G.R. No.
L-12449 May 30, 1961 three individuals who helped him dig the grave some distance away from
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ESPIRIDION ALIDO, ET AL., defendants.
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Hon. F.
Imperial Reyes, presiding, finding accused-appellants Inocencio Hervas
and Marcelo Hervas guilty of the murder of their cousin, Francisco Hervas,
and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua and to pay 1/3 of the
indemnity of P6,000. Espiridion Alido was also sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of from 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 17
years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased Francisco Hervas 1/3 of the sum of P6,000, and to pay a
proportionate share of the costs, but he did not appeal.
On or before May 29, 1955, Francisco Hervas, his wife and their children
were living in their house on a land situated in the barrio of Dagami,
Municipality of Maasin, Province of Iloilo. At about 6:00 in the evening of
that day, Francisco Hervas seemed to have heard some noise coming from
his cornfield near their house, so he went to the batalan adjacent to their
house to find out what was the noise about, but suddenly a shotgun
exploded from the neighboring field, and the shot from it hit Francisco on
the chest and he fell down dead. The following morning, the widow,
Concepcion Laserna sent her eldest child, Ofelia Hervas, to the house of
Inocencio Hervas, one of the accused, which was nearest their house, and
to the house of the brother of the deceased, Proceso Hervas, farther away,
to inform them of the incident. The brother of the deceased happened to be
away from home and as Ofelia returned, she passed by the house of
Inocencio Hervas, informing him that the brother of the deceased could
not come, so Inocencio went to the house of the victim, accompanied by
the house and there interred him.
No steps were taken by the family or by relatives of the deceased to
Investigate who the author of the crime was. But news of the killing came
to the ears of the Philippine Constabulary. So one day the Philippine
Constabulary had the remains of the deceased exhumed. Those present at
the exhumation were the investigator of the Constabulary, Sgt. Pelagio
Agraviador the Chief of Police, the sanitary inspector and the municipal
mayor. They proceeded to the barrio of Dagami, passing first by the house
of Inocencio Hervas, and with the latter they went to the place where the
body of the deceased had been interred. The grave was dug and the dead
body was brought out. They found out that there were nine pellet holes.
Thereafter, the Constabulary began questioning the widow, Concepcion
Laserna. Her statement was taken at the municipal building and she
declared that she was able to recognize Espiridion Alido as the one who
shot her husband, accompanied at the time of the shooting by two persons
whom she could not recognize. This statement (Exhibit "1" Alido, 2
Hervas), of Concepcion Laserna was made on June 13, 1955. A similar
statement was made by her daughter, Ofelia Hervas, and to the same
effect.
The municipal police of Maasin could not effect the arrest of Alido, but
before July 13, 1955, he surrendered to the Philippine Constabulary at
Sta. Barbara, Iloilo. He surrendered to Sgt. Silverio Balmaceda at the
barracks. Balmaceda referred him to Cpl. Delfin de la Torre, who was then
investigator of the company. Alido's statement was taken down in writing
and was presented in court during the trial as Exhibit "C". According to
this statement, Inocencio Hervas invited him on May 29, 1955 to the
house of one Carlos Camral, on the occasion of the killing of a pig that in
the afternoon of that day, Inocencio, he and Marcelo proceeded to the
house of Francisco Hervas, armed as follows: Inocencio, with a shot gun
(paltik), Marcelo with a rifle, and he with a bolo; that once near the house
of Francisco Hervas, he heard one shot and upon hearing it he ran away,
returning to the house of Carlos Camral that about 9:00 that evening,
Inocencio Hervas came back to the house of Camral with a shotgun,
boasting that they could now live in peace because the arrogant man is
already dead (referring to the deceased Francisco Hervas.) .
As a result of this affidavit of Alido further investigation petitions were
made. Concepcion Laserna was again examined this time before the
Justice of the Peace of Maasin, and she then, declared in her affidavit
(Exhibit I, Alido, 3 Hervas) dated July 20, 1955 that it was Inocencio
Hervas who fired the shot that killed her husband, and that Marcelo
Hervas and Espiridion Alido were with Inocencio at the time of the
shooting. On July 20, 1955, the information was filed in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Maasin, charging the three accused with the murder of the
deceased. The information charges the accused with having committed the
crime with treachery and evident premeditation.
Concepcion Laserna testified at the trial that three persons had
approached their house on the afternoon of May 29, 1955, namely,
Inocencio Hervas, Marcelo Hervas and Espiridion Alido that Inocencio was
provided with a paltik, Espiridion had a rifle and Marcelo had a bolo; that
she actually saw that it was Inocencio who fired the shot that killed her
husband; and that as soon as her husband had fallen down after the shot,
the three persons ran away. She further declared that she saw the
assailant because she was at the time of the shooting at the window of
their house. Demetrio Hervas, a son of the deceased, also testified and
declared that when his father went to the batalan attracted by a noise in
the cornfield, he (witness) was at the door of the house; that when he
heard the shot which felled his father, he immediately directed his eyes
towards the place where the explosion had come and saw the aggressor,
Inocencio Hervas, and his companions, Marcelo Hervas and Espiridion
Alido.
Upon being asked why in her statement made before the Municipal Mayor
on June 13, 1955 (Exhibit "2" — Hervas; Exhibit "1" — Alido), she declared
that she saw Espiridion Alido fired the shot that killed her husband and
that she did not recognize Alido's companions, she explained that at that
time she was under the influence of fear of Inocencio Hervas. Explaining
this, she declared that the morning after the shooting she sent her
daughter Ofelia to the house of Inocencio Hervas to tell him that she
should bury her husband; that Inocencio Hervas threatened to kill her if
she should disclose or point to him as the author of the death; that he just
suggested to her that she should explain that the cause of her husband's
death was his having bolo wounds, instead of gunshot wounds. Upon
being asked the probable reason why her husband was killed by the
accused, she declared that it was because the accused had taken away
bamboos from the land which the deceased was taking care of, and her
husband had denounced them to the owner of the land, namely, Eugenio
Maquiling.
The Constabulary investigator, Sgt. Pelagio Agraviador, who had seen the
exhumation, corroborates this alleged fear of Inocencio Hervas of
Concepcion Laserna. He testified that at the time he was investigating
Concepcion Laserna, Inocencio Hervas was present, and that every time
Concepcion was asked a question she would first look at Inocencio before
answering the question. Further elaborating on the matter, this witness
declared that when the investigation was being made in the building of the
puericulture center, the persons who were present were Concepcion
Laserna, her daughter Ofelia Hervas, Inocencio Hervas, a policeman and
himself, and that he observed that every time a question was directed to
Concepcion Laserna, she would look at Inocencio who, in turn would look
at her with sharp eyes; that he noticed such interest on the part of
Inocencio that in the middle part of the questioning of Concepcion, he had
to ask Inocencio to go out. He also declared that when Ofelia Hervas was
investigated, Inocencio Hervas again went inside the room where the
investigation was being conducted and again he had to ask him to go out
of the room, because he wanted to have secrecy in the investigation.
All of the three accused denied having participated in the commission of
the crime, including Espiridion Alido, who did not appeal from the
decision. Inocencio Hervas declared that he was always in good terms with
Francisco Hervas and his wife; that he was living at a distance of one-half
kilometer from the house of Francisco Hervas, and that the one carrying
the work of the family was the wife, Concepcion Laserna, because one of
the hands of Francisco Hervas had been cut in a fight during the Japanese
regime; that about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the day of the shooting,
he had to go to the house of one Carlos to help in the slaughter of a pig,
and did not know of the death of Francisco Hervas until the following
morning when the daughter of the deceased, Ofelia, informed him thereof;
that when she went to the house of Francisco there was no one there
except the wife and the children, and when he asked her if she recognized
the persons who killed her husband, she answered she did not because it
was very dark; that thereafter she left the house and went home, with the
instruction that when the brother of the deceased would arrive he (the
accused) would be called. Further testifying, he declared that he returned
at about 4:00 in the afternoon, and that since the younger brother of the
deceased, Proceso Hervas, did not come, they buried the deceased with the
help of his children, namely, Carlos, Martin and Juan. Testifying on the
exhumation, he declared that the mayor, the Chief of Police and some
policemen came on the Sunday following the burial on Monday; that the
Chief of Police and the mayor called for him at his house; that the son of
Francisco Hervas, named Demetrio Hervas, Juan and Martin were also
called; that some Philippine Constabulary soldiers were also with the
party, and that it was he and the son of Francisco that indicated to them
where the body was buried; that they did not make any investigation that
afternoon because it was already very late when the exhumation was
finished; that they passed the night at his house and the following
morning the party returned back to the poblacion together with the wife of
the deceased. He also testified that he, the widow and her children were
brought to town, as the Mayor had asked him to accompany the widow. He
denied that at the time the widow was being investigated, he used to look
at her with sharp eyes. On being asked the possible reason why he was
being accused, he declared that he had an altercation with one Estong
Amorte and Fabian Resano, because when a certain parcel of land was
surveyed, he stopped them because his brother Marcelo was not present.
(It is important to note that the land which was supposed to be surveyed
appears to be the cause of the trouble, as it is the very land occupied by
Francisco Hervas. Francisco Hervas was the one named by the original
owner, Eugenio Maquiling, to cultivate and stay on the land. Later,
Maquiling transferred it to Estong Amorte and Fabian Resano.)
The accused Marcelo Hervas also denied the imputation, declaring that on
the day of the shooting, he was away from his house, and that he learned
of the death of Francisco Hervas only when he arrived home on Tuesday
(killing occurred on Monday). He stated. that he had come from the
poblacion because he was engaged in the business of making gold teeth for
his patients, so he had to go to the poblacion very often; that on the day
following his arrival on Tuesday, he asked for the wife of the deceased, and
he inquired from her what was the cause of her husband’s death, and she
had answered that the deceased had stepped on a bolo; that she told him
that at the time of the wounding of her husband she had heard a sound
similar to a falling can. Asked if there was any ill-feeling between
Francisco Hervas and his family, he declared that there was none and the
deceased even frequented his house to drink tuba, the deceased being his
first cousin. Asked what the probable reason was why the widow had
pointed to him as one of the authors of the death of her husband, he
declared that she acted under the advice of their enemies Estong Amorte
and Fabian Resano. Explaining this matter he said that Fabian Resano
had purchased a piece of land from Arcadio Maquiling, the son of Eugenio
Maquiling and as Resano surveyed the land, he (Resano) tried to include
the land belonging to him (Marcelo), and that he (Marcelo), did not agree to
this. As to the charge that he had been stealing bamboos, he answered
that the bamboos were not Maquiling's but his own.
A consideration of the circumstances brought out at trial both by the
prosecution as well as by the defense, indicate that the probable cause of
the killing is, as indicated by the widow, Concepcion Laserna, that is,
Inocencio Hervas and Marcelo Hervas resented the act of Francisco Hervas
in denouncing them for cutting bamboos on the land of Maquiling. The
land on which the house of Francisco Hervas is erected belonged to
Eugenio Maquiling. Marcelo Hervas claimed that the bamboos that he cut
were his own; that when the land of Maquiling was sold to Fabian Resano
and the latter was trying to survey it, Marcelo objected to the survey on
the ground that Resano was including a portion of his own land. Both
accused-appellants Inocencio and Marcelo, both surnamed Hervas,
admitted that the relationship between them and the deceased and his
family was cordial. There is, therefore, no reason why the widow should
point out to Marcelo and to Inocencio as the authors of the death of her
husband, unless she and her children had actually seen them do the
criminal act.
Her statement when she was brought to the municipal building for
investigation on June 13, 1955 pointing to Espiridion Alido as the one who
killed her husband and that his companions could not be recognized by
her must have been due to the fact that she was then under the influence
of fear of Inocencio Hervas. The conduct of Inocencio Hervas, a first cousin
of the deceased, in not initiating the move to have the authors of the death
of his cousin investigated and his advice of a prompt burial, in locate a
guilty conscience — he must have had part therein and he wanted to be
saved from being held to account for the murder. His advice that the
widow should declare that the deceased had been killed by a bolo wound,
also attests to his interest in suppressing the truth, certainly to save
himself. The testimony of Marcelo to the effect that the widow had told him
that the deceased died of a bolo wound is the very explanation that was
taught by Inocencio Hervas to the widow. Both of them, Inocencio and
Marcelo, must have thought of pretending that the death of Francisco
Hervas was due to a bolo wound, not from a gunshot wound, to suppress
or prevent the investigation of the crime. Marcelo Hervas was the barrio
lieutenant. Why did he not take steps to have the matter reported to the
authorities for investigation? His only excuse was that the widow
supposedly told him that he lied of a bolo wound. If he was satisfied with
this false explanation, it must have been because he wanted to shelter he
culprits from investigation, which fact in turn shows also a guilty mind.
The statement of the widow on June 13, 1955, when examined by the
municipal mayor, is explained away by his testimony of the sergeant of the
Constabulary who was resented at the time of the taking of the statement,
to the effect that every time a question was asked the widow, he would
look at Inocencio for an answer. This corroborates the story of the widow
that she was then under influence of Inocencio and her fear of him.
We are satisfied with the above circumstances and explanation of the
widow that her statement on June 13, was induced by her fear of
Inocencio. Proceeding now to the consideration of the direct evidence, we
find that both Demetrio Hervas, 15 years old, and his mother, Concepcion
Laserna, positively asserted that they saw the three accused Espiridion
Alido, Marcelo Hervas and Inocencio Hervas near their house on May 29,
1955 and that they recognized the latter as the one who fired the shot
from the "Paltik", that killed Francisco Hervas. Demetrio Hervas testified
that it was in the afternoon when the assault was made. The statement of
the widow before the mayor on June 13, 1955 placed the time of the
assault at 6:10 in the afternoon. We take judicial notice of the fact that in
the month of May and June, the days are long and the sun sets after 6:00
in the afternoon, for which reason even though it was actually 6:00 in the
afternoon, when the assault was made, both Demetrio Hervas and his
mother could easily see and recognize the assailants of the deceased
because it was not yet dark. The assailants are well known to them, two of
them being first cousins of the deceased; so was Alido known to them. It is
not that their faces were clearly seen a person can necessary easily be
recognized from his stature, by the way he stands and moves. We are,
therefore, satisfied that the two witnesses, — the widow and her son,
actually recognized the assailants as Espiridion Alido, Inocencio Hervas
and Marcelo Hervas. The testimony of the boy, Demetrio, could not be
impeached on the cross-examination. His testimony was positive and
direct, leaving absolutely no doubt as to the circumstances under which
he saw the shooting and the certainty of his identification of the accused-
appellants. As to the widow, the explanation given as hereinabove stated,
to the fact that she was under the influence of fear of Inocencio Hervas,
sufficiently explains why in her statement before the mayor on June 13,
1955, she pretended not to have recognized the companions of Espiridion
Alido on the evening of May 29, 1955.
There was one other last incident which proves the consciousness of guilt
of Marcelo Hervas. This is the fact that he pretended to be away and was
not in his house when Ofelia went to notify him of the death of her father.
When the Constabulary also went to his house, when the matter was
investigated, after the surrender of Alido, he again was not at home. As a
barrio lieutenant, he should have been the first to make steps to report the
crime, but he pretended to be away. These are the circumstances which
show consciousness of guilt on his part.
With the above circumstances and the testimony of two witnesses
identifying the two accused-appellants and the finding of the trial judge
who heard the witnesses and the appellants testify, that the appellants are
guilty, we are forced to the conclusion that the said accused-appellants
participated in the commission of the offense charged, jointly with
Espiridion Alido and are guilty thereof. The crime committed is that of
murder, qualified by the circumstance of alevosia, as the attack was
unexpected and the victim was even no opportunity to defend himself. As
to the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, it is true that
the confession of Espiridion Alido, Exhibit "C" is to the effect that
Inocencio had invited Alido, to go with them to kill the deceased, and that
he provided his companions with requisite arms. However, this confession
of Alido is not admissible in evidence against Inocencio Hervas and
Marcelo Hervas. We therefore had no sufficient evidence of the evident
premeditation.

