and MONIQUE YAZMIN MARIA Q. LAGDAMEO, respondents.
G.R. No. 204123. EN BANC. March 19, 2013. Leonen, J.
DOCTRINE:
Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the "sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members." Thus, this Court's
jurisdiction to review HRET's decisions and orders is exercised only upon showing that the HRET acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Otherwise, this Court shall not interfere
with the HRET's exercise of its discretion or jurisdiction.
FACTS:
Petitioner Locsin and private respondent Lagdameo, along with three other candidates, vied for the
position to represent the First Legislative District of Makati in the 2010 national elections. Respondent
Lagdameo was proclaimed winner by the City Board of Canvassers on 11 May 2010 garnering 42,102 votes.
Petitioner came in second with 41,860 votes or a losing margin of 242 votes.
On 21 May 2010, petitioner Locsin instituted an election protest before the HRET impugning the
election results in all 233 clustered precincts in Makati's First District. Petitioner alleged that the results were
tainted by election fraud, anomalies, and irregularities. On 2 July 2010, Lagdameo filed her Answer with
Counter-Protest questioning the results in 123 clustered precincts.
The HRET dismissed the petitioner's election protest and affirmed the proclamation of protestee
Monique Yazmin Maria Q. Lagdameo as the duly elected Representative of the First Legislative District of
Makati City in the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections.
Hence, Locsin filed the present petition on the ground that public respondent HRET committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Locsin alleged that the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion when it ignored the presence of
2,457 invalid, irregular, and rejectible ballots for Lagdameo and 663 bona fide claimed ballots for petitioner.
Specifically, only two of the 2,457 contested ballots were rejected by the HRET, and only 192 of the 663
ballots claimed by petitioner were admitted by the HRET. Petitioner argued that a re-examination of the
private respondent's ballots would show that markings were placed intentionally for identification, and the
ballots should have been rejected. Those which contained shadings below the 50% threshold should have
been rejected also.
Public respondent HRET argued that under the Constitution, the HRET alone shall have the
authority to determine the form, manner, and conduct by which an election controversy is settled and decided
with no further appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the HRET’s dismissal of the petitioner's election protest was proper. (YES)
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RULING:
Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the "sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members." As this Court held
in Lazatin v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal:
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred. The
exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as
"intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature." Earlier, this
grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm "as full, clear and complete." Under
the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it
remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission.
The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution.
Thus, this Court's jurisdiction to review HRET's decisions and orders is exercised only upon showing
that the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Otherwise,
this Court shall not interfere with the HRET's exercise of its discretion or jurisdiction. In the present case,
we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent HRET when it dismissed petitioner's
election protest.
Public respondent HRET conducted a revision and appreciation of all the ballots from all the
precincts. This was done despite the fact that results of initial revision proceedings in 25% of the precincts
increased the winning margin of private respondent from 242 to 265 votes. Out of due diligence and to
remove all doubts on the victory of private respondent, the HRET directed continuation of revision
proceedings.
Petitioner argues that in election law, irrelevant expressions, impertinent figures, words or phrases,
and unnecessary and identifying expressions nullify ballots. The cardinal objective in ballot appreciation is to
discover and give effect to, rather than frustrate, the intention of the voter. Extreme caution is observed before
any ballot is invalidated and doubts are resolved in favor of the ballot’s validity. Public respondent HRET
was guided by this principle and the existing rules and rulings in its appreciation of the contested ballots. The
distinguishing mark which the law forbids to be placed in the ballots is that which the elector may have placed
with the intention of facilitating the means of identifying said ballot, for the purpose of defeating the secrecy
of the suffrage which the law establishes. As this is a question of fact, it should be resolved with the ballot
itself in view. Marks made by the voter unintentionally do not invalidate the ballot. Neither do marks made
by some person other than the voter.
Moreover, the Omnibus Election Code provides explicitly that every ballot shall be presumed valid
unless there is clear and good reason to justify its rejection. Unless it should clearly appear that they have
been deliberately put by the voter to serve as identification marks, commas, dots, lines, or hyphens between
the first name and surname of a candidate, or in other parts of the ballot, traces of the letter "T", "J", and other
similar ones, the first letters or syllables of names which the voter does not continue, the use of two or more
kinds of writing and unintentional or accidental flourishes, strokes, or strains, shall not invalidate the ballot.
Petitioner objected to most of the ballots on the ground that these were Spurious or Substituted
ballots. These are ballots that allegedly do not contain the signature of the Chairperson of the Board of
Election Inspectors (BEI) at the designated space or the signature is allegedly different from the BEI
Chairperson’s signature appearing on other election documents.
In Punzalan v. Comelec, this Court held that "it is a well-settled rule that the failure of the BEI
chairman or any of the members of the board to comply with their mandated administrative responsibility,
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i.e., signing, authenticating and thumbmarking of ballots, should not penalize the voter with
disenfranchisement, thereby frustrating the will of the people." The consistent rule is that a ballot is considered
valid and genuine when it bears any one of the following authenticating marks: (a) the COMELEC watermark
or (b) the signature or initials or thumbprint of the Chairman of the BEI; and (c) in those cases where the
COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent to the naked eye, the presence of red and blue
fibers in the ballots.
In this case, ultra-violet (UV) lamps were used to confirm the presence of the UV code or seal placed
as security markings at the upper center of the automated ballots. This UV code or seal was inserted to
identify ballots that were cast and fed to the PCOS machines. The HRET found these ballots authentic and
admitted as valid the 1,808 ballots objected by petitioner and favoring Lagdameo. On the other hand, the
HRET admitted 1,905 ballots objected by Lagdameo and favoring Locsin.
The HRET did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it in fact applied meticulously the existing
rules and rulings on the ballot appreciation for the objected and claimed ballots made by both parties.
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Q: Petitioner Locsin and private respondent Lagdameo, along with three other candidates, vied for the
position to represent the First Legislative District of Makati in the 2010 national elections. Respondent
Lagdameo was proclaimed winner by the City Board of Canvassers on 11 May 2010 garnering 42,102 votes.
Petitioner came in second with 41,860 votes or a losing margin of 242 votes.
On 21 May 2010, petitioner Locsin instituted an election protest before the HRET impugning the election
results in all 233 clustered precincts in Makati's First District. Petitioner alleged that the results were tainted
by election fraud, anomalies, and irregularities. On 2 July 2010, Lagdameo filed her Answer with Counter-
Protest questioning the results in 123 clustered precincts.
The HRET dismissed the petitioner's election protest and affirmed the proclamation of protestee Monique
Yazmin Maria Q. Lagdameo as the duly elected Representative of the First Legislative District of Makati City
in the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections.
Hence, Locsin filed the present petition on the ground that public respondent HRET committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Is the HRET’s dismissal of the petitioner’s election
protest proper?
A: YES. Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the "sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members." As this Court held
in Lazatin v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal:
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred. The exercise of
the power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as "intended to be
as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature." Earlier, this grant of power to
the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm "as full, clear and complete." Under the amended 1935
Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it remained as full, clear
and complete as that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission. The same may be said
with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution.
Thus, this Court's jurisdiction to review HRET's decisions and orders is exercised only upon showing that
the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Otherwise, this
Court shall not interfere with the HRET's exercise of its discretion or jurisdiction. In the present case, we
find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent HRET when it dismissed petitioner's
election protest. (Locsin v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 204123, [March 19, 2013],
706 PHIL 590-611, as penned by J. Leonen)
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2020 Golden Notes
THE OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, petitioner, vs. DEVELYN

GESULTURA, respondent.
A.M. No. P-04-1785. EN BANC. April 2, 2013. LEONEN, J.
DOCTRINE:
Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives. Those charged with the dispensation of justice, from justices and judges to the lowliest
clerks, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Not only must their conduct at all
times be characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, it must be beyond suspicion.
FACTS:
On June 17, 2003, Paz Facun, an officer of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), informed the
Chief of Office of the Supreme Court Fiscal Management and Budget Office (FMBO), Corazon Ordoñez,
that an investigation conducted by the LBP Internal Audit Group showed discrepancies between LBP records
and FMBO records on the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) deposit account of the RTC Pasig City (the
account). FMBO accountant Rogelio Valdezco, Jr. then submitted a Reconciliation Report stating that the
account was missing P3,707,471.76 for the period of January 2001 to June 2003.
In a Memorandum titled, "Anomaly in the Deposit of Judiciary Development Fund in the Office of
the Clerk of Court of RTC-Pasig City (OCC RTC-Pasig City)," Court Management Office Judicial Staff Head
Nicandro Cruz observed that while the January 2001 to June 2003 records of the OCC RTC-Pasig City
indicated its total JDF collection and deposit to be P8,902,187.95, the amount actually deposited in the
account was P5,194,716.21.
Cruz identified Develyn Gesultura (Gesultura) as the person responsible for the discrepancy. The
person responsible for the loss was the head of the Cashier's section at the OCC, Ms. Develyn Gesultura.
Ms. Gesultura had earlier confessed her transgression to RTC Executive Judge Jose Hernandez and Clerk
of Court Grace Belvis. She executed an affidavit to that effect and has been relieved of her duties as cashier.
A Financial Audit Team at the Court Management Office submitted its final report assessing the total
undeposited collections of the OCC RTC-Pasig City for the period December 1996 to December 2003 to
be in the amount of P5,463,931.30.
On March 26, 2010, Atty. Velasco filed a complaint for malversation of public funds and falsification
of official or public documents against Gesultura before the Office of the Ombudsman.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the offense committed by Gesultura warrants dismissal from service. (YES)
RULING:
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Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from the occupant than does the
judicial office. The safekeeping of funds and collections is essential to the goal of an orderly administration
of justice. The act of misappropriating judiciary funds constitutes dishonesty and grave misconduct which are
grave offenses punishable by dismissal upon the commission of even the first offense. Time and again, we
have reminded court personnel tasked with collections of court funds, such as Clerks of Courts and cash
clerks, to deposit immediately with authorized government depositories the various funds they have collected,
because they are not authorized to keep funds in their custody.
We accept the findings of the Fiscal Management and Budget Office, the Court Management Office,
and the Office of the Court Administrator that Gesultura is liable for misappropriating collections for the
Judiciary Development Fund. We are convinced that she has committed dishonesty in the service.
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Q: Paz Facun, an officer of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), informed the Chief of Office of the
Supreme Court Fiscal Management and Budget Office (FMBO), Corazon Ordoñez, that an investigation
conducted by the LBP Internal Audit Group showed discrepancies between LBP records and FMBO
records on the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) deposit account of the RTC Pasig City (the account).
FMBO accountant Rogelio Valdezco, Jr. then submitted a Reconciliation Report stating that the account was
missing P3,707,471.76 for the period of January 2001 to June 2003.
Court Management Office Judicial Staff Head Nicandro Cruz identified Develyn Gesultura (Gesultura) as
the person responsible for the discrepancy. The person responsible for the loss was the head of the Cashier's
section at the OCC, Ms. Develyn Gesultura. Ms. Gesultura had earlier confessed her transgression to RTC
Executive Judge Jose Hernandez and Clerk of Court Grace Belvis. She executed an affidavit to that effect
and has been relieved of her duties as cashier.
Should Gesultura be dismissed from service?
A: YES. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from the occupant than does the judicial
office. The safekeeping of funds and collections is essential to the goal of an orderly administration of
justice. The act of misappropriating judiciary funds constitutes dishonesty and grave misconduct which are
grave offenses punishable by dismissal upon the commission of even the first offense. Time and again, we
have reminded court personnel tasked with collections of court funds, such as Clerks of Courts and cash
clerks, to deposit immediately with authorized government depositories the various funds they have collected,
because they are not authorized to keep funds in their custody.
We accept the findings of the Fiscal Management and Budget Office, the Court Management Office, and the
Office of the Court Administrator that Gesultura is liable for misappropriating collections for the Judiciary
Development Fund. We are convinced that she has committed dishonesty in the service. (Office of the Court
Administrator v. Gesultura, A.M. No. P-04-1785 (Resolution), [April 2, 2013], 707 PHIL 318-327, as penned
by J. Leonen)
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RE: NOMINATION OF ATTY. LYNDA CHAGUILE, IBP IFUGAO PRESIDENT, AS

REPLACEMENT FOR IBP GOVERNOR FOR NORTHERN LUZON, DENIS B. HABAWEL
A.M. No. 13-04-03-SC. EN BANC. December 10, 2013. Leonen, J.
DOCTRINE:
To be a de facto officer, all of the following elements must be present: (1) There must be a de
jure office; (2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and (3) There must be
actual physical possession of the office in good faith.
FACTS:
This case involves two (2) Administrative Matters. The first Administrative Matter (A.M. No. 13-04-
03-SC) arose from a Motion filed by Atty. Marlou Ubano, IBP Governor for Western Visayas. Atty. Ubano
sought to have this Court declare as ultra vires the portion of the March 21, 2013 Resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors, which approved the nomination of Atty. Lynda Chaguile as replacement of IBP
Governor for Northern Luzon, Denis Habawel.
In this Motion, Atty. Ubano alleged that the IBP Governor for Northern Luzon, Denis Habawel,
filed a Certificate of Candidacy to run for the position of Provincial Governor of the Province of Ifugao on
or before October 5, 2012. Atty. Ubano also alleged that Atty. Habawel nominated Atty. Lynda Chaguile,
IBP Ifugao Chapter President, as his successor to the position of IBP Governor for Northern Luzon.
Atty. Ubano challenged the IBP Board of Governor's approval of Atty. Chaguile's succession as IBP
Governor for Northern Luzon on two grounds: First, there was, as yet, no vacancy. Atty. Habawel was himself
present at the meeting where his replacement was named. There was, therefore, no need to name a
replacement. Second, the right to elect the successor of a resigned IBP Governor is vested, not in the IBP
Board of Governors, but in the delegates of the concerned region. Thus, the IBP Board of Governors'
approval of the nominee to succeed Atty. Habawel is ultra vires.
The second Administrative Matter (A.M. No. 13-05-08-SC) arose from another Motion filed by Atty.
Ubano who sought to nullify the May 22, 2013 election for IBP Executive Vice President (EVP) and restrain
Atty. Vicente Joyas from discharging the duties of IBP EVP/Acting President.
In a Resolution dated June 18, 2013, this Court consolidated the two administrative matters.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Chaguile's appointment as governor was itself ultra vires, and therefore, void ab
initio.
RULING:
NO. We hold that Atty. Chaguile took on the role of IBP Governor for Northern Luzon in a de
facto capacity. Hence, all official of Atty. Chaguile as de facto officer must be deemed valid, binding, and
effective, as though she were the officer validly appointed and qualified for the office.
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The concept of a de facto officer was explained in Civil Service Commission v. Joson, Jr., “A de
facto officer is one who is in possession of the office and discharging its duties under color of authority. By
color of authority is meant that derived from an election or appointment, however irregular or informal, so
that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer.”
The expanse of the de facto doctrine was established early in the development of our jurisprudence.
In Luna v. Rodriguez, the doctrine was established to contemplate situations:
Where the duties of the office were exercised: (a) Without a known appointment or election, but
under such circumstances of reputation or acquiescence as were calculated to induce people, without inquiry,
to submit to or invoke his action, supposing him to be the officer he assumes to be; (b) under color of a
known or valid appointment or election, where the officer has failed to conform to some precedent
requirement or condition, for example, a failure to take the oath or give a bond, or similar defect; (c) under
color of a known election or appointment, void because the officer was not eligible, or because there was
a want of power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise,
such ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown to the public; and (d) under color of an election,
or appointment, by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be such.
This coverage, affirmed and reiterated in subsequent jurisprudence, unequivocally includes officers
whose election is void because the body that elected (or otherwise designated) them lacked the capacity to
do so. This is precisely the situation in this case: The power to elect an IBP Governor is lodged in the
delegates of the concerned region, not in the IBP Board of Governors; yet the IBP Board of Governors
approved Atty. Chaguile's nomination as IBP Governor for Northern Luzon.
To be a de facto officer, all of the following elements must be present:
1) There must be a de jure office;
2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and
3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.
In the present case, there is no dispute that a de jure office — that of IBP Governor for Northern
Luzon — exists. Neither is there any dispute that Atty. Chaguile took possession of and performed the
functions of such office. In fact, the Motions submitted as part of the first Administrative Matter were precisely
intended to put a stop to her performance of these functions.
Likewise, Atty. Chaguile took possession of and performed the functions of the IBP Governor for
Northern Luzon through a process, albeit "irregular or informal, so that she is not a mere volunteer," that is,
not through her own actions but through those of the IBP Board of Governors. Thus, she did so under "color
of authority," as defined in settled jurisprudence.
All considered, the circumstances under which Atty. Chaguile's nomination was approved and under
which Atty. Chaguile subsequently assumed the role of IBP Governor for Northern Luzon are sufficient to
induce a general belief that she was properly the IBP Governor for Northern Luzon and that her actions in
this office were properly invoked. Having established that Atty. Chaguile was the IBP Governor for Northern
Luzon in a de facto capacity, we turn to the validity of her actions as a de facto officer.
To reiterate, one that is de facto is "illegitimate but in effect." Thus, it is settled that "the acts of the de
facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third
persons who are interested therein are concerned." This is necessary so as to protect the sanctity of their
dealings with those relying on their ostensible authority: "third persons cannot always investigate the right of
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one assuming to hold an important office. They have a right to assume that officials apparently qualified and
in office are legally such."
Accordingly, we hold that all official actions of Atty. Chaguile as de facto IBP Governor for Northern
Luzon must be deemed valid, binding, and effective, as though she were the officer validly appointed and
qualified for the office. It follows that her participation and vote in the election for IBP EVP held on May
22, 2013 are in order.
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Q: Atty. Marlou Ubano, IBP Governor for Western Visayas, sought to have this Court declare as ultra
vires the portion of the March 21, 2013 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, which approved the
nomination of Atty. Lynda Chaguile as replacement of IBP Governor for Northern Luzon, Denis Habawel.
Atty. Ubano alleged that the IBP Governor for Northern Luzon, Denis Habawel, filed a Certificate of
Candidacy to run for the position of Provincial Governor of the Province of Ifugao on or before October 5,
2012. Atty. Ubano also alleged that Atty. Habawel nominated Atty. Lynda Chaguile, IBP Ifugao Chapter
President, as his successor to the position of IBP Governor for Northern Luzon.
Atty. Ubano challenged the IBP Board of Governor's approval of Atty. Chaguile's succession as IBP
Governor for Northern Luzon on two grounds: First, there was, as yet, no vacancy. Atty. Habawel was himself
present at the meeting where his replacement was named. There was, therefore, no need to name a
replacement. Second, the right to elect the successor of a resigned IBP Governor is vested, not in the IBP
Board of Governors, but in the delegates of the concerned region. Thus, the IBP Board of Governors'
approval of the nominee to succeed Atty. Habawel is ultra vires.
Is Atty. Chaguile's appointment as governor ultra vires, and therefore, void ab initio?
A: NO. The concept of a de facto officer was explained in Civil Service Commission v. Joson, Jr., “A de
facto officer is one who is in possession of the office and discharging its duties under color of authority. By
color of authority is meant that derived from an election or appointment, however irregular or informal, so
that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer.”
To be a de facto officer, all of the following elements must be present:
1) There must be a de jure office;
2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and
3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.
In the present case, there is no dispute that a de jure office — that of IBP Governor for Northern Luzon —
exists. Neither is there any dispute that Atty. Chaguile took possession of and performed the functions of
such office. In fact, the Motions submitted as part of the first Administrative Matter were precisely intended
to put a stop to her performance of these functions.
Likewise, Atty. Chaguile took possession of and performed the functions of the IBP Governor for Northern
Luzon through a process, albeit "irregular or informal, so that she is not a mere volunteer," that is, not through
her own actions but through those of the IBP Board of Governors. Thus, she did so under "color of authority,"
as defined in settled jurisprudence. Having established that Atty. Chaguile was the IBP Governor for
Northern Luzon in a de facto capacity, we turn to the validity of her actions as a de facto officer.
To reiterate, one that is de facto is "illegitimate but in effect." Thus, it is settled that "the acts of the de
facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third
persons who are interested therein are concerned." This is necessary so as to protect the sanctity of their
dealings with those relying on their ostensible authority: "third persons cannot always investigate the right of
one assuming to hold an important office. They have a right to assume that officials apparently qualified and
in office are legally such."
Accordingly, we hold that all official actions of Atty. Chaguile as de facto IBP Governor for Northern Luzon
must be deemed valid, binding, and effective, as though she were the officer validly appointed and qualified
for the office. (In re Chaguile, A.M. Nos. 13-04-03-SC, 13-05-08-SC & 13-06-11-SC (Resolution), [December
10, 2013], 723 PHIL 39-89, as penned by J. Leonen)
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ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC., ALSO KNOWN

AS ARARO PARTY-LIST, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. 192803. EN BANC. December 10, 2013. Leonen, J.
DOCTRINE:
We agree with the petitioner but only to the extent that votes later on determined to be invalid due
to no cause attributable to the voter should not be excluded in the divisor. In other words, votes cast validly
for a party-list group listed in the ballot but later on disqualified should be counted as part of the divisor. To
do otherwise would be to disenfranchise the voters who voted on the basis of good faith that that ballot
contained all the qualified candidates. However, following this rationale, party-list groups listed in the ballot
but whose disqualification attained finality prior to the elections and whose disqualification was reasonably
made known by the Commission on Elections to the voters prior to such elections should not be included in
the divisor.
We qualify that the divisor to be used in interpreting the formula used in BANAT is the total votes
cast for the party-list system. This should not include the invalid votes. However, so as not to disenfranchise
a substantial portion of the electorate, total votes cast for the party-list system should mean all the votes validly
cast for all the candidates listed in the ballot. The voter relies on the ballot when making his or her choices.
Therefore, the divisor should now include all votes cast for party-list groups that are subsequently
disqualified for so long as they were presented as a choice to the electorate.
FACTS:
Petitioner, Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc., (ARARO) was a duly accredited
party-list under Republic Act No. 7941. It garnered a total of 147,204 votes in the May 10, 2010 elections
and ranked 50th. The Commission on Elections En Banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers initially
proclaimed 28 party-list organizations as winners involving a total of 35 seats guaranteed and additional
seats. The result was based on the Commission on Elections' count of 121 Certificates of Canvass or a total
of 29,750,041 votes for the Party-List System.
Petitioner then filed an election protest before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) questioning the Resolution of the Commission on Elections that proclaimed the 28 party-list groups.
Without waiting for the resolution of the HRET, the petitioner filed the present Petition for Review
on Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. The petitioner asks
that this Court, among others, modify the Commission on Elections' interpretation of the formula stated
in BANAT v. COMELEC by making the divisor for the computation of the percentage votes, from total
number of votes cast minus the votes for the disqualified party-list candidates, to the total number of votes
cast regardless whether party-list groups are disqualified.
The petitioner now argues that the votes of all the registered voters who actually voted in the May
2010 elections should be included in the computation of the divisor whether valid or invalid. According to
the petitioner, votes cast for the party-list candidates is not the same as the votes cast under or for the party-
list system. Specifically, it said that the party list system is not just for the specific party lists as provided in the
ballot, but pertains to the system of selection of the party list to be part of the House of Representatives.
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The petitioner claims that there should be no distinction in law between valid and invalid votes.
Invalid votes include those votes that were made for disqualified party-list groups, votes that were spoiled due
to improper shading, erasures in the ballots, and even those that did not vote for any party-list candidate at
all. All of the votes should be included in the divisor to determine the 2% threshold.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the valid as well as invalid votes should be included in the divisor. (NO)
RULING:
This case is moot and academic. Several supervening events have already rendered this case moot
and academic. First, the Commission on Elections En Banc already proclaimed other winning party-list
groups. Second, the term of office of the winning party-list groups in the May 2010 national elections ended
on June 30, 2013. Finally, the conduct of the May 13, 2013 elections resulted in a new set of party-list groups.
We held that the expiration of the challenged term of office renders the corresponding Petition moot
and academic. This leaves any ruling on the issues raised by the petitioner with no practical or useful value.
However, on the importance of the assailed formula, this Court will discuss the issues raised by the petitioner
as these are capable of repetition yet evading review and for the guidance of the bench, bar, and public.
In this case, the petitioner attacks the validity of the formula used and upheld in BANAT. It also
proposes its own interpretation of the formula to determine the proportional representation of party-list
candidates in the House of Representatives. However, despite any new computation, ARARO's proposed
divisor of total votes cast for the party-list system whether valid or invalid still fails to secure one seat for
ARARO. The computation proposed by petitioner ARARO even lowers its chances to meet the 2%
threshold required by law for a guaranteed seat. Thus, it has no legal standing to raise the argument in this
Court.
However, we review the interpretation of the formula used for the determination of wining party-list
candidates with respect to the divisor used for the guidance of bench and bar and for future elections.
We agree with the petitioner but only to the extent that votes later on determined to be invalid due
the divisor.
We qualify that the divisor to be used in interpreting the formula used in BANAT is the total votes
cast for the party-list system. This should not include the invalid votes. However, so as not to disenfranchise
a substantial portion of the electorate, total votes cast for the party-list system should mean all the votes validly
To the voter, the listing of candidates in the official ballot represents the extent of his or her choices
for an electoral exercise. He or she is entitled to the expectation that these names have properly been vetted
by the Commission on Elections. Therefore, he or she is also by right entitled to the expectation that his or
her choice based on the listed names in the ballot will be counted.
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In Reyes v. COMELEC as cited in Loreto v. Brion, this Court said "that the votes cast for the
disqualified candidate are presumed to have been cast in the belief that he is qualified." Therefore, the votes
cast for disqualified candidates are presumed to be made with a sincere belief that the voters' choices were
qualified candidates and that they were without any intention to misapply their franchise. Their votes may
not be treated as stray, void or meaningless for purposes of the divisor in the party-list elections.
Assuming arguendo that petitions for certiorari do not stay the execution of the judgment or final order or
resolution sought to be reviewed, the finality of the disqualification of a candidate should not be a means for
the disenfranchisement of the votes cast for the party-list system.
Therefore, the divisor should now include all votes cast for party-list groups that are subsequently
disqualified for so long as they were presented as a choice to the electorate.
If his or her vote is not counted as part of the divisor, then this would amount to a disenfranchisement
of a basic constitutional right to be able to choose representatives of the House of Representatives in two
ways. First, his or her vote will be nullified. Second, he or she will be deprived of choosing another party-list
group to represent his or her interest should the party listed in the ballot be declared disqualified.
However, there are instances when the Commission on Elections include the name of the party-list
group in the ballot but such group is disqualified with finality prior to the elections. In applying and
interpreting the provisions of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, we said in Cayat v. Commission on
Elections that votes cast in favor of a candidate "disqualified with finality" should be considered stray and not
be counted. To be consistent, the party-list group in the ballot that has been disqualified with finality and
whose final disqualification was made known to the electorate by the Commission on Elections should also
not be included in the divisor. This is to accord weight to the disqualification as well as accord respect to the
inherent right of suffrage of the voters.
Thus, the formula to determine the proportion garnered by the party-list group would now
henceforth be:
The total votes cast for the party-list system include those votes made for party-list groups indicated
in the ballot regardless of the pendency of their motions for reconsideration or petitions before any tribunal
in relation to their cancellation or disqualification cases. However, votes made for those party-list groups
whose disqualification attained finality prior to the elections should be excluded if the electorate is notified
of the finality of their disqualification by the Commission on Elections. The divisor also shall not include
invalid votes.
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Q: Petitioner, Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc., (ARARO) was a duly accredited party-
list under Republic Act No. 7941. It garnered a total of 147,204 votes in the May 10, 2010 elections and
ranked 50th. The Commission on Elections En Banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers initially
proclaimed 28 party-list organizations as winners involving a total of 35 seats guaranteed and additional
seats. The result was based on the Commission on Elections' count of 121 Certificates of Canvass or a total
of 29,750,041 votes for the Party-List System.
Petitioner then filed an election protest before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
questioning the Resolution of the Commission on Elections that proclaimed the 28 party-list groups.
The petitioner argues that the votes of all the registered voters who actually voted in the May 2010 elections
should be included in the computation of the divisor whether valid or invalid. According to the
petitioner, votes cast for the party-list candidates is not the same as the votes cast under or for the party-list
system. Specifically, it said that the party list system is not just for the specific party lists as provided in the
ballot, but pertains to the system of selection of the party list to be part of the House of Representatives.
The petitioner claims that there should be no distinction in law between valid and invalid votes. Invalid votes
include those votes that were made for disqualified party-list groups, votes that were spoiled due to improper
shading, erasures in the ballots, and even those that did not vote for any party-list candidate at all. All of the
votes should be included in the divisor to determine the 2% threshold.
Should the valid as well as invalid votes be included in the divisor?
A: NO. We agree with the petitioner but only to the extent that votes later on determined to be invalid due
the divisor.
We qualify that the divisor to be used in interpreting the formula used in BANAT is the total votes cast for
the party-list system. This should not include the invalid votes. However, so as not to disenfranchise a
substantial portion of the electorate, total votes cast for the party-list system should mean all the votes validly
Therefore, the divisor should now include all votes cast for party-list groups that are subsequently disqualified
for so long as they were presented as a choice to the electorate.
To be consistent, the party-list group in the ballot that has been disqualified with finality and whose final
disqualification was made known to the electorate by the Commission on Elections should also not be
included in the divisor. This is to accord weight to the disqualification as well as accord respect to the inherent
right of suffrage of the voters.
Thus, the formula to determine the proportion garnered by the party-list group would now henceforth be:
The total votes cast for the party-list system include those votes made for party-list groups indicated in the
ballot regardless of the pendency of their motions for reconsideration or petitions before any tribunal in
relation to their cancellation or disqualification cases. However, votes made for those party-list groups whose
disqualification attained finality prior to the elections should be excluded if the electorate is notified of the
finality of their disqualification by the Commission on Elections. The divisor also shall not include invalid
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votes. (Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192803,
[December 10, 2013], 723 PHIL 160-205, as penned by J. Leonen)
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND

HIGHWAYS (DPWH), Petitioner -versus- ORTIGAS AND COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 171496 | Third Division | March 03, 2014 | Leonen, J.
DOCTRINE: The right to compensation under Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution was put in
place to protect the individual from and restrain the State’s sovereign power of eminent domain, which is the
government’s power to condemn private properties within its territory for public use or purpose. This power
is inherent and need not be granted by law. Thus, while the government’s power to take for public purpose
is inherent, immense, and broad in scope, it is delimited by the right of an individual to be compensated. In
a nutshell, the government may take, but it must pay.
FACTS:
Respondent, Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership, is the owner of a parcel of land known as
Lot 5-B-2 in Pasig City. Upon the request of the Department of Public Works and Highways, respondent
Ortigas caused the segregation of its property into five lots and reserved one portion for road widening for
the C-5 flyover project. It designated Lot 5-B-2-A, for the road widening of Ortigas Avenue. Respondent
Ortigas also caused the annotation of the term "road widening" on its title. The title was then inscribed with
an encumbrance that it was for road widening and subject to Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or
the Property Registration Decree.
The C-5-Ortigas Avenue flyover was completed in 1999, utilizing only 396 square meters of the
1,445-square-meter allotment for the project. Consequently, respondent Ortigas further subdivided Lot 5-B-
2-A into two lots: Lot 5-B-2-A-1, which was the portion actually used for road widening, and Lot 5-B-2-A-2,
which was the unutilized portion of Lot 5-B-2-A.
On February 14, 2001, respondent Ortigas filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig a petition for
authority to sell to the government Lot 5-B-2-A-1. Respondent Ortigas alleged that the Department of Public
Works and Highways requested the conveyance of the property for road widening purposes.
Despite due notice to the public, including the Office of the Solicitor General and the Department
of Public Works and Highways, no one appeared to oppose respondent Ortigas’ petition. Respondent
Ortigas was able to establish the jurisdictional facts of the case and was allowed to present evidence ex parte.
Respondent Ortigas presented Mr. Romulo Rosete to support its allegations in its petition for
authority to sell to the government. Rosete was respondent Ortigas' liaison officer who represented
respondent Ortigas in government transactions. He alleged that respondent Ortigas was not compensated for
the use of its property, and respondent Ortigas was requested by the Department of Public Works and
Highways to convey the utilized property to the government. Hence, to facilitate the processing of its
compensation, respondent Ortigas filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court.
Finding merit in respondent Ortigas' petition, the Regional Trial Court issued an order authorizing
the sale of Lot 5-B-2-A-1 to petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an
opposition, alleging that respondent Ortigas' property can only be conveyed by way of donation to the
government, citing Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, also known as the Property Registration
Decree.
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ISSUE:
Whether the property in question is a proper subject of an expropriation proceeding. (YES)
RULING:
Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 does not apply in a case that is the proper subject of an
expropriation proceeding. Respondent Ortigas may sell its property to the government. It must be
compensated because its property was taken and utilized for public road purposes.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ reliance on Section 50 of the Property Registration Decree is
erroneous. Section 50 contemplates roads and streets in a subdivided property, not public thoroughfares built
on a private property that was taken from an owner for public purpose. A public thoroughfare is not a
subdivision road or street.
More importantly, when there is taking of private property for some public purpose, the owner of
the property taken is entitled to be compensated.
There is taking when the following elements are present:
1. The government must enter the private property;
2. The entrance into the private property must be indefinite or permanent;
3. There is color of legal authority in the entry into the property;
4. The property is devoted to public use or purpose;
5. The use of property for public use removed from the owner all beneficial enjoyment of the
property.
All of the above elements are present in this case. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ construction
of a road — a permanent structure — on respondent Ortigas’ property for the use of the general public is an
obvious permanent entry on petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ part. Given that the road was constructed
for general public use stamps it with public character, and coursing the entry through the Department of
Public Works and Highways gives it a color of legal authority.
As a result of petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ entry, respondent Ortigas may not enjoy the
property as it did before. It may not anymore use the property for whatever legal purpose it may desire.
Neither may it occupy, sell, lease, and receive its proceeds. It cannot anymore prevent other persons from
entering or using the property. In other words, respondent Ortigas was effectively deprived of all the bundle
of rights attached to ownership of property.
In this case, the lot was reserved for road widening at the instance of petitioner Republic of the
Philippines. While the lot segregated for road widening used to be part of the subdivided lots, the intention
to separate it from the delineated subdivision streets was obvious from the fact that it was located at the fringes
of the original lot — exactly at petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ intended location for the road widening
project. Moreover, petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ intention to take the property for public use was
obvious from the completion of the road widening for the C-5 flyover project and from the fact that the
general public was already taking advantage of the thoroughfare.
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Further, since the Constitution proscribes taking of private property without just compensation, any
taking must entail a corresponding appropriation for that purpose. Public funds, however, may only be
appropriated for public purpose. Employment of public funds to benefit a private individual constitutes
malversation. Therefore, private subdivision streets not taken for public use may only be donated to the
government. In contrast, when the road or street was delineated upon government request and taken for
public use, as in this case, the government has no choice but to compensate the owner for his or her sacrifice,
lest it violates the constitutional provision against taking without just compensation, thus:
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
As with all laws, Section 50 of the Property Registration Decree cannot be interpreted to mean a
license on the part of the government to disregard constitutionally guaranteed rights.
The right to compensation under Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution was put in place to protect
the individual from and restrain the State’s sovereign power of eminent domain, which is the government’s
power to condemn private properties within its territory for public use or purpose. This power is inherent
and need not be granted by law. Thus, while the government’s power to take for public purpose is inherent,
immense, and broad in scope, it is delimited by the right of an individual to be compensated. In a nutshell,
the government may take, but it must pay.
Title to the subject lot remains under respondent Ortigas’ name. The government is already in
possession of the property but is yet to acquire title to it. To legitimize such possession, petitioner Republic
of the Philippines must acquire the property from respondent Ortigas by instituting expropriation
proceedings or through negotiated sale, which has already been recognized in law as a mode of government
acquisition of private property for public purpose.
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Q: Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership, is the owner of a parcel of land known as Lot 5-B-2 in Pasig
City. Upon the request of the Department of Public Works and Highways, respondent Ortigas caused the
segregation of its property into five lots and reserved one portion for road widening for the C-5 flyover project.
It designated Lot 5-B-2-A, for the road widening of Ortigas Avenue.
The C-5-Ortigas Avenue flyover was completed. Ortigas filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig a petition
for authority to sell to the government Lot 5-B-2-A-1. Respondent Ortigas alleged that the Department of
Public Works and Highways requested the conveyance of the property for road widening purposes it was
further alleged that no compensation was given to Ortigas for the use of its land.
Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition, alleging that respondent Ortigas' property can only be
conveyed by way of donation to the government, citing Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, also
known as the Property Registration Decree. Is the argument of the Republic correct?
A: NO. The Republic’s argument is not correct. When there is taking of private property for some public
purpose, the owner of the property taken is entitled to be compensated. The right to compensation under
Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution was put in place to protect the individual from and restrain the State’s
sovereign power of eminent domain, which is the government’s power to condemn private properties within
its territory for public use or purpose. Thus, while the government’s power to take for public purpose is
inherent, immense, and broad in scope, it is delimited by the right of an individual to be compensated. In a
nutshell, the government may take, but it must pay. The government is already in possession of the property
but is yet to acquire title to it. To legitimize such possession, petitioner Republic of the Philippines must
acquire the property from respondent Ortigas by instituting expropriation proceedings or through negotiated
sale, which has already been recognized in law as a mode of government acquisition of private property for
public purpose.
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CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, represented by its Mayor, HON. DARLENE MAGNOLIA R.

