GERMAN SCHNELLBOOTE (E-Boats) by Dr. G. Hiimmelchen 50p/$2-00Editorially Speaking s*% 9272! a"engement copies fromthe builders, and additional material supplied by the Bundesarchiv, Freiburg. We are, {as usual, indebted to Dr Jurgen. Rohwer of the Bibliothek fur Zeitgeschichte, Stuttgart for The German Schneliboot or ‘S-Boat was known to the British as the E-Boat, Although initially their hunting ground was the English Channel and the North Sea as the War progressed the S-Boat photographs. {lotillas were sent to the Baltic, the Black Seaand the Mediterranean, The Author and this Profile touches on all the ‘operational theatres. ‘The S-Boat proved avery tough opponent in battle, andits main adversaries, British MTBs (see Profile No 7) could not claim to match it for firepower until latein the war. With its diesel engines it was less liable to catch fire than the petrol-engined boats used by the Americans and British, andits size made for weatherliness. One mystery remains : the origin of the common British term for these craft, 'E-Boats’. The traditional interpretation is Enemy War Motorboat’, but on examination this phrase has an amateurish, journalistic ring to it. Furthermore itis unlikely that such a description ever originated in the British Admiralty, which normally copied German designations such as U-Boat, R-Boat and F-Lighter. From British sources we have compiled a technical appendix to the main text which gives a far more likely explanation of the term. Stop Press Dr Gerhard Hiimmelchen is the director of the Arbeitskreis fiir Wehrforschung (War Studies Centre) in Stuttgart, and has spent many years on studying the operations of S-Boatsin all theatres. He is at present ‘compiling afull history of the technical development of the type anda detailed analysis of their operations. Heis the author of Handelsstorer andthe Seekriegsatlas Mittelmeer 1940-3 and has collaborated with Dr Rohweronanavalchronologyof Emden. World War Il, apart from writing numerous articles. He served in the Luftwaffe from 1943 to 1945 and studied History, History of Art and Germanistics at the Universities of Heidelberg and Tubingen. Two readers, Mr J. Smith of Hove and Mr John Hill of Loughton have written into point outa discrepancy in the centre-spread of Profile No 24—Emden. The plan shows the forecastle deck ending boats could not have been supported and secured solely by davits, andin fact the photographs taken aboard Emden after her destruction show these skid- beams clearly. We apologise for these errors. Mr Gibbons of Hockley has criticised the same Profile for not making more of the revelation that Emden had side-armour protection. All previous authorities, including Dr Groner, described her ashaving only a protective deck, but the official German records at Freiburg show thatthe machinery spaces were protected by 80-1 00mm plating This was not true armour but additional plating bolted to the shell-plating, much asin the British Chatham and Arethusa classes which followed the ‘Areader has sent in the intriguing photograph shown below, Location and identification of the ships are wanted, but the motor launches in the foreground look brand new, and are probably freshly delivered from Canada minus armament. My guessis that the icebreaker is the Alexander ex- Russian Aleksander Nevski in 1917 or 1918, but the Devonshire class cruiser is a mystery. abreast of the foremost funnel, The artwork by David Warner is very impressive, andis the most detailed large-scale colour reference which has appeared so far, The colour-scheme comes from a wartime colour photograph, butunfortunately we could not identify the individual S-Boat Any information on S-Boat insignia would be welcome. The reference for the drawing isa Your next Warship Prot No 34 Gato Class Submai USS Barb (SS.220) ‘This Profile describes the Gato class, one of the two A further point raisedis that the skid-beams under the boats have been omitted. Obviously these whereas the profile view shows a row of scuttles running back almost to the second funnel. As scuttles indicate an enclosed space this means that the planked deck must have reached further back than shown onthe plan. highly successful submarine types developed for the Pacific war by the US Navy. In the hands of skilled submariners American wolf-pack tactics achieved successes which demonstrate vividly what would have happened to the Anglo-American alliance if German U-boats had triumphed in the Battle of the Atlantic. Barb sank over 90,000 tons of shipping, and became the first submarine in history to launch rockets. The author is William H. Cracknell, a Commander inthe USN and an active cartier pilot. He is the author of four previous Profiles.The s neliboot German Schnellboote (E-Boats) by Dr. G. Hummelchen Schneliboote development up to 1939 The heavy restrictions imposed by the Versailles Treaty of 1919 on the German navy afloat, together with certain experiences gained in the operational employment of small, fast motor-torpedoboats gave rise to the idea of developing this weapon further. In the early stages, the lack of funds did not permit of this and in the first