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    Marxism and Literature Ideology

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    Literature RAYMOND WILLIAMS 54 Marxism and Literature loctronic transmission and recording of speech and of writing for speech, and tho chomical and electronic composition and transmission of images, In complex rolations with spoech and ‘with writing forspooch, and including images which can them Selves be “writen” None ofthese means cancels print, or oven iminishesits specific importance, butthey arenetsimpleadal- tions t i, or mere alternatives. In thei complex connections and intoreations they compose a new substantial practice in Social language itslf, over a range from public address and ‘manifest representation to"inner spocci” and verbal thought. For they are always more than new technologies, in the limited sense. They are meons of production, developed in direct if compiex relations with profoundly changing and extending social and cultural relationships: changes elsewhere recogniza- be as deep political and economic transformations. I way surprising that the specialized concept of “i Adaveloped in precee forme of corespondence with ap Social class, particular organization of learaing, and the ‘appropriate paticulr technology of print, should now be so ‘often Invoked in retrospective, nestalgle, or reactionary moods, ‘34 form of opposition to whats comocty seen ase new phase tdvillation. ‘The situation is historieally comparable to that Invocation af the divine nd th sscred, and ofdivine end sacrod int the new humanist concopt of literature, inthe ‘contested transition from feudal to bourgeois ‘Wh im each transition, is 2 historical development of social language lel. finding new ‘means, new forme and then new definitions of changin prac- teal conscloueness, Many ofthe active values of literature! have then tobe seen, not sted tothe concopt, which came olimitas ‘well ato summarize them, buts elements ofa continuing and ‘changing practice which already substantially, and now atthe levelof theoretical redefinition, iemoving beyond its old forms. 4. Ideology ‘The concept of ideology’ dd not originate in Marxism and is still inno wey confined to It, Yet Its evidently an important cancept in almost all Marxist thinking about culture, and espe- tially about literature and Ideas, The eificalty then ie that we have to distinguish three common versions of the concept, ‘which ao ellcommon in Maret waiting, These are, broadly (1) aaystem of beliefs charecerstc of particular class or rou; (i) a systom of ilusory beliofs—falso idoas or fal sciousness —which can be contrasted with true oF Knowledge: it) genera proces ofthe production of meanings and fens In one variant of Marxism, senses (0) and (i) canbe effectively Combined. In 4 class society, all beliofs are founded on class position, and the systems of lit of al lasses—or, quite com- ‘monly, of al classes preceding, and other than, the proletariat ‘whose formation is th project of the sbolition of class society re thea in part or wholly false (lusory), The specie prob- lems In this powerful general proposition have led to intense controversy within Mardst thought. It 1s not unusual to find ‘tome form ofthe proposition alongside ues ofthe simple sans (O,ssin the characterization, for example by Lenn, of soclalist Ideology’. Another way of broadly retaining but distinguishing senses} and (i) isto use sense i) for systems af belief founded fn class postion, including that of the proletarlat within class Soctety, and sense) for contrast with in abroad sense) scien bfie knowledgeat all kinds, which is based on reality rather than illusions. Sense (l) undercuts most of these distinctions, for the ideological ‘bear in Marxist ideological studs, ‘In ths situation thao can bo no question of establishing, 6 Marxism and Literature cexcopt in polemics, single ‘core’ Marsst definition of idaol- ‘ony. Iie more to the point to return the term and its variations to {he issues withia which itand these were formed: and specif cally, rt to the historical development. We can then return to {the ssues as they now present thomselves, and tothe important ‘onttoversies which the erm and its variations revel and cor- "Ideology’ ws coined a term in the lete eighteenth century by the French philosopher Destut de Tracy. It was intandod to ‘be a philosophical term for the ‘scionco of Ideas’. Ts use ‘depended on particular understanding of the nature of ideas’ ‘which was broadly that of Locke and the empiricist tradition: “Thus ides wore not tobe and could not be understood in any of theolder metaphysical or 'idoalst'sonss, The slenceof ideas must be a natural eclence, since all ideas originate In men's ‘experienc fthe world, Specifically, in Dstt ideology fs part of zoology: Wola only ap incompletekoowledgeof an animal if we do notknow Is inelletalfacatesIdology ts part of Zoology, and its espe ‘aly insman that hs part important and deserves tobe mare doply Anderstod: ments dialog, a0, Pace). ‘The description is characteristic of scientific empiricism. The ‘real elements’ of ideology are ‘our intellectual facultes, thelr principal phenomena and thelr most evideat circumstances. ‘Tho eiical aspect of his emphasis was at once realized by one kind of opponent, the reactionary de Bonald: Ideology has replaced motaphics because modern philosophy sees no other ides in tho world but those af men” De Banald comectly felated the scientific vens of ideology tothe empiricist tradition ‘which had passed from Locke through Condi, pointing out its preaoeupation with signs and their Influence on thought eduction of our though 5 The inital bearings ofthe concept of Ideology are then very ‘complex. It was indeed an aserton against metaphysies that {here aro "no ideas inthe world but those of men’. Atthe same time, inlonded asa branch of empirieal science, "Weology” was Limited, by its philosophical assumptions, to «version of ideas Weology 57 as transformed sensations” and to ¢ version of language as 2 ‘system of signs’ (based, as in Condillac, on an ultimately ‘mathematical modo). These limitations with thelr characteris: ticabstraction of man’ and the world and wilh thelr reliance nthe passive reemption’and systematic association’ of sense tions”, were not only ‘scientific’ and “empirical” but were ments ofa basicaly bourgeois view of human existence. The ‘ejection of metaphysics was a characteristic gain, confirmed by tho development of prociso and systematic empirical enquiry. [Atthesame ne th effect exclusion of any eacial dimension oth the practical exclusion of social selationshipe implied in the model of ‘man’ and “the world, and the charscteratic die- placement of necessary socal relationships to a formal system, ‘whether the “laws of psychology” or language asa “system of Signs'—vwas @ deep and apparently irrecoverable loss and Alstortion. Wissignlicant that the inital objection othe exclusion ofany active conception of intelligence vas made from generally reac: Uonery positions, which soughtta relat th sense of activity in its old metaphysical form. I is even more significant, inthe next stage of the development, that a derogatory sense of'ideol- ‘ogy’ a Impractcal theory’ or ‘abstractIusion frst introduced ‘Bom an evidently resetionsry position by Napoleon, was taken ver, though from a new position, by Marx 11s the doctrine ofthe ideologues—to this difue mataphyses, ‘iki in conto manne sks to find th primary eases anon this foundation would erctthe egiationof penples saad of oop the laws to 9 Knowledge of te human hart and of the lessns of to which gan met tibte all fhe misortanes which nee ono beatiful France Scott (Napoleon, 1827, vi, 251) summarizad: ‘Ideology, by which nickname the French rulor used to distinguish every species of theory which resting in ao respect upon the basis of Sellintemst, could, he thought, prevall with none save hole Trained boys and crazed enthusiasts” Tach element of this condemnation of ‘ideology’—which bocame very sell known and was often repeated in Europe and North America during tho frst half of the nineteenth cn tury—was taken up and appliod by Marc and Engels, in their * Cad in A. Nae. Dac sly and Obey, Cao, 156, 15 0 Marxism and Literature cavly writings. Itsthe substantial content of thelrattackon their ‘German contemporaries In The German idcology 1846). Tofind Spimary causes! in-ieas was een as th bale eor. Theres ven the same tone of contemptuous practicality nthe ancedote In Mare's Preface: ‘Once uponatimean honest fellow hd th ieathat nen were drowned vehi ‘ode ty by sting to bea thay would be subimely pool ast Sop Eanger fom water 3) Aten edt atin ne cence ey and then tn a Sepa ee a at Se poetry tae Aerie erat eat hee eee at cee ees Pete nel pac mlb Soe ts Seal Sen ae SES, Ni Stn lr Fa ee cg tre ere ee fea tenant roa tar Sane ‘Yot already at this stage there wore obvious complicatons ‘ideology’ became a polemical nickname for kinds of thinking ‘thich neglected or gnorod the material socal process of whch ‘consciousness’ was lways a par CConsiousnes cn never be anything le han conscious existence, Sid the existence ofmen lth acl fe process I imal ology ‘on nd thai ccumstances spear upside dows aia » camera hero, this phenomenon ara fort ae mule rom thelr historical Tsprocess afte inversion of objects on tho retina does fom thet pista if proce (2,13), ‘The emphasis s clear but the analogy is dificult. The physical [processes of the retina cannot reasonably be separated from the [Physical processes ofthe bran, which, as a necessarily con fected ectvity control and recy’ the inversion. The camera ‘bscura was a conscious device for discerning proportions; the {inversion had in fact been corrected by adding anothet lens. In ‘ne sense the analogies are no more than incidental, but they Weology 59 probably relate to (though in fact, as examples, they work ‘agtns!) an underlying criterion of ‘direct positive knowledge’ ‘They aroina way very ike the ue of the doa of gravity" torefuts fides Ifthe idea had boon fanding of a natural force superiority or of te inferior wisdom tf women’, the argument might in the end have come out the Same way but it would have had to poss through many more significant stages and difficulties “Thief alan trap even ofthe more postive definition: Wie dont st ut rom what mens, magne, conesve nor rom men Senarsted thought imagined. concattd, in nda to rlveat ne inthe Mee Wo et out ore active men, and wn the bss of thst ‘eal ifeprocse we demonesta the dovelopmanto! the eolaieal lly verifiable and bound lo material promis. sale tot of ology ad their ‘lance of independence cl 3) ‘That ‘deol’ should be deprived ofits “semblance of inde pendence is entirely reasonable. Bu the language of "eflexes” ‘echoes phantoms, and “sublimates’ is slmplistie, and hs in repetition boon disatous. Tt belongs to tho naive dualism of “mechanical materialism’ in which the idealist separation of “Ideas” and material reality’ had beon repeated, but with is priorities reversed, The emphasis on consclousness as insepara- bile from conscious existene, and then on conscious existence ‘as inseparable from material social process, sin affect lost in the use of this deliberately degrading vocabulary. The damage ‘an he realized if we compare it for a moment with Mares ‘description of ‘human labour’ In Capital (1. 185-6) Ree ero SS eer BUAh Son fetes oe “he gon prap eno ch he hry but ite ss foe elder ot pmo ra a Hines no eb ad Coren sen to SOUS on nt sal pond (60 Marxism and Literature its product i “ideas are then et much part of this process as material product themselves. This, centrally, was th thrust of Mares whole argunent, bt the point was lst, in this eruclal tea, by temporary surrender tothe cynicism of practical men’ find, even moze, to the abstract empiricism of « version of “natoral science ‘What had relly boon introduced, asa corrective to abstract fmplillam, was the sense of material and social history a the teal relationship betwoen ‘man’ and nate Dut itis then very curious of Marx and Engels to abstract, in tor, the persuasive ‘mon in tho flea’, at whom we ‘arrive’ To begin by presuppos- ing them, es the necessary starting point, is right while we romembor that they ere threfoe also conscious men. The dec fon not to at ox fom what men #6 Imagine, concelve, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived” I the at beats corrective reminder that there is olher end sometime Inarderevidonce of what they have done. But itis lant ts worst an objectivst fantasy: thatthe whole “real lifeprocess' can be [Known independently of language [what men se”) and of is records (min as narated, For thevery notion ofhistary would ‘become absurd if we did not look at men as nareted” (who having died, they are hardly likely tobe accessible ‘in theflesh and on which, inevitably, Marx and Engela extensively and repented relied) well as at that history of industry». ast ‘anopen book ofthe human faculties. 4121}, whieh they had decisively introduced against the exclu: sons of other historians, Whatthey were centrally arguing wasa thew way of sosing the total relationships between this “open book” and ‘what men say” and ‘men ae nareted” Ina polemical response to the abstact history of Ideas or of constiousness they made thelr main point but in one decisive area lost it again. This confusion isthe source of the naive reduction, in ‘much subsequent Marist thinkin. of consciousness imagin ton, art, and ide to reflexes, echoes’, ‘phantoms’, and ‘sub. imate” and then of « profound confusion In the concept of “ideology ‘We can trace further elements of this fluro if we examine those definitions of Ideology which gain most of their force by contrat with what is not ideology. The most common ofthese Contrasts is with what is called ‘sclence’ For example: Hdeology 61 ‘hare spectation ente—in sel lie—there ral, postive science brs: the roroseattion ofthe rasta svi. of the prctcl rocetof development of men Ey alaboutconicoushes chase nd real Knowledge esto tak fe place. When reality fe depited, Dhilsophy eran indopendent branch of activity lowes emia of einencn (Gl 17), ‘There are soveral difficulties here, The uses of ‘consciousness! and philosophy’ depend almost entirely onthe main ergament bout the fully of separating consciousnessand thought from ‘the material social process. It is he separation that makes sch consciousness and thought Into ideology. Buti is easy to se¢ hhow the point could be taken, and has ten boon taken, in a auitediffeent way-Ine nowkind of abstraction, ‘consciousness! fad “philosophy” ae separated, ta their ten, fom rel edge’ and from the: practical process. Ths expecially easy to do with the avallable language of ‘reflexes’, ‘echoos, ‘phn tom, endsublimates-Therosult ofthis soparation, against the ‘riginal conception of an Indissoluble proces, Is the farcical ‘exelusion of consciousness from the ‘development of men’ and ‘om ‘eal knowledge’ of thie development. Gut the former, at least isimpossibleby any standard. All that can then be doneto maf the familar two-stge modal (the mechanial materialist versal of the Idealist dualism, al socal life and then, et some tem poral or spatial distance, consciousness and its products. This leads directly to simpla reductionism: ‘consciousness’ and ts products can be nothing but ‘reflections of wet has elzeady ‘ccured in the materia socal process 1t can of course be seld from exporionce (that experience ‘which produced the later anxious warnings and qualifications) that this is @ poor practical way of trying to understand ‘con sclousness and its products that these continually escapo so simple a reductive equation. But this is a marginal point. The real point is thatthe separation and abstraction hoss and its products aba flectiv’ or ‘sulle in an Iron idealization of ‘consciousness and its pro duce" at this socondary level For ‘consciousness and Its products" aro always, though in variable forms, parts of the material social process itsolf “whether a hat Marx called the necasery element of imagine tion’ in th labour process; or es tho necessary conditions of (62, Marxism and Literature associated labour, in languago and in practical doas of reltion- Shipsor. which isso ignificantly forgotten, nthe ral processes all of them physical and material, most of them ‘manifestly so—Wwhich are masked and Idealized ay ‘conscious ‘and its products’ but which, shen seen without ilusions, fare themselves necessarily social material activities. What Is fact idealized, in the ordinary reductive view, i thinking’ or Imagining’, and the only matarialization of these abstrecod processos is by a gonoral reference back to tho whole (and ‘because abstracted then in effoct complete) matral social pro- cose. And what this version of Marxiam expecially overlooks ls that thinking’ and ‘imagining’ are from the beginning social rocessos (of course including that capacity for ‘internalization Which is @ necessary part of any social process betwoon actual individuals) and thal thoy become accessible only inunarguebly physical and material ways: in voices, in sounds made by Instruments, in penned or prntod writing, in ernged pigments tn canvas or plaster, in worked marble or stone. To exclude ‘these material socal processes from the material social process is the same ertor a to mics all material social procesres to rected life The ‘What can then be sid tobe idoology’, in its recelved negative form? It-can of course be sed that these pracesee, or some of ‘them, come in variable forms (which is as undeniable as the variable forms of eny production), and that some of those forms ate ‘ideology while othersare not. Thisisatempting path butt {is usually not followed far, bocause theo isa fool's beecon tected jst a ite way along it This the difficult concept of ‘science. We have to notice frst a problem of translation. The German Wissenschaft, like the Fronch science, as © mich broader meaning than English science has had since the early Inetoenth century. The broader meaning isn th area of se matic knowledge’ or organized learning’. In English this has boon largely specialized to such knowledge based on observa: tion ofthe ‘eat wordt fest, and stil persistently. within the teategories of man’ and "the world’) and on the significant die- tinction (and even opposition) botwoon the formerly intar- changeable wordsexperience and experiment, the ater tract Hdeology 68 in the cours of development, now senses of empirical and positive. Its then very difieultforeny English reader to take the translated phrate of Marc and Engele~eal, positive. sci fnca’—in anything other than ths specalized sense, But two (qualifications have then at ance to be made. Flt, that the Marxist definition of the ‘eal world, by moving beyond the soparatod eatogories of man’ andthe world’ and including, as Conta th active material sociel process, hed made any such Simple transfor impossible Indust is concave as an exter form ofthe realization ofthe ‘esunta human faculties ones able owas also the human essence ff Nature or thenotura! esac of ean, he ata scence vil the Sandon tee abtrart materials. or rae, ides orenstion, and ‘rl come the base ofa human scence One bass for fe and othr forsclence ina prota flsehood (M122) ‘This is an argument precisely against the categories of the English specialization of 'sclence’ But then, second, the act progress of scentific rationally, especially in He rejection of Imotaphysics and In ts ulumphanteseape from a limitation ¢o for tnderstanding society. Though the object of Inquiry had ‘been radically changedfrom man’ and the world’ toan active, interactive, and ins kay sense selfcreating material social procoss—it was supposed, or rahe hoped, that the methods, or At last the mood, could be carted ove ‘Thissonso of geting fre ofthe ordinery assumptions f social Inguiry which usually bogan where it should have ended, with the forms and categories of a particular historical phase of soclty, is immensely important and was radically: demon- ‘Stated in mot of Marx's work, But itis very different from the Uunerlicl use of 'scfence” and sclentfc. with deliberate refer: fences to and analogies from ‘natural science’, to describe the fssentally critical ond historical work which was actually undertaken, Engels, it is tuo, usod these references and ‘analogies mich moro often than Marx. ‘Selentific sociale! ‘became, under is influence, a polemical eatchword, In practice depends almost equally ona Gustifiable) sense of systematic Inowledge of socity, based on observation and anal¥sis of its processes of development (as distinct, say, from “utopian’ G4 Marxism and Literature sociallam, which proectoda desirable fture without close con- i processes within which it had sociation with th fundamen- tal oe uni ‘which, even when they turned out to be ‘law’ rather than effective working alizations or hypotheses, were ofa diferent kind because hair cally different. ‘is contrasted with res, lad and connected know: Fedge ofthe practical procas of davelopment of mon’ then The distinction may have significance as an indication of the ‘Tocoived assumptions, concepts, end points of view which can bo shown to prevent or distort such dotaled and connected knowledge. We can often feel that this is all that was really intended. fut the contrast is of enue Toke sines its confident application distinction betwoen ‘detaled end conne practical process of development’ and Jecge’ which may often closely resemble i One way of apply- lng the distinguishing criterion would be by examining the ssumptions, concepts, and points of view’, whether received (ornot by which any knowledge hasbeen gained and organized. Hut itis ast thie kine of analysis which is rovented by the priori assumption ofa positive’ method whichis aot subjct to Such serutiny: an assumption based in fect onthe received (and ‘unexamined) assumptions of “positive, scenic knowledge, {rood ofthe “ideological bis’ ofall other observers. This post jon, which has beon often repeated in orthodox Marxism. i ther» circular demonstration ora familias partisan claim (of the Kind made by almost ll partos that others are blased but that, by definition, we are not That indeod was the fools way out ofthe very dificult probs Jom sehich yes now being confronted, within historical ‘materialism Is symptomatic importance atthe level of dog thas tobe nated and thon set aide two are to so, clearly. every diffrentand mich moreinteresting proposition, which leads to ‘quite different (though not often theoretically distingylaged) Aefnition of ideology. Tis begins from the main pol ofthe attack on the Young Hegelians, who were said 10 “consider conceptions thoughts, ideas, in fact all the products of-con- Weology 68 selousness, to which they atsibute an independent existance, fs tho real chains of men’. Social Uberation would then come {through a ‘chango of consciousness’. Everything then turns, of course, on the definition of ‘consciousnest’. The definition adopted, polemically, by Marx and Engels, is in effect thelr Gefinition of ideology: not ‘practical consciousness’ but ‘sl ‘dependent theory’ Hence really itis oly aquestion ofexplain- ‘ng ths thooretical talk from th actual existing conditions. The real practical dissolution of thse phrases, the removal ofthese potions from the consciousness of mon, will... be affected by stared cecumstances, not by theoretical deductions (G19). this task the proletariat hasan advantage, since for the mats of ‘men ... these theoretical notions do not exist TE ove can take this seriously we are left ith a much more limited and in that respect more plaustble ofinition of ideo. ogy. Since ‘consciousness, Including ‘conceptions, thoughts, ‘dea’, can hardly be asserted tobe non-existant inthe mass of mon’, the definition falls back to a Kind of consciousness, and Cartain kinds of conceptions, thoughts, and ideas, which ere ‘specifically ‘ideological’. Engels lter sought to clarify this pos. ton: ‘very ideology once ts aise, develops in connection wit th fen conoapt aril and dovlops thie material uth herve ‘rould emt tobe daoogy tht a occupation with though Se wth Indepondeat sation, devsioping independontiy and subject only 10 thet own aw That to mate if condittons of the persons iaide ‘ose haod this tought proces goes on In th lst rt termine ‘hevcoure ofthis proces, remain of cosity unknown to hee ‘pewons, for oer there would be amend 10 all ieelogy Feuerbach 65-0) eelogy te 2 process accomplished by the so-ciled thinks, con ‘sloulyindond bt with afales consciousness, There mativestpel- Hing him mala unknown to him otherwise it wou nob ao Ioglal proces st i ene ha imagines fale or apparent moive Beeauact ies procosof thought hdtv both he fomand content ftom pure though iter hil own oat of his predecasores ‘Taken on their own, these statements can appear virtually piyehological They aostructurally very simiartothe Freudian ‘concept of ationalization’ in such phress as “inside whose heads; real motives... unknown to him’ "imagines fase oF * Lut Maung. 4) 408 ronda Selec Conespendanc, ‘Now York 38 | 66 Marxism and Literature apparent motives’. In this form 6 version of'ideology” i readily ‘sczepted in modern bourgeots thought which has ts oven con- ‘cepts ofthe ‘real —matrial or psychologial—toundercut either {deology of eatonallzation. But it had once boon a more serious position. Ideology was specifically Identified as a consequence ofthe division of labour: Division of labour only bacomas rly such from the moment whon 2 fivson of mle sd mented abour app From this cman ‘nvwndsconscloumesscan rely ater tealfthatitssarathingothe? thon consoustes of xsting prctic, ha ireally represents some {ng witientropeseting sometngronram now onconsclousnss {sins postion tosmaneipaellf fo fe world and to procsnd ote Termalion of pute’ thor. theology. phitsophy. this ee 6,51) oology is then ‘separated thory’,anditsanalysismustinvolve restoration of it ‘eal connections ‘Tedivsionoflabour... manifests son the ralingclas the

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