ANTONINO-CUSTODIO, Petitioner - versus - COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent
G.R. No. 199439 | EN BANC | September 11, 2009 | LEONEN, J.
In order to be able to deliver more effective and efficient services, the law allows local government
units the power to reorganize. In doing so, they should be given leeway to entice their employees to avail of
severance benefits that the local government can afford. However, local government units may not provide
such when it amounts to a supplementary retirement benefit scheme.
FACTS:
Then mayor of General Santos City, Pedro B. Acharon, Jr., issued Executive Order No. 40, series of 2008,
creating management teams pursuant to its organization development program. It was patterned after
Executive Order No. 366 dated October 4, 2004 entitled Directing a Strategic Review of the Operations and
Organizations of the Executive Branch and Providing Options and Incentives for Government Employees
who may be Affected by the Rationalization of the Functions and Agencies of the Executive Branch and its
implementing rules and regulations. The mayor declared the city’s byword of "Total Quality Service" in his
state of the city address in 2005. This was followed by the conduct of a process and practice review for each
department, section, and unit of the local government. The product was an organization development
masterplan adopted as Executive Order No. 13, series of 2009.
This was followed by Resolution No. 004, series of 2009, requesting for the mayor’s support for GenSan
SERVES, an early retirement program to be proposed to the Sangguniang Panlungsod. The ordinance, as
amended, provides that qualified employees below sixty (60) years of age but not less than fifty (50) years and
sickly employees below fifty (50) years of age but not less than forty (40) years may avail of the incentives
under the program.7 In other words, the ordinance "provides for separation benefits for sickly employees
who have not yet reached retirement age."
Consequently, Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was passed together with its implementing rules and
regulations, designed "to entice those employees who were unproductive due to health reasons to avail of the
incentives being offered therein by way of early retirement package.” The passing of Ordinance No. 08, series
of 2009, was not contested by respondent Commission on Audit.
Laraño v. Commission on Audit ruled that an early retirement program should be by virtue of a valid
reorganization pursuant to law in order to be valid. It opined that since Ordinance No. 08 is in the nature of
an ERP [Early Retirement Program] of the City Government of General Santos, a law authorizing the same
is a requisite for its validity. In the absence, however, of such law, the nullity of Ordinance No. 08 becomes
a necessary consequence. respondent Commission on Audit observed that GenSan SERVES was not based
on a law passed by Congress but on ordinances and resolutions passed and approved by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod and Executive Orders by the city mayor.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion when it considered Ordinance No. 08, Series of
2009, in the nature of an early retirement program requiring a law authorizing for its validity?
RULING:
YES. Local autonomy also grants local governments the power to streamline and reorganize. This
power is inferred from Section 76 of the Local Government Code on organizational structure and staffing
pattern, and Section 16 otherwise known as the general welfare clause. Designing and implementing a local
government unit’s own "organizational structure and staffing pattern" also implies the power to revise and
reorganize. Without such power, local governments will lose the ability to adjust to the needs of its
constituents. Effective and efficient governmental services especially at the local government level require
rational and deliberate changes planned and executed in good faith from time to time.
The constitutional mandate for local autonomy supports petitioner city’s issuance of Executive Order
No. 40, series of 2008, creating change management teams as an initial step for its organization development
masterplan.
Thus, consistent with the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution, under
Section 25, Article II and Section 2, Article X, and the Local Government Code of 1991, the Court declares
that the grant and release of the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits given to petitioner’s officials
and employees were validly enacted through an ordinance passed by petitioner’s Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
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Q: Then mayor of General Santos City, Pedro B. Acharon, Jr., issued Executive Order No. 40, series of
2008, creating management teams pursuant to its organization development program. It was patterned after
Executive Order No. 366 dated October 4, 2004 entitled Directing a Strategic Review of the Operations and
Organizations of the Executive Branch and Providing Options and Incentives for Government Employees
who may be Affected by the Rationalization of the Functions and Agencies of the Executive Branch and its
implementing rules and regulations. Consequently, Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was passed together
with its implementing rules and regulations, designed "to entice those employees who were unproductive due
to health reasons to avail of the incentives being offered therein by way of early retirement package.” The
passing of Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was not contested by respondent Commission on Audit.
Jurisprudence stated that an early retirement program should be by virtue of a valid reorganization pursuant
to law in order to be valid. It opined that since Ordinance No. 08 is in the nature of an ERP [Early Retirement
Program] of the City Government of General Santos, a law authorizing the same is a requisite for its validity.
In the absence, however, of such law, the nullity of Ordinance No. 08 becomes a necessary consequence.
Respondent Commission on Audit observed that GenSan SERVES was not based on a law passed by
Congress but on ordinances and resolutions passed and approved by the Sangguniang Panlungsod and
Executive Orders by the city mayor. Did COA commit grave abuse of discretion when it considered
Ordinance No. 08, Series of 2009, in the nature of an early retirement program requiring a law authorizing
for its validity?
A: YES. Local autonomy also grants local governments the power to streamline and reorganize. This power
is inferred from Section 76 of the Local Government Code on organizational structure and staffing pattern,
and Section 16 otherwise known as the general welfare clause. Designing and implementing a local
government unit’s own "organizational structure and staffing pattern" also implies the power to revise and
reorganize. Without such power, local governments will lose the ability to adjust to the needs of its
constituents. Effective and efficient governmental services especially at the local government level require
rational and deliberate changes planned and executed in good faith from time to time.
Thus, consistent with the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution, under
Section 25, Article II and Section 2, Article X, and the Local Government Code of 1991, the Court declares
that the grant and release of the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits given to petitioner’s officials
and employees were validly enacted through an ordinance passed by petitioner’s Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent-Appellee- versus - VICTOR COGAED y

ROMANA, Accused-Appellant
G.R. No. 200334 | THIRD DIVISION | July 30, 2014 | LEONEN, J.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
FACTS:
At about 6:00 a.m. of November 25, 2005, Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan received a text
message from an unidentified civilian informer that one Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin Bugat) would
be transporting marijuana from Barangay LunOy, San Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion of San Gabriel,
La Union. The police officer organized checkpoints and ordered SPO1 Taracatac to set up a checkpoint in
the waiting area of passengers from San Gabriel bound for San Fernando. A passenger jeepney from Barangay
Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatac’s checkpoint. The jeepney driver disembarked and signalled to SPO1
Taracatac indicating the two male passengers who were carrying marijuana. SPO1 Taracatac approached the
two male passengers who were later identified as Victor Romana Cogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao. Cogaed
was carrying a blue bag and a sack while Dayao was holding a yellow bag.
SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags. Cogaed and Dayao told
SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since they were transporting the bags as a favor for their barriomate
named Marvin. After this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks of what looked like
marijuana. They were later brought to the police station where the Chief of Police and Investigator PO3
Stanley Campit requested Cogaed and Dayao to empty their bags. Inside Cogaed’s sack was "four (4) rolled
pieces of suspected marijuana fruiting tops," and inside Dayao’s yellow bag was a brick of suspected marijuana.
The said drugs were then taken by the police for testing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid seizure of marijuana against the appellant, and whether it should
be admitted as evidence?
RULING:
NO. As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets all the requirements of this
provision are reasonable. This warrant requires the existence of probable cause that can only be determined
by a judge. The existence of probable cause must be established by the judge after asking searching questions
and answers. However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless. One of
these jurisprudential exceptions to search warrants is "stop and frisk". "Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes
referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the
legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to
protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
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Cogaed was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboard a jeepney. There was nothing
suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion was
not made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver who signalled to the police that
Cogaed was "suspicious." It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable
degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person.
This is necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and reasonably searched. Anything less than
this would be an infringement upon one’s basic right to security of one’s person and effects.
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Q: Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan received a text message from an unidentified civilian informer
that one Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin Bugat) would be transporting marijuana from Barangay LunOy,
San Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union. The police officer organized checkpoints.
A passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at the checkpoint where two male passengers were
caught carrying marijuana. The two male passengers who were later identified as Victor Romana Cogaed and
Santiago Sacpa Dayao. Cogaed were carrying a blue bag and a sack while Dayao was holding a yellow bag.
Cogaed and Dayao told the police that they did not know about the drugs since they were transporting the
bags as a favor for their barriomate named Marvin. After this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag,
revealing three bricks of what looked like marijuana. They were later brought to the police station where the
Chief of Police and Investigator PO3 Stanley Campit requested Cogaed and Dayao to empty their bags.
Inside Cogaed’s sack was "four (4) rolled pieces of suspected marijuana fruiting tops," and inside Dayao’s
yellow bag was a brick of suspected marijuana. The said drugs were then taken by the police for testing. Was
there a valid seizure of marijuana against the appellant, and should it be admitted as evidence?
A: NO. As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets all the requirements of this provision
are reasonable. This warrant requires the existence of probable cause that can only be determined by a judge.
The existence of probable cause must be established by the judge after asking searching questions and
answers. However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless. One of these
jurisprudential exceptions to search warrants is "stop and frisk". "Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred
to as Terry searches) are necessary for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal
arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect
the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
Cogaed was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboard a jeepney. There was nothing suspicious,
moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion was not made by
the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver who signalled to the police that Cogaed was
"suspicious." It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of
suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. This is
necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and reasonably searched. Anything less than this
would be an infringement upon one’s basic right to security of one’s person and effects.
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SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., Petitioner -versus- JOY C.

CABILES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 170139 | En Banc | August 05, 2014 | Leonen, J.
DOCTRINE: When a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution,
the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision. A
law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have
so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.
FACTS:
Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency.
Responding to an ad it published, respondent, Joy C. Cabiles, submitted her application for a quality control
job in Taiwan. Joy’s application was accepted. Joy was later asked to sign a one-year employment contract for
a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00.
Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She alleged that
in her employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked to
work as a cutter.
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from
Wacoal informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and that "she should immediately report
to their office to get her salary and passport." She was asked to "prepare for immediate repatriation."
Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of
NT$9,000. According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.
Joy filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission against petitioner and Wacoal.
She claimed that she was illegally dismissed. She asked for the return of her placement fee, the withheld
amount for repatriation costs, payment of her salary for 23 months as well as moral and exemplary damages.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed Joy’s complaint. Acting Executive Labor Arbiter Pedro C.Ramos ruled
that her complaint was based on mere allegations. Joy appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission.
The National Labor Relations Commission declared that Joy was illegally dismissed. The National
Labor Relations Commission awarded respondent only three (3) months worth of salary in the amount of
NT$46,080, the reimbursement of the NT$3,000 withheld from her, and attorney’s fees of NT$300.
Aggrieved by the ruling, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency caused the filing of a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission with respect to the finding of illegal dismissal, Joy’s entitlement to the equivalent of
three months worth of salary, reimbursement of withheld repatriation expense, and attorney’s fees.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in awarding the Respondent only the amount equivalent
to three months’ worth of her salary. (NO)
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RULING:
Respondent Joy Cabiles, having been illegally dismissed, is entitled to her salary for the unexpired
portion of the employment contract that was violated together with attorney’s fees and reimbursement of
amounts withheld from her salary.
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042,otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995, states that overseas workers who were terminated without just, valid, or authorized
cause "shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve (12%) per annum,
plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year
of the unexpired term, whichever is less."
The Court of Appeals affirmed the National Labor Relations Commission’s decision to award
respondent NT$46,080.00 or the three-month equivalent of her salary, attorney’s fees of NT$300.00, and
the reimbursement of the withheld NT$3,000.00 salary, which answered for her repatriation.We uphold the
finding that respondent is entitled to all of these awards. The award of the three-month equivalent of
respondent’s salary should, however, be increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired term of the
employment contract.
In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., this court ruled that
the clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" is unconstitutional
for violating the equal protection clause and substantive due process. A statute or provision which was
declared unconstitutional is not a law. It "confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all."
We are aware that the clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever
is less" was reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010.
Republic Act No. 10022 was promulgated on March 8, 2010. This means that the reinstatement of
the clause in Republic Act No. 8042 was not yet in effect at the time of respondent’s termination from work
in 1997. Republic Act No. 8042 before it was amended byRepublic Act No. 10022 governs this case.
In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the government may
exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the existence of any law
that supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws must be read in
light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is a nullity.
Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution, the
nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision. A law
or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have so
changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.
We are not convinced by the pleadings submitted by the parties that the situation has so changed so
as to cause us to reverse binding precedent.
We reiterate our finding in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime that limiting wages that should be recovered
by an illegally dismissed overseas worker to three months is both a violation of due process and the equal
protection clauses of the Constitution.
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Q: Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997, with the intervention
of Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, a recruitment and placement agency. She alleged that in her
employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked to work
as a cutter. However, on July 14, 1997, Joy was informed that her employment is terminated and that she will
be repatriated immediately.
Joy filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission against petitioner and Wacoal. The
Labor Arbiter dismissed Joy’s complaint. Joy appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission. The
National Labor Relations Commission declared that Joy was illegally dismissed. The National Labor
Relations Commission awarded respondent only three (3) months worth of salary, this award was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. The award was based on Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 which was previously
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. However the same section was reinstated in Republic Act
No. 10022. Is the award of the amount equivalent only to Joy’s 3-months’ worth of salary correct?
A: NO. The award is not correct. When a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the
Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or
provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless
circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.
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THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner - versus - LEOVIGILDO DELOS

REYES, JR., Respondent
G.R. No. 208976 | SECOND DIVISION | October 13, 2014 | LEONEN, J.
In administrative cases, it is sufficient that "there is reasonable ground to believe that the petitioner is
guilty of the act or omission complained of, even if the evidence might not be overwhelming.
FACTS:
To generate more funds in line with its mandate, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO)
maintains On-line Lottery Terminals in its main office and in provincial district offices. The Marketing and
On-line Division of PCSO’s Central Operations Department (COD) manages the terminals in the main office
under Agency Number 14-5005-1. Respondent Leovigildo Delos Reyes, Jr. served as the COD Division
Chief. PCSO auditors later submitted a consolidated report based on a surprise audit conducted on June 5,
2001. The auditors found that the cash and cash items under Delos Reyes’ control were in order. However,
the auditors recommended that the lotto proceeds be deposited in a bank the next working day instead of
Delos Reyes keeping the lotto sales and proceeds in a safe inside his office. COD Manager Josefina Lao
instructed OIC Division Chief of the Liaison and Accounts Management Division Teresa Nucup to conduct
an account validation and verification to reconcile accounts due to substantial outstanding balances. Nucup
found that there was a deliberate delay in the submission of the periodic sales report; that the partial
remittance of total sales were made to cover previous collections; and that the unremitted collections were
attributed to Cesar Lara, Cynthia Roldan, Catalino Alexandre Galang, Jr., who were all employed by PCSO
as Lottery Operations Assistants II, and Elizabeth Driz, the Assistant Division Chief.
After conducting its own investigation, the PCSO Legal Department recommended filing formal
charges against Delos Reyes and Elizabeth Driz for dishonesty and gross neglect of duty. The PCSO Legal
Department found that the Lottery Operations Assistants turned over the lotto proceeds and lotto ticket sales
reports to Delos Reyes as the Division Chief. In case of his absence, the proceeds and reports were turned
over to Driz. Driz would then deposit the proceeds in the bank. If both Delos Reyes and Driz were absent,
the proceeds would be placed in the vault under Delos Reyes’ control and deposited the next banking day.
PCSO filed an affidavit-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. Delos Reyes and Driz were criminally
charged with malversation of public funds or property under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, and
administratively charged with dishonesty and gross neglect of duty under Section 46(b)(1) and (3) of Book V
of Executive Order No. 292. CA held that the Office of the Ombudsman failed to prove Delos Reyes’ guilt
with substantial evidence, and the ruling must be overturned, and also found that it was Driz who had the
specific duty to prepare and consolidate the sales reports and to remit the proceeds to the bank.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Office of the Ombudsman committed
gross misapprehension of facts in finding that substantial evidence exists for the administrative charge of grave
misconduct and gross neglect of duty?
RULING:
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YES. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Office of the Ombudsman committed gross
misapprehension of facts despite lack of proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the
Ombudsman. There was substantial evidence to justify the finding of gross misconduct and gross neglect of
duty. Misappreciation of facts or evidence is not equivalent to a finding of grave abuse of discretion.
Moreover, citing Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, petitioner argued that "findings of fact of the
Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence." In administrative cases, it is sufficient
that "there is reasonable ground to believe that the petitioner is guilty of the act or omission complained of,
even if the evidence might not be overwhelming.
In this case, the Court finds respondent guilty of both grave misconduct and gross neglect of duty.
There is substantial evidence supporting the Office of the Ombudsman’s finding that respondent intentionally
failed to act on his duty with a conscious indifference to the consequences. The alleged lack of specific internal
control procedures does not sway the court. It is undisputed that as Chief of the Marketing and On-Line
Division of the COD, respondent was accountable for the vault and the lotto proceeds placed inside it. As
the Division Chief, respondent had the duty to monitor, check, and reconcile the reports of the daily lotto
proceeds. It is true that it was not his job to personally deposit the lotto proceeds with the bank, as this fell
under Driz’s responsibility. However, it was incumbent upon respondent to ensure that the lotto proceeds
deposited in the bank correspond to the reports submitted to him and that the proceeds are deposited
promptly. Despite such duty, respondent willfully ignored the auditor’s recommendations for prompt deposit
of the lotto sales proceeds. He disregarded his duty of overseeing the deposit of the proceeds and wholly
relied on Driz’s representations. Respondent’s act constitutes gross neglect of duty.
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Q: To generate more funds in line with its mandate, PCSO maintains On-line Lottery Terminals in its main
office and in provincial district offices. The Marketing and On-line Division of PCSO’s Central Operations
Department (COD) manages the terminals in the main office under Agency Number 14-5005-1. Respondent
Leovigildo Delos Reyes, Jr. served as the COD Division Chief. PCSO auditors later submitted a consolidated
report based on a surprise audit where they found that the cash and cash items under Delos Reyes’ control
were in order. COD Manager Josefina Lao instructed OIC Division Chief of the Liaison and Accounts
Management Division Teresa Nucup to conduct an account validation and verification to reconcile accounts
due to substantial outstanding balances. Nucup found that there was a deliberate delay in the submission of
the periodic sales report; that the partial remittance of total sales were made to cover previous collections;
and that the unremitted collections were attributed to some employees of PCSO.
After conducting its own investigation, the PCSO Legal Department recommended filing formal charges
against Delos Reyes and Elizabeth Driz for dishonesty and gross neglect of duty. The PCSO Legal
Department found that the Lottery Operations Assistants turned over the lotto proceeds and lotto ticket sales
reports to Delos Reyes as the Division Chief. In case of his absence, the proceeds and reports were turned
over to Driz. Driz would then deposit the proceeds in the bank. If both Delos Reyes and Driz were absent,
the proceeds would be placed in the vault under Delos Reyes’ control and deposited the next banking day.
PCSO filed an affidavit-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. Delos Reyes and Driz were criminally
charged with malversation of public funds or property under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, and
administratively charged with dishonesty and gross neglect of duty under Section 46(b)(1) and (3) of Book V
of Executive Order No. 292. CA held that the Office of the Ombudsman failed to prove Delos Reyes’ guilt
with substantial evidence, and the ruling must be overturned, and also found that it was Driz who had the
specific duty to prepare and consolidate the sales reports and to remit the proceeds to the bank. Did the
Court of Appeals err in holding that the Office of the Ombudsman committed gross misapprehension of
facts in finding that substantial evidence exists for the administrative charge of grave misconduct and gross
neglect of duty?
A: YES. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Office of the Ombudsman committed gross
misapprehension of facts despite lack of proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the
Ombudsman. There was substantial evidence to justify the finding of gross misconduct and gross neglect of
duty. Misappreciation of facts or evidence is not equivalent to a finding of grave abuse of discretion.
In this case, the Court finds respondent guilty of both grave misconduct and gross neglect of duty. There is
substantial evidence supporting the Office of the Ombudsman’s finding that respondent intentionally failed
to act on his duty with a conscious indifference to the consequences. The alleged lack of specific internal
control procedures does not sway the court. It is undisputed that as Chief of the Marketing and On-Line
Division of the COD, respondent was accountable for the vault and the lotto proceeds placed inside it. As
the Division Chief, respondent had the duty to monitor, check, and reconcile the reports of the daily lotto
proceeds. It is true that it was not his job to personally deposit the lotto proceeds with the bank, as this fell
under Driz’s responsibility. However, it was incumbent upon respondent to ensure that the lotto proceeds
deposited in the bank correspond to the reports submitted to him and that the proceeds are deposited
promptly. Despite such duty, respondent willfully ignored the auditor’s recommendations for prompt deposit
of the lotto sales proceeds. He disregarded his duty of overseeing the deposit of the proceeds and wholly
relied on Driz’s representations. Respondent’s act constitutes gross neglect of duty.
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ATTY. ANACLETO B. BUENA, JR., MNSA, in his capacity as Regional Director of Regional Office No.
XVI, Civil Service Commission, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Cotabato City, Petitioner -
versus – DR. SANGCAD D. BENITO, Respondent
G.R. No. 181760| EN BANC | October 14, 2014 | LEONEN, J.
The Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao has the power to appoint
officers in the region's civil service. However, if there is no regional law providing for the qualifications for
the position at the time of appointment, the appointee must satisfy the civil service eligibilities required for
the position in the national government to be appointed in a permanent capacity.
FACTS:
Dr. Parouk S. Hussin, then Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
appointed Dr. Sangcad D. Benito as Assistant Schools Division Superintendent of the Department of
Education, Division of Lanao del Sur-I, in a temporary capacity. Regional Governor Hussin later reappointed
Dr. Benito as Assistant Schools Division Superintendent, this time in a permanent capacity. To change the
status of Dr. Benito’s appointment from temporary to permanent, Regional Governor Hussin requested the
Civil Service Commission Regional Office for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao to attest to Dr.
Benito’s permanent appointment. However, the Regional Office, through Regional Director Anacleto B.
Buena, Jr. returned the appointment to the Regional Governor. According to the Regional Office, Dr. Benito
did not possess the career executive service eligibility required for the position of Assistant Schools Division
Superintendent.
Dr. Benito filed a petition for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court to compel the Regional
Office to attest to his permanent appointment and claimed that it was the Regional Office’s ministerial duty
to attest to his appointment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent requires career executive service
eligibility?
RULING:
YES. Under the civil service law, positions in the Career Executive Service are: "Undersecretary,
Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional
Director, Chief of Department Service, and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the
Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President."
In the exercise of its legal mandate, the Career Executive Service Board issued Resolution No. 945
dated June 14, 2011, where it set the following criteria to determine whether a position belongs to the Career
Executive Service:
1. The position is career;
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2. The position is above division chief; and
3. The position entails performance of executive and managerial functions.
Aside from satisfying the criteria set by the Career Executive Service Board, the holder of the position
must also be a presidential appointee. Applying these principles in this case, the Court rules that the position
of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent belongs to the Career Executive Service.
The position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent is a career position. Appointment to the
position is based on merit and fitness and gives the appointee an opportunity for advancement to higher
career positions, such as Schools Division Superintendent. If permanently appointed, the appointee is
guaranteed security of tenure.
Permanent appointment to positions in the Career Executive Service presupposes that the appointee
has passed the Career Executive Service examinations. In this case, respondent Dr. Benito does not possess
the required career executive service eligibility. He, therefore, cannot be appointed to the position of Assistant
Schools Division Superintendent in a permanent capacity. The Civil Service Commission cannot be
compelled to attest to the permanent appointment of respondent Dr. Benito.
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Q: Dr. Parouk S. Hussin, then Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
appointed Dr. Sangcad D. Benito as Assistant Schools Division Superintendent of the Department of
Education, Division of Lanao del Sur-I, in a temporary capacity. Hussin later reappointed Dr. Benito as
Assistant Schools Division Superintendent, this time in a permanent capacity. To change the status of Dr.
Benito’s appointment from temporary to permanent, Hussin requested the Civil Service Commission
Regional Office for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao to attest to Dr. Benito’s permanent
appointment. However, the Regional Office, through Regional Director Anacleto B. Buena, Jr. returned the
appointment to the Regional Governor. According to the Regional Office, Dr. Benito did not possess the
career executive service eligibility required for the position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent.
Dr. Benito filed a petition for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court to compel the Regional Office to
attest to his permanent appointment and claimed that it was the Regional Office’s ministerial duty to attest to
his appointment. Does the position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent require career executive
service eligibility?
A: YES. Under the civil service law, positions in the Career Executive Service are: "Undersecretary, Assistant
Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief
of Department Service, and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive
Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President." The position of Assistant Schools Division
Superintendent is a career position. Appointment to the position is based on merit and fitness and gives the
appointee an opportunity for advancement to higher career positions, such as Schools Division
Superintendent. If permanently appointed, the appointee is guaranteed security of tenure.
Permanent appointment to positions in the Career Executive Service presupposes that the appointee has
passed the Career Executive Service examinations. In this case, respondent Dr. Benito does not possess the
required career executive service eligibility. He, therefore, cannot be appointed to the position of Assistant
Schools Division Superintendent in a permanent capacity. The Civil Service Commission cannot be
compelled to attest to the permanent appointment of respondent Dr. Benito.
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REMIGIO D. ESPIRITU and NOEL AGUSTIN, Petitioners –versus- LUTGARDA TORRES DEL
ROSARIO represented by SYLVIA R. ASPERILLA, Respondents
G.R. No. 204964 | SECOND DIVISION | October 15, 2014| LEONEN, J.
The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real
opportunity to be heard. In administrative proceedings, such as in the case at bar, procedural due process
simply means the opportunity to explain one's side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of. "To be heard" does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also
thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded,
there is no denial of procedural due process.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include the following:
(1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's
legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses
and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and
so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as
impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for
consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.
FACTS:
The City Council of Angeles City, Pampanga, enacted Zoning Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1978,
classifying areas in Barangay Margot and Barangay Sapang Bato, Angeles City, as agricultural land.
Respondent, Lutgarda Torres del Rosario (del Rosario) allegedly requested the City Zoning
Administrator to exempt from the zoning classification Lot Nos. 854 and 855 located in Barangay Margot
and Barangay Sapang Bato, Angeles City.
On June 10, 1988, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (Republic Act No. 6657) was enacted.
Del Rosario, through her representative Sylvia R. Asperilla (Asperilla), filed an application for
exemption with the Department of Agrarian Reform, seeking to exempt Lot Nos. 854 and 855 from the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage.
On February 19, 2004, then Secretary of Agrarian Reform Roberto M. Pagdanganan (Secretary
Pagdanganan) issued an order granting the application for exemption.
However, farmers in del Rosario's landholdings, led by Remigio Espiritu (Espiritu), filed a motion
for reconsideration of the order. They argued that under Zoning Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1978, Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board Resolution No. 705, Series of 2001, and Angeles City Council Resolution
No. 3300, Series of 2001, the landholdings were classified as agricultural, not industrial. Secretary
Pangandaman issued an order granting the motion for reconsideration and revoking the earlier order.
Del Rosario contended that this order was sent to her through Clarita Montgomery in Barangay
Margot, Sapang Bato, Angeles City, and not at Asperilla's address in Cubao, Quezon City, which was her
address on record. She then filed her motion for reconsideration of the order. Secretary Pangandaman found
that the certifications issued by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board classified the landholdings as
agricultural before June 15, 1988. Del Rosario filed a notice of appeal before the Office of the President.
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The Office of the President, through then Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Manuel B. Gaite
(Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite), rendered the decision dismissing the appeal for lack of merit.
Del Rosario filed a motion for extension of 10 days to file her motion for reconsideration but the
Office of the President, through then Deputy Executive Secretary Natividad G. Dizon, denied the motion.
When raised to the Court of Appeals, the petition was granted and stated that del Rosario was indeed
prevented from participating in the proceedings that led to the issuance of Secretary Pangandaman's order
when the notices were sent to her other address on record.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not del Rosario was denied due process when the order of Secretary Pangandaman was
"erroneously sent to another address"
2. Whether or not the decision of then Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite was valid since he had been
appointed to the Securities and Exchange Commission two months prior to the rendering of the
decision.
RULING:
1. NO. Del Rosario was not deprived of due process. While it may be true that respondent was
prevented from filing a timely motion for reconsideration of Secretary Pangandaman's order, it would be
erroneous to conclude that she had been completely denied her opportunity to be heard.
It was held in the case of Department of Agrarian Reform v. Samson that in administrative
proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's side suffices to meet the requirements of due
process. In Casimiro v. Tandog, the Court held that in administrative proceedings, procedural due process
has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of
proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with
the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a
tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively
a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported
by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made
known to the parties affected.
The denial of del Rosario’s motion was on the basis of the merits of her arguments and any other
evidence she was able to present. She was given a fair and reasonable opportunity to present her side; hence,
there was no deprivation of due process. She was able to actively participate not only in the proceedings
before the Department of Agrarian Reform, but also on appeal to the Office of the President and the Court
of Appeals.
2. YES. Deputy Secretary Gaite’s decision is presumed valid, effective, and binding.
Assuming that Gaite's appointment became effective on March 16, 2009, he can be considered a de
facto officer at the time he rendered the decision dated May 7, 2009. A de facto officer is one who derives
his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and
whose appointment is valid on its face. The acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as
those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned.
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Being a public officer, Gaite’s acts also enjoy the presumption of regularity. The presumption of
regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
duty. The presumption however prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence
to the contrary.
Del Rosario has not presented evidence showing that the decision was rendered ultra vires, other
than her allegation that Gaite had already been appointed to another office. Unless there is clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary, the decision dated May 7, 2009 is conclusively presumed to have been
rendered in the regular course of business.
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Q: Del Rosario, through her representative Asperilla, filed an application for exemption with the Department
of Agrarian Reform, seeking to exempt Lot Nos. 854 and 855 from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) coverage. Secretary of Agrarian Reform Roberto M. Pagdanganan (Secretary Pagdanganan)
issued an order granting the application for exemption but it later on issued another order revoking it.
The order revoking the grant earlier given to Del Rosario was not sent to Asperilla's address in Cubao,
Quezon City, which was her address on record. Del Rosario alleged that she only came to know of the order
when the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer of Pampanga handed her a copy of the order. She then filed
her motion for reconsideration of the order. Acting on del Rosario's motion for reconsideration, Secretary
Pangandaman found that the certifications issued by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board classified
the landholdings as agricultural before June 15, 1988. Based on the ocular inspections conducted by the
Center for Land Use Policy, Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI), the land remained agricultural and
was planted with sugar cane and corn. Accordingly, Secretary Pangandaman denied del Rosario's motion in
the order . Del Rosario filed a notice of appeal before the Office of the President (OP). Through then
Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Manuel B. Gaite, the OP rendered the decision dismissing the
appeal for lack of merit.
Was del Rosario denied due process when the order of Secretary Pangandaman was "erroneously sent to
another address”?
A: NO. The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real
opportunity to be heard. In administrative proceedings, such as in the case at bar, procedural due process
simply means the opportunity to explain one's side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of. "To be heard" does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also
thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded,
there is no denial of procedural due process.
When del Rosario filed her motion for reconsideration assailing Secretary Pangandaman's order, she was
able to completely and exhaustively present her arguments. The denial of her motion was on the basis of the
merits of her arguments and any other evidence she was able to present. She was given a fair and reasonable
opportunity to present her side; hence, there was no deprivation of due process.
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THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, represented by the MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA
and the BISHOP HIMSELF in his personal capacity, Petitioners –versus- COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and the ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V.
MAJARUCON, Respondents
G.R. No. 205728 | EN BANC | January 21, 2015| LEONEN, J.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred
position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such
priority „gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusion.
There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to
justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the right
of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not
affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.
FACTS:
The petitioners, The Diocese of Bacolod (The Diocese) posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6')
by ten feet (10') in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first
tarpaulin contains the message "IBASURA RH Law" referring to the Reproductive Health Law of
2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case.
This tarpaulin contains the heading "Conscience Vote" and lists candidates as either "(Anti-RH) Team
Buhay" with a check mark, or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay" with an "X" mark. The electoral candidates were
classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH
Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising "Team Patay,"
while those who voted against it form "Team Buhay".
Respondents, Commission on Elections (COMELEC) conceded that the tarpaulin was neither
sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names of
candidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were
not candidates for that election.
Respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon (Atty. Majarucon), in her capacity as Election Officer of
Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop
Vicente M. Navarra. The election officer ordered the tarpaulin's removal within three (3) days from receipt
for being oversized. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for the size requirement of two feet (2') by
three feet (3').
Petitioners replied requesting, among others, that (1) petitioner Bishop be given a definite ruling by
COMELEC Law Department regarding the tarpaulin; and (2) pending this opinion and the availment of legal
remedies, the tarpaulin be allowed to remain.
COMELEC Law Department issued a letter ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin;
otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election offense against petitioners.
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Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their exercise of free speech, petitioners
initiated this case through this petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the tarpaulins are a form or election propaganda or political advertisement which may be
regulated by COMELEC.
2. Whether the notice and order by COMELEC to the Diocese violated their right to freedom of
expression in ordering the removal or regulation of the tarpaulins.
3. Whether or not the order of the removal is a content based or content-neutral regulation.
4. Whether the notice and order by COMELEC to the Diocese violated their right to property in
ordering the removal or regulation of the tarpaulins posted on their own private property.
RULING:
1. NO. The tarpaulin consists of satire of political parties that "primarily advocates a stand on a social
issue; only secondarily-even almost incidentally-will cause the election or non-election of a
candidate." It is not election propaganda as its messages are different from the usual declarative
messages of candidates. The tarpaulin is an expression with political consequences, and "this court's
construction of the guarantee of freedom of expression has always been wary of censorship or
subsequent punishment that entails evaluation of the speaker's viewpoint or the content of one's
speech."
The Court recognizes that there can be a type of speech by private citizens amounting to election
paraphernalia that can be validly regulated. However, this is not the situation in this case. The twin tarpaulins
consist of a social advocacy, and the regulation, if applied in this case, fails the reasonability test.
2. YES. Petitioners are not candidates. The Court acknowledged the "chilling effect" of the assailed
notice and letter on this constitutional right.
Nothing less than the electorate's political speech will be affected by the restrictions imposed by COMELEC.
Political speech is motivated by the desire to be heard and understood, to move people to action. It is
concerned with the sovereign right to change the contours of power whether through the election of
representatives in a republican government or the revision of the basic text of the Constitution. The zeal with
which we protect this kind of speech does not depend on our evaluation of the cogency of the message.
Neither do we assess whether we should protect speech based on the motives of COMELEC. We evaluate
restrictions on freedom of expression from their effects. We protect both speech and medium because the
quality of this freedom in practice will define the quality of deliberation in our democratic society.
COMELEC's notice and letter affect preferred speech. Such acts are capable of repetition. Under the
conditions in which it was issued and in view of the novelty of this case, it could result in a "chilling effect" that
would affect other citizens who want their voices heard on issues during the elections. Other citizens who
wish to express their views regarding the election and other related issues may choose not to, for fear of
reprisal or sanction by the COMELEC.
3. The regulation is content-based. More than incidence, it affects the message of The Diocese. The
form of expression is just as important as the information conveyed that it forms part of the
expressions. Size does matter. Size enhances the efficiency of the communication. It conveys the
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idea that the message being expressed is important. The lager the tarpaulin, the more messages into
that tarpaulin. Size of the tarpaulin enables the person to insert more important messages into that
Tarpaulin.
4. YES. Respondents ordered petitioners, who are private citizens, to remove the tarpaulin from their
own property. The absurdity of the situation is in itself an indication of the unconstitutionality of
COMELEC's interpretation of its powers.
Freedom of expression can be intimately related with the right to property. There may be no expression
when there is no place where the expression may be made. COMELEC's infringement upon petitioners'
property rights as in the present case also reaches out to infringement on their fundamental right to speech.
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 and the Fair Election Act intend to prevent the posting of election
propaganda in private property without the consent of the owners of such private property. COMELEC has
incorrectly implemented these regulations. Consistent with our ruling in Adiong, we find that the act of
respondents in seeking to restrain petitioners from posting the tarpaulin in their own private property is an
impermissible encroachment on the right to property.
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Q: As part of the Catholic Church’s opposition to the Reproductive Health Law, the Diocese of Bacolod
came up with a tarpaulin measuring 6’ by 10’. The said tarpaulin had the heading “Conscience Vote,”
identifying candidates who voted for (Team Patay) or against the law (Team Buhay).
The COMELEC advised the petitioners to pull down the same since it violated the limitations set for
campaign materials, namely, that it should be no bigger than 2’ by 3.’ The Church refused and brought up
this case challenging the validity of the COMELEC directive.
Could the opinion of the COMELEC be assailed on freedom of expression grounds since it is not itself a
statute and the constitutional provision refers to a law? Could the COMELEC validly regulate the posting of
tarpaulin of a non-candidate posted on their own private property?
A: While it is true that the present petition assails not a law but an opinion by the COMELEC Law
Department, the Court has applied Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution even to governmental acts.
There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in
their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.
“The right to freedom of expression, thus, applies to the entire continuum of speech from utterances made
to conduct enacted, and even to inaction as a symbolic manner of communication.” And, with regard to
political speech, the Court declared, “Speech with political consequences is at the core of the freedom of
expression and must be protected by this court.”
The regulation involved at bar is content-base. The tarpaulin is not easily divorced from the size of the
medium.” The form of expression is just as important as the message itself.
The Court also saw the tarpaulins as a form of satire of political parties, something that is similarly protected
under the freedom of speech. On expression and the use of one’s own private property, the Court pointed
out that “[f]reedom of expression can be intimately related with the right to property. There may be no
expression when there is no place where the expression may be made. COMELEC’s infringement upon
petitioners’ property rights as in the present case also reaches out to infringement on their fundamental right
to speech.” In fine, “the act of respondents in seeking to restrain petitioners from posting the tarpaulin in
their own private property is an impermissible encroachments on the right to proper.
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JOSEPH B. TIMBOL, Petitioners –versus- COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents
G.R. No. 206004 | EN BANC | February 24, 2015| LEONEN, J.
Under Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution, the State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service. This, however, does not guarantee a constitutional right to run for or hold
public office. To run for public office is a mere privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Among these
limitations is the prohibition on nuisance candidates.
The opportunity to be heard is a chance to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In election cases, due process requirements are
satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy
at hand.
FACTS:
Joseph B. Timbol (Timbol) filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of the Second District of Caloocan City. He received a Subpoena from
COMELEC Election Officer Dinah A. Valencia (Election Officer Valencia), ordering him to appear before
her office on for a clarificatory hearing in connection with his Certificate of Candidacy.
Timbol, together with his counsel, appeared before Election Officer Valencia. During the
clarificatory hearing, Timbol argued that he was not a nuisance candidate. He contended that in the 2010
elections, he ranked eighth among all the candidates who ran for Member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
the Second District of Caloocan City. He allegedly had sufficient resources to sustain his campaign.
He pointed out before the clarificatory hearing panel that his name already appeared in the list of
nuisance candidates posted in the COMELEC website pursuant to Resolution No. 9610 dated January 11,
2013. The clarificatory hearing panel allegedly assured him that his name would be deleted from the list and
that his Certificate of Candidacy would be given due course.
In the Memorandum dated January 17, 2013, Election Officer Valencia recommended that
Timbol's Certificate of Candidacy be given due course. However, Timbol's name was not removed from the
list of nuisance candidates posted in the COMELEC's website.
With the printing of ballots for the automated elections set on February 4, 2013, Timbol filed on
February 2, 2013 a Petition praying that his name be included in the certified list of candidates for the May
13, 2013 elections. In the Minute Resolution dated February 5, 2013, the COMELEC denied the Petition
for being moot, considering that the printing of ballots had already begun.
On March 15, 2013, Timbol filed his Petition for Certiorari with this court, arguing that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in declaring him a nuisance candidate. According to Timbol, the
COMELEC deprived him of due process of law when he was declared a nuisance candidate even before
Election Officer Valencia conducted the clarificatory hearing. He prayed for a preliminary mandatory
injunction ordering the COMELEC to include his name in the certified list of candidates for the position of
Member of Sangguniang Panlungsod of the Second District of Caloocan City.
In the Resolution dated April 16, 2013, this court ordered the Office of the Solicitor General to
comment on behalf of the COMELEC.
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In its Comment, the COMELEC argued that the Petition was already moot and academic,
considering that the May 13, 2013 elections had already been conducted.
Even assuming that the Petition was not moot and academic, the COMELEC maintained that it did
not gravely abuse its discretion. Contrary to Timbol's argument, he was given an opportunity to be heard
when Election Officer Valencia heard him during the clarificatory hearing. He even admitted that he attended
the clarificatory hearing with his counsel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner Timbol's Petition for
inclusion in the certified list of candidates.
RULING:
YES. Respondent's power to motu proprio deny due course to a certificate of candidacy is subject to
the candidate's opportunity to be heard.
Under Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution, the State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service" This, however, does not guarantee "a constitutional right to run for or hold
public office" To run for public office is a mere "privilege subject to limitations imposed by law." Among
these limitations is the prohibition on nuisance candidates.
Nuisance candidates are persons who file their certificates of candidacy "to put the election process
in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the
registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has
no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus
prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate."
To minimize the logistical confusion caused by nuisance candidates, their certificates of candidacy
may be denied due course or cancelled by respondent. This denial or cancellation may be "motu proprio or
upon a verified petition of an interested party," "subject to an opportunity to be heard."
The opportunity to be heard is a chance "to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of." In election cases, due process requirements are
satisfied "when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy
at hand."
Respondent commits grave abuse of discretion if it denies due course to or cancels a certificate of
candidacy without affording the candidate an opportunity to be heard.
Respondent declared petitioner a nuisance candidate without giving him a chance to explain his bona
fide intention to run for office. Respondent had already issued Resolution No. 9610 on January 11, 2013
when petitioner appeared before Election Officer Valencia in a clarificatory hearing on January 17, 2013.
This was an ineffective opportunity to be heard.
That petitioner was able to file a Petition for inclusion in the certified list of candidates did not cure
the defect in the issuance of Resolution No. 9610. First, he would not have to file the Petition had he been
given an opportunity to be heard in the first place. Second, in the Minute Resolution dated February 5, 2013,
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respondent denied petitioner's Petition on the sole ground that the printing of ballots had already begun on
February 4, 2013.
Although reprinting another batch of ballots would, indeed, be costly. Respondent should balance
its duty "to ensure that the electoral process is clean, honest, orderly, and peaceful" with the right of a
candidate to explain his or her bona fide intention to run for public office before he or she is declared a
nuisance candidate.
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Q: Timbol filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the
Second District of Caloocan City. He received a Subpoena from COMELEC Election Officer Dinah A.
Valencia (Election Officer Valencia), ordering him to appear for a clarificatory hearing in connection with
his Certificate of Candidacy. Timbol, together with his counsel, appeared and argued that he was not a
nuisance candidate. He contended that in the 2010 elections, he ranked eighth among all the candidates who
ran for Member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the Second District of Caloocan City. He allegedly had
sufficient resources to sustain his campaign.
He pointed out before the clarificatory hearing panel that his name already appeared in the list of nuisance
candidates posted in the COMELEC website pursuant to Resolution No. 9610 dated January 11, 2013. The
clarificatory hearing panel allegedly assured him that his name would be deleted from the list and that his
Certificate of Candidacy would be given due course.
Despite Election Officer Valencia's favorable recommendation, Timbol's name was not removed from the
list of nuisance candidates posted in the COMELEC's website. With the printing of ballots for the automated
elections set on February 4, 2013, Timbol filed on February 2, 2013 a Petition praying that his name be
included in the certified list of candidates for the May 13, 2013 elections. The COMELEC denied the
Petition for being moot, considering that the printing of ballots had already begun.
Was Timbol afforded with the opportunity to be heard?
A: NO. COMELEC’s power to motu proprio deny due course to a certificate of candidacy is subject to the
candidate's opportunity to be heard.
Under Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution, "the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for
public service." This, however, does not guarantee "a constitutional right to run for or hold public office." To
run for public office is a mere "privilege subject to limitations imposed by law." Among these limitations is
the prohibition on nuisance candidates.
The opportunity to be heard is a chance "to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of." In election cases, due process requirements are satisfied "when the parties
are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand."
COMELEC declared petitioner a nuisance candidate without giving him a chance to explain his bona
fide intention to run for office. Respondent had already issued Resolution No. 9610 on January 11, 2013
when petitioner appeared before Election Officer Valencia in a clarificatory hearing on January 17, 2013.
This was an ineffective opportunity to be heard.
Timbol was able to file a Petition for inclusion in the certified list of candidates did not cure the defect in the
issuance of Resolution No. 9610. First, he would not have to file the Petition had he been given an
opportunity to be heard in the first place. Second, in the Minute Resolution dated February 5, 2013,
respondent denied petitioner's Petition on the sole ground that the printing of ballots had already begun on
February 4, 2013.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners –versus- HEIRS OF GABRIEL Q. FERNANDEZ,