years of the Republic, the navy had to make do with a few boats dating from World War |. These small, round-bilge boats however were of very limited use. Short-ranged and with little freeboard, they could be operated only in calm seas, It was not until the end of the 1920's that two new fast boats of the Thomycroft type could be afforded, for experimental purposes. Both were built in 1928, the Narwal UZ(S).18 at the Caspar Yard in Travemiinde and the so-called K-boat UZ(S).12 by Abeking & Rasmussen at Lemwerder. Both turned ‘out to be total failures. Just as with the previous boats, their sea-keeping qualities left much to be desired, and they were discarded on 31 March 1931 These experiences influenced the Naval Staff to revert to the round-bilge boat and, in collaboration with the Lurssen Yard in Bremen-Vegesack, to develop a new type of S-Boat. Liirssen had already succeeded in accumulating considerable experience in the construction of fast motor-cruisers for sport purposes and in 1929 built the first deep-sea S- Boat which, for reasons of secrecy was commissioned on 7 August 1930 as UZ(S).16, a designation that was changed on 31 March 1931 to W.7 (W=Wachboot= Guard-boat). It displaced 39 tons, had an overall length of 29 metres, beam 4-5 metres and draught 1-6 metres. Three Daimler petrol engines each of 900hp gave the boat a speed of 32 knots, Armament consisted of two torpedo-tubes forward, one 20mm AA gun and one machine-gun, W.1, known as S.7 since 16 March 1932, underwent various modifica- tions resulting from exhaustive trials. In the first instance an enclosed wheelhouse replaced the open steering position. It was obvious that the petrol- driven engines constituted an ever-present fire and explosion hazard and this notwithstanding the efforts to improve safety through the installation of an Ardex fire-extinguishing system. At this time there was no serviceable diesel engine with the necessary power and it was only now that the Maschinen fabrik Augsburg-Nurnberg (MAN) and Daimler. Benz in Stuttgart were given contracts for the development of such motors. Making full use of experience gained with $.7 under the command of Oberleutnant Ewerth, 183Lurssen in 1932 built four more S-boats—S.2, S.3, $.4 and $.5—with similar dimensions but having a somewhat heavier displacement (45 tons). These boats too, were of mahogany/light metal composite construction, with an inner lining of white cedar, and with the engines anchored to a steel base-plate. The power still had to come from Daimler-Benz 12 cylinder 4-cycle Otto engines (3 x950hp) producing a speed of 34-35 knots. One important new feature was the incorporation of a 100hp engine of the Maybach S.5 type, which was coupled to the centre shaft, This increased the endurance and, with main engines switched off, could provide a silent-running speed of 6 knots. A light-weight signal mast abatt the wheelhouse for radio antenna and night signal lamps had the added advantage of facilitating night operating in groups. Improvements were also introduced for the crews (1 Officer and 11-13 ratings) including hot water radiators for living quarters, wheelhouse and engine compartments. This of course ensured that the boats could operate all the year round. The new boats formed the 1st S-Boat Half-Flotilla which was led by Kapitan leutnant Erich Bey. The COs were Oberleutnants Hans Eckermann (5.2), Hans-Rudolf Résing (S.3). Fuhrke (S.4) and Karl Stockmann (S.5). The first boat to be fitted with the three newly- developed MAN-diesel engines of the Type L7 (T-cylinder 4-cycle) each with a maximum of 1320hp, was S.6. launched in 1933. But because these diesels had turned out to be much heavier than originally intended, $.6 was unable to attain the anticipated speed, and the 80-ton boat's top speed was only 32 knots. In the practical employment of the boats so far built, it soon emerged that when proceeding at little more than moderate speeds in bad weather the bows dipped deep, causing considerable seas to break over. In an effort to overcome this disadvantage S.2 ‘was given a new bow with a knuckle. This modifica tion improved the sea-keeping qualities and so this new bow-form was adopted for the next series, 5.7 toS.13. S.7t0 S.9 were also fitted with three of the above. AAneliboot $1, faunched in 1929 and commission S.1 until 16 March 1992 known asW.1.andnot known a: 184 7 4u mentioned MAN-diesel engines, each with a maximum of 1320hp. On the other hand, $.70 to $.13 were the first to be fitted with the newly developed Daimler-Benz 16-cylinder diesels, Type MB 502 and also with a maximum of 1320hp. The new series displaced 78 tons, had an overall length of 32:4 metres, beam 4:9 metres and draught 1-7 metres. The armament was still two torpedo-tubes and two torpedoes in reserve and a 20mm AA gun for which 3000 rounds of ammunition were carried. In all they were exactly the same as the earlier boats, except that the crew was now 16-20. The increase in new boats meant that in 1936 the Half-Flotilla could become the 1st S-Boat Flotilla. From 1 October 1934 the leader was Korvettenkapitan Gunther Schubert, who was relieved by