In the Matter of Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Amparo in favor of Lilibeth Ladaga vs.
disappearances and extrajudicial killings. It plays the preventive role of breaking the
Major General Reynaldo Mapugu et.al G.R. No. 189689,189690 and 189691 , November
13, 2012
Facts:
Petitioners share the common circumstance of having their names included in the
Order of Battle Validation result of the Phil. Army, which is a list containing the names of
organizations and personalities in Southern Mindanao, supposedly connected to the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and NPA with the ultimate goal to oust PGMA on
November 30, 2007. They perceive that by the inclusion of their names in the said OB List,
they become easy targets of unexplained disappearances or extralegal killings a real
threat to their life, liberty and security.
Petitioner Lagada first came to know of the existence of the OB List through Bayan
Muna partylist Rep, Satur Ocampo and substantiated the death threats about her that were
reported to the police. Petitioner Zarate, a human rights lawyer, vehemently denied that he
was fronting for CPP NPA. IN fine, the petitioners were one in asserting that the OB list is
really a military hit-list as allegedly shown there had been victims of EJK whose violent
deaths can be linked directly to the OB list.
On June 16, 2009, petitioners separately filed before the RTC a petition for the
Issuance for the Writ of Amparo with application for production order (special
proceeding). The court directed the respondents to file a verified written return within 72
hours and setting the case for summary hearing.
In their returns, respondents denied authorship of the documents being adverted to and
distributed to Rep. Ocampo to the media. Instead, they asserted that petitioners’ allegations
are solely based on hearsay, speculation, beliefs, impression and feelings, which are
insufficient to warrant an issuance of the write, and ultimately, the grant of the privilege
of the writ of Amparo.
RTC Ruling: Denied the issuance of the writ of amparo finding no substantial evidence to
show that the perceived threat to petitioners' life, liberty and security was attributable to
the unlawful act or omission of the respondents.
Issue: WON the totality of evidence satisfies the degree of proof required under
the Amparo Rule?
SC Ruling: No. The writ of amparo was promulgated by the Court pursuant to its rule-
making powers in response to the alarming rise in the number of cases of enforced
expectation of impunity in the commission of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, as well as the curative role of facilitating the subsequent punishment of the
perpetrators.
The writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy intended to address violations of,
or threats to, the rights to life, liberty or security and that, being a remedy of
extraordinary character, it is not one to issue on amorphous or uncertain grounds but only
upon reasonable certainty.  Hence, every petition for the issuance of the writ is required
to be supported by justifying allegations. A mere inclusion of one's name in the OB List,
without more, does not suffice to discharge the burden to establish actual threat to one's
right to life, liberty and security by substantial evidence.
No substantial evidence of an actual threat to petitioners' life, liberty and security
has been shown to exist in this case.  For, even if the existence of the OB List or, indeed, the
inclusion of petitioners' names therein, can be properly inferred from the totality of the
evidence presented, still, no link has been sufficiently established to relate the subject OB
list.  Facts and circumstances of the case can qualify as a violation that may be addressed
under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
Doctrine of the case
Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.  It is more than a mere imputation of
wrongdoing or violation that would warrant a finding of liability against the person
charged. The summary nature of amparo proceedings, as well as the use of substantial
evidence as standard of proof shows the intent of the framers of the rule to address
situations of enforced disappearance and extrajudicial killings, or threats thereof, with what
is akin to administrative proceedings.
Court laid down a new standard of relaxed admissibility of evidence to enable
amparo petitioners to meet the required amount of proof showing the State's direct or
indirect involvement in the purported violations and found it a fair and proper rule in
amparo cases "to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality" and "to
consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is
consistent with the admissible evidence adduced... evidence is not to be rejected outright
because it is inadmissible under the rules for as long as it satisfies "the most basic test of
reason i.e., relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the
pieces of adduced evidence." right to life, liberty or security on the other.
Marynette R. Gamboa v. Psupt Marlou C. Chan et al , G.R. No. 19636 , July 24, 2012 In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence
Facts: that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters
Petitioner Gamboa was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte, while respondent Police Senior susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents
Superintendent (P/SSUPT.) Chan was the Officer-in-Charge. sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the
A Zeñarosa Commission was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of
(PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating them before the 10 May 2010 elections and regularity, which she failed to overcome. [T]he state interest of dismantling PAGs far
dismantling them permanently in the future. outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte) and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate.
conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.
someone who keeps a Private Army Group (PAG). Purportedly without the benefit of data Doctrine of the case
verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa
Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals
maintaining PAGs.
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and
destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against
respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.
RTC Ruling: The trial court categorically ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the list of
persons maintaining PAGs, as published in the Report, constituted a violation of her right to
privacy
CA Ruling:
Issue: WON the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper when the right to
privacy is invoked as opposed to the state’s interest in preserving the right to life, liberty
or security.
SC Ruling:
NO.
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the
image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to
provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to
protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in
which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be

Marynette R. Gamboa v. Psupt Marlou C. Chan et al , G.R. No. 19636 , July 24, 2012
Facts:
Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, an administrative clerk at the Manila
Electric Company (MERALCO), learned of an anonymous letter that was posted at the door
of the Metering Office of the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector,
at which respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter reads:  safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty and security
“Cherry Lim:
MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY
GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO.
KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB…”
By Memorandum, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCO’s Human Resource
Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCO’s Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as
“A/F OTMS Clerk,” in light of the receipt of “… reports that there were accusations and
threats directed against [her] from unknown individuals and which could possibly
compromise [her] safety and security.”
Respondent questions the propriety of MERALCO’s action in a letter as “highly suspicious…”
and being “punitive”, but the latter never responded. Respondent filed a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bulacan. Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) enjoining petitioners from effecting her transfer to the MERALCO Alabang Sector.
The trial court granted the prayers of respondent including the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction directing petitioners to desist from implementing respondent’s
transfer until such time that petitioners comply with the disclosures required.
RTC Ruling:
CA Ruling:
Issue:
1] WON the RTC lacked jurisdiction to over the case and cannot restrain MERALCO’s
prerogative as employer to transfer the place of work of its employees.
[2] WON the issuance of the writ outside the parameters expressly set forth in the Rule on
the Writ of Habeas Data? 
 
SC Ruling:
1] YES.
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the
image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant
to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus
against abuse in this age of information technology. It bears reiteration that like the writ of
amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available
remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or
security as a remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.
[W]rits of …habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns
nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.
Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause of the
Constitution. It is evident that respondent’s reservations on the real reasons for her transfer
– a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of one’s employment – are what
prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such
concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.
[2] YES. 
There is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or
unlawful violation of respondent’s right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or
security. To argue that petitioners’ refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly
received on the threats to respondent’s safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy
is at best speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from
unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her letter as “highly suspicious,
doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all.” And she even suspects that her
transfer to another place of work “betray[s] the real intent of management]” and could be a
“punitive move.” Her posture unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related.
Doctrine of the case

Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, G.R. 180906, October 7, 2008
Facts:
On February 14, 2006, brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo, armers from San Ildefonso,
Bulacan were abducted by members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit
(CAFGU) on suspicion that the brothers were members or supporters of the New Peoples’
Army (NPA). The Manalo brothers were detained in various locations: in Fort Magsaysay,
Nueva Ecija; in Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan; in Camp Luna, Limay Bataan; in a house
somewhere in Zambales; in a farm in Pangasinan. They were also subjected to various forms
of torture such as chained and blind folded, beaten black and blue in different parts of
the body, hit in the stomach with a hard wood, slapped in the forehead by .45 pistol,
punched in the mouth, burned some parts of their bodies with a burning wood, made to
witness the killings of fellow captives; forced to take the pill “alive” which caused them
headaches, and threatened to be executed. After having been detained and tortured for
18 months, the brothers were able to escape from their captors and torturers on August 13,
2007. On August 23, 2007, the Manalo brothers filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction,
and Temporary Restraining Order to stop the military (herein petitioners) from depriving
them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. While the petition was pending, the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October24, 2007. On the same day, the Manalo
brothers filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo
Petition. The next day, October 25, 2017, the Supreme Court (SC) favorably granted their
petition which was treated as an Amparo Petition. The SC remanded the Amparo petition to
the Court of Appeals (CA) and ordered the latter to conduct a summary hearing there on
November 8, 2007.
CA RULING:
On December 26, 2007, the CA granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo to the Manalo
brothers relying on the brothers’ affidavits and testimonies and the medical reports and
testimony of Dr. Molino, a forensic expert, on the scars left by the injuries inflicted on the
brothers. The CA ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the AFP Chief of
Staff (petitioners) to furnish the Manalo brothers and the CA within 5 days with all
the official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken, confirm in writing the
present places of Hilario and Caigas –the military personnel identified by the Manalo
brothers; to produce all medical reports, records and charts, reports of any treatment
given or recommended and medicines prescribed while in detention; and to submit a
list of medical personnel who attended to the brothers while under military custody.
In their Return of the Writ, the military disputed the brothers’ accounts but undertook to
exert efforts in providing results of the investigations conducted or to be conducted relative
to the circumstance of the alleged abduction of the Manalo brothers. The petitioners went
to the Supreme Court seeking the reversal of the CA decision extending the privilege of the
Writ of Amparo to the Manalo brothers.
ISSUES:
1.WON the CA erred in believing and in giving full faith and credit to the affidavit/testimony
of the Manalo brothers?
2.Whether or not the CA erred in granting the reliefs requested in the Amparo Petition –
requiring the petitioners to furnish the Manalo brothers and the CA with all the official and
unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken, confirm in writing the present places of
Hilario and Caigas, to produce all medical reports, records and charts, reports of any
treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed while in detention and to
submit a list of medical personnel who attended to the brothers while under military
custody
Held:
No. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
Section 1. Petition. -The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall
cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (emphasis
supplied)
Meanwhile Sections 17 and 18 provide that the quantum of evidence required in
petitions for Writ of Amparo is substantial evidence, to wit:
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. -The parties shall
establish their claims by substantial evidence. In affirming the factual findings of the CA, the
Supreme Court ruled that Raymond Manalo’s affidavit and testimony which was
corroborated by his brother Reynaldo’s affidavit and testimony as well as the medical
reports and testimony of forensic expert, Dr. Molino, constitute substantial evidence which
is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. The SC was convinced by the CA findings that indeed the Manalo
brothers were abducted and detained by the military for 18 months in various locations on
suspicion that they were either members or sympathizers of the NPA. The participation of
identified abductors Hilario, Arman, Ganata, Cabalse, Caigas and the named CAFGU
auxillaries was established. General Palparan’s participation in the abduction was also
established when he failed to controvert Raymond Manalo’s claim. The SC also pointed out
that the results of the investigation of the Provost Marshall focused on the one-sided
version of the CAFGU auxillaries involved. The SC ruled that there is a continuing violation of
the Manalo brothers’ right to security. Since the brothers’ escape, they have been under
concealment and protection from the military by private citizens because of the threat to
their life, liberty and security. The circumstances of the brothers’ abduction, detention,
torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that
they will again be abducted, tortured, and even executed. These constitute threats to their
liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a Writ of Amparo.
2. No. The petitioners argue that the production order of the CA partakes the nature
of a search warrant that necessitates compliance with the Constitutional requisites for the
protection of the right against unreasonable searches. They are wrong. The amparo
production order pertained to a procedure that cannot be identified or confused with
unreasonable searches prohibited by the Constitution. Moreover in his affidavit, AFP Chief
of Staff himself undertook to provide results of the investigations conducted or to be
conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged abduction of
the Manalo brothers.

LOZADA v. PGMA, ERMITA, RAZON G.R. 184379-80
Facts:
Petitioner Lozada was the former President and Chief Executive Officer of the Philippine
Forest Corporation (PFC), a government-owned and -controlled corporation under the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Petitioner Violeta Lozada
(Violeta) is his wife, while petitioner Arturo Lozada (Arturo) is his brother. The instant
Petition stems from the alleged corruption scandal precipitated by a transaction between
the Philippine government, represented by the National Broadband Network (NBN), and ZTE
Corporation (ZTE), a Chinese manufacturer of telecommunications equipment. Former
National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) Secretary Romulo Neri (Sec. Neri) sought
the services of Lozada as an unofficial consultant in the ZTE-NBN deal. The latter avers that
during the course of his engagement, he discovered several anomalies in the said
transaction involving certain public officials. These events impelled the Senate of the
Philippines Blue Ribbon Committee (Blue Ribbon Committee) to conduct an investigation
thereon, for which it issued a subpoena directing Lozada to appear and testify on 30 January
2008. On that date, instead of appearing before the Blue Ribbon Committee, Lozada left the
country for a purported official trip to London, as announced by then DENR Secretary Lito
Atienza (Sec.Atienza). In the Petition, Lozada alleged that his failure to appear at the
scheduled hearing was upon the instructions of then Executive Assistant Undersecretary
Manuel Gaite (Usec. Gaite). Consequently, the Senate issued an Order dated 30 January
2008: (a) citing Lozada for contempt; (b) ordering his arrest and detention; and (c) directing
the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms to implement the Order and make a return thereon. While
overseas, Lozada asked Sec. Atienza whether the former could be allowed to go back to the
Philippines. Upon the approval of Sec. Atienza, Lozada informed his family that he was
returning from Hong Kong on 5 February 2008 on board Cathay Pacific Flight No. 919, bound
to arrive in Manila at 4:40 p.m. on the same day. In the Petition, Lozada claims that, upon
disembarking from the aircraft, several men held his arms and took his bag. Although he
allegedly insisted on meeting with his family, he later realized that it was wiser to just follow
them, especially when he overheard from their handheld radio: "[H]wag kayong dumaan
diyan sir nandyan ang mga taga senado. Thereafter Sec. Atienza phoned Lozada that the
men with him were from government for his protection. The car where Lozada ride is heavy
guarded and tailed with other vehicles. The car drove away and traversed SLEX and towards
Laguna. Lozada requested that he be brought to Pasig but to no avail due to security risk.