Respondents
G.R. No. 175493 | SECOND DIVISION | March 25, 2015| LEONEN, J.
Under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, the implementing agency must, upon filing of the
expropriation complaint, immediately pay the property owner an amount equivalent to 100% of the value of
the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the value
of any improvements or structure on a replacement cost method. The law further mandates that courts may
issue a Writ of Possession only upon the presentation by the implementing agency of a certificate of
availability of funds.
For the Republic to be able to take possession of the property, the law mandates that it must first pay
to the landowner 100% of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the
property by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The payment of less than the amount required by law cannot
be considered substantial compliance.
FACTS:
The Heirs of Gabriel Q. Fernandez (Heirs of Fernandez) are the owners of an 11,165-square-meter
property in Barangay Tuyo, Balanga, Bataan. The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), on behalf of the
Department of Public Works and Highways, filed a Verified Complaint for Expropriation against the Heirs
of Fernandez and Sotera Santuyo, the owner of another property in Barangay Tuyo.
The Republic, through its Verified Complaint for Expropriation, alleged that the Department of
Public Works and Highways intended to construct a four-lane highway in Barangay Tuyo. It alleged that it
was necessary to acquire the properties of the Heirs of Fernandez and Sotera Santuyo for that purpose, but
its offer to purchase was refused. Also, that the adjacent properties were already acquired by negotiation. The
Republic prayed that a Writ of Possession be issued in its favor upon the filing of the Petition and the deposit
of the value of the properties "as provisionally ascertained and fixed by the court, which should not be more
than P50.00 per square meter."
The Heirs of Fernandez admitted that there was "nobility and utility" in the construction of the
highway but disputed the necessity of expropriating their property. They argued that the expropriation of
their property was not permitted by the Constitution and that the Republic must first comply with the
guidelines stated in Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974 and Section 12 of its Implementing Rules and
Regulations before a Writ of Possession can be issued.
The Republic filed a Motion/Manifestation dated February 4, 2002 wherein it alleged that on
October 20, 2000, it offered the amount of P35.00 per square meter to the Heirs of Fernandez as
compensation for the property. It alleged that the price was above the zonal value, which was P15.00 per
square meter. It also alleged that after it had filed the Verified Complaint for Expropriation, it offered the
Heirs of Fernandez P50.00 per square meter, which the latter refused as they were demanding P1,000.00 per
square meter. It also submitted that in compliance with Section 12 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 8974, it was ready to deposit P167,475.00, which was the equivalent of the
zonal value of the property.
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On February 21, 2002, the trial court issued an Order allowing the Republic to take possession of
the Heirs of Fernandez's property in view of their payment of P167,475.00, as evidenced by a Land Bank of
the Philippines check in the name of Gabriel Q. Fernandez.
On April 23, 2002, the Heirs of Fernandez filed an Omnibus Motion requesting for the admission
of the existence of seven roads connecting Balanga to the Roman Highway, the comprehensive land use plan,
a list of provincial roads per municipality, and a photocopy of the Bureau of Internal Revenue zonal valuation
for Barangay Tuyo. They prayed for the nullification of the Order dated February 21, 2002, alleging that a
copy of the Order was only served on them at the pre-trial on April 3, 2002. They also alleged that they were
not served a copy of the Republic's Motion/Manifestation dated February 4, 2002.
On May 22, 2002, the trial court issued an Order finding that the Republic had a lawful right to take
the property and appointing three commissioners to determine the amount of just compensation to be given
to the Heirs of Fernandez. It also ruled that the failure to serve a copy of the Order dated February 21, 2002
was a mere inadvertence of the clerk in charge of civil cases.
The Heirs of Fernandez appealed the case before the Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA rendered a Decision that set aside the Republic's authority to take possession of the
property but affirmed the Order to appoint commissioners to determine the amount of just compensation.
It acknowledged that while there were roads that connected Balanga to Roman Highway, it conceded that the
construction of a four-lane highway was a public need that would undeniably become beneficial to Balanga
and the Province of Bataan.
The CA also ruled that the Heirs of Fernandez were not denied due process since they had the
opportunity to seek for the nullification of the Order dated February 21, 2002 when they filed their Omnibus
Motion on April 23, 2002.
On the issue on the correct valuation of the property, the Court of Appeals relied on the Heirs of
Fernandez's copy of the Bureau of Internal Revenue zonal valuation and Gabriel Q. Fernandez's tax
declaration submitted by the Republic, which categorized the property as "A1" or "1st agricultural land" valued
at P50.00 per square meter. Citing Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, the Court of Appeals ruled that it
was only upon the payment of P558,250.00, which was 100% of the zonal value of the property, and the
submission of a certificate of availability of funds that a Writ of Possession may be issued.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside petitioner Republic's Writ of Possession for the
latter's failure to comply with Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974.
2. Whether the reversal of the issuance of the Writ of Possession by the Court of Appeals was effectively
an injunction against petitioner Republic from proceeding with the expropriation.
RULING:
1. NO. A Writ of Possession may be issued only upon full compliance with Section 4 of Republic Act
No. 8974. Before the state may expropriate private property for a national infrastructure project, it
must first comply with the requisites in Republic Act No. 8974, otherwise known as An Act to
Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or Location for National Government Infrastructure
Projects and for Other Purposes.
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Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974 states:
Section 4. Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings. — Whenever it is necessary to acquire real

property for the right-of-way or location for any national government infrastructure project through
expropriation, the appropriate implementing agency shall initiate the expropriation proceedings before the
proper court under the following guidelines:
(a) Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to the defendant, the implementing agency
shall immediately pay the owner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred percent
(100%) of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR); and (2) the value of the improvements and/or structures as determined under Section
7 hereof;
Under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, the implementing agency must, upon filing of the
The provisional value that must be paid under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974 should not be
confused with the payment of just compensation required by the Constitution in the exercise of the power
of eminent domain. The payment of the provisional value under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974 is
different from the payment of just compensation.
The correct zonal value of the property is P50.00 per square meter, not P15.00 per square meter.
Hence, the P167,475.00 payment made by the Republic based on P15.00 per square meter as to the
expropriated property's provisional value is not equivalent to the payment of the present fair market value of
the property. It only serves as a pre-payment so that the government may take possession of the property.
Moreover, the value need not be judicially determined; rather the value has already been set by the current
relevant zonal value of the area as classified by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
This pre-payment must also be paid immediately to the owner of the property before a Writ of
Possession may be issued. The law is clear. All courts, excluding this Supreme Court, are prohibited from
issuing a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or mandatory preliminary injunction to enjoin
the government from acquiring the site of any national government project.
2. NO. Contrary to the Republic's argument, the setting aside of a Writ of Possession is not an
injunction.
Thus, the court cannot issue a Writ of Possession if the guidelines in Republic Act No. 8974 were
not complied with. There is also nothing that prevents a court from setting aside a Writ of Possession on
appeal when it is found that the guidelines were not complied with.
In contrast, an injunction is a separate proceeding that must be instituted by a party seeking

immediate relief. Before an injunctive writ can be issued, a party must first establish a right to be protected
and show a perceived injury if the act complained of is not enjoined.
The applicant must follow the procedural requisites outlined in Rule 58 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure before a preliminary injunction may be granted by the court. The facts show that respondents
Heirs of Fernandez have not commenced any proceeding of this nature.
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Clearly, the Writ of Possession was set aside by the Court of Appeals, not as an ancillary remedy to
preserve respondents Heirs of Fernandez's rights, but because the Republic failed to comply with the
requirements of Republic Act No. 8974.
For the Republic to be able to take possession of the property, the law mandates that it must first pay
to the landowner 100% of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the
property by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The payment of less than the amount required by law cannot
be considered substantial compliance.
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Q: The Republic, through its Verified Complaint for Expropriation, alleged that the Department of Public
Works and Highways intended to construct a four-lane highway in Barangay Tuyo. It further alleged that it
was necessary to acquire the properties of the Heirs of Fernandez and Sotera Santuyo for that purpose, but
its offer to purchase was refused. It also alleged that the adjacent properties were already acquired by
negotiation. The Republic prayed that a Writ of Possession be issued in its favor upon the filing of the Petition
and the deposit of the value of the properties "as provisionally ascertained and fixed by the court, which
should not be more than P50.00 per square meter."
The Heirs of Fernandez argued that the expropriation of their property was not permitted by
the Constitution and that the Republic must first comply with the guidelines stated in Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 8974 and Section 12 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations before a Writ of Possession can be
issued.
The trial court issued an Order allowing the Republic to take possession of the Heirs of Fernandez's property
in view of their payment of P167,475.00, based on the zonal value of P15.00 per square meter, as evidenced
by a Land Bank of the Philippines check in the name of Gabriel Q. Fernandez.
However, correct zonal value of the property is P50.00 per square meter, not P15.00 per square meter.
However, the Court of Appeals reversed the issuance of Writ of Possession.
Was the reversal of issuance of Writ of Possession proper?
A: YES. A Writ of Possession may be issued only upon full compliance with Section 4 of Republic Act No.
8974. Under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, the implementing agency must, upon filing of the
Hence, it is only upon the payment of P558,250.00, based on P50.00 per square meter, which was 100% of
the zonal value of the property, and the submission of a certificate of availability of funds that a Writ of
Possession may be issued.
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RICHARD N. RIVERA, Petitioners –versus- GENESIS TRANSPORT SERVICE, INC. and RIZA A.
MOISES, Respondents
G.R. No. 215568 | SECOND DIVISION | August 3, 2015| LEONEN, J.
Article XIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of workers to security of tenure.
One’s employment, profession, trade or calling is a property right of which a worker may be deprived only
upon compliance with due process requirements: It is the policy of the state to assure the right of workers to
security of tenure (Article XIII, Sec. 3 of the New Constitution, Section 9, Article II of the 1973 Constitution).
The guarantee is an act of social justice. When a person has no property, his job may possibly be his only
possession or means of livelihood. Therefore, he should be protected against any arbitrary deprivation of his
job. Article 280 of the Labor Code has construed security of tenure as meaning that the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by the code. Dismissal is
not justified for being arbitrary where the workers were denied due process and a clear denial of due process,
or constitutional right must be safeguarded against at all times.
Misconduct and breach of trust are just causes for terminating employment only when attended by
such gravity as would leave the employer no other viable recourse but to cut off an employee's livelihood.
The Labor Code recognizes serious misconduct, willful breach of trust or loss of confidence, and other
analogous causes as just causes for termination of employment.
FACTS:
Petitioner Richard N. Rivera (Rivera) was employed by respondent Genesis Transport Service, Inc.
(Genesis) as a bus conductor.
In his Position Paper before the Labor Arbiter, Rivera acknowledged that he was dismissed by
Genesis on account of a discrepancy in the amount he declared on bus ticket receipts. He alleged that on
June 10, 2010, he received a Memorandum giving him twenty-four (24) hours to explain why he should not
be sanctioned for reporting and remitting the amount of P198.00 instead of the admittedly correct amount
of P394.00 worth of bus ticket receipts. He responded that it was an honest mistake, which he was unable to
correct "because the bus encountered mechanical problems."
The discrepancy between the reported and remitted amount as against the correct amount was
detailed in the "Irregularity Report" prepared by Genesis' Inspector, Arnel Villaseran (Villaseran).
On July 20, 2010, Genesis served on Rivera a written notice informing him that a hearing of his case
was set on July 23, 2010. Despite his explanations, Rivera's services were terminated through a written notice
dated July 30, 2010. Contending that this termination was arbitrary and not based on just causes for
terminating employment, he filed the Complaint for illegal dismissal.
For their defense, Genesis and Riza A. Moises claimed that Rivera's misdeclaration of the amount in
the bus ticket receipts and failure to remit the correct amount clearly violated Genesis' policies and amounted
to serious misconduct, fraud, and willful breach of trust; thereby justifying his dismissal.
Labor Arbiter Gaudencio P. Demaisip gave credence to respondents' appreciation of the gravity of
Rivera's acts of misdeclaring the amount of bus ticket receipts and failing to remit the correct amount and
dismissed Rivera's Complaint. The National Labor Relations Commission Second Division affirmed the
Decision of Labor Arbiter Demaisip.
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ISSUE:
Whether Rivera’s employment was terminated for just cause.
RULING:
NO. Misconduct and breach of trust are just causes for terminating employment only when attended
by such gravity as would leave the employer no other viable recourse but to cut off an employee's livelihood.
The Labor Code recognizes serious misconduct, willful breach of trust or loss of confidence, and other
analogous causes as just causes for termination of employment.
Our laws on labor, foremost of which is the Labor Code, are pieces of social legislation. They have
been adopted pursuant to the constitutional recognition of "labor as a primary social economic force" and to
the constitutional mandates for the state to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare" and for
Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the
people to human dignity, and reduce social, economic, and political inequalities."
Article XIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of workers to security of tenure.
"One's employment, profession, trade or calling is a "property right,'" of which a worker may be deprived only
upon compliance with due process requirements:
It is the policy of the state to assure the right of workers to "security of tenure" (Article XIII, Sec. 3
of the New Constitution, Section 9, Article II of the 1973 Constitution). The guarantee is an act of social
justice. When a person has no property, his job may possibly be his only possession or means of livelihood.
Therefore, he should be protected against any arbitrary deprivation of his job. Article 280 of the Labor Code
has construed security of tenure as meaning that "the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee
except for a just cause or when authorized by" the code. Dismissal is not justified for being arbitrary where
the workers were denied due process and a clear denial of due process, or constitutional right must be
safeguarded against at all times. (Citations omitted)
Conformably, liberal construction of Labor Code provisions in favor of workers is stipulated by

Article 4 of the Labor Code:
Art. 4. Construction in favor of labor. All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the
provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.
This case is quintessentially paradigmatic of the need for the law to be applied in order to ensure
social justice. The resolution of this case should be guided by the constitutional command for courts to take
a preferential view in favor of labor in ambitious cases.
This case revolves around an alleged discrepancy between the amounts indicated on a single ticket.
For the paltry sum of P196.00 that petitioner failed to remit in his sole documented instance of apparent
misconduct, petitioner's employment was terminated. He was deprived of his means of subsistence.
Concededly, bus conductors handle money. To this extent, their work may be analogous to that of
tellers, cashiers, and other similarly situated rank-and-file employees who occupy positions of trust and
confidence. However, even granting that the first requisite for termination of employment on account of
willful breach of trust has been satisfied, we find it improper to sustain the validity of the termination of
petitioner's employment.
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The Court takes judicial notice of bus conductors' everyday work. Bus conductors receive, exchange,
and keep money paid by passengers by way of transportation fare. They keep track of payments and make
computations down to the last centavo, literally on their feet while a bus is in transit. Regardless of whether a
bus is driving through awkward spaces — through steep inclines, rugged roads, or sharp turns — or of whether
a bus is packed with standing passengers, the lonesome task of keeping track of the passengers' payments falls
upon a bus conductor.
Thus, while they do handle money, their circumstances are not at all the same as those of regular
cashiers. They have to think quickly, literally on their feet. Regular cashiers, on the other hand, have the time
and comfort to deliberately and carefully examine the transactions of their employer. However, handling
passengers' fare payments is not their sole function. Bus conductors assist drivers as they maneuver buses
through tight spaces while they are in transit, depart, or park. They often act as dispatchers in bus stops and
other such places, assist passengers as they embark and alight, and sometimes even help passengers load and
unload goods and cargo. They manage the available space in a bus and ensure that no space is wasted as the
bus accommodates more passengers. Along with drivers, bus conductors commit to memory the destination
of each passenger so that they can anticipate their stops.
The records are bereft of evidence showing a pattern of discrepancies chargeable against petitioner.
Seen in the context of his many years of service to his employer and in the absence of clear proof showing
otherwise, the presumption should be that he has performed his functions faithfully and regularly. It can be
assumed that he has issued the correct tickets and given accurate amounts of change to the hundreds or even
thousands of passengers that he encountered throughout his tenure. It is more reasonable to assume that —
except for a single error costing a loss of only P196.00 — the company would have earned the correct expected
margins per passenger, per trip, and per bus that it allowed to travel.
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Q: Rivera was employed by respondent Genesis Transport Service, Inc. (Genesis) beginning June 2002 as a
bus conductor. He was dismissed by Genesis on account of a discrepancy in the amount he declared on bus
ticket receipts. He received a Memorandum giving him twenty-four (24) hours to explain why he should not
be sanctioned for reporting and remitting the amount of P198.00 instead of the admittedly correct amount of
P394.00 worth of bus ticket receipts. He responded that it was an honest mistake, which he was unable to
correct because the bus encountered mechanical problems.
Subsequently, Genesis served on Rivera a written notice informing him that a hearing of his case was set on
July 23, 2010. Despite his explanations, Rivera's services were terminated through a written notice dated July
30, 2010. Contending that this termination was arbitrary and not based on just causes for terminating
employment, he filed the Complaint for illegal dismissal.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed Rivera's Complaint. The National Labor Relations Commission affirmed
the Decision of LA.
Was Rivera illegally terminated?
A: YES. Misconduct and breach of trust are just causes for terminating employment only when attended by
such gravity as would leave the employer no other viable recourse but to cut off an employee's livelihood.
Article XIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of workers to security of tenure. "One's
employment, profession, trade or calling is a "property right," of which a worker may be deprived only upon
compliance with due process requirements
The Court takes judicial notice of bus conductors' everyday work. Bus conductors receive, exchange, and
keep money paid by passengers by way of transportation fare. They keep track of payments and make
computations down to the last centavo, literally on their feet while a bus is in transit. Regardless of whether a
bus is driving through awkward spaces — through steep inclines, rugged roads, or sharp turns — or of whether
a bus is packed with standing passengers, the lonesome task of keeping track of the passengers' payments falls
upon a bus conductor. Thus, while they do handle money, their circumstances are not at all the same as those
of regular cashiers. They have to think quickly, literally on their feet. Regular cashiers, on the other hand,
have the time and comfort to deliberately and carefully examine the transactions of their employer. However,
handling passengers' fare payments is not their sole function. Bus conductors assist drivers as they maneuver
buses through tight spaces while they are in transit, depart, or park. They often act as dispatchers in bus stops
and other such places, assist passengers as they embark and alight, and sometimes even help passengers load
and unload goods and cargo. They manage the available space in a bus and ensure that no space is wasted as
the bus accommodates more passengers. Along with drivers, bus conductors commit to memory the
destination of each passenger so that they can anticipate their stops.
Seen in the context of his many years of service to his employer and in the absence of clear proof showing
otherwise, the presumption should be that he has performed his functions faithfully and regularly. It can be
assumed that he has issued the correct tickets and given accurate amounts of change to the hundreds or even
thousands of passengers that he encountered throughout his tenure. It is more reasonable to assume that —
except for a single error costing a loss of only P196.00 — the company would have earned the correct expected
margins per passenger, per trip, and per bus that it allowed to travel.
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MONICO LIGTAS, Petitioner -versus- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 200751 | Second Division | August 17, 2015 | Leonen, J.
DOCTRINE: Findings of fact of administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial powers
are entitled to respect if supported by substantial evidence. This court is not tasked to weigh again "the
evidence submitted before the administrative body and to substitute its own judgment as to the sufficiency of
evidence."
FACTS:
Ligtas was charged with the crime of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. According
to the prosecution witnesses, Anecita Pacate was the owner of an abaca plantation situated at Sitio Lamak,
Barangay San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte. On June 29, 2000, Cabero, the plantation's administrator, and
several men, including Cipres, went to the plantation to harvest abaca upon Anecita Pacate's instructions.
However, Cabero and his men were surprised to find Ligtas harvesting abaca at the plantation. Ligtas was
accompanied by three (3) unidentified men. Allegedly, Ligtas threatened that there would be loss of life if
they persisted in harvesting the abaca. Cabero reported the incident to Anecita Pacate and the police.
On July 2, 2000, Cabero and Cipres went back to the plantation and conducted a survey on the
condition of the plantation. They found that 1,000 kilos of abaca, valued at P28.00 per kilo, were harvested
by Ligtas.
On July 3, 2000, Ligtas and Anecita Pacate confronted each other before the Sogod Police
Station. Ligtas admitted to harvesting the abaca but claimed that he was the plantation owner. According to
Ligtas, he had been a tenant of Anecita Pacate and her late husband, Andres Pacate since 1993. Andres
Pacate installed him as tenant of the 1.5 to two hectares of land involved in the criminal case.
Meanwhile, Ligtas filed a Complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) of Sogod, Southern Leyte for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession on November 21,
200. On January 22, 2002, the DARAB rendered the Decision ruling that Ligtas was a bona fide tenant of
the land.
While records are bereft as to when the DARAB Decision was formally offered as evidence before
the trial court, records are clear that the DARAB Decision was considered by both the trial court and Court
of Appeals and without any objection on the part of the People of the Philippines.
The Regional Trial Court convicted the accused of the crime charged. It ruled that Ligtas' defense
of tenancy was not supported by concrete and substantial evidence. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
ruling of the trial court. According to the CA, Ligtas was not able to establish all the essential elements of a
tenancy agreement.
ISSUE:
Whether the DARAB decision as to the finding of a tenancy relation, if supported by substantial
evidence, is conclusive upon the Courts. (YES)
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RULING:
We hold that a DARAB decision on the existence of a tenancy relationship is conclusive and binding
on courts if supported by substantial evidence.
Generally, decisions in administrative cases are not binding on criminal proceedings. This court has
ruled in a number of cases that:
It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that administrative cases are

independent from criminal actions for the same act or omission. Thus, an absolution from a
criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, or vice versa. One thing is
administrative liability; quite another thing is the criminal liability for the same act.
Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure
followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and
conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other. Notably, the evidence presented
in the administrative case may not necessarily be the same evidence to be presented in the criminal
cases.
However, this case does not involve an administrative charge stemming from the same set of facts
involved in a criminal proceeding. This is not a case where one act results in both criminal and administrative
liability. DARAB Case No. VIII-319-SL-2000 involves a determination of whether there exists a tenancy
relationship between petitioner and private complainant, while Criminal Case No. R-225 involves
determination of whether petitioner committed theft. However, the tenancy relationship is a factor in
determining whether all the elements of theft were proven by the prosecution.
Findings of fact of administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial powers are entitled
to respect if supported by substantial evidence. This court is not tasked to weigh again "the evidence submitted
before the administrative body and to substitute its own judgment as to the sufficiency of evidence."
The DARAB is the quasi-judicial tribunal that has the primary jurisdiction to determine whether
there is a tenancy relationship between adverse parties. This court has held that "judicial determinations of
the a DARAB have the same binding effect as judgments and orders of a regular judicial body."
In Salazar v. De Leon, this court upheld the Department of Agrarian Reform's primary jurisdiction
over agrarian disputes, which includes the relationship between landowners and tenants. The DARAB
Decision is conclusive and binding on courts when supported by substantial evidence.
The DARAB, in DARAB Case No. VIII-319-SL-2000, held that all the essential elements of a
tenancy relationship were proven by petitioner. It found that there was substantial evidence to support
petitioner's claim as tenant of the land. In rendering the Decision, the DARAB examined pleadings and
affidavits of both petitioner and private complainant. It was convinced by petitioner's evidence, which
consisted of sworn statements of petitioner's witnesses that petitioner was installed as tenant by Andres Pacate
sometime in 1993. Petitioner and Andres Pacate had an agreement to share the produce after harvest.
However, Andres Pacate had died before the first harvest. Petitioner then gave the landowner's share to
private complainant, and had done so every harvest until he was disturbed in his cultivation of the land on
June 29, 2000.
The existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue of tenancy between petitioner and
private complainant negates the existence of the element that the taking was done without the owner's consent.
The DARAB Decision implies that petitioner had legitimate authority to harvest the abaca. The prosecution,
therefore, failed to establish all the elements of theft.
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Q: Ligtas was charged with theft for harvesting abaca in the plantation of Anecita Pacate. During the trial,
Ligtas alleged that he is a tenant of the plantation, While the criminal case is pending, Ligtas filed a Complaint
before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Sogod, Southern Leyte for
Maintenance of Peaceful Possession. The DARAB rendered the Decision ruling that Ligtas was a bona fide
tenant of the land.
Despite the DARAB decision of finding a tenancy relationship, the RTC still convicted Ligtas of the crime
of theft. The conviction was affirmed by the CA. Is the DARAB decision finding a tenancy relationship
conclusive upon the courts?
A: Yes, the DARAB decision finding a tenancy relationship between Ligtas and Pacate is conclusive upon
the courts. Findings of fact of administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial powers are entitled
to respect if supported by substantial evidence. The DARAB is the quasi-judicial tribunal that has the primary
jurisdiction to determine whether there is a tenancy relationship between adverse parties. This court has held
that "judicial determinations of the a DARAB have the same binding effect as judgments and orders of a
regular judicial body."
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RE: REQUEST OF RETIRED SUPREME COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICES FOR
INCREASE/ADJUSTMENT OF THEIR DECEMBER 1998 PENSIONS
A.M. No. 99-7-01-SC | En Banc | August 18, 2015 | Leonen, J.
DOCTRINE: Fiscal autonomy has been defined as "freedom from outside control." It guarantees
full flexibility in the utilization of funds and resources. The Constitution grants fiscal autonomy to the
judiciary to ensure its independence.
FACTS:
The Court of Tax Appeals Presiding Justice Roman G. Del Rosario requests the Supreme Court
to grant retired Court of Tax Appeals justices the retirement benefits and other privileges given to retired
Court of Appeals justices, specifically the annual year-end bonus and cash gift.
The request was prompted by the letter sent by retired Court of Tax Appeals Justices Ernesto D.
Acosta and Olga Palanca-Enriquez to Presiding Justice Del Rosario. They requested for entitlement to the
annual year-end bonus and cash gift while they have yet to receive their monthly pensions from this court.
ISSUE:
Whether retired Court of Tax Appeals justices are entitled to the annual year-end bonus and cash
gift. (YES)
RULING:
Fiscal autonomy has been defined as "freedom from outside control." It guarantees full flexibility in
the utilization of funds and resources. The Constitution grants fiscal autonomy to the judiciary to ensure its
independence. As explained in Bengzon v. Drilon:
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the
independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition
of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and
utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not
only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the
independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system
is based.
In A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, this court discussed that one aspect of the constitutional grant of fiscal
autonomy is administrative supervision over courts and its personnel, thus:
The Judiciary's fiscal autonomy is realized through the actions of the Chief Justice, as its head, and
of the Supreme Court En Banc, in the exercise of administrative control and supervision of the
courts and its personnel
Thus, under the guarantees of the Judiciary's fiscal autonomy and its independence, the
Chief Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide the who, what, where, when[,]
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and how of the privileges and benefits they extend to justices, judges, court officials and court
personnel within the parameters of the Court's granted power; they determine the terms, conditions
and restrictions of the grant as grantor.
. . . Any kind of interference on how these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised
and availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also
encroaches upon the constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court
En Banc to manage the Judiciary's own affairs.
Hence, the power to decide "who, what, where, when[,] and how" to grant retirement benefits is
within this court's exercise of administrative supervision over courts and its personnel. Any outside
interference would violate this court's fiscal autonomy.
Republic Act No. 9946 specifies what is included in the pension of retired members of the judiciary
as follows:
SEC. 3. Upon retirement, a Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan or of the Court of Tax Appeals, or a Judge of the regional trial court, metropolitan
trial court, municipal trial court in cities, municipal trial court, municipal circuit trial court, shari'a
district court, shari'a circuit court, or any other court hereafter established shall be automatically
entitled to a lump sum of five (5) years' gratuity computed on the basis of the highest monthly salary
plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, representation and other allowances such as
personal economic relief allowance (PERA) and additional compensation allowance he/she was
receiving on the date of his/her retirement and thereafter upon survival after the expiration of five
(5) years, to further annuity payable monthly during the residue of his/her natural life pursuant to
Section 1 hereof.
The enumeration under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9946 admittedly does not include the year-
end bonus and cash gift. Nevertheless, the interpretation of retirement laws is part of this court's fiscal
autonomy. In addition, the grant of the year-end bonus and cash gift is based on A.M. No. 91-8-225-CA and
A.M. No. 99-7-01-SC.
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Q: The Court of Tax Appeals Presiding Justice Roman G. Del Rosario requests the Supreme Court to grant
retired Court of Tax Appeals justices the retirement benefits and other privileges given to retired Court of
Appeals justices, specifically the annual year-end bonus and cash gift. However, the enumeration under
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9946 as to what constitutes the pension of a retired member of the judiciary
admittedly does not include the year-end bonus and cash gift. Can the Supreme Court allow the grant of the
year-end bonus and cash gift?
A: Yes, the Supreme Court can grant the year-end bonus and cash gift to the retired members of the judiciary.
The Constitution grants fiscal autonomy to the judiciary to ensure its independence. Thus, under the
guarantees of the Judiciary's fiscal autonomy and its independence, the Chief Justice and the Court En
Banc determine and decide the who, what, where, when, and how of the privileges and benefits they extend
to justices, judges, court officials and court personnel within the parameters of the Court's granted power; they
determine the terms, conditions and restrictions of the grant as grantor.
The enumeration under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9946 admittedly does not include the year-end bonus
and cash gift. Nevertheless, the interpretation of retirement laws is part of this court's fiscal autonomy. In
addition, the grant of the year-end bonus and cash gift is based on A.M. No. 91-8-225-CA and A.M. No. 99-
7-01-SC.
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PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. ASIAVEST

MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD, Respondent.
G.R. No. 172301 | Second Division | August 19, 2015 | Leonen, J.
DOCTRINE:
The determination of whether to entertain a case is addressed to the sound discretion of the court,
which must carefully consider the facts of the particular case. A mere invocation of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens or an easy averment that foreign elements exist cannot operate to automatically divest a court of
its jurisdiction. It is crucial for courts to determine first if facts were established such that special circumstances
exist to warrant its desistance from assuming jurisdiction.
FACTS:
This case stemmed from an action for recovery of sum of money filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig by respondent Malaysian corporation against petitioner Philippine National Construction
Corporation (PNCC), formerly Construction & Development Corporation of the Philippines. PNCC is a
government-acquired asset corporation.
PNCC and Asiavest Holdings (M) Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest Holdings) caused the incorporation of an
associate company known as Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest-CDCP), through which they entered into
contracts to construct rural roads and bridges for the State of Pahang, Malaysia. In connection with this
construction contract, PNCC obtained various guarantees and bonds from Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M)
Berhad to guarantee the due performance of its obligations. The four contracts of guaranty stipulate that
Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad shall guarantee to the State of Pahang "the due performance by
PNCC of its construction contracts and the repayment of the temporary advances given to PNCC." These
contracts were understood to be governed by the laws of Malaysia.
There was failure to perform the obligations under the construction contract, prompting the State of
Pahang to demand payment against Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad's performance bonds.
Consequently, the corporation demanded indemnity from PNCC by demanding the amount it paid to the
State of Pahang. On April 12, 1994, Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad filed a Complaint for recovery
of sum of money against PNCC before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. It based its action on Malaysian
laws.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad. The trial court
found that Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad complied with the requisites for proof of written foreign
laws. The trial court denied PNCC's Motion to Lift Order of Default and also denied PNCC's Motion for
Reconsideration Ad Cautelam. PNCC brought its case before the Court of Appeals.
The CA dismissed PNCC's appeal for raising pure questions of law exclusively cognizable by this
court. It likewise denied reconsideration.
PNCC submits that the trial court could have invoked the principle of forum non conveniens and
refused to take cognizance of the case considering the difficulty in acquiring jurisdiction over the two
Malaysian corporations and in determining PNCC's exact liability.
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ISSUES:
1. Whether our courts have subject matter jurisdiction over an action for recovery of sum of money
filed by a Malaysian corporation against a Philippine corporation involving a contract executed and
performed in Malaysia (YES)
2. Whether petitioner’s right to due process was denied (NO)
RULING:
I.
"Forum non conveniens literally translates to 'the forum is inconvenient.'" This doctrine applies in
conflicts of law cases. It gives courts the choice of not assuming jurisdiction when it appears that it is not the
most convenient forum and the parties may seek redress in another one. It is a device "designed to frustrate
illicit means for securing advantages and vexing litigants that would otherwise be possible if the venue of
litigation (or dispute resolution) were left entirely to the whim of either party."
Puyat v. Zabarte enumerated practical reasons when courts may refuse to entertain a case even though
the exercise of jurisdiction is authorized by law:
1. The belief that the matter can be better tried and decided elsewhere, either because the main aspects
of the case transpired in a foreign jurisdiction or the material witnesses have their residence there;
2. The belief that the non-resident plaintiff sought the forum, a practice known as forum shopping,
merely to secure procedural advantages or to convey or harass the defendant;
3. The unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to non residents or aliens when the docket may
already be overcrowded;
4. The inadequacy of the local judicial machinery for effectuating the right sought to be maintained; and
5. The difficult of ascertaining foreign law
On the other hand, courts may choose to assume jurisdiction subject to the following requisites: "(1)
that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court
is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court
has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision."
The determination of whether to entertain a case is addressed to the sound discretion of the court,
exist to warrant its desistance from assuming jurisdiction.
We discussed in Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Rebesencio how the doctrine grounds on "comity and
judicial efficiency" and how it involves a recognition that other tribunals may be better positioned to enforce
judgments:
Forum non conveniens entails a recognition not only that tribunals elsewhere are better
suited to rule on and resolve a controversy, but also, that these tribunals are better positioned to
enforce judgments and, ultimately, to dispense justice. Forum non conveniens prevents the
embarrassment of an awkward situation where a tribunal is rendered incompetent in the face of the
greater capability — both analytical and practical — of a tribunal in another jurisdiction.
The trial court assumed jurisdiction and explained in its Order dated August 11, 1995 that "on the
contrary, to try the case in the Philippines, it is believed, would be more convenient to defendant corporation
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as its principal office is located in the Philippines, its records will be more accessible, witnesses would be
readily available and entail less expenses in terms of legal services." We agree. Petitioner is a domestic
corporation with its main office in the Philippines. It is safe to assume that all of its pertinent documents in
relation to its business would be available in its main office. Most of petitioner's officers and employees who
were involved in the construction contract in Malaysia could most likely also be found in the Philippines.
Thus, it is unexpected that a Philippine corporation would rather engage this civil suit before Malaysian courts.
Our courts would be "better positioned to enforce the judgment and, ultimately, to dispense" in this case
against petitioner.
Also, petitioner failed to plead and show real and present danger that another jurisdiction
commenced litigation and the foreign tribunal chose to exercise jurisdiction.
II.
This court has consistently held that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. In
other words, there is no denial of the right to due process if there was an opportunity for the parties to defend
their interests in due course.
Petitioner had been able to file a Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam before the trial court,
and later elevated its case before the Court of Appeals. There is no denial of due process if a party was given
an opportunity to be heard in a Motion for Reconsideration.
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Q: Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) and Asiavest Holdings entered into contracts to
construct rural roads and bridges for the State of Pahang, Malaysia. In connection with this construction
contract, PNCC obtained various guarantees and bonds from Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad to
guarantee the due performance of its obligations. The four contracts of guaranty stipulate that Asiavest
Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad shall guarantee to the State of Pahang "the due performance by PNCC of its
construction contracts and the repayment of the temporary advances given to PNCC." These contracts were
understood to be governed by the laws of Malaysia.
There was failure to perform the obligations under the construction contract, prompting the State of Pahang
to demand payment against Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad's performance bonds. The corporation
demanded indemnity from PNCC by demanding the amount it paid to the State of Pahang. Asiavest
Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad filed a Complaint for recovery of sum of money against PNCC before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, basing its action on Malaysian laws. PNCC contends that the trial court could
have invoked the principle of forum non conveniens and refused to take cognizance of the case considering
the difficulty in acquiring jurisdiction over the two Malaysian corporations and in determining PNCC's exact
liability. Is the contention of PNCC correct?
A: NO. The determination of whether to entertain a case is addressed to the sound discretion of the court,
exist to warrant its desistance from assuming jurisdiction. The trial court assumed jurisdiction and explained
that "on the contrary, to try the case in the Philippines, it is believed, would be more convenient to defendant
corporation as its principal office is located in the Philippines, its records will be more accessible, witnesses
would be readily available and entail less expenses in terms of legal services."(Philippine National
Construction Corporation v. Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad, G.R. No. 172301, August 19, 2015, as
penned by J. Leonen)
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST,

NOW PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OFFICE (PMO), Petitioner, v. VIRGILIO M.
TATLONGHARI, DOMINGO P. UY, GUILLERMO P. UY, HINOSAN MOTORS
CORPORATION, AND WESTERN GUARANTY CORPORATION, Respondents.
G.R. No. 170458 | Second Division | November 23, 2015 | Leonen, J.
DOCTRINE:
The notation "in trust for" or "for escrow" that comes with deposited funds indicates that the deposit
is for the benefit of a third party. In this case, Asset Privatization Trust deposited funds "in trust for" Pantranco
North Express, Inc., a corporation under the management of Asset Privatization Trust. These funds belong
to Pantranco.
FACTS:
Pantranco was formerly a government-owned and controlled corporation without original charter. In
1972, Pantranco suffered financial losses. Pantranco's assets was foreclosed by Philippine National Bank, and
in 1978, the ownership of Pantranco was transferred to the National Investment Development Corporation,
a subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank.
National Investment Development Corporation sold Pantranco to North Express Transport, Inc.
After the 1986 People Power Revolution, Pantranco was sequestered by the Presidential Commission on
Good Government. Pantranco was allegedly part of Ferdinand Marcos' ill-gotten wealth. The sequestration
was lifted in 1988 "to give way to the sale of Pantranco North Express Inc." At that time, Asset Privatization
Trust took over Pantranco's management.
A Complaint was filed against Pantranco. This was entitled Imexco Enterprises, Inc. v. Northern
Express Transport, Inc., PNEI, PNB, NIDC, SBTC and APT (Imexco case). In the Imexco case, the trial
court allowed the sale of Pantranco's assets. In view of the trial court Order, Pantranco's Board of Directors
passed a Resolution authorizing the transfer of P20 million to Asset Privatization Trust as the manager of
Pantranco.
Meanwhile, Domingo P. Uy, Guillermo P. Uy, and Hinosan Motors Corporation, as separate
creditors of Pantranco, filed separate civil cases against Pantranco. The Decisions promulgated were all in
favor of Domingo P. Uy, Guillermo P. Uy, and Hinosan Motors, and the total monetary award of these
Decisions amounted to P27,815,188.52. Acting on the Decisions, Sheriffs Carmelo V. Cachero, Rodrigo R.
Orfiano, and Gerry Duncan served Notices of Garnishment on Virgilio M. Tatlonghari who was then the
National Treasurer.
Asset Privatization Trust, through Atty. Jose C. Sison informed the sheriffs "that the subject funds
belong to the government and not subject to execution notwithstanding the filing of bonds."
The trial court explained that since Section 33 of Proclamation No. 50 provides that proceeds from the sale
of assets form part of the general fund of national government, the assets in this case, which are in cash, should
automatically be considered as part of the general fund.
The Court of Appeals held that the phrases "for escrow" and "in trust for" should be construed in their ordinary
meaning. Clearly, that the funds were held "for escrow" and "in trust for" meant that Asset Privatization Trust
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was holding the funds for Pantranco. Moreover, if the funds were indeed government funds, there would be
"no need to specify the nature of the deposit."
ISSUE:
Whether the funds belonging to Pantranco are in the nature of private funds (YES)
RULING:
We rule that the subject funds belong to Pantranco and are in the nature of private funds. Hence,
the subject funds can be garnished and be used to satisfy the claims of respondents Tatlonghari, Domingo P.
Uy, Guillermo P. Uy, Hinosan Motors, and Western Guaranty Corporation.
The definition of "government funds" is provided under the Revised Administrative Code and
Presidential Decree No. 1445:
"Government funds" includes public moneys of every sort and other resources pertaining to any
agency of the Government.
The phrase "pertaining to any agency of the Government" distinguishes government funds from
private funds. The definition of "government funds" indicates that for funds to be considered government
funds or public funds, it must be shown that the funds properly belong to a government agency. The
determination of the nature of funds is important especially in cases where there are allegations that the funds
involved are government funds. The general rule is that government funds cannot be garnished.
In this case, petitioner has not shown that Pantranco is a government entity. As the history of
Pantranco shows, it was originally a government corporation, was foreclosed by Philippine National Bank,
and was later sold and incorporated as a private corporation. Pantranco was sequestered, but the sequestration
did not have the effect of transferring ownership to the national government. When Pantranco was under
sequestration, it remained to be a private corporation, and its funds also remained to be private. Although the
Presidential Commission on Good Government is a government agency, it does not follow that Pantranco's
funds were converted into public funds by the mere fact that its conservator was a government agency.
Before the Asset Privatization Trust can "take title to and possession of assets, a deed of assignment
must be executed, evidencing the transfer of assets in favor of national government. This requirement is
provided under Section 24 of Proclamation No. 50. In this case, petitioner did not present the Deed of
Assignment that would show that Pantranco or its assets had been transferred to national government. Hence,
while petitioner acts as the manager of Pantranco, it has not necessarily acquired ownership over Pantranco's
assets. To rule that all assets under the management of petitioner are automatically converted to government
property is dangerous because it may affect the rights of creditors. As held by this court, a private corporation
remains to be private unless there is a final determination by the courts that it was acquired through the use
of ill-gotten wealth.
Moreover, if petitioner believed that the subject funds were public funds, then the words "in trust for"
and "for escrow" should not have been used when it deposited the subject funds with the Central Bank.
This court has defined "escrow" as:
A written instrument which by its terms imports a legal obligation and which is deposited by the
grantor, promisor, or obligor, or his agent with a stranger or third party, to be kept by the depositary until the
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performance of a condition or the happening of a certain event, and then to be delivered over to the grantee,
promisee, or obligee.
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Q: Pantranco was formerly a government-owned and controlled corporation. When it suffered financial
losses, the ownership of Pantranco was transferred to the National Investment Development Corporation, a
subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank. The National Investment Development Corporation sold
Pantranco to North Express Transport, Inc. After the 1986 People Power Revolution, Pantranco was
sequestered by the Presidential Commission on Good Government as Pantranco was allegedly part of
Ferdinand Marcos' ill-gotten wealth. The sequestration was lifted in 1988 "to give way to the sale of Pantranco
North Express Inc." At that time, Asset Privatization Trust took over Pantranco's management.
Domingo P. Uy, Guillermo P. Uy, and Hinosan Motors Corporation, as separate creditors of Pantranco,
filed separate civil cases against Pantranco. The Decisions promulgated were all in favor of Domingo,
Guillermo, and Hinosan Motors. Acting on the decisions, the sheriffs served Notices of Garnishment but
Asset Privatization Trust informed the sheriffs "that the subject funds belong to the government and not
subject to execution notwithstanding the filing of bonds." Is the contention of Asset Privatization Trust
correct?
A: NO. As the history of Pantranco shows, it was originally a government corporation, was foreclosed by
Philippine National Bank, and was later sold and incorporated as a private corporation. Pantranco was
sequestered, but the sequestration did not have the effect of transferring ownership to the national
government. When Pantranco was under sequestration, it remained to be a private corporation, and its funds
also remained to be private. Although the Presidential Commission on Good Government is a government
agency, it does not follow that Pantranco's funds were converted into public funds by the mere fact that its
conservator was a government agency. (Republic of the Philippines v. Virgilio M. Tatlonghari, G.R. No.
170458, November 23, 2015, as penned by J. Leonen)
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MARILOU S. LAUDE AND MESEHILDA S. LAUDE, Petitioners, --versus-- HON. ROLINE M.

GINEZ-JABALDE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 74, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF THE CITY
OF OLONGAPO; HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HON. ALBERT
F. DEL ROSARIO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS; HON. GEN.
GREGORIO PIO P. CATAPANG, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES; HON. EMILIE FE DELOS SANTOS, CHIEF CITY PROSECUTOR OF
OLONGAPO CITY; AND L/CPL JOSEPH SCOTT PEMBERTON, Respondent.
G.R. No. 217456| En Banc | November 24, 2015 | Leonen, J.
DOCTRINE:
Failure to meet the three-day notice rule for filing motions and to obtain the concurrence of the
Public Prosecutor to move for an interlocutory relief in a criminal prosecution cannot be excused by general
exhortations of human rights.
FACTS:
Jeffrey "Jennifer" Laude was killed in Olongapo City allegedly by 19-year-old US Marine L/CPL
Joseph Scott Pemberton. The Public Prosecutor filed an Information for murder against Pemberton before
the Regional Trial Court in Olongapo City. A warrant of arrest against Pemberton was likewise issued.
Pemberton surrendered personally to Judge Roline M. Ginez-Jabalde on December 19, 2014, and
he was then arraigned. On the same day, Marilou S. Laude filed an Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail and a Motion to Allow
Media Coverage. The Motion was scheduled for hearing on December 22, 2014, at 2 p.m. According to
petitioners, they were only able to serve the Motion on Pemberton's counsel through registered mail. In any
case, they claim to have also furnished a copy of the Motion personally at the hearing of the Motion.
Judge Ginez-Jabalde denied petitioners' Urgent Motion for lack of merit. Petitioners filed a Motion
for Reconsideration but was also denied by Judge Ginez-Jabalde.
Petitioners argue that respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to an excess
or absence of jurisdiction when she dismissed the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail based on mere technicalities. In
particular, they argue that the three-day rule on motions under Rule 15, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Court
is not absolute, and should be liberally interpreted when a case is attended by exigent circumstances.
Petitioners advance that the rationale behind the three-day notice rule is satisfied when there is an opportunity
to be heard, which was present in this case since Pemberton's counsel and the Public Prosecutor were present
in the hearing of the two Motions filed by petitioners.
Petitioners further argue that Judge Ginez-Jabalde should not have dismissed the Urgent Motion to
Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail
"considering that the Urgent Motion raised issues that are of transcendental importance and of primordial
public interest." Petitioners aver that under international human rights law, in particular the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for
Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, they have the right to access to justice, which is "distinct from the
power of the Public Prosecutors to prosecute the criminal case."
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ISSUE:
1. Whether the failure of the petitioners to comply with the three day notice rule is justified (NO)
2. Whether petitioners’ reliance on the right to access to justice under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political to justify their failure to comply with a domestic procedural rule was proper (NO)
RULING:
I.
The failure of petitioners to comply with the three-day notice rule is unjustified. Rule 15, Section 4
of the Rules of Court clearly makes it a mandatory rule that the adverse party be given notice of hearing on
the motion at least three days prior. Failure to comply with this notice requirement renders the motion
defective consistent with protecting the adverse party's right to procedural due process. In Jehan Shipping
Corporation:
As an integral component of procedural due process, the three-day notice required by the Rules is
not intended for the benefit of the movant. Rather, the requirement is for the purpose of avoiding
surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet the
arguments in the motion before a resolution by the court. Principles of natural justice demand that
the right of a party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard.
While the general rule is that a motion that fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 15 is a mere
scrap of paper, an exception may be made and the motion may still be acted upon by the court, provided
doing so will neither cause prejudice to the other party nor violate his or her due process rights. The adverse
party must be given time to study the motion in order to enable him or her to prepare properly and engage
the arguments of the movant. In this case, the general rule must apply because Pemberton was not given
sufficient time to study petitioners' Motion, thereby depriving him of his right to procedural due process.
Petitioners admit that they personally furnished Pemberton a copy of the Urgent Motion to Compel
the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail only during
the hearing.
Even granting that Pemberton's counsel was able to comment on the motion orally during the hearing,
which incidentally was set for another incident, it cannot be said that Pemberton was able to study and prepare
for his counterarguments to the issues raised in the Motion. Judge Ginez-Jabalde was correct to deny the
Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the
Olongapo City Jail based on noncompliance of procedural rules. To rule otherwise would be to prejudice
Pemberton's rights as an accused.
II.
Article 2, paragraph (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states:
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall
have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons
acting in an official capacity;
b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined
by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent
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authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of
judicial remedy;
c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.
There is no need to discuss whether this provision has attained customary status, since under treaty
law, the Philippines, as a State Party, is obligated to comply with its obligations under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. However, petitioners went too far in their interpretation, ignoring
completely the nature of the obligation contemplated by the provision in an attempt to justify their failure to
comply with a domestic procedural rule aimed to protect a human right in a proceeding, albeit that of the
adverse party.
The obligation contemplated by Article 2, paragraph (3) is for the State Party to establish a system of accessible
and effective remedies through judicial and administrative mechanisms. The present trial of Pemberton, to
which petitioner, Marilou S. Laude, is included as a private complainant, indicates that there is a legal system
of redress for violated rights. That petitioners chose to act on their own, in total disregard of the mechanism
for criminal proceedings established by this court, should not be tolerated under the guise of a claim to justice.
This is especially in light of petitioners' decision to furnish the accused in the case a copy of her Motion only
during the hearing. Upholding human rights pertaining to access to justice cannot be eschewed to rectify an
important procedural deficiency that was not difficult to comply with. Human rights are not a monopoly of
petitioners. The accused also enjoys the protection of these rights.
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Q: Jennifer Laude was killed by 19-year-old US Marine Joseph Pemberton. An Information for murder was
filed against Joseph and a warrant of arrest against was subsequently issued. Joseph surrendered personally to
Judge Roline on December 19, 2014, and he was then arraigned. On the same day, Marilou Laude, Jennifer’s
sibling and one of the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to
Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail. The Motion was scheduled for hearing on
December 22, 2014, at 2 p.m. According to petitioners, they were only able to serve the Motion on Joseph's
counsel through registered mail. In any case, they claim to have also furnished a copy of the Motion personally
at the hearing of the Motion.
Judge Roline denied petitioners' Urgent Motion for lack of merit. Petitioners argue that Judge Roline
committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to an excess or absence of jurisdiction when she dismissed
the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the
Olongapo City Jail based on mere technicalities. They argue that the three-day rule on motions under the
1997 Rules of Court is not absolute, and should be liberally interpreted when a case is attended by exigent
circumstances. Is the contention of the petitioners correct?
A: NO. The failure of petitioners to comply with the three-day notice rule is unjustified. Rule 15, Section 4
of the Rules of Court clearly makes it a mandatory rule that the adverse party be given notice of hearing on
the motion at least three days prior. Failure to comply with this notice requirement renders the motion
defective consistent with protecting the adverse party's right to procedural due process. (Marilou S. Laude v.
Hon. Roline M. Ginez-Jabalde, G.R. No. 217456, November 24, 2015, as penned by J. Leonen)
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner - versus – MOLDEX REALTY, INC., et. al,
Respondents
G.R. No. 171041 | SECOND DIVISION | February 10, 2016 | LEONEN, J.
A case becomes moot and academic when, by virtue of supervening events, the conflicting issue that may be
resolved by the court ceases to exist. There is no longer any justiciable controversy that may be resolved by
the court. This court refuses to render advisory opinions and resolve issues that would provide no practical
use or value. This court’s generally “decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of
“mootness.”
FACTS:
On January 2000, Luis Erce, Rosa Cinense, and Maria Clara Erce Landicho applied for the registration of
parcels of land in Indang, Cavite, designated as Lot Nos. 9715-A, 9715-B, and 9715-C before the Regional
Trial Court. The properties had a total area of 80,565 square meters.
Eventually, applicants sold Lot Nos. 9715-B and 9715-C, with a total land area of 40,000 square meters, to
Moldex Realty, Inc. Applicants were later substituted by Moldex Realty, Inc. in the application for registration
pending before the Regional Trial Court. Lot No. 9715-A was dropped from the application for registration.
To prove its title, Moldex Realty, Inc. presented the testimonies of Engineer John Arvin Manaloto (Manaloto)
and Pio Atis. Manaloto, testified for the sale of the properties with heirs of Erce; that the technical descriptions
and the subdivision plan covering the properties are approved by the Bureau of Lands; tax declarations
showing that the properties had been owned by the Erces; and that he was able to secure from the Forest
Management Sector of Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of Trece Martires City a
certification that the properties were declared alienable and disposable. Pio Atis, on the other hand, testified
that he knew the owners of the properties before Moldex Realty Inc.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a decision granting the application.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTC's
Decision before the Court of Appeals, arguing that Moldex Realty, Inc. failed to prove its open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the property since June 12, 1945, or for more than 30 years. The
possession of Moldex Realty, Inc.'s predecessors-in-interest cannot result in adverse possession against the
Republic since it was only in 1982 when the properties had been classified as alienable and disposable.
The Court of Appeals (CA), still granted the application of Moldex Realty Inc. citing Republic v. Naguiat
ruling that, an application for registration satisfies the requirement that the property is classified as alienable
and disposable if the land has been alienable and disposable at the time of the application for registration.
The OSG then filed for a petition for review arguing that Moldex Realty, Inc. failed to prove that it or its
predecessors-in-interests had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property
in the concept of an owner from June 12, 1945 or for at least 30 years. It also argued that in affirming the
RTC Decision, the CA erroneously relied on Naguit instead of Republic v. Herbieto.
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On March 2012, the court received a Manifestation and Motion from Moldex Realty, Inc. stating that
although it had already been issued a favorable decision by the RTC and the CA, it opted to withdraw its
application for registration of the properties in its name. Hence, the case had become moot and academic.
Petitioner filed its Comment on the Manifestation and Motion. Moldex Realty, Inc. pointed out that since
the RTC and the CA had already issued a decision in its favor, the court should not just dismiss petitioner's
appeal; but, it should reverse and set aside the Decisions of the RTC and of the CA in favor of Moldex Realty,
Inc.
ISSUE:
Whether Moldex Realty, Inc.'s withdrawal of its application for land registration has rendered this case moot
and academic
RULING:
YES. Respondent's withdrawal of its application for registration has rendered this case moot and academic.
This court's power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies. Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution provides:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
There is an actual case or controversy when the case presents conflicting or opposite legal rights that may be
resolved by the court in a judicial proceeding.
A case becomes moot and academic when, by virtue of supervening events, the conflicting issue that may be
resolved by the court ceases to exist. There is no longer any justiciable controversy that may be resolved by
the court. This court refuses to render advisory opinions and resolve issues that would provide no practical
use or value. Thus, courts generally "decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness."
Respondent's Manifestation stating its withdrawal of its application for registration has erased the conflicting
interests that used to be present in this case. Respondent's Manifestation was an expression of its intent not
to act on whatever claim or right it has to the property involved. Thus, the controversy ended when respondent
filed that Manifestation.
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Q: Moldex Realty Inc. filed for the registration of the parcels of land wherein the RTC granted its application.
The OSG appealed the Decision to CA where it contended that the Moldex Realty Inc. failed to to prove its
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property since June 12, 1945, or for more than
30 years. However, the CA still granted the application of Moldex ruling that an application for registration
satisfies the requirement that the property is classified as alienable and disposable if the land has been
alienable and disposable at the time of the application for registration. OSG then filed for a petition for review
against the granted application for registration of land for Moldex Realty, Inc. During the pendency of the
case, court received a Manifestation and Motion from Moldex Realty, Inc. stating that although it had already
been issued a favorable decision by the RTC and the CA, it opted to withdraw its application for registration
of the properties in its name. Hence, the case had become moot and academic. Is the withdrawal of Moldex
Realty, Inc.'s of its application for land registration has rendered this case moot and academic?
A: YES. Respondent's Manifestation stating its withdrawal of its application for registration has erased the
conflicting interests that used to be present in this case. Respondent's Manifestation was an expression of its
intent not to act on whatever claim or right it has to the property involved. Thus, the controversy ended when
respondent filed that Manifestation. A case becomes moot and academic when, by virtue of supervening
events, the conflicting issue that may be resolved by the court ceases to exist. There is no longer any justiciable
controversy that may be resolved by the court. This court refuses to render advisory opinions and resolve
issues that would provide no practical use or value. Thus, courts generally "decline jurisdiction over such case
or dismiss it on ground of mootness."
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QUEZON CITY PTCA FEDERATION, INC., Petitioner - versus – DEPARTMENT OF

EDUCATION, represented by SECRETARY JESLI A. LAPUS, Respondents
G.R. No. 188720 | EN BANC | February 23, 2016 | LEONEN, J.
The three powers of government—executive, legislative, and judicial—have been generally viewed as
non-delegable. However, in recognition of the exigencies that contemporary governance must address, our
legal system has recognized the validity of "subordinate legislation," or the rule-making power of agencies
tasked with the administration of government.
FACTS:
On June 1, 2009, the Department of Education, through Former Secretary Jesli A. Lapus, issued
Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009 entitled Revised Guidelines Governing Parents-Teachers
Associations (PTAs) at the School Level.
The Department Order sought to address the limitations of the guidelines set forth in D.O. No. 23,
s. 2003 and was issued in response to increasing reports of malpractices by officers or members of PTAs,
such as, but not limited to (1) officers absconding with contributions and membership fees; (2) non-disclosure
of the status of funds and non-submission of financial statements; and (3) misuse of funds.
More specifically, the D.O provides for 1) The approval of the school head as a prerequisite for
PTAs to be organized, 2) the terms of office and manner of election of a PTA’s board of directors, and 3)
the cessation of recognition of existing parents-teachers community associations (PTCAs) and of their
federations effective school year 2009–2010. The Department Order gave them until June 30, 2009 to
dissolve, wind up their activities, submit financial reports, and turn over all documents to school heads and
schools division superintendents.
Petitioner Quezon City PTCA Federation filed the present petition that the contents of the D.O.
undermine the independence of PTAS and PTCAs, effectively amend the constitutions and by-laws of
existing PTAs and PTCAs, and violate its constitutional rights to organize and to due process, as well as other
existing laws.
ISSUE:
Whether the Department Order was a valid exercise of DepEd’s rule-making powers
RULING:
YES. The three powers of government—executive, legislative, and judicial—have been generally
viewed as non-delegable. However, in recognition of the exigencies that contemporary governance must
address, our legal system has recognized the validity of "subordinate legislation," or the rule-making power of
agencies tasked with the administration of government.
In Eastern Shipping Lines v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration:
The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the
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Government but is especially important in the case of the legislative power because of the many
instances when its delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial powers
have to be delegated by the authorities to which they legally pertain. In the case of the legislative
power, however, such occasions have become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This has
led to the observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-
delegation the exception.
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability
of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of
society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature
cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become
necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may
not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions.
These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the
particular fields assigned to them.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly
applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant
peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to
administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute.
This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a
statute by "filling in" the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to
provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such
as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These
regulations have the force and effect of law.
Administrative agencies, however, are not given unfettered power to promulgate rules. As noted in
Gerochi v. Department of Energy, two requisites must be satisfied in order that rules issued by administrative
agencies may be considered valid: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
The Education Act of 1982 vested in the then Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports "[t]he
administration of the education system and . . . the supervision and regulation of educational institutions."
Section 70 of the Education Act of 1982 vested rule-making authority in the Minister of Education who, under
Section 55 of the same statute, was the head of the Ministry:
Section 70. Rule-making Authority. – The Minister of Education, Culture and Sports
charged with the administration and enforcement of this Act, shall promulgate the necessary
implementing rules and regulations.
Apart from the Education Act of 1982, Book IV, Chapter 2 of the Administrative Code provides for
the rule-making power of the secretaries heading the departments that comprise the executive branch of
government:
SECTION 7. Powers and Functions of the Secretary.—The Secretary shall:
(4) Promulgate administrative issuances necessary for the efficient administration of the
offices under the Secretary and for proper execution of the laws relative thereto. These issuances
shall not prescribe penalties for their violation, except when expressly authorized by law;
It was pursuant to this rule-making authority that Former Secretary of Education Jesli A. Lapus
promulgated Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009. As its title denotes, the Department Order provided
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revised guidelines governing PTAs at the school-level.
The Department Order does not exist in a vacuum. As underscored by the Department of Education,
the Department Order was issued "in response to increasing reports of malpractices by officers or members
of PTAs." Thus, the Department Order rationalized the mechanism for the organizing and granting of official
recognition to PTAs.
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Q: The DepEd issued Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009 entitled Revised Guidelines Governing
Parents-Teachers Associations (PTAs) at the School Level. The Department Order sought to address the
limitations of the guidelines set forth and was issued in response to increasing reports of malpractices by
officers or members of PTAs, such as, but not limited to (1) officers absconding with contributions and
membership fees; (2) non-disclosure of the status of funds and non-submission of financial statements; and
(3) misuse of funds. More specifically, the D.O provides for 1) The approval of the school head as a
prerequisite for PTAs to be organized, 2) the terms of office and manner of election of a PTA’s board of
directors, and 3) the cessation of recognition of existing parents-teachers community associations (PTCAs)
and of their federations effective school year 2009–2010. The Department Order gave them until June 30,
2009 to dissolve, wind up their activities, submit financial reports, and turn over all documents to school
heads and schools division superintendents. Is the Department Order a valid exercise of DepEd’s rule-
making powers?
A: YES. The three powers of government—executive, legislative, and judicial—have been generally viewed as
non-delegable. However, in recognition of the exigencies that contemporary governance must address, our
legal system has recognized the validity of "subordinate legislation," or the rule-making power of agencies
tasked with the administration of government. In this case, the DepEd is was vested by the Education Act of
1982 a rule-making authority to promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Moreover, it
also grant the power to the Secretary to promulgate administrative issuances necessary for the efficient
administration of the offices under the Secretary and for proper execution of the laws relative thereto.
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EDNA MABUGAY-OTAMIAS, JEFFREN M. OTAMIAS AND MINOR JEMWEL M. OTAMIAS,

represented by their mother EDNA MABUGAY-OTAMIAS, Petitioners - versus – REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by COL. VIRGILIO O. DOMINGO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE
COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE PENSION AND GRATUITY MANAGEMENT CENTER
(PGMC) OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents
G.R. No. 189516 | SECOND DIVISION | June 8, 2016 | LEONEN, J.
Moreover, the 1987 Constitution gives much importance to the family as the basic unit of society,
such that Article XV is devoted to it. The passage of the Family Code further implemented Article XV of the
Constitution. This Court has recognized the importance of granting support to minor children, provided that
the filiation of the child is proven. In this case, the filiation of Jeffren M. Otamias and Jemwel M. Otamias
was admitted by Colonel Otamias in the Deed of Assignment. Even before the passage of the Family Code,
this Court has given primary consideration to the right of a child to receive support.
FACTS:
Petitioner Edna Mabugay-Otamias (Edna) and retired Colonel Francisco B. Otamias (Colonel
Otamias) were married in 1978 and had 5 children. However, in 2000, the two separated due to his alleged
infidelity. The children remained with Edna.
On August 2002, Edna filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Colonel Otamias before the Provost
Marshall Division of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. She demanded monthly support equivalent to
75% of Colonel Otamias' retirement benefits. Colonel Otamias executed an Affidavit stating that he can only
commit 50% of his retirement benefits for the support of his wife and children. That to implement this
compromise, he is willing to enter into an agreement to his wife through Deed of Assignment, where he
waived 50% of his salary and pension benefits in favor of Edna and their children. Colonel Otamias retired
on April 1, 2003.
The agreement was honored until January 2006. Elena alleged that Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) suddenly decided not to honor the agreement between the Colonel and his family. In a letter, the AFP
Pension and Gratuity Management Center (AFP PGMC) informed Edna that a court order was required for
the AFP PGMC to recognize the Deed of Assignment and act on Edna’s request to receive a portion of the
pension. Edna, on behalf of herself and Jeffren M. Otamias and Jemwel M. Otamias (Edna, et al.), then filed
before the RTC an action for support .
The trial court's Sheriff tried to serve summons on Colonel Otamias several times, to no avail.
Colonel Otamias was subsequently declared in default for failure to file a responsive pleading despite order
of the trial court. The RTC ruled in favor of Edna et al. and ordered the automatic deduction of the amount
of support from the monthly pension of Colonel Otamias.
The AFP, through the Office of the Judge Advocate General, filed a Manifestation/Opposition to the
Decision of the trial court, but it was not given due course due to its late filing. Edna filed a Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Execution, which the trial court granted, and writ was issued. The AFP Finance Center
filed a Motion to Quash the writ of execution and argued that the AFP Finance Center's duty to disburse
benefits is ministerial. It releases benefits only upon the AFP PGMC's approval. However, the RTC denied
the Motion to Quash. The AFP PGMC moved for reconsideration, but it was denied. A Notice of
Garnishment was issued then received by the AFP PGMC.
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The AFP PGMC filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. The
CA granted the petition holding that PD 1638, or the AFP Military Personnel Retirement and Separation
Decree of 1979, in conjunction with Sec. 13, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the right to receive legal support,
or money or property obtained such support, or any pension or gratuity from the Government is exempted
from the monthly pension of retired military personnel. Also citing Pacific Products, Inc. vs. Ong, “[M]oneys
sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government,
belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof. And
still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of public policy forbids it.”
In addition, the AFP PGMC was not impleaded as a party in the action for support; thus, it is not
bound by the Decision.
The Armed Forces of the Philippines, through the OSG, argues that it was not a party to the case
filed by Edna, et al. Thus, "it cannot be compelled to release part of the monthly pension benefits of retired
Colonel Otamias in favor of [Edna, et al]." The OSG avers that the AFP PGMC never submitted itself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court. It was not a party to the case as the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over
the AFP PGMC.
The OSG also argues that Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 and Rule 39, Section 13(1) of
the Rules of Court support the Court of Appeals Decision that Colonel Otamias' pension benefits are exempt
from execution. Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 "does not deprive the survivor/s of a retired or
separated officer or enlisted man of their right to support." Rather, "what is prohibited is for respondent [AFP
PGMC] to segregate a portion of the pension benefit in favor of the retiree's family while still in the hands of
the AFP." Hence, AFP PGMC cannot be compelled to directly give or issue a check in favor of Edna, et al.
ISSUES:
Whether the Deed of Assignment made by Edna and Colonel Otamias is valid
RULINGS:
YES. Article 6 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law
Waiver, as defined by this Court, is a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a

known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver the party would
have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by him to exist,
with the intent that such right shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or such
conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the intentional doing of an act
inconsistent with claiming it.
In determining whether a statutory right can be waived, this Court is guided by the following
pronouncement:
[T]he doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character, and, since the word
'waiver' covers every conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter which
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affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to
him or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred with statute, or
guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in the individual, are intended for
his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights of others, and further provided the waiver of the right
or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy; and the principle is
recognized that everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule made
solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed
with and relinquished without infringing on any public right, and without detriment to the community
at large[.] (Emphasis in the original)
When Colonel Otamias executed the Deed of Assignment, he effectively waived his right to claim
that his retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The right to receive retirement benefits belongs to
Colonel Otamias. His decision to waive a portion of his retirement benefits does not infringe on the right of
third persons, but even protects the right of his family to receive support.
In addition, the Deed of Assignment should be considered as the law between the parties, and its
provisions should be respected in the absence of allegations that Colonel Otamias was coerced or defrauded
in executing it. The general rule is that a contract is the law between parties and parties are free to stipulate
terms and conditions that are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
The Deed of Assignment executed by Colonel Otamias was not contrary to law; it was in accordance
with the provisions on support in the Family Code. Hence, there was no reason for the AFP PGMC not to
recognize its validity. Further, this Court notes that the AFP PGMC granted the request for support of the
wives of other retired military personnel in a similar situation as that of petitioner in this case. Attached to the
Petition are the affidavits of the wives of retired members of the military, who have received a portion of their
husbands' pensions.
Moreover, the 1987 Constitution gives much importance to the family as the basic unit of society,
such that Article XV is devoted to it. The passage of the Family Code further implemented Article XV of the
Constitution. This Court has recognized the importance of granting support to minor children, provided that
the filiation of the child is proven. In this case, the filiation of Jeffren M. Otamias and Jemwel M. Otamias
was admitted by Colonel Otamias in the Deed of Assignment. Even before the passage of the Family Code,
this Court has given primary consideration to the right of a child to receive support.
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Q: Edna was married to Colonel Otamias and had 5 children with him. After many years, Edna and Colonel
Otamias separated and the children remained with the mother. Edna then filed a complaint against Colonel
Otamias to demand monthly support for her and their children of 75% of his retirement benefits. The
Colonel agreed through a Deed of Assignment but only up to 50% of his retirement benefits. After some
time, the granting of monthly checks for Edna were stopped. The AFP argued that it is prohibited is for them
to segregate a portion of the pension benefit in favor of the retiree's family while still in the hands of the AFP.
Hence, it cannot be compelled to directly give or issue a check in favor of Edna, et al. Is the AFP correct in
not honoring the Deed of Assignment of Edna and Colonel Otamias?
A: NO. According to Article 6 of the Civil Code, “rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law,
public order, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized
by law. When Colonel Otamias executed the Deed of Assignment, he effectively waived his right to claim that
his retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The right to receive retirement benefits belongs to Colonel
Otamias. His decision to waive a portion of his retirement benefits does not infringe on the right of third
persons, but even protects the right of his family to receive support.
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ATTY. JOSELITA C. MALIBAGO-SANTOS, CLERK OF COURT VI, OFFICE OF THE CLERK