Korvettenkapitin Heinz~ Dietrich von Conrady on 1 October 1936. The old boats S.7 to S.5 were taken out of service on 10 December 1936 and later sold to Spain. (On 26 September 1934, Tsingtau (1980 tons), a modern depot-ship, was commissioned and assigned tothe 1stS-Flotilla in place of the old tender Nordsee which had been serving as accommodation- and depot-ship. As a further development of the L7 engine, MAN had meanwhile produced a new, more powerful engine, the 11-cylinder diesel L11, with a maximum of 2000hp. This was fitted in the next series $.14 to ‘S.17, which were launched in 1936/37 and com: missioned between 12.6.1936 and 18.3.1938, These boats had a displacement of 97 tons, an overall length of 34:62 metres, beam 5-26 metres and draught 1-67 metres. They reached a speed of 37 knots and were thus 2 knots faster than S.10-S.13. Whereas the Daimler-Benz V engines in S.70 to .13 functioned faultlessly even in heavy seas, the new MAN diesels were a disappointment. The long engines positioned in tandem proved to have inadequate resistance to vibration and, being narrow at the base and standing very high, put too great a strain on the steel base-plates of the lightly-built craft, Fractures as well as breakdowns occurred, and ‘even when the base-plates were strengthened, this brought little improvement and in the end the Naval 1930 a8 U2(S).16. From 31 March 1931 she was‘Schneliboot S.4. which came into service on 20.June 1932 Below : The Sehn S.6andS.8 (BIZ) (812) /oo0t Flotila in the autumn of 1934 wath its new tender, the Tsingtau. The boats seen are $.1, $.3,$.5 Staff had to decide against fitting any more boats with the MAN engines. Inthe meantime Daimler-Benz had also developed ‘a 2000hp engine, the 20-cylinder V-form diesel MB501. This was destined to prove a great success in the next series, 5.78 to S.25, and was ultimately adopted as the standard S-Boat engine. This series has the same dimension as. 14 to S.17, but because ‘of a much wider use of light metals and plywood linings, the boats had become even lighter. With a displacement of 85 tons the boats attained 39:5 knots. $.78 was commissioned in July 1938, $.79 in October and S.27 in December 1938, $.20 followed in March 1939, 5.22 in May and S.23, the last boat before the outbreak of war, in July 1939. From August 1938, a second S-Boat Flotilla was formed in Wilhelmshaven, under the command of Kapitin- leutnant Rudolf Petersen, formerly CO of S.9.S0atfullspeed (B12)Initially 5.6 to $.9 and S.1410 S.17 were allocated to this flotilla. $.70 to $.73, S.18 and $.19 comprised the 1st Flotilla, which had been taken over on 1 June 1938 by Kapitanleutnant Kurt Sturm, formerly CO of S7. In all the peace-time exercises it had emerged that the one method of attack which promised most success for the S-Boats was the night attack. In spite of the underwater exhaust, the engine noise from an approaching S-Boat force could be heard from a considerable distance. The only way in which a night undetected approach could be made was by using the silent-running motor. This method was employed later with considerable success in World War I in operations against convoys proceeding on fixed routes. Night exercises showed that an off-white paint was the boats’ best camouflage. Even on a dark night, especially with a phosphorescent sea, the grey-white boats were barely discernible, Intensive night manoeuvres were exercised, being absolutely essential, for the simple reason that any Asideview of S.10 (BIZ) misunderstanding or lack of attention in the handling Of such fast, manoeuvrable boats in close formation would lead to collisions. Later on during the war, collisions very often occurred and on most occasions it was because of the inadequate experience of young, newly appointed COs, Performance and endurance of S-Boat crews were evaluated in peace-time in long, non-stop voyages taking the boats to the full extent of their range. The first of these was in May 1937 when an endurance trial was carried out at the moderate ctuising speed of 25 knots from Heligoland round The Skaw to Kiel. The Daimler-Benz boats $.70 to 5.13 completed the 500 mile trip with no trouble, but some of the boats fitted with the MAN-engines suffered considerable delay due to engine trouble, some even breaking down entirely, On the next voyage, in July 1937, from Cuxhaven to limuiden all the boats—S.8to S.15—did extremely well to make headway in a northwest wind at times reaching Force 7-8, and correspondingly high seas, However, the distance here was only 250 miles— half that of the previous trip. A third long-distance voyage was made in May 1938 from Sassnitz round The Skaw into the North Sea. One of the objects of this trip was to test the performance of S.16 and S.17, which had newly joined the flotilla. The boats put out from Sassnitz in the morning and that night reached the North Sea off Horns Reet. Once again the boats had no difficulty in maintaining a cruising speed of 26 knots, On the last stretch towards Heligoland the flotilla ran into rough seas, quite contrary to the weather that had been forecast. The CO of S.17 reported that his boat was taking the seas badly and that the longitudinal frame appeared to be giving way. The flotilla thereupon turned about and, running before the heavy sea, sought shelter in a bay off The Skaw. After taking on fuel from Tsingtau, the boats made for Kiel. Once again they had been at sea for around 24 hours and had covered about 550 miles. It turned out that in $.17 the two lower longitudinal beams had in fact given way at the engine-room bulkhead and because of the head sea the upper bow section had been forced upwards. From then on, the forward longitudinal beams on all boats were made of steel S-Boats in World War Il First Operations 1939 On the outbreak of World War II, the German navy had only 18 S-Boats, forming two flotillas. An additional boat, 5.24, joined them on 18 September 1939, The 1st Flotilla under the command of Kapitan- leutnant Sturm was based at Kiel and at the end of August 1939 proceeded into the Baltic where, from 1 September 1939, it was assigned to patrol in the Gulf of Danzig. It was here that in the first minutes after hostilities were opened the flotilla achieved its first, if modest, success. In position 54°35'N, 19°08'E, $.23 under Oberleutnant Christiansen used the 20mm gun to sink the small Polish barrage pilot vessel, the former trawler Lfoyd Bydgoski, after giving the crew time to take to the boats, ‘The 2nd S-Flotilla, under Kapiténleutnant Petersen, operated from 3 September 1939 in the North Sea, using Heligoland as a base. The flotilla comprised $.10 to $.13 and S.15 to S.17. In the first sortie, on 3 September 1939, 5.17 sustained severe damage from the seas that were encountered and had to be paid off. She was one of those boats fitted with the MAN-diesels, whose unreliable qualities have 187already been mentioned. Only fourteen days previously this boat, whose CO was Oberleutnant Claus Schultze-Jena, had had to be taken into dock when trouble with the centre shaft had reduced her speed to 24 knots. In October 1939, the 1st S-Flotilla together with the depot-ship 7singtau moved from the Baltic to the North Sea, where it was joined by the new boat $.24 which had just completed trials. The bad weather and the early, hard winter ruled out large-scale S-Boat operations, so that on 29 November, the 1st Flotilla comprising Tsingtau, S.18 to 5.21, $.23 and S.24 returned to Kiel where on 1 December, Kapitinleutnant Heinz Birnbacher assumed com- mand of the flotilla Norway 1940 The next opportunity to employ S-Boats came in the 'Weseruibung’ operation, namely the occupation of Denmark and Norway by the German Wehrmacht. The 1st S-Boat Flotilla consisting of five boats— $.19, 21, 22, 23, 24—was assigned to the Naval Task Force Ill, which was to occupy Bergen. The task of the 2nd Flotilla—S.7, 8, 17, 30, 31, 32 and 33: was to assist the Naval Task Force IV in taking Kristiansand (On the evening of 8 April, $.27 and S.19 collided in fog and $.19, which was entirely out of action, had to receive assistance from torpedoboat Wolf. This reduced the Bergen group to four operational boats. Following the successful landing in Norway, the S-Boats were employed in reconnoitring the numerous fjords and it was in the course of this that, the boats of the 1st Flotilla were several times in action. On 19 April, in Hardanger Fjord they sank the Norwegian torpedoboat Sae/. On 25 April, while stopping merchant shipping for examination, the boats of the 1st Flotilla came under heavy machine- ‘gun fire off Ulvik. Every one of the boats was hit and the flotilla leader, two COs and other crew members were wounded, while one boat had to be temporarily paid off, S-Boats took part in the seizure of a number of Norwegian ships, as for ‘example the old minelayer Uiler Western Area 1940/41 The German S-Boats had to face their first big test as an effective weapon, in the Channel and off the Dutch coast, when the German offensive in the West began in May 1940. On the night of 9/10 May, 5.30, 31, 32, and 33 of the 2nd Flotilla encountered a British force of cruisers and destroyers of the Home Fleet out searching for German minelayers. $.30 and $.32 had to withdraw in the face of heavy gunfire and $.33 lost part of her forecastle in a collision with a British destroyer. Only $.37, under Oberleutnant Hermann Opdenhoff, managed to cary out an attack in which she torpedoed the destroyer Kelly. Although seriously damaged and very low in the water, Kelly was under tow for 91 hours and was successfully brought into the Tyne. The Germans presumed her to have been sunk, (On 21 May, German S-Boat sank the British Mine Destructor vessel Corburn (1786grt) off Le Havre. Two days later the 1st Flotilla achieved a first success against the S-Boat's worst enemy, the 158 destroyer, when $.23 (Oberleutnant GeorgChristian sen) and $21 (Oberleutnant Gotz von Mirbach) sank the French destroyer Jaguar off Malo les Bains. After actions with the Dutch submarine 0.73 and the British destroyer Vega off the Belgian coast on 26 May, the Germans officially—but wrongly— Claimed the sinking of both. A few days later, on 29 May, $.30 (Oberleutnant Wilhelm Zimmermann) of the 2nd Flotilla torpedoed and sank the British destroyer Wakefu/ off Nieuport. On the following day $.24 (Oberleutnant Hans Detlefsen) succeeded in torpedoing the French destroyer Cyclone off Dunkirk. Although minus her bows, Cyclone reached Dover under her own steam and from there proceeded to Brest, only to fall into German hands while in dock on 18 June. On 30 May, $.23 and $26 (Oberleutnant Kurt Fimmen) of the 1st Flotilla scored two torpedo-hits to sink Sirocco, a sister ship of Cyclone, in the Channel. The first successful S-Boat sortie to the English East Coast was on the night of 19/20 June 1940. Shortly after midnight $.19 and S.26 sank the British freighter Roseburn (3103grt) off Dungeness with torpedo and 20mm gunfire. This was the first of the numerous operations destined to be carried out in the months and years ahead, bringing many successes as well as heavy losses, The first S-Boat to be lost was on 21 June 1940 when S.32 detonated a mine in the Channel south of Dungeness. The CO and six ratings went down with her, the survivors being picked up by S.37 and $.35. At the end of that month $.27 sank off Boulogne but she was raised and back in service by July 1940. On the night of 23/24 June, S-Boats were again operating off Dungeness and here $.79 (Ober- leutnant Werner Toniges) and $.36 (Oberleutnant Dietrich Babbel) sank the British tanker Albuera (3477g1t) and the small coaster Kingfisher (276qrt) In July 1940, S-Boats made their first sortie to the South Coast. On 4 July, convoy AO 178 was the target for attacks south of Portland, by the 1st S-Flotilla operating out of Cherbourg. 5.24, 79, 20, 26 were involved, sinking the freighter Elmcrest (4343grt) and scoring torpedo-hits on two more ships totalling 12,472grt. And again south of Portland $.27 (Oberleutnant Bernd Klug) on 25 July sank the French passenger ship Meknés (6127grt) This was a tragic occurrence, since the ship was carrying French soldiers on their way back to France ; the ship's movements had not been notified to the German High Command. On 26 July the 1st Flotilla managed to sink three ships out of Convoy CWB, which had already been mauled by German dive-bombers, On the night of 7/8 August, the next convoy—CW9-—also lost three ships to the 1st Flotilla. In this action S.27 and S.27 suffered some wounded from the enemy gunfire. On 12 July 1940, the 1st Flotilla lost $.23, which was mined north of Calais, The 2nd Flotilla lost 5.37 east of Orfordness on 12 October 1940, also a mine casualty, ‘Successful sorties against convoys on the English ree views of $-Boats: top, centre and bottom, S 8.19 and 8.22 (BIZ)South and Southeast Coast, continued up to winter 1940/41. On 19 November 1940, two MGBs of the 6th MGB flotilla (Lt-Cdr R. P. Hitchens) encountered two German $-Boats, which had collided in the Thames Estuary. One of the boats, 5.38, was abandoned and was boarded by the British, but she sank soon afterwards. During 1940, German S-Boats in the Western theatre succeeded in sinking 41 Mine Destructor Vessel Steamers 28 Marchant shi (48.8389) From summer 1940 onwards a total of three S-Boat flotillas were operating in the west, a 3rd Flotilla having been formed at Kiel on 15 May 1940. Its first CO was Oberleutnant Toniges, who had been relieved at the end of May by Kapitanleutnant Friedrich Kemnade, As new boats came into service —20 were commissioned in 1940 making a total of 25 from the outbreak of war—it became possible to withdraw the older boats that were liable to break down and use them for training purposes. However, ‘the total number of operational boats was even now too small to have anything more than a nuisance value against the British convoy traffic on the east and south coast of England. Nevertheless the boats ‘were kept busy carrying out numerous minelaying ‘operations, with each boat loading up to eight mines on her after deck. ‘On 1 October 1940 new boats being commis: sioned went to forma 4th Flotilla under the command of Kapitanleutnant Niels Batge. But it was 1941 before the boats became fully operational. In the first six months of 1941, the four flotillas began to be active in the areas off Southwold, Cromer, Smith’s Knoll, Lowestoft, Great Yarmouth etc. On occasions there were reports of the sinking of British destroyer, as well as merchant ships, the tonnage of which were for the most part exaggerated. In fact, during this period the Royal Navy lost only one destroyer, HMS Exmoor, sunk on 26 February 1941 by S.30 (Oberleutnant Klaus Feldt) in position 52° 32'N, 02° OB'E. In addition to this, in the first One of the older series boatsatfullspeed (B12) ett; 5 tr 160 half of 1941 the S-Boats sank a total of 16 merchant ships with an aggregate tonnage of 28,614grt off the south and east coast of England. Preparations for the German attack on the Soviet Union necessitated a reduction in the S-Boat strength in the west. On 1 April 1941 a 6th Flotilla was formed under the command of Kapitanleutnant Albrecht Obermaier, but initially this comprised no more than a few old boats, and it was not until the second half of 1941 that it became operational as, new boats were delivered. The first six months of 1941 saw the commission. ing of 15 new S-Boats, namely $.39 t0 48, 67, 103 to 106, Baltic 1941 In May 1941, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Flotillas were withdrawn from the west for use in the Baltic. leaving behind only the 4th Flotilla, (On 16 June 1941, Kapitanleutnant Klug was given special orders to proceed to Gotenhafen (Gdynia) with $,28, 27 and 29. Here they took on mines and, with these three boats—until then 101 these, nine ships of 20.2909rt were sunk in March alone. fve of {Rint out Of convoy. FN 426° %n tho. Cromer/Soutnwold area. on 7 hharch(€8).f be aad idge of 8.47, with the spare rorpedo visible to. a (81Z) Z tarboard, and an ant ireraftgun toport attached to the 1st Flotilla—established the Sth Flotilla. At this stage there were not enough new boats to bring this new ‘Flotilla’ up to the authorised strength of 10 boats, nor could the boats taken from the 1st Flotilla be replaced, The latter was at this time in Danzig-Neufahrwasser and consisted of Depot ship Carl Peters and S.26, 39, 40, 101, 102, 103. The flotilla sailed for Finland, arriving at noon on 18 June 1941 in Helsingfors to berth below Sveaborg fortress. On the night of 22/23 June 1941, the day of the German attack on the Soviet Union, four boats of the 2nd Flotilla escorted a minelaying group, which laid the ‘Apolda’ minefield between Fano Fjord and Dago. Later the six boats of the 2nd Flotilla provided cover for the ‘Cobra’ minelaying group as they laid the ‘Corbeatha’ minefield between Kallbada-Grund and Pakenort. Other boats of the 2nd Flotilla themselves laid mines in the Soela Sound and Moon Sound. The 5th Flotilla scattered mines in the western entrance to Irben Strait and the 3rd Flotilla in the approaches Libau and Windau. Off Windau $.59 (Oberleutnant Alber Miller) and $,60 (Ober leutnant Siegfried Wuppermann) sank the Latvian steamer Gaisma (3077gtt) a few minutes after hostilities were opened with the USSR. Units of the ist Flotilla captured the Estonian freighter Estonia (1181grt). Early in the morning of 22 June 1941 $.103 and S.39, also of the 1st Flotilla ran aground in the difficult fairway off Helsinki, sustaining damage so that they were no longer operational. Indeed S.103 was so badly damaged that she had toretum to Germany forrepairs. The days that followed were also occupied in laying mines and carrying out raids along the enemy coast. In one such sortie against Hango on 23 June $.44 (Oberleutnant Opdenhoff) of the 3rd Flotilla sank the Russian guardboat MO-238. On the same day S.35 (Leutnant Horst Weber) destroyed the submarine S-3 off Steinort with depth-charges and hand-grenades. On the night of 26/27 June, boats of the 2nd Flotilla captured the Russian motor- torpedo boat TKA-47 off Backofen, ‘On the night of 25/26 June, boats of the 2nd and 5th Flotillas again provided support for a minelayer. When north of Moon Sound the force ran into a Russian minefield that had been laid before the start of hostilities. 5.43 and S.106 were sunk. On the same day the 3rd Flotilla laid mines in the Irben Stait and on the way back S.34 (Leutnant Erwin Luders) sank the Estonian steamer Lizada, while $.54, 60 and 67 launched torpedoes into Windau harbour, In the course of an operation by the 3rd Flotilla on the night of 26/27 June, S.37 (Leutnant Heinz Haag) and S.59 torpedoed the Russian destroyer ‘StoroZev0i, hitting her in the fore- part. In a follow-up attack §.59 and S.60 (Oberleutant Wuppermann) sank the submarine S-70, while in a third assault $.35 and $.60 probably sank the Russian mine- sweeper 7-208 (Skiv). The S-Boat crews believed that in these attacks they had sunk two destroyers anda torpedoboat, Following further minelaying operations during 161June and July 1941, the 1st Flotilla with S.26, 28, 39, 40 and 107, carried out a torpedo attack on 10 July on a group of Russian ships off Ekholm in the Gulf of Finland. However the torpedoes that were fired only struck the wreck of the Latvian freighter Rasma (3204grt) that had been mined a few days previously and beached. A similar attack by the 1st Flotilla on 14 July was also without success as was that on the following day by S.47, 54, 57 and 58 of the 3rd Flotilla on a Russian destroyer in Riga Bay. On 27 July the 3rd Flotilla had more luck in the same area, when S.54 (Leutnant Herbert Wagner) sank a destroyer proceeding independently, probably Smelyi. ‘After this there were no more successes to be had and in Autumn 1941, S-Boat operations in the Baltic ceased for the time being. The 2nd and 5th Flotillas were transferred to the Western area preparations went ahead for the planned removal of the 1st Flotilla to the Black Sea and the boats of the 3rd Flotilla entered Wilhelmshaven in September for ‘a major overhaul before proceeding via the Rhine ‘and Rhone to the Mediterranean. ‘The Baltic operations had shown that the S-Boats were very much subject to breakdowns. Even relatively slight technical faults often led to the withdrawal of boats from operational assignments, For example, in the very first week of operating in the Baltic, the 3rd Flotilla had three boats in dock with mechanical troubles. Thereafter there was 162 hardly ever an occasion when this flotilla had more than five or six out of ten boats operational. And the same applied to the two other flotilas. The meagre successes of the S-Boats in the Baltic Were to a great extent due to the fact that en- counters with the enemy were largely a matter of luck, Success might well have been greater had there been the support of sound reconnaissance reports from the Luftwaffe. But the essential close co-operation between S-Boats and Luftwaffe was entirely lacking, although it was not for want of hints in this direction from the naval side, Western Areain the second half of 1941 After the withdrawal of the three flotillas to the Baltic, this left the 4th Flotilla entirely alone to continue the struggle against British coastal traffic. In the months of May, June and July 1941, S-Boats did not sink a single ship off the English coast. In August, the 4th Flotilla sank two freighters totalling 3519grt, in September three more with a tonnage of {6676grt and in October two ships totalling 3305grt It was not until November that the successes started to increase, following the arrival of the 2nd Flotilla in the West. On the night of 19/20 November, a sortie was carried out by a mere four boats (S.47, 53, 104, 105) against a convoy off Great Yarmouth, yet these sank three ships, including the Fleet oiler War Mehtar (8502grt) by S.104, In this operation S.47 was so badly damaged that she had to be abandoned.In November, the 4th Flotilla carried out two successful operations. On the night of 23/24 November, 5.50, 51, 52, 109 and 710, attacked a convoy east of Orfordness, with S.709 (Leutnant Walter Bosse) sinking the British tanker Virgilia (8723grt). In addition to the tanker, the Dutch freighter Groenlo (1984grt) was sunk and another ship of 4155grt damaged. On the night of 28/29 November, $.57, 52 and 64 of the 4th Flotilla sank three British merchant ships with an aggregate tonnage of 6387grt In addition to the night torpedo attacks against British convoys, the S-Boats carried out a number of mining operations off British ports. In the western theatre during 1941 they torpedoed and sank a total of 1 Escontdestoyer 30 Marchant ships with an aggregate tonnage of 63 S63g¢t. Arctic Waters 1941/42 For operational tasks in the northern waters the SO Torpedoboats on 19 October 1941, ordered four newly refitted boats of the 2nd Flotilla—S.42, 44, 45, and 46—together with the Depot-ship Adoff Luderitz, to be moved to Narvik. These four boats were designated the 8th Flotilla. The new staff was formed from the staffs of the 6th and 7th Flotillas and in December 1941 it became possible to start, the transfer of the boats from Kiel to northern Norway. But the voyage was bedevilled by bad luck. On 27 December the 8th Flotilla reached Tromsé. $.45 had run aground on the previous day and had to go into dock to have new screws fitted Next day the first three boats arrived at Narvik and tied up alongside Adolf Liideritz. On 29 December, they were sent out against British destroyers off Tranoy/Vestfjord, but owing to bad weather had to turn back without completing their task. Inward- bound, S.42 and $.44 collided, the latter with her bows so badly damaged that she had to be declared non-operational for an indeterminate period. This left the 8th Flotilla with only two operational boats Later on this flotilla under the command of Kapitan- leutnant Georg-Stuhr Christiansen operated out of '$.55running her rials in August 1940 (BIZ) Kirkenes into the Kola Inlet area, but was not able toachieveany success, In June 1942 the German Naval Staff replaced the 8th Flotilla with the 6th Flotilla, which arrived in ‘Tromso on 21 June with S.77, 73, 74, 75 and S.114 and on the following day in their base at Kirkenes, Early on the morning of 30 June the five boats sailed for their first minelaying operation off Kola Inlet. However, since the improvement in visibility precluded all possibility of completing their mine. laying task without an encounter with the enemy, the flotilla returned to Kirkenes during the forenoon $.69, 76 and 173 of the 6th Flotilla remained as the S-Boat Group Narvik with Oberleutnant Gerhard Meyering of S.76 in command. S.68 had to remain in Trondheim for repairs and did not arrive in Kirkenes until later. Alter Tsingtau had relieved Adolf Luderite as Depot-ship, the 8th Flotilla, comprising S.42, 44, 45 and 46, returned to Germany and was disbanded on 10 July 1942. It was not until 1 December that a ‘new 8th Flotilla was formed under the command of Korvettenkapitan Felix Zymalkowski Mediterranean 1941/42 As already mentioned, the 3rd S-Flotilla, on completion of its service in the Baltic, had been moved to Wilhelmshaven for a thorough refit. When this work was finished, the journey to the Mediter- ranean started on the morning of 7 October 1941 Divided into two groups (S.55, 35, 67, 31, 34) and (S.56, 54, 57, 58, 59) the boats put out from Wilhelmshaven for Rotterdam. Rough weather was encountered in the North Sea and $.54 and S.57 suffered damage which necessitated a delay in Rotterdam for repairs, From there the journey down the Rhine