WHEREFORE, we affirm the judgment of the court below finding the

appellants guilty of murder and the sentence imposed upon each of them
with costs of this appeal against the appellants.
G.R. No. L-16664 March 30, 1962
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN AYONAYON and GASPAR ACERADOR, defendants-appellants.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Sur, Hon. Felix Q. Antonio, presiding, finding Juan Ayonayon and Gaspar
Acerador guilty of murder, for the killing of Florentino Lazo and Jose Lazo
and, frustrated murder, for the wounding of Genoveva Lazo, and
sentencing each of them to death for the crime of murder, and to an
indeterminate penalty of from 8 years of prision mayor as minimum, to 14
years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum, for the
frustrated murder, with the proper indemnities and the accessories of the
law, and to pay each his proportional part of the costs.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that on August 5, 1959, while
Florentino Lazo and members of his family, namely, his wife, Juana
Resuello, his children, Jose Lazo, 25 years, Pergentino Lazo, 17 years,
Genoveva Lazo, 21 years, Samuel Lazo, 7 years, and Juan Lazo, 12 years,
were taking their supper around a low table in the bamboo kitchen of their
house at barrio Namalpalan, Municipality of Magsingal, Ilocos Sur, their
two dogs suddenly started barking and running to and fro, below and near
the house. Genoveva Lazo called the attention of her father to the unusual
behaviour of the dogs and commented that there must be some persons on
the ground. So she stood up and peeped thru the window of the kitchen
and saw a man dressed in dark green fatigue clothes, standing on the
ground on the opposite end of the kitchen, peeping at the southwestern
part thereof in a semi-stooping position, with his gun pointed thru the
corner of the kitchen. The kitchen floor was about four feet eight inches
from the ground. The wall of the kitchen was made of bamboo split and
flattened as in "sawali". She heard a burst of gunfire (parac-pac-pac) and
she felt that she was hit on her left shoulder. She fell to the floor of the
kitchen wounded, and lying flat on the floor hid herself near the stove.
With the first burst of the gunfire, Jose Lazo was also hit and he fell dead
on the floor of the kitchen. Pergentino Lazo, upon observing the gunfire
and what had happened to his brother and sister, promptly ran away from
the kitchen, crossing the batalan that separated the kitchen from the sala,
and to the sala, towards a side beside a wardrobe. Here, behind the
wardrobe, he hid himself. From this position, behind the wardrobe, he
heard gunfire from the batalan near the stairs of the house, and, directed
his eyes to the place where the gunfire came from, he saw through the
opening of the window just above the stairs, the accused Juan Ayonayon
and his companion, the other accused Gaspar Acerador. From the top of
the stairs, the accused fired at his father who had run to the sala, but who
fell down on the other side opposite the wardrobe.
Juana Resuello, got her two minor sons in her arms, Juan and Samuel,
and tried to run away from the kitchen also. It so happened, however, that
her husband Florentino was already ahead of her and was already
crossing the batalan that separated the kitchen from the sala, running to
escape from the gunfire.
As she was about to cross the batalan to the sala, she saw towards the left
the two accused Juan Ayonayon and Gaspar Acerador. At that time,
Ayonayon was already on top of the stairs, while his companion was on
the last rung of the stairs.
The prosecution also proved that, that same evening, upon receipt of news
of the murders in the barrio of Namalpalan, a group of Constabulary
soldiers stationed in the poblacion, together with the municipal health
officers and others, went to the scene of the murders. The soldiers found
30-calibre empty shells on the ground near the kitchen, also on the
batalan above the stairs. They also found that the walls of the kitchen and
a wall of the sala was pierced by bullet holes. The dead body of Florentino
Lazo was found lying on the floor of the sala, and that of Jose Lazo also in
the kitchen, both of them riddled with bullets. Genoveva Lazo was found
near the stove. Pergentino Lazo, upon being questioned by the
Constabulary sergeant, gave details of the incident, also already described
by the witnesses for the prosecution, and pointed to the two accused
herein as the ones responsible for the assault.
It is also shown that paraffin casts were taken of the hands of both
accused and the casts, upon examination in the National Bureau of
Investigation, had positive traces of nitrate.
Various slugs were extracted from the body of the deceased Jose Lazo and
another was also extracted from that of Genoveva Lazo, and these, upon
examination, were found to have been fired from a semi-automatic or an
automatic .30-caliber carbine, from the same gun firing the empty shells.
It was further shown that upon learning who the assailants were, as per
information by Pergentino Lazo, two soldiers went to the house of accused
Gaspar Acerador. He was not in his house and as he was then wearing
undershirt and drawers, he had to be taken to his house so he could put
on his clothes, before being brought to town for examination. The
constabulary men who accompanied him to his house saw that a green
fatigue suit and poncho were hanging on the wall. On the other hand,
Juan Ayonayon was arrested by a Constabulary captain and his company
that same evening in the house of Marcelino Uberita in Santo Domingo,
about seven kilometers from Magsingal.
As possible motive for the crime, it was shown that accused Gaspar
Acerador had been accused of the murder of Pablo Resuello, the brother of
Juana Resuello, wife of Florentino Lazo, the deceased. On the other hand,
Florentino Lazo used to drive a carromata where Hipolito Peralta, who was
accused of the murder of a relative of a cousin of Ayonayon, usually rode
in going to court. While nobody could testify as to the motive of the
murder, it is apparent from these circumstances that enmity must have
existed between Florentino Lazo and his wife Juana Resuello on one hand,
and the accused Gaspar Acerador and Juan Ayonayon, on the other.
The defenses presented by the accused are alibis testified to by their
respective relatives. Juan Ayonayon stated that at about 6:00 o'clock in
the evening of the day in question, he was in the house of his cousin
Engineer Uberita in Santo Domingo, with whom he was living then. But
the barrio of Santo Domingo is only seven kilometers from the house of the
Lazos, the victims, and he could easily have gone from his place of
residence to the house of the Lazos in 10 minutes by jeepney. For his part,
Acerador was living in a barrio of Panay, which is only a kilometer away
from the scene of the crime. The fact, therefore, that the relatives of the
accused stated that they were in their respective houses around 6:00
o'clock in the evening of the day of the crime, does not discount the
possibility that the accused themselves had actually gone to the house of
their victims at about the time of 6: 00 o'clock in the evening. It must be
noted that the time given was merely a calculation, and what may have
been considered by one witness as six o'clock may actually have been
5:30, etc. So that the defenses of alibis appear to Us as of very little weight
or value, especially in view of the fact that the witnesses for the
prosecution clearly identified the accused, such identification being
positive and immediate because given as soon as the officers of the
Constabulary arrived.
We will now proceed to the principal issue, namely, whether the three
witnesses who testified to having identified the accused were really in a
position to and did actually identify them. The first witness was Genoveva
Lazo who said that she peeped out of the window and saw the face and
figure of a man who later she identified as Gaspar Acerador. The
description that she gave at the trial coincides with the physical features
that the court saw in the person of the said accused at the time of the
trial. Gaspar Acerador was also identified by the wife of the deceased,
Juana Resuello, who declared that Acerador was seen by her on the last
rung of the stairs leading to their batalan. Pergentino Lazo also identified
both accused when, looking thru the window near the stairs, he saw them
firing their guns at the deceased Florentino Lazo.
With respect to Juan Ayonayon, his identification by Juana Resuello is
beyond question. As Juana was going to cross the batalan, she saw Juan
Ayonayon already on the batalan and was about to speak to him. He,
Ayonayon, was known to her, consequently, the identification was prompt
and immediate. It is a fact that when one meets a person known to him,
identification takes place at first sight, so the testimony of Juana Resuello
that she identified Ayonayon, who was known to her, should be accepted.
The same fact of identification is true as to the accused Gaspar Acerador,
also known to Juana Resuello..
As to the testimony of Pergentino Lazo, which testimony is being attacked,
it is to be noted that he saw the two accused while the latter were already
on the batalan. From a diagram of the house, We note that place where the
accused were standing, while firing at the decease Florentino Lazo, was
visible through a window from the place beside the aparador where
Pergentino Lazo, had stationed himself. But the fact that Pergentino Lazo,
when the officers came in the same evening, declared to the Constabulary
officers that the assailants were Ayonayon and Acerador, this readiness,
shows that he was able positively identify them at the time of the assault,
the accused being known to him.
Counsel for Acerador argues that since at the time of the assault, which
was 6:00 o'clock in the evening, it was already dark, the accused could not
have been identified by Genoveva Lazo, Juana Resuello or Pergentino Lazo.
We checked the time when the sun set on August 5, 1959 and We have
been informed that the sun set on that date at about 6:38 in the evening,
which shows that at 6:00 o'clock, the surrounding of the house where the
victims were shot, were not yet dark. The use of a kerosene lamp inside a
house does not mean that outside the house, where the assailants were
seen, was also dark. The inside of a house is necessarily darker than the
outside; so the use of a kerosene lamp while the inmates are taking
supper, does not mean that persons outside cannot be identified from
within the house.
Capital is made of the fact that the witness Genoveva Lazo said that during
the day there were stars. She did not say that during the daytime there
were stars; she must have meant that during the time when the assault
was made there were stars in the sky at night. Besides, we take judicial
notice of the fact that while it is true that the month of August is
characterized by showers or rains, they generally are passing showers and
rains, after which the atmosphere becomes clear.
But as the most compelling reason why the witnesses for the prosecution
must be believed as to the identification of the accused by them, is the fact
that they had no cause or reason to charge or point out the accused as the
ones responsible for the offense, there being no strong reason why they
should violate their oaths and declare falsely.
After a review of all the evidence, We are convinced that the two accused
were really the ones who assaulted and fired at Genoveva, Florentino and
Jose Lazo, and killed Florentino Lazo and Jose Lazo, and that their guilt
has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The penalty that was imposed
by the lower court is that of death for the murders of Florentino Lazo and
Jose Lazo. There is no question that the murders were committed with the
qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation, and with the aggravating
circumstances of treachery and dwelling of the offended party. But while
the penalty imposed appears justified by the aggravating circumstances,
there is no sufficient number of votes to affirm the penalty of death for the
reason that it does not appear from the evidence that the accused-
appellants were so perverse as to deserve the supreme penalty. Hence, no
sufficient number of Justices voted to affirm the imposition of the death
penalty.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified by imposing
upon each of the accused-appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
the murder of Florentino Lazo and Jose Lazo, but the judgment is hereby
affirmed in all other respects. The judgment and sentence imposed upon
them for the wounding of Genoveva Lazo is affirmed, with costs against
accused-appellants. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-35133 May 31, 1974
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAYMUNDO MADERA @ "Mundo", MARIANITO V. ANDRES @ "Totoy",
GENEROSO ANDRES @ "Ross", defendants-appellants.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This case is now before Us on appeal of the three appellants from a
decision of the Circuit Criminal Court 1 finding them guilty of the crime of
murder, and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount
of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
to pay the cost proportionately.
There is no question that at about 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of
April 20, 1970, three men barged at the doorstep of the house of the victim
Elino Bana in Sitio Baag, Barrio Bantug, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija. The
gunman, standing on the first rung of the stairs of the house, fired a volley
of shots from a .45 caliber gun at Elino Bana who was then sleeping on
the floor of his house near the stairs. Two gunshot wounds were inflicted
on the victim but the fatal one was the one that hit him on the abdominal
region. Elino Bana did not die immediately. He stood up and told his wife
to call for his brother Conrado who lives not far away from their house.
The victim's wife fetched Conrado; but when they returned, the wounded
man was no longer at home for he was already brought to the Municipal
Building of Gabaldon. He was carried by his son-in-law, Francisco Viloria,
with the assistance of some people. From the Municipal Building, he was
brought to the Nueva Ecija General Hospital, but he died on the way that
same day, April 20,1970.
We affirm the lower court's finding that the prosecution has proven beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant Raymundo Madera was the one who fired
the shots at the victim Elino Bana, one of which was the fatal shot, and
that appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres were with Madera
at the time.
Juanita Bana, a son of the victim, testified that he was awakened by the
gunfire and saw the appellant Raymundo Madera standing on the first
step of their stairs holding a .45 caliber firearm. He also saw the
appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres just behind the
appellant Madera, at a distance of 1 1/2 meters from the stairs. Bernarda
Bana, wife of the victim, declared that she saw Raymundo Madera as the
one who shot her husband with a foot-long firearm, and appellants
Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres were then with Madera.
In addition to the testimonies of these two witnesses, the prosecution
presented the dying, declaration of the victim Elino Bana. The trip from
the house of Elino Bana to the Municipal Building took only about thirty
minutes. On the way, they were met by policeman Ambrosio Feliciano from
Gabaldon who was fetched from his house by Barrio Captain Emiliano
Jornadal of Bantug to look into the shooting incident. Upon reaching the
Municipal Building, Patrolman Feliciano told Elino Bana that he would
have to take down his written statement regarding the shooting incident,
and the latter agreed. The latter was then in agony. It was then 3:00
o'clock in the morning. In said dying declaration, he was asked who shot
him and the answer was: Mundo Madera and two others whom he could
not recognize.
The lower court was correct in refusing to give credence to the testimony of
Patrolman Feliciano that while they were on their way to the Municipal
Building, Elino Bana told him that he could not identify the persons who
shot him. Said policeman has been an investigator in the police force since
1964. He should have asked Elino Bana while he was giving his dying
declaration in the Municipal Building why he said earlier that he did not
know who shot him. But Patrolman Feliciano did not do this. It must be
noted that not only Patrolman Feliciano but also Francisco Viloria, a
witness to the dying declaration, testified to its lawful execution.
The fact that Juanito Bana and Bernarda Bana failed to reveal right away
the identities of the appellants to the Victim himself and to their relatives
Conrado Bana and Francisco Viloria, does not militate against their
credibility. There is no evidence on record that they were asked by their
relatives about the identity of the appellants. Had they been asked, they
would have readily revealed appellants' identities as they did to the Chief
of Police and Municipal Mayor of Gabaldon only a few hours after the
fateful incident, during a formal investigation of the case in the Office of
the Chief of Police when and where they executed their respective sworn
statements.
In their respective written statements taken on April 20, 1970, subscribed
and sworn on the same date before the Mayor of Gabaldon, Bernardo Bana
and Juanito Bana categorically stated that Elino Bana was shot by
Raymundo Madera @ Mundo, while Ross and Totoy Andres were
downstairs.
Juanito Bana was then living with his parents. He must be familiar with
their house. He testified on direct examination that he slept in the balcony
of their house. On cross examination, he said that he slept inside their
house. That does not show any inconsistency in his testimony, because on
further questioning, he said that the balcony referred to by him was inside
their house. Yes, he said that after he heard the shots, he jumped to the
ground through the back portion of their house. The falsity of this
statement has not been shown by the defense. The pictures presented by it
which apparently show that there was no such opening, can be explained
by the fact that the tall grasses could obscure the back portion of the
house where the kitchen door was located.
Juanito Bana admitted that he was gripped with fear when he heard the
burst of gunfire. But that would not prove that he failed to recognize the
appellants.
An excited person may overlook the presence of another whom he
would otherwise have observed.
Under some circumstance, however, excitement may whet the
attention to a keen edge. In some other cases, it has been
observed, in effect, that the emotion incident to the impending
peril may not be the kind of excitement which confuses, but that
which focalizes the faculties to scrutinize. the circumstance of the
threatened danger in order to avoid it.
The appellants asserted in their briefs that "the evidence on record does
not show that there was a moon shining in the early morning of April 20,
1970, at Barrio Bantug, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija;" that it was then "a
moonless night;" hence, Juanito Bana and Bernarda Bana could not have
recognized the appellants. This position is untenable. Why?
The Court can take judicial notice of the "laws of nature"4 and, under this
rule, of the time when the moon rises or sets on a particular day.5 This
notwithstanding and for certainty, We took it unto Ourselves to get a
certification from the Weather Bureau6 which shows that the moon was
bright at the time of the shooting incident. It reads:
To whom It May Concern:
This is to certify that, based on the computations made by this
office, the following astronomical data for Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija
are true and correct:
1. that the moon rose at 4:11 P.M. on April 19, 1970 and set the
following day, April 20, at 4:27 A.M.;
2. that at 2:00 A.M. on April 20, 1970, the moon was at an
altitude of 34 degrees above the western horizon with bearing of
South 73 degrees West;
3. and that the moon was illumined 97% at 2:00 A.M. on April 20,
1970, full moon having occurred at 00.21 A.M. on April 22,1970.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mr. Estanislao
Fernandez, Associate Justice, Supreme Court, Manila.
For the Administrator:
SIMEON V. INCIONG Chief, Astronomical Division
It was not necessary for the prosecution to prove motive on the part of the conspiracy, the same degree of proof required for establishing the
appellants for there is no doubt as to their identities. crime is required to support a finding of its presence that is, it
must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the
It is true that, according to Maximo A. Obra, the forensic chemist of the commission of the offense itself.
NBI, appellant Raymundo Madera was found negative in a paraffin test.
But Obra himself admitted that, the paraffin test having been conducted The evidence fails to meet such requirements. To hold him liable,
fourteen days after the incident, the test could have given a negative result upon the other hand, as an accomplice, it must be shown that he
even if the appellant had fired a gun fourteen days earlier, because the had knowledge of the criminal intention of the principal, which
nitrate deposits on his hands could have been washed off by washing or may be demonstrated by previous or simultaneous acts which
could have been removed by perspiration. contributes to the commission of the offense as aid thereto
whether physical or moral. As aptly stated in People v. Tamayo: "It
The defense of the appellants was alibi. But said defense cannot prevail is an essential condition to the existence of complicity, not only
over the positive identification of the appellants by the prosecution that there should be a relation between the acts done by the
witnesses. The house of appellant Raymundo Madera is just about 400 principal and those attributed to the person charged as
meters away from that of the victim Elino Bana. accomplice, but it is further necessary that the latter, with
knowledge of the criminal intent, should cooperate with the
We need not discuss further the defense of alibi of the appellants intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the
Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres because the Solicitor General crime in an efficacious way." ... From our view of the evidence it
recommended their acquittal. And We agree. has not been convincingly established that appellant cooperated in
the commission of the offense, either morally, through advice,
The fact that these two appellants were standing behind appellant Madera
encouragement or agreement or materially through external acts
when the latter fired shots at Elino Bana, did not make them liable for
indicating a manifest intent of supplying aid in the perpetration of
what Madera did, there being no proof whatsoever of any conspiracy
the crime in an efficacious way. Such circumstances being absent,
among the three appellants. They were not armed. They did nothing to
his mere passive presence at the scene of the crime certainly does
help Madera. Their mere passive presence at the scene of the crime did not
not make him either a co-principal or an accomplice in the
make them liable either as co-principals or accomplices. In one of the
commission of the offense.
latest decisions of this Court, penned by Justice Felix Q. Antonio, We held:
This is good a time as any to emphasize upon those in charge of the
It is well to recall the settled rule that conspiracy presupposes the
prosecution of criminal cases that the prosecutor's finest hour is not when
existence of a preconceived plan or agreement and in order to
he wins a case with the conviction of the accused. His finest hour is still
establish the existence of such a circumstance, it is not enough
when, overcoming the advocate's natural obsession for victory, he stands
that the persons supposedly engaged or connected with the same
up before the Court and pleads not for the conviction of the accused but
be present when the crime was perpetrated. There must be
for his acquittal. For indeed, his noble task is to prosecute only the guilty
established a logical relationship between the commission of the
and to protect the innocent. We, therefore, commend Solicitor General
crime and the supposed conspirators, evidencing a clear and more
Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz and Solicitor
intimate connection between and among the latter, such as by
Sinfronio I. Ancheta for having correctly recommended the acquittal of the
their overt acts committed in pursuance of a common design.
appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres.
Considering the far-reaching consequences, of criminal
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with respect
to the appellant Raymundo Madera alias "Mundo", with 1/3 of the cost
charged against him; and it is hereby reversed as regards appellants
Marianito Andres alias "Totoy" and Generoso Andres alias "Ross", who are
hereby acquitted of the crime charged with proportionate costs de oficio.
Their immediate release from confinement is hereby ordered unless they
are held for another legal cause.
G.R. No. L-45857 October 27, 1983
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ERNESTO SISON Y AVILES, defendant-appellant.
MAKASIAR, J:
In her sworn complaint, complainant Violeta Begino y Aquino accused
defendant-appellant of forcible abduction with rape allegedly committed as
follows:
That on or about the 15th day of July, 1973, in Quezon City
Philippines, the above-named accused with lewd design, and then
and there wilfully, unlawfully appeal feloniously, by means of force
and intimidation abduct the undersigned, by then and there
forcibly dragging her into a tricycle, after which the undersigned
was brought to a house located at Novaliches. this City where said
accused by means of force and intimidation had carnal knowledge
of the undersigned, all against the will and without the consent of
the undersigned, to her damage and prejudice in such amount as
may be awarded to her under the provisions of the Civil Code.
Contrary to law (p. 2, rec.).
The trial court convicted him of the charge and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with accessories of the law, to indemnify the
complainant in the sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the
costs, crediting him however with the entire period of his temporary
detention.
Complainant Violeta Begino, a native of Cabcab Catanduanes, was about
15 years and 10 months old on July 15, 1973, a Sunday. About 4 feet and
7 inches tall and weighing about 93 lbs., she was the housemaid of Jose
Baruela of Galas, Quezon City.
Between 3 and 4 o'clock in the afternoon of Sunday, July 15, 1973, Violeta
was standing at the corner of Luzon Avenue and Union Civica St., Galas,
Quezon City, waiting for a ride to Quiapo, Manila to buy slippers for her
employer. Appellant Ernesto Sison, then about 23 years old, who was
courting her, approached her and invited her to take the tricycle then
driving. When she refused, appellant allegedly drew 7-inch knife and
poked it at her abdomen, threatening to kill her if she did not board his
tricycle. He allegedly seized her and forced her to get into the tricycle.
This is quite incredible because on such Sunday afternoon, with many
people passing by or walking in the vicinity, as Galas is thickly populated
by low-income and middle-class groups - of which fact the Supreme Court
can take judicial notice - she could have resisted and shouted for help. It
was not easy for appellant to grab her and force her into the tricycle
without being noticed by passersby and bystanders. She claims that after
she was seated inside the tricycle, appellant drove his tricycle to the
España Rotonda, a busy intersection of España St., Manila, Quezon
Avenue, España Extension (now E. Rodriguez Ave.), Mayon St., and Pulog
St. going towards Galas, Quezon City. Said rotonda is over one kilometer
from Galas, with several street corners to pass along the way.
With appellant driving the tricycle, complainant could have shouted for
help while seated in the rear compartment for passengers behind him,
since as aforestated, from the corner where she was allegedly forced to
board the tricycle up to España Rotonda is quite a distance, with so many
houses and several persons along the way. And children would be playing
on the streets. Or she could have jumped out of the tricycle for a tricycle
does not run fast and the tricycle is always open at its right side just
behind appellant who was on the driver's seat. Appellant could not be
poking a knife with one hand at Violeta and driving the tricycle with the
other hand.
From the España Rotonda, they took a passenger jeepney for Balintawak,
Quezon City. They were allegedly the only passengers of the jeepney, with
appellant holding her hands and telling her that he would kill her if she
tried to go home. From España Rotonda to Balintawak is a distance of
about five kilometers. Being a passenger jeepney, it presumably took the
usual passenger jeepney routes. It would be unbelievable that all
throughout the distance of about five kilometers, a Sunday afternoon, no
other passenger boarded the jeepney between España Rotonda and
Balintawak. The route of said jeepney must pass through Mayon St.
towards North Cemetery beside Balintawak. But even assuming that they
were the lone passengers of the jeepney throughout the distance she could
have shouted for help or created a commotion to alert the jeepney driver. It
is also possible that she must have seen policemen along the route,
especially near the gate of the North Cemetery. The various jeepney routes
from Quezon City to North Cemetery include Mayor Norberto Amoranto St.
(formerly Retiro), Del Monte Avenue, Dapitan, Laong-Laan St., and from
Manila to the North Cemetery then to Balintawak, via Dimasalang St., and
coming from Rizal Avenue Extension and passing the Chinese General
Hospital via Blumentritt. Upon reaching the busy intersection in front of
the North Cemetery gate, with a lot of people around, including employees
of the gas station just across the gate of the North Cemetery, she could
have screamed for help, but she did not.
At Balintawak, appellant allegedly brought her to the house of his aunt, to
whom he allegedly introduced her as his girlfriend. After talking to her
aunt, he and complainant left the house and rode in a passenger jeepney
bound for Novaliches, passengers inside the jeepney Quezon City. There
were other pass but she did not make any outcry nor ask help from the
other passengers during that long trip from Balintawak to Novaliches,
which is a lot farther than from España Rotonda to Balintawak.
Balintawak is also a busy street all the way to Clover Leaf (the hub
connecting to Novaliches) and there are many houses' and shops along the
way - more so upon reaching the busy market near the Clover Leaf. And
then from Clover Leaf through Quirino Avenue towards Novaliches, there
must have been numerous persons that Sunday afternoon, because
Quirino Avenue is likewise a busy avenue, being the only route to
Novaliches from the Clover Leaf and the traffic along that thoroughfare is
heavy at all hours of the day because of the numerous passenger buses,
jeepneys, cargo trucks, and private cars on the road. But she did not cry
for help.
At Novaliches, appellant led her to the house of another aunt, Maria Aviles
Reyes and took her purse containing P12.00. After eating their supper,
appellant allegedly brought her to a room and ordered her to lie down. She
resisted and appellant slapped her repeatedly. She became unconscious
and upon regaining consciousness, she found herself naked with appellant
on top of her and his penis inside her vagina "up to her stomach." If she
resisted as she claimed, there should have been some commotion and
maybe pieces of furniture like chairs and tables being pushed or the sound
of shuffling feet, accompanied by her cries or screaming indicating
resistance. When he slapped her repeatedly, she must have shouted in
pain and even cursed him aloud with the usual vulgar rivectives. With
such commotion, screaming, cries of pain and vulgar purses it is
unthinkable that the aunt and the rest of the inmates of the house would
not have heard the same. They could have been curious about the
commotion and could have frustrated whatever criminal Intention
appellant might have towards her.
She alleged that he had sexual intercourse with her three times that July
15 even as she was experiencing pain. The following day (July 16), he had
sexual intercourse with her four times. Then on the third day (July 17), he
did the same to her. They stayed in Novaliches from July 15 to July 21,
1973. .Never did she complain to his aunt or to the other inmates of the
house about what appellant did to her. During those six days, she must
have gone out of the room to eat or to attend to personal necessities in the
bathroom. During those six days too, his aunt and the other members of
the family would have noticed her painful expression or her moaning in
pain and would have asked her the cause of the same.
In the afternoon of July 21, 1973, appellant, with his mother and his aunt
Maria, brought Violeta to his house in Sampaloc, Manila, and from there,
to Violeta's mother at 11-B Luzon Avenue, Galas, Quezon City. All the
mother did was to slap her.
It should be stressed, as heretofore intimated, that this Court sitting in
Metro Manila, can take judicial notice of the geography of said metropolis,
and the approximate distance from Galas to España Rotonda, from
España Rotonda to Balintawak, and from Balintawak to Novaliches, the
passenger routes to said place, the nature of traffic along said routes, the
heavy population in Metropolitan Manila, and the habits of the residents
therein.

There is nothing in the record to indicate as to why her mother and her
employer did not look for her during the six days that she was missing
from the house of her employer and why they did not report to the police
authorities said fact of her being missing for almost a week. Neither is
there any intimation that her employer inquired about the money he gave
to her to purchase slippers, which is quite unnatural.

All the foregoing circumstances not only negate the conclusion that she
was sexually assaulted by appellant against her will, but also affirm that
she went willingly with the appellant and submitted to his lewd design.

Consequently, the only possible conclusion is that she voluntarily went

with appellant on that six-day tryst with him. for which appellant could
have been convicted of consented abduction as Violeta was then over 12
but under 18 years of age (Art. 343, R.P.C.), if the complaint included the
essential elements of abduction with consent Valdepeha vs. People, 16
SCRA 871, April 30, 1966; U.S. vs. Asuncion, 31 Phil. 614, Oct. 2, 1915).
Unfortunately, the complaint as aforequoted does not allege that the
offended party was a virgin, over 12 years and under 18 years of age Barba
vs. People, 89 SCRA 112, March 28,1979; People vs. Castro, 58 SCRA 473,
Aug. 19, 1974; People vs. Samillano, 56 SCRA 573, April 22, 1974; People
vs. Magat, 94 Phil. 118, Dec. 29, 1953).

Hence, the appellant should be acquitted of the charge.

WHEREFORE, APPELLANT ERNESTO SISON Y AVILES IS HEREBY

ACQUITTED. WITH COSTS DE OFICIO.

HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE IS HEREBY ORDERED UNLESS HE IS HELD

FOR SOME OTHER VALID CHARGES.
G.R. No. 159467 December 9, 2005
SPOUSES NORA SAGUID and ROLANDO P. SAGUID, Petitioners,
vs.
SECURITY FINANCE, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure are the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 68129 dated 31 January 2003 reversing the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 135, in Civil Case No.
98-1803, dated 07 July 2000, ordering respondent Security Finance, Inc.
to pay petitioner Spouses Nora and Rolando Saguid the daily earnings of
the seized motor vehicle as well as damages, attorney’s fees and costs of
suit, and its Resolution dated 10 June 2003 denying petitioners’ motion
for reconsideration.
On 30 July 1998, respondent filed a case for Recovery of Possession with
Replevin with Alternative Prayer for Sum of Money and Damages against
petitioners and one John Doe in whose possession and custody the
mortgaged property may be found.3 It alleged that petitioners, for value,
jointly and severally executed in its favor a Promissory Note4 in the
amount of ₱508,248.00, payable in monthly installments per schedule
indicated therein. To secure payment of the Promissory Note, petitioners
executed a Chattel Mortgage over a motor vehicle particularly described as
follows:
MAKE : TOYOTA COROLLA XL
MODEL : 1996
ENGINE NO. : 2E-2895512
SERIAL NO. : EE100-9555787
Respondent alleged that petitioners defaulted in complying with the terms
and conditions of the Promissory Note and Chattel Mortgage by failing to
pay several monthly installments on the Promissory Note. As provided for
in the Promissory Note and Chattel Mortgage, the failure of the petitioners
to pay any installment when due shall make the entire balance of the
obligation immediately due and payable. The total obligation of petitioners
amounted to ₱756,634.64 as of 15 May 1998.6
Despite demand7 for payment or the surrender, if in good order and
condition, of the mortgaged motor vehicle, petitioners failed and refused to
comply with the demand. Thus, respondent was constrained to file the
instant case praying that (1) a Writ of Replevin be issued ordering the
seizure of the afore-described vehicle, complete with all its accessories,
and that same be delivered to it; or (2) in the event that manual delivery
thereof cannot be effected, order the petitioners to pay the amount of
₱756,634.64 exclusive of accruing interest and penalty charges thereon at
the rate of five percent (5%) per month until fully paid. In either case, to
order petitioners to pay respondent the amount of ₱189,158.66 as and for
attorney’s fees, replevin bond premium and other expenses incurred in the
seizure of the motor vehicle, and costs of suit.
On 03 August 1998, the Hon. Francisco B. Ibay, Presiding Judge, Branch
135, RTC, Makati City, issued an Order directing the branch sheriff to
seize the aforementioned vehicle upon filing of a bond in the amount of
₱1,513,270.00 which is double the value of the property to be seized, and
to take it into his custody upon further orders from the court.8
Upon being informed by respondent in a Motion for Clarification9 that the
reasonable estimated value of the vehicle involved is ₱150,000.00, the RTC
lowered the Replevin Bond to be filed to ₱300,000.0010 which respondent
filed on 12 August 1998.
On 12 October 1998, the RTC issued a Writ of Seizure ordering the Branch
Sheriff to seize the vehicle, to keep it in his possession for five (5) days,
and then to deliver it to respondent.11
On 13 October 1998, after service upon petitioners of the copy of the
summons with the complaint and annexes, affidavit, writ of seizure and
bond, the vehicle subject of this case was repossessed by the sheriff upon
issuance of the corresponding receipt. On 20 October 1998, the vehicle
was delivered to respondent.12
In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,13 petitioners specifically
denied the allegations in the Complaint. They maintained they, whether
individually or as spouses, did not and never executed a Promissory Note
and Chattel Mortgage in favor of respondent. They claimed they bought the
car subject of the case in cash as evidenced by the Vehicle Sales Invoice14
of Toyota Balintawak, Inc. dated 15 March 1996. Petitioner Nora Saguid
alleged that she could not have physically executed the Promissory Note
on 23 April 1996 as she was in Australia when the same was supposedly
executed. On the part of petitioner Rolando Saguid, he admitted that he
signed the promissory note in preparation for an application for loan upon
the request of one Sonny Quijano who promised to facilitate the same for
the purchase of another motor vehicle to be converted into a taxicab, but
not with respondent. As compulsory counterclaim, they ask that
respondent be ordered to pay moral, exemplary and actual damages, as
well as attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
After pre-trial, the RTC issued a Pre-Trial Order containing the following
stipulation of facts:
1. The personal and corporate personalities of the parties;
2. That the promissory note dated April 23, 1996 in the amount of
P508,248.00 in favor of plaintiff was signed by defendant Rolando Saguid;
and
3. That the chattel mortgage was signed by defendant Rolando Saguid; . . .
Trial ensued. The respective evidence of the parties are substantially
summarized in the decision of the RTC.
Evidence of the Petitioners:
The plaintiff presented two (2) witnesses: 1] Rosauro G. Maghirang, Jr., 43
years of age, married, Assistant Vice-President for Marketing of the
plaintiff, and a resident of No. 140 J. Molina Street, Marikina City; and 2]
Antonio B. Placido, 37 years of age, married, an employee of the plaintiff,
and a resident of 263 Santo Cristo Street, Angat, Bulacan.
It can be culled from plaintiff’s evidence that an application [Exhibit A] for
a loan to finance the purchases [of] a new car was filed with the plaintiff.
The application was not signed by any of the defendants. The signature
appearing on the application [Exhibit A] belongs to one David Garcia, a
Marketing Assistant of the plaintiff. The application was evaluated and
investigated and was approved. The Promissory Note No. 96-01447 dated
April 23, 1996 [Exhibit B] and the Chattel Mortgage Contract dated
September 3, 1996 [Exhibit D] were signed. Submitted to the plaintiff were
postdated checks [Exhibits E, E-1 to E-12]. When deposited these checks
were dishonored for the reason that the account was already closed. The
dishonored checks were replaced with P27,137.67 cash for which O.R. No.
12467 dated June 27, 1996 [Exhibit F]. After the payment made on June
27, 1996, the checks that subsequently bounced were not replaced. The
case was referred to counsel for collection. A demand letter was delivered
by witness Placido to the residence of the defendants. There being no
response from the defendants this case was filed against them. Placido
conducted a surveillance of the place where the vehicle could possibly be
found. He accompanied the sheriff in implementing the writ of seizure.
After seizure of the vehicle it was stowed at the warehouse of plaintiff in
Las Pinas.
On cross-examination of Rosauro G. Maghirang, Jr., Assistant Vice-
President for Marketing of the plaintiff, it was established that the
mortgage of subject motor vehicle was not registered with the LTO because
the dealer did not submit to plaintiff the certificate of registration. In
transactions of this nature, loan applicants are required to submit the
original certificate of registration and the official receipt. The dealer, Toyota
Balintawak, did not send to the plaintiff these documents.16
Evidence of the Respondent:
Defendants testified for and in their behalf. Zenaida Marquinez Maralit, 33
years of age, single, a resident of Orlon Street, Litex Village, San Jose,
Rodriguez, Rizal, and the Credit and Collection Head of Toyota Balintawak
testified for the defendants. Defendant Rolando bought in cash the subject
motor vehicle from Toyota Balintawak. He was issued Vehicle Delivery
Invoice No. 7104 [Exhibit1] and Vehicle Delivery Note No. 7104 [Exhibit 2].
The same vehicle was registered [Exhibit 3]. He identified his signatures in
the promissory note [Exhibit B] and in the chattel mortgage [Exhibit D]. He
was asked by one Sonny Quijano to sign these documents in blank on the
representation of the latter that he will help him secure additional capital
to enable him to purchase another taxi.
Rolando met for the first time Sonny Quijano sometime in January 1996
at Toyota Quezon Avenue. Rolando was then planning to purchase two
units of taxi colored white. But at that time there was only one available
unit at Toyota Quezon Avenue. Quijano approached Rolando informing
him that there are units colored white available at Toyota Balintawak and
that he will help him secure one. Rolando was able to secure one. In the
month of May, Quijano went to the house of defendants and asked
Rolando if he is still interested in getting additional capital to purchase a
taxi. Rolando was asked to sign documents in blank. The name of the
plaintiff does not appear in these documents. When Rolando asked
Quijano why the documents are in blank, Quijano told him just to sign
and that he will take care of everything. Nora did not sign the documents
because at that time she was in Australia. Rolando do (sic) not know what
happened to the documents he signed. He read from the papers that
Quijano was shot. He denied the issuance of the checks [Exhibits E, E-1 to
E-12]. Defendants received a letter [Exhibit 8] dated February 21, 1997
from De Castro Law Office. Rolando went to this Law Office and presented
his documents evidencing payment of the subject motor vehicle. He was
told by Atty. De Castro that everything is okay and that he will take care of
everything.
On October 28, 1998 at about 7:00 in the morning two [2] units of taxi
including subject motor vehicle were seized by the sheriff assisted by three
[3] SWAT members. The boundary of the subject motor vehicle, which is a
taxi, is P750.00 for every 24 hours. From October 28, 1998 to October
1999 defendants lost P180,000 in income. Defendants retained the
services of counsel for P100,000 plus P1,500 per appearance. With this
incident on October 28, 1998, Rolando was embarrassed in front of his
neighbors. For his sufferings Rolando is praying for P1 Million in damages
plus P3 Million in exemplary damages.
Witness Maralit corroborated that testimony of Rolando that the subject
motor vehicle was purchased in cash and not through financing. Had
subject vehicle been purchased through financing the original Certificate
of Registration and Certificate of Registration would have been transmitted
to the financing company marked by the LTO "encumbered". This did not
happen in this case. Security Finance, the plaintiff in this case was not
accredited by Toyota Balintawak not even in one transaction. The
appearance in both Exhibits 1 and 2 of "SPQ Center/Nora Saguid" as
purchaser of the subject motor vehicle was satisfactorily explained by
witness Maralit. The subject motor vehicle was initially reserved by SPQ
Center but later on it waived its right in favor of Nora. It is for this reason
that "SPQ Center/Nora Saguid" appears as the purchaser of the vehicle.17
In its decision18 dated 07 July 2000, the RTC ruled in favor of petitioners,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering plaintiff SECURITY
FINANCE, INCORPORATED to pay defendant-spouses ROLANDO and
NORA SAGUID:
1. The total amount of the daily earnings of the seized motor vehicle
computed from the date of its seizure on October 28, 1998 up to its return
to the defendants, at the rate of P750.00 daily;
2. The amount of P500,000 for moral damages;
3. The amount of P1,000,000 for exemplary damages;
4. The amount P200,000 for and as attorney’s fees; and
5. The Costs.
In reaching its verdict, the RTC ruled that the promissory note and the
deed of mortgage were not valid contracts and were not binding on
petitioners. It explained that respondent failed to show with convincing
evidence that it loaned to petitioners the money used in the purchase of
the subject motor vehicle. On the contrary, it found that there was
preponderance of evidence showing that the motor vehicle was purchased
in cash by petitioners from Toyota Balintawak, Inc.
Respondent appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals via a Notice of
Appeal.19
On 31 January 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision.
It reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and ruled in favor of
respondent. It disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the trial court
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one is rendered in
favor of the plaintiff-appellant. Costs against the defendants-appellees.20
The Court of Appeals found the ruling of the trial court that there was no
valid contract entered into between the parties on the ground there was no
cause or consideration when they executed the same, and that respondent
failed to show with convincing evidence that it loaned the money to
petitioners which was used to purchase the subject motor vehicle, to be
bereft of factual and legal basis. It relied heavily on the admission of
petitioner Rolando Saguid during pre-trial and during his direct-
examination that he signed the promissory note dated 23 April 1996 and
the chattel mortgage dated 03 September 1996. It did not give weight to
petitioners’ bare denial that they never transacted with respondent for the
subject loan and that they never executed the promissory note and the
deed of chattel mortgage because it belied the admission made by
petitioner Rolando Saguid.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration21 dated 24 February 2003
while respondent filed a Motion for Clarificatory Judgment22 dated 17
February 2003.
In a resolution dated 10 June 2003, the Court of Appeals denied the
Motion for Reconsideration and granted the Motion for Clarificatory
Judgment. It amended the dispostive portion of its 31 January 2003
decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the trial court
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one is rendered in
favor of the plaintiff-appellant ordering the defendants-appellees:
1) To deliver to the plaintiff-appellant the motor vehicle described as
follows:
MAKE : Toyota Corolla XL
MODEL : 1996
ENGINE NO. : 2E-2895512
SERIAL NO. : EE100-9555787
2) In the event the manual delivery of the above-described motor vehicle is
not feasible, to pay the plaintiff appellant the amount of ₱508,248.00 plus
interest and penalty charges at the legal rate per annum until fully paid, in
line with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Medel vs. Court
of Appeals, 299 SCRA 481; and
3) To pay the costs of suit.23
Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ENTERED INTO A
TRANSACTION WITH RESPONDENT CONCERNING THE SUBJECT
MOTOR VEHICLE BASED ON THE PROMISSORY NOTE AND CHATTEL
MORTGAGE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT PETITIONER ROLANDO
SAGUID’S ADMISSION OF HAVING SIGNED THE DOCUMENTS WAS
MERELY IN PREPARATION FOR A LOAN APPLICATION PRESENTED TO
HIM BY THE LATE SONNY QUIJANO, A CAR SALES AGENT.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PROMISSORY NOTE
AND THE DEED OF MORTGAGE ARE NOT VALID AND NOT BINDING ON
THE PETITIONERS CONSIDERING PETITIONER ROLANDO SAGUID’S
EXPLANATION REGARDING HIS ADMISSION AND THE SOLID AND
COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONER WIFE WAS NOT IN THE
PHILIPPINES AT THE TIME OF THE EXECUTION OF THE SAID
DOCUMENTS BUT WAS IN AUSTRALIA.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND THE EVIDENCE WHEN IT GRANTED
RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR CLARIFICATORY JUDGMENT AND
ORDERED PETITIONER TO DELIVER THE SUBJECT MOTOR VEHICLE
TO RESPONDENT AND TO PAY RESPONDENT THE AMOUNT OF
P508,248.00 PLUS INTEREST AND PENALTY CHARGES IN CASE
MANUAL DELIVERY OF THE VEHICLE WAS NOT FEASIBLE,
OVERLOOKING THE FACT THAT THE SUBJECT MOTOR VEHICLE WAS
ALREADY FORCIBLY CONFISCATED AND SEIZED BY THE SHERIFF BY
VIRTUE OF THE WRIT OF SEIZURE ISSUED BY THE TRIAL COURT AND
DULY ACKNOWLEDGED TO HAVE BEEN RECEIVED BY THE SHERIFF
FROM THE PETITIONERS.
Respondent would like to impress on the Court that there is a valid
Contract of Loan between it and petitioners, and that the proceeds of the
loan were used to buy the vehicle involved in this case. In support thereof,
it offered, among other things, a Promissory Note24 dated 23 April 1996
and Chattel Mortgage25 dated 03 September 1996 over the subject vehicle
which served as security for the payment of the amount indicated in the
former. On the other hand, petitioners contend that they neither entered
into any contract with respondent nor did they receive any money from it
that was used to buy the subject car. Though petitioner Rolando Saguid
admitted that the signatures in the Promissory Note and Chattel Mortgage
are his, he clarified that when he signed said documents upon the
prodding of Sonny Quijano, he signed them in blank. Petitioner Nora
Saguid, on her part, denied signing said documents. She claimed that the
signatures purporting to be hers are forgeries since she was in Australia
when said documents were executed.
Petitioners maintained that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that they
entered into a transaction with respondent based on the promissory note
and chattel mortgage despite petitioner Rolando Saguid’s explanation of
the circumstances surrounding his signing thereof, and in not holding that
these documents are not valid and binding on them.
To ascertain whether or not petitioners are bound by the promissory note
and chattel mortgage, it must be established that all the elements of a
contract of loan are present. Like any other contract, a contract of loan is
governed by the rules as to the requisites and validity of contracts in
general. It is basic and elementary in this jurisdiction that what
determines the validity of a contract, in general, is the presence of the
elements constituting the same, namely: (1) consent of the contracting
parties; (2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and
(3) cause of the obligation which is established.26 In this case, petitioners
insist the third element is lacking since they never transacted with
respondent for the proceeds of the loan which were used in purchasing the
subject motor vehicle.
The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners transacted with respondent
and are bound by the promissory note and chattel mortgage they signed. It
anchored its ruling on the admission of petitioner Rolando Saguid that he
signed said documents. Citing Section 4, Rule 12927 of the Rules of Court,
it reasoned out that petitioner Rolando Saguid’s bare denial cannot qualify
the admission he made during pre-trial and during trial that they
transacted with respondent and executed the aforesaid documents. It
brushed aside the explanation made by petitioner Rolando Saguid that he
signed the same in blank and only as preparation for a loan application
presented to him by Sonny Quijano.
From the record, it is clear that what petitioner Rolando Saguid admitted
was only his signatures in the aforementioned documents and not the
contents thereof. In petitioners’ Answer, Rolando Saguid admitted signing
the promissory note in preparation for an application for loan upon the
request of Sonny Quijano who promised to facilitate the same for the
purchase of another motor vehicle to be converted into a taxicab, but not
with respondent. During trial, Rolando Saguid explained the
circumstances under which he signed the documents with emphasis that
he signed them in blank.
We find that the Court of Appeals committed an error when it closed its
eyes to the clarification made by petitioner Rolando Saguid on the ground
that same belied his admission. The rule that an admission cannot be
contradicted unless it can be shown that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made will not apply under the
circumstances obtaining in this case. It does not follow that the admission
of the signatures carries with it the admission of the contents of the
documents especially when the person who affixed his signatures thereon
questions its execution and the veracity of the details embodied therein.
Petitioners could have been bound by the terms and conditions of the
promissory note and chattel mortgage if petitioner Rolando Saguid
admitted not only his signatures but also as to what are contained therein.
This is not to be in the case before us. Petitioners can therefore adduce
evidence that would nullify or invalidate both the promissory note and the
chattel mortgage. In other words, they can show that the elements of the
contract of loan are wanting.
The Court of Appeals held that it was not in a proper position to entangle
itself in resolving the matter as regards the qualification made by
petitioner Rolando Saguid on his admission because whatever the
documents he signed in favor of Mr. Quijano is not the concern of the
court as the same is not one of the issues presented before it, and that Mr.
Quijano is not a party in the case. Petitioners claim that if only the Court
of Appeals ruled on the matter, it could have ruled in their favor and
sustained the decision of the trial court.
The Court of Appeals should have ruled on the same it being the primal
defense of petitioners. It should not have wholly disregarded the
qualification made by petitioner Rolando Saguid considering that said
defense can easily be supported by other competent evidence. Instead of
relying heavily on the admitted signatures, it should have evaluated other
evidence that could have either bolstered or disproved the defense of
petitioners.
This did not happen in this case. The Court of Appeals conveniently did
not mention in its decision the testimony of Zenaida M. Maralit, an
employee of Toyota Balintawak, Inc., who testified as to the circumstances
on how the subject car was bought, and the documentary evidence that
originated from Toyota Balintawak, Inc. We consider her to be an impartial
witness whose testimony is vital in the proper resolution of this case.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the ruling
of the trial court that the promissory note and the deed of chattel mortgage
are not valid contracts and are not binding on them on the ground that the
contracts did not contain the essential element of cause. The Court of
Appeals said the trial court did not clearly declare in categorical terms the
absence of cause in the aforesaid contracts and that petitioners failed to
disprove that they are debtors of respondent since it is presumed that the
cause exists in the contract.
Under Article 1354 of the Civil Code, it is presumed that consideration28
exists and is lawful unless the debtor proves the contrary.29 Moreover,
under Section 3(r) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is presumed that
there is a sufficient consideration for a contract. The presumption that a
contract has sufficient consideration cannot be overthrown by a mere
assertion that it has no consideration.30 To overcome the presumption of
consideration, the alleged lack of consideration must be shown by
preponderance of evidence.31
In proving that there is no consideration for the aforementioned
documents, petitioners proffered in evidence the following documents that
showed that they bought the subject vehicle in cash and not in installment
basis: (a) Vehicle Sales Invoice No. 7104;32 (b) Vehicle Delivery Note;33 (c)
Official Receipts No. 20864634 and No. 208648;35 (d) Certificate of
Registration No. 32862328;36 and (e) Official Receipt No. 40459605.37 In
addition, Ms. Zenaida Maralit of Toyota Balintawak, Inc. confirmed that
the subject car was indeed paid in cash and not through financing for the
reasons that the originals of the Certificate of Registration and the Official
Receipt of the subject vehicle have not been marked as encumbered by the
Land Transportation Office and are in the possession of the buyer. She
added that respondent is not accredited in Toyota Balintawak, Inc. She
testified:
Q: Madam Witness, do you know if this vehicle was purchased in cash or
through financing?
A: It was purchased in cash.
Q: What proof do you have to show that it was purchased in cash?
A: There was an invoice cash return.
Q: By the way, being the head of the Credit and Collection, what are your
duties and functions?
A: We are in-charge of collection, we are in-charge of the documentation
with LTO, insurance and financing documents.
Q: As far as the purchase of vehicle through financing, what is your
specific duty?
A: We are the one who asked the client to sign the documents.
Q: Will you tell the Honorable Court what is the procedure in case the
vehicle is purchased from your office through financing?
A: After the client signed the documents, we get all the requirements based
on the credit advice issued by the financing company. So together with the
documents and all the requirements, valid ID, post dated checks, we are
the one transmitting them to the financing company and after processing,
the financing company gave us the proceed two to four days after the
release of the vehicle.
Q: As far as the Certificate of Registration and Official Receipt are
concerned, what did you do with them if the vehicle was purchased
through financing?
A: If it was through financing, the original Official Receipt and Certificate
of Registration goes to the financing company. We are the one transmitting
them. Only the xerox copies of the Official Receipt and Certificate of
Registration go to the client through financing transaction.
Q: As far as the security of the financing company, when it comes to
purchase of vehicle through financing, what do you do with the Official
Receipt and Certificate of Registration?
A: The LTO marked there encumbered. It means it was mortgaged to that
particular financing company.
Q: Where it was marked?
A: At the Certificate of Registration, it was marked encumbered.
Q: On the face?
A: On the face.
Q: Do you have any policy as far as your company is concerned with
regards to the purchase of vehicle through financing?
A: We have only the accredited financing companies.
Q: Is the plaintiff herein, Security Finance, accredited in your company?
A: No, not even in one transaction.
Q: What would be the significance if the original copy of the Certificate of
Registration and the corresponding Official Receipt is in the possession of
the buyer?
A: That means it was on cash transaction.38
On the other hand, respondent, through Rosauro G. Maghirang, Jr., Vice-
President for Marketing, said that it paid the dealer in checks and that
they have proof of payment. He testified:
Q: Mr. witness, you said you paid the dealer. In what form did you pay the
dealer?
A: In checks, sir.
Q: Do you have any proof of your payment?
A: Yes, sir. 39
It is thus clear that the subject car was bought in cash and not through
financing via respondent. We find the evidence presented by respondent to
be unreliable and erratic. The testimony of Rosauro Maghirang, Jr. that
respondent paid Toyota Balintawak, Inc. is simply unsubstantiated by
competent evidence. If respondent truly paid the dealer how come it never
presented the checks it used to pay Toyota Balintawak, Inc.? Even
assuming arguendo that respondent released the loan proceeds to
petitioners, the same would be inconsistent with its allegation that it was
the one that paid the dealer. Furthermore, another telltale sign that
strengthens the claim of petitioners that they did not transact with
respondent for a loan was the fact that the alleged loan/credit
application40 was not signed by any or both of them.
Respondent’s contention that petitioners did not deny drawing postdated
checks in its favor is untenable. Petitioner Rolando Saguid categorically
denied issuing the check and claimed that the signatures appearing
thereon were not his.41
As to the alleged signature of petitioner Nora Saguid in the promissory
note, evidence points that she could not have signed the document she
being in Australia when she allegedly executed said document on 23 April
1996 as established by a certification42 from the Bureau of Immigration
that she left for Sydney, Australia, on 30 September 1995 and returned to
the country on 15 June 1996.
From the foregoing, the Court is convinced that petitioners’ allegation of
absence of consideration has been substantiated and the presumption of
consideration disproved and overcome. We are of the mind that petitioners
bought the car with their own money. There being no cause or
consideration in the contract of loan allegedly entered into by the parties,
the promissory note is not binding on the petitioners.
As regards the chattel mortgage, it is settled that a mortgage is a mere
accessory contract and its validity would depend on the validity of the loan
secured by it.43 The chattel mortgage constituted over the subject vehicle
is an accessory contract to the loan obligation as embodied in the
promissory note. It cannot exist as an independent contract since its
consideration is the same as that of the principal contract. A principal
obligation is an indispensable condition for the existence of an accessory
contract.44 Since it has been sufficiently established that there was no
cause or consideration for the promissory note, it follows that the chattel
mortgage has no leg to stand on. Hence, it must be extinguished and
cannot have any legal effect on petitioners.
Having ruled that both promissory note and chattel mortgage are not
binding on petitioners, the return of the subject vehicle to petitioners is in
order. In case the vehicle can no longer be delivered in the condition when
it was seized, respondent shall pay petitioners the amount of
₱150,000.0045 plus interest of 6% per annum to be computed from 13
October 1998,46 the date when said vehicle was seized, until finality of
judgment after which interest rate shall become 12% per annum until
actual payment.
We now go to the award of damages.
It is well-settled that actual or compensatory damages must be proved and
proved with reasonable degree of certainty. A party is entitled only up to
such compensation for the pecuniary loss that he has duly proven.47 It
cannot be presumed.48 Absent proof of the amount of actual damages
sustained, the Court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures, or
guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon
competent proof that they have been suffered by the injured party and on
the best obtainable evidence of the actual amount thereof.49
In the instant case, the trial court awarded as actual damages the amount
of ₱750.00 per day as daily earnings of the seized vehicle from 28 October
1998 until its return. Same should be deleted for lack of competent proof.
The bare assertion of petitioner Rolando Saguid that the subject vehicle judgment after which interest rate shall become 12% per annum until
was earning ₱750.00 a day before it was seized is inadequate, if not actual payment. Respondent is also ordered to pay petitioners ₱50,000.00
speculative, and should not be accepted because it is not supported by as moral damages, ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages and ₱20,000.00 by
independent evidence. Petitioners should have at least presented a record way of attorney’s fees.
or journal that would clearly show how much the vehicle earned in a
specific period. This, petitioners failed to do. Instead, they relied on mere No pronouncement as to costs.
allegations that do not prove anything.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners are entitled to moral damages having suffered undue
embarrassment when the subject vehicle was seized from their home.
There is no hard-and-fast rule in the determination of what would be a fair
amount of moral damages since each case must be governed by its own
peculiar facts. The yardstick should be that it is not palpably and
scandalously excessive.50 We find the amount of ₱500,000.00 awarded by
the lower court to be excessive. In our view, the award of ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages is reasonable under the facts obtaining in this case.

Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or

correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages.51 When moral damages are
awarded, exemplary damages may also be granted.52 We, however, find
the ₱1,000,000.00 awarded by the lower court to be excessive and should
accordingly be reduced to ₱50,000.00.

Moreover, attorney’s fees may be awarded when a party is compelled to

litigate or incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified
act of the other party.53 Petitioners are entitled thereto because they were
compelled to litigate in order to protect their interest. Moreover, there
being an award for exemplary damages,54 it follows that there should be
an award thereof. An award of ₱20,000.00 will be sufficient as the award of
₱200,000.00 by the RTC is too much.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. CV No. 68129 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent
Security Finance, Inc. is ordered to deliver the possession of the subject
vehicle to petitioners, or, in the alternative if such delivery can no longer
be made, to pay petitioners the amount of ₱150,000.00 plus interest of 6%
per annum to be computed from 13 October 1998 until finality of
G.R. NO. 148273 April 19, 2006
MILAGROS SIMON and LIBORIO BALATICO, Petitioners,
vs.
GUIA W. CANLAS, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 23, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 62789
which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65,
Tarlac City dated July 31, 1998 in Civil Case No. 7384.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On February 11, 1991, Edgar H. Canlas (Edgar) filed a complaint for
judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage against Milagros Simon
(Milagros) and her husband, Liborio Balatico (petitioners). In the
complaint, Edgar alleges that: on September 10, 1987, Milagros obtained a
loan from him in the amount of P220,000.00 secured by a real estate
mortgage2 over her paraphernal property, a 748-square meter parcel of
land located at San Nicolas, Victoria, Tarlac, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 139884; the loan was payable within a period
of three years or until September 18, 1990; Milagros defaulted in the
payment of the loan and repeated demands for payment went unheeded,
prompting the filing of a case in court.
On March 25, 1991, petitioners filed their Answer with Counterclaim,
alleging that Milagros never transacted any business with Edgar and she
did not receive the consideration of the alleged mortgage.4
On March 26, 1991, Edgar filed his Reply and Answer to Counterclaim,
reiterating validity and due execution of the real estate mortgage.
On November 12, 1991, with leave of court, petitioners filed a Third-Party
Complaint against Virginia Canlas (Virginia) and Aurelia Delos Reyes
(Aurelia), claiming that they duped Milagros to part with her title and sign
the mortgage documents without giving her the consideration and refusing
to return her title when demanded.
On November 18, 1991, Virginia and Aurelia filed their Answer with
Counterclaim to Third-Party Complaint, alleging that the complaint states
no cause of action against them since they are not privies to the real estate
mortgage and Aurelia is only a witness to the mortgage document.
On November 28, 1991, petitioners filed their Reply and Answer to
Counterclaim, reiterating their claims in the third-party complaint.
Edgar died during the pendency of the case. On December 4, 1991, upon
proper motion, the RTC ordered that Edgar be substituted by his wife,
Guia W. Canlas (respondent), as plaintiff.
On August 12, 1996, the RTC issued a pre-trial order stating that the
parties failed to arrive at a settlement. However, they agreed to stipulate
on the following: "[t]hat the defendant executed a deed of real estate
mortgage in favor of the plaintiff involving a parcel of land covered by TCT
No. 139884 located at San Nicolas, Victoria, Tarlac."
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued with respondent presenting her
witnesses, namely: Nelson Nulud, the records custodian of the Registry of
Deeds of Tarlac; Aurelia, the third-party defendant and one of the
instrumental witnesses to the real estate mortgage; and respondent
herself. When petitioners’ turn came, they presented Crisostomo Astrero,
the other instrumental witness to the real estate mortgage.
On April 15, 1998, petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Norberto De Jesus, filed an
Ex-Parte Urgent Motion for Postponement since he is busy campaigning as
a candidate in the coming elections.13 There being no objection from
respondent, the RTC reset the hearing to May 28, 1998.
On May 28, 1998, Atty. De Jesus and petitioners failed to appear in court.
The RTC reset the hearing on June 17, 1998 with a warning that if the
petitioners will still fail to appear on said date, they will be considered to
have waived their right to present further evidence.
On June 17, 1998, Atty. De Jesus failed to appear in court but petitioners
were present. Milagros informed the RTC that Atty. De Jesus withdrew his
appearance as their counsel. In view thereof, the RTC directed petitioners
to secure the services of another counsel and the hearing was reset to
June 24, 1998 with a warning that should petitioners still fail to present
evidence at said hearing, they will be considered to have waived their right
to present further evidence.16 On June 23, 1998, Atty. De Jesus filed his
Withdrawal of Appearance as Counsel for the Defendants with the
conformity of Milagros.17
On June 24, 1998, Milagros informed the RTC that they have retained
Atty. Alejo Y. Sedico18 as new counsel. The hearing was again reset to
July 2, 1998 with the final warning that should petitioners’ witnesses fail
to appear at the said hearing, they would be considered to have waived
their right to present further evidence.19
On July 1, 1998, Atty. Sedico formally filed his Entry of Appearance with
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Reset, praying that the hearing scheduled on
July 2, 1998 be reset to August 12, 1998 due to conflict of schedule and
his trial calendar for July is fully occupied, as well as to give him more
time to study the case since he had just been retained.20
On July 2, 1998, the RTC allowed, in the interest of justice, the resetting
of the hearing for presentation of petitioners’ evidence for the last time on
July 15, 1998. The RTC directed petitioners to secure the services of a
counsel of their choice to represent them in the said hearing considering
that it postponed motu propio the hearing in the interest of justice over the
vigorous objection of the respondent due to failure of petitioners’ counsel
to appear for three successive times. It warned petitioners that in case
they would be unable to present evidence in the next scheduled hearing,
they would be deemed to have waived their right to present further
evidence.21
On July 9, 1998, Atty. Sedico filed an Urgent Motion to Reset the
scheduled hearing on July 15, 1998 due to a previously scheduled hearing
on the same date of Criminal Case Nos. 6463 to 6510 for Estafa entitled
"People of the Philippines v. Eddie Sentero" before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 172, Valenzuela. He reiterated that his trial calendar for the whole
month of July is fully occupied and requested the hearing be reset to
August 10 or 19, 1998.22
At the scheduled hearing on July 15, 1998, the RTC was apprised of the
Urgent Motion to Reset filed by petitioners’ counsel. In view of the vigorous
objection of respondent’s counsel on the ground that the case has been
postponed several times at petitioners’ instance, the RTC denied the
motion to reset and petitioners were deemed to have waived their right to
present evidence. The case was then considered submitted for decision.23
Sixteen days later, on July 31, 1998, the RTC rendered its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff having substantiated her claim by a
preponderance of evidence, this Court hereby renders judgment in her
favor, ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff within a period of ninety
(90) days from the entry of judgment hereof, the following sums of:
(1) P220,000.00, representing the principal obligation plus
interest thereof of 12% per annum from the filing of the complaint
until fully paid;
(2) P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and
(3) The costs of suit.
It is further adjudged that in the event defendants default in the payment
of the above determined amounts, Lot No. 2763, with an area of 748
square meters situated in San Nicolas, Victoria, Tarlac and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 13984 – Tarlac Registry, particularly
identified and described in the Real Estate Mortgage contract (Exhibit "A"),
shall be sold at public auction to satisfy this judgment.
SO ORDERED.24
The RTC held that Milagros executed a deed of real estate mortgage in
favor of Edgar and she received the consideration for the mortgage in the
amount of P220,000.00; that petitioners’ inaction for three years before
the filing of the complaint against them to protest the alleged non-receipt
of the consideration for the mortgage casts serious doubts on their claim;
and that the deed of real estate mortgage was duly notarized and assumed
the character of a public instrument.
On September 2, 1998, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
claiming that they were denied due process when the RTC decided the
case without petitioners’ evidence.25 On October 16, 1998, the RTC
denied the motion for reconsideration, holding that petitioners were given
ample opportunity to hire a counsel, prepare for trial and adduce evidence,
which they took for granted and they should bear the fault.26
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA. On May 23, 2001, the
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.27 The CA ruled that petitioners were
not denied due process since they were duly accorded all the opportunities
to be heard and present evidence to substantiate their defense but they
forfeited their right for not appearing in court together with their counsel
at the scheduled hearings; that since Milagros admitted the existence, due
execution, authenticity and validity of the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
during the Pre-Trial Conference on June 7, 1995, absence of consideration
is no longer an issue; that, in any case, the amount of P220,000.00 was
actually received by Milagros per the testimony of Aurelia; that petitioners
slept on their rights, if they had any, since they never lifted a finger to
protect and preserve their alleged rights and interests; and that the
mortgaged property is not conjugal property but the exclusive property of
Milagros which she could validly dispose of or encumber without her
husband’s consent.
The CA merely noted that the RTC failed to dispose of petitioners’ third-
party complaint and without any further discussion, dismissed the third-
party complaint in the dispositive portion of its decision, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto as
to the main case. The third-party complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.28
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari anchored on the
following Assignment of Errors:
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
UPHELD THE VALIDITY OF THE QUESTIONED REAL ESTATE
MORTAGE EVEN AS THERE WAS LACK OF CONSIDERATION
AND THAT THE SAME WAS EXECUTED THROUGH
FRAUDULENTLY [sic] SCHEME;
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
RULED THAT THE DUE EXECUTION OF THE REAL ESTATE
MORTGAGE WAS ADMITTED WHILE WHAT WAS ADMITTED
ONLY IS ITS EXECUTION;
3. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
RULED THAT THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY IS PARAPHERNAL
EVEN AS EXISTING LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE HAD
CONSIDERED IT CONJUGAL OR ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF
PROPERTY;
4. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
RULED THAT DESPITE OF [sic] HAVING DENIED PETITIONER TO
BE REPRESENT [sic] BY A COUNSEL OF CHOICE DUE PROCESS
IS SATISFIED.
Petitioners contend that the real estate mortgage was fraudulently
executed and there was lack of consideration but material facts relating
thereto were not fully ventilated because the RTC denied petitioners’
motion to reset the hearing. They maintain that they never admitted the
due execution of the real estate mortgage, but only its execution or
existence. They further insist that the mortgaged property is conjugal, not
paraphernal, and therefore, Milagros could not dispose of or encumber
without her husband’s consent; and the CA disregarded Article 9930 of the
Family Code which provides that all the property owned by the spouses at
the time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter forms
part of the community property. Lastly, they submit that while they were
given the opportunity to secure the services of a new counsel to defend
them, the RTC’s apathy to the plight of petitioners’ counsel on the latter’s
conflict of schedule amounted to stripping such right to counsel and
denial of due process.
For her part, respondent contends that the petition should be dismissed
outright for impleading the CA as respondent, despite the clear directive of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure against it. She further points out that
the petition lacks verification, a certification against forum shopping, a
copy of the assailed CA decision, and it fails to raise any specific question
of law but only presents and discusses an "assignment of errors."
In any event, even if these procedural defects are disregarded, respondent
argues that petitioners were not denied due process when the RTC denied
their motion for postponement since they were duly accorded all the
opportunities to be heard and to present their evidence to substantiate
their defense but they forfeited this right for not appearing in court
together with their counsel at the scheduled hearings. They also aver that
the real estate mortgage is valid and duly executed and the mortgaged
property is the paraphernal property of Milagros such that she can validly
dispose of or encumber it without her husband’s consent.
Anent the procedural defects raised by respondent, the Court agrees that
the correct procedure, as mandated by Section 4, Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, is not to implead the lower court which rendered
the assailed decision.31 However, impleading the lower court as
respondent in the petition for review on certiorari does not automatically
mean the dismissal of the appeal but merely authorizes the dismissal of
the petition.32 Besides, formal defects in petitions are not uncommon. The
Court has encountered previous petitions for review on certiorari that
erroneously impleaded the CA. In those cases, the Court merely called the
petitioners’ attention to the defects and proceeded to resolve the case on
their merits.33
The Court finds no reason why it should not afford the same liberal
treatment in this case. While unquestionably, the Court has the discretion
to dismiss the appeal for being defective, sound policy dictates that it is far
better to dispose of cases on the merits, rather than on technicality as the
latter approach may result in injustice.34 This is in accordance with
Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure35 which encourages
a reading of the procedural requirements in a manner that will help secure
and not defeat justice.36
As to respondent’s claim that the petition lacks verification, a certification
against forum shopping and a copy of the assailed CA decision, the Court
has carefully examined the rollo of the case and found them to be attached
to the petition.37
Anent respondent’s submission that the petition failed to raise a question
of law, the Court disagrees. For a question to be one of law, it must not
involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by
the litigants or any of them.38 Petitioners’ contention that they were
denied substantive due process is a pure question of law.39
As a rule, the grant or denial of a motion for postponement is addressed to
the sound discretion of the court, which should always be predicated on
the consideration that more than the mere convenience of the courts or of
the parties in the case, the ends of justice and fairness should be served
thereby. After all, postponements and continuances are part and parcel of
our procedural system of dispensing justice."40 When no substantial
rights are affected and the intention to delay is not manifest with the
corresponding motion to transfer the hearing having been filed
accordingly, it is sound judicial discretion to allow the same to the end
that the merits of the case may be fully ventilated.41 Thus, in considering
motions for postponements, two things must be borne in mind: (1) the
reason for the postponement, and (2) the merits of the case of the
movant.42 Unless grave abuse of discretion is shown, such discretion will
not be interfered with either by mandamus or appeal.43
In the present case, there are circumstances that justify postponement of
the July 15, 1998 hearing. Atty. Sedico had only been formally retained as
petitioners’ new counsel as of July 1, 1998, or merely two weeks before
July 15, 1998. Atty. Sedico also had a previously intransferable hearing in
a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172, Valenzuela
scheduled on the same date of July 15, 1998. The distance factor, from
Valenzuela to Tarlac, is enough consideration to call for postponement.
Moreover, Atty. Sedico twice informed the RTC that his entire calendar for
July is already full such that he requested specific dates in August for the
hearing.44 The motion to reset the hearing has not been shown to be
manifestly dilatory. Besides, except for the May 28, 1998 scheduled
hearing,45 petitioners have always been present in court. They cannot be
said to have lost interest in fighting the civil case to the end; only that
Atty. De Jesus withdrew his appearance as their counsel and petitioners
had to look for new counsel to take their case on short notice. Absolutely
wanting from the records is any evidence that the change of counsel was
intended to delay the proceedings. In fact, only 48 days have lapsed from
the time Atty. De Jesus failed to appear on May 28, 199846 to the time
when Atty. Sedico’s motion to reset was denied on July 15, 1998.47 Such
intervening time cannot be said to have greatly impaired the substantial
rights of respondent. Thus, absent unreasonable delay and manifest intent
to employ dilatory tactic prejudicial to the respondent and trifling court
processes, Atty. Sedico’s request for resetting should have been granted.
It cannot be disputed that the case has been pending since February 11
1991,48 or more than seven years until petitioners were able to start their
presentation of their evidence on March 11, 1998.49
The Court is as aware as anyone of the need for the speedy disposition of
cases. However, it must be emphasized that speed alone is not the chief
objective of a trial. It is the careful and deliberate consideration for the
administration of justice, a genuine respect for the rights of all parties and
the requirements of procedural due process, and an adherence to this
Court’s standing admonition that the disposition of cases should always
be predicated on the consideration that more than the mere convenience of
the courts and of the parties in the case, the ends of justice and fairness
would be served thereby. These are more important than a race to end the
trial.50 Indeed, court litigations are primarily for the search for truth, and
a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are given the
fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to ferret out such
truth.51
Ironically, the precipitate action of the RTC prolonged the litigation and
unnecessarily delayed the case, in the process, causing the very evil it
apparently sought to avoid. Instead of unclogging dockets, it has actually
increased the workload of the justice system as a whole. Such action does
not inspire public confidence in the administration of justice.
Moreover, it is noted that petitioners filed a third-party complaint which
the RTC simply disregarded. On the other hand, the CA, while stating in
its Decision that "[a]ll thus told, we find no reversible error in the
judgment of the trial court, except that it failed to dispose of the third-
party complaint,"52 it simply proceeded to dismiss the third-party
complaint in the dispositive portion of herein assailed decision, without
giving any reason or justification therefor.
As to the effect of petitioners’ admission of the due execution of the real
estate mortgage during the pre-trial conference, it must be noted that in
Benguet Exploration, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 53 this Court ruled that the
admission of the genuineness and due execution of a document simply
means that the party whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily
signed the document or it was signed by another for him and with his
authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly
as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document
was delivered; and that any formalities required by law, such as a seal, an
acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him.
However, it does not preclude a party from arguing against it by evidence
of fraud, mistake, compromise, payment, statute of limitations, estoppel
and want of consideration. Petitioners therefore are not barred from
presenting evidence regarding their claim of want of consideration.
It bears stressing that the matter of absence of consideration and alleged
fraudulent scheme perpetuated by third-party defendants, being
evidentiary, should be threshed out in a proper trial. To deny petitioners
their right to present evidence constitutes a denial of due process, since
there are issues that cannot be decided without a trial of the case on the
merits.

Ordinarily, when there is sufficient evidence before the Court to enable it

to resolve the fundamental issues, the Court will dispense with the regular
procedure of remanding the case to the lower court, in order to avoid
further delays in the resolution of the case.54 However, a remand in this
case, while time-consuming, is necessary, because the proceedings had in
the RTC are grossly inadequate to settle factual issues. Petitioners were
unduly deprived of the full opportunity to present evidence on the merits
of their defense and third-party complaint.

Considering the foregoing, the Court need not delve on the other issues
raised by petitioners. Suffice it to say that such matters are best decided
by the RTC only after full reception of petitioners’ evidence.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision

dated May 23, 2001 of the Court of Appeals and the Decision dated July
31, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Tarlac City in Civil Case
No. 7384, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the
said Regional Trial Court for reception of petitioners’ evidence and further
proceedings.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 165987 March 31, 2006
JOSHUA S. ALFELOR and MARIA KATRINA S. ALFELOR, Petitioners,
vs.
JOSEFINA M. HALASAN, and THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to nullify the Decision1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 74757, as well as the
Resolution2 dated June 28, 2004 denying the motion for reconsideration
thereof.
On January 30, 1998, the children and heirs of the late spouses Telesforo
and Cecilia Alfelor filed a Complaint for Partition3 before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Davao City. Among the plaintiffs were Teresita Sorongon
and her two children, Joshua and Maria Katrina, who claimed to be the
surviving spouse of Jose Alfelor, one of the children of the deceased Alfelor
Spouses. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 26,047-98, was raffled to
Branch 17 of said court.
On October 20, 1998, respondent Josefina H. Halasan filed a Motion for
Intervention,4 alleging as follows:
1. That she has legal interest in the matter of litigation in the
above-entitled case for partition between plaintiffs and defendants;
2. That she is the surviving spouse and primary compulsory heir
of Jose K. Alfelor, one of the children and compulsory heirs of
Telesforo I. Alfelor whose intestate estate is subject to herein
special proceedings for partition;
3. That herein intervenor had not received even a single centavo
from the share of her late husband Jose K. Alfelor to the intestate
estate of Telesforo K. Alfelor.
WHEREFORE, movant prays that she be allowed to intervene in this case
and to submit attached Answer in Intervention.
Josefina attached to said motion her Answer in Intervention,6 claiming
that she was the surviving spouse of Jose. Thus, the alleged second
marriage to Teresita was void ab initio for having been contracted during
the subsistence of a previous marriage. Josefina further alleged that
Joshua and Maria Katrina were not her husband’s children. Josefina
prayed, among others, for the appointment of a special administrator to
take charge of the estate. Josefina attached to her pleading a copy of the
marriage contract7 which indicated that she and Jose were married on
February 1, 1956.
Since petitioners opposed the motion, the judge set the motion for hearing.
Josefina presented the marriage contract as well as the Reply-in-
Intervention8 filed by the heirs of the deceased, where Teresita declared
that she knew "of the previous marriage of the late Jose K. Alfelor with that
of the herein intervenor" on February 1, 1956.9 However, Josefina did not
appear in court.
Teresita testified before the RTC on February 13, 2002.10 She narrated
that she and the deceased were married in civil rites at Tagum City, Davao
Province on February 12, 1966, and that they were subsequently married
in religious rites at the Assumption Church on April 30, 1966. Among
those listed as secondary sponsors were Josefina’s own relatives–Atty.
Margarito Halasan, her brother, and Valentino Halasan, her father.11
While she did not know Josefina personally, she knew that her husband
had been previously married to Josefina and that the two did not live
together as husband and wife. She knew that Josefina left Jose in 1959.
Jose’s relatives consented to her (Teresita’s) marriage with Jose because
there had been no news of Josefina for almost ten years. In fact, a few
months after the marriage, Josefina disappeared, and Jose even looked for
her in Cebu, Bohol, and Manila. Despite his efforts, Jose failed to locate
Josefina and her whereabouts remained unknown.
Teresita further revealed that Jose told her that he did not have his
marriage to Josefina annulled because he believed in good faith that he
had the right to remarry, not having seen her for more than seven years.
This opinion was shared by Jose’s sister who was a judge. Teresita also
declared that she met Josefina in 2001, and that the latter narrated that
she had been married three times, was now happily married to an
Englishman and residing in the United States.
On September 13, 2002, Judge Renato A. Fuentes issued an Order12
denying the motion and dismissed her complaint, ruling that respondent
was not able to prove her claim. The trial court pointed out that the
intervenor failed to appear to testify in court to substantiate her claim.
Moreover, no witness was presented to identify the marriage contract as to
the existence of an original copy of the document or any public officer who
had custody thereof. According to the court, the determinative factor in
this case was the good faith of Teresita in contracting the second marriage
with the late Jose Alfelor, as she had no knowledge that Jose had been
previously married. Thus, the evidence of the intervenor did not satisfy the
quantum of proof required to allow the intervention. Citing Sarmiento v.
Court of Appeals,13 the RTC ruled that while Josefina submitted a
machine copy of the marriage contract, the lack of its identification and
the accompanying testimony on its execution and ceremonial
manifestation or formalities required by law could not be equated to proof
of its validity and legality.
The trial court likewise declared that Teresita and her children, Joshua
and Maria Katrina, were the legal and legitimate heirs of the late Jose K.
Alfelor, considering that the latter referred to them as his children in his
Statement of Assets and Liabilities, among others. Moreover, the oppositor
did not present evidence to dispute the same. The dispositive portion of the
Order reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of intervenor, Josephina (sic) Halasan
through counsel, not sufficient to prove a preponderance of evidence and
compliance with the basic rules of evidence to proved (sic) the competent
and relevant issues of the complaint-in-intervention, as legal heir of the
deceased Jose K. Alfelor, the complaint (sic) of intervention is ordered
dismiss (sic) with cost[s] de oficio.
On the other hand, finding the evidence by Teresita Sorongon Aleflor,
oppositor through counsel sufficient to proved (sic) the requirement of the
Rules of Evidence, in accordance with duly supporting and prevailing
jurisprudence, oppositor, Teresita Sorongon Alfelor and her children,
Joshua S. Alfelor and Maria Katrina S. Alfelor, are declared legal and
legitimate Heirs of the late Jose K. Alfelor, for all purposes, to entitled (sic)
them, in the intestate estate of the latter in accordance to (sic) law, of all
properties in his name and/or maybe entitled to any testate or intestate
proceedings of his predecessor-[in]-interest, and to receive such
inheritance, they are legally entitled, along with the other heirs, as the
case maybe (sic).13
Josefina filed a Motion for Reconsideration,15 insisting that under Section
4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court, an admission need not be
proved. She pointed out that Teresita admitted in her Reply in Intervention
dated February 22, 1999 that she (Teresita) knew of Jose’s previous
marriage to her. Teresita also admitted in her testimony that she knew of
the previous marriage. Since the existence of the first marriage was proven
in accordance with the basic rules of evidence, pursuant to paragraph 4,
Article 80 of the New Civil Code, the second marriage was void from the
beginning. Moreover, contrary to the ruling of the trial court, Article 83 of
the Civil Code provides that the person entitled to claim good faith is the
"spouse present" (thus, the deceased Jose and not Teresita). Josefina
concluded that if the validity of the second marriage were to be upheld,
and at the same time admit the existence of the second marriage, an
absurd situation would arise: the late Jose Alfelor would then be survived
by two legitimate spouses.
The trial court denied the motion in its Order17 dated October 30, 2002.
Aggrieved, Josefina filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the
CA, alleging that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in declaring that she failed to prove the
fact of her marriage to Jose, in considering the bigamous marriage valid
and declaring the second wife as legal heir of the deceased. Josefina also
stressed that Articles 80 and 83 of the New Civil Code provide for a
presumption of law that any subsequent marriage is null and void. She
insisted that no evidence was presented to prove that she had been absent
for seven consecutive years before the second marriage.
In their comment, Teresita and her children countered that anyone who
claims to be the legal wife must show proof thereof. They pointed out that
Josefina failed to present any of the following to prove the fact of the
previous marriage: the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the
couple’s public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the
alleged wedding; the birth and the baptismal certificates of children during
such union, and other subsequent documents mentioning such union.
Regarding Teresita’s alleged admission of the first marriage in her Reply in
Intervention dated February 22, 1999, petitioners claim that it was mere
hearsay, without probative value, as she heard of the alleged prior
marriage of decedent Jose Alfelor to Josefina only from other persons, not
based on her own personal knowledge. They also pointed out that Josefina
did not dispute the fact of having left and abandoned Jose after their
alleged marriage in 1956, and only appeared for the first time in 1988
during the filing of the case for partition of the latter’s share in his parents’
estate. They further pointed out that Josefina does not even use the
surname of the deceased Alfelor. Contrary to the allegations of Josefina,
paragraph 2, Article 83 of the Civil Code, now Article 41 of the Family
Code, is applicable. Moreover, her inaction all this time brought to
question her claim that she had not been heard of for more than seven
years.
In its Decision dated November 5, 2003, the CA reversed the ruling of the
trial court. It held that Teresita had already admitted (both verbally and in
writing) that Josefina had been married to the deceased, and under
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, a judicial admission
no longer requires proof. Consequently, there was no need to prove and
establish the fact that Josefa was married to the decedent. Citing Santiago
v. De los Santos,18 the appellate court ruled that an admission made in a
pleading cannot be controverted by the party making such admission, and
is conclusive as to such party; and all contrary or inconsistent proofs
submitted by the party who made the admission should be ignored
whether objection is interposed by the other party or not. The CA
concluded that the trial court thus gravely abused its discretion in
ordering the dismissal of Josefina’s Complaint-in-Intervention. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed orders, having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Resultantly, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Davao City, is
ordered to admit petitioner’s complaint in intervention and to forthwith
conduct the proper proceeding with dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.19
Thus, Joshua and Maria Katrina Alfelor filed the instant petition, assailing
the ruling of the appellate court.
Petitioners limit the issue to the determination of whether or not the CA
erred in ordering the admission of private respondent’s intervention in S.P.
Civil Case No. 26,047-98. They insist that in setting aside the Orders of
the trial court, dated September 13, 2002 and October 30, 2002, the CA
completely disregarded the hearsay rule. They aver that while Section 4 of
Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides that an admission does
not require proof, such admission may be contradicted by showing that it
was made through palpable mistake. Moreover, Teresita’s statement in the
Reply-in-Intervention dated February 22, 1999, admitting knowledge of the
alleged first marriage, is without probative value for being hearsay.
Private respondent, for her part, reiterates that the matters involved in this
case fall under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, and
thus qualify as a judicial admission which does not require proof.
Consequently, the CA did not commit any palpable error when it ruled in
her favor.
Petitioners counter that while Teresita initially admitted knowledge of
Jose’s previous marriage to private respondent in the said Reply-in-
Intervention, Teresita also testified during the hearing, for the purpose,
that the matter was merely "told" to her by the latter, and thus should be
considered hearsay. They also point out that private respondent failed to
appear and substantiate her Complaint-in-Intervention before the RTC,
and only submitted a machine copy of a purported marriage contract with
the deceased Jose Alfelor.
The issue in this case is whether or not the first wife of a decedent, a fact
admitted by the other party who claims to be the second wife, should be
allowed to intervene in an action for partition involving the share of the
deceased "husband" in the estate of his parents.
The petition is dismissed.
The fact of the matter is that Teresita Alfelor and her co-heirs, petitioners
herein, admitted the existence of the first marriage in their Reply- in-
Intervention filed in the RTC, to wit:
1.1. Plaintiff Teresita S. Alfelor admits knowledge of the previous marriage
of the late Jose K. Alfelor, with that of the herein intervenor were married
on February 1, 1956;20
Likewise, when called to testify, Teresita admitted several times that she
knew that her late husband had been previously married to another. To
the Court’s mind, this admission constitutes a "deliberate, clear and
unequivocal" statement; made as it was in the course of judicial
proceedings, such statement qualifies as a judicial admission.21 A party
who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge that fact as judicial
admissions are a waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed
with.23 A judicial admission also removes an admitted fact from the field
of controversy.24 Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings
cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are
conclusive as to such party, and all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent
therewith should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party
or not.25 The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a
pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot
subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with what was
pleaded.26
On the matter of the propriety of allowing her motion for intervention, the
pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court is Section 1, Rule 19,
which provides:
SEC. 1. Who may intervene. – A person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution
or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The
court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether
or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate
proceeding.
Under this Rule, intervention shall be allowed when a person has (1) a
legal interest in the matter in litigation; (2) or in the success of any of the
parties; (3) or an interest against the parties; (4) or when he is so situated
as to be adversely affected by a distribution or disposition of property in
the custody of the court or an officer thereof.27 Intervention is "a
proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is permitted by the
court to make himself a party, either joining plaintiff in claiming what is
sought by the complaint, or uniting with defendant in resisting the claims
of plaintiff, or demanding something adversely to both of them; the act or
proceeding by which a third person becomes a party in a suit pending
between others; the admission, by leave of court, of a person not an
original party to pending legal proceedings, by which such person becomes
a party thereto for the protection of some right of interest alleged by him to
be affected by such proceedings."28
Considering this admission of Teresita, petitioners’ mother, the Court rules
that respondent Josefina Halasan sufficiently established her right to
intervene in the partition case. She has shown that she has legal interest
in the matter in litigation. As the Court ruled in Nordic Asia Ltd. v. Court
of Appeals:29
x x x [T]he interest which entitles a person to intervene in a suit between
other parties must be in the matter in litigation and of such direct and
immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct
legal operation and effect of the judgment. Otherwise, if persons not
parties to the action were allowed to intervene, proceedings would become
unnecessarily complicated, expensive and interminable. And this would be
against the policy of the law. The words "an interest in the subject" means
a direct interest in the cause of action as pleaded, one that would put the
intervenor in a legal position to litigate a fact alleged in the complaint
without the establishment of which plaintiff could not recover.30

In Uy v. Court of Appeals,31 the Court allowed petitioners (who claimed to

be the surviving legal spouse and the legitimate child of the decedent) to
intervene in the intestate proceedings even after the parties had already
submitted a compromise agreement involving the properties of the
decedent, upon which the intestate court had issued a writ of execution. In
setting aside the compromise agreement, the Court held that petitioners
were indispensable parties and that "in the interest of adjudicating the
whole controversy, petitioners’ inclusion in the action for partition, given
the circumstances, not only is preferable but rightly essential in the proper
disposition of the case."32

Contrary to petitioners’ argument, the case of Sarmiento v. Court of

Appeals33 is not in point, as the Court therein did not discuss the
propriety of allowing a motion for intervention, but resolved the validity of
a marriage. In relying on the merits of the complaint for partition, the
Court ultimately determined the legitimacy of one of the petitioners therein
and her entitlement to a share in the subject properties.

CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. SP No. 74757 is AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 17,
Davao City, is ORDERED to admit respondent Josefina Halasan’s
Complaint-in-Intervention and forthwith conduct the proper proceedings
with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 190321 April 25, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
SAMMY UMIPANG y ABDUL, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal from the 21 May 2009 Decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA)1 affirming the 24 July 2007 Joint Decision of the Pasig
City Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Cases No. 14935-D-TG and No.
14936-D-TG.2 The RTC Decision convicted Sammy Umipang y Abdul
(Umipang) for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165 (R.A. 9165), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.
Facts
The pertinent facts, as determined by the CA, are quoted as follows:
Acting on a tip from a confidential informant that a person named Sam
was selling drugs along Cagayan de Oro Street in Maharlika Village,
Taguig City, a buy-bust team from the [Station Anti-Illegal Drugs – Special
Operation Task Force (SAID-SOTF)] of the Taguig City Police was
dispatched on April 1, 2006 at around 6:00 in the evening. [Police Officer
(PO) 2] Gasid was assigned to act as poseur buyer and he was given a ₱
500.00 marked money. The operation was coordinated with the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).
Upon arrival at the area, PO2 Gasid and the confidential informant
sauntered the length of the street while the other members of the team
strategically positioned themselves. The confidential informant saw the
man called Sam standing near a store. The confidential informant and PO2
Gasid then approached Sam. Straight off, the confidential informant said
"Sam, pa-iskor kami." Sam replied "Magkano ang iiskorin nyo?" The
confidential informant said "Five hundred pesos." Sam took out three (3)
plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance with various price
tags–500, 300, and 100. After making a choice, PO2 Gasid handed the
marked ₱ 500.00 to Sam who received the same.
Upon receipt by Sam of the marked money, PO2 Gasid took off his cap as
the pre-arranged signal that the sale had been consummated. Sensing
danger, Sam attempted to flee but PO2 Gasid immediately grabbed and
arrested Sam. In a few seconds, the rest of the buy-bust team [comprised
of their team leader, Police Senior Inspector (PS/INSP.) Obong, Senior
Police Officer (SPO) 1 Mendiola, PO3 Hajan, PO3 Maglana, PO3 Salem, and
PO1 Ragos] joined them. PO1 Ragos handcuffed Sam. Five (5) more plastic
sachets containing the same white crystalline substance were recovered
from Sam. PO2 Gasid marked the items with the initials "SAU" [which
stood for Sammy A. Umipang, the complete name, including the middle
initial, of accused-appellant]. Sam was forthwith brought to the police
station where he was booked, investigated and identified as accused-
appellant Sammy Umipang y Abdul. PO2 Gasid then brought the
confiscated items to the crime laboratory for testing. The specimens all
tested positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, popularly known as
"shabu," a dangerous drug.
On the other hand, the defense presented accused-appellant himself and
his brother Nash Rudin Umipang. According to them:
In the evening of April 1, 2006, while they were sleeping, accused-
appellant and his family were awakened by loud knocking on the door. The
persons outside shouted "Mga pulis kami. Buksan mo ang pinto kung
hindi gigibain namin ito." Accused-appellant obliged and opened the door.
Five (5) policemen barged into his house and pointed a gun at him. Against
his will and amid the screams of his wife, accused-appellant was brought
to a waiting vehicle and brought to the police headquarters. At the Taguig
Police station, PO2 Gasid tried to extort from him ₱ 100,000.00 for his
release. He denied the charges and that the alleged evidence were all
"planted" by the police.3
Consequently, the following charges were brought against Umipang:
That on or about the 1st day of April 2006, in the City of Taguig,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without having been authorized by law, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell deliver and give away to
poseur buyer PO2 Ruchyl Gasid, one heat sealed transparent plastic
sachet containing 0.05 gram of white crystalline substance, which
substance was found positive to the test for Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride also known as "shabu" a dangerous drug, in consideration
of the amount of ₱ 500.00, in violation of the above-cited law.
That on or about the 1st day of April 2006, in the City of Taguig,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without having been authorized by law, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess and have in his custody
and control five (5) heat sealed transparent plastic sachets, each
containing 0.05 gram, 0.05 gram, 0.05 gram, 0.04 gram and 0.04 gram
with a total weight of 0.23 gram of white crystalline substance, which
substances were found positive to the tests for Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride also known as "shabu" a dangerous drug, in violation of the
above-cited law.
RTC Ruling
In its 24 July 2007 Joint Decision, the Pasig City RTC found accused-
appellant guilty of violating Section 5 (Sale, Trading, Administration,
Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous
Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals) and Section
11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs), Article II of R.A. 9165. The RTC gave
more weight to the testimonies of the arresting officers on how they
conducted the buy-bust operation than to accused-appellant’s claim of
frame-up by the police. Thus, for violating Section 5 (Criminal Case No.
14935-D-TG), Umipang was sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to
pay a fine of ₱ 500,000. For violating Section 11 (Criminal Case No. 14936-
D-TG), he was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to fourteen
(14) years one (1) day as maximum and to pay a fine of ₱ 300,000.
CA Ruling
In its 21 May 2009 Decision, the CA affirmed in toto the 24 July 2007
Joint Decision of the RTC. According to the appellate court, the elements
necessary for the prosecution of the illegal possession and sale of
dangerous drugs were present and established. Thus, it no longer
disturbed the RTC’s assessment of the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses. Furthermore, the CA found that there was no showing of
improper motive on the part of the police officers. With the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties, it ruled against the denials
of accused-appellant, and his defense of frame-up.
We have consistently declared that a review of the factual findings of the
lower courts is not a function that is normally undertaken in appeals
before this Court. However, after a careful scrutiny of the CA Decision, we
find it proper to reevaluate the factual issues surrounding the present
case, especially since it is not clear from the Decision whether the proper
implementation of the strict procedural safeguards laid down in R.A. 9165
was established.
Issue
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in finding that the testimonial
evidence of the prosecution witnesses were sufficient to convict accused-
appellant of the alleged sale and possession of methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, which are violations under Sections 5 and 11, respectively,
of R.A. 9165.
Discussion
Accused-appellant argues4 that since there were two versions presented
during trial – one, that of the prosecution; and the other, that of the
accused – the latter version must be adopted, because the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties should not take precedence
over the presumption of innocence of the accused. He also contends that a
surveillance of just 30 minutes was insufficient to establish that Umipang
was engaged in the sale of illegal drugs. Lastly, accused-appellant claims
that the fact of possession of the confiscated plastic sachets was not
clearly established, and that the evidence allegedly confiscated from him
was merely planted.5 Alluding to the testimony of PO1 Ragos, he points
out that the former did not see him holding the drugs, and that the sachet
was shown only to PO1 Ragos by PO2 Gasid.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the
affirmation of the RTC Joint Decision in all respects, as it was decided in
accord with law and evidence.6 The OSG argues7 that the necessary
elements to convict a person under Sections 5 and 11 were proven beyond
reasonable doubt. It then contends that, absent independent proof and
substantiated evidence to the contrary, accused-appellant’s bare-faced
denial should be deemed merely as a self-serving statement that does not
hold merit. Finally, the OSG asserts that, where there is no evidence of
improper motive on the part of the prosecution witness to testify falsely
against accused-appellant, the testimony must be given full faith and
credence.
Substantive law requires strict observance of the procedural safeguards
outlined in R.A. 9165
At the outset, we take note that the present case stemmed from a buy-bust
operation conducted by the SAID-SOTF. We thus recall our
pronouncement in People v. Garcia:
A buy-bust operation gave rise to the present case. While this kind of
operation has been proven to be an effective way to flush out illegal
transactions that are otherwise conducted covertly and in secrecy, a buy-
bust operation has a significant downside that has not escaped the
attention of the framers of the law. It is susceptible to police abuse, the
most notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion. In People v. Tan,
this Court itself recognized that "by the very nature of anti-narcotics
operations, the need for entrapment procedures, the use of shady
characters as informants, the ease with which sticks of marijuana or
grams of heroin can be planted in pockets of or hands of unsuspecting
provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals,
the possibility of abuse is great. Thus, courts have been exhorted to be
extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer
the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses." Accordingly, specific
procedures relating to the seizure and custody of drugs have been laid
down in the law (R.A. No. 9165) for the police to strictly follow. The
prosecution must adduce evidence that these procedures have been
followed in proving the elements of the defined offense.8 (Emphasis
supplied and citations omitted.)
Section 21 of R.A. 9165 delineates the mandatory procedural safeguards9
that are applicable in cases of buy-bust operations:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA
shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources
of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well
as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the
following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of
the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the
same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a
qualitative and quantitative examination;
(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results,
which shall be done under oath by the forensic laboratory
examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24) hours after the
receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of
the dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and
controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the
completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory
examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein
the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the
forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification
shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination
on the same within the next twenty-four (24) hours;
(4) After the filing of the criminal case, the Court shall, within
seventy-two (72) hours, conduct an ocular inspection of the
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, including the instruments/paraphernalia
and/or laboratory equipment, and through the PDEA shall within
twenty-four (24) hours thereafter proceed with the destruction or
burning of the same, in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the DOJ, civil society groups and any elected public
official. The Board shall draw up the guidelines on the manner of
proper disposition and destruction of such item/s which shall be
borne by the offender: Provided, That those item/s of lawful
commerce, as determined by the Board, shall be donated, used or
recycled for legitimate purposes: Provided, further, That a
representative sample, duly weighed and recorded is retained;
(5) The Board shall then issue a sworn certification as to the fact
of destruction or burning of the subject item/s which, together
with the representative sample/s in the custody of the PDEA, shall
be submitted to the court having jurisdiction over the case. In all
instances, the representative sample/s shall be kept to a
minimum quantity as determined by the Board;
(6) The alleged offender or his/her representative or counsel shall
be allowed to personally observe all of the above proceedings and
his/her presence shall not constitute an admission of guilt. In
case the said offender or accused refuses or fails to appoint a
representative after due notice in writing to the accused or his/her
counsel within seventy-two (72) hours before the actual burning or
destruction of the evidence in question, the Secretary of Justice
shall appoint a member of the public attorney's office to represent
the former; x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Congress introduced another complementing safeguard through Section
86 of R.A. 9165, which requires the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
Philippine National Police (PNP), and Bureau of Customs (BOC) to
maintain close coordination with PDEA in matters of illegal drug-related
operations:
Section 86. Transfer, Absorption, and Integration of All Operating Units on
Illegal Drugs into the PDEA and Transitory Provisions. – x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
Nothing in this Act shall mean a diminution of the investigative powers of
the NBI and the PNP on all other crimes as provided for in their respective
organic laws: Provided, however, That when the investigation being
conducted by the NBI, PNP or any ad hoc anti-drug task force is found to
be a violation of any of the provisions of this Act, the PDEA shall be the
lead agency. The NBI, PNP or any of the task force shall immediately
transfer the same to the PDEA: Provided, further, That the NBI, PNP and
the Bureau of Customs shall maintain close coordination with the PDEA
on all drug related matters. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the 2002 Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 9165 (IRR) set
the following procedure for maintaining close coordination:
SECTION 86. Transfer, Absorption, and Integration of All Operating Units
on Illegal Drugs into the PDEA and Transitory Provisions. — x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
(a) Relationship/Coordination between PDEA and Other Agencies — The
PDEA shall be the lead agency in the enforcement of the Act, while the
PNP, the NBI and other law enforcement agencies shall continue to
conduct anti-drug operations in support of the PDEA: Provided, that the
said agencies shall, as far as practicable, coordinate with the PDEA prior
to anti-drug operations; Provided, further, that, in any case, said agencies
shall inform the PDEA of their anti-drug operations within twenty-four (24)
hours from the time of the actual custody of the suspects or seizure of said
drugs and substances, as well as paraphernalia and transport equipment
used in illegal activities involving such drugs and/or substances, and shall
regularly update the PDEA on the status of the cases involving the said
anti-drug operations; Provided, furthermore, that raids, seizures, and
other anti-drug operations conducted by the PNP, the NBI, and other law
enforcement agencies prior to the approval of this IRR shall be valid and
authorized; Provided, finally, that nothing in this IRR shall deprive the
PNP, the NBI, other law enforcement personnel and the personnel of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from effecting lawful arrests and
seizures in consonance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
Given the nature of buy-bust operations and the resulting preventive
procedural safeguards crafted in R.A. 9165, courts must tread carefully
before giving full credit to the testimonies of those who conducted the
operations. Although we have ruled in the past that mere procedural
lapses in the conduct of a buy-bust operation are not ipso facto fatal to the
prosecution’s cause, so long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items have been preserved,10 courts must still thoroughly
evaluate and differentiate those errors that constitute a simple procedural
lapse from those that amount to a gross, systematic, or deliberate
disregard of the safeguards drawn by the law. Consequently, Section 21(a)
of the IRR provides for a saving clause in the procedures outlined under
Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165, which serves as a guide in ascertaining those
procedural aspects that may be relaxed under justifiable grounds, viz:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — x x x:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof:
Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted
at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever
is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items; (Emphasis supplied.)
We have reiterated that "this saving clause applies only where the
prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and thereafter explained the
cited justifiable grounds" after which, "the prosecution must show that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized have been
preserved."11 To repeat, noncompliance with the required procedure will
not necessarily result in the acquittal of the accused if: (1) the
noncompliance is on justifiable grounds; and (2) the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending team.12
Accordingly, despite the presumption of regularity in the performance of
the official duties of law enforcers,13 we stress that the step-by-step
procedure outlined under R.A. 9165 is a matter of substantive law, which
cannot be simply brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality. The
provisions were crafted by Congress as safety precautions to address
potential police abuses, especially considering that the penalty imposed
may be life imprisonment. In People v. Coreche,14 we explained thus:
The concern with narrowing the window of opportunity for tampering with
evidence found legislative expression in Section 21 (1) of RA 9165 on the
inventory of seized dangerous drugs and paraphernalia by putting in place
a three-tiered requirement on the time, witnesses, and proof of inventory
by imposing on the apprehending team having initial custody and control
of the drugs the duty to "immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof". (Emphasis supplied.)
Consequently, in a line of cases,15 we have lain emphasis on the
importance of complying with the prescribed procedure. Stringent
compliance is justified under the rule that penal laws shall be construed
strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the accused.16
Otherwise, "the procedure set out in the law will be mere lip service."17
Material irregularities in the conduct of the buy-bust operations
In the recent case of People v. Relato, we reiterated the following:
In a prosecution of the sale and possession of methamphetamine
hydrochloride prohibited under Republic Act No. 9165, the State not only
carries the heavy burden of proving the elements of the offense of, but also
bears the obligation to prove the corpus delicti, failing in which the State
will not discharge its basic duty of proving the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. It is settled that the State does not establish the corpus
delicti when the prohibited substance subject of the prosecution is missing
or when substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the prohibited
substance raise grave doubts about the authenticity of the prohibited
substance presented as evidence in court. Any gap renders the case for the
State less than complete in terms of proving the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, Relato deserves exculpation, especially as
we recall that his defense of frame-up became plausible in the face of the
weakness of the Prosecution’s evidence of guilt.18 (Emphasis supplied and
citations omitted.)
The conduct of the buy-bust operations was peppered with defects, which
raises doubts on the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items from accused-appellant.
First, there were material inconsistencies in the marking of the seized
items. According to his testimony, PO2 Gasid used the initials of the
complete name, including the middle initial, of accused-appellant in order
to mark the confiscated sachets. The marking was done immediately after
Umipang was handcuffed. However, a careful perusal of the testimony of
PO2 Gasid would reveal that his prior knowledge of the complete initials of
accused-appellant, standing for the latter’s full name, was not clearly
established. Thus, doubt arises as to when the plastic sachets were
actually marked, as shown by PO2 Gasid’s testimony:
A [PO2 Gasid]: We conducted a buy-bust operation on April 1, 2006.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Against whom did you conduct this buy-bust
operation?
A: Against alias Sam, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: What prompted you to conduct this operation against
this alias Sam?
A: We received information from our confidential informant that one alias
Sam is selling shabu at Cagayan De Oro Street, Maharlika Village, Taguig.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Aside from this information that you received from
your informant, was there anything more that your informant told you
about the real identity of this alias Sam?
A: Nothing more, sir, he gave us only his alias, sir.19
xxx xxx xxx
PROSEC. SANTOS: So, after you have taken the item and paid alias Sam
and then you executed the pre-arranged signal that you have already
purchased from him, what happened then?
A: After I made the pre-arranged signal, mabilis po yung mata ni alias PROSEC. SANTOS: Was there anything that you and your team did in the
Sam, para ho bang balisa, siguro napansin nya na hindi lang kami dalawa items that you confiscated from the possession of the accused during that
(2), aakma syang tatakbo, sinunggaban ko na po sya. time and the shabu that you bought from him?

PROSEC. SANTOS: So, you held Sam already during that time? A: I marked the items I confiscated at the place of incident.

A: Yes, sir. PROSEC. SANTOS: How did you marked [sic] the item that you bought
from this alias Sam?
PROSEC. SANTOS: What happened after that?
A: SAU, sir.
A: I introduced myself as police officer and at that time I arrested him.
PROSEC. SANTOS: And what does that stand for? That SAU?
PROSEC. SANTOS: What about your companions who serves [sic] as your
immediate back up, what happened to them when you were already hold A: Stands for the initials of alias Sam.
and arrested [sic] this alias Sam?
PROSEC. SANTOS: Is that the only thing that you placed on the plastic
A: I noticed my companions approaching us. sachet containing the shabu that you bought from this alias Sam during
that time?
xxx xxx xxx
A: I marked the shabu I bought as SAU-1.
PROSEC. SANTOS: And what did your colleague Ragos do when he arrived
at your place? PROSEC. SANTOS: How about the other five (5) plastic sachets containing
the suspected shabu, what happened to that?
A: When he arrived at the place, after arresting alias Sam, he was the one
who handcuffed him. A: I marked them as SAU-2, SAU-3, SAU-4, SAU-5 and SAU-6.20

PROSEC. SANTOS: Was there anything more that was done in that place xxx xxx xxx
of occurrence during that time, Officer?
PROSEC. SANTOS: Now, after you have marked and inventoried the items
A: Yes, sir. that you bought and confiscated from this alias Sam during that time,
what else happened?
PROSEC. SANTOS: Tell us please?
A: After the inventory of the evidences, I turn [sic] them over to the
A: After arresting alias Sam, I frisk [sic] him for the remaining items he investigator.
showed me and the buy-bust money I gave him.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Where did you turn these items to your investigator?
xxx xxx xxx
A: At the office, sir.

PROSEC. SANTOS: Who was your investigator during that time?

A: PO1 Alexander Saez, sir. ATTY. HERNANDEZ: So, you did not conduct any test buy?

PROSEC. SANTOS: When you turn these items to your investigator, where A: No, sir.
were you?
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Nor did you make any inquiry with Cagayan De Oro
A: At the office, sir. Street regarding the accused?

PROSEC. SANTOS: What happened to these items that you turn it over
[sic] to your investigator?
A: He made a request for laboratory examination of the items
confiscated.21
A: Not anymore, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: At that moment, you don’t have any idea regarding
the identity of the accused and also whether he was engaged in illegal
activity?

xxx xxx xxx A: Regarding the identity, he was described by the informant.

PROSEC. SANTOS: Now, Officer, this Sam when you have already arrested
him, were you able to know his real name?
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: What was his real name?
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: It was only the informant who knows the accused?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And also your other members, they did not know the
accused?

A: Sammy Umipang, sir. A: Yes, sir.23 (Emphasis supplied.)

PROSEC. SANTOS: Is he present here in Court? A clearer picture of what transpired during the buy-bust operation, from
the marking of the confiscated items to the arrest of accused-appellant, is
A: Yes, sir.22 provided by the testimony of PO1 Ragos:

xxx xxx xxx PROSEC. SANTOS: And what is the effect to you of the act of Gasid taking
off his cap?
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: When you arrived at the place, by the way, where was
your target area, Mr. Witness? A: That is the sign that he already bought the shabu.

A: Cagayan De Oro Street, Barangay Maharlika, Taguig City. PROSEC. SANTOS: When you saw Gasid acting that way, being the back
up of him during that time, what did you do?
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: When you were there, you did not buy [sic] anybody
to buy shabu from the accused? A: I run [sic] towards them.

A: No, sir. PROSEC. SANTOS: Were you able to go near him when you run [sic]
towards him?
A: Yes, sir. A: We went back to the office.

PROSEC. SANTOS: What happened? PROSEC. SANTOS: All the members of the team went back to the office?

A: I saw him holding Sam. A: Yes, sir.

PROSEC. SANTOS: When you saw Gasid already holding Sam, what did PROSEC. SANTOS: And together with this alias Sam?
you do?
A: Yes, sir.
A: I handcuffed Sam.
PROSEC. SANTOS: What happened in your office?
PROSEC. SANTOS: After that, what happened?
A: We turn [sic] over the evidence to the investigator.
A: The items confiscated by Gasid were marked with his initials.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Who was your investigator during that time?
PROSEC. SANTOS: Did you see Gasid marking those things that he took
from this Sam during that time? A: PO1 Saez.

A: Yes, sir. xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx PROSEC. SANTOS: So, after the team has turn [sic] over the evidences to
your investigator in the person of Officer Saez, was there anything more
PROSEC. SANTOS: What marked [sic] did he put on these plastic sachets? that transpired in relation to this event, this incident?

A: SAU, sir. A: We prepared an affidavit of arrest.24

PROSEC. SANTOS: Do you know what SAU connotes? xxx xxx xxx

A: Yes, sir. ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And this information regarding the accused was
relayed to you by your immediate superior?
PROSEC. SANTOS: Tell us?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Sammy Abdul Umipang.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And this information was the first information
PROSEC. SANTOS: After that, what happened? regarding the accused, is that correct?

A: He was apprising [sic] of his constitutional rights. A: Yes, sir.

PROSEC. SANTOS: After this person was apprised of his rights, was there ATTY. HERNANDEZ: What was told you was that your target person was
anything more that was done? alias Sam?
A: Yes, sir. ATTY. HERNANDEZ: It was PO1 Saez who got his full name and on you
[sic] part, that was the first time that you were able to learned [sic] the full
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: No photographs of alias Sam was shown to you? name of the accused?

A: None, sir. A: Yes, sir.

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: You have no derogatory records of this alias Sam in ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Because you knew him only as alias Sam?
your office?
A: Yes, sir.
A: None, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: How about Officer Gasid, it was also the first time
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: You have no warrant of arrest? that he learned the full name of the accused?

A: None, sir. A: Maybe not, sir.

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: This alias Sam was not included in your watch list? ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Mr. Witness, you mentioned that it was Officer Saez
who delivered the items to the crime lab?
A: No, sir.25
A: No sir, it was Gasid.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: But you were not with him when he delivered the
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: So, the markings were placed on the plastic sachets? specimen to the crime laboratory?
A: Yes, sir. A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: After that Mr. Witness, you brought the accused ATTY. HERNANDEZ: No further question, Your Honor.
together with the items to your office?
PROSEC. SANTOS: No re-direct, Your Honor. x x x26 (Emphasis supplied.)
PROSEC. SANTOS: Already answered, Your Honor. We are just repeating
the same pattern, Your Honor. The circumstances surrounding the marking of the seized items are
suspect. From their testimonies during the trial, PO2 Gasid and PO1
xxx xxx xxx Ragos both admitted that they only knew their target by the name "Sam."
They both testified that, after accused-appellant was handcuffed, frisked,
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Mr. Witness, you investigated the accused?
and read his rights, they immediately brought him to the police precinct.
A: No more, it was PO1 Saez who investigated the accused. They then said that it was a certain PO1 Saez who investigated him. In
fact, in their joint affidavit, PO2 Gasid and PO1 Ragos stated thus:
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: So, you did not ask the full name of the accused?
Na dinala namin siya [accused] sa aming opisina para sa pagsisiyasat at
A: It was PO1 Saez who investigated him, sir. pagtatanong tungkol sa detalye ng kaniyang pagkatao at sa layuning
masampahan ng kaukulang reklamo sa paglabag ng Section 5 and 11 of
RA 9165.27 (Emphasis supplied.)
Evidence on record does not establish that PO2 Gasid had prior knowledge
of the complete name of accused-appellant, including the middle initial,
which enabled the former to mark the seized items with the latter’s
complete initials. This suspicious, material inconsistency in the marking of
the items raises questions as to how PO2 Gasid came to know about the
initials of Umipang prior to the latter’s statements at the police precinct,
thereby creating a cloud of doubt on the issues of where the marking really
took place and whether the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items were preserved. All that was established was that it was PO1 Saez
who asked accused-appellant about the latter’s personal circumstances,
including his true identity, and that the questioning happened when
accused-appellant was already at the police station. We thus reiterate:
Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or
other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused.
Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is
vital that the seized contraband[s] are immediately marked because
succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference.
The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from
the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are
seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of criminal
proceedings, obviating switching, "planting", or contamination of evidence.
Long before Congress passed RA 9165, this Court has consistently held
that failure of the authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs raises
reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti and suffices to
rebut the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties,
the doctrinal fallback of every drug-related prosecution. Thus, in People v.
Laxa and People v. Casimiro, we held that the failure to mark the drugs
immediately after they were seized from the accused casts doubt on the
prosecution evidence, warranting acquittal on reasonable doubt. These
rulings are refinements of our holdings in People v. Mapa and People v.
Dismuke that doubts on the authenticity of the drug specimen occasioned
by the prosecution’s failure to prove that the evidence submitted for
chemical analysis is the same as the one seized from the accused suffice to
warrant acquittal on reasonable doubt.28 (Emphasis supplied and
citations omitted.)
It is true that the failure of the arresting officers to mark the seized items
at the place of arrest does not by itself impair the integrity of the chain of
custody and render the confiscated items inadmissible in evidence.29 We
have already clarified that the marking upon "immediate" confiscation of
the prohibited items contemplates even that which was done at the
nearest police station or office of the apprehending team.30 We will
analyze this possible seed of doubt that has been planted by the
unexplained marking of the shabu with the complete initials of Umipang,
together with the other alleged irregularities.
Second, the SAID-SOTF failed to show genuine and sufficient effort to seek
the third-party representatives enumerated under Section 21(1) of R.A.
9165. Under the law, the inventory and photographing of seized items
must be conducted in the presence of a representative from the media,
from the Department of Justice (DOJ), and from any elected public official.
The testimony of PO2 Gasid, as quoted below, is enlightening:
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Mr. Witness, you also made the certificate of
inventory, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And since this is a drug operation, you are required
by law to make a certificate of inventory?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And that inventory, you are required by law that
there should be a signature of any representative from the media, is that
correct?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And also representative from the Department of
Justice, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And also elected official, Mr. Witness?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: I’m showing to you Mr. Witness your certificate of
inventory, do you confirm that there are no signatures placed by any
member of the media, representative from the Department of Justice and
any elected official?
A: Yes, sir, there is none, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And there appears to be an initial of RS above the
type written name Sammy Umipang, who wrote this initial RS?
A: That stands for refuse [sic] to sign, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Who refuse [sic] to sign?
A: Sammy Umipang, sir.31
xxx xxx xxx
PROSEC. SANTOS: Why was the certificate of inventory not witnesses [sic]
and signed by any members of the media, the DOJ and elected officials,
Officer?
A: That time there is no available representative, sir.
COURT: How did you exert effort to locate available representative of those
officers or persons in the certificate of inventory?
A: The investigator contacted representative from the media, Your Honor.
COURT: What barangay this incident happened?
A: Barangay Maharlika, Your Honor.
COURT: Did you talk to the barangay captain?
A: No, Your Honor.
COURT: What about the barangay councilman?
A: No, Your Honor.32 (Emphasis supplied.)
Indeed, the absence of these representatives during the physical inventory
and the marking of the seized items does not per se render the confiscated
items inadmissible in evidence. However, we take note that, in this case,
the SAID-SOTF did not even attempt to contact the barangay chairperson
or any member of the barangay council. There is no indication that they
contacted other elected public officials. Neither do the records show
whether the police officers tried to get in touch with any DOJ
representative. Nor does the SAID-SOTF adduce any justifiable reason for
failing to do so – especially considering that it had sufficient time from the
moment it received information about the activities of the accused until
the time of his arrest.
Thus, we find that there was no genuine and sufficient effort on the part of
the apprehending police officers to look for the said representatives
pursuant to Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. A sheer statement that
representatives were unavailable – without so much as an explanation on
whether serious attempts were employed to look for other representatives,
given the circumstances – is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse. We stress
that it is the prosecution who has the positive duty to establish that
earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives
enumerated under Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165,33 or that there was a
justifiable ground for failing to do so.34
Third, the SAID-SOTF failed to duly accomplish the Certificate of Inventory
and to take photos of the seized items pursuant to Section 21(1) of R.A.
9165. As pointed out by the defense during trial,35 the Certificate of
Inventory did not contain any signature, including that of PO2 Gasid – the
arresting officer who prepared the certificate36 – thus making the
certificate defective. Also, the prosecution neither submitted any evidence were derived from a buy-bust operation – "redounds to the benefit
photograph of the seized items nor offered any reason for failing to do so. of the criminal justice system by protecting civil liberties and at the same
We reiterate that these requirements are specifically outlined in and time instilling rigorous discipline on prosecutors."46
required to be implemented by Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165.37
WHEREFORE, the appealed 21 May 2009 CA Decision affirming the 24
Minor deviations from the procedures under R.A. 9165 would not July 2007 RTC Joint Decision is SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Sammy
automatically exonerate an accused from the crimes of which he or she Umipang y Abdul is hereby ACQUITTED of the charges in Criminal Cases
was convicted.38 This is especially true when the lapses in procedure were No. 14935-D-TG and No. 14936-D-TG on the ground of reasonable doubt.
"recognized and explained in terms of [] justifiable grounds."39 There must The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby ORDERED to
also be a showing "that the police officers intended to comply with the immediately RELEASE accused-appellant from custody, unless he is
procedure but were thwarted by some justifiable consideration/reason."40 detained for some other lawful cause.
However, when there is gross disregard of the procedural safeguards
prescribed in the substantive law (R.A. 9165), serious uncertainty is SO ORDERED.
generated about the identity of the seized items that the prosecution
presented in evidence.41 This uncertainty cannot be remedied by simply
invoking the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties, for a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the procedural
safeguards effectively produces an irregularity in the performance of
official duties.42 As a result, the prosecution is deemed to have failed to
fully establish the elements of the crimes charged, creating reasonable
doubt on the criminal liability of the accused.43 1âwphi1

For the arresting officers’ failure to adduce justifiable grounds, we are led
to conclude from the totality of the procedural lapses committed in this
case that the arresting officers deliberately disregarded the legal
safeguards under R.A. 9165. These lapses effectively produced serious
doubts on the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti, especially in the
face of allegations of frame-up. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, we must
resolve the doubt in favor of accused-appellant, "as every fact necessary to
constitute the crime must be established by proof beyond reasonable
doubt."44

As a final note, we reiterate our past rulings calling upon the authorities
"to exert greater efforts in combating the drug menace using the
safeguards that our lawmakers have deemed necessary for the greater
benefit of our society."45 The need to employ a more stringent approach to
scrutinizing the evidence of the prosecution – especially when the pieces of
G.R. No. 190749 April 25, 2012
VALENTIN ZAFRA y DECHOSA and EROLL MARCELINO y REYES,
Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For review before this Court is the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR No. 31713 dated 30 October 2009,1 affirming the decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76, Malolos, Bulacan,2 which
found petitioners Valentin Zafra y Dechosa (Zafra) and Eroll Marcelino y
Reyes (Marcelino) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Possession of
Dangerous Drugs in violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (RA)
No. 9165 (the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) and imposing
on each of them the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one
(1) day as the minimum term, to thirteen (13) years as maximum, and of
fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00).
The Facts
The prosecution charged Zafra and Marcelino with violation of Section 11,
Article II of RA No. 91653 before the RTC of Bulacan under the Information
below:
That on or about the 12th day of June, 2003, in the municipality of
Balagtas, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law
and legal justification, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in their possession and control dangerous drug consisting
of two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet of methylamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu) weighing 0.0614 gram, in conspiracy with one
another.5
The prosecution’s lone witness, SPO4 Apolinario Mendoza (SPO4
Mendoza), Chief of the Investigation and Drug Enforcement Unit of the
Philippine National Police of Balagtas, Bulacan, testified that on 12
January 2003, at around 4:30 in the afternoon, he conducted surveillance
in front of a sari-sari store at the corner of Miraflor Subdivision and P.
Castro Street in Balagtas, Bulacan, due to reported drug trafficking in the
area. SPO4 Mendoza found there the group of Zafra, Marcelino, and a
certain Marlon Daluz (Daluz) standing and facing each other.7 In that
position, he saw Zafra and Marcelino holding shabu, while Daluz was
holding an aluminum foil and a disposable lighter.8 Seeing this illegal
activity, SPO4 Mendoza single-handedly apprehended them. He grabbed
the shabu from the hands of Zafra and Marcelino, and confiscated the
drug paraphernalia from Daluz. Then, he ordered the three to lie down; he
frisked them. Boarding a tricycle, he brought them to the Balagtas Police
Station,9 where he personally marked the confiscated two (2) sachets of
shabu, one with VSD, the initials of Valentin Zafra y Dechosa and the
other with EMR, the initials of Eroll Marcelino y Reyes.10
On the following day, 13 June 2003, SPO4 Mendoza brought the accused
and the items to the crime laboratory for urine sampling and laboratory
examination, respectively.11 The test of the items resulted to positive
presence of methylamphetamine hydrochloride.12
The RTC, Branch 76, Malolos, Bulacan, in a decision dated 11 June 2008,
convicted Zafra and Marcelino for the crime of possession of shabu:
WHEREFORE, finding guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt in
Criminal Case No. 2297-M-2003, accused VALENTIN ZAFRA y DECHOSA
and accused EROLL MARCELINO y REYES are hereby CONVICTED for
possession of sachets of methylamphetamine hydrochloride commonly
known as shabu, with a weight of 0.31 gram and 0.30 gram, respectively,
which are classified as dangerous drugs in violation of Section 11, Article
II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002" and are each SENTENCED to suffer the
IMPRISONMENT of, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, TWELVE
(12) YEARS AND ONE DAY, AS THE MINIMUM TERM, TO THIRTEEN (13)
YEARS, AS THE MAXIMUM TERM, and to pay the FINE of THREE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱300,000.00).13
Daluz, on the other hand, who was charged of possession of drug
paraphernalia in violation of Section 12 of RA No. 9165 pleaded guilty to
the charge and was released after serving his sentence of eight (8)
months.14
Zafra and Marcelino appealed; but the CA affirmed in toto the RTC
Decision:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED for lack
of merit. Accordingly, the assailed 11 June 2008 Decision of the Court a
quo STANDS.15
Hence, this appeal on the following grounds: first, the arrest was unlawful;
second, the prohibited drugs are inadmissible in evidence; third, Section
21 of RA No. 9165 was not complied with; and, finally, the prosecution
failed to prove petitioners’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court’s Ruling
We resolve to ACQUIT petitioners Zafra and Marcelino on the following
grounds:
First, the prosecution’s lone witness, SPO4 Mendoza,16 testified that, from
a distance, he saw Zafra and Marcelino holding shabu by their bare
hands, respectively, while Daluz was holding an aluminum foil and a
disposable lighter.17 Seeing this illegal activity, he single-handedly
apprehended them.18 He grabbed the shabu from the hands of Zafra and
Marcelino, and confiscated the drug paraphernalia from Daluz.
In his affidavit, however, SPO4 Mendoza stated, that:
Na, nitong nakaraang Hunyo 12, 2003 ng 4:30 ng hapon humigit
kumulang, sa P. Casto St., Barangay Borol-1, Balagtas Bulacan,
habang ako ay nagsasagawa ng surveillance sa Suspected Drug
Pusher sa nasabing lugar ay aking nakita ang tatlo (3) kalalakihan
na nakatalikod sa isang corner ng tindahan sa P. Castro St., na
nakilala ko na sina Valentine D. Zafra @ Val, Eroll R. Marcelino @
Eroll, at Marlon B. Daluz @ Marlon na pawang mga residente ng
Borol-1, Balagtas, Bulacan.
Na, ako ay lumapit na naglalakad kina Valentine Zafra, Errol
Marcelino at Marlon Daluz at sa aking paglapit sa kanilang tatlo
ay aking nakita at naaktuhang inabot ni Valentine Zafra kay Eroll
Marcelino ang isang (1) plastic sachet ng shabu may timbang na
0.30 grams, at isa pang plastic sachet ng shabu na si Marlon
Daluz ay hawak ang isang disposable lighter at 2 piraso ng
aluminum foil na inaayos na nilalagyan ng lupi at 7 piraso ng
empty plastic sachet. (Emphasis supplied)19
xxxx
On cross examination, SPO4 Mendoza testified that it was Zafra and not
Daluz, who was holding the aluminum foil (contrary to his earlier
testimony that Zafra was holding shabu);20 that Daluz (whom he claimed
during the direct examination to be holding the aluminum foil) and
Marcelino were holding handkerchiefs and on top of them were shabu;21
When the defense confronted SPO4 Mendoza about the inconsistency, he
told the court that his version during his direct testimony was the correct
one.22
While, it is hornbook doctrine that the evaluation of the trial court on the
credibility of the witness and the testimony is entitled to great weight and
is generally not disturbed upon appeal,23 such rule does not apply when
the trial court has overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any fact of
weight or substance.24 In the instant case, these circumstances are
present, that, when properly appreciated, would warrant the acquittal of
petitioners.
Certainly, SPO4 Mendoza’s credibility has to be thoroughly looked into,
being the only witness in this case. While in his affidavit, SPO4 Mendoza
claimed that he saw the sachet of shabu (0.30 gram) because Zafra was in
the act of handing it to Marcelino, his testimony during the direct
examination reveals another version, that is, from a distance, he saw Zafra
and Marcelino holding shabu, respectively, hence, he approached them
from behind and confiscated the shabu from both of them and the
paraphernalia from Daluz. How he saw a 0.30 gram of shabu from a
distance in a busy street, baffles this Court. Asked, however, on cross
examination, who among the three were holding the shabu and drug
paraphernalia, SPO4 Mendoza failed to be consistent with his earlier
testimony and pointed to Daluz as the one holding shabu with a
handkerchief in his hand and Zafra as the one in possession of drug
paraphernalia. These inconsistencies are not minor ones, and, certainly,
not among those which strengthens the credibility of a witness. Possession
of drug paraphernalia vis-à-vis shabu, are two different offenses under RA
No. 9165. That Zafra was holding drug paraphernalia and not shabu is
material to this case, to the accusation against him, and to his defense.
Second, a reading of the RTC decision on this matter reveals that the
conviction was arrived at upon reliance on the presumption of regularity in
the performance of Mendoza’s official duty.25
It is noteworthy, however, that presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions cannot by its lonesome overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence.26 Evidence of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and nothing else can eclipse the hypothesis of
guiltlessness. And this burden is met not by bestowing distrust on the
innocence of the accused but by obliterating all doubts as to his
culpability.27
Third, SPO4 Mendoza was the lone arresting officer, who brought the
petitioners to the police station,28 who himself marked the confiscated
pieces of evidence sans witnesses, photographs, media, and in the absence
of the petitioners. His colleagues were nowhere.29 And, worse, he was the
same person who took custody of the same pieces of evidence, then,
brought them on his own to the crime laboratory for testing.30 No
inventory was ever done;31 no inventory was presented in court.
The solo performance by SPO4 Mendoza of all the acts necessary for the
prosecution of the offense is unexplained and puts the proof of corpus
delicti, which is the illegal object itself in serious doubt. No definite answer
can be established regarding the question as to who possessed what at the
time of the alleged apprehension. More significantly, we are left in doubt
whether not the two sachets of shabu allegedly seized from the petitioners
were the very same objects offered in court as the corpus delicti.
Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that
the elemental act of possession of a prohibited substance be established
with moral certainty.32 The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very
corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a
judgment of conviction.33 Essential therefore in these cases is that the
identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt.34 Be that as
it may, the mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to create
in a reasonable mind the moral certainty required to sustain a finding of
guilt.35 More than just the fact of possession, the fact that the substance
illegally possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court
as exhibit must also be established with the same unwavering exactitude
as that requisite to make a finding of guilt.36 The chain of custody
requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary
doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.37
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of RA No. 9165 reads:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Section 21(a) Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA
No. 9165 reads:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of
the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof:
Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted
at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever
is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires
that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims
it to be.38 It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from
the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence,
in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe
how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it
while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received
and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.39
These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that
there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity
for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.40
The records readily raise significant doubts as to the identity of the
sachets of shabu allegedly seized from Zafra and Marcelino. SPO4
Mendoza’s claim that the two sachets of shabu presented in court were the
same ones confiscated from the petitioners, cannot be taken at its face
value, solely on the presumption of regularity of one’s performance of duty.
SPO4 Mendoza blatantly broke all the rules established by law to
safeguard the identity of a corpus delicti. There was even no mention
about the details of the laboratory examination of the allegedly seized
drugs. To allow this to happen is to abandon everything that has been said
about the necessity of proving an unbroken chain of custody. SPO4
Mendoza cannot alone satisfy the requirements in RA No. 9165 which is
anchored on, expressly, the participation of several personalities and the
execution of specified documents.
And, while jurisprudence has refined the enumerated duties of an
apprehending officer in a drug case and has thus described the equivalent
requirements for a proper chain of custody of the corpus delicti, still, the
case at bar cannot pass the constitutional requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
We reiterate, that this Court will never waver in ensuring that the
prescribed procedures in the handling of the seized drugs should be
observed. In People v. Salonga,41 we acquitted the accused for the failure
of the police to inventory and photograph the confiscated items. We also
reversed a conviction in People v. Gutierrez,42 for the failure of the buy-
bust team to inventory and photograph the seized items without justifiable
grounds. People v. Cantalejo43 also resulted in an acquittal because no
inventory or photograph was ever made by the police.
We reached the same conclusions in the recent cases of People v.
Capuno,44 People v. Lorena,45 and People v. Martinez.46
The present petition is the sum total of all the violations committed in the
cases cited above.
Lest the chain of custody rule be misunderstood, we reiterate that non-
compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements does not
necessarily render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid;
the seizure may still be held valid, provided that (a) there is a justifiable
ground for the non-compliance, and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items are shown to have been properly preserved.47 These
conditions, however, were not met in the present case as the prosecution
did not even attempt to offer any justification for the failure of SPO4
Mendoza to follow the prescribed procedures in the handling of the seized
items.1âwphi1 As we held in People v. De Guzman,48 the failure to follow
the procedure mandated under RA No. 9165 and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations must be adequately explained. The justifiable ground for
the non-compliance must be proven as a fact. The Court cannot presume
what these grounds are or that they even exist.
In our constitutional system, basic and elementary is the presupposition
that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused lies on the prosecution
which must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the
weakness of the defense.49 The rule is invariable whatever may be the
reputation of the accused, for the law presumes his innocence unless and
until the contrary is shown.50 In dubio pro reo.51 When moral certainty
as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt
inevitably becomes a matter of right.52

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the

Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 October 2009 in CA-G.R. CR No.
31713. Petitioners Valentin Zafra y Dechosa and Eroll Marcelino y Reyes
are hereby ACQUITTED for the failure of the prosecution to prove their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately RELEASED
from detention, unless they are confined for another lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of

Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for immediate implementation. The Director
of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this Court the action
taken within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 144656 May 9, 2002
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GERRICO VALLEJO Y SAMARTINO @ PUKE, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
88, Cavite City, sentencing Gerrico Vallejo y Samartino to death and
ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages for the
rape-slaying of a 9-year old child, Daisy Diolola, in Rosario, Cavite on July
10, 1999.
The Information charging accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo with the crime
of Rape with Homicide alleged:
"That on or about the 10th day of July 1999, in Barangay Ligtong
I, Municipality of Rosario, Province of Cavite, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Trial Court, the above-
named accused, with lewd design, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with DAISY DIOLOLA Y
DITALO, a nine-year old child against the latter's will and while
raping the said victim, said accused strangled her to death."
"CONTRARY TO LAW."2
Accused-appellant was arraigned on July 26, 1999 and, with the
assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, whereupon
trial ensued.
Ten (10) witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely, Ma. Nida Diolola,
the victim's mother; Dr. Antonio S. Vertido, medico-legal officer of the NBI;
Atty. Lupo Leyva; Mayor Renato Abutan of Rosario, Cavite; Atty. Sikat
Agbunag of the Public Attorney's Office; Pet Byron Buan, NBI Forensic
Biologist; Aida Viloria-Magsipoc, NBI Forensic Chemist; SPO1 Arnel
Cuevas of the Rosario, Cavite police station; and Jessiemin Mataverde and
Charito Paras-Yepes, both neighbors of the victim.
The victim's mother, Ma. Nida Diolola, testified that at around 1:00 o'clock
in the afternoon of July 10, 1999, she sent her 9-year old daughter Daisy
Diolola to their neighbor's house in Pilapil, Ligtong I, Rosario, Cavite, so
that Aimee Vallejo, the sister of accused-appellant, could help Daisy with
her lessons. Aimee's house, where accused-appellant was also staying, is
about four to five meters away from Daisy's house. Ma. Nida saw her
daughter go to the house of her tutor. She was wearing pink short pants
and a white sleeveless shirt. An hour later, Daisy came back with accused-
appellant. They were looking for a book which accused-appellant could
copy to make a drawing or a poster that Daisy would submit to her
teacher. After finding the book, Daisy and accused-appellant went back to
the latter's house. When Ma. Nida woke up at about 5:30 o'clock after an
afternoon nap, she noticed that Daisy was not yet home. She started
looking for her daughter and proceeded to the house of Aimee, Daisy's
tutor. Aimee's mother told Ma. Nida that Daisy was not there and that
Aimee was not able to help Daisy with her lessons because Aimee was not
feeling well as she had her menstrual period. Ma. Nida looked for Daisy in
her brother's and sister's houses, but she was not there, either. At about
7:00 o'clock that evening, Ma. Nida went back to her neighbor's house,
and there saw accused-appellant, who told her that Daisy had gone to her
classmate's house to borrow a book. But, when Ma. Nida went there, she
was told that Daisy had not been there. Ma. Nida went to the dike and was
told that they saw Daisy playing at about 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon.
Jessiemin Mataverde also told Ma. Nida that Daisy was playing in front of
her house that afternoon and even watched television in her house, but
that Daisy later left with accused-appellant.
Ma. Nida and her brother and sister searched for Daisy the whole evening
of June 10, 1999, a Saturday, until the early morning of the following day,
June 11, 1999, a Sunday, but their search proved fruitless. Then, at about
10:00 o'clock in the morning of June 11, 1999, she was informed that the
dead body of her daughter was found tied to the root of an aroma tree by
the river after the "compuerta" by a certain Freddie Quinto. The body was
already in the barangay hall when Ma. Nida saw her daughter. Daisy was
wearing her pink short pants with her sleeveless shirt tied around her
neck. Barangay Councilmen Raul Ricasa and Calring Purihin reported the
incident to the Rosario police. The other barangay officers fetched
accused-appellant from his house and took him to the barangay hall. At
the barangay hall, Ma. Nida pointed to accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo
as the probable suspect since he was with the victim when she was last
seen alive.3
Another witness, Jessiemin Mataverde, testified that at around 3:00
o'clock in the afternoon of that day, she saw Daisy playing with other
children outside her house. She asked Daisy and her playmates to stop
playing as their noise was keeping Jessiemin's one-year old baby awake.
Daisy relented and watched television instead from the door of Jessiemin's
house. About five minutes later, accused-appellant came to the house and
told Daisy something, as a result of which she went with him and the two
proceeded towards the "compuerta."
Jessiemin testified that at around 5:00 o'clock that afternoon, while she
and her daughter were in front of a store across the street from her house,
accused-appellant arrived to buy a stick of Marlboro cigarette. Accused-
appellant had only his basketball shorts on and was just holding his shirt.
They noticed both his shorts and his shirt were wet. After lighting his
cigarette, accused-appellant left.4
Charito Yepes, another neighbor of Ma. Nida, also testified. She said that
at about 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon of July 10, 1999, while she and her
husband and children were walking towards the "compuerta" near the
seashore of Ligtong, Rosario, Cavite, they met a fisherman named
Herminio who said that it was a good day for catching milkfish (bangus).
For this reason, according to this witness, they decided to get some fishing
implements. She said they met accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo near the
seashore and noticed that he was uneasy and looked troubled. Charito
said that accused-appellant did not even greet them, which was unusual.
She also testified that accused-appellant's shorts and shirt (sando) were
wet, but his face and hair were not.5
SPO1 Arnel Cuevas testified that upon receipt of the report, Rosario Police
Chief Ricardo B. de la Cruz, Jr. responded to the call together with his
men, PO2 Garcia, SPO1 Araracap and PO2 Lariza. When they arrived,
Daisy's body was already in the barangay hall. SPO1 Cuevas took
photographs of the body. At that time, Daisy was wearing pink short pants
and a dirty white panty with a dirty white sleeveless shirt wrapped around
her neck. The body was afterwards taken to the Samson Funeral Parlor in
Rosario, Cavite. The inquiries conducted by the police showed that one
Freddie Quinto was fishing near the compuerta when he accidentally hit
the body of Daisy, which was in the mud and tied to the root of an aroma
tree.
Accused-appellant was invited by the policemen for questioning. Two
others, a certain Raymond and Esting, were also taken into custody
because they were seen with accused-appellant in front of the store in the
late afternoon of July 10 1999. Later, however, the two were released.
Based on the statements of Jessiemin Mataverde and Charito Paras-Yepes,
the policemen went to the house of accused-appellant at about 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon of July 11, 1999 and recovered the white
basketball shirt, with the name Samartino and No. 13 printed at the back,
and the violet basketball shorts, with the number 9 printed on it, worn by
accused-appellant the day before. The shirt and shorts, which were
bloodstained, were turned over to the NBI for laboratory examination.6
Dr. Antonio S. Vertido, NBI Medico-Legal Officer, testified that at about
9:00 o'clock in the evening of July 11, 1999, he conducted a physical
examination of accused-appellant. His findings7 showed the following:
"PHYSICAL FINDINGS:
"Abrasions: thigh, right, antero-lateral aspect, lower 3rd 5.0 x 0.1
cm., knee, left, 7.0 x 6.0 cm. legs, right anterior aspect, 28.0 x 8.0
cms., left anterior aspect, 24.0 x 10.0 cms., feet, plantar aspects;
right, 9.0 x 3.0 cms. and left, 13.0 x 5.0 cms.
"Hematoma, left ring finger, posterior aspect, 1.0 x 0.5 cm.
"Lacerations, left ring finger, posterior aspect, 0.3 cm.
 "(Living Case No. BMP-9902, p. 101, records)"
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, Dr. Vertido went to the Samson
Funeral Parlor in Rosario, Cavite for an autopsy on the cadaver of the
victim Daisy Diolola. The autopsy revealed the following postmortem
findings:8
"Body in early stage of postmortem decomposition characterized
by foul odor, eyes and tongue protruding, bloating of the face and
blister formation.
"Washerwoman's hands and feet.
"Contusion, (pinkish) face, right, 14.0 x 10.0 cms. and left, 13.0 x
6.0 cms. Contused abrasions, forehead, 13.0 x 5.0 cms. upper lip,
5.0 x 22.0 cms., lower lip, 3.0 x 2.0 cms., neck (nailmarks)
anterior aspect, 8.0 x 5.0 cms., arms, right antero-medial aspect,
middle 3rd 3.0 x 15.0 cms. posterior aspect, upper 3rd, 1.5 x 1.0
cms., left posterior aspect, 20.0 x 9.0 cms., forearm, left, posterior
aspect, 21.0 x 8.0 cms. left thumb, anterior aspect, 1.5 x 1.0 cms.,
left middle, ring and little fingers, dorsal aspect, .50 x 4.0 cms.
knees, right, 3.0 x 2.0 cms. and left, 8.0- x 5.0 cms., legs, right
anterior aspect, upper and middle 3rd 3.0 x 2.5 cms. foot right,
dorsal aspect.
"Hematoma, periorbital right, 5.0 x 3.0 cms. and left, 4.5 x
3.0 cms.
"Fracture, tracheal rings.
"Hemorrhages, interstitial, neck, underneath, nailmarks.
"Petechial hemorrhages, subendocardial, subpleural.
"Brain and other visceral organs are congested.
"Stomach, contains ½ rice and other food particles.
"CAUSE OF DEATH: -Asphyxia by Manual Strangulation.
"GENITAL EXAMINATION: - Pubic hair, no growth. Labia majora
and minora, gaping and congested. Hymen, moderately tall, thick
with fresh lacerations, complete at 3:00, 6:00 and 9:00 o'clock
positions, edges with blood clots." [Autopsy Report No. BTNO-99-
152]
Renato Abutan, Municipal Mayor of Rosario, Cavite, testified that he was
informed of the rape and murder at past 10:00 o'clock in the evening of
June 11, 1999. The mayor said he immediately proceeded to the municipal
jail, where accused-appellant was detained, and talked to the latter.
Accused-appellant at first denied having anything to do with the killing
and rape of the child. The mayor said he told accused-appellant that he
could not help him if he did not tell the truth. At that point, accused-
appellant started crying and told the mayor that he killed the victim by
strangling her. Accused-appellant claimed that he was under the influence
of drugs. The mayor asked accused-appellant if he wanted to have the
services of Atty. Lupo Leyva, a resident of Rosario, as his lawyer. When
accused-appellant said he did, Mayor Abutan fetched Atty. Leyva from his
house and took him to the police station about 11:00 o'clock that
evening.9
Atty. Lupo Leyva corroborated Mayor Abutan's testimony. He said that
upon arriving at the police station, he asked accused-appellant if he
wanted his services as counsel in the investigation. After accused-
appellant assented, Atty. Leyva testified that he "sort of discouraged" the
former from making statements as anything he said could be used against
him. But, as accused-appellant was willing to be investigated, Atty. Leyva
said he advised him to tell the truth. PO2 Garcia, the investigator,
informed accused-appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent
and to be assisted by counsel and warned him that any answer he gave
could and might be used against him in a court of law. PO2 Garcia asked
questions from accused-appellant, who gave his answers in the presence
of Atty. Leyva. After the statement was taken, Atty. Leyva and accused-
appellant read it and afterwards signed it. Atty. Leyva testified that he did
not see or notice any indication that accused-appellant had been
maltreated by the police. In his sworn statement (Exh. M), accused-
appellant confessed to killing the victim by strangling her to death, but
denied having molested her.10
Pet Byron Buan, Forensic Biologist of the NBI, testified that on July 12,
1999, he took blood samples from accused-appellant in his office for
laboratory examination to determine his blood type. Likewise, the
basketball shorts and shirt worn by accused-appellant on the day the
victim was missing and the victim's clothing were turned over to the
Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI by PO1 Amoranto of the Rosario,
Cavite police for the purpose of determining the presence of human blood
and its groups.11
The results of the examinations conducted by Pet Byron T. Buan showed
accused-appellant to belong to Group "O". The following specimens: (1) one
(1) white no. 13 athletic basketball shirt, with patches "Grizzlies" in front
and "SAMARTINO" at the back; (2) one (1) violet no. 9 athletic basketball
short pants; (3) one (1) white small "Hello Kitty" T-shirt with reddish brown
stains; (4) one (1) "cut" pink short pants with reddish brown stains; (5) one
(1) "cut" dirty white small panty with reddish brown stains, were all
positive for the presence of human blood showing the reactions of Group
"A".12
Pet Byron Buan also testified that before he took the blood samples, he
had a conversation with accused-appellant during which the latter
admitted that he had raped and later killed the victim by strangulation
and stated that he was willing to accept the punishment that would be
meted out on him because of the grievous offense he had committed. Mr.
Buan observed that accused-appellant was remorseful and was crying
when he made the confession in the presence of SPO1 Amoranto at the
NBI laboratory.13
When accused-appellant was brought before Inquest Prosecutor Elpidia J.
Itoc at around noon of July 13, 1999 in Cavite City, accused-appellant had
with him a handwritten confession which he had executed inside his cell
at the Municipal Jail of Rosario. In his confession, accused-appellant
admitted not only that he killed the victim but that he had before that
raped her. Accused-appellant said he laid down the victim on a grassy
area near the dike. He claimed that she did not resist when he removed
her undergarments but that when he tried to insert his penis into the
victim's vagina, she struggled and resisted. Accused-appellant said he
panicked and killed the child. He then dumped her body in the shallow
river near the "compuerta" and went home.14
Atty. Sikat Agbunag, a lawyer from the Public Attorney's Office, testified
that at noon of July 13, 1999, while she was in their office in Cavite City,
Prosecutor Itoc came together with accused-appellant and some
policemen. Prosecutor Itoc asked Atty. Agbunag to assist accused-
appellant about his confession. Atty. Agbunag read the document,
informed accused-appellant of his constitutional rights, and warned him
that the document could be used against him and that he could be
convicted of the case against him, but, according to her, accused-appellant
said that he had freely and voluntarily executed the document because he
was bothered by his conscience. Accused-appellant, assisted by Atty.
Agbunag, then affixed his signature to the document and swore to it before
Prosecutor Itoc.15
At the instance of City Prosecutor Agapito S. Lu of Cavite City, NBI
Forensic Biologist Pet Byron Buan took buccal swabs and hair samples
from accused-appellant, as well as buccal swabs and hair samples from
the parents of the victim, namely, Ma. Nida Diolola and Arnulfo Diolola.
The samples were submitted to the DNA Laboratory of the NBI for
examination.
Aida Viloria-Magsipoc, Forensic Chemist of the NBI, conducted DNA tests
on the specimens collected by Dr. Vertido. She testified that the vaginal
swabs of the victim taken by Dr. Vertido during the autopsy contained the
DNA profiles of accused-appellant and the victim.16
The defense then presented as witnesses accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo
and his sister Aimee Vallejo. Their testimonies show that at about 1:00
o'clock in the afternoon of July 10, 1999, accused-appellant, Aimee, and
their sister Abigail were in their house in Barangay Talisay, Ligtong I,
Rosario, Cavite when Daisy Diolola came to ask accused-appellant to draw
her school project. After making the request, Daisy left.17 Accused-
appellant did not immediately make the drawing because he was watching
television. Accused-appellant said that he finished the drawing at about
3:00 o'clock in the afternoon and gave it to the victim's aunt, Glory. He
then returned home to watch television again. He claimed he did not go
out of the house until 7:00 o'clock in the evening when he saw Ma. Nida,
who was looking for her daughter. Accused-appellant said he told her that
he had not seen Daisy. After that, accused-appellant said he went to the
"pilapil" and talked with some friends, and, at about 8:00 o'clock that
evening, he went home.
At 9:00 o'clock in the morning of July 11, 1999, barangay officials fetched
accused-appellant from his house and took him to the barangay hall,
where he was asked about the disappearance of Daisy. He claimed that he
did not know anything about it. Accused-appellant was allowed to go
home, but, at 11:00 o'clock that morning, policemen came and invited him
to the police headquarters for questioning. His mother went with him to
the police station. There, accused-appellant was asked whether he had
something to do with the rape and killing of Daisy. He denied knowledge of
the crime.
At 4:00 o'clock that afternoon, accused-appellant accompanied the police
to his house to get the basketball shorts and shirt he was wearing the day
before, which were placed together with other dirty clothes at the back of
their house. According to accused-appellant, the police forced him to
admit that he had raped and killed Daisy and that he admitted having
committed the crime to stop them from beating him up. Accused-appellant
claimed the police even burned his penis with a lighted cigarette and
pricked it with a needle.
Accused-appellant confirmed that Mayor Renato Abutan and Atty. Lupo
Leyva went to see him in the investigation room of the police station and
told him that they would help him if he told the truth. Atty. Leyva asked
him whether he wanted him to be his counsel, and accused-appellant said
he answered in the affirmative. He said Atty. Leyva informed him of his
constitutional rights. Accused-appellant claimed that, although he
admitted to Mayor Abutan and Atty. Leyva the commission of the crime,
this was because the police had maltreated him. Accused-appellant said
he did not tell the mayor or Atty. Leyva that he had been tortured because
the policemen were around and he was afraid of them. It appears that the
family of accused-appellant transferred their residence to Laguna on July
12, 1999 because of fear of reprisal by residents of their barangay.18
According to accused-appellant, Mayor Abutan and Atty. Leyva were not
present when he gave his confession to the police and signed the same.
Accused-appellant claims that although Exhibit "N" was in his own
handwriting, he merely copied the contents thereof from a pattern given to
him by the police.19
On July 31, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision finding accused-
appellant guilty of the offense charged. The dispositive portion of its
decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the
Court finds the accused Gerrico Vallejo y Samartino GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide, as
charged in the Information, accordingly hereby sentences him to
the supreme penalty of DEATH. The accused is directed to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
"SO ORDERED."20
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that:
"I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE DESPITE THE
INSUFFICIENCY AND WEAKNESS OF THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION.
"II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING
EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT TO THE ALLEGED ORAL CONFESSIONS
OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE ITS BEING HEARSAY IN
NATURE.
"III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
GIVING PROBATIVE VALUE TO THE WRITTEN EXTRA-JUDICIAL
CONFESSION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THE SAME WAS OBTAINED THROUGH FORCE AND
 INTIMIDATION AND THAT THE LAWYER WHO ASSISTED HIM
DURING HIS CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION DID NOT AND COULD
NOT POSSIBLY GIVE HIM EFFECTIVE LEGAL ASSISTANCE."
We find accused-appellant's contentions to be without merit.
First. An accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available,
provided sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution
to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the
crime.21 In rape with homicide, the evidence against an accused is more
often than not circumstantial. This is because the nature of the crime,
where only the victim and the rapist would have been present at the time
of its commission, makes the prosecution of the offense particularly
difficult since the victim could no longer testify against the perpetrator.
Resort to circumstantial evidence is inevitable and to demand direct
evidence proving the modality of the offense and the identity of the
perpetrator is unreasonable.22
Under Rule 133, section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence,
circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if:
"(a) there is more than one circumstance;
"(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and
"(c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce
conviction beyond reasonable doubt."23
In the case at bar, the following circumstantial evidence establish beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of accused-appellant:
1. The victim went to Aimee Vallejo's house, where accused-
appellant was residing, at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 10,
1999, for tutoring.
2. At around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, accused-appellant and
Daisy went together to the latter's house to get a book from which
the former could copy Daisy's school project. After getting the
book, they proceeded to accused-appellant's residence.
3. From accused-appellant's house, Daisy then went to the house
of Jessiemin Mataverde where she watched television. Accused-
appellant thereafter arrived and whispered something to Daisy,
and the latter went with him towards the "compuerta."
4. At about 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the spouses Iluminado
and Charito Yepes saw accused-appellant coming out of the
"compuerta," with his clothes, basketball shorts, and t-shirt wet,
although his face and hair were not. According to these witnesses,
he looked pale, uneasy, and troubled (balisa). He kept looking
around and did not even greet them as was his custom to do so.
5. The fishing boat which accused-appellant used as a bomber (a
boat for catching fish with dynamite) was docked by the seashore.
6. A little before 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Jessiemin
Mataverde also saw accused-appellant buying a Marlboro cigarette
from a store. Jessiemen also noticed that accused-appellant's
clothes were wet but not his face nor his hair.
7. By 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon, as Ma. Nida Diolola looked for
her daughter, she was told by accused-appellant that Daisy had
gone to her classmate Rosario's house. The information proved to
be false.
8. Daisy's body was found tied to an aroma tree at the part of the
river near the "compuerta."
9. During the initial investigation, accused-appellant had
scratches on his feet similar to those caused by the thorns of an
aroma tree.
10. The clothes which accused-appellant wore the day before were
bloodstained. The bloodstains on accused-appellant's clothes and
on Daisy's clothes were found positive of human blood type "A."
 11. Accused-appellant has blood type "O."
12. The vaginal swabs from Daisy's body contained her DNA
profile as well as that of accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant contends that the bloodstains found on his garments
were not proven to have been that of the victim as the victim's blood type
was not determined.
The contention has no merit. The examination conducted by Forensic
Biologist Pet Byron Buan of both accused-appellant's and the victim's
clothing yielded bloodstains of the same blood type "A".24 Even if there
was no direct determination as to what blood type the victim had, it can
reasonably be inferred that the victim was blood type "A" since she
sustained contused abrasions all over her body which would necessarily
produce the bloodstains on her clothing.25 That it was the victim's blood
which predominantly registered in the examination was explained by Mr.
Buan, thus:26
"ATTY. ESPIRITU
Q: But you will agree with me that more probably than not, if
a crime is being committed, and it results in a bloody death, it is
very possible that the blood of the victim and the blood of the
assailant might mix in that particular item like the t-shirt, shorts
or pants?
A: It is possible when there is a huge amount of blood coming
from the victim and the suspect, Sir. It is possible. It will mix.
Whichever is the dominant blood in it, it will be the one which will
register. For example, if there is more blood coming from the
victim, that blood will be the one to register, on occasions when
the two blood mix.
Q: But in these specimens number 1 to 5, it is very clear now
that only type A and no type O blood was found?
A: Yes, sir."
Accused-appellant also questions the validity of the method by which his
bloodstained clothes were recovered. According to accused-appellant, the
policemen questioned him as to the clothes he wore the day before.
Thereafter, they took him to his house and accused-appellant
accompanied them to the back of the house where dirty clothes were
kept.27 There is no showing, however, that accused-appellant was coerced
or forced into producing the garments. Indeed, that the accused-appellant
voluntarily brought out the clothes sought by the police becomes more
convincing when considered together with his confessions. A consented
warrantless search is an exception to the proscription in Section 2 of
Article III of the Constitution. As we have held, the consent of the owner of
the house to the search effectively removes any badge of illegality.28
The DNA analysis conducted by NBI Forensic Chemist Aida Viloria-
Magsipoc is also questioned by accused-appellant. He argues that the
prosecution failed to show that all the samples submitted for DNA testing
were not contaminated, considering that these specimens were already
soaked in smirchy waters before they were submitted to the laboratory.
DNA is an organic substance found in a person's cells which contains his
or her genetic code. Except for identical twins, each person's DNA profile is
distinct and unique.29
When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the
crime or from the victim's body for the suspect's DNA. This is the evidence
sample. The evidence sample is then matched with the reference sample
taken from the suspect and the victim.30
The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists
between the evidence sample and the reference sample.31 The samples
collected are subjected to various chemical processes to establish their
profile.32 The test may yield three possible results:
1) The samples are different and therefore must have originated
from different sources (exclusion). This conclusion is absolute and
requires no further analysis or discussion;
 2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test,
whether the samples have similar DNA types (inconclusive). This
might occur for a variety of reasons including degradation,
contamination, or failure of some aspect of the protocol. Various
parts of the analysis might then be repeated with the same or a
different sample, to obtain a more conclusive result; or
3) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the
same source (inclusion).33 In such a case, the samples are found
to be similar, the analyst proceeds to determine the statistical
significance of the Similarity.34
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should
consider, among others things, the following data: how the samples were
collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the
samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the
proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests,
and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, the bloodstains taken from the clothing of the victim
and of accused-appellant, the smears taken from the victim as well as the
strands of hair and nails taken from her tested negative for the presence of
human DNA,35 because, as Ms. Viloria-Magsipoc explained:
"PROSECUTOR LU:
Q: I noticed that specimens 1 to 5 consisting of bloodstains
taken from the clothing of the victim and of the accused gave
negative results for the presence of human DNA. Why is it so?
What is the reason for this when there are still bloodstains on the
clothing?
A: After this Honorable Court issued an Order for DNA
analysis, serological methods were already conducted on the said
specimens. And upon inquiry from Mr. Buan and as far as he also
knew of this case, and we also interviewed the mother who came
over to the laboratory one time on how was the state of the
specimens when they were found out. We found that these
specimens were soaked in smirchy water before they were
submitted to the laboratory. The state of the specimens prior to
the DNA analysis could have hampered the preservation of any
DNA that could have been there before. So when serological
methods were done on these specimens, Mr. Byron could have
taken such portion or stains that were only amenable for
serological method and were not enough for DNA analysis already.
So negative results were found on the clothings that were
submitted which were specimens no. 1 to 5 in my report, Sir.
Q: I also noticed that specimen no. 6-B consisting of the
smears taken from the victim also proved negative for human
DNA, why is it so?
A: Because when we received the vaginal smears submitted
by Dr. Vertido, the smear on the slide was very, very dry and could
have chipped off. I already informed Dr. Vertido about it and he
confirmed the state of the specimen. And I told him that maybe it
would be the swab that could help us in this case, Sir. And so
upon examination, the smears geared negative results and the
swabs gave positive results, Sir.
Q: How about specimen no. 7, the hair and nails taken from
the victim, why did they show negative results for DNA?
A: The hair samples were cut hair. This means that the hair
did not contain any root. So any hair that is above the skin or the
epidermis of one's skin would give negative results as the hair
shaft is negative for DNA. And then the nails did not contain any
subcutaneous cells that would be amenable for DNA analysis also,
Sir.
Q: So it's the inadequacy of the specimens that were the
reason for this negative result, not the inadequacy of the
examination or the instruments used?
A: Yes, Sir."
Thus, it is the inadequacy of the specimens submitted for examination,
and not the possibility that the samples had been contaminated, which
accounted for the negative results of their examination. But the vaginal
swabs taken from the victim yielded positive for the presence of human
DNA. Upon analysis by the experts, they showed the DNA profile of
accused-appellant:36
"PROSECUTOR LU:
Q: So based on your findings, can we say conclusively that
the DNA profile of the accused in this case was found in the
vaginal swabs taken from the victim?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: That is very definite and conclusive?
A: Yes, Sir."
In conclusion, we hold that the totality of the evidence points to no other
conclusion than that accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged.
Evidence is weighed not counted. When facts or circumstances which are
proved are not only consistent with the guilt of the accused but also
inconsistent with his innocence, such evidence, in its weight and probative
force, may surpass direct evidence in its effect upon the court.37 This is
how it is in this case.
Second. Accused-appellant challenges the validity of the oral and written
confessions presented as evidence against him. He alleges that the oral
confessions were inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay, while the
extrajudicial confessions were obtained through force and intimidation.
The claim is untenable. Section 12 of Art. III of the Constitution provides
in pertinent parts:
"(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
"(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other
means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms
of detention are prohibited.
"(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 shall be inadmissible in evidence against him."
There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this
constitutional provision: (1) coerced confessions, the product of third
degree methods such as torture, force, violence, threat, and intimidation,
which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of Section 12, and (2) uncounselled
statements, given without the benefit of Miranda warnings, which are the
subject of paragraph 1 of the same section.38
Accused-appellant argues that the oral confessions given to Mayor Abutan
of Rosario, Cavite and to NBI Forensic Biologist should be deemed
inadmissible for being violative of his constitutional rights as these were
made by one already under custodial investigation to persons in authority
without the presence of counsel. With respect to the oral confessions, Atty.
Leyva testified:39
"PROSECUTOR LU:
Q: Upon meeting this Gerrico Vallejo at the police station
were you able to confer with him?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Did you ask him whether he really wants you to represent
or assist him as a lawyer during that investigation?
A: I did, as a matter of fact, I asked him whether he would
like me to represent him in that investigation, Sir.
 Q: And what was his answer? A: I told him that, as a matter of fact, and I also told him to
tell the truth and nothing but the truth."
A: He said "yes".
The testimony of Atty. Leyva is not only corroborated by the testimony of
Q: After agreeing to retain you as his counsel, what else did Mayor Renato Abutan,41 it is also confirmed by accused-appellant who
you talk about? testified as follows:42

A: I told him that in the investigation, whatever he will state "ATTY. ESPIRITU:
may be used against him, so it's a sort of discouraging him from
making any statement to the police, Sir." Q: Did Atty. Leyva explain to you the meaning and
significance of that document which you are supposed to have
Upon cross-examination, Atty. Leyva testified as follows:40 executed and signed?

Q: You stated that you personally read this recital of the A: Yes, Sir.
constitutional rights of the accused?
Q: What did Atty. Leyva tell you?
A: Yes, Sir.
A: That they are allowing me to exercise my constitutional
Q: But it will appear in this recital of constitutional rights right to reveal or narrate all what I know about this case, Sir.
that you did not inform the accused that the statement that he
will be giving might be used against him in a court of justice? Q: Did Atty. Leyva tell you that if you do not want, nobody
can force you to give that statement?
A: I did that, Sir.
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: But it does not appear in this statement?
Q: And did he tell you that what you would be giving is an
PROSECUTOR LU extra-judicial confession?

The best evidence will be the statement, your Honor. A: Yes, Sir."

ATTY ESPIRITU Clearly, accused-appellant cannot now claim that he was not apprised of
the consequences of the statements he was to make as well as the written
The only thing that is stated here is that "Maaaring gamitin pabor confessions he was to execute. Neither can he question the qualifications
o laban sa iyo." of Atty. Lupo Leyva who acted as his counsel during the investigation. To
be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being
COURT
propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop
Let the witness answer. an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him but, rather,
it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as
would lead the accused to admit something false. Indeed, counsel should A: He had been silent for a minute. Then we talked about the
not prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.43 incident, Sir.

Indeed, accused-appellant admitted that he was first asked whether he Q: And what exactly did he tell you about the incident?
wanted the services of Atty. Leyva before the latter acted as his defense
counsel.44 And counsel who is provided by the investigators is deemed A: I asked him, "Were you under the influence of drugs at
engaged by the accused where the latter never raised any objection against that time"?
the former's appointment during the course of the investigation but, on the
contrary, thereafter subscribed to the veracity of his statement before the Q: What else did he tell you?
swearing officer.45 Contrary to the assertions of accused-appellant, Atty.
A: I told him, "What reason pushed you to do that thing?" x x
Leyva was not the municipal attorney of Rosario, Cavite but only a legal
x
adviser of Mayor Renato Abutan.46
Q: Please tell us in tagalog, the exact words that the accused
Accused-appellant contends that the rulings in People vs. Andan47 and
used in telling you what happened.
People vs. Mantung48 do not apply to this case. We disagree. The facts of
these cases and that of the case at bar are similar. In all these cases, the A: He told me that he saw the child as if she was headless at
accused made extrajudicial confessions to the municipal mayor freely and that time. That is why he strangled the child, Sir. ("Ang sabi niya
voluntarily. In all of them, the extrajudicial confessions were held po sa 'kin, nakita niya raw 'yung bata na parang walang ulo na
admissible in evidence, being the spontaneous, free, and voluntary naglalakad. Kaya po sinakal niya.")
admissions of the guilt of the accused. We note further that the testimony
of Mayor Abutan was never objected to by the defense. xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, the mayor's questions to accused-appellant were not in the nature COURT:
of an interrogation, but rather an act of benevolence by a leader seeking to
help one of his constituents. Thus, Mayor Abutan testified:49 Q: When you told the accused that you will help him, what
kind of help were you thinking at that time?
"PROSECUTOR LU:
A: I told him that if he will tell the truth, I could help give him
Q: And during the conversation you had with Accused legal counsel.
Gerrico Vallejo, what exactly did he tell you?
Q: And what was the answer of the accused?
A: At first he said that he did not do that. That was the first
thing he told me. Then I told him that I will not be able to help him A: Yes, he will tell me the truth, Your Honor."
if he will not tell me the truth.
In People vs. Mantung,50 this Court said:
Q: And what was the reply of the accused?
"Never was it raised during the trial that Mantung's admission
during the press conference was coerced or made under duress.
 As the records show, accused-appellant voluntarily made the Q: What was the subject of your conversation with him?
statements in response to Mayor Marquez' question as to whether
he killed the pawnshop employees. Mantung answered in the A: It is customary when we examine the accused. During the
affirmative and even proceeded to explain that he killed the examination, we talk to them for me to add knowledge on the case,
victims because they made him eat pork. These circumstances Sir.
hardly indicate that Mantung felt compelled to own up to the
crime. Besides, he could have chosen to remain silent or to do Q: What did you talk about during your conversation?
deny altogether any participation in the robbery and killings but
A: I asked him if he was the one who did the killing on this
he did not; thus accused-appellant sealed his own fate. As held in
victim, Daisy Diolola, Sir.
People v. Montiero, a confession constitutes evidence of high order
since it is supported by the strong presumption that no person of Q: And what was the reply of the accused?
normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime
unless prompted by truth and his conscience." A: He said yes, Sir.

And in People vs. Andan, it was explained: Q: What else did you ask the accused?

"Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on A: I remember that while asking him, he was crying as if
custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, feeling remorse on the killing, Sir.
not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an
ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having ....
committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the
compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The Q: And it was you who initiated the conversation?
rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest
A: Yes, Sir.
use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit
something false, not prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling
Q: Do you usually do that?
the truth."51
A: Yes, Sir. We usually do that.
For the same reason, the oral confession made by accused-appellant to
NBI Forensic Biologist Pet Byron Buan is admissible. Accused-appellant Q: Is that part of your procedure?
would have this Court exclude this confession on the ground that it was
uncounselled and that Mr. Buan, who initiated the conversation with A: It is not SOP. But for me alone, I want to know more about
accused-appellant, was part of the NBI. The issue concerning the the case, Sir. And any information either on the victim or from the
sufficiency of the assistance given by Atty. Leyva has already been suspect will help me personally. It's not an SOP, Sir."
discussed. On the other hand, the questions put by Mr. Buan to accused-
appellant were asked out of mere personal curiosity and clearly not as part The confession, thus, can be likened to one freely and voluntarily given to
of his tasks. As Buan testified:52 an ordinary individual and is, therefore, admissible as evidence.

"PROSECUTOR LU:
Third. The admissibility of the extrajudicial confessions of accused- Q: How many were they inside that room?
appellant is also attacked on the ground that these were extracted from
him by means of torture, beatings, and threats to his life. The bare A: Five, Sir.
assertions of maltreatment by the police authorities in extracting
confessions from the accused are not sufficient. The standing rule is that Q: They are all policemen?
"where the defendants did not present evidence of compulsion, or duress
A: Yes, Sir.
nor violence on their person; where they failed to complain to the officer
who administered their oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or xxx xxx xxx
administrative action against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment;
where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies; and Q: Until what time did they keep you inside that room?
where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to
buttress their claim," all these will be considered as indicating A: Up to 11:00 in the evening, Sir.
voluntariness.53 Indeed, extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be
voluntary, and, in the absence of conclusive evidence showing that the Q: Between 10:30 in the morning up to 11:00 o'clock in the
declarant's consent in executing the same has been vitiated, the evening, what did you do there?
confession will be sustained.54
A: They were interrogating and forcing me to admit
Accused-appellant's claim that he was tortured and subjected to beatings something, Sir.
by policemen in order to extract the said confession from him is
Q: In what way did they force you to admit something?
unsupported by any proof:55
A: They were mauling me, Sir.
"ATTY. ESPIRITU:
Q: The 5 of them?
Q: Did they further interrogate you?
A: Yes, Sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: The 5 of them remained inside that room with you
Q: What else did they ask you?
throughout the questioning?
A: They were asking me the project, Sir.
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: What else?
Q: In what way did they hurt you?
A: That is the only thing, Sir.
A: They burned my private part with a lighted cigarette butt
Q: Who was doing the questioning? and pierced me with a needle, Sir.

A: The investigator, Sir. Q: Who did these things to you?

A: Mercado, Sir. These bare assertions cannot be given weight. Accused-appellant testified
that he was made to stay in the municipal hall from 10:00 o'clock in the
Q: Who is this Mercado? morning until 11:00 o'clock that night of July 10, 1999, during which time
he was boxed, tortured, and hit with a piece of wood by policemen to make
A: EPZA policemen, Sir. him admit to the crime. However, accused-appellant was physically
examined by Dr. Antonio Vertido at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of
Q: Did the other policemen help in doing these things to you?
the same day. While the results show that accused-appellant did sustain
A: No, Sir. injuries, the same are incompatible with his claim of torture. As Dr.
Vertido testified:56
Q: Were you asked to undress or you were forced to do that?
"PROSECUTOR LU:
A: They forced me to remove my clothes, Sir.
Q: What were your findings when you conducted the physical
Q: In what way did they force you to remove your clothes? examination of the suspect?

A: They were asking me to take off the pants which I was A: I found abrasions, your Honor, abrasions on the thigh,
wearing at the time, Sir. knees, legs and feet of the suspect, and I also found hematoma on
the left ring finger, posterior aspect and at the same time, a
Q: Did they do anything to you to force you to remove your laceration on the left ring finger.
pants?
xxx xxx xxx
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: In your findings, it appears that the accused in this case
Q: What? suffered certain physical injuries on his person like this abrasion
on the thigh, right anterior lateral aspect lower third of the knee,
A: They boxed me, Sir. what could have caused this injury?

Q: What else, if any? A: Abrasions are usually caused when the skin comes in
contact with a rough surface, Sir. Hematoma are usually caused
A: They hit me with a piece of wood, Sir.
by a blunt instrument or object and laceration is the forcible
contact of the skin from that blunt object.
Q: What did you feel when your private part was burned with
a cigarette butt?
Q: I am particularly interested in your findings hematoma on
the left ring finger, posterior aspect and laceration left ring finger
A: It was painful, Sir.
posterior aspect, what could have caused those injuries on the
Q: In what part of your body were you pricked by a needle? accused?

A: At my private part, Sir."

 A: My opinion to these hematoma and laceration found on penalty of DEATH and directing him to indemnify the heirs of the victim in
the said left ring finger was that it was caused by a bite, Sir." the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral
damages, is hereby AFFIRMED.
If the account of accused-appellant that he was beaten up is true, Dr.
Antonio Vertido would have found more than mere abrasions and In accordance with Section 25 of R.A. 7659, amending Art. 83 of the
hematoma on his left finger. Dr. Vertido's findings are more consistent Revised Penal Code, upon the finality of this decision, let the records of
with the theory that accused-appellant sustained physical injuries as a this case be forthwith forwarded to the President of the Philippines for the
result of the struggle made by the victim during the commission of the possible exercise of the pardoning power.
rape in the "compuerta."
SO ORDERED.
At all events, even if accused-appellant was truthful and his assailed
confessions are inadmissible, the circumstantial evidence, as already
shown, is sufficient to establish his guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. The
prosecution witnesses presented a mosaic of circumstances showing
accused-appellant's guilt. Their testimonies rule out the possibility that
the crime was the handiwork of some other evil mind. These witnesses
have not been shown to have been motivated by ill will against accused-
appellant.

On the other hand, no other witness not related to accused-appellant was

ever called to corroborate his claim. The defense presented only accused-
appellant's sister, Aimee Vallejo, to corroborate his story. We have held
time and again that alibi cannot prosper if it is established mainly by the
accused and his relatives, and not by credible persons.57 It is well settled
that alibi is the weakest of all defenses as it is easy to contrive and difficult
to disprove. For this reason, this Court looks with caution upon the
defense of alibi, especially when, as in this case, it is corroborated only by
relatives or friends of the accused.58

Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code provides that "When by reason or
on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
death."59 Therefore, no other penalty can be imposed on accused-
appellant.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the decision of

the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City, finding accused-
appellant Gerrico Vallejo y Samartino GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentencing him to the supreme