OF COURT, REGINAL TRIAL COURT, ANTIPOLO CITY, RIZAL, Complainant, - versus –
JUANITO B. FRANCISCO, JR., SHERIFF VI, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT [OCC],
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, ANTIPOLO, RIZAL, Respondent
A.M. No. P-16-3459 | EN BANC | June 21, 2016 | LEONEN, J.
Our Constitution states that “public office is a public trust.” It provides that “public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
FACTS:
Atty. Joselita Malibago-Santos (Atty. Santos) received a letter of Intent to Redeem Subject Property
from Overlook Resort Inc. and its President, Raymond Ricardo, in relation to its extrajudicial foreclosure
case.
Planters Development Bank (Plantersbank) was adjudged highest bidder during the auction held.
Thus, Atty. Santos wrote the bank’s Senior Vice President to inform her of the mortgagor’s intent to redeem
the foreclosed property. She requested the bank to submit a statement of account of all expenses it incurred
relative to the foreclosure sale.
Atty. Santos received a letter from the legal counsel for Plantersbank stating the redemption price for
the foreclosed property and attached were statements of accounts and receipts in support of this amount,
including a receipt for P8,000.00 signed by Sheriff Juanito Francisco (Sherriff Francisco). The said receipt for
P8,000.00 represents the Posting Fee and Sheriff’s Expenses which was signed by the Sheriff. Atty. Santos
required Sheriff Francisco to explain why he did not submit an estimate expenses and liquidation in relation
to the amount he received.
Sheriff Francisco submitted an Explanation and then, Position Paper admitting having received a
check for P8,000.00 from Plantersbank. He furthered that the stated that he received the check when the
auction had already been concluded, as a token of appreciation. The auction was conducted in the manner
provided by law, without any irregularity. Rule 141 of Rule of Courts, which required the submission of
estimate expenses, only pertains to execution of writs, and in his honest belief, this provision does not apply
to extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. The Sheriff also said that Plantersbank insisted that it regularly gives
this standard amount as posting fee and sheriff’s expense and alleged that he did not solicit nor demand any
fee, and even initially declined the gratuity.
In a Confidential Memorandum, Judge Ma. Consejo Gengos-Ignalaga recommended that Sheriff

Francisco be found guilty of simple misconduct and reprimanded as penalty. The Office of the Court
Administrator directed the Sheriff to comment on the Memorandum. Sheriff Francisco filed a Manifestation
adopting his Position Paper mentioning that he has been in government service since 19845, and this was his
first time to be charged of an alleged misdeed. The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that the
instant complaint against the Sheriff be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and, find the latter guilty
of gross misconduct and be suspended for 3 months without pay with a stern warning.
ISSUE:
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Whether respondent Sheriff Francisco is guilty of gross misconduct when he accepted the check
from Plantersbank
RULING:
YES. Our Constitution states that “public office is a public trust.” It provides that “public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. Sheriffs play a crucial role in the
justice system as front-line representatives tasked with executing final judgments by the courts. Consequently,
a sheriff must always perform his or her duty with integrity for once he loses the people’s trust, he diminishes
the people’s faith in the judiciary.
Rule 141, Section 10 of the Rules of Court requires sheriffs to submit their expense estimates to the
court for approval, thus:
SECTION 10. Sheriffs, PROCESS SERVERS and other persons serving processes. —
With regard to sheriff's expenses in executing writs issued pursuant to court orders or
decisions or safeguarding the property levied upon, attached or seized, including kilometrage for each
kilometre of travel, guards' fees, warehousing and similar charges, the interested party shall pay said
expenses in an amount estimated by the sheriff, subject to the approval of the court. Upon approval
of the said estimated expenses, the interested party shall deposit such amount with the clerk of court
and ex-officio sheriff, who shall disburse the same to the deputy sheriff assigned to effect the process,
subject to liquidation within the same period for rendering return on the process. The liquidation
shall be approved by the court. Any unspent amount shall be refunded to the party making the
deposit. A full report shall be submitted by the deputy sheriff assigned with his return, and the sheriff's
expenses shall be taxed as costs against the judgment debtor.
In his Position Paper, respondent submits that this provision only applies to execution of writs and
not to extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings such as this case and admits that he honestly believe that official
duties as regards the foreclosure proceedings have already ceased. His admission that he accepted a check
for P8,000.00, which he claims need not be accounted as expense estimates for court approval in accordance
with Rule 141, Section 10, establishes his culpability.
Rule 10, Section 46(A)(10) of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
considers the acceptance of any gratuity in the course of official duty as a grave offense punishable by dismissal
from the service:
Section 46. Classification of Offenses. - Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties

are classified into grave, less grave or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects on the
government service.
A. The following grave offenses shall be punishable by dismissal from the service:
10. Soliciting or accepting directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor,

entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value which in the course of his/her official
duties or in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may
be affected by the functions of his/her office. The propriety or impropriety of the foregoing
shall be determined by its value, kinship, or relationship between giver and receiver and the
motivation. A thing of monetary value is one which is evidently or manifestly excessive by its
very nature[.]
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Those serving in the judiciary must carry the heavy burden and duty of preserving public faith in our
courts and justice system by maintaining high ethical standards. They must stand as "examples of
responsibility, competence and efficiency, and they must discharge their duties with due care and utmost
diligence since they are officers of the court and agents of the law." The Court does not tolerate any
misconduct that tarnishes the judiciary's integrity.
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Q: Sheriff Francisco received a check worth P8,000.00 as a token of appreciation from the Plantersbank as
the auction had already been concluded. The auction was conducted in the manner provided by law, without
any irregularity. The Sheriff explained that Rule 141 of Rule of Courts, which required the submission of
estimate expenses, only pertains to execution of writs, and in his honest belief, this provision does not apply
to extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. He also said that Plantersbank insisted that it regularly gives this
standard amount as posting fee and sheriff’s expense and alleged that he did not solicit nor demand any fee,
and even initially declined the gratuity. Is Sheriff Francisco guilty of gross misconduct?
A: YES. Respondent's Manifestation stating its withdrawal of its application for registration has erased the
conflicting interests that used to be present in this case. Respondent's Manifestation was an expression of its
intent not to act on whatever claim or right it has to the property involved. Thus, the controversy ended when
respondent filed that Manifestation. A case becomes moot and academic when, by virtue of supervening
events, the conflicting issue that may be resolved by the court ceases to exist. There is no longer any justiciable
controversy that may be resolved by the court. This court refuses to render advisory opinions and resolve
issues that would provide no practical use or value. Thus, courts generally "decline jurisdiction over such case
or dismiss it on ground of mootness."
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ARIEL LOPEZ, Petitioner, - versus – PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
G.R No. 212186 | SECOND DIVISION | June 29, 2016 | LEONEN, J.
People v. Chavez discussed that the so-called Miranda rights “are intended to protect ordinary citizens
from the pressures of a custodial setting.” The confrontation between Teresita and petitioner can be
considered as having been done in a custodial setting because 1) petitioner was requested to appear by the
police; (2) the confrontation was done in a police station; and (3) based on his testimony, PO3 Lozarito was
inside the police station during the confrontation. When petitioner appeared before Teresita at the police
station, the "pressures of a custodial setting" were present.
FACTS:
Petitioner Ariel Lopez (Lopez) was charged with violation of P.D No. 533 or The Anti-Cattle Rustling
Law of 1974. That on or about July 17, 2002 in City of Davao, with intent to gain with grave abuse of
confidence and without the knowledge and consent of the complainant, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
took, stole and carried away 1 female carabao valued at P5,000.00, more or less, belonging to Teresita D.
Perez, to the latter's damage and prejudice in the aforesaid amount. Lopez pleaded not guilty during his
arraignment.
During trial, Mario Perez (Perez) testified that he purchased the female carabao and it was evidenced
by a Certificate of Transfer of Large Cattle. He narrated that he tied his carabao to a coconut tree located
inside the property of a certain Constancio Genosas. Around 5:00 a.m. on July 17, 2002, Perez discovered
that the female carabao was missing. He claimed that he searched for his carabao for over a month. After, he
went to the Barangay Captain of Wines to ask for assistance.
Prosecution witness Felix Alderete (Alderete) testified that he worked as an errand boy for Lopez.
The former claimed that he slept at Lopez's house on July 17, 2002 and at around 3:45 a.m. of the next day,
the two went to Constancio Genosas' property. Lopez untied the carabao and allegedly told Alderete that he
would bring this carabao to his boss. He ordered Alderete to deliver the carabao to the boss. Alderete, not
knowing whether the carabao was owned by Lopez, followed Lopez's instructions. The boss was able to
receive the carabao.
Alderete learned that there was a commotion regarding Perez's lost carabao. Afraid of being accused,
Alderete sought help from the barangay police.
Teresita Perez (Teresita) testified that Barangay Police Moralde informed her and Perez, her
husband, that Lopez stole their carabao. Subsequently, a confrontation took place at the barangay police
station. During the confrontation, Lopez admitted to taking the carabao and promised to pay indemnification.
Police Officer III Leo Lozarito (PO3 Lozarito) corroborated Teresita's testimony and stated that a
request for Lopez's appearance was issued, but no custodial investigation was conducted. He claimed that he
simply allowed Lopez and Teresita to "confront each other." He also stated that Lopez wanted to settle by
paying for the carabao, but the parties were unable to agree on the price.
The defense presented Lopez as a witness during trial. Lopez denied stealing the carabao and to
knowing Alderete. He stated that he was a farmer, and that at the time the offense was committed, he was
working at his home. He also knew Teresita because she "used to borrow rice and feeds from his parents”
and was surprised that she accused him of stealing her carabao. Lopez also testified that he went to the police
station where he denied stealing any carabao. After his appearance at the police station, he went home.
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The defense presented another witness, Marvin Bongato, who claimed to have seen a certain "Edoy"
riding a carabao in the morning of July 17, 2002. He denied seeing Alderete riding a carabao on the same
date.
The trial court found Lopez guilty of cattle-rustling and gave credence to Alderete's testimony. In
addition, the trial court discussed that Lopez's defense of denial had no credence because during the meeting
at the police station, Lopez offered to reimburse the value of the carabao and even ask Teresita for
forgiveness.
Lopez filed before the CA an appeal arguing that the prosecution was unable to prove that the carabao
allegedly stolen was the same carabao owned by Mario and Teresita Perez. He argued that the "request for
appearance . . . issued by PO3 Lozarito was in violation of his custodial rights."
The CA ruled that the Certificate of Transfer of Large Cattle and Alderete's testimony were sufficient
to prove the ownership of the lost carabao. It also held that there was no violation of Lopez's custodial rights.
PO3 Lozarito did not ask questions, and Lopez was not compelled to make any admissions. Lopez negotiated
for a settlement with Mario and Teresita Perez, which could not be considered as custodial investigation.
However, the CA modified the penalty imposed by the trial court. Lopez moved for reconsideration,
but the Motion was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner’s appearance to the barangay police can be considered a custodial investigation
RULING:
NO. Petitioner’s appearance to the barangay police can be considered a custodial investigation. The
CA held that "[t]he constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous
statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby the
accused orally admits having committed the crime." However, the record shows that petitioner's appearance
before the police station was far from being voluntary. In this case, the so-called "request for appearance" is
no different from the "invitation" issued by police officers for custodial investigation.
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7438 provides:
SEC. 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or under Custodial Investigation; Duties of

Public Officers. -
As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation"
to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed,
without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law.
Custodial investigation has also been defined as:
Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as
a suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask
questions on the suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission.
The circumstances surrounding petitioner's appearance before the police station falls within the
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definition of custodial investigation. Petitioner was identified as a suspect in the theft of large cattle. Thus,
when the request for appearance was issued, he was already singled out as the probable culprit.
PO3 Lozarito testified that there was no custodial investigation because he did not ask questions. He
"let Teresita and [petitioner] confront each other." However, PO3 Lozarito's explanation attempts to
circumvent the law protecting the rights of the accused during custodial investigation.
People v. Chavez discussed that the so-called Miranda rights "are intended to protect ordinary citizens
from the pressures of a custodial setting." The confrontation between Teresita and petitioner can be
considered as having been done in a custodial setting because (1) petitioner was requested to appear by the
police; (2) the confrontation was done in a police station; and (3) based on his testimony, PO3 Lozarito was
inside the police station during the confrontation. When petitioner appeared before Teresita at the police
station, the "pressures of a custodial setting" were present.
People v. Bio has held that "the infractions of the so-called Miranda rights render inadmissible only
the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation." With this rule applied and
petitioner's uncounselled admission disregarded, petitioner should still be acquitted because the prosecution
was unable to prove the identity of the lost carabao owned by Mario and Teresita Perez.
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Q: Lopez was charged with violation of PD 533 or the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974. When the Sps. Perez
learned that their carabao is missing, they sought help from the barangay police regarding the incident. One
Alderete came forward to tell the barangay police that it was Lopez who took the carabao of the Sps. Perez.
When Lopez went to the barangay police because of the request for Lopez’s appearance, PO3 Lozarito
claimed that he simply allowed Lopez and Teresita to confront each other. PO3 Lozarito also stated that
Lopez wanted to settle by paying for the carabao, but the parties were unable to agree on the price. The trial
court discussed that Lopez's defense of denial had no credence because during the meeting at the police
station, Lopez offered to reimburse the value of the carabao and even ask Teresita for forgiveness. Is Lopez’s
appearance to the barangay police can be considered a custodial investigation?
A: YES. Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect
in the commission of a crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect's
participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission. PO3 Lozarito testified that there was no custodial
investigation because he did not ask questions. The circumstances surrounding petitioner's appearance before
the police station falls within the definition of custodial investigation. Petitioner was identified as a suspect in
the theft of large cattle. Thus, when the request for appearance was issued, he was already singled out as the
probable culprit. He "let Teresita and [petitioner] confront each other." However, PO3 Lozarito's explanation
attempts to circumvent the law protecting the rights of the accused during custodial investigation.
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JANET LIM NAPOLES, Petitioner, v. HON. SECRETARY LEILA DE LIMA, PROSECUTOR

GENERAL CLARO ARELLANO, AND SENIOR DEPUTY STATE PROSECUTOR THEODORE
M. VILLANUEVA, IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS OFFICERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 150, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION (NBI), ARTURO F. LUY, GERTRUDES K. LUY, ANNABELLE LUY-REARIO,
AND BENHUR K. LUY, Respondents.
G.R. No. 213529 | Second Division | July 13, 2016 | Leonen, J.
DOCTRINE:
A decision convicting an accused moots any proceeding that questions the determination of probable
cause, either in the filing of the information in court or in the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Guilt beyond
reasonable doubt had then been established, and questioning whether a lower quantum of proof exists, i.e.,
probable cause, would be pointless.
FACTS:
This case stems from a Joint Sworn Statement executed by Arturo Francisco Luy, Gertrudes Luy,
Arthur Luy, and Annabelle Luy on March 8, 2013. They alleged that a family member, Benhur Luy, had
been detained against his will since December 19, 2012, transferred from place to place in a bid to cover up
the JLN Group of Companies' anomalous transactions involving the Priority Development Assistance Fund.
Napoles, owner of the JLN Group of Companies, and her brother, Reynald Lim (Lim), allegedly
masterminded the "pork barrel scam" and the detention of Benhur Luy.
Acting on the Joint Sworn Statement, Secretary of Justice Leila M. De Lima directed the National
Bureau of Investigation Special Task Force to investigate the matter. This led to a "rescue operation" to release
Benhur Luy who, at that time, was reportedly detained in a condominium unit at Pacific Plaza Tower,
Bonifacio Global City. Lim, who was with Benhur Luy at the condominium unit, was arrested by operatives
of the National Bureau of Investigation.
In the March 23, 2013 Recommendation addressed to Prosecutor General Claro A. Arellano,
National Bureau of Investigation Director Nonnatus Caesar R. Rojas requested the prosecution of Lim and
Napoles for serious illegal detention. In their respective Counter-Affidavits, Lim and Napoles denied illegally
detaining Benhur Luy.
Finding no probable cause against Lim and Napoles, Assistant State Prosecutor Juan Pedro V. Navera
recommended the dismissal of the complaint for serious illegal detention in the Resolution dated June 10,
2013. As to the claim that Benhur Luy was detained to cover up the alleged anomalous transactions of the
JLN Group of Companies involving the Priority Development Assistant Fund, Prosecutor Navera said that
the claim was too speculative and not sufficiently established.
Prosecutor Navera's recommendation was initially approved by Prosecutor General Arellano.

However, in the Review Resolution dated August 6, 2013, Senior Deputy State Prosecutor and Chair of the
Task Force on Anti-Kidnapping Theodore M. Villanueva reversed the June 10, 2013 Resolution and
recommended filing an information for serious illegal detention against Lim and Napoles. According to
Prosecutor Villanueva, the alleged diversion of government funds to the JLN Group of Company's dummy
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foundations was necessary to "establish the alleged motive of Napoles and Lim in detaining Benhur Luy
against his will."
The Review Resolution was approved by Prosecutor General Arellano, and an Information for
serious illegal detention was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati against Napoles and Lim. The
case was raffled to Branch 150 presided by Judge Elmo M. Alameda. Recommending no bail for Napoles
and Lim, Judge Alameda issued a warrant for their arrest.
Napoles filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion
on the part of Secretary De Lima, Prosecutor General Arellano, Prosecutor Villanueva, Director Rojas, and
of Judge Alameda. She contended that there was no probable cause to charge her with serious illegal
detention, and that Judge Alameda erred in issuing the arrest warrant despite the pendency of her Motion for
Judicial Determination of Probable Cause.
The CA ruled that full discretionary authority in the determination of probable cause during a
preliminary investigation has been delegated to the executive branch, particularly at the first instance to the
public prosecutor, and ultimately to the Department of Justice. Hence, absent any grave abuse of discretion,
courts will not disturb the public prosecutor's finding of probable cause. The Court of Appeals observed that
the Review Resolution "showed the reasons for the course of action the prosecution had taken which were
thoroughly and sufficiently discussed therein." With respect to the issuance of the arrest warrant, the Court of
Appeals noted Napoles' "attempt to quash the warrant of arrest issued against her by way of... petition for
certiorari." Moreover, since Napoles failed to attach copies of the arrest warrant in her Petition for Certiorari,
the Court of Appeals refused to squarely rule on the issue of whether there was grave abuse of discretion in
its issuance. Finding no grave abuse of discretion in the filing of the information in court and the issuance of
the arrest warrant, the Court of Appeals dismissed Napoles' Petition for Certiorari.
On September 11, 2014, Napoles filed before this Court her Petition for Review on Certiorari with
Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Napoles maintains
that respondents whimsically and arbitrarily found probable cause against her. She emphasizes that, without
introduction of additional evidence, the Department of Justice reversed its initial Resolution dismissing the
complaint for serious illegal detention.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion: first, in filing an
information for serious illegal detention against Napoles (NO); and, second, in the issuance of a warrant for
her arrest (NO)
RULING:
I.
Even before the filing of this Petition questioning the Review Resolution, an Information for serious
illegal detention has been filed against Napoles. Therefore, with the filing of the Information before the trial
court, this Petition has become moot and academic. The trial court has then acquired exclusive jurisdiction
over the case, and the determination of the accused's guilt or innocence rests within the sole and sound
discretion of the trial court.
It is true that the Constitution allows the exercise of the power of judicial review in cases where grave
abuse of discretion exists. In this case, however, a petition for certiorari before this Court was not the "plain,
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speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law" because, as discussed, the trial court already
acquired jurisdiction over the case. The proper remedy for Napoles was to proceed to trial and allow the
exhaustive presentation of evidence by the parties.
During the pendency of this Petition, the main case from which the Petition for Certiorari stemmed
was decided by the trial court. In its April 14, 2015 Decision, the Regional Trial Court of Makati City found
Napoles guilty beyond reasonable doubt of serious illegal detention. All the more should this Petition be
dismissed. Napoles has been found guilty of serious illegal detention with proof beyond reasonable doubt, a
quantum of evidence higher than probable cause. Resolving whether there was probable cause in the filing of
information before the trial court and in the issuance of an arrest warrant would be "of no practical use and
value."
In any case, despite the mootness of this Petition, we proceed with resolving the issues presented by
the parties for the guidance of the bench and the bar.
II.
During preliminary investigation, the prosecutor determines the existence of probable cause for filing
an information in court or dismissing the criminal complaint. As worded in the Rules of Court, the prosecutor
determines during preliminary investigation whether "there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial." At this stage, the determination of probable cause is an executive function. Absent grave abuse of
discretion, this determination cannot be interfered with by the courts. This is consistent with the doctrine of
separation of powers.
On the other hand, if done to issue an arrest warrant, the determination of probable cause is a judicial
function. No less than the Constitution commands that "no . . . warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce." This requirement of personal evaluation by the judge is
reaffirmed in Rule 112, Section 5(a) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure:
SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. —
(a) By the Regional Trial Court. — Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or
information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order
when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on
the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence
within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days
from the filing of the complaint or information.
Therefore, the determination of probable cause for filing an information in court and that for issuance
of an arrest warrant are different. Once the information is filed in court, the trial court acquires jurisdiction
and "any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court."
There was no grave abuse of discretion in the filing of Information against Napoles. It is true that the
Review Resolution reversed the initial rinding of lack of probable cause against Napoles and Lim. However,
this in itself does not show grave abuse of discretion. The very purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to
give the prosecutor a chance to correct any errors that he or she may have committed in issuing the resolution
ordering the filing of an information in court or dismissing the complaint. A reversal may result if a piece of
evidence that might have yielded a different resolution was inadvertently overlooked.
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In initially dismissing the criminal complaint filed by Benhur Luy's family, the prosecutor disregarded
the purported motive behind Benhur Luy's detention. According to the initial Resolution, whether Napoles
and Lim detained Benhur Luy to prevent him from exposing the anomalous transactions of the JLN Group
of Companies involving the Priority Development Assistance Fund would spawn an entirely different
proceeding; hence, the issue is irrelevant in the proceedings involving the serious illegal detention charge.
Neither was there grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the arrest warrant against Napoles. That
Judge Alameda issued the arrest warrant within the day he received the records of the case from the prosecutor
does not mean that the warrant was hastily issued. "Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-
judicial officer cannot per se be instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of functions. For one's
prompt dispatch may be another's undue haste." Judge Alameda was under no obligation to review the entire
case record as Napoles insists. All that is required is that a judge personally evaluates the evidence and decides,
independent of the finding of the prosecutor, that probable cause exists so as to justify the issuance of an
arrest warrant.
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Q: A sworn statement alleged that Benhur had been detained against his will and transferred from place to
place in order to cover up for JLN Group of Companies' anomalous transactions involving the Priority
Development Assistance Fund. Janet, together with her brother Reynald allegedly masterminded the “pork
barrel scam”. The National Bureau of Investigation Special Task Force investigated the matter and led to a
rescue operation to release Benhur. NBI Director Rojas requested the prosecution of Reynald and Janet for
serious illegal detention. The complaint was dismissed as Assistant State Prosecutor Navera found no
probable cause. Prosecutor Navera's recommendation was initially approved by Prosecutor General Arellano.
However, Senior Deputy State Prosecutor and Chair of the Task Force on Anti-Kidnapping Villanueva
reversed the Resolution and recommended filing an information for serious illegal detention against Reynald
and Janet. Janet filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion
contending that there was no probable cause to charge her with serious illegal detention. Is Janet’s contention
correct?
A: NO. There was no grave abuse of discretion in the filing of Information against Janet. It is true that the
Review Resolution reversed the initial finding of lack of probable cause against Reynald and Janet. However,
this in itself does not show grave abuse of discretion. The very purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to
give the prosecutor a chance to correct any errors that he or she may have committed in issuing the resolution
ordering the filing of an information in court or dismissing the complaint. A reversal may result if a piece of
evidence that might have yielded a different resolution was inadvertently overlooked. (Janet Lim Napoles v.
Hon. Secretary Leila De Lima, G.R. No. 213529, July 13, 2016 as penned by J. Leonen)
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DEVELOPMENT ACADEMY OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner – versus – CHAIRPERSON MA.

GRACIA M. PULIDO TAN, COMMISSIONER JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR., COMMISSIONER
HEIDI L. MENDOZA, AND COMMISSION ON AUDIT Respondent
G.R. No. 203072| En Banc | October 18, 2016 | Leonen, J.
DOCTRINE: The entire point of the Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System is the
recognition of exemplary personal effort. Contributions beyond the ordinary are its essence. Even as Section
2 of Rule X of the Omnibus Rules implementing Book 5 of the Administrative Code refers to "rewarding
officials and employees . . . in groups," the pivotal consideration remains to be innovations or
accomplishments of an exceptional nature, that is, those that may be set apart from what the remainder of
work force has attained. To use the Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System to grant incentive
packages to all employees (excepting only those with disciplinary liabilities) is to run afoul of its very nature.
FACTS:
The Development Academy of the Philippines (DAP) obligated P3,613,998.72 for the grant of its
Financial Performance Award to its officers and employees. It was only in 2004 that the implementing rules
for its grant was issued in the form of DAP Memorandum Circular No. MC-2004-003 and its addendum,
DAP Memorandum Circular No. MC-2004-003A. The memorandum stipulated that those entitled to the
award will be released in two tranches, specifically, all regular employees as well as letter of invitation-based
staff who have rendered service of at least a total of six (6) months in 2002. With the implementing rules in
place, the release and grant of the Financial Performance Award, inclusive of the so-called “MANCOM Fee”
and “Star Award”, followed. In effect, the Financial Performance Award was made available to the
Development Academy of the Philippines’ employees en masse.
On post-audit, Corporate Auditor Ignacio Alfonso issued an Audit Observation Memorandum which
noted the irregularities of the release of the amount to the DAP employees. Acting on the Audit Observation
Memorandum, the Commission on Audit’s Legal and Adjudication Office-Corporate issued a Notice of
Disallowance No. DAP-06-001-(04) disallowing the payment of P4,862.845.71, representing the DAP’s
payment of the Financial Performance Award to its employees “for want of legal basis” and other deficiencies.
In its Response, the DAP asserted that there was ample legal basis for the Award, specifically citing:
(1) P.D. No. 807 or the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, Section 33 which provides for the Employee
Suggestions and Incentive Award System (ESIAS), 92) Rule X, Section 5 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987, and (3) Rule V, Section 2 and 3 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 6713.
In its assailed decision, the COA affirmed the Notice of Disallowance, noting that “the grant of
[Financial Performance Award] from its inception was not valid, and therefore, created no legal obligation
and right.” Hence, the DAP filed the present Petition for Certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent COA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Commission on Audit acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in sustaining the Notice of Disallowance
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RULING:
NO. Republic Act No. 6758 "was passed to standardize salary rates among government personnel
and do away with multiple allowances and other incentive packages and the resulting differences in
compensation among them." Precisely for the purpose of standardization, "the general rule is that all
allowances are deemed included in the standardized salary." However, Republic Act No. 6758's standardized
salary rates and guidelines in Section 9 "do not take into consideration the peculiar characteristics of each
government office where performance of the same work may entail different necessary expenses for the
employee."
It is in recognition of these peculiarities that, through Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758, certain
specified allowances are permitted to be given, on top of or in addition to standardized salaries. The key
consideration for allowances and other incentive packages to be deemed exceptional and permissible under
Section 12 is a showing that they "are given to government employees of certain offices due to the unique
nature of the office and of the work performed by the employee." Petitioner has not shown that its Financial
Performance Award, as obligated and paid for calendar year 2002, is an exceptional incentive package
sanctioned by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758.
Rule X, Section 1 of these Omnibus Rules enables government-owned and controlled corporations
with original charters — such as petitioner — to establish their respective Employee Suggestions and Incentive
Award System, subject to the approval of the Civil Service Commission. Conformably, petitioner drafted
its own Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System, to which the Civil Service Commission
subsequently issued a letter of approval. It is this letter that petitioner capitalizes on, noting that it never
indicated any instruction to modify or remove the grant of Financial Performance Award despite a specific
provision in its submitted draft to the effect that a "[Financial Performance Award] recognizing not only
individual but [even] collective effort for the furtherance of [its] mandate" shall be extended to its employees.
Petitioner's claims are antithetical to the very nature of the Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award
System.
For its part, Section 2 of Rule X of the Omnibus Rules, implementing Book 5 of the Administrative
Code, provides:
SECTION 2. The System is designed to encourage creativity, innovativeness, efficiency, integrity and
productivity in the public service by recognizing and rewarding officials and employees, individually or in
groups, for their suggestions, inventions, superior accomplishments, and other personal efforts which
contribute to the efficiency, economy, or other improvement in government operations, or for other
extraordinary acts or services in the public interest.
Respondents are, therefore, correct. There is no room for the Employee Suggestions and Incentive
Award System for the indiscriminate grant of an incentive package to all employees, or the en masse payment
of the Financial Performance Award, as petitioner did.
The entire point of the Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System is the recognition of
exemplary personal effort. Contributions beyond the ordinary are its essence. Even as Section 2 of Rule X of
the Omnibus Rules implementing Book 5 of the Administrative Code refers to "rewarding officials and
employees . . . in groups," the pivotal consideration remains to be innovations or accomplishments of an
exceptional nature, that is, those that may be set apart from what the remainder of work force has attained.
To use the Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System to grant incentive packages to all employees
(excepting only those with disciplinary liabilities) is to run afoul of its very nature.
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Q: The Development Academy of the Philippines (DAP) obligated P 3,613,998.72 for the grant of its
Financial Performance Award to its officers and employees. It was only in 2004 that the implementing rules
for its grant was issued in the form of DAP Memorandum Circular No. MC-2004-003 and its addendum,
DAP Memorandum Circular No. MC-2004-003A. In effect, the Financial Performance Award was made
available to the Development Academy of the Philippines’ employees en masse.
On post-audit, Corporate Auditor Ignacio Alfonso issued an Audit Observation Memorandum which noted
the irregularities of the release of the amount to the DAP employees. The Commission on Audit’s Legal and
Adjudication Office-Corporate issued a Notice of Disallowance No. DAP-06-001-(04) disallowing the
payment of P4,862.845.71, representing the DAP’s payment of the Financial Performance Award to its
employees “for want of legal basis” and other deficiencies. In its Response, the DAP asserted that there was
ample legal basis for the Award.
The COA affirmed the Notice of Disallowance, noting that “the grant of [Financial Performance Award]
from its inception was not valid, and therefore, created no legal obligation and right.” Did the Commission
on Audit act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in sustaining the Notice
of Disallowance?
A: NO. The entire point of the Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System is the recognition of
exemplary personal effort. Contributions beyond the ordinary are its essence. Even as Section 2 of Rule X of
the Omnibus Rules implementing Book 5 of the Administrative Code refers to "rewarding officials and
employees . . . in groups," the pivotal consideration remains to be innovations or accomplishments of an
exceptional nature, that is, those that may be set apart from what the remainder of work force has attained.
To use the Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System to grant incentive packages to all employees
(excepting only those with disciplinary liabilities) is to run afoul of its very nature.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner – versus – HON. LUISITO G. CORTEZ, Respondent
G.R. No. 187257| En Banc | February 7, 2017 | Leonen, J.
DOCTRINE: SECTION 8. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive

additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the
consent of the Congress, any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign government.
Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation.
FACTS:
In 1976, a salary standardization and compensation plan for public employees, including that of
government-owned and controlled corporations, was enacted through Presidential Decree No. 985. In 1989,
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6758 (Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989) to
standardize compensation and benefits of public employees, effective July 1, 1989. On October 2, 1989, the
Department of Budget and Management issued Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No.
10), which provided for the integration of COLA, AA, and other allowances into the standardized salaries of
public employees effective November 1, 1989.
On April 5, 1993, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7648 (Electric Power Crisis Act of 199),
allowing the President of the Philippines to upgrade the compensation of NAPOCOR employees "at rates
comparable to those prevailing in privately-owned power utilities." On August 12, 1998, this Court
promulgated De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, which found DBM-CCC No. 10 ineffective for lack of
publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, the circular only became
effective on March 16, 1999.
On December 28, 2007, Abner P. Eleria, president of NECU, and Melito B. Lupanggo, president
of NEWU, filed a Petition for Mandamus with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 84, praying
that NAPOCOR be ordered to release the COLA and AA due them. The Petition sought to direct the
National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), its President and its Board of Directors to release and pay the
Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) and Amelioration Allowance (AA) to all NAPOCOR employees beginning
July 1, 1989 to March 16, 1999.
NAPOCOR created a Committee to study the grant of the additional allowances. The Committee
issued a Certification that the COLA and AA were not integrated into the salaries of NAPOCOR employees
hired from July 1, 1989 to March 16, 1999. Due to the continued refusal of NAPOCOR to release the
allowances, NECU and NEWU were constrained to file the Petition for Mandamus.
The RTC rendered its Decision in favor of NECU and NEWU. According to the trial court, the
determination of whether the COLA and AA had been factually integrated was already resolved when the
NAPOCOR Committee certified that the COLA and AA of the employees from July 1, 1989 to December
31, 1993 were not factually integrated into their standardized salaries. The Petition for Mandamus was granted
by the trial court and the NAPOCOR was ordered to pay a total of P6,496,055,339.98 as back payment for
COLA and AA with an additional P704,777,508.60 as legal interest.
Aggrieved, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition docketed
as G.R. No. 187257. The Department of Budget and Management, through Secretary Andaya, Jr. also filed
a Motion for Reconsideration and a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution, while the motions were pending
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before the trial court, the Department of Budget and Management filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 187776.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court violated the Constitution when it ordered NAPOCOR to back pay
COLA and AA from its corporate funds
RULING:
COLA and AA are already deemed integrated into the standardized salaries of the NAPOCOR
employees from July 1, 1989 to December 31, 1993.
Republic Act No. 6758 aimed "to standardize salary rates among government personnel and do away
with multiple allowances and other incentive packages and the resulting differences in compensation among
them. Thus, Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758 introduced the concept of integration of allowance upon
the standardization of the salary rates. Republic Act No. 6758 remained effective during the period of
ineffectivity of DBM-CCC No. 10. Thus, the COLA and AA of NAPOCOR officers and employees were
integrated into the standardized salaries effective July 1, 1989 pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act No.
6758.
Unfortunately, the attached Notices of Position Allocation and Salary Adjustment and pay slips only
served to prove that from July 1, 1989 to December 31, 1993, the COLA and AA were already deemed
integrated into the basic salary. According to the various Notices of Position Allocation and Salary Adjustment
submitted to this Court, the receipt of COLA and AA was not discontinued due to the implementation of
Republic Act No. 6758.
The integration of COLA into the standardized salary rates is not repugnant to the law. Gutierrez, et
al. v. Department of Budget and Management, et al. explains:
COLA is not in the nature of an allowance intended to reimburse expenses incurred by officials and
employees of the government in the performance of their official functions. It is not payment in consideration
of the fulfillment of official duty. As defined, cost of living refers to "the level of prices relating to a range of
everyday items" or "the cost of purchasing those goods and services which are included in an accepted standard
level of consumption." Based on this premise, COLA is a benefit intended to cover increases in the cost of
living. Thus, it is and should be integrated into the standardized salary rates.
Thus, it would be incongruous to grant any alleged back pay of COLA and AA from July 1, 1989 to
December 31, 1993, when the NAPOCOR officers and employees have already received such allowances
for this period. The grant would be tantamount to additional compensation, which is proscribed by Section
8, Article IX (B) of the Constitution:
SECTION 8. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double,
or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the
Congress, any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign government.
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Mandamus cannot lie to compel the performance of an unconstitutional act. The Regional Trial
Court clearly acted in grave abuse of discretion in ordering the back payment, to the affected NAPOCOR
officers and employees, the COLA and AA for the period of July 1, 1989 to December 31, 1993.
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Q: On December 28, 2007, Abner P. Eleria, president of NECU, and Melito B. Lupanggo, president of
NEWU, filed a Petition for Mandamus with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 84, praying
that NAPOCOR be ordered to release the COLA and AA due them. The Committee issued a Certification
that the COLA and AA were not integrated into the salaries of NAPOCOR employees hired from July 1,
1989 to March 16, 1999. Due to the continued refusal of NAPOCOR to release the allowances, NECU and
NEWU were constrained to file the Petition for Mandamus. The RTC rendered its Decision in favor of
NECU and NEWU. The Petition for Mandamus was granted by the trial court and the NAPOCOR was
ordered to pay a total of P6,496,055,339.98 as back payment for COLA and AA with an additional
P704,777,508.60 as legal interest.
Did the trial court violate the Constitution when it ordered NAPOCOR to back pay COLA and AA from its
corporate funds?
A: YES. It would be incongruous to grant any alleged back pay of COLA and AA from July 1, 1989 to
December 31, 1993, when the NAPOCOR officers and employees have already received such allowances
for this period. The grant would be tantamount to additional compensation, which is proscribed by Section
8, Article IX (B) of the Constitution:
SECTION 8. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the Congress, any
present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign government.
Mandamus cannot lie to compel the performance of an unconstitutional act. The Regional Trial Court clearly
acted in grave abuse of discretion in ordering the back payment, to the affected NAPOCOR officers and
employees, the COLA and AA for the period of July 1, 1989 to December 31, 1993.
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AQUILINA B. GRANADA, CARLOS B. BAUTISTA, AND FELIPE PANCHO, Petitioner – versus

– PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
G.R. No. 184092| Second Division| February 22, 2017 | Leonen, J.
DOCTRINE: The Commission on Audit is the guardian of public funds and the Constitution has
vested it with the "power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue
and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property [of] the Government, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters."
FACTS:
Teresita Lagmay, Eden Intencion, and Mabini Reyes of the Commission on Audit, Davao City,
submitted a Joint-Affidavit with an attached Special Audit Report to the Commission on Audit Director
disclosing that the various school forms and construction materials purchased by the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports, now Department of Education, Division Office of Davao for the Elementary
School Building Program were priced above the prevailing market prices, leading to a loss of P613,755.36
due to overpricing. The auditors recommended the refund of the excess amount, and the filing of a criminal
or administrative action against the public officials who participated in the transactions.
The Office of the Ombudsman found that there was sufficient evidence to indict several Department
of Education, Culture and Sports officials for violating Section 3 (g) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
Petitioners Nava, Cabahug, Granada, and Dela Cruz were subsequently charged with Violation of Section 3
(g) of Republic Act No. 3019. Petitioners entered separate pleas of not guilty during their respective
arraignments. The prosecution presented witnesses Araceli P. Geli (Geli), State Auditor for the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports Division office and Lagmay, State Auditor III for the Commission on Audit.
Geli was the state auditor stationed at the Department of Education, Culture and Sports Division
Office, Davao City. She submitted her annual report to the Commission on Audit where she disclosed the
overpricing committed in the Elementary School Building Program. Geli testified that she re-canvassed the
price of each item ordered by the Division Office after she was informed that there was no public bidding
undertaken prior to the purchase. While Lagmay testified that the special audit was prompted by Geli's
findings and that the audited transactions required public bidding but the documents submitted to them for
audit did not show any indication that public bidding was conducted.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of petitioners. The
Sandiganbayan also ruled that there was a concerted effort by the petitioners to facilitate the release of funds
and make it appear that a public bidding took place. The Sandiganbayan denied the motions for
reconsideration filed by Nava, Cabahug, Granada, and Dela Cruz.
Nava filed a petition for certiorari, while Cabahug, Granada and Dela Cruz filed their respective
petitions for review of the Sandiganbayan Decision and Resolution.
Nava asserts in his petition that the Decision erred in applying the presumption of regularity to Geli’s
canvass when Geli did not follow the established Commission on Audit Procedures. The Office of the Special
Prosecutor argued that in the absence of bad faith or malice, the canvass performed by the auditors should
be given the benefit of the doubt due to the presumption of regularity accorded to a public official.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the presumption of regularity applies with the State Auditor’s post-canvass of similar
items purchased by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports from Geomiche
RULING:
YES. The Commission on Audit is the guardian of public funds and the Constitution has vested it
with the "power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and
receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property [of] the Government, or any of its subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters."
The questioned transactions and the delivery of construction materials happened sometime in 1991.
Geli then conducted her post-audit, and submitted her Memorandum and Report on the Annual Operations
Audit on March 6, 1992. Thus, the requirements of canvass sheets or price quotations listed down in the
Commission on Audit's Memorandum Order No. 97-102, which was issued on March 31, 1997, cannot be
applied to Geli's 1992 audit.
More importantly, the Sandiganbayan found that the contract for the purchase of construction
materials and supplies from Geomiche for the construction of school buildings did not undergo public
bidding.
As an auditor of the Commission on Audit, Geli had the same mandate to audit all government
agencies and to be vigilant in safeguarding the proper use of the people's property.
In the absence of malice or bad faith, the canvass and audit performed by the auditors, which were
substantiated by evidence, should be upheld in recognition of their technical expertise. This finds support in
Lumayna, et al. v. Commission on Audit, citing Ocampo v. Commission on Elections, which states: SDHTEC
[I]t must be stressed that factual findings of administrative bodies charged with their specific field of
expertise, are afforded great weight by the courts, and in the absence of substantial showing that such findings
were made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are conclusive, and in the interest
of stability of the governmental structure, should not be disturbed.
Instead of finding fault, the vigilance and initiative of Geli should be commended. Our audit officers
should be expected to discharge their duties with zeal within the bounds of the law.
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Q: A Joint-Affidavit with an attached Special Audit Report to the Commission on Audit Director disclosing
that the various school forms and construction materials purchased by the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports for the Elementary School Building Program were priced above the prevailing market prices,
leading to a loss of P613,755.36 due to overpricing. The Office of the Ombudsman found that there was
sufficient evidence to indict several Department of Education, Culture and Sports officials for violating
Section 3 (g) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
Geli was the state auditor stationed at the Department of Education, Culture and Sports Division Office,
Davao City. She submitted her annual report to the Commission on Audit where she disclosed the
overpricing committed in the Elementary School Building Program. Geli testified that she re-canvassed the
price of each item ordered by the Division Office after she was informed that there was no public bidding
undertaken prior to the purchase. The Sandiganbayan also ruled that there was a concerted effort by the
petitioners to facilitate the release of funds and make it appear that a public bidding took place.
One of the indicted officials, asserts that the Decision of applying the presumption of regularity to Geli’s
canvass is a mistake, when in fact Geli did not follow the established Commission on Audit Procedures.
Should the presumption of regularity apply to Geli’s post-canvass of the similar items purchased by the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports?
A: YES. The Commission on Audit is the guardian of public funds and the Constitution has vested it with
the "power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts
of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property [of] the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies,
or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters."
As an auditor of the Commission on Audit, Geli had the same mandate to audit all government agencies and
to be vigilant in safeguarding the proper use of the people's property.
In the absence of malice or bad faith, the canvass and audit performed by the auditors, which were
substantiated by evidence, should be upheld in recognition of their technical expertise. This finds support in
Lumayna, et al. v. Commission on Audit, citing Ocampo v. Commission on Elections, which states: SDHTEC
[I]t must be stressed that factual findings of administrative bodies charged with their specific field of expertise,
are afforded great weight by the courts, and in the absence of substantial showing that such findings were
made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are conclusive, and in the interest of
stability of the governmental structure, should not be disturbed.
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ROGER RAPSING, Petitioner – versus – JUDGE CARIDAD M. WALSE-LUTERO, Respondent
A.M. No. MTJ-17-1894| En Banc | April 4, 2017 | Leonen, J.
DOCTRINE: In RE: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 55, Malabon City,"[j]udges and branch clerks of court should conduct personally a physical inventory
of the pending cases in their courts and examine personally the records of each case [not only] at the time of
their assumption to office, [but] every semester thereafter on 30 June and 31 December." "[T]he regular and
continuing physical inventory of cases enable[s] the judge to keep abreast of the status of the pending cases
and to be informed that everything in the court is in proper order." Responsibility rests primarily on the judge
and he or she "cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement of his personnel."
FACTS:
Roger Rapsing (Rapsing) accused Presiding Judge Caridad M. Walse-Lutero (Judge Walse-Lutero)
of undue delay in resolving two (2) motions filed by his counsel. Rapsing's Affidavit-Complaint was docketed
as OCA I.P.I. No. 11-2355-MTJ.
Judge Walse-Lutero denied delaying the resolution of the motions. She explained that the Branch
Clerk of Court failed to return the record of the case to her for the resolution of the motions.Carian, the
Docket Clerk-in-Charge averred that the former Clerk-in-Charge turned over all the records of the civil cases
to the Branch Clerk of Court, namely, Rota. Rota admitted that even with intermittent follow-up of the parties,
she failed to refer the case to Judge Walse-Lutero due to the volume of civil cases also for decision. Judge
Wale-Lutero further explained that she inherited several cases of which she could not possibly monitor and
therefore had to rely on Ms.Rota but unfortunately, Rota had been greatly remiss in the performance of her
duties which even led to respondent submitting several memoranda to the Office of the Court Administrator
requesting to drop Rota from the rolls.
The Court resolved to furnish Rota with copies of the Affidavit-Complaint and of the Comment of
Judge Walse-Lutero. The Court equally decided to require her to explain “why she should not be
administratively held liable for gross neglect of duty”. Rota attributed her “neglect/omission/lapse” to the high
caseload of the court, particularly in criminal cases. She also explained that the case record got wet during the
Typhoon Ondoy through a leak in the roof.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommended the dismissal of the case against Judge Walse-
Lutero and to for Rapsing’s complaint to be docketed as a separate administrative matter against Rota for
gross neglect of duty.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Judge Walse-Lutero is liable for neglecting her duty to resolve the motions
expeditiously
2. Whether or not the Office of the Court Administrator was correct in finding Rota guilty of gross
neglect of duty
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RULING:
1. YES. As the presiding judge, it was respondent's responsibility to know which cases or motions
were submitted for decision or resolution. Judges are expected to closely follow the development of cases
and in this respect, "to keep [their] own record of cases so that [they] may act on them promptly."
In RE: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 55, Malabon
City, this Court held that "[j]udges and branch clerks of court should conduct personally a physical inventory
of the pending cases in their courts and examine personally the records of each case [not only] at the time of
their assumption to office, [but] every semester thereafter on 30 June and 31 December." "[T]he regular and
Judges have the duty to administer justice without delay. Judge Walse-Lutero should bear in mind
that those charged with the task of dispensing justice carry a heavy burden of responsibility. As a frontline
official of the Judiciary, a trial judge should at all times maintain professional competence and observe the
high standards of public service and fidelity. Her dedication to duty is the least she could do to sustain the
public's trust and confidence not only in her but more importantly in the institution she represents.
2. YES. Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure of an employee to give one's attention to a
task expected of him or her. Gross neglect of duty is such neglect which, "from the gravity of the case or the
frequency of instances, becomes so serious in its character as to endanger or threaten the public welfare." In
GSIS v. Manalo:
Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence 'refers to negligence characterized by the want of even slight
care, or by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully
and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to the consequences, insofar as other persons may be affected.
It is the omission of that care that even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to give to their own property.'
It denotes a flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness of a person to perform a duty. In cases involving
public officials, gross negligence occurs when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.
Rota's neglect in this case is gross, bordering on utter carelessness or indifference, to the prejudice of
the public she was duty-bound to serve. Her inattentiveness and lack of any effort to even look for the case
records, despite several follow-ups from the complainant, caused unnecessary and undue delay in the progress
of the ejectment case.
Clerks of Court are at the forefront of judicial administration because of their indispensable role in
case adjudication and court management. They are the models for the court employees "to act speedily and
with dispatch on their assigned task[s] to avoid the clogging of cases in court and thereby assist in the
administration of justice without undue delay." Moreover, as public officers, they should discharge their tasks
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency guided by the principle that "public office is a public
trust."
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Q: Roger Rapsing (Rapsing) accused Presiding Judge Caridad M. Walse-Lutero (Judge Walse-Lutero) of
undue delay in resolving two (2) motions filed by his counsel. Judge Walse-Lutero denied delaying the
resolution of the motions. She explained that the Branch Clerk of Court failed to return the record of the
case to her for the resolution of the motions. Rota, the Branch Clerk of Court, admitted that even with
intermittent follow-up of the parties, she failed to refer the case to Judge Walse-Lutero due to the volume of
civil cases also for decision. Judge Wale-Lutero further explained that she inherited several cases of which
she could not possibly monitor and therefore had to rely on Ms.Rota but unfortunately, Rota had been greatly
remiss in the performance of her duties which even led to respondent submitting several memoranda to the
Office of the Court Administrator requesting to drop Rota from the rolls.
1. Is Judge Walse-Lutero liable for neglecting her duty to resolve the motions expeditiously?
2. Is Rota guilty of gross neglect of duty?
A: 1. YES. As the presiding judge, it was respondent's responsibility to know which cases or motions were
submitted for decision or resolution. Judges are expected to closely follow the development of cases and in
this respect, "to keep [their] own record of cases so that [they] may act on them promptly."
In RE: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 55, Malabon City,
this Court held that "[j]udges and branch clerks of court should conduct personally a physical inventory of the
pending cases in their courts and examine personally the records of each case [not only] at the time of their
assumption to office, [but] every semester thereafter on 30 June and 31 December." "[T]he regular and
2.YES. Rota's neglect in this case is gross, bordering on utter carelessness or indifference, to the prejudice of
the public she was duty-bound to serve. Her inattentiveness and lack of any effort to even look for the case
records, despite several follow-ups from the complainant, caused unnecessary and undue delay in the progress
of the ejectment case.
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KIM LIONG, Petitioner – versus - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
G.R. No. 200630 | Third division | June 4, 2018 | Leonen, J.
DOCTRINE: Like any right, the right to cross-examine may be waived. It is a personal one which
may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-
examination. When an accused is given the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but fails to avail of it, the
accused shall be deemed to have waived this right. The witness’ testimony given during direct examination
will remain on record.
FACTS:
Kim Liong was charged with estafa for allegedly failing to return to Equitable PCI Bank, despite
demand, a total of US$50,955.70. Liong was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty. The date of the hearing
was reset. The first prosecution witness, Antonio Dela Rama was finally presented as scheduled on June 8,
2006. His direct examination was terminated on January 25, 2007, and the initial date for his cross
examination was set on March 15, 2007. On March 15, 2007, Atty. Danilo Banares appeared as collaborating
counsel of Atty. Jovit Ponon, Liong's counsel of record. Atty. Banares then moved for the resetting of the
hearing to April 19, 2007.
On April 19, 2007, the hearing was again reset on the instance of Liong because Atty. Ponon was
allegedly a fraternity brother of one of the private prosecutors. Thus, Liong terminated the services of Atty.
Ponon and the hearing was reset on a different date. The cross examination of witness Dela Rama had been
reset a number of times due to the fault of the accused who kept on changing his counsel, which lapsed for
almost two (2) years. Thus, one of the private prosecutors moved that Liong be declared to have waived his
right to cross-examine Dela Rama, which was granted by the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether Liong waived his right to cross-examine witness Dela Rama. (YES)
HELD:
Yes. Liong waived his right to cross-examine the witness. “To meet the witness face to face” is the
right of confrontation. Subsumed in this right to confront is the right of an accused to cross-examine the
witness against him or her, i.e., to propound questions on matters stated during direct examination, or
connected with it. The cross examination may be done “with sufficient fullness and freedom to test the witness’
accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts
bearing upon the issue.
Denying an accused the right to cross-examine will render the testimony of the witness incomplete
and inadmissible in evidence. When cross-examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to causes
attributable to the party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incomplete.
However, like any right, the right to cross-examine may be waived. It is a personal one which may be waived
expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. When an
accused is given the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but fails to avail of it, the accused shall be deemed
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to have waived this right. The witness’ testimony given during direct examination will remain on record. If
this testimony is used against the accused, there will be no violation of the right of confrontation.
In People v. Narca, the trial court deferred to another date the cross-examination of the prosecution
witness on the instance of the accused. However, in the interim, the prosecution witness was murdered. Thus,
the accused moved that the testimony of the prosecution witness be stricken off the record for lack of cross-
examination. This Court rejected the argument, finding that the accused waived their right to cross-examine
the prosecution witness when they moved for postponement. It said that "mere opportunity and not
actual cross-examination is the essence of the right to cross-examine.
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Q: Kim Liong was charged with estafa for allegedly failing to return to Equitable PCI Bank, despite demand,
a total of US$50,955.70. Liong was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty. The first prosecution witness,
Antonio Dela Rama was finally presented as scheduled. The cross examination of witness Dela Rama had
been reset a number of times due to the fault of the accused who kept on changing his counsel, which lapsed
for almost two (2) years. Whether Liong waived his right to cross-examine witness Dela Rama?
A: YES. Liong waived his right to cross-examine the witness. When cross-examination is not and cannot be
done or completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is
thereby rendered incomplete. However, like any right, the right to cross-examine may be waived. It is a
personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right
of cross-examination. When an accused is given the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but fails to avail
of it, the accused shall be deemed to have waived this right. The witness’ testimony given during direct
examination will remain on record. If this testimony is used against the accused, there will be no violation of
the right of confrontation. (Kim Liong v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 200630, June 4, 2018, as penned
by J. Leonen)
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JEROME R. CANLAS, Petitioner – versus - GONZALO BENJAMIN BONGOLAN, ELMER

NONNATUS CADANO, MELINDA ADRIANO, RAFAEL DELOS SANTOS, CORAZON
CORPUZ, DANILO JAVIER AND JIMMY SARONA, Respondents
G.R. No. 199625 | Third division | June 6, 2018 | Leonen, J.
DOCTRINE: A corporation's officers cannot hide behind the separate personality of the
corporation, or that of its directors and stockholders, to avoid liability for offenses they participated in. In
Republic Act No. 3019, it is clear that the party that is penalized is the public officer who commits any of the
corrupt practices enumerated under Section 3.
FACTS:
The National Housing Authority, R-II Builders, Inc., Home Guaranty Corporation (a GOCC
guarantor), and the Philippine National Bank (PNB) entered into the Smokey Mountain Asset Pool
Formation Trust Agreement, which provided for the mechanics to implement the Joint Venture Agreement.
In this Agreement, the parties agreed to employ the asset-backed securitization method to finance the Project.
This is where the PNB, as the trustee of the asset pool, would issue to investors Participation Certificates,
which are guaranteed by Home Guaranty. The Participation Certificates matured. Because of the asset pool’s
inability to pay for the Participation Certificates, Planters Bank (the new trustee) called on Home Guaranty’s
guaranty. Hence, Home Guaranty’s Board of Directors approved the call to which R-II did not object.
Planters Bank transferred the entire asset pool properties to Home Guaranty through a Deed of Assignment
and Conveyance.
To recover its exposure, Home Guaranty published a Notice of Sale in the Philippine Daily Inquirer,
seeking to sell the properties in the asset pool. Alfred Wong King Waii proposed to purchase two lots in the
asset pool located in Manila Harbour Centre, to which he offered to pay P14,000 per square meter, but was
reduced to P13,300 per square meter or P384,715,800.00 because Home Guaranty allowed a 5% cash
discount as an incentive for spot cash purchase. The Board of Directors, however, deferred action on Wong’s
proposal but no one else came forward with a proposal. Hence, the lots were sold to Wong.
Canlas filed a Complaint-Affidavit before the Office of the Ombudsman against Home Guaranty’s
officers claiming that they were guilty of grave misconduct and of entering into a contract grossly
disadvantageous to the government under Section 3(g) of RA No. 3019. He alleged that the lots were sold
below their actual or appraised fair market value, and that the government suffered damages. Canlas made
comparison of the prices of other properties in the same area. He asserted that the sold lots should have been
worth at least P506,205,000.00 as of August 2001.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Canlas has the legal standing to file the administrative case. (NO)
2. Whether Home Guaranty Corporation Officers are the proper parties charged with the offense.
(NO)
HELD:
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1. NO. Canlas does not have the legal standing to appeal this case. The Ombudsman was given the
power to evaluate an administrative complaint even though the complainant does not have a personal interest
in the case. No matter the identity of the complainant, the Ombudsman may act on the matter. Moreover, it
may, on its own, inquire into illegal acts of public officials, which may be discovered from any source.
However, if the "the complainant has no sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of the grievance,"
the Ombudsman may choose not to investigate the administrative act complained of. The power of the
Ombudsman to act on an administrative complaint by a person without any personal interest in the case is,
thus, discretionary.
While public office is a public trust, public officers must not be exposed to continued and persistent
lawsuits that can derail their ability to discharge their duties once it has been found that there is no substantial
evidence of their guilt. The effective administration of the State's policies is of paramount importance, which
should not be hampered by time consuming, baseless, and repetitive suits. Thus, if there is a clear finding,
supported by substantial evidence, that the public officer is not guilty of the charges, this finding must be given
great weight and must be respected. Therefore, not all may appeal to question a decision of the Ombudsman
(OMB).
The OMB's decisions in administrative cases may either be unappealable or appealable. The
unappealable decisions are final and executory, to wit: (1) respondent is absolved of the charge; (2) the penalty
imposed is public censure or reprimand; (3) suspension of not more than one month; and (4) a fine equivalent
to one month's salary.
In the case at bar, the Office of the Ombudsman's October 12, 2010 Decision exonerated
respondents. Thus, Canlas has no right to appeal this Decision. He has no other recourse. "The right to
appeal is a mere statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance
with, the provisions of law. There must then be a law expressly granting such right." Canlas filed the
administrative case in his personal capacity. There is no showing that he stands to be benefited or injured by
the finding of guilt of respondents.
2. NO. This Court rules that respondents are not solely responsible for the sale. Home Guaranty is
governed by its Board of Directors, which directs, controls, and manages its activities.
As a government-owned and -controlled corporation, Home Guaranty is also governed by Republic

Act No. 10149. Under Section 30 of Republic Act No. 10149, the Corporation Code applies suppletorily to
government-owned and -controlled corporations. Section 23 of the Corporation Code necessarily applies. It
provides that the Board of Directors of a corporation exercises all the corporation's powers, conducts all its
business, and controls all its properties. Thus, it is Home Guaranty's Board of Directors that is primarily
responsible for the sale.
Nonetheless, Canlas is correct that a corporation's officers cannot hide behind the separate
personality of the corporation, or that of its directors and stockholders, to avoid liability for offenses they
participated in.
In Republic Act No. 3019, it is clear that the party that is penalized is the public officer who commits
any of the corrupt practices enumerated under Section 3. A "public officer" includes "elective and appointive
officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service
receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government." In this particular case, the offense charged is
against public officers who, on behalf of the government, allegedly entered into a contract or transaction
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government. Thus, it does not distinguish whether the public
officer is a director or a mere employee. Clearly, whether or not a person is a director or an officer of a
corporation, so long as he or she is the party responsible for the offense, he or she is the party that ought to
be charged. Thus, while the Board of Directors is primarily responsible for the sale, respondents may still be
held liable for offenses if they knowingly entered into, facilitated, or participated in their execution and
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ensured their implementation. Moreover, the law requires that the contract must be grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government or that it be entered into with malice. It does not find guilt on the mere
entering of a contract by mistake. Thus, it cannot be said that the contract was grossly disadvantageous to the
government.
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Q: The National Housing Authority, R-II Builders, Inc., Home Guaranty Corporation (a GOCC guarantor),
and the Philippine National Bank (PNB) entered into the Smokey Mountain Asset Pool Formation Trust
Agreement, which provided for the mechanics to implement the Joint Venture Agreement. The asset pool is
unable to pay for the Participation Certificates, which is guaranteed by Home Guaranty, and is to be issued
to investors. Home Guaranty’s guaranty was called for and the asset pool was then transferred to them. To
recover its exposure, Home Guaranty published a Notice of Sale in the Philippine Daily Inquirer to which
Alfred Wong submitted a proposal. After deferring the proposal, the lots were sold to Wong. Jerome Canlas,
in his personal capacity, filed a Complaint against Home Guaranty’s officers claiming that they were guilty of
grave misconduct and of entering into a contract grossly disadvantageous to the government. Is the Board of
Directors the proper parties to be charged?
A: NO. This Court rules that respondents are not solely responsible for the sale. Home Guaranty is governed
by its Board of Directors, which directs, controls, and manages its activities. A corporation's officers cannot
hide behind the separate personality of the corporation, or that of its directors and stockholders, to avoid
liability for offenses they participated in. In Republic Act No. 3019, it is clear that the party that is penalized
is the public officer who commits any of the corrupt practices enumerated under Section 3. A "public officer"
includes "elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified
or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government." In this
particular case, the offense charged is against public officers who, on behalf of the government, allegedly
entered into a contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government. Thus, it does
not distinguish whether the public officer is a director or a mere employee. Clearly, whether or not a person
is a director or an officer of a corporation, so long as he or she is the party responsible for the offense, he or
she is the party that ought to be charged. Thus, while the Board of Directors is primarily responsible for the
sale, respondents may still be held liable for offenses if they knowingly entered into, facilitated, or participated
in their execution and ensured their implementation. (Jerome Canlas v. Gonzalo Bongola, et.al, G.R. Ni.
199625, June 6, 2019, as penned by J. Leonen)
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RE: MEMORANDUM DATED JULY 10, 2017 FROM ASSOCIATE JUSTICE TERESITA J.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
A.M. No. 17-07-05-SC | En Banc | July 3, 2018| Leonen, J.
RE: LETTER OF RESIGNATION OF ATTY. BRENDA JAY ANGELES MENDOZA, PHILJA

CHIEF OF OFFICE FOR THE PHILIPPINE MEDIATION CENTER
A.M. No. 18-02-13-SC | En Banc | July 3, 2018 | Leonen, J.
DOCTRINE: The PHILJA Chief of Office for the Philippine Mediation Center receives the same
compensation and benefits as an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. Due to this position having judicial
rank, which bears a salary grade of 30, and consistent with the prior Resolutions of this Court, the PHILJA
Chief of Office for the Philippine Mediation Center is deemed included as among the positions which shall
be appointed by the Court En Banc.
FACTS:
Associate Justice Leonardo-De Castro submitted to the Court En Banc a Memorandum pointed to
the following key positions within this Court which had not yet been filled and which she noted were, thus,
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Further, Associate Justice Leonardo-De Castro presented to this Court that the appointment of the
incumbent PHILJA Chief of Office for the Philippine Mediation Center, Atty. Mendoza, is not in accordance
with Administrative Order No. 33-2008, which requires appointment by this Court upon the
recommendation of PHILJA.
She pointed out that unlike the previous appointments to the position, Atty. Mendoza was not
appointed by the Court En Banc, upon the recommendation of the PHILJA Board of Trustees in a board
resolution. Instead, Atty. Mendoza was appointed by virtue of Memorandum Order No. 26-2016 dated June
28, 2016, signed only by Chief Justice Sereno and the two (2) most senior Associate Justices - Senior Associate
Justice Carpio, and Associate Justice Velasco.
It was the position of Associate Justice Leonardo-De Castro that since the Constitution vests in this
Court the power of appointment of all officials and employees of the judiciary,4 this power can only be
exercised by the Court En Banc, unless duly delegated by a court resolution.
She proposed that the Resolution dated April 22, 2003 in A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC (Revised), which
was cited as the basis for Memorandum Order No. 26-2016, should be clarified as to the scope of the authority
to appoint that is delegated to the Chief Justice and the Chairpersons of the Divisions.
A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC (Revised) states, among others, that the "[a]ppointment and revocation or
renewal of appointments of regular (including coterminous), temporary, casual, or contractual personnel in
the Supreme Court" shall be referred to the Chairpersons of the Divisions. Associate Justice Leonardo-De
Castro was of the view that the "personnel" referred to in A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC (Revised) should exclude
high-ranking officials of the highly technical and/or policy-determining third-level positions below the Chief
Justice and Associate Justices. She pointed to A.M. No. 05-9-29-SC, which enumerates the third-level
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positions as those with salary grades 26 and higher, as a guide for which positions should continue to be
appointed by the Court En Banc.
This matter invokes the administrative powers of the Supreme Court En Banc. It does not call for
the exercise of this Court's adjudicative powers. Thus, the purpose of this Resolution is to resolve pending
questions as to the interpretation of this Court's power as contained in the Constitution, relevant laws, and
this Court's administrative orders. Resolutions of this nature may also suggest not only clarifications but also
changes in policy when necessary.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Brenda Jay A. Mendoza’s appointment as the Philippine Judicial Academy Chief of
Office for the Philippine Mediation Center is proper. (NO)
HELD:
NO. Atty. Mendoza’s appointment is not proper. The PHILJA Chief of Office for the Philippine
Mediation Center receives the same compensation and benefits as an Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals. Due to this position having judicial rank, which bears a salary grade of 30, and consistent with the
prior Resolutions of this Court, the PHILJA Chief of Office for the Philippine Mediation Center is deemed
included as among the positions which shall be appointed by the Court En Banc.
In contrast with the appointments of Atty. Ponferrada and Justice Econg, PHILJA's recommendation
for Atty. Mendoza's appointment was not made in a Board Resolution of the PHILJA Board of Trustees.
Instead, PHILJA, through PHILJA Chancellor Azcuna, issued a letter recommending Atty. Mendoza. Under
Administrative Order No. 33-2008, the appointment of the PHILJA Chief of Office for the Philippine
Mediation Center shall be made "by the Court, upon recommendation of PHILJA." Prior to the appointment
of Atty. Mendoza, it is evident that this Court's practice is to have the Court En Banc issue the appointment
following the recommendation made by the PHILJA Board of Trustees, as evidenced by a Board Resolution.
Parenthetically, this was also the position of the Chief Justice in 2015.
In line with this Court's prior Resolutions and further to its interpretation that the "recommendation
of PHILJA" means the recommendation of the PHILJA Board of Trustees, there must be a Resolution issued
by the PHILJA Board of Trustees, stating its recommendation for the position of the PHILJA Chief of Office
for the Philippine Mediation Center. This is regardless of any other methods employed by PHILJA to
evaluate its personnel recommendations to this Court. It is PHILJA, acting through its governing body, the
PHILJA Board of Trustees, which must make the recommendation.
The mere existence of any inconsistency in the rule of appointments of officials and employees of
the Judiciary, including the PHILJA Chief of Office for the Philippine Mediation Center, should have
prompted a request for clarification from the Court En Banc because it is only the Court En Banc, and not
one or some of its Members, which is vested with the power of appointments in the Judiciary under the
Constitution. PHILJA acting alone has no power to decide the form of the recommendation it must make to
this Court.
Nothing in this Resolution should be interpreted in any manner as a judgment on the qualifications
or eligibility of Atty. Mendoza. The issue in this administrative matter only pertains to the procedure for her
appointment, not her competence or qualifications. Concededly, Chief Justice Sereno, Senior Associate
Justice Carpio, and Associate Justice Velasco all signed Memorandum Order No. 26-2016, appointing Atty.
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Mendoza in accordance with A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC (Revised) and the Supreme Court Human Resource
Manual. Also, it appears that Atty. Mendoza ranked first in the selection process conducted by a screening
panel convened by the PHILJA Management Committee, a standing committee of PHILJA.
The rules on the appointment of personnel to the Judiciary, as clarified in this Resolution, are
amended. The delegation to the Chief Justice and the Chairpersons of the Divisions in A.M. No. 99-12-08-
SC (Revised) of the power of appointment and revocation or renewal of appointments of personnel in this
Court, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals, the Lower Courts including the Sharia'h
courts, the Philippine Judicial Academy, and the Judicial and Bar Council shall not be deemed to include
personnel with salary grades 29 and higher, and those with judicial rank.
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Q: Associate Justice Leonardo-De Castro presented to this Court that the appointment of the incumbent
PHILJA Chief of Office for the Philippine Mediation Center, Atty. Mendoza, is not in accordance with
Administrative Order No. 33-2008, which requires appointment by this Court upon the recommendation of
PHILJA. She pointed out that unlike the previous appointments to the position, Atty. Mendoza was not
appointed by the Court En Banc, upon the recommendation of the PHILJA Board of Trustees in a board
resolution. Instead, Atty. Mendoza was appointed by virtue of Memorandum Order No. 26-2016 dated June
28, 2016, signed only by the Chief Justice and the two (2) most senior Associate Justices. Is Atty. Mendoza’s
appointment proper?
A: NO. The PHILJA Chief of Office for the Philippine Mediation Center receives the same compensation
and benefits as an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. Due to this position having judicial rank, which
bears a salary grade of 30, and consistent with the prior Resolutions of this Court, the PHILJA Chief of Office
for the Philippine Mediation Center is deemed included as among the positions which shall be appointed by
the Court En Banc. The delegation to the Chief Justice and the Chairpersons of the Divisions in A.M. No.
99-12-08-SC (Revised) of the power of appointment and revocation or renewal of appointments of personnel
in this Court, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals, the Lower Courts including the
Sharia'h courts, the Philippine Judicial Academy, and the Judicial and Bar Council shall not be deemed to
include personnel with salary grades 29 and higher, and those with judicial rank. (Re: Memorandum Dated
July 10, 2017 from Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, A.M. No. 17-07-05-SC, July 3, 2018, as
penned by J. Leonen)
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ELMER P. LEE, Petitioner vs. ESTELA V. SALES, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER LEGAL AND
INSPECTION GROUP; EFREN P. MARTINEZ, CHIEF PERSONNEL INQUIRY DIVISION;
NESTOR S. VALEROSO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, REVENUE REGION NO. 8; and ALL OF THE
BIR AND ALL PERSONS ACTING ON THEIR ORDERS OR BEHALF, Respondents
G.R. No. 205294 | THIRD DIVISION | JULY 4, 2018| LEONEN, J.
DOCTRINE: The pendency of a motion for reconsideration of a decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman does not stay the immediate execution of the penalty of dismissal imposed upon a public office.
It is improper to file petition for prohibition in the RTC directed against the execution of a decision of the
Ombudsman. Petitioner's proper recourse should have been to file a petition for mandamus to compel the
Ombudsman to resolve his motion for reconsideration within the five (5)-day period prescribed in the Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. Otherwise, he should have awaited the Ombudsman's ruling
on his motion for reconsideration, then, in the event of a denial, file a petition for review under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals.
FACTS:
A Complaint filed by Associate Graft Investigation Officer Buenaventura, charged the spouses Elmer
and Mary Ramirez Lee (the Spouses Lee) with dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service. The Spouses Lee were both employed at the Bureau of Internal Revenue as
Revenue Officer I.
The Complaint charged that the Spouses were members, stockholders, or incorporators of 4
corporations, but did not disclose such interests in their 2001 to 2006 SALNs. The Complaint further alleged
that the Spouses Lee acquired wealth in the amounts of ₱2,353,785.93 and US$13,414.17, which were
disproportionate to their legitimate incomes.
In its July 16, 2012 Decision, the Ombudsman found the Spouses Lee guilty of dishonesty and grave
misconduct. The Ombudsman held that they had the willful intent to violate Section 7 of Republic Act No.
3019, in relation to Section 8 of Republic Act No. 1379, when they failed to declare their true, detailed, and
sworn statements of their business and financial interests. They did not initiate to correct their earlier non-
declaration of these interests in their subsequent SALNs, which confirmed their persistent disregard of the
existing laws.
The Ombudsman found that these acts amounted to gross misconduct and ordered them to be
"dismissed from service effective immediately with forfeiture of all of their benefits, except accrued leave
credits, if any, with prejudice to their reemployment in the government."
Elmer filed a Motion for Reconsideration. While the motion was still pending, he received a letter
from Martinez, Chief of the Personnel Inquiry Division of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The letter
prohibited him from reporting to the office, representing the office, instructing staff members on official
matters, and signing any documents, among others.
Elmer then informed Martinez of his pending motion for reconsideration, and that the Office of the
Ombudsman's July 16, 2012 Decision was not yet final and executory. However, Sales, the Deputy
Commissioner of the Legal Inspection Group, as well as Martinez, insisted on Elmer's dismissal.
On October 12, 2012, Elmer filed a Petition for Injunction and/or Prohibition and Damages with
Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the RTC of
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QC. He claimed that the Office of the Ombudsman's Decision was not yet final and executory due to his
pending motion for reconsideration. He claimed that his dismissal pre-empted and rendered moot his motion
for reconsideration. Elmer claims that his case was not yet pending appeal, but only pending a motion for
reconsideration. Further, citing JP Latex Technology, Inc. v. Ballons Granger Balloons, Inc., he claims that
the pendency of a motion for reconsideration prevents the period to appeal from even commencing.
The RTC denied Elmer's prayer and dismissed the case for injunction and/or prohibition. The RTC
found that since there was a five (5) day period within which the Ombudsman must resolve a motion for
reconsideration, his remedy should have been a petition for mandamus to compel the Ombudsman to resolve
his motion. Moreover, in the Office of the Ombudsman's Memorandum Circular No. 01, Series of 2006,
decisions and resolutions of the Ombudsman shall not be stayed by a motion for reconsideration or petition
for review filed before it.
On February 6, 2013, Elmer filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court before
this Court, assailing the Order of the RTC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a pending motion for reconsideration stays the execution of a decision of the
Ombudsman dismissing a public officer from service; and
2. Whether or not a Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over a petition for prohibition or injunction
directed against the execution of a decision of the Ombudsman.
RULING:
1. NO, a pending motion for reconsideration does not stay the execution of a decision of the
Ombudsman dismissing a public officer from service.
The Office of the Ombudsman issued Administrative Order No. 7, as amended by Administrative
Order No. 17, Rule III, Section 7, states:
Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. - Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and
in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than
one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable.
In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review
under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory.s In case the penalty is suspension or
removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive
suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the
suspension or removal.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of
course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and properly
implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Office
of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be a ground for disciplinary action
against said officer.
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Moreover, Ombudsman Memorandum Circular No. 01, Series of 2006, provides:
Section 7 Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, otherwise known as, the "Ombudsman Rules of
Procedure" provides that: "A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be
executed as a matter of course."
In order that the foregoing rule may be strictly observed, all concerned are hereby enjoined to
implement all Ombudsman decisions, orders or resolutions in administrative disciplinary cases, immediately
upon receipt thereof by their respective offices.
The filing of a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review before the Office of the
Ombudsman does not operate to stay the immediate implementation of the foregoing Ombudsman
decisions, orders or resolutions.
Only a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, duly issued by a
court of competent jurisdiction, stays the immediate implementation of the said Ombudsman decisions,
orders or resolutions.
Both Administrative Order No. 17 and Memorandum Circular No. 01, Series of 2006 were issued
by the Ombudsman, an independent Constitutional office, pursuant to its rule-making power under the 1987
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 to effectively exercise its mandate to investigate any act or omission
of any public official, employee, office, or agency, when this act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient. For this Court to not give deference to the Ombudsman's discretion would be to
interfere with its Constitutional power to promulgate its own rules for the execution of its decisions.
The Ombudsman is the Constitutional body tasked to preserve the integrity of public service, and
must be beholden to no one. To uphold its independence, this Court has adopted a general policy of non-
interference with the exercise of the Ombudsman of its prosecutorial and investigatory powers. The
execution of its decisions is part of the exercise of these powers to which this Court gives deference.
Further, after a ruling supported by evidence has been rendered and during the pendency of any
motion for reconsideration or appeal, the civil service must be protected from any acts that may be committed
by the disciplined public officer that may affect the outcome of this motion or appeal. The immediate
execution of a decision of the Ombudsman is a protective measure with a purpose similar to that of preventive
suspension, which is to prevent public officers from using their powers and prerogatives to influence witnesses
or tamper with records.
Moreover, public office is a public trust. There is no vested right to a public office or an absolute
right to remain in office that would be violated should the decision of the Ombudsman be immediately
executed. In case the suspended or removed public official is exonerated on appeal, Administrative Order
No. 17, Rule III, Section 7 itself provides for the remedial measure of payment of salary and such other
emoluments not received during the period of suspension or removal. No substantial prejudice is caused to
the public official.
Notably, at the time the Office of the Ombudsman's July 16, 2012 Decision was issued in this case,
the amendatory Administrative Order No. 17 and Memorandum Circular No. 01, Series of 2006, had already
been issued. Thus, respondents did not err in implementing petitioner's dismissal from office.
2. NO, the RTC does not have jurisdiction over a petition for prohibition or injunction directed
against the execution of a decision of the Ombudsman.
Petitioner's proper recourse should have been to file a petition for mandamus to compel the
Ombudsman to resolve his motion for reconsideration within the five (5)-day period prescribed in the Rules
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of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. Otherwise, he should have awaited the Ombudsman's ruling
on his motion for reconsideration, then, in the event of a denial, file a petition for review under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals.
Since decisions of the Ombudsman are immediately executory even pending appeal, it follows that
they may not be stayed by the issuance of an injunctive writ. It bears noting that for an injunction to issue, the
right of the person seeking its issuance must be clear and unmistakable. However, no such right of petitioner
exists to stay the execution of the penalty of dismissal. There is no vested interest in an office, or an absolute
right to hold office. Petitioner is deemed preventively suspended and should his motion for reconsideration
be granted or his eventual appeal won, he will be entitled to the salary and emoluments he did not receive in
the meantime.
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Q: The Office of the Ombudsman found Petitioner Lee guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty upon a
finding of improper SALN disclosures. Lee then filed a motion for reconsideration against the decision.
While the said motion was pending the Regional Director of the BIR ordered his dismissal. In response to
this, Lee filed a petition for prohibition with the RTC stating that the decision of the Ombudsman had not
yet become final and executory as his motion for reconsideration had not been acted upon. Furthermore,
Lee contends that although the rules provide that an appeal shall not stay the execution of the decisions of
the Ombudsman, he claims that the pendency of a motion for reconsideration prevents the period to appeal
from even commencing. Are the contentions of Petitioner Lee correct? Does the RTC have jurisdiction over
the suit?
A: 1. NO, Petitioner Lee’s contentions are not correct. A pending motion for reconsideration does not stay
the execution of a decision of the Ombudsman dismissing a public officer from service.
Both Administrative Order No. 17 and Memorandum Circular No. 01, Series of 2006 were issued by the
Ombudsman, an independent Constitutional office, pursuant to its rule-making power under the 1987
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 to effectively exercise its mandate to investigate any act or omission
of any public official, employee, office, or agency, when this act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient. For this Court to not give deference to the Ombudsman's discretion would be to
interfere with its Constitutional power to promulgate its own rules for the execution of its decisions.
The Ombudsman is the Constitutional body tasked to preserve the integrity of public service, and must be
beholden to no one. To uphold its independence, this Court has adopted a general policy of non-
interference with the exercise of the Ombudsman of its prosecutorial and investigatory powers. The
execution of its decisions is part of the exercise of these powers to which this Court gives deference.
Further, after a ruling supported by evidence has been rendered and during the pendency of any motion for
reconsideration or appeal, the civil service must be protected from any acts that may be committed by the
disciplined public officer that may affect the outcome of this motion or appeal. The immediate execution of
a decision of the Ombudsman is a protective measure with a purpose similar to that of preventive suspension,
which is to prevent public officers from using their powers and prerogatives to influence witnesses or tamper
with records.
2. NO, the RTC does not have jurisdiction over the suit.
Petitioner's proper recourse should have been to file a petition for mandamus to compel the Ombudsman to
resolve his motion for reconsideration within the five (5)-day period prescribed in the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman. Otherwise, he should have awaited the Ombudsman's ruling on his motion
for reconsideration, then, in the event of a denial, file a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court with the Court of Appeals
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OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner vs. LOVING F. FERALVERO, JR., Respondent
DOCTRINE: Complainants in administrative proceedings carry the burden of proving their