was carried out at an average speed of 18 knots and in daily stages until reaching Stras bourg. From here the route led through the Rhine/ Rhone canal, through 167 locks, down to the Burgundian Gate, along the River Doubs to the estuary where it joins the Saone at St Sinforien, thence down the Saone and finally into the Rhone at Lyons. From here the boats proceeded downriver to the Mediterranean, The first group of boats 163(wussesopung) aveweuze soiseoy pue ‘ye Buloey saqn) opadso2 jeuonippe ym 1eog-s 01 uoneYIpow pasodosc) td ot TAs‘A schneliboot of the S.80 series, with the original wheelhouse and ‘wearing a camouflage scheme used by the 1st S-Boat Flotilla in the Baltic, The insignia is taken from a photograph of an unidentified S-boat. Note that the spare torpedoes have not been shown on their chocks to show deck detail, and for the same reason the ‘canvas screens have been omitted, Inset: The armoured cupola wheelhouse (known as the ‘kalotte’) which was introduced in the 5.700 series. David Warner © Profile Publications Ltdoro feo ee metrescompleted the journey quite quickly and by December 1941 they were ready to undertake their first operations from Sicily. On the nights of 16, 22, 23 and 31 December 1941, the five boats laid a total of 73 mines off the entrance to the Grand Harbour, Malta, The second group required somewhat longer to complete the journey to the Mediterranean, the low level of water in the Rhone holding them up for six weeks, so that it was 10 January 1942 before they could move on. They reached La Spezia on 15 January, and from there continued to Augusta in Sicily, where the first group had already started their operations, In the meantime the supply and base-personnel together with reserves had arrived in Sicily by rail with the necessary material loaded in 120 goods wagons. temporary situations where the 3rd Flotilla had more, operational boats than there were COs to take them to sea, When the flotilla was at full strength, many more mining operations were carried out against Malta. On 7 May 1942, the 3rd Flotilla achieved their ‘st success in the Mediterranean off Malta 5.54, 37 and 67 in bright moonlight delivered a surprise attack on the British ML.130, sinking her with their 20mm guns and picking up 11 survivors. But only three days later after coming through all their previous operations without a single casualty, the Flotilla suffered its first loss when S.37 ran on a British mine and sank with the loss of 12 of the crew. On the night of 17 May 1942 the flotilla carried out what was to be its last minelaying operation against Malta for some time. The boats were One of the $.26 series (B12) The journey from Germany was extremely difficult due to narrow locks and low bridges. Because the S-Boats with the 20-cylinder engines were too large for the Rhine-Rhone canal locks, the 3rd Flotilla, whose boats had the smaller 16-cylinder engine, was chosen. Even with these boats, extensive modifications were still found to be necessary. In addition alterations had to be made for reasons of camouflage. e.g. the 20mm AA gun was removed and the torpedo-tubes covered with sheet-metal plating. A thick funnel was placed over the forward engine fan-light. The bridge house was reduced to about half its height and the cut-away top half placed on the after deck. This meant that, the helmsman had to stand in the open. Finally the boats were painted pitch-black and the Reich Service Flag flown (as worn by fleet auxiliaries) The intention was to give them the appearance of air-sea-rescue vessels. The crews wore civilian Clothes and all military talk in front of strangers was strictly forbidden. Throughout the journey to the Mediterranean there was @ total clampdown on mail andleave Shortly afterwards, the S-Boats moved from ‘Augusta to Porto Empedocle. Sickness among the COs and subsequent new appointments resulted in 166 located by the enemy and, as they endeavoured to lay their mines regardless of the danger, they came under fire from the coastal batteries. S.34 received a direct hit in the engine-room, killing three of the crew. A scuttling charge was set to destroy the boat, but she failed to sink and the Luftwaffe had to be called in next morning to send the wreck to the bottom. On 24 May 1942, the 3rd Flotilla, reinforced in the meantime by S.30, 33, 36 and 60, was ordered to move to Derna, North Africa. The flotilla sailed ‘on Whit Sunday, reached Suda Bay, Crete, on the following day, and from there they sailed for Derna ‘on a bright moonlight night. On 14 June the opportunity arose for an attack on the Malta convoy. ‘Vigorous’, which together with convoy ‘Harpoon coming from the west, had already suffered severe losses inflicted by German and Italian forces. On the evening of 14 June S.56, 54, 55, 58, 59 and 60 sailed from Derna, $.55 (Oberleutnant Horst Weber) sank the British destroyer Hasty and S.56 (Ober- leutnant Wuppermann) hit the light cruiser Mew- castle with two torpedoes. A search next night for stragglers from the convoy proved fruitless. A week later six boats from the flotilla operated against British shipping withdrawing from Tobruk,