Violeta filed before this Court a Petition for Habeas Corpus and Arturo likewise filed before
this Court a Petition for a Writ of Amparo and prayed for the issuance of (a) the writ of
amparo; (b) a Temporary Protection Order (TPO); and (c) Inspection and Production Orders
as regards documents related to the authority ordering custody over Lozada, as well as any
other document that would show responsibility for his alleged abduction. At around the
same time that Arturo filed the Petition for a Writ of Amparo, Col. Mascarinas drove Lozada
back to La Salle Green Hills.30 Lozada was then made to sign a typewritten, antedated letter
requesting police protection. Thereafter, former Presidential Spokesperson Michael
Defensor (Sec. Defensor) supposedly came and requested Lozada to refute reports that the
latter was kidnapped and to deny knowledge of alleged anomalies in the NBNZTE deal. Sec.
Defensor then purportedly gave Lozada ₱50,000 for the latter’s expenses. On 7 February
2008, Lozada decided to hold a press conference and contact the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms,
who served the warrant of arrest on him. Lozada claimed that after his press conference and
testimony in the Senate, he and his family were since then harassed, stalked and
threatened. Thereafter, Lozada filed a Motion for Temporary Protection Order and
Production of Documents while Arturo filed a Motion for Production of Documents.46
Additionally, Arturo also filed a Motion for the Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and
Presentation of Hostile Witnesses and Adverse Parties Romulo Neri, Benjamin Abalos, [Sr.],
Rodolfo Valeroso, "Jaime" the Driver and OtherRespondents.
The CA denied the Motion for the Issuance of Subpoena on the ground that the alleged acts
and statements attributed to Sec. Neri and Benjamin Abalos (Abalos) were irrelevant to the
Amparo case, and that to require them to testify would only result in a fishing expedition.
The CA likewise denied Arturo’s subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue:
WON CA correctly denied the Motion for the Issuance of Subpoena on the ground that the
alleged acts and statements attributed to Sec. Neri and Benjamin Abalos (Abalos) were
irrelevant to the Amparo case, and that to require them to testify would only result in a
fishing expedition. 
Held: dragging the names of other people into the picture. We have repeatedly reminded the
Yes, the CA did not commit any reversible error in denying the Motion for the Issuance of parties, in the course of the proceedings, that the instant Amparo Petition does not involve
Subpoena Ad Testificandum. This Court, in Roco v. Contreras, ruled that for a subpoena to the investigation of the ZTE-[NBN] contract. Petitioner should focus on the fact in issue and
issue, it must first appear that the person or documents sought to be presented are prima not embroil this Court into said ZTE-NBN contract, which is now being investigated by the
facie relevant to the issue subject of the controversy, to wit: A subpoena is a process Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and the Office of the Ombudsman. All the references of
directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or trial of an action petitioners to either Sec. Neri or Abalos were solely with respect to the ZTENBN deal, and
or at any investigation conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for the taking of his not to the events that transpired on 5-6 February 2008, or to the ensuing threats that
deposition. In this jurisdiction, there are two (2) kinds of subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad petitioners purportedly received. Although the present action is rooted from the
testificandum and subpoena duces tecum. The first is used to compel a person to testify, involvement of Lozada in the said government transaction, the testimonies of Sec. Neri or
while the second is used to compel the production of books, records, things or documents Abalos are nevertheless not prima facie relevant to the main issue of whether there was an
therein specified. As characterized in H.C. Liebenow vs. The Philippine Vegetable Oil unlawful act or omission on the part of respondents that violated the right to life, liberty and
Company: security of Lozada.
The subpoena duces tecum is, in all respects, like the ordinary subpoena ad testificandum
with the exception that it concludes with an injunction that the witness shall bring with him
and produce at the examination the books, documents, or things described in the subpoena.
Well-settled is the rule that before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court must first
be satisfied that the following requisites are present:
(1) the books, documents or other things requested must appear prima facie relevant to the
issue subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); and
(2) such books must be reasonably described by the parties to be readily identified (test of
definiteness). In the present case, the CA correctly denied petitioners’ Motion for the
Issuance
of Subpoena Ad Testificandum on the ground that the testimonies of the witnesses sought
to be presented during trial were prima facie irrelevant to the issues of the case. The court a
quo aptly ruled in this manner: The alleged acts and statements attributed by the petitioner
to Neri and Abalos are not relevant to the instant Amparo Petition where the issue involved
is whether or not Lozada’s right to life, liberty and security was threatened or continues to
be threatened with violation by the unlawful act/s of the respondents. Evidence, to be
relevant, must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or
nonexistence. Further, Neri, Abalos and a certain driver "Jaime" are not respondents in this
Amparo Petition and the vague allegations averred in the Motion with respect to them do
not pass the test of relevancy. To Our mind, petitioner appears to be embarking on a
"fishing expedition". Petitioner should present the aggrieved party [Lozada], who has been
regularly attending the hearings, to prove the allegations in the Amparo Petition, instead of

SEC. DE LIMA V GATDULA, G.R. 204528, FEBRUARY 19, 2013
Facts:
Respondent Gatdula filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the RTC of
Manila, directed against petitioners. Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of
Amparo or not, the judge issued summons and ordered the petitioners to file an answer. He
also set the case for hearing.
The counsel for petitioners manifested that a Return and not an Answer is appropriate for
Amparo cases but the Judge opined that the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure applied
since an Amparo case is summary in nature, thus, required an Answer.
The hearing was conducted and the judge ordered the parties to file their respective
memoranda.
RTC Decision:
It then rendered a decision granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo and interim reliefs
prayed for namely: Temporary protection, production and inspection orders.
The decision was assailed by the petitioners through a Petition for Review on Certiorari via
Rule 45 as enunciated in Sec. 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the filing of an Answer was appropriate?
2. Whether or not the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure apply in a Petition for Writ of
Amparo?
3. Whether or not the holding of the hearing on the main case was proper?
4. Whether or not the filing of the memorandum was proper?
5. Whether or not the decision granting the privilege of the Writ and the interim reliefs was
correct?
6. Whether or not the mode of appeal under Rule 45 availed by the Petitioners was correct?
HELD:
1. No. It is the Return that serves as the responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of
Writs of Amparo.
2. The Revised Rules of Summary Procedures apply only to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-
boggling how this rule could possibly apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this
Court limited the application of summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A
writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right or particular fact.34 It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application
of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced.
3. No. The holding of the hearing without the Return was not proper. There will be a
summary hearing only after the Return is filed to determine the merits of the petition and
whether interim reliefs are warranted. If the Return is not filed, the hearing will be done ex
parte.
4. No. A memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
5. No. The decision was not correct. This gives the impression that the decision was the
judgment since the phraseology is similar to Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo:
"SEC. 18. Judgment. — The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time
the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by
substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be
proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied." (Emphasis supplied).
The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual order called the
Writ of Amparo. The privilege includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo. The judgment should detail the required acts from the
respondents that will mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the
petitioner's life, liberty or security.
A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the writ" cannot be executed.
6. The Petition for Review is not the proper remedy to assail the interlocutory order. A
Petition for Certiorari, on the other hand, is prohibited. Simply dismissing the present
petition, however, will cause grave injustice to the parties involved. It undermines the
salutary purposes for which the Rule on the Writ of Amparo were promulgated.
Decision:
(1) NULLIFY all orders issued by the Judge in relation to this Petition for the Issuance of a
Writ of Amparo case;
(2) DIRECT the Judge to determine within forty-eight (48) hours from his receipt of this
Resolution whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper on the basis of the petition
and its attached affidavits.