allegations with substantial evidence or such "relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion”
FACTS:
Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency, Inc. (Lockheed) was the security services contractor for
Philippine Ports Authority's Port District Office-Luzon. When the time came to bid for a new security
provider, Lockheed applied for accreditation to bid for the security services contract. Officers from the Port
Police Department reviewed Lockheed's performance and gave it a rating of 78.30 or "fair." Lockheed's fair
rating effectively disqualified it from being accredited to bid for the new security services contract.
Lockheed submitted its comment, and Port District Office-Luzon Security Staff Officer Captain
Geronimo R. Grospe (Grospe), finding merit in its arguments, recommended the reconsideration of its rating.
Port District Office-Luzon Port District Manager Hector Miole (Miole) also recommended the
recomputation of Lockheed's rating and the issuance of its Certificate of Accreditation. Philippine Ports
Authority Assistant General Manager Cecilio directed Port District Office-Luzon Superintendent Fetalvero
to review Grospe's and Miole's recommendations against the guidelines and to draft a reply. Cecilio eventually
adapted Grospe's and Miele's recommendations and issued Lockheed a Certificate of Final Rating, with a
readjusted rating of 83.97, or satisfactory, making Lockheed eligible for the accreditation to bid.
Port Police Department Division Manager Maximo Aguirre (Aguirre) filed a complaint-affidavit
against Cecilio, Fetalvero, Miele, Grospe, for Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty. Aguirre claimed that Cecilio
issued Lockheed's Certificate of Final Rating without going through the prescribed procedure under the
Philippine Ports Authority Memorandum Circular No. 18-2000.
Aguirre also averred that the Port Police Officers who gave Lockheed its original rating did not
participate in its reevaluation, contrary to the claims of Petitioners. Furthermore, the Port Police Officers who
rated Lockheed denied reevaluating Lockheed and changing its rating. Thus, Aguirre asserted that Cecilio
committed deceit, misrepresentation, and deception because the reassessment was without basis and was
done to favor Lockheed.
Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer Generoso dismissed the complaint. However Assistant
Special Prosecutor III Roberto T. Agagon recommended the reversal of the Decision and the dismissal from
service of the charged officers. He held that while it was acceptable to move for the reconsideration of the
issued rating, readjusting it from 78.30 to 83.97 was another matter altogether and constituted Grave
Misconduct and Dishonesty. It likewise noted that Lockheed's reevaluation was irregularly made because the
Port Police Officers who conducted the first evaluation denied being part of the reevaluation.
On June 7, 2006, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II Joselito Fangon (Officer Fangon)
granted the motions for reconsideration and reversed the Review Resolution. However, on October 20, 2006,
Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer I Russel C. Labor recommended the reversal of the June 7, 2006
Order and the affirmation of the November 25, 2004 Review Resolution.
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Fetalvero appealed the Office of the Ombudsman's November 25, 2004 Review Resolution and
October 20, 2006 Review Order to the Court of Appeals. Fetalvero claimed that his acts of collating and
computing Lockheed's reevaluated ratings from Grospe and Miole were "ministerial ... done in the regular
performance of his duty.”
The Court of Appeals sustained the May 21, 2003 Decision of Officer Generoso and upheld his
findings that Fetalvero's acts did not constitute dishonesty and grave misconduct.
On April 24, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman filed its petition before this Court. In its Petition,
petitioner emphasizes that the readjusted Certificate of Final Rating awarded to Lockheed was loosely based
on respondent Fetalvero's Reply.
Petitioner also points out that the officers who conducted the reevaluation were not the same officers
who conducted the original evaluations. The officers who conducted the reevaluation, including respondent
Fetalvero, had no personal knowledge of the performance of Lockheed's security guards to serve as basis for
their reevaluation. Petitioner asserts that respondent's acts of adjusting Lockheed's ratings and giving it undue
preference call for a finding of administrative liability for grave misconduct and dishonesty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is substantial evidence to hold respondent Loving F. Fetalvero, Jr.
administratively liable for the charges of dishonesty and misconduct against him.
RULING:
No, there is no substantial evidence to hold respondent Fetalvero administratively liable for the
damages of dishonesty and misconduct against him.
In administrative proceedings, complainants carry the burden of proving their allegations with
substantial evidence or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."
Petitioner fails to discharge its burden. What petitioner only managed to prove was that respondent,
upon orders of his superior, collated the ratings and recommendations submitted by the other officers and
then summarized them into a report. By no stretch of mind can respondent's submission of a report, an act
which was done within the confines of his function as the Superintendent of the Port District Office-Luzon,
be seen as an unlawful act.
Petitioner accuses respondent of conniving with Cecilia, Miole, and Grospe to give Lockheed an
unfair preference by readjusting its rating so that it could participate in the bidding for a security services
contract with the Philippine Ports Authority. Petitioner faults Cecilia for ordering a reassessment of the Port
Police Department's rating of Lockheed's performance as the then incumbent security provider. It claims that
the reassessment and eventual readjustment of Lockheed's rating to 83.97 from the original 78.30 were
without basis and were clearly meant to favor Lockheed.
As the Assistant General Manager for Operations, Cecilio exercised control and supervision over the
Port Police Department. The power of supervision involves oversight of a subordinate to ensure that the rules
are followed. On the other hand, the power of control is broader as it involves laying down the actual rules to
be followed. If the rules are not followed, the power of control allows the controlling officer to order that the
act be done or undone, or even to supplant the subordinate's act with his or her own act.
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In administrative law[,] supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see
that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them[,] the former may take
such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand,
means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in
the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
Petitioner faults Cecilio for readjusting Lockheed's original rating from the Port Police Department,
thereby leading to Lockheed's eligibility to participate in the bidding for a security service contract. However,
as the controlling officer over the Port Police Department, Cecilio precisely had the authority to supplant its
rating with a new one as long as the new rating was backed by the necessary evidence and he did not gravely
abuse his authority to do so.
In petitioner's June 7, 2006 Order, Officer Fangon found sufficient basis for the readjustment of
Lockheed's rating. Needless to state, the ensuing review of the recommended ratings resulted in the re-
adjustment of the ratings of [Lockheed] from Fair to Satisfactory (or from 78.3[0] to 83.97). The records of
the case will reveal that the re-adjusted ratings were based on documents culled by the officials who conducted
the review of the ratings consisting of Summary Reports and Monthly Performance Ratings. From these
documents, it appears that there was sufficient basis to recommend the increase of the ratings of [Lockheed].
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Q: Lockheed was the security services contractor for Philippine Ports Authority's Port District. When the
time came to bid for a new security provider, Lockheed applied for accreditation to bid for the security
services contract. But upon review of the Officers from the Port Police Department Lockheed’s performance
was only given a “fair" rating and thus disqualified it from accreditation.
Upon comment of Lockheed, the Port’s Security Staff Officer Chief recommended the reconsideration of
the company’s rating. Port District Manager Miole also recommended the company’s recomputation.
Philippine Ports Authority Assistant General Manager Cecilio directed Port District Office-Luzon
Superintendent Fetalvero to review Grospe's and Miole's recommendations against the guidelines and to draft
a reply. Cecilio eventually adapted Grospe's and Miele's recommendations and issued Lockheed a Certificate
of Final Rating.
A complaint was filed against Fetalvero, Cecilio, Grospe and Miole alleging that Cecilio issued Lockheed's
Certificate of Final Rating without going through the prescribed procedure under the Philippine Ports
Authority Memorandum Circular No. 18-2000. The Ombudsman found the same guilty of grave misconduct
and dishonesty and warranted their dismissal from their service.
Fetalvero appealed the decision to the CA. Fetalvero claimed that his acts of collating and computing
Lockheed's reevaluated ratings from Grospe and Miole were "ministerial ... done in the regular performance
of his duty.” The CA ruled in his favor and found the acts in question did not constitute dishonesty and grave
misconduct. Did the CA err in this ruling?
A: No, the CA did not err. In administrative proceedings, complainants carry the burden of proving their
allegations with substantial evidence or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate
to support a conclusion."
Petitioner Ombudsman fails to discharge its burden. What petitioner only managed to prove was that
respondent, upon orders of his superior, collated the ratings and recommendations submitted by the other
officers and then summarized them into a report. By no stretch of mind can respondent's submission of a
report, an act which was done within the confines of his function as the Superintendent of the Port District
Office-Luzon, be seen as an unlawful act.
Petitioner accuses respondent of conniving with Cecilia, Miole, and Grospe to give Lockheed an unfair
preference by readjusting its rating so that it could participate in the bidding for a security services contract
with the Philippine Ports Authority. Petitioner faults Cecilia for ordering a reassessment of the Port Police
Department's rating of Lockheed's performance as the then incumbent security provider. It claims that the
reassessment and eventual readjustment of Lockheed's rating to 83.97 from the original 78.30 were without
basis and were clearly meant to favor Lockheed.
As the Assistant General Manager for Operations, Cecilio exercised control and supervision over the Port
Police Department. The power of supervision involves oversight of a subordinate to ensure that the rules are
followed. On the other hand, the power of control is broader as it involves laying down the actual rules to be
followed. If the rules are not followed, the power of control allows the controlling officer to order that the act
be done or undone, or even to supplant the subordinate's act with his or her own act.
In administrative law[,] supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them[,] the former may take such
action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means
the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
Petitioner faults Cecilio for readjusting Lockheed's original rating from the Port Police Department, thereby
leading to Lockheed's eligibility to participate in the bidding for a security service contract. However, as the
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controlling officer over the Port Police Department, Cecilio precisely had the authority to supplant its rating
with a new one as long as the new rating was backed by the necessary evidence and he did not gravely abuse
his authority to do so.
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DANILO A. LIHAYLIHAY, Petitioner vs. THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES ROBERTO C.

TAN, SECRETARY OF FINANCE MARGARITO B. TEVES, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, AND THE GOVERNOR
OF BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS (BSP), Respondents
DOCTRINE: The grant of an informer's reward for the discovery, conviction, and punishment of
tax offenses is a discretionary quasi-judicial matter that cannot be the subject of a writ of mandamus. It is not
a legally mandated ministerial duty. This reward cannot be given to a person who only makes sweeping
averments about undisclosed wealth, rather than specific tax offenses, and who fails to show that the
information which he or she supplied was the undiscovered pivotal cause for the revelation of a tax offense,
the conviction and/or punishment of the persons liable, and an actual recovery made by the State.
Indiscriminate, expendable information negates a clear legal right and further impugns the propriety of issuing
a writ of mandamus.
A writ of mandamus will not issue unless it is shown that there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. While this Court exercises original jurisdiction over petitions for
mandamus, it will not exercise jurisdiction over those filed without exhausting administrative remedies, in
violation of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and the principle of hierarchy of courts, and when their filing
amounts to an act of forum shopping.
FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Mandamus and Damages, with a Prayer for a Writ of
Garnishment, praying that former Treasurer of the Philippines Roberto C. Tan (Treasurer Tan), former
Secretary of Finance Margarito B. Teves (Secretary Teves), the Governor of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, and
the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (collectively, respondents) be
ordered to deliver to Lihayhay the amounts of P11,875,000,000,000.00 and P50,000,000,000.00, and several
government lands as informer's rewards owing to Lihaylihay's alleged instrumental role in the recovery of ill-
gotten wealth from former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family, and their cronies.
In his Petition, Lihaylihay identified himself as a "Confidential Informant of the State (CIS) pursuant
to Republic Act No. 2338, duly accredited and registered as such with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
and Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)." Lihaylihay recalled sending two (2) letters,
both dated March 11, 1987, to Atty. Eliseo Pitargue (Atty. Pitargue), the former head of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue-Presidential Commission on Good Government Task Force, concerning information on former
President Marcos' ill-gotten wealth.
Almost 20 years later, on November 29, 2006, Lihaylihay wrote to then Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, Jose Mario C. Buñag (Commissioner Buñag), demanding payment of 25% informer's reward on
the P118,270,243,259.00 supposedly recovered by the Philippine government through compromise
agreements with the Marcoses.
On May 31, 2010, without waiting for Secretary Teves' and Treasurer Tan's official actions on his
letters, Lihaylihay filed the present Petition, dubbed a Petition for "Mandamus and Damages, with a Prayer
for a Writ of Garnishment." Insisting on his entitlement to informer's rewards, he prays that Treasurer Tan
and Secretary Teves be ordered to deliver to him the amount of P11,875,000,000,000.00; that the Secretary
of Environment and Natural Resources be ordered to transfer to him several government lands; and that the
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Governor of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas be ordered to garnish in his favor P50,000,000,000.00 worth of
jewelry recovered from former First Lady Imelda Romualdez Marcos.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Lihayhay is entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel respondents then
Treasurer of the Philippines Roberto C. Tan, then Secretary of Finance Margarito B. Teves, the Secretary of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and the Governor of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas to
deliver to him proceeds and properties representing 25% informer's reward pursuant to Section 1 of Republic
Act No. 2338.
RULING:
No, he is not entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to deliver to him proceeds and
properties representing 25% informer’s reward.
The most basic obstacle to petitioner's claim for an informer's reward under Section 1 of Republic
Act No. 2338 is that Republic Act No. 2338 is no longer in effect. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 2338 was
amended by Presidential Decree No. 707 in 1975. It was then superseded by Section 331 of the National
Internal Revenue Code of 1977, which was itself amended in 1981 by Section 35 of Presidential Decree No.
1773.
The grant of an informer's reward for the discovery of tax offenses is currently governed by Section
282 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, which was amended by Republic Act No. 8424 or the
Tax Reform Act of 1997.
Under Section 282 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended, an information
given by an informer shall merit a reward only when it satisfies certain formal and qualitative parameters. As
a matter of form and procedure, that information must be voluntarily given, definite, and sworn to.
Qualitatively, that information must be novel and, subsequently, prove itself effective.
Information is novel when it is "not yet in the possession of the Bureau of Internal Revenue" and "not
refer[ring] to a case already pending or previously investigated or examined." Information has shown itself to
be effective not only when it leads "to the discovery of frauds upon the internal revenue laws or violations of
any of [its] provisions," but also when that discovery in turn enables "the recovery of revenues, surcharges and
fees and/or the conviction of the guilty party and/or the imposition of any of the fine or penalty." In lieu of
enabling the conviction of the guilty party and the imposition of fines or penalties, information is also effective
when the discovery of tax offenses leads the offender to offer "to compromise the violation." A mere offer,
however, is not enough; it must have actually been accepted and collected. Regardless of whether a
compromise or conviction ensues, actual recovery is indispensable: "should no revenue, surcharges or fees
be actually recovered or collected, such person shall not be entitled to a reward.
Petitioner's entitlement to an informer's reward is not a ministerial matter. Quite the contrary, its
determination requires a review of evidentiary matters and an application of statutory principles and
administrative guidelines. Its determination is a discretionary, quasi-judicial function, demanding an exercise
of independent judgment on the part of certain public officers.
A writ of mandamus is equally unavailing because there is evidently another "plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." This, of course, is the processing of his claims by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue and the Department of Finance, and their final resolution by the Secretary of Finance.
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Q: Without waiting for the actions of the Treasury Department or the Department of Finance, Petitioner
Lihayhay a Petition for Mandamus and Damages, with a Prayer for a Writ of Garnishment, praying that
former Treasurer of the Philippines Roberto C. Tan (Treasurer Tan), former Secretary of Finance Margarito
B. Teves (Secretary Teves), the Governor of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, and the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (collectively, respondents) be ordered to deliver to
Lihayhay the amounts of P11,875,000,000,000.00 and P50,000,000,000.00, and several government lands as
informer's rewards owing to Lihaylihay's alleged instrumental role in the recovery of ill-gotten wealth from
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family, and their cronies. He alleges that the two letters he wrote
in 1987 concerning information on former President Marcos’ ill-gotten wealth entitled him to 25% informants
rewards pursuant to RA 2338. Is his contention correct?
A: No, his contentions are not correct.
The grant of an informer's reward for the discovery, conviction, and punishment of tax offenses is a
discretionary quasi-judicial matter that cannot be the subject of a writ of mandamus. It is not a legally mandated
ministerial duty. This reward cannot be given to a person who only makes sweeping averments about
undisclosed wealth, rather than specific tax offenses, and who fails to show that the information which he or
she supplied was the undiscovered pivotal cause for the revelation of a tax offense, the conviction and/or
punishment of the persons liable, and an actual recovery made by the State. Indiscriminate, expendable
information negates a clear legal right and further impugns the propriety of issuing a writ of mandamus.
A writ of mandamus will not issue unless it is shown that there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. While this Court exercises original jurisdiction over petitions for mandamus, it
will not exercise jurisdiction over those filed without exhausting administrative remedies, in violation of the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction and the principle of hierarchy of courts, and when their filing amounts to an
act of forum shopping.
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CESAR MATAS CAGANG vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458, July 31, 2018, Leonen, J.
Inordinate delay in the resolution and termination of a preliminary investigation will result in the
dismissal of the case against the accused. Delay, however, is not determined through mere mathematical
reckoning but through the examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding each case. Courts should
appraise a reasonable period from the point of view of how much time a competent and independent public
officer would need in relation to the complexity of a given case. Nonetheless, the accused must invoke his or
her constitutional rights in a timely manner. The failure to do so could be considered by the courts as a waiver
of right.
FACTS:
The Office of the Ombudsman received an anonymous complaint alleging that certain public officials
committed graft and corruption by diverting public funds given as grants or aid using barangay officials and
cooperatives as "dummies." The Commission on Audit submitted its audit report finding that the officials and
employees of the Provincial Government of Sarangani appear to have embezzled millions in public funds by
sourcing out the funds from grants, aid, and the Countrywide Development Fund using dummy cooperatives
and people's organizations.
The Ombudsman found probable cause to charge the public officials with Malversation through
Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
One of the accused, Cagang, filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and Set Aside
Order of Arrest. Cagang argued that there was an inordinate delay of seven (7) years in the filing of the
Informations. He argued that the delay violated his constitutional rights to due process and to speedy
disposition of cases.
ISSUE:
Whether the right to speedy disposition of case may be invoked as early as the preliminary
investigation or inquest.
RULING:
YES. The right to speedy disposition of cases should not be confused with the right to a speedy trial,
a right guaranteed under Article III, Section 14(2) of the Constitution. The right to a speedy trial is invoked
against the courts in a criminal prosecution. The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, is invoked
even against quasi-judicial or administrative bodies in civil, criminal, or administrative cases before them.
While the right to speedy trial is invoked against courts of law, the right to speedy disposition of cases
may be invoked before quasi-judicial or administrative tribunals in proceedings that are adversarial and may
result in possible criminal liability. The right to speedy disposition of cases is most commonly invoked in fact-
finding investigations and preliminary investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman since neither of these
proceedings form part of the actual criminal prosecution. The Constitution itself mandates the Office of the
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Ombudsman to “act promptly” on complaints filed before it: Section 12. The Ombudsman and his
Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against
public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or -controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the
complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.
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Q: Can the right to speedy disposition of case be invoked in preliminary investigations by the Ombudsman?
A: YES. While the right to speedy trial is invoked against courts of law, the right to speedy disposition of cases
may be invoked before quasi-judicial or administrative tribunals in proceedings that are adversarial and may
result in possible criminal liability. The right to speedy disposition of cases is most commonly invoked in fact-
finding investigations and preliminary investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman since neither of these
proceedings form part of the actual criminal prosecution.
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INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC., Petitioner - versus - THE CITY OF

MANILA, et. al, Respondents
G.R. No. 185622 | THIRD DIVISION | October 17, 2018 | LEONEN, J.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires recourse to the pertinent

administrative agency before resorting to court action. This is under the theory that the administrative agency,
by reason of its particular expertise, is in a better position to resolve particular issues If the party can prove
that the resort to the administrative remedy would be an idle ceremony such that it will be absurd and unjust
for it to continue seeking relief that evidently will not be granted to it, then the doctrine would not apply.
FACTS:
When the petitioner International Container, Inc. renewed its business license for 1999, the City of
Manila assessed it for two business taxes: one for which it was already paying and another for which it was
newly assessed. Petitioner protested before the City Treasurer but the latter failed to decide the protest within
60 days, prompting the petitioner to file a complaint before RTC. RTC ruled against the petitioner. CA
reversed and remanded the case to RTC to further proceedings.
Because the City of Manila continued to impose the business tax, petitioner sent a letter addressed
to the City Treasurer reiterating its protest and requesting for a refund of its payment in accordance with
Section 196 of the Local Government Code. Petitioner then filed an amended petition alleging that since the
payment of both taxes was a pre-condition to the renewal of its business permit, it was compelled to pay and
had been paying under protest. RTC dismissed the amended petition because of the failure to comply with
the requirements of Section 195 of the Local Government Code.
The Court of Tax Appeals found that since the petitioner paid taxes under the assessment, its claim
for refund assumed that the assessment was wrong. The claim should be understood as logical and necessary
consequence of the allegedly improper assessment such that if the assessment were cancelled, the taxes paid
under it should be refunded. This should not be understood as the claim for refund under Section 196 of
the Local Government Code. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Section 195 or Section 196 of the Local Government Code governs
petitioner’s claim for refund.
2. Whether or not petitioner complied with the requirements that would entitle it to the refund.
RULING:
1. SECTION 196.
Sections 195 and 196 of the Local Government Code govern the remedies of a taxpayer for taxes
collected by local government units, except for real property taxes.
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If the taxpayer receives an assessment and does not pay the tax, its remedy is strictly confined to
Section 195 of the Local Government Code. Thus, it must file a written protest with the local treasurer within
60 days from the receipt of the assessment. If the protest is denied, or if the local treasurer fails to act on it,
then the taxpayer must appeal the assessment before a court of competent jurisdiction within 30 days from
receipt of the denial, or the lapse of the 60-day period within which the local treasurer must act on the protest.
In this case, as no tax was paid, there is no claim for refund in the appeal.
If the taxpayer opts to pay the assessed tax, fee, or charge, it must still file the written protest within
the 60-day period, and then bring the case to court within 30 days from either the decision or inaction of the
local treasurer. In its court action, the taxpayer may, at the same time, question the validity and correctness
of the assessment and seek a refund of the taxes it paid.
On the other hand, if no assessment notice is issued by the local treasurer, and the taxpayer claims
that it erroneously paid a tax, fee, or charge, or that the tax, fee, or charge has been illegally collected from
him, then Section 196 applies.
What determines the appropriate remedy is the local government's basis for the collection of the tax.
It is explicitly stated in Section 195 that it is a remedy against a notice of assessment issued by the local
treasurer, upon a finding that the correct taxes, fees, or charges have not been paid. The notice of assessment
must state "the nature of the tax, fee, or charge, the amount of deficiency, the surcharges, interests and
penalties.” No such precondition is necessary for a claim for refund pursuant to Section 196.
Here, no notice of assessment for deficiency taxes was issued by respondent City Treasurer to
petitioner for the taxes collected after the first three (3) quarters of 1999. The "assessments" from the fourth
quarter of 1999 onwards were Municipal License Receipts; Mayor's Permit, Business Taxes, Fees & Charges
Receipts; and Official Receipts issued by the Office of the City Treasurer for local business taxes, which must
be paid as prerequisites for the renewal of petitioner's business permit in respondent City of Manila. While
these receipts state the amount and nature of the tax assessed, they do not contain any amount of deficiency,
surcharges, interests, and penalties due from petitioner. They cannot be considered the "notice of assessment"
required under Section 195 of the Local Government Code.
2. YES
To be entitled to a refund under Section 196 of the Local Government Code, the taxpayer must
comply with the following procedural requirements: first, file a written claim for refund or credit with the local
treasurer; and second, file a judicial case for refund within two (2) years from the payment of the tax, fee, or
charge, or from the date when the taxpayer is entitled to a refund or credit.
As to the first requirement, the records show that the following written claims for refund were made
by petitioner. As for the taxes paid thereafter and were not covered by these letters, petitioner readily admits
that it did not make separate written claims for refund, citing that "there was no further necessity” to make
these claims. It argues that to file further claims before respondent City Treasurer would have been "another
exercise in futility”.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires recourse to the pertinent

As correctly pointed out by petitioner, the filing of written claims with respondent City Treasurer for
every collection of tax would have yielded the same result every time. Further, the issue at the core of
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petitioner's claims for refund of the second business tax is a question of law. When the issue raised by the
taxpayer is purely legal and there is no question concerning the reasonableness of the amount assessed, then
there is no need to exhaust administrative remedies.
Similarly, petitioner complied with the second requirement under Section 196 of the Local
Government Code that it must file its judicial action for refund within two (2) years from the date of payment,
or the date that the taxpayer is entitled to the refund or credit.
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Q: When International Container, Inc. renewed its business license, the City of Manila assessed it for two
business taxes: one for which it was already paying and another for which it was newly assessed. It filed written
claims for refund to the City Treasurer. However, as for the taxes paid thereafter and were not covered by
the letters, International Container Inc. did not make separate written claims for refund, citing that there was
no further necessity to make such claims and arguing that to file further claims before the City Treasurer
would have been another exercise in futility. Did International Container, Inc. violate the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies?
A: NO. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires recourse to the pertinent
As correctly pointed out by petitioner, the filing of written claims with respondent City Treasurer for every
collection of tax would have yielded the same result every time. Further, the issue at the core of petitioner's
claims for refund of the second business tax is a question of law. When the issue raised by the taxpayer is
purely legal and there is no question concerning the reasonableness of the amount assessed, then there is no
need to exhaust administrative remedies.
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NAREDICO, INC, Petitioner - versus - KROMINCO, INC., Respondents
G.R. No. 196892 | THIRD DIVISION | December 5, 2018 | LEONEN, J.
In deference to its technical knowledge and expertise on matters falling within its jurisdiction, the
findings of fact of the Mines Adjudication Board, when supported by substantial evidence, are binding on the
Court of Appeals and on this Court.
FACTS:
Krominco, Inc. entered into two Operating Contracts with the government, through the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources to explore, develop, and exploit the use of the chromite deposits of
Surigao Mineral Reservation. An Amended Survey Plan for the contract area was later on approved.
Naredico’s president applied for an Exploration Contract with the Mines and Geosciences Bureau
(MGB). Later on, it requested for the revision of Naredico’s earlier application and asked for a conversion
into a mineral production sharing agreement. However, Director of the MGB informed Naredico’s president
that the area sought to be covered by the proposed mineral production sharing agreement overlapped with a
portion of Krominco’s final operating area. Naredico agreed to a suggestion excluding from its proposed
agreement the areas covered by Krominco’s mining rights. The government and Naredico then executed a
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (Agreement).
Naredico filed a petition before the DENR to cancel Krominco’s Operating Contract and declare its
Amended Survey Plan as null. DENR Secretary Alcala declared the Amended Survey Plan as null. DENR
Secretary Ramos directed the Regional Executive Director to conduct an ocular inspection over the disputed
area. The Secretary emphasized that jurisdiction over the controversy lay with the DENR and not with the
MGB Panel of Arbitrators.
Krominco filed before MGB Panel of Arbitrators a petition against Naredico, praying that the overlap
area be excluded from Naredico’s Agreement, and that its exclusive rights over the overlap area be recognized.
The Panel of Arbitrators ruled that Krominco had a better right than Naredico over the overlap area. It found
that Naredico had known that its proposed contract area overlapped with Krominco’s final operating area
and agreed to exclude it from its own final contract area.
The Mines Adjudication Board modified the the Panel of Arbitrator’s decision and awarded the area
occupied with Krominco’s structures to Krominco and the free area to Naredico.
CA reversed the MAB decision and ruled in favor of Krominco. It pointed out that Naredico agreed
to a suggestion to exclude from its Agreement the areas covered by Krominco’s subsisting mining rights.
Petitioner asserts that the CA erred in failing to take judicial notice of Secretary Alcala’s findings and
it faults CA for not adopting the findings of the MAB and the results of the Joint Relocation Survey. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in reversing the findings of the MAB.
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RULING:
YES. In deference to its technical knowledge and expertise on matters falling within its jurisdiction,
the findings of fact of the Mines Adjudication Board, when supported by substantial evidence, are binding on
the Court of Appeals and on this Court.
In modifying the Panel of Arbitrators' Decision, the Mines Adjudication Board acknowledged that
petitioner's and respondent's mining contracts were perfected, and ruled that there was a need to harmonize
their stipulations.
It ordered a Joint Relocation Survey, which confirmed that while respondent's mine pit and ore body
were within its contract area, some of its structures lay outside its contract area and within the contested area.
This Court sees no reason to disturb the findings of the Mines Adjudication Board. TAIaHE
The Mines Adjudication Board has appellate jurisdiction over decisions and orders of the Panel of
Arbitrators, while also possessing specific powers and functions related to its quasi-judicial functions.
In this case, after its Joint Relocation Survey, the Mines Adjudication Board found that respondent's
final operating area went beyond the actual areas occupied by its structures, in clear contravention of the terms
in its Operating Contract.
As the administrative body with jurisdiction over disputes relative to mining rights, the Mines
Adjudication Board's findings should be treated with deference in recognition of its expertise and technical
knowledge over such matters.
Additionally, Rule 43, Section 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, acknowledging the primacy and
deference accorded to decisions of quasi-judicial agencies, states that the factual findings of a quasi-judicial
agency, when supported by substantial evidence, shall be binding on the Court of Appeals. Hence, this Court
upholds the findings of the Mines Adjudication Board and reinstates its Decision.
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Q: Krominco Inc. entered into Operating Contracts with the government. Later on, Naredico entered a
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (Agreement). However, the Mines Adjudication Board found that
there exists an overlapping area covered by the Operating Contract and the Agreement. To resolve the
dispute, it awarded the area occupied with Krominco’s structure to Krominco and the free area to Naredico.
CA reversed the MAC decision and ruled in favor of Krominco. Did CA err in reversing the findings of the
MAB?
A: YES. In deference to its technical knowledge and expertise on matters falling within its jurisdiction, the
findings of fact of the Mines Adjudication Board, when supported by substantial evidence, are binding on the
Court of Appeals and on this Court.
As the administrative body with jurisdiction over disputes relative to mining rights, the Mines Adjudication
Board's findings should be treated with deference in recognition of its expertise and technical knowledge over
such matters.
Additionally, Rule 43, Section 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, acknowledging the primacy and deference
accorded to decisions of quasi-judicial agencies, states that the factual findings of a quasi-judicial agency, when
supported by substantial evidence, shall be binding on the Court of Appeals. Hence, this Court upholds the
findings of the Mines Adjudication Board and reinstates its Decision.
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RE: COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT OF ELVIRA ENALBES ET AL AGAINST FORMER CHIEF

JUSTICE TERESITA LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
A.M. No. 18-11-09-SC | EN BANC | January 22, 2019 | LEONEN, J.
While the 24-month period provided under the 1987 Constitution is persuasive, it does not
summarily bind this Court to the disposition of cases brought before it. It is a mere directive to ensure this
Court's prompt resolution of cases, and should not be interpreted as an inflexible rule.
FACTS:
Complainants filed a complaint-affidavit against former Chief Justice Teresita Leonardo-de Castro
charging her with gross ignorance of the law, gross inefficiency, gross misconduct, gross dishonesty, and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
They state that Mallari spouses filed two petitions which were assigned to this Court’s First Division
and were raffled to then Chief Justice De Castro. They aver that despite the lapse of more than 5 years,
respondent failed to decide on both petitions of spouses Mallari. They maintain that the respondent’s failure
to to promptly act on the petitions resulted in a violation of the spouses’ constitutional right to speedy
disposition of their cases. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the former Chief Justice should be held administratively liable for gross ignorance
of the law, gross inefficiency, gross misconduct, gross dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service.
RULING:
NO. Complainants' arguments lack merit. Article VIII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution states:
SECTION 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided
or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced
by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower
courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the ling of the last
pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
In relation, Rule 13, Section 1 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court provides:
SECTION 1. Period for Deciding or Resolving Cases. — The Court shall decide or resolve all cases
within twenty-four months from the date of submission for resolution. A case shall be deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the ling of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum that the Court or its Rules
require.
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Both the 1987 Constitution and the Internal Rules state that the 24-month period for deciding on or
resolving a case is reckoned from the date of its submission for resolution. The 24-month period does not
run immediately upon the filing of a petition before this Court, but only when the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum has been submitted.
Being the court of last resort, this Court should be given an ample amount of time to deliberate on
cases pending before it. Ineluctably, leeway must be given to magistrates for them to thoroughly review and
reflect on the cases assigned to them. This Court notes that all matters brought before it involves rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable. It would be at the height of injustice if cases were hastily decided on
at the risk of erroneously dispensing justice.
While the 24-month period provided under the 1987 Constitution is persuasive, it does not
summarily bind this Court to the disposition of cases brought before it. It is a mere directive to ensure this
Court's prompt resolution of cases, and should not be interpreted as an inflexible rule.
Magistrates must be given discretion to defer the disposition of certain cases to make way for other
equally important matters in this Court's agenda.
As a final note, the prescribed time limit should not be ignored as to render nugatory the spirit which
breathes life to the letter of the 1987 Constitution. Ultimately, courts must strike an objective and reasonable
balance in disposing cases promptly, while maintaining judicious tenacity in interpreting and applying the law.
Accordingly, respondent's failure to promptly resolve the Mallari Spouses' Petitions does not
constitute gross ignorance of the law warranting administrative liability.
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Q: Complainants filed a complaint-affidavit against former Chief Justice Teresita Leonardo-de Castro
charging her with gross ignorance of the law, gross inefficiency, gross misconduct, gross dishonesty, and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. hey aver that despite the lapse of more than 5 years,
respondent failed to decide on both petitions of spouses Mallari. They maintain that the respondent’s failure
to to promptly act on the petitions resulted in a violation of the spouses’ constitutional right to speedy
disposition of their cases. Did the former Chief Justice act in prejudicial to the best interest of the service?
A: NO. Being the court of last resort, this Court should be given an ample amount of time to deliberate on
cases pending before it. Ineluctably, leeway must be given to magistrates for them to thoroughly review and
reflect on the cases assigned to them. This Court notes that all matters brought before it involves rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable. It would be at the height of injustice if cases were hastily decided on
at the risk of erroneously dispensing justice.
While the 24-month period provided under the 1987 Constitution is persuasive, it does not summarily bind
this Court to the disposition of cases brought before it. It is a mere directive to ensure this Court's prompt
resolution of cases, and should not be interpreted as an inflexible rule.
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REYNALDO S. ZAPANTA, Petitioner - versus - COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ALFRED J.

