Colonial Drug Trade in South Asia From Palashi to Partition M. Emdadul Haq MA (Waterloo, Canada), PhD (La Trobe, Australia) Prof. of Political Science & Chair DHP, North South University The British Academy Visiting Professor, Strathclyde University, UK CENTURY PUBLICATIONSColonial Drug Trade in South Asia From Palashi to Partition Second edition, January 2019 First published in Bangladesh, December 2017 ISBN: 978-984-34-3236-0 © Reserved by the Author All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without written permission. Published by Century Publications 19, Rafin Plaza (2 Floor) Nilkhet, Dhaka-1205 Phone : +880 1713-062608 E-mail: sumon1205@gmail.com Exclusive Distributor Friends’ Book Corner 16 Rafin Plaza (2 Floor) 3/B Mirpur Road, New Market Dhaka-1205 Price Taka 550, US$ 22, INR 550 Printed at Nova Press & Publications2 British Imperial Drug Trade Through the dealings of the British East India Company (BEIC), opium, traditionally used medicinally by the Arabs and local physicians, became a non-medicinal business commodity. The current chapter illustrates why the dominant British mercantile group colonized the Kingdom of Bengal in the first place and how they consolidated their grip over the flourishing drug trade across the region afterwards. At the time of forceful foundation of the opium monopoly in Bengal, the economic condition of the poppy farmers (ryots) had deteriorated and tension had erupted between the local Zamindars (landlords) and the colonial authorities. To find an early solution to this dispute, the BEIC changed the existing Mughal aristocracy and lifted up the money lenders (banians) instead. This long term social conflict partly contributed to the eventual uprising of 1857, also portrayed as the Indian ‘Sepoy Mutiny’ by the colonialist writers. In an attempt to restrict the private cultivation of opium poppies by locals and the participation of other European counterparts in the flourishing opium trade, the government adopted multiple regulations from then on. The colonial drug laws applied a double standard, as they allowed the company authorities to appropriate revenue from the state-run opium monopoly, while pushing the private traders out of the market. Besides making China a major market for the supply of opium from India, the colonial rulers progressively increased local consumption of intoxicating drugs through licensed vendors by referring to their origins from the Arabs and Mughals.BRITISH IMPERIAL DRUG TRADE 23 securing permission from Emperor Jahangir to establish their first factory at Surat. In 1651, the British East India Company (BEIC) opened a factory at Hoogly followed by factories at Patna and Kasimbazar. In 1690, the BEIC secured trade facilities in Kolkata from the Nawab of Bengal against the payment of Rs.1,200/- per year. In 1717, the English got the free trade access in Bengal except for paying an annual sum of Rs.3,000/- payable to imperial treasury at Hoogly. Starting from handicrafts to raw silk, a multiple number of commodities were exported from Bengal during the mid-eighteenth century. Bengal handicrafts had extensive domestic and foreign markets. Embroidery, jewellery and shakha from Dhaka, Shitalpati from Sylhet were exportable items. Witnessing the eclipse of the Mughal Empire, the BEIC forcefully established a substantial influence in the Indian opium trade by the mid-eighteenth century. In March 1757, in a letter to the President and Council of Fort William in Bengal, P. Godfrey and his associates indicated that the East India Company had achieved exclusive control over the opium trade on the West Coast by October 1754, and had ‘prohibited’ all other parties “from trading therein’.** It is more plausible that the BEIC was inspired by the Dutch opium monopoly that had been established in Ceylon in 1675. Through this measure the Dutch colonial rulers had prohibited local people and all other private traders from taking part in the commercial activities in opium. In view of the fact, let us now focus on the British propagation of making Mughals responsible for their earlier connection in the trade. COLONIAL WARS ON DRUGS In the pretext of the CIA’s alleged underhand connection in the beroin trafficking during the Vietnam War, President Richard Nixon officially declared a ‘War on Drugs’ in early 1971. The publicity of this policy became reactivated during the upsurge of global narcotics trade during the Afghan War in the early 1980s. To provide a contrast picture, the following discussion demonstrates the series of battles that were fought primarily by the British for establishing their supremacy in the regional drug ‘rade in Bengal and the surrounding areas until 1919. After nearly24 COLONIAL DRUG TRADE IN SOUTH ASIA. a century, Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper (2007) wrote a book Forgotten Wars: The End of Britain’s Asian Empire that mostly demonstrates the nationalist upsurge among the Asian nations following the World War II. The current account explains how the South Asian nations were subdued primarily for making money making from the regional drug trade. It argues that the BEIC either invaded or blocked many areas that were strategically conducive for growing opium poppies in order to build up a strong capitalist economy in the UK. We may recall here that in an interview in 1986 with Lt. Col. James B. Gritz (Ret.), an official envoy of the White House, the Burmese drug lord Khun Sa’ maintained that: We must remember the opium trade is originally a creation of the west. The British fought major wars with Asian nations to ensure their monopoly on, and freedom to trade in opium.”° Although, of late, this bitter claim came from an infamous drug dealer, no academic inquiry into the origins of the British drug trade in Bengal and other parts of South Asia have been made; nor their connection with the regional wars have been established earlier. The present discussion illustrates why and how the geo-strategic interests for drug revenue led the BEIC to capture territories one after another in their centuries-long battles in the region. (i) Battle of Palashi The Kingdom of Bengal enjoyed its autonomy under the independent Nawabs in Murshidabad for over half a century before it had fell in the hands of the BEIC in 1757 by means of treachery and conspiracy. It was an era of the golden period, when the vicinity of united Bengal, comprising present-day Bangladesh, Tripura, West Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, witnessed booming economy. After the establishment of Dewani rule by Nawab Murshid Quli Khan (1697-1727) in independent Bengal, the successive rulers were Shujauddin Khan (1728-°39), Alivardi Khan (1739-’56), and of late it was Seraj-ud Daula (1756-57). For its rich natural resources, the Mughal Emperor Humayun had termed Bengal as Zannat-abad or the ‘habitat paradise’. Also, every Mughal official documents (formans) mentioned Bengal asBRITISH IMPERIAL DRUG TRADE 25 the ‘Paradise of India’. Contemporary writer Ghulam Hussain Salim in his Persian text Riyaz-us-Salatin described Bengal as Zannat-al-bilad or ‘Paradise of Nations’. Long before the colonial takeover, an English traveller also noted: ‘A wonderful land, whose richness and abundance neither war and pestilence, nor oppression could destroy’.*”” The current discussion demonstrates how and why the above assertion became untrue within a couple of decades immediately after the Battle of Palashi during the mid eighteenth century. Mainstream history suggests that deception and conspiracy over the power conflict within the Nawab’s court and forging of an alliance by conspirators with the BEIC helped establish colonial ascendancy in the Kingdom of Bengal in 1757. The British propagated ‘Black Hole Tragedy’ of suffocating 123 prisoners to death by the Seraj-ud Daula’s army was the immediate cause of the battle. The Indian author Rajat Kanto Roy (1994) in his book riz wee e crea wae (Conspiracy of Palashi and Contemporary Scoeity) and the voluminous work edited by a leading Bangladeshi historian Sirajul Islam (1997) entitled History of Bangladesh 1704-1971, touched upon certain traditional facts and issues that were mostly written during the colonial era. These could hardly touch upon the connections between the Battle of Palashi and the British interests in the regional drug trade in Bengal. Consulting numerous colonial papers and documents the following discussion establishes the logical correlation between the colonial take over and flourishing opium trade in the region concurrently. The British trade interest in Bengal dates back to 1658, when the BEIC had opened a factory in Hoogly followed by factories in Patna and Kasimbazar for supplying opium to Southeast Asia. Om Prakash maintains that by the middle of the seventeenth century the BEIC carried opium from Bengal to Sumatra in Indonesia for sale.** At that point, however, the British waders had to compete with their Dutch counterparts that received permission from the Mughal Emperor in 1676 for licit trading in opium by ‘paying a tax’.”” In 1683, the management of the BEIC officially decided ‘to make opium a part of the Company’s ssvestment’.“’ By 1686, the decision led to a tussle with Mughals aed within four years a peace deal was reached between the26 COLONIAL DRUG TRADE IN SOUTH ASIA parties on trade facilities. In 1690, the BEIC secured trade facilities in Kolkata from the Nawab of Bengal by paying Rs.1,200/- per year. In 1698, the British purchased Zaminderi rights and established Fort William in Kolkata. In 1717, the English people renewed trade facilities from Emperor Forrukh Siyer in Delhi with the payment of Rs.3,000/- per year. Nevertheless, the Patna opium dealers and petty traders (paykars), who due to their connections with the Dutch traders had attained a dominant position in the trade, confronted the British merchants. The strategic importance of the east coast due to its geographical proximity to the Asia-Pacific region, a major market for opium trade, influenced the British merchants to expand their military influence in Madras and surrounding areas. In an attempt to expand their commercial facilities, the BEIC increased military power along the coastline in Bengal in the mid-eighteenth century. Due to abuse of trade facilities by the BEIC, tension arose between authorities, as the Bengal government was financially loser, but the company was in no mode to address it. They perceived the newly appointed Nawab as unfriendly to their trade interests and refrained from recognizing him, while other major European companies greeted him. Further to this annoyance, the BEIC provided illegal shelter to a corrupt official Krisna Das who fled from Dhaka with a large amount of revenue money to Kolkata. Finally, the adoption of defence strategies, in violation of the Mughal trade rules (dastak), generated an armed conflict between Nawab Seraj-ud Daula of Bengal and the East India Company authorities. To bring the BEIC under control, Seraj-ud Daula in a hasty attack captured Fort William by June 1756, Narrating the prime cause of the battle Sir George Watt in 1891 noted: The attack of Nawab Seraj-ud Daula over the Kashimbazar military base in 1756, and the disruption in the supply of opium from the Patna Opium dealers’ to the British East India Company, led to the Battle of Plassey in the following year."" The commentator was a leading Scottish physician and botanist who worked in India as ‘reporter’, and compiled a major multi- volume work, The Dictionary of Economic Products of India in 1893. His observation in this context can be considered as a goldmine for new analysis over the Battle of Palashi. In line withBRITISH IMPERIAL DRUG TRADE 27 Watt, another contemporary top official in the colonial administration James F. Finlay, in 1894, viewed: The destruction of the English settlements by Sura-jud-Daula in 1756 drove the English merchants out of the market; and in defaunt [defiant) of competitors, the native dealers were compelled to dispose of their opium to the Dutch at Rs70 a maund. This low rate led to the cultivation being greatly restricted.” Even though Finlay indicated the aforesaid price as ‘low rate’, but practically it was a very expensive substance at that point in time. It may be mentioned here that the value of the Rupee in those days was higher than the other currencies in the contemporary world. An example from the Mughal Governor Shaista Khan’s rule in Bengal might help to understand the contemporary market value. It is widely known that under the last Mughal Governor eight mon (anglicise maund i.e., around 295 kilogram) processed rice was sold for one rupee at the turn of the seventeenth century. The indicated market value of opium was as costly as compared to heroin or cocaine in the underworld market these days. Given the importance of the opium trade and to break the above uncertainties in the supply chain, the Madras Board of Governors sent Colonel Robert Clive and Admiral Watson to regain the possession and retrieve company’s position in Bengal. Clive and Watson recaptured Kolkata. Being misled by the commander-in- chief Mir Jafar, on a preemptive threat posture from Ahmed Shah Abdali of Afghanistan, Seraj-ud Daula signed the Alinagar Treaty on February 1757 and accepted all the unjustifiable demands of the Bntish. Perceiving the temptations of the young Nawab, the British mow decided to replace him by traitors in the throne of Bengal. On 5" Sane 1757, BIEC entered into a conspiracy with Mir Jafar, business Myeoons: Jagat Seth and Omi Chand, army commanders: Lutfi Khan ed Kadam Hossain, and certain other quarters of the government to Sethrone Siraj-ud Daula. Mir Jafar signed the agreement on behalf of Be conspirators. On 11 June, Clive began his plan to attack Messhidabad and the BEIC Select Committee approved the plan. ‘The Fort William-India House Correspondence indicated that under = wade agreement’ Omichund, an influential merchant within the ‘reb’s court, helped in ousting the troubled Nawab from power.” ‘= connection to the Seven Years War in Europe, a group of French28 COLONIAL DRUG TRADE IN SOUTH ASIA marines fought with their guns and ammunition shoulder-to-shoulder along with the Bengal army, however, traitors remained standstill without any active role in the fateful battle. (ii) Bengal ‘cash cow’ Despite the fact that colonialist writers and authors generally portrayed a rosy picture of the colonial role in different parts of the world, their exploitation in Bengal and the rest of South Asia was tragic and painful. The dawn of eighteenth century witnessed a booming economy in the Kingdom of Bengal at a time when the British East India Company was trying to consolidate its business across the region. In 1704, Murshid Quli Khan (1697-1727) established the Dewani rule in independent Bengal and he was succeeded subsequently by two capable Nawabs: Shujauddin Khan (1728-39) and Alivardi Khan (1739-56). Before the Dewani had been established, every year one and half crore of Rupees were drained out to Delhi from Bengal in cash on revenue accounts. Being impressed by its abundance of resources Mughal emperor Humayun once regarded Bengal as Zannat-abad or the ‘habitat paradise’. Same way every Mughal official formans mentioned Bengal as the ‘Paradise of India’. Recognizing the superiority of the region, Ghulam Hussain Salim in his Persian text Riyaz-us-Salatin described Bengal as Zannat-al-bilad or ‘Paradise of Nations’. Long before the British rule was established in Bengal, a travelling Englishman also noted in his diary that: ‘A wonderful land, whose richness and abundance neither war, pestilence nor oppression could destroy’. In view of the above contentions the current discussion demonstrates how and why the flourishing condition of the Bengal economy was targeted by the colonial authority as a ‘cash cow’ since the mid-eighteenth century. To quash colonial misdeeds, however, the colonialist writers generally argued that unlike other colonial powers the British helped their colonies to grow and develop in terms of western education, legal system, culture, leadership, agriculture, industrialization and so on. In a comparative analysis Angus Maddison (1971) in his book Class Structure and Economic Growth: India and Pakistan since the Moghuls demonstrated many positive aspects of the British rule inBRITISH IMPERIAL DRUG TRADE 29 the Indian sub-continent. Referring to the religious pragmatism of the British imperialism, Madison argued that ‘its motivation was economic, not evangelical’. He wrote: There was none of the dedicated Christian fanaticism which the Portuguese and Spanish demonstrated in Latin America and less enthusiasm for cultural diffusion than the French (or the Americans) showed in their colonies. ** As compared to their white dominated colonies: New Zealand, Australia or Canada, the colonial government attempted to westernize India only to a limited degree. In a Neo-Marxist perspective, however, Anupam Sen (1982) in his book The State, Industrialization and Class Formations in India provided an analysis of the questionable impact of the colonial state in bringing under-development in the sub-continent. Despite the fact that colonialist writers and authors generally portrayed a rosy picture of the colonial role in different parts of the world, the situation in Bengal and the rest of South Asia was depressing and painful. Putting this debate aside, the following discussion demonstrates how the colonial authority steadily started the plundering of Bengal resources right from day one. The tacit victory in the Battle of Palashi provided the English forces a stronger political hold over the opium trade in Patna and the surrounding poppy-growing areas. Following the invasion, the leoting and plundering of resources from Bengal started by the British by every conceivable means. In the early process of raiding, a contemporary House of Commons report indicated that, Governor Drake received Rs.4,80,000/-, Watts Rs.12,40,000/-, Mir Jafar Rs.16,00,000/-, Clive Rs.25,00,000 etc. as prize money fom Murshidabad, the capital of the Kingdom of Bengal. There were many more names in the list and the figures were staggering. Moreover, 100 ships loaded with Bengal resources and treasures sailed for Clive to London and this sort of plundering continued ering his two subsequent visits. Eventually, Robert Clive had to ‘ce corruption charges and received life-long imprisonment for phoning off wealth to his personal account. To evade his shame aed disgrace, Clive later on committed suicide behind the bar. Selient narratives and influences of the colonial plundering were provided by Brook Adams in 1896, where he noted:30 COLONIAL DRUG TRADE IN SOUTH ASIA Very soon after Plassey the Bengal plunder began to arrive in London, and the affect appears to have been instantaneous, for all the authorities agree that the Industrial Revolution, the event which has divided the nineteenth century form all antecedent time, began with the year 1760. Plassey was fought in 1757, and probably nothing has ever equaled the rapidity of the change which followed between 1760 and 1815, the growth was very rapid and prodigious. * The influx of the Bengal capital and their strategic investment and returns in the manufacturing of goods and products in the factories and industries in UK was fabulous. Recalling the records the Latin American writer Andre Gunder Frank (1969) in his book The Third World Crisis observed: “Bengal once provided the life blood of mercantile and industrial capitalist development in the metropolis. “Economists agree that since the dawn of human civilization no investment has ever yielded as much as compared to the rate of profit that was generated from the capital of Bengal plunder. The issue received closer attention in the writings of an Indian writer Shashi Tharoor (2017) in his book Inglorious Empire: What the British Did in India. During the initial years of the Industrial Revolution, for nearly fifty years, Great Britain remained without a competitor overseas and could use Bengal as the biggest ‘cash cow” in their prolonged exploitive mission. In order to create and expand their external market, the BEIC destroyed the local cotton and textile industries, including the world famous Mus/in products in Eastern Bengal. Under the Bengal Nawabs textile and silk production, especially the Muslin, was at its peak that was meeting the enormous demands of both Asia and Europe. The cotton textile industry of Eastern Bengal was among the greatest industries in the world and its product Mus/in was prized in the imperial courts of Europe and Asia. It may be noted here that for its finest quality, the Bengal’s Muslin was in great demand among the members of the European nobility. The Bengal raw silk, cloths etc. to a vast amount were exported to the West and as far as Guzrat, Lahore and even Ispahan. Asian merchants exported raw silk from Bengal amounting Rs.48 /acs per annum on an average in the late 40s and early 50s of the eighteenth century. During the Nawabi period Bengal textile amounted more than 50% of the total BritishBRITISH IMPERIAL DRUG TRADE 31 and Dutch textile exports from Asia. The Bengal cotton textile surpassed all other parts of India. Contemporary foreign travellers and European trading companies provide us information. During the pre-Palashi days Bengal exported rice, wheat, sugar, ghee and other products to various parts of India and the eastern Islands. In an attempt to feed their new textile products, the colonial government ‘through various and innumerable methods of oppression to the poor weavers such as by fines, imprisonments, floggings, forcing bonds from them’ systematically destroyed the industry. “’ The rapid decimation of the local textile and silk industries brought tremendous economic hardship for the artisans and the area assumed a new role as a supplier of agricultural raw materials within a couple of decades. Many of the uprooted people with no other occupation fell back on agriculture which created massive rural unemployment for the first time in Bengal history. Thus, the proportion of the total population dependent on agriculture for their livelihood gradually increased in Bengal almost hundred percent within the first one hundred years of colonization. In connection to the Industrial Revolution, however, the expanding British textile industry needed a steady supply of indigo from Bengal. Once the traditional supply line was cut off from the US after its independence in 1776, the leaders of the BEIC turned their eyes to Bengal for producing indigo forcefully. European planters compelled the Bengali peasants to grow indigo, the plant used to make blue dye for use in the textile industries in different cities in UK. Before the harvesting of opium or indigo, Bengal had 2 balanced agricultural economy, producing grain, jute, spices and other crops. But, then came the age of indigo and opium, everything changed and made the area a supplier of agricultural raw materials. The BEIC encouraged and supported the European planters who were involved in the cultivation of indigo in Bengal. Especially the Hindu Zamindars and planters were given a free Sand by the colonial power in the exploitation of the peasants in erder to maximize profits. In response to their repressive tactics the peasants challenged the Zamindars, the planters and also the British Government through the organized Indigo Movement during 1859- *!. It was the growing peasant unrest that forced the colonial mmeni to come up with a proclamation that the cultivators free to decide wheth + or not to cultivate indigo.32 COLONIAL DRUG TRADE IN SOUTH ASIA (iii) Anglo-Afghan Wars Subsequent to the initial fateful battles for opium, Bengal became springboard for British colonial expansion in different directions, especially towards Afghanistan in Southwest Asia. After the Boxer War in 1764, the BEIC annexed areas one after another which became strategically important to them to secure and maintain their supremacy in the regional opium traffic. (Maps incorporated in the book clearly show the process of gradual territorial expansions). For tightening and expanding of their grip over rest of South Asia, the BEIC invaded territories along the eastern side of Punjab in 1801 and some parts of Uttar Pradesh (UP) in 1803 and subsequently expanded the Bengal opium monopoly system in northern India. During the 1820s and 1830s the British government either conquered or physically blocked the strategically important poppy-growing areas in central India to help expand the opium enterprise in Bengal. = ere Native soldiers of the BEIC, The Illustrated London News, 1814 To force China to buy Indian opium, the British fought two Opium Wars in the late 1830s and 1850s. Besides, there were series of Anglo-Afghan wars (1839-42, 1878-’80, and 1919) and Anglo-Burmese wars (1824-’26 and 1852-53) for capturing those areas under the British dominance. Currently known as the