ZAPANTA; EDILBERTO U. LAGASCA, Respondents
G.R. No. 233016 | EN BANC | March 5, 2019 | LEONEN, J.
In a multi-slot office, all votes cast in favor of the nuisance candidate whose name is confusingly
similar to a bona fide candidate shall not be automatically credited in the latter's favor. If the ballot contains
one (1) vote for the nuisance candidate and no vote for the bona fide candidate, that vote will be counted in
the latter's favor. However, if the nuisance candidate and the bona fide candidate each gets a vote, only one
(1) vote will be counted in the latter's favor.
FACTS:
Petitioner Reynaldo, respondent Alfred, and petitioner-intervenor each filed a Certificate of

Candidacy for city councilor of the Second District of Antipolo Rizal. Alfred filed before the Commission a
petition to cancel certificate of candidacy of Reynaldo as Nuisance Candidate, alleging that the latter indicated
the name “Alfred” both as his nickname and his name in the official ballots. He averred that Reynold’s use
of the name “Alfred” was designed to mislead the voters to steal the votes intended for him.
The Commission’s Second Division granted Alfred’s petition and held that Reynaldo’s name was
confusingly similar to Alfred’s name. Commission en banc affirmed and ruled that since the name “Alfred”
could not be directly connected to Reynaldo’s name, Reynaldo should have presented sufficient evidence to
establish his allegation. It further ruled that the votes in favor of Reynaldo should be credited to Alfred.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner argues that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion when it declared
petitioner as nuisance candidate and directed proclamation of private respondents as the winning candidate.
He further argues that if the votes he garnered will be added to the votes of private respondent, then the
electorate will be disenfranchised, their right to suffrage will be violated.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not COMELEC, in declaring petitioner as a nuisance candidate, committed

gave abuse of discretion.
2. Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered that the
votes cast for petitioner be credited to the votes case for private respondent.
RULING:
1. NO.
The only way to distinguish petitioner from private respondent is their number on the ballot and
their a affiliations. Other than that, a voter who wanted to vote for "Alfred Zapanta," but only knows the name
"Alfred" or surname "Zapanta," would be confused on which oval to shade to re ect his or her choice. No
other candidate for the position of city councilor has either the name "Alfred" or “Zapanta."
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After a perusal of the case records, this Court holds that petitioner was not able to sufficiently show
that voters can clearly identify that his chosen nickname pertains only to him. The affidavits he presented are
not enough to show that he had been using the name "Alfred" or that he is publicly known by that name.
Moreover, despite being given an opportunity to counter private respondent's allegations, petitioner
failed to deny that he had no campaign materials using the name "Alfred Zapanta," or present evidence to the
contrary. He merely banked on his membership in a political party to support his claim that he had a bona
fide intention to run for office. Association to a political party perfse does not necessarily equate to a
candidate's bona fide intent; instead, he or she must show that he or she is serious in running for office. This,
petitioner failed to demonstrate.
Additionally, private respondent is more recognized by his constituents as “Alfred Zapanta," being an
incumbent city councilor who was running for another term.
2. NO.
This Court finds that public respondent did not exercise its judgment in an arbitrary, capricious, or
whimsical manner when it ordered adding the votes cast for petitioner to the votes cast for private respondent.
On the contrary, it merely applied "the current state of our law."
Here, the Santos doctrine must be applied: the votes for petitioner alone should be counted in favor
of private respondent; if there are votes for both petitioner and private respondent in the same ballot, then
only one (1) vote should be counted in the latter's favor. This will not only discourage nuisance candidates,
but will also prevent the disenfranchisement of voters.
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Q: Alfred filed a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Reynaldo as a nuisance candidate, alleging
that the latter indicated the name “Alfred” both as his nickname and his name in the official ballots. He
averred that Reynold’s use of name “Alfred” was designed to mislead the voters to steal the votes intended
for him. Because of this, COMELEC ruled that the votes in favor of Reynaldo should be credited to Alfred.
Did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion?
A: NO. In a multi-slot office, all votes cast in favor of the nuisance candidate whose name is confusingly
similar to a bona fide candidate shall not be automatically credited in the latter's favor. If the ballot contains
one (1) vote for the nuisance candidate and no vote for the bona fide candidate, that vote will be counted in
the latter's favor. However, if the nuisance candidate and the bona fide candidate each gets a vote, only one
(1) vote will be counted in the latter's favor.
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MARIA SHIELA HUBAHIB TUPAZ, Petitioner – versus – THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS; ATTY. FERNANDO ABELLA, REGISTER OF DEEDS; and
MACRINA ESPINA, Respondent
GR No. 212491-92 | Third Division | June 21, 2019 | LEONEN, J.
Public prosecutors must address the different dimensions of complaints before them. When they
provide well-reasoned resolutions on one dimension, but overlook palpable indications that another crime
has been committed, they fail to responsibly discharge the functions entrusted to them.
FACTS:
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas issued order OMB-V-C-13-0098 dismissing
the Criminal Complaint for falsification and violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, fild by petitioner Maria Shiela Hubahib against private respondents Fernando M. Abella, Register of
Deeds of Catarman, Northern Samar, and Macrina Espina.
In the Complaint-Affidavit filed by Tupaz, she stated there that her mother Sol Espina Hubahib, was
the registered owner of the 100,691 square meter property in Barangay Rawis, Lao-ang, Northern Samar,
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 15609 wherein a duplicate of the said title has always been in the
possession of Hubahib and her heirs.
On April 17, 2011, Atty. Abella canceled Original Certificate of Title No. 15609 and issued Transfer
Certificate Title Nos. 116-2011000073 and 116-2011000074 in favor of Genaro Espina, represented by his
attorney-in-fact, Macrina. According to Tupaz, the cancellation of was based on the following grounds:
1. A document labeled as the owner’s duplicate of Original Certificate Title No. 15609
but which Tupaz argued was “materially and essentially different” from the copy on file with the
Register of Deeds and the genuine owner’s duplicate copy in her family’s custody;
2. A Certificate Authorizing Registration supposedly issued by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue which indicated that no capital gains tax was paid despite the property being a more
than 100,000 square meter commercial land with zonal valuation of 400 pesos per square meter
as of 2002. The same certificate also indicated that only 2,655 pesos in documentary stamp taxes
and 100 pesos for the certification fee were paid;
3. A 1972 Deed of Conveyance, which was never annotated onto the Original
Certificate Title No. 15609 and which had surfaced only in 2011, bearing a forgery in Hubahib’s
signature; and
4. A subdivision plan that was made without the participation of or notice to Tupaz or
her co-heirs/owners.
Tupaz maintained that Atty. Abella: issued a spurious owner’s duplicate copy of Original Certificate
Title No. 15609; tolerated the use of an equally spurious Certificate Authorizing Registration and Deed of
Converyance; and enabled the issuance of specious transfer certificates of titles wherein Genaro was the
beneficiary. She filed her complaint asserting that Atty. Abella, along with Macrina were liable for falsification,
graft and corrupt practices, misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Her complaint was docketed as OMB-V-C-13-0098 for the criminal aspect concerning falsification and graft
and corrupt practices while OMB-V-C-13-100 was docketed for the administrative aspect concerning
misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
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In the assailed April 23, 2013 Consolidated Evaluation Report, the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas dismissed Tupaz’s complaint for being “premature” and declined to file criminal
informations, both for falsification and graft and corrupt practices act against Atty. Abella and Macrina. It
reasoned that the possible criminal liability of Atty. Abella was closely intertwined with the issue on ownership
of the subject property, if the transfer of the title of the property in the favor of Espina is upheld and valid,
the present charges for falsification, dishonesty, etc. against them would have no leg to stand on.
ISSUE:
Whether or not public respondent Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not finding probable cause to charge
public respondent Fernando M. Abella, along with private respondent Macrina Espina, with violation of
Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
RULING:
THERE IS PROBABLE CAUSE TO FILE THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION AGAINST

ABELLA AND MACRINA
Probable cause for the filing of an information is a matter which rests on likelihood rather than on
certainty. It relies on common sense rather than ‘clear and convincing evidence.’ As stated in Ampil v Office
of the Ombudsman, probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief,
in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was
guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. It needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely
than not a crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was committed by the
accused, it need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt.
Determining probable cause must be made in reference to the elements of the crime charged. A
violation of section 3(e) is deemed to have occurred when the following elements are demonstrated: the
offender is a public officer; the act was done in the discharge of the public officer’s official, administrative or
judicial functions; the act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence;
and the public officer caused undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any unwarranted
benefits, advantage, or preference.
There is no doubt about the first, second or third elements. While the evidence strongly suggests that
the third element was present in the form of gross inexcusable negligence. While he did not act with
respondent Macrina out of a shared malevolent design, he nonetheless relied manifestly defective and tellingly
suspicious documents that private respondent Macrina presented.
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Q: The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas issued order OMB-V-C-13-0098 dismissing the
Criminal Complaint for falsification and violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
fild by petitioner Maria Shiela Hubahib Tupaz against private respondents Fernando M. Abella, Register of
Deeds of Catarman, Northern Samar, and Macrina Espina. Tupaz claimed, in the complaint affidavit, that
the owner of the 100,691 in Barangay Rawis, Lao-ang, Northern Samar was her mother by virtue of Original
Certificate Title No. 156909. Atty. Abella canceled the Original Certificate Title and issued Transfer
Certificate Titles No. 116-2011000073 and 116-2011000074 in favor of Genaro Espina. The cancellation
and issuance of titles was based on: (1) a materially and essentially different Original Certificate Title from
that of the Register of Deeds; (2) a Certificate of Authorizing Registration supposedly issued by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue; (3) a 1972 deed of conveyance; and (4) a subdivision plan without the consent of Tupaz.
Can a criminal information be filed despite not having clear and convincing evidence of guilt?
A: YES. Only a probable cause is needed in order to file a criminal information before a court. Probable
cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, that
the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. It needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it
was committed by the accused. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on
evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
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LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner – versus – LUCY GRACE, AND ELMA GLORIA
FRANCO, REPRESENTED BY ATTORNEY-IN-FACT VICENTE GUSTILLO, JR., Respondent
GR No. 203242 | EN BANC | March 12, 2019 | Leonon, J.
The final determination of just compensation is vested in courts. The Court may deviate from the
basic formula provided by administrative agencies if it finds, in its discretion, that other factors must be taken
into account in the determination of just compensation. Deviation, however, must be grounded on a reasoned
explanation based on the evidence on record.
FACTS:
Lucy Grace Franco and Elma Gloria Franco were the registered owners of parcels of agricultural land
in Barangay Maquina, Dumangas, Iloilo, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-62209, T-62210,
and T-51376.
The Francos offered the parcels of land for sale to the Department of Agrarian Reform under the
Voluntary Offer to Sell of the Coprehensive Agrarian Reform Program in 1995. 12.5977 out of the 14.444
hectares of the property were acquired and distributed to qualified reform beneficiaries. The parcels of
land were valued at 714,713.78 pesos. The Francos did not agree to initial valuation and upon a Petition for
Review, the Departmet of Agrarian Reform Adjucation Board raised the amount to 739,461.43 pesos. The
latter amount was then withdrawn by the Francos from the Land Bank of the Philippines.
Still dissatisfied with the amount, the Francos filed before the Regional Trial Court, sitting as the
Special Agrarian Court, a Complaint for the determination of just compensation. Subsequently, they filed an
Amended Petition against Land Bank, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and other tenant-beneficiaries who
were not included in the original complaint.
The Special Agrarian Court fixed the just compensation for the 12.5977 hectares of land area actually
taken by the Government in the amount of 1,024,115.49 pesos. It ordered Land Bank to pay the remaining
balance of 288,115.49-peso balance with legal interest at 12% per annum from April 25, 1996 until full
payment. It also held that the Francos were entitled to an additional 5% cash payment by way of incentive for
voluntary offering their lots for sale under Section 19 of Republic Act 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the Special Agrarian Court on January 20, 2011. It
however, modified the decision of the Special Agrarian Court by deleting the imposition of the 12% legal
interest on the outstanding amount stating that delay in the delivery of payment has not been established.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or Not the Court of Appeal erred in affirming the Special Agrarian Court’s valuation of
just compensation, using a variation of the basic general formula provided for in Department of Agrarian
Reform Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1998
2. Whether or Not the five percent cash incentive under Section 19 of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law refers only to the mode of payment of the cash portion, not to an increase in the total amount
of just compensation
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RULING:
1. YES. The Special Agrarian Court’s computation of just compensation resulted in a double take
up of the market value per tax declaration of the property. This method of valuation has already been
considered as a departure from the mandate of law and basic administrative guidelines.
Regional Trial Courts, sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, have original and exclusive jurisdiction over
all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, as well as the prosecution of offenses
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law while the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board only has preliminary administrative determination of just compensation.
Administrative Order No. 5 provides a comprehensive formula that considers several factors in
determining just compensation. Although jurisprudence provides that courts are still tasked with considering
all factors present, which may be stated in formulas provided by administrative agencies. The special agrarian
courts are not strictly bound to apply the formula to its minute detail, particularly when faced with situations
that do not warrant the formula’s strict application, they may exercise discretion and relax the formula’s
application to fit the factual situations before them. It may deviate from the formulas if it can show that the
value is not equivalent to the fair market value at the time of taking.
Nonetheless, having original and exclusive jurisdiction does not mean that our courts should be
removed from the realities that confront the entire government bureaucracy and, in so doing, become
impervious to the guidelines issued by our administrative agencies. Any deviation to the basic formula made
in the exercise of judicial discretion must supported by a reasoned explanation grounded on the evidence on
record.
2. YES. The five percent (5%) cash incentive under Section 19 is not an addition to the amount of
just compensation awarded to by the courts. The incentive only applies to the cash payment to be awarded.
As provided in Section 18, just compensation shall be paid in different modes, and for lands that are
twenty-four hectares and below, it shall be paid in thirty-five percent cash with the balance to paid in
government financial instruments negotiable at any time.
The respondents shall only be entitled to an additional five percent on the cash portion of the
payment for their voluntary offer of land. Therefore, instead of receiving thirty-five percent in cash and sixty-
five percent in bonds, it shall now be forty percent in cash and sixty percent in bonds.
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Q: Lucy Grace Franco and Elma Gloria Franco were the registered owners of parcels of agricultural land in
Barangay Maquina, Dumangas, Iloilo, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-62209, T-62210, and
T-51376. The Francos voluntarily offered their land to the Department of Agrarian Reform for the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. The Francos were initially offered 714,713.78 pesos for just
compensation but was later raised to 739,461.43 pesos. The Francos withdrew the compensation but was still
dissatisfied with the amount, they the filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court, sitting as Special
Agrarian Court. The court fixed the just compensation to 1,024,115.59 pesos and ruled that the Francos were
entitled to 5% additional cash payment for voluntarily offering their lots for the CARP. Did the Special
Agararian Court err in fixing the just compensation?
A: YES. The Special Agrarian Court’s computation of the just compensation resulted in a double take up of
the market value of the per tax declaration of the property. Although the court is allowed to take all factors
present in consideration and not to be strictly bound to apply the formula to its minute detail, the method
used by the court can already be considred as a departure from the mandate of the law and basic
administrative guidelines.
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LARRY SABUCO MANIBOG, Petitioner – versus – PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
GR No. 211214 | THIRD DIVISION | July 1, 2019 | Leonen, J.
For a “stop and frisk” search to be valid, the totality of suspicious circumstances, as personally
observed by the arresting officer, must lead to a genuine reason to suspect that a person is committing and
illicit act. Consequently, a warrantless arrest not based on this constitutes and infringement of a person’s basic
right to privacy.
FACTS:
On March 17, 2010, Larry Sabuco Manibog was charged with violation of Sec 1 of Commission on
Elections Resolution 8714, in relation to Sec 32 of Republic Act No. 7166, and Sec 261(q) and 264 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code (Gun ban).
On arraingnment, Manibog pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. During the pre-trial, the parties
stilpulated that on March 17, 2010, police officers arrested Manibog and seized his firearm for not having a
permit from the COMELEC to carry it. The issue was later narrowed down to whether an illegal search and
seizure attended Manibog’s apprehension and confiscation of his firearm.
In the morning of March 17, 2010, Police Chief Inspector Randolph Beniat received information
from a police asset that Manibog was standing outside the Municipal Tourism Office of Dingras, Ilocos Norte
with a gun tucked in his waistband. He then organized a team, and together they proceeded to the Municipal
Tourism Office located around 20 meters from the police station. Manibog was seen about five to eight meters
standing outside the Municipal Tourism Office. As the team was approaching Manibog, Chief Inspector
Beniat saw a bulge on Manibog’s waist which was deduced to be a gun due to its unique contour. Chief
Inspector Beniat went up to Manibog, patted the bulging object, and confirmed that there was a gun tucked
in the latter’s waistband. The former then disarmed the latter of the .45 caliber handgun inside a holster and
then arrested him for violating the election gun ban and brought him to the police station for an inquest
proceeding.
Police Officer 2 Rodel Caraballa testified that he was part of the team to verify a tip they received
concerning Manigbog. He stated that as he was walking up to manibog with the team during the operation,
he noticed what appeared to be a gun-shaped bulge on Manibog’s waist. He further testified that Chief
Inspector Beniat handed him the gun after it had been confiscated. He then marked the gun in the police
station with his initials “RC.”
Manibog then testified for his defense, he did not deny that he was carrying a gun when the police
officers arrested him, but he claimed that while Chief Inspector Beniat was frisking him, the police officer
whispered an apology, explaining that he had to do it, or he would get in trouble with the provincial director.
Manibog further testified that at the police station, Chief Inspector Beniat asked him to relay his apologies to
Dingras Mayor Marinette Gamboa since Manibog had worked closely with her and said that he did not have
a grudge against Chief Inspector Beniat.
On August 25, 2011, the Regional Trial Court found Manibog guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
election offense with which he was charged. It ruled that the warrantless search on Manibog was incidental to
a lawful arrest because there was probable cause for the police officers to frisk and arrest him. The RTC cited
the case of People v. Tudtud wherein it stated that to justify a warrantless arrest, it is not enough that the police
officers were armed with reliable information, it must be combined with an accused’s overt act indicating that
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he or she has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. The trial court pointed out in the case
of Manibog that not only were the police officers armed with very specific information, they were also able to
personally observe a distinct bulge on the waistline of Manibog, which they suspected to be a gun due to its
contour and their experience as police officers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless search made on Manibog was valid
RULING:
CONSTITUTIONAL PROSCRIPTION ONLY COVERS UNREASONABLE SEARCHES

AND SEIZURES
The general rule is that a search is that a search and seizure must be carried out through a judicial
warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure violate the constitution. Any evidence resulting from it shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Jurisprudence has recognized instances of reasonable
warrantless searches and seizures, included is the “stop and frisk.”
Stop and frisk searches are conducted to deter crime. Law enforcers should be given this legal arsenal
to prevent the commission of crimes. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy
of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The balance lies in the concept of
“suspiciousness” present in the situation where the police officer finds himself or herself in. Police officers
have the ability to discern, based in facts that they themselves observe, whether an individual is acting in a
suspicious manner. For a stop and frisk search to be valid, the arresting officer must have had personal
knowledge of facts, which would engender a reasonable degree of suspicion of an illicit act. There must be
more than one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of
criminal activity” to uphold the validity of a stop and frisk search.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that a reasonable search was conducted on the petitioner, the
facts do not point to a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, but rather a stop and frisk search. The
tip on the petitioner along with the police officers’ visual confirmation that petitioner had a gun shaped object
tucked in his waistband, led to a reasonable suspicion that he was carrying a gun during an election gun ban.
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Q: Larry Manibog was charged for the violation of RA 7166 and the Omnibus Election Code. Police Chief
Inspector Ronald Beniat received a tip that Manibog was outside the Municipal Tourism Office of Dingras,
Ilocos Norte, with gun tucked in his waist. After organizing a team, Beniat, with his team, saw Manibog five
to eight meters from the Municipal Tourism Office. The team then noticed a bulge on the waist of Manibog
which was deduced to be a gun. Beniat then approached Manibog, searched him, without a search warrant,
and recovered a .45 caliber firearm and arrested him. Is the stop and frisk conducted on Manibog valid?
A: YES. The tip on the petitioner along with the police officers’ visual confirmation that petitioner had a gun
shaped object tucked in his waistband, led to a reasonable suspicion that he was carrying a gun during an
election gun ban. Law enforcers are given the legal arsenal of stop and frisk searches in order to prevent or
deter the commission of crimes.
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KILUSANG MAYO UNO, et. al, Petitioner – versus - HON. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III et.
al, Respondent
GR No. 210500 | EN BANC | April 2, 2019 | Leonon, J.
For a court to take cognizance of a case, petitioner must first exhaust all administrative remedies
available.
FACTS:
On April 19, 2013, the Social Security Commission issued Resolution No. 262-s. 2013, which
provided an increase in the Social Security members’ contribution rate from 10.4% to 11% and the maximum
monthly salary credit from 15,000 pesos to 16,000 pesos, subject to the approval of the President of the
Philippines.
On September 6, 2013, the President approved the increase. Then on September 20, 2013, the
Social Security Commission issued Resolution No. 711-s. 2013, which approved the increase in contribution
and maximum monthly salary.
On October 2, 2013, the Social Security Commission, issued Circular No. 2013-010, which provided
the revised schedule of contributions that would be in effect in January 2014. Employers and employees shall
now equally shoulder the 0.6% increase in contributions.
On January 10, 2014, Kilusang Mayo Uno, et. al. filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,
questioning the validity of the issuances.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court can exercise its power of Judicial review
2. Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy
3. Whether or not the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies
4. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to file the Petition
5. Whether or not the assailed issuances were issued in violation of laws and with grave abuse of
discretion
a. Whether or not the assailed issuances are void for having been issued under vague and unclear
standards contained in the Social Security act
b. Whether or not the increase in Social Security System contributions is reasonably necessary
for the attainment of the purpose sought and is unduly oppressive upon the labor sector
c. Whether or not the revised ratio of contributions between employers and employees is grossly
unjust to the working class and beyond respondent Social Security Commission’s power to
enact.
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RULING:
1. YES.
The issue before the Court is of transcendental importance therefore the required legal standing for
petitioners must be relaxed. Millions of Filipinos working here and abroad shall be affected by the issue due
to the substantial portion of the members’ salary going to the Social Security fund. Delaying the resolution of
such important issue would be a great disservice to the Court’s duty enshrined in the Constitution. Despite
the technical infirmities in the Petition, the Court reviews the assailed issuances.
2. NO.
The petitioners failed to prove how the assailed issuances violated workers’ constitutional rights such
that it would warrant judicial review. Petitioners cannot merely cite and rely on the Constitution without
specifying how these rights translate to being legally entitled to a fixed amount and proportion of Social
Security System contributions.
3. YES.
The Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies state that courts may only take cognizance
of a case or controversy if the petitioner has exhausted all remedies available to it under the law. The doctrine
ensures that the administrative agency exercised its power to its full extent, including its authority to correct
or reconsider its actions. Under Rule 65 petitions, it is required that no other plain, speedy, or adequate
remedy is available to the party, thus the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies apply, regardless
of the act of the administrative agency concerned.
It is clear in the case that the petitioners have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Under
Sections 4 and 5 of the Social Security Act, it is clear that the Social Security Commission has jurisdiction
over any dispute arising from the law regarding coverage, benefits, contributions, and penalties. Any dispute
regarding coverage entitlement to benefits, collection and settlement of premium contributions and penalties,
or any other matter related thereto shall be cognizable by the Commission. The Social Security Commission
must be given a chance to render a decision on the issue, or to correct any alleged mistake before the courts
can exercise judicial review.
4. BOTH YES AND NO.
Petitioners Joseliton Ustarez, Salvador Carranza, Nenita Gonzaga, Prescila Maniquiz, Reden
Alcantara, and Anakpawis Party-list Representative Fernando Hicap, for himself, are Social Security System
members who stand to suffer direct and material injury from the assailed issuances’ enforcement which vest
them the legal personality to assail the imposed increase in contribution rates and maximum monthly salary
credit.
On the other hand, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno, Anakpawis Party-list, Center for Trade Union
and Human Rights, and National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno all failed to show how
they will suffer direct and material injury from the enforcement for the assailed issuance. However,
jurisprudence is replete with instances when a liberal approach to determining legal standing was adopted
which allowed ordinary citizens, members of the Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions
involving the constitutionality or validity of law, regulations, and rulings.
5. A. NO.
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Petitioners are putting not only the validity of the exercise of the delegated power in issue, but also
the validity of the delegation itself, making a collateral attack on the validity of the provisions of the Social
Security Act’s provisions. Collateral attacks on a presumably valid law are not allowed. Laws, rules, or acts
can only be annulled through a direct proceeding.
Furthermore, the delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies is

allowed in the face of increasing complexity of modern life. Given the volume and variety of interactions
involving the members of today’s society, it is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws dealing with the
minutiae aspects of everyday life. It creates the need to delegate to administrative bodies the authority to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its policies.
B. YES. An examination of the provision and the assailed issuances reveals that the questioned
increase in contribution rate was not solely for the increase in members’ benefits, but also to extend actuarial
life. It was well in the scope of the lawful exercise of police power. The increase reflected in the issuances of
respondents are reasonably necessary to observe the constitutional mandate of promoting social justice under
the Social Security Act. The public interest involved is the State’s goal of establishing, developing, promoting,
and perfecting a sound and viable tax-exempt social security system.
C. NO. Nothing in the law requires that the ratio of contributions must be set at a 70%-30% sharing
in favor of the employee. Supplanting the executive branch’s determination of the proper ratio of contribution
would result in judicial legislation.
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Q: The Social Security Commission issued Resolution No. 262-s. 2013, which provided an increase in the
Social Security members’ contribution rate from 10.4% to 11% and the maximum monthly salary credit from
15,000 pesos to 16,000 pesos, subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines. The President
approved the increase. Kilusang Mayo Uno et. al then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before
the Court. Can the Court exercise judicial power?
A: YES. The court ruled that the case is of transcendental importance, therefore must be settled immediately
and any delay would be a great disservice to the Court’s duty enshrined in the constitution. The Court also
stated that the rules regarding legal standing must be relaxed due to the transcendental importance of the
issues.
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MARILYN R. YANGSON vs. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
G.R. No. 200170. June 03, 2019. LEONEN, J.
“Reassignments differ from transfers, and public employees with appointments that are not station-
specific may be reassigned to another station in the exigency of public service.”
FACTS:
Marilyn R. Yangson (Yangson) was Principal III at the Surigao Norte National High School (Surigao
National). A Memorandum was issued where she was reassigned from Surigao National to Toledo S. Pantilo
Memorial National High School (Toledo Memorial). Yangson refused to accept the Memorandum.
Yangson alleged that the Memorandum was issued without her prior consultation. Thus, Yangson
filed before the Regional Trial Court a Petition for Injunction. However, the Regional Trial Court denied
Yangson's prayer for preliminary injunction. It held that Yangson did not have a vested right over her position
at Surigao National because her appointment as Principal III was not station-specific.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner’s appointment was station-specific.
RULING:
NO. An appointment is station-specific if the employee's appointment paper specifically indicates on

its face the particular office or station the position is located. Moreover, the station should already be specified
in the position title, even if the place of assignment is not indicated on the face of the appointment.
Here, petitioner's appointment is not solely for Surigao National or for any specific school. There is
no particular office or station specifically indicated on the face of her appointment paper. Neither does her
position title specifically indicate her station.
Section 6 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers does not apply here. Section 6 applies to
transfers, not reassignments. Petitioner's movement from Surigao National to Toledo Memorial was a
reassignment, not a transfer.
The legal concept of transfer differs from reassignment. Most notably, a transfer involves the issuance
of another appointment, while a reassignment does not.
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Q: Yangson, a Principal III at Surigano High was reassigned to Toledo High. She refused to be reassigned.
She argues that there should be prior consultation as provided under the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers. DepEd on the other hand argues that she is being reassigned and that her appointment is not
station-specific. Decide.
A: Yangson’s appointment is not station-specific. An appointment is station-specific if the employee's

appointment paper specifically indicates on its face the particular office or station the position is located.
Moreover, the station should already be specified in the position title, even if the place of assignment is not
indicated on the face of the appointment.
Moreover, the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers does not apply because it only applies to transfers,
not reassignments. The legal concept of transfer differs from reassignment. Most notably, a transfer involves
the issuance of another appointment, while a reassignment does not.
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PHILIPPINE INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES (PIDS) vs. COA
G.R. No. 212022. August 20, 2019. LEONEN, J.
“The doctrine of qualified political agency acknowledges the multifarious executive responsibilities
that demand a president's attention, such that the delegation of control power to his or her Cabinet becomes
a necessity. Unless the Constitution or law provides otherwise, Cabinet members have the president's
imprimatur to exercise control over the offices and departments under their respective jurisdictions, which
authority nonetheless remains subject to the president's disapproval or reversal.”
FACTS:
Sometime in 1999, the Philippine Institute for Development Studies requested that it be authorized
to establish a health maintenance program in the form of a free annual medical checkup through their
membership in a private health maintenance organization. In accordance with law, the Philippine Institute
for Development Studies sought the President's approval which was granted. Armed with the Office of the
President's approval, the Philippine Institute for Development Studies executed a Health Care Agreement
with PhilamCare Health System, Inc. (PhilamCare).
Upon post-audit, the Audit Team Leader issued Audit Observation Memorandum No. 2005-001
finding that the payment to PhilamCare was contrary to Commission on Audit Resolution No. 2005-001. The
Philippine Institute for Development Studies was directed to discontinue further payment for the transaction.
The amount was disallowed for being violative of the February 3, 2005 Commission on Audit Resolution No.
2005-001, which the Audit Team Leader and Supervising Auditor said prohibits the procurement of
healthcare insurance from private agencies.
Petitioner argues that the Commission on Audit erred. It stresses that the President, as an exercise of
authority under Presidential Decree No. 1597, allowed it to avail of medical benefits other than those in the
administrative order.
ISSUE:
Whether COA erred in upholding the notice of disallowance.
RULING:
Commission on Audit Resolution 2005-001 does not entirely prohibit the procurement of health
insurance from private insurance agencies. What it proscribes is the procurement of an additional health
insurance from private health insurance companies aside from PhilHealth.
Clearly, procuring health insurance from private health insurance companies, by itself, does not
constitute disbursement of public funds. What Commission on Audit Resolution No. 2005-001 forbids is the
procurement of another health insurance in addition to the health program provided by the government
through PhilHealth.
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The annual medical checkup program implemented by petitioner is not an additional insurance. It
is an alternative to that provided by PhilHealth. Therefore, the agreements entered by petitioner do not
constitute additional allowance prohibited under Commission on Audit Resolution 2005-001.
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Q: PIDS executed a Healthcare Agreement with PhilamCare. COA issued a Notice of Disallowance relying
on a Resolution which provides that procurement of healthcare insurance from private agencies are
prohibited. PIDS argue that the President allowed it to avail of the medical benefits other than those in the
administrative order. Is COA correct in disallowing the transaction?
A: NO. What Commission on Audit Resolution No. 2005-001 forbids is the procurement of another health
insurance in addition to the health program provided by the government through PhilHealth. The annual
medical checkup program implemented by petitioner is not an additional insurance. It is an alternative to that
provided by PhilHealth. Therefore, the agreements entered by petitioner do not constitute additional
allowance prohibited under Commission on Audit Resolution 2005-001.
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RICARDO E. ROTORAS vs. COA
G.R. No. 211999, August 20, 2019, LEONEN, J.
“The special trust fund of a state university or college shall only be used for instruction, research,
extension, or similar programs or projects. The members of governing boards and officials who approved an
allowance or benefit that has been disallowed are obliged to return what they have received. The defense of
good faith is no longer available to them. Neither is the defense available to the rank and file should the
allowance or benefit be the subject of collective negotiation agreement negotiations.”
FACTS:
Through various resolutions, the governing boards of 21 state universities and colleges granted
honoraria to board members in amounts ranging from P3,000.00 to P5,000.00 for attendance in board
meetings.
Subsequently, various audit team leaders of the Commission on Audit's Regional Legal and
Adjudication Offices issued audit observation memoranda. These resulted in Notices of Disallowance for the
payments of the honoraria on the ground of lack of legal basis.
Aggrieved, presidents of 11 of the affected state universities and colleges wrote the Philippine
Association of State Universities and Colleges assailing the Notices of Disallowance. The appeal was referred
to COA’s Legal and Adjudication Office-National and was denied.
Commission on Audit En Banc affirmed the rulings of the Legal and Adjudication Office which
noted that Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 8292, in relation of Rule 4, Section 17 of its Implementing Rules
and Regulations, prohibited members of the governing boards from receiving compensation, only allowing
them to be reimbursed for necessary expenses in limited circumstances.
Ricardo E. Rotoras, as the president of the Philippine Association of Universities and Colleges, filed
this Petition for Certiorari
ISSUE:
Whether COA correctly disallowed the additional honoraria for members of the governing boards
of the state universities and colleges
RULING:
YES. Specifically, tuition fees and other necessary school charges collected by the state university or
college constitute a special trust fund, which shall be disbursed by its governing board for instruction, research,
extension, or other programs or projects.
Here, it is undisputed that the additional honoraria to the members of the state universities and
colleges' governing boards when they attend board meetings are to be sourced, not from appropriations, but
from their special trust funds.
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Respondent is correct. The use of state universities or colleges' special trust funds to pay additional
honoraria to members of their governing boards has no legal basis.
Meetings of the state university and colleges' governing boards cannot be considered as instruction,
research, extension, or any other similar project or program.
There being no legal basis for the additional honoraria for members of the state universities and
colleges' governing boards, respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the
disallowances.
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Q: The governing board of state universities was granted honoraria for attending board meetings. COA issued
a Notice of Disallowance on the ground that there is no legal basis to grant honoraria for attending board
meetings. Should the governing board of state universities be granted honoraria for attending board meetings?
A: NO. Tuition fees and other necessary school charges collected by the state university or college constitute
a special trust fund, which shall be disbursed by its governing board for instruction, research, extension, or
other programs or projects. The meetings of the state university and colleges' governing boards cannot be
considered as instruction, research, extension, or any other similar project or program.
The additional honoraria to the members of the state universities and colleges' governing boards when they
attend board meetings are to be sourced, not from appropriations, but from their special trust funds. The use
of state universities or colleges' special trust funds to pay additional honoraria to members of their governing
boards has no legal basis.
Page 172 of 172

HRET Dismissal of Election Protest Upheld

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2020 Golden Notes

Political Law (J. Leonen Cases)

MARIA LOURDES B. LOCSIN, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

G.R. No. 204123. EN BANC. March 19, 2013. Leonen, J.

THE OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, petitioner, vs. DEVELYN

A.M. No. P-04-1785. EN BANC. April 2, 2013. LEONEN, J.

Should Gesultura be dismissed from service?

RE: NOMINATION OF ATTY. LYNDA CHAGUILE, IBP IFUGAO PRESIDENT, AS

A.M. No. 13-04-03-SC. EN BANC. December 10, 2013. Leonen, J.

To be a de facto officer, all of the following elements must be present:

1) There must be a de jure office;

2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and

3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.

To be a de facto officer, all of the following elements must be present:

1) There must be a de jure office;

2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and

3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.

ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC., ALSO KNOWN

G.R. No. 192803. EN BANC. December 10, 2013. Leonen, J.

Should the valid as well as invalid votes be included in the divisor?

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND

G.R. No. 171496 | Third Division | March 03, 2014 | Leonen, J.

Whether the property in question is a proper subject of an expropriation proceeding. (YES)

There is taking when the following elements are present:

1. The government must enter the private property;

2. The entrance into the private property must be indefinite or permanent;

3. There is color of legal authority in the entry into the property;

4. The property is devoted to public use or purpose;

CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, represented by its Mayor, HON. DARLENE MAGNOLIA R.

G.R. No. 199439 | EN BANC | September 11, 2009 | LEONEN, J.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent-Appellee- versus - VICTOR COGAED y

G.R. No. 200334 | THIRD DIVISION | July 30, 2014 | LEONEN, J.

SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., Petitioner -versus- JOY C.

G.R. No. 170139 | En Banc | August 05, 2014 | Leonen, J.

THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner - versus - LEOVIGILDO DELOS

G.R. No. 208976 | SECOND DIVISION | October 13, 2014 | LEONEN, J.

G.R. No. 181760| EN BANC | October 14, 2014 | LEONEN, J.

1. The position is career;

2. The position is above division chief; and

3. The position entails performance of executive and managerial functions.

G.R. No. 204964 | SECOND DIVISION | October 15, 2014| LEONEN, J.

G.R. No. 205728 | EN BANC | January 21, 2015| LEONEN, J.

JOSEPH B. TIMBOL, Petitioners –versus- COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents

G.R. No. 206004 | EN BANC | February 24, 2015| LEONEN, J.

Was Timbol afforded with the opportunity to be heard?

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners –versus- HEIRS OF GABRIEL Q. FERNANDEZ,

Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974 states:

Section 4. Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings. — Whenever it is necessary to acquire real

In contrast, an injunction is a separate proceeding that must be instituted by a party seeking

Was the reversal of issuance of Writ of Possession proper?

G.R. No. 215568 | SECOND DIVISION | August 3, 2015| LEONEN, J.

Whether Rivera’s employment was terminated for just cause.

Conformably, liberal construction of Labor Code provisions in favor of workers is stipulated by

Was Rivera illegally terminated?

MONICO LIGTAS, Petitioner -versus- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 200751 | Second Division | August 17, 2015 | Leonen, J.

It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that administrative cases are

A.M. No. 99-7-01-SC | En Banc | August 18, 2015 | Leonen, J.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. ASIAVEST

G.R. No. 172301 | Second Division | August 19, 2015 | Leonen, J.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST,

G.R. No. 170458 | Second Division | November 23, 2015 | Leonen, J.

This court has defined "escrow" as: