A Contro) Pa "Of ection of Tenany so received, a8 the unexpirag lease bears to the total periog provided further that, resaid, the landlord shal sent per annum on the a 1 portio DN of the con ‘ontract or a of Agraarment ‘ OF contract or agreerr, nent any di lefaul II be lial 'S Made in making mount Ee Pay Simple intoragt aren Yd as ch he has omitted Tene rate of s SYNOPSis ease OF failed to tatune rr §. 14A—Introduction : s, 14A—Object 4A and ' an Ss. 25A, 25B ang 25C are not violative of Art. 14 of the §. 14A(1}—Conditions of applicability §. 14A(1)—Landlord en noose . §. 14A(1}—Being a i ‘ vate , mane 'n occupation of any residential accommodation 7 quired to vacate in pursuance Government or authority of an order of the Central 8, $14A(1}—Purpose of letting i residential 9 is irrelevant but accommodation must be 9. S.14A(1)}—Overrides the provisions of the Slum Act 10. Set mel at pe invoked even during the period of limited tenancy 11. $.14A(1}—Procedure for trial of an eviction petition under S. 14A 42. S. 14A(1)—Defences open in an eviction application under S. 140. 43. S. 14A(1}—Leave to defend a petition under the section 44, S.14A(1)—Applicability of S. 14(6) and S. 14(7) 45. S. 14A(1)}—Applicability of S. 19(1) 16. S.14A(1}—Claim of eviction must be bona fide 17. S. 14A(1}—Effect of modified circular dated 14-7-1977 on pending proceedings 1. S. 144A4—Introduction.—This section was added for the first time by the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1976, S. 5. It was preceded by Ordinance No. 24 of 1975 which came into force on 1.12.75. And the Act which superseded the Ordinance was made retrospective to take effect from the same date, The section gives Government servants residing in Government accommodation an immediate right to recover possession of their own houses. S. 25B was also added primarily to implement this section and it provided summary procedure but it was made applicable simultaneously to all landlords/owners who required their houses on the ground of bona fide requirement. 2. $. 144A—Object.—During the Emergency, the Government laid down as a matter of policy that Government premises occupied by persons who had pret own houses should be asked to vacate such accommodation occupied by them.' th Law of Rent Cor ta ww cmd which penal » van by a certain date bey Mn The decision was taker eos were required to A were therefore added 4,, r" ac ate ment prem itor 4 Chapter TTI houses within the time allowed , This section ane 1 to their own of the Government calling upon the oe, ‘Pan premises has been made cong, chy 121978 euch oocupants to shif fer to vacate the hor this reason the ore he house for his own occupation yment premises is need for f! Gover Kasturi Lal’ the Supreme Court made the fotic, ing evidence of h In Sarwan Singh ¥ observations: — “The object of S. 144, as shown by its marginal note, is to conf, right on certain landlords to recover “immediate Possession” of premises” belonging to them and which are in the possession of jy, tenants. In the significant language of the marginal note, such a Tigh a “to accrue” to a class of persons. The same concept is pursued dy clarified in the body of Section 14A by providing that in ns ee mentioned i ine section, a right will accrue to n landlord “to recover immediat ossession of an’ is by him.” mole any Premises let out Again >— “Whatever be the merits of that philosophy, the is phy, the theory is allottee from the Central Government or a local authority shout a Pe a mercy of law’s delays while being faced with instant evi, a 2 Bs landlord save on payment of what in practice is penal mon ‘ac od with a Hobson's choice, to quit the official residence or mt market rent fri the allotee had in tum to be afforded a ee oped . Hous Stee: against his own tenant. With that end FS Vit oa stand inthe way of th alo even the Slum Clearance Act, shall allo om evicting hi x the summary procedure i g his tenant by resortin, te Prescribed by Chapter III A. The ee —_____ 1. SeeR.K, Parikh KAY. Uma Verma, 1978(1) RLR 423 (430). 2. AIR 197 5c 265 (272.3), 3. Wbid p.274 of at 3): 1978(2) RCR 445; 1977 rae ; 6: 1977 RCR 348,7 - wal Control of Eviction of Tenant 1 to supp ort e " Seon es r the view that the express Pa ain Gi Cesidental suitability, and ee sim residential ; 2 » of lel was eleva oy eel ourt quoted the above observation Pace ao ¢ object was also further rvations in a later wd eet the Delhi High Court explained in its social setting in this Tse. F tr peld that pee also commented on the object” In this case ie ao Pec} es ea S. Jaye were not available in Io the ingredients of § a and that defence under S. 14A 1s ; . 144. The C dt awellin ; ‘ ourt also interpreted the jon ‘dwelling house’ used in the section. The scope of the section was tai down in the form of propositions. nd SS. . S- ent tae 25B and 25C are not violative of Art. 14 of the constitution: 4 question came up before the Courts in relation to the jal proce ure laid down in S. 25B for trying only particular eviction applications, ie., on the grounds contained in S. 14(1)(e) and S. 14A. The vires ofS. 25 were challenged on the contention that it was violative of Art. 14 and suffered from the vice of excessive delegation. The challenge was turned down: In Ravi Dutt Sharma's case before the Supreme Court the attack was in fact on the validity of Ss. 25A, 25B, 25C. It was not a case under S. 14A but an eviction application under S. 14(1)(e) read with S. 25B, and the principal yestion Was whether permission under the Slum Act was necessary before filing the application. The landlord had applied for permission under the Slum ‘Act which was refused. He then filed the application without permission in view of the Supreme Court decision in Sarwan Singh v. Kasturi Lal.4 It was in this context that the validity of Ss. 25A, 25B and 25C was raised. The Supreme Court laid down the law in the following words “13, On a consideration, therefore, of the facts and circumstances of the case and the law referred to above, we reach the following conclusions: (1) That Ss. 14A, 25A, 25B and 25C of the Rent Act are special provisions so far as the landlord and tenant are concerned and in view of the non-obstante clause these provisions would override the existing law so far as the new procedure is concerned: (2) That there is no difference either on principle or in law between Ss. 14(1) (e) and 14A of the Rent Act even though two provisions relate to eviction of tenants under different situations: _—_— 1. Busching Schmitz (P) Lid. v. P.T. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569: 1977(2) RCR 233: 1977 Raj LR 283. 2. VL. Kashyap v. R.P. Puri, 1977(1) RLR 397 (405): ILR 1977(1) Del 22. 3. Kewal Singh v. Lajwanti, AIR 1980 SC 161; Ravi Dutt Sharma v. Ratan Lal Bhargava, SC 967: 1984(1) RR 357: 1984(1) RCJ 325. AIR 1977 SC 265: 1977(2) SCR 421. AIR 1984 SC 967 at 971. AIR 1984 aweSe Law of Rent Control in Petit ap pter HHA of the Aimeng (That the procedure incorporated in Chap Ling Act into the Rent Act is in public interest and 16 P01 Violajiyg Article 14 of the Constitution (4) That in view of the procedure in ¢ hapter IA of the Rent Acy, the Shim Act is rendered inapplicable to the extent of inconsisten, and it is not, therefore, necessary for the landlord to oby,,7 permission of the Competent Authority under 5. 19 (1) (a) of the Slum Act before instituting a suit for eviction and coming Within S. 14 (1) (e) or 14A of the Rent Act.” 4, S. 14A(1)—Conditions of applicability. —They are: (1) The landlord must be a person who is in actual occupation of residential premises allotted to him by the Central Government or an local authority; it is not necessary that he must be a Government servant. (2) He is required to vacate such premises by or in pursuance of a genera] or special order made by the Central Government or authority and to incur certain obligations in case of default. (3) Such order is made on the ground that he owns a residential accommodation, either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child, in the Union Territory of Delhi. For a statement of the conditions for the applicability of the section, see B.N, Muttoo v. Dr. T.K. Nandi! and Busching Schmitz v. P T Menghani2 Also see the undermentioned case.3 We will consider these conditions separately. 5. S. 14A(1)—Landlord.—It implies that the occupant of the Government premises must be the owner. Where wife is the owner, an application by the “husband will not be maintainable.‘ But a petition by her under S. 25B on the ground contained in S. 14(1)(e) may be made on the ground of her husband's requirement.5 The occupant may be one of the co-owners. He may apply along with the other co-owners or by impleading them as respondents.° The occupant may not be the owner in the strict sense. For that see commentary under S. 14(1)(e). The same person should be owner, landlord and allottee of Government accommodation to maintain an application under the section.” AIR 1979 SC 460: 1979(15) DLT 36 SC: 1979(1) RCJ 316: 1979(1) and RCR 144: 1978(2) SCR 409 and Busching Schmitz v. P.T. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569 at 1575. AIR 1977 SC 1569 at 1575. . Tilak Ram v. Maya Devi, 1977 (1) RLR 645. |. Tilak Ram v. Maya Devi, 1977 (1) RLR 645. . Ibid. Kanta Goel v. B.P. Pathak, 1977 RC] 735: 1977 Raj LR 49; K.R. Nambiar v. S.C. Mittal, 1977(1) RCJ 907 Del: AIR 1978 Del NOC 44. 7. Attar Kaur v. R.N. Gupta, 1978(1) RLR 61 Del. aaRoeny al Control of Eviction of ‘1p ow nant 563 as been held that the allottee will be the ¢ sprained on hie purchase from DDA under betta of the house which he pase ement and Disposal of Housin ng, Estate ans 1 Estates) Regulations, 1964 dlord may be the real owne: The jan ner but the house ndent . se may stand e name of ris wile oe lent child benami for him, inasmuch i. a ‘i ve 7 e Ss el i ‘ = a uch a case cove a chi Sar ‘ tion Sa own name or in the name of his wife o pel ap, e Ue yas in name. ipply where they are the owners, in fact Thi Development Authority the Delhi High Court view has been dissented from by the Punjab and vyna High Court.) Successor of i Hath tof the section’ the original landlord is entitled to the _ S 44A(1)—Being a person in occupati wags accommodation —Actual Occupation is ne one ‘he ses rat the landlord never lived in Government accommodation and that he lived a house 0 Kamila Nagar. Leave to defend was granted.® The application will not lie if he has already vacated Government premises.6 A mete allotment of 1 nmodation not followed by actual occupation i nt sufficient” 7.8. 14A(I)—Is required to vacate in pursuance of an order of the Central Government or authority —The section will not apply where the allottee was otherwise bound to vacate Government premises for other reasons such as retirement from service or transfer from Delhi The Supreme Court held that the provision applies to a person who is in Government service at the time of the notice to vacate and retires subsequently, but not to one. who has already retired or been transferred outside Delhi.? In Nihal Chand’s case the Supreme Court was concerned with a case in which the Government servant had retired after service of notice for vacating the premises, and the question as to what would be the position in a case where the notice was served after retirement of the Government servant did not directly arise. It arose in the case of B.N. Muttoo v. TK. Nandi.'© The Court observed that on the reasoning of Nihal Chand’s case the landlord would fail, but it proceeded to hold that there was _____— 1. Kanwal Kishore Chopra v. O.P. Diwedi, 19772) RLR 274 1977(2) RCJ 320; Swaran Singh v. Kul Bhushan, 1978(1) RLR 548 Del CL Seth v. Deoki Nandan, 1977 Raj LR 110; Tilak Ram v. Maya Devi, 1977 Raj LR 34. Dilbag Rai v. Lajwanti, 1977(2) RC] 135 on S. 13A(1) added in the Punjab Act in its application to the Union Territory of Chandigarh, | VIL. Kashyap v. RP. Puri 1977(1) RLR 397: 1977(1) RC} 47: ILR 1977(1) Del 22. Fateh Singh v. Hukam Chand, 1977 (2) RCR 165: 1977 RLR 244, Busching Schmitz v.P.T. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, Om Parkash Gupta v. Ram Nath Gupta, 1976 RC) 780: 1977 RLR 496. Ram Chander v. Gokul Chand, 1977(1) RC) 1. Nihal Chand v. Kalyan Chand, AIR 1978(1) SC 2! 1978(2) SCR 183. AIR 1979 SC 460. 59 (265): 1978(1) RCR 223: 1978 Raj LR.100: 10.564 Law of Rent Control in Detht [Sec. 14, no reason to restrict the plain meaning of the words used in the statute. The Court said:! The Court has to determine the intention as expressed by the word. used. If the words of statutes are themselves precise and unambiguous then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. The words themselves alone do in such a case best declare the intention of the lawgiver. Taking into account the object of the Act there could be no difficulty in giving the plain meaning to the word ‘person’ as not being confined to Government servants for it is seen that accommodation has been provided by the Government not only to Government servants but to others. In the circumstances, the Court cannot help giving the plain and unambiguous meaning to the section. It may be that the retired Government servants as well others who are in occupation of Government accommodation may become entitled to a special advantage, but the purpose of the legislation being to enable the Government to get possession of accommodation provided by them by enabling the allottees to get immediate possession of the residential accommodation owned but let by them, the Court will not be justified in giving a meaning which the words used will not warrant. On this question therefore we find ourselves unable to concur with the view taken by the High Court.” It was held that the appellant wi appeal was allowed with costs. Thus, case do not hold the field. Continued occupation of Government accommodation till the date of the application is not necessary.? The matter was considered by the Supreme Court in Narain Khamman v. Parduman Kumar Jain? and it stated its conclusions in the form of propositions, which are teproduced below: “18. To summarise our conclusions: as entitled to invoke S. 14A(1) and his the contrary observations in Nihal Chand ———____ 1. BN. Muttoo v. T.K, Nandi, AIR 1979 sc 460 at 465. 2. Basheshar Nath Setia v. PC. j AR DONS tia v. Tandon, 1980 (17) DLT 202: 1980 Raj LR 49; 1980(1) RLR 120: 3. AIR 1985SC 4 in para 18; 1985(1) SCC 1; 1985(27) DLT 35.Control . val of Eviction of Tenants 565 hen he files i wn at ‘Control A es under S. 14A (1) of the l , , to re Pt residential premises which he so PaSeR eT has be sie Sa r ich has been let by Q) such person has, newever, other premises which he owns either or in tl is wii See ve name of his wife or dependent child into which he h; application under S. 144 (1) of the Act. () Even i the other Premises owned by him either in his own name or int fants of his wife or dependent child are not reasonably suitable for his accommodation, he cannot maintain an application under S. 14A (1) but must fil ar le an application on the ground specie in clause (e) of the Proviso to sub-section (1) of Lan of (8S 14A(1)—Purpose of letting is irrelevant but accommodation must be residential —It is established by a series of decisions of the Supreme Court that the purpose of letting is irrelevant for attracting S. 14A. One may refer to the undernoted decisions.! No teference, therefore, needs to be made tn the High Court decisions in which the same view was taken. The same view has been taken by the Supreme Court in regard to interpretation of the subsequently inserted provisions contained in Ss. 14B, 14C and 14D? Even though the purpose of letting is irrelevant, the premises sought to be got vacated must be ‘residential accommodation.’ Krishna lyer, J. laid down what is meant by this expression in Busching Schmitz case. The learned judge explained the meaning of this expression in three short paragraphs so beautifully that it almost appears to be a picture of what ‘residential accommodation’ is. It is not necessary to reproduce here the entire discussion. The test was laid down in para 18 in these words: -wauu.Whatever is suitable or adaptable for residential uses, even by making some changes, can be designated ‘residential premises’. And once it is ‘residential’ in the liberal sense, S. 14 A stands attracted.” The proviso to S. 14A(1) uses the expression ‘dwelling house’. In the context it is obvious that the expression ‘dwelling house’ has been used in the same sense as ‘residential accommodation’. An exhaustive discussion, with 1. Busching Schmitz (P) Lid. v. P-T. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569; BIN. ‘Muttoo v. T.K. Nandi, eee 3; Chander Mohan v. Harwant . Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India, 1991(1) RCR 347 SC 12, 13; ler in v. Harwari Singh 1994(54) DLT 12: 1994(1) RC] 545: 1994(2) RCR 24: 1994 RLR 220. 3. AIR 1977 SC 1569. 4. See paras 17 to 19 of AIR 1977 SC 1569 at 1576. RvLaw of Rent Control in Dethi aw of Re [ee 14 “ he meaning, of ‘dwelling rel '$ (0 be foung poset OMe ac irt held: reference a pea of the cases, the Cou Delhi case. aka fore, clear to me that the use of the words “24. It is, there a it not synonymous with the word n house’ in S. i The reason is that the allottees of Gove men defined in the odation are not only Class IV ang Class Ij ffcer residential accomm« ‘ing one or two room tenements in Covert (who may be vate clude Secretaries and Joint Secretaries falling premises), but sphere ed to live in complete bungalows, cor sisting Sane a in addition to other @PPUrtenances a of three or Sie intention of the amendment 1S to require them to conveniences. t accommodation and live in their own house, it ig aut aoa that they are Tequired to live in their Whole h, reasonal 0 P Ouse ding. In other Word remise in part of the bui rds thei ee ee is not confined to only one Of th eir ni eated in the proviso and a wider expression ‘dwelling ae inserted. The word ‘dwelling-house’ must, therefore more extensive meaning than Premises, but another whole be excluded from its connotation.” ile interpreting the UP. Which is to the same effect as S, 14A(1) and the proviso,4 The Court also Teiterated and ©xpressly agreed with the views of Justice Krishna Tyer in the Busching Schmitz case, Kashyap’s case was distinguisheg On the basis of the ob, Supreme CourtS and j the ‘Premises let out by him’ ‘an the whole building. The building in this case been let out to four tenants. The Court Construed it to mean that the Portion with each tenant Was ‘Premises’. It was observe that if that 1. VL. Kashyap v, Rp. Puri, 1977 Roy 47, TR 19771) Det 29. AIR 19; 2 Ibid at p. 60 of RC, 3. SS. Makhijani y. VK. Jotwani, 1997 ni, Raj LR 207: 1977 DR 880 4. SP Jain y. Krishna Mohan Gupta, AIR 1987 Hee . 222: 1987(1 191, 5. Kanta Goel v. pp Pathak, 197713) sop 412 followeg nn Verma, 1980(18) DLT 118, in Nanak Chand Gupta v. Ish Kumar 77 Del Noc 205.OF Eviction Ff Teng : nant commodation Was insuffic lent he 5 14()(@)-| was held that the ». jhe right of the landlord to claim as the landlord had been aby et pon ° LO pal inder 5+ 14A was dismissed, © Be u 4g, $. 4A(—Overrides the . Prov; under the Slum Areas (Improvement on of the Siu , recondition to file a petition ung, a -— Permission he Supreme Court in Rayj p, ne the section. The roposition ey iS Rot a te the right under ¢ Tai Sharma's case has ahent en laid down by sublic interest and not for hig owe been conferred on the been extracted enefi indlor h agreement between the parties contrary at only. It has been held that an, from enforcing his right under the Pare was that the landlord had a section’ Tp tO” Will not prevent him me Pe choice to retain allo, argument before the judge rent or ask for eviction of the tenant from hi oma eremises and pay penal argument is that the landlord had no absol n house. The fallacy in the accommodation on paym« 'y in the allotted iS ‘ent of penal rent ieee between the exercise of nl So there was no question of choice 567 Ould sue the 6 ea two tenants under PrOVISO Was to restrict me tenant under S. 144, > tenants, his adding, the Tom only « nf 5 petition two rights. cs commentary under S. 25A. 11. S. 14A(1)—Procedure for trial of a1 is laid down in S. 25B. S. 25B(1) lays down that an application under S. 14A shall be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in that section. The two grounds one under S. 14A and S, 14(1)(e) are distinct and mutually exclusive. In an application under S. 14A the landlord must plead all the three ingredients.” Notwithstanding this difference in the pleadings and scope of enquiry on the two kinds of applications for eviction, the procedure for trial is the same, i.e., as laid down in S. 25B, sub-sections (2) to (7). And in either case there need not be specific prayer for trial under the summary procedure n eviction petition under S. 14A.—It Panna Lal Jain v. Memo Devi, 1983(2) RLR 186: 1983(24) DLT 66. Sarwan Singh v. Kasturi Lal, AIR 1977 SC 265; Madan Lal Gupta v. Ravinder Kumar, 2001(1) SCC 252: 2001 (1) JT 123 SC; Ravi Dutt Sharma v. Ratan Lal Bhargava, AIR 1984 SC 967; Shafait Ali v. Shiva Mal, 1987(3) SCC 728: 1987 Raj LR 470. See commentary under heading 3 supra. Geoffery Manners and Co. v. Harbhagwan Singh, 1984(2) RC} 384: 1984(26) DLT 404: 19842) RCR 302 Del. International Building & Furnishing Co. v. J.S. Rikhy, 1985(2) RCR 2 2s a iB 81 . JL. Paul (Dr.) v. Ranjit Singh, 1980(18) DLT SN 24: 1980(2) RCR 52’ BRR but Hari Mohan Nehru v. Rameshwar Dayal, 1980 Raj LR 249: AIR 1980 : : ol : 284. - 17; J.L. Paul (Dr.) v. Ranjit Singh, AIR 1977 SC 265 - para 17; anit : ‘008 aa SN Seana RCR 527; Krishan Kumar v. R.C. Dhingra, 1980 RajLaw of Rent Control in Delhi 568 Ie. 144 Defences open in an eviction application under s 1 Dieter ated cele eas the landlord, The defences on merits in such ae renin only 4, fulfilment ot otherwise of the conditions an res retions mentio in 5.14 above, apart from any defence of a procedura atur pili ray available according, to law.! In many cases an aaa of S 14(1)(0). However, Pitan under S. 14A must also satisfy requirements of 5. F ee fever, it is row settled that not only S. 14A but Ss. 14B, 14C an are different from cca and confer special rights and a tenant may Pes such application, only on the grounds specified within the respective sections. 13. S. 14A(1)—Leave to defend a petition under the section.—It is Obvious that defences open to a tenant in an application under S. 14(1)(e) are not Open to him. He can contest it only on the ground that the landlord 1s Not a person in occupation of residential premises allotted to him by the Centraj Government or that no general or special order has been made by the Government requiring him to vacate such residential accommodation on the terms specified in the section. Leave to defend an application under S. 14A(1) cannot be said to be analogous to the provisions of grant of leave to defend as envisaged by the Civil Procedure Code, Order XXXVII. 14, S. 14A(1)—Applicability of S. 14(6) and S. 14(7).—S. 25C(1) Temoves the restriction imposed by S. 14(6) in case of persons who satisfy the requirements of S. 14A. This means that the restriction imposed therein would apply only in case of application made under S14(1)(e)- By virtue of S. 25C(2) the period prescribed by S. 14(7) is reduced from 6 months to 2 months. The reason is that otherwise an applicant under S. 144 would be entitled to possession immediately.> But this is not correct in view of the decision in Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India,® and the Controller can give reasonable time to vacate the premises to the tenant. 15. S. 14A(1)—Applicability of S. 19(1).—S. 19(1) of the Act lays down that where a landlord recovers possession of any premises from a tenant under Ss. 14(1)(e), 14A, 14B, 14C and 14D, he shall not within three years from the date of obtaining possession re-let whole or part of the premises without permission of the Controller. The reference to Ss. 14A, 14B, 14C and 14D has been added only by the Amendment Act 57 of 1988. However, even when there was no reference to it in S, 19(1), the Supreme Court had held + Vil. Kashyap v. RP. Puri, 1977(1) RC} 47: ILR 1977(1) Del 22, 2. BN. Muttoo v. T.K. Nandi, AIR 1979 SC 460; Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India, 1991(1) RCR 347 SC, 3. BN. Muttoo v. T.K, Nandi Supra; Busching Schmitz v. P.T. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569 - reiterated in Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India supra. + See B.N. Muttoo v. TK. Nandi, AIR 1979 SC 460 at 467-68. . Ibid at p. 468. 6. Supra, aemoval of Renctiam of Trees wu wee en week! Apply evn IN relation ty 65 pot tw! 4A by reason of nevewary amen ig MACY Claim or eviction mut be home fide I , Supreme Court that all clai ft has beer Laie pony tne laine for eviction of tenamte enue ie wien heading of Chapter Tl A was also re Teeases in which the contrary ples dhoveca le . nor this propositin sre th Oe good Taw mn made can not be nb ACI) Effect of modified 2 §. 4A ified ci 7 1 Sine? _Refore considering the cneaTad pia ie won pending, r cessary to note the difference it made. By circular dated 9 7h, be eetment decided that those Government servants who had built their wees at (NE place of their posting within the limits of any local or adjacent nicipality shall be required to vacate the Government accommodation ak to them within three months from 1-10-1975. It was also provided that if they did not vacate the Government accommodation within the stipulated | after that period they would be charged licence fee at market rate. By the revised circular dated 14-7-1977 the Government decided with effect from 14-1977 the restriction on allotment of accommodation to such servants would stand modified making them eligible for Government accommodation The rent or licence fee payable by the allottee was related to the rent the allottee was receiving from his own house. The modification was brought about by a notification issued by the President in pursuance of rule 45 of the Fundamental Rules amending the Allotment of Government Residences (General Pool in Delhi) Rules, 1963 contained in Part VIII, Division XXVI B of the Supplementary Rules. Thus where leave had been refused by the Controller and eviction order had been passed, the High Court took note of the subsequent event, granted leave to defend and sent the matter back for the tenant to take it as a ground of defence and for the Controller to consider its effect and decide afresh the application for eviction. The matter came up before the Supreme Court. It was held that the modification did not amount to withdrawal of the first notification, which only stood modified to the extent as to what rate of rent would be payable by the Government employee, owning his own house, if he retained the allotted premises, that is, if he failed to vacate the Government accommodation in pursuance of the general order dated September 9, 1975 and the special order dated December 26, 1975. An eviction petition filed before the modified order was issued remained maintainable. The High Court's order dismissing it at the revision stage was set aside. mul 1. Busching Schmitz Pot. Ltd. v. P.T. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569. 2. Surjit Singh Kalra v. UOI supra. 3. Balkrishan Kapur v. Fagir Chand Jain, 1978(2) RLR 682 Del. 4. Hakam Singh v. Jagat Singh, 1979(1) RC} 384: 1978(2) RCR 957: 1979(15) DLT 117: ILR 1978(2) Del 797; Mohan Singh v. Narain Das, 1978 Raj LR 3 5. Jain Malleables v. Bharat Sahay, AIR 1982 SC 71: 1982(21) DLT 134: 1982 Raj LR 138: 1962(1) RC] 431 - overruling K.D. Singh v. Hari Babu Kanwal supre.570 Law of Rent Control in Delhi [See in je possession of premises to a jt 1[14B. Right to recover immediat iy Were tne landlord rces, etc. bers of the armed fo! “vn d or retired person from any armed forces a, (a) is a aah by him are required for his own residence; or premi Core Ind the d forces who had bee a member of any armet "il (b) in oes ie iotiald let out by such member are required f4, the ' - residence of the family of such member, dependent may, within one year tr s the case may be, the _ we aoieiciesre or retirement from such armed forces OF, a8 the ca, a the date of death of such member, or within a period of one year from Pe of commencement of the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 199, whichever is later, apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises. (2) Where the landlord is a member of any of the armed forces and hag 2 period of less than one year preceding the date of his retirement and the premises let out by him are required for his own residence after his Tetirement, he may, at any time, within a period of one year before the date of his retirement, apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises. (3) Where the landlord referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) has let out more than one premises, it shall be open to him to make an application under that sub-section in respect of only one of the premises chosen by him. Explanation— For the purposes of this section, ‘armed forces’ Means an armed force of the Union constituted under an Act of Parliament and includes a member of the police force constituted under Section 3 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978 (34 of 1978). 14C. Right to recover immediate Possession of premises to accrue to Central Government and Delhi Administration employees.—(1) Where the landlord is a retired employee of the Central Government or of the Delhi Administration, and the premises let out by him are required for his own residence, such employee may, within one year from the date of his retirement or within a period of one year from the date of commencement of Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1988, whichever is later, apply to the Controller for Tecovering the immediate possession of Such premises. (2) Where the landlord is an employee of the Central Delhi Administration and has a period of less than one of his retirement and the Premises let out by him are Fequired by him for his own residence after his tetirement, he may, at any time within a period of one year before the date of his retirement, apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of Such premises. Government or of the year preceding the date —_—__ 1. Ins. by Act 57 of 1988, sec. 9 (wef 1-12-1988),ws) Control of Lvtction of Tenant Gee .q) Where tho landlord referred to IN Sub-section (1) or exp« , as (ot oul more Ha ONG premises, it Shall be open here a It eation under thal Sub-Socton i’ agryny Only one of the proneasn chosen PY ul anes ht to recover Immediat 44D. Rig! © Possession of premise t dow. —(1) Where the landlord isa widow and the pras68 tt by ho her husband, are required by her for her own the Controller for recovering the immediate posses 2) Where the landlord referred 0 in sub-secti ae lon (1) has let out more than one premises, it snall be open to her to make an application under that sub- section in respect of any one of the Premises chosen by her) put by her, or fesidence, she may apply to 'SION of SUCH premises SYNOPSIS 4. $8. 14B, 14C and 14D—Iintroduction 2, $8. 14B, 14C and 140— Validity 3, Ss, 14B, 14C and 14D—Procedure to be fc spalleatons thereundes lollowed for trial of eviction Ss. 14B, 14C and 14D—Claim under must be bona fide . $8, 14B, 14C and 14D—Applicabitity of s, 19 . $8. 148, 14C and 14D—Applicabitty of & 14(6) and S, 14(7) . $s. 14B, 14C and 14D—Landlord need not be the owner . Ss. 14B, 14C and 140—Purpose of letting is Irrelevant b be suitable for residence 8 . Mt premises must . Ss. 14B, 14C and 14D—Transteree landlord cannot invoke ). Ss. 14B, 14C and 14D—Detences ‘open to the teriant 11, S,14B-Scope 12, S, 14B—Meaning of retirement 13. S.14C—Scope 14, S.14C—Leave to defend 15. S.14D—Scope Ss. 14B, 14C and 14D—Introduction.—These three sections have been inserted in the Act for the first time by the Amendment Act of 1988. They are intended to confer special rights for tecovery of immediate possession of their premises on defined categories of landlords, in case they require the same for their own residence. The categories of these landlords are three: (1) Landlord who is released or retired person or a person due to retire from any armed force, i., armed force of the Union constituted under an Act of Parliament or the police force constituted under S. 3 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978; (2) landlord being retired employee or employee due to retire from service of the Central Government or of the Delhi Administration; and (3) landlord who isa widow.Law of Rent Control in Deth [Ser 14R Certain common features (the three sections is quite similar Certain i The wording of the Firstly, all the three sections refer tq e noted in the three sections may be not Se he sections the basic condity \ rd and not the owner Secondly, in allt i ; h ; hi st be for ‘own residence’ In case is that the requirement of the landlord must be f ver of arined a of Sua requirement may also be of the family of the member of armed force: require ay pose ptting nor the nature of premises js refered ie bli icobrous thal the premises fa question must be ulabe ye ee Baad wholly commercial premises would be outside the sections Thin thy in “tthe three sections a period of limitation of one year is prescribed for invoking the section from the date of accrual of the cause iM action a in case of the employees ete. of the armed forces or Government joned in Ss. 14B and 14C, the landlord may invoke the section upto one year prior to the due date of retirement. Fourthly, in all cases an option has been Biven to the landlord to choose one premises, where he has let out more than one Premises, for the purposes of invoking the requisite section. He cannot invoke the section in respect of more than one premises. At the same time, his choice of one premises cannot be questioned, provided of course the Premises are suitable for residence. Simultaneously with the insertion of Ss. 14B to 14D, S. 25B(1) of the Act was also amended to provide that the applications under Ss. 14B to 14D would be dealt with in accordance with procedure specified in S. 25B. S. 19(1) was also amended. But no amendments were made in S. 25B sub-secs. (2) to (5). Though the sections are comparatively new, several aspects related to their validity and interpretation have been authoritatively settled. We shall first refer to the common points and then the specific sections in this respect. 2. Ss. 14B, 14C and 14D—Validity—The validity of the sections was challenged on the ground of violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution. It was submitted that the classification made by these sections was arbitrary, discriminatory and illegal. The challenge was rejected and it was held that it was a matter of legislative policy if it felt that Particular sections of landlords should be allowed to recover Possession of their premises from tenants in a faster and easier manner. It was irrelevant that all the deserving categories of the landlords had not been given similar benefit! 3. Ss. 14B, 14C and 14D—Procedure to be applications thereunder—The question was B.M. Chanana v. Union of India? by a divisi Relying on the fact that by the Amendment —_____ 1. BM. Channa v. Union of india, 1990(1) RCR 312 Del DB: : ; "3300 RR mane) RCJ 219: 1990(40) DLT 113, . Kapur (Dr) v. Union of India : RCI ; 4 Union ofa, BIO) ROR a ee need on another pone Singh Kalra v. 417: 1991(2) SCC 87:Sec. 14B] Control o Ml Eviction of Tenant amended, but the other not amended, it was ur down in S. 25B would sub. Section 20 S thereof an, ed betore the Cour an a Sh apply to such ot ~C Applications me T Menetted 10 the Supreme Cone von Wd Vv. > Menghani! j @ecision in Busch “ Nas bee: ae Viction under ¢ os een held tha ond ele that aes As even though ene oe Hat: 19 applied ever and a at despite the omission by the L seen erence to S '4A in. 19, of S. 25B except sub-sec.(1) ~Cgislature to amend the Provisi Schedule, it was obvious th; mend form ¢ ‘a . Ss. 14B, 14C and 4p ce ih of Legislature was that cases under 10us] id be i. * summary procedure lain down i my disposed of and therefore the der Ss. 14B, 14C - “9B would apply to evict es unde of summons ‘would There was no difficulty in tis peceinene ave to be adapted by Mserting the relevant as taken the same view, though urt judgment. The Court observed Purpose and object of classification ecified rights to recover immediate cd nugatory3 ve form of sure nONS w "SUMMArY procedure laid of summons in the ‘asses with sp possession of premises would be rendere so.’ Contrary observations in some earlier cases are not good law. But even in Dr. P.P. Kapur’s case the bench had held that mere desire of the landlord was not enough, and there must be an element of need in it. The tenant can not be evicted on a false plea of requirement or feigned requirement.6 5. Ss. 14B, 14C and 14D—Applicability of S. 19.—It including these sections by amendment by Act 57 of 1988, 6. Ss. 14B, 14C and 14D—Applicability of S. 14(6) and S. 14(7).—They do not apply. The reader may refer to the commentary under those sections. Also see commentary under heading No. 9, infra. applies by specifically Though S. 14(7) does not apply, it does not mean that the tenant is not entitled to any time for surrendering possession of the premises. It is always left open to the Controller, who is a quasi judicial authority, to exercise his judicial discretion in every case of eviction, and grant reasonable time to the ; vcae 7 tenant to deliver possession of premises. 1. AIR 1977 SC 1569. 2. Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India, 1991 (2) SCC 87. 3.\ Ibid. para 8. ; » 4, Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India supra para 20. o 5. P.P. Kapur (Dr.) v. Union of India, AIR ee ae etc ic |. v. Rajendra K. Tandon, 6. Rahabar Productions Put. Ltd. v. 7. Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India supra para 21.7. Law of Rent Control in Delhi Ge 574 aw of [er in In this connection it may be noticed that the Delhi High Court hag the Controllers to give two month’s time for vacating, the premis cases.' In view of the Supreme Court decision, the Controller can ary thy time according to the circumstances of each case. But itis obvious thar ihe should not exceed very much beyond the period of two-three months, j of the fact that even in a case under S. 14(1)(¢) the maximum time allowed i. six months. These being provisions for immediate recovery of POSSESSion, the time allowed should be at least lesser than that in cases under S, 14(1 Ne)? 7. Ss. 14B, 14C and 14D—Landlord need not be the owner.— Ajj the thes sections use the word ‘landlord’. Accordingly the landlord need not be aso the owner of the premises in question, as in the case of an eviction PPlication under S. 14(1)(e). 8. Ss. 14B, 14C and 14D—Purpose of letting is irrelevant but Pre: must be suitable for residence.—So far as the first part of the Proposit concerned, it is settled by decisions of the Supreme Court.’ The same vie: been taken by the High Court. The reader may also refer to comm, under S. 14A whereunder the legal position is the same. Stroy Mall sug N View Mises tion is "Ww had lentary The second part of the proposition is implicit in the sections. As alread observed all the sections~provide for immediate recovery of Possession of premises in case of requirement for ‘residence’ either of the landlord, or his family in case of a landlord who, being a member of the armed forces, was Killed in action. It follows a fortiori that the premises must be such which are suitable for residence. Thus it is submitted that the word ‘premises’ in these sections will have the same meaning as has been given to the words ‘residential accommodation’ used in S. 14A. The test laid down by Krishna yer, J. in Busching Schmitz case® would be applicable. For that again the reader may refer to the commentary under S. 14A. In Mahendra Raj's case the Court observed that if premises are residential in nature the purpose of letting would be irrelevant, meaning thereby that the premises must be residential in nature. It is submitted that the test laid down in Busching Schmitz case is more appropriate. \ 9. Ss. 14B, 14C and 14D—Transferee landlord cannot invoke.—In BM. Chanana v. Union of India’ question arose before the High Court as to whether a transferee landlord or the successor-in-interest of the original landlord had a right to invoke S. 14C. The Court referred to V.L. Kashyap’s case” and Kanta L B.M. Channa v. Union of India supra and Mahendra Raj v. Union of India, 1990(2) RCR 63 DB. Mahendra Raj v. Union of India, 1990(2) RCR 63 Del DB affirmed in Surpit Singh Kalra v. Union of India, 1991(1) RCR 347 SC; P.P. Kapur (Dr.) v. Union of India, AIR 1990 Del 290. Furit Singh Kalra v. Union of India supra; EMC Steels Ltd. v. Union of India, 1991() RCR 407. n P.P. Kapur (Dr.) v. Union of India, AIR 1990 Del 290. AIR 1977 SC 1569. - 1990(1) RCR 312 DB. TLR 1977(1) Del 22. nage. 14B \ sec. 148] Control of Futction of of Tenant , 1 Goel’s case! and held that the expre: premises of which he was the ndlong ‘Premise: let we landlord nt § Wet out by ir when application for eviction Was filed the date of retirement aia mean ‘ourt express 5 ‘d, in case ‘e time The Cc 7 Pp essed the view that it would Nis filed before his Tetirement object of enacting §. 14c if 4 “tbe defeating the Purpose expressed the conclusion, Strictive me, Poegiand there; landlord either by inheri crefore, that where 5 eritance oO occupation thereof under that landlord 7 or when he filed an application under ‘ate of the land) premises were let out }: aoe we . Y the land maintain the said application.2 The cout i in position to apply to a case under S. 14C, 9¢ ; wither held that s i 5, f the heirs my was e1 tit ? one o| on against the tenant who was inducted by tie hei a h their agen sete held that the premises were aa ’ Us eir agent. It w: 1 v a ‘ough th gent. It was This matter also cam € up before thy i ‘it Si Union of India It was urged bef ae upreme Court in Surjit Singh Kalra v. oe Supreme Court that S. 14(6) was als attracted to applications 14C and 14D. The Court re “The original landlord who cannot evict the tenant since he has got Many houses under his Occupation cannot use the device by transferring one of the houses to a third party who could easily evict such a tenant. The tenant in occupation of the transferred premises gets a protection from eviction for a minimum period of five years. S. 14B and other allied provisions referred to the premises let out and not acquired by transfer. One may become an owner of the premises by transfer but the tenant in occupation of the transferred property cannot be evicted by resorting to Ss. 14B to 14D. If the transferee wants to evict the tenant of such premises he must take action only under S. 14(1)(€)..00..” (Emphasis supplied) 1. AIR 1977 SC 1599. : ° ees age fon bur 2 eer 1994(2) RCR 24: 1994 994(54 : 3. Chander Mohan v. Harwant Singh, 1 RLR 220, 4. 1991(1) RCR 347. 5. Atp. 353 para 21 of the RCR.Law of Rent Control in Delhi See. 14R 576 : » Supreme Court judgme, squence of the sent ig . at the consequ Pre met e naeE It is therefore cle et high Court i Raiciamama men gment of the that the judgmen ent sath overruled to this exte far as the Supreme C ‘ourt has held r at S. 14(6) has It is submitted that so fa na aD, here can De no aut “1 ¢ inder Ss. ications Ww servations in Sarwan Singh application to app h there are some obs i v this proposition, even et but for S. 25C the provisions of S. 14(6) could Kasturi Lal' which sugges case under S. 14A, and on parity of Teasoning to have ns applicable ° ne This is because S. 14(6) expressly refers to cases under Ss. ; nae 4(1)(e). application for eviction ey . ' Oe eee landlord cannot invoke Ss. 145 However, the proposition al : ears, with respect, to be too wide, The to 14D under any Se eee BM. Chanana’s case appears to be aed eat aa cononanee with the statutory provisions. The High eet ie ‘Tightly observed that in principle no distinction ean ibe made between S. 14A and the sections under consideration in respect o Tansferee landlord. The Supreme Court appears to have proceeded on an assumption that it is very easy to transfer houses to persons who can take benefit of the sections under consideration and thereby summarily evict the tenants. It is submitted that there is no foundation for such an assumption. In the first place it is not so simple to transfer residential houses merely with intent to evict the tenant, and that too to a category of landlords covered by the sections under consideration. Secondly, even if a transfer is made simply to invoke the sections under consideration, it would always be open to the tenant to show that the transfer was mala fide or sham with the intention of simply evicting the tenant in occupation. Thirdly, by reasoning of this interpretation many deserving landlords would be denied the right of invoking the section, For example, a member of the armed forces may genuinely purchase a house occupied by a tenant with the intention of Occupying it at some future point of in action soon after the purchase. This een and there is no reason as to why in many instances of en nat to invoke S. 14B. There may be expression “let oA “Tet out by her, out by him” in Ss, 145 and 14C and or by as 1 AIR 1977 5¢ 265 (274), Y her husband” in S. 14D have 2. 2004 (10) SCALE 550,sec. 14B] Control of Eviction of Tenant S77 significance. If it was unnecessary in the scheme of these Sections as to who had actually let out the premises, the legislature would not have used the term “let out by him” or ‘let out by her, or by her husband” In interpreting, a provision one cannot assume that the words employed by the legislature are redundant. ” The expression, “let out by her or by her husband” is not an expression which permits of any ambiguity. We must, therefore, give it its normal meaning. So understood the conclusion is inescapable that the legislature intent was only to confer a special right on a limited class of widows viz. the widow who let the premises or whose husband had let the premises before his death and which premises that widow requires for her own use.” It was further held that if Ss. 14(6) and 14D were not read harmoniously, it would lead to an anomaly. Such anomaly can be removed by holding that since a transferee landlord cannot evict a tenant before expiry of 5 years from date of purchase, S. 14D providing for immediate recovery of premises would not be applicable to such a case. 10. Ss. 14B, 14C and 14D—Defences open to the tenant—Since the procedure laid down in S. 25B applies, the tenant has to obtain leave to defend under S. 25B(5). The scope of S. 25B(5) has been considered in detail later and reference may be made to the commentary thereunder. The question which would survive for consideration is as to what are the defences open to the tenant under Ss. 14B, 14C and 14D. The matter is no longer res integra and has been examined and settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court as also the Delhi High Court. In Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India,’ which was a case under S. 14B, it was argued on behalf of the tenants that the tenant would be entitled to leave to contest an application under Ss. 14B, 14C and 14D by disclosing such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction on grounds specified in S. 14(1)(e). The Court compared the provisions in S. 14(1)(e) and in S. 14B, and after observing that Ss. 14C and 14D were similar to S. 14B, it came to the conclusion that ‘Ss. 14B to 14D were markedly different from S. 14(1)(e).’ It, then referred to the statutory provisions in S. 25B and the form of the summons in the Third Schedule and repelled the argument of the tenants in these words:? If the application is filed under S. 14B, the summons should state that the application is filed under S. 14B and not under S. 14(1)(e) or 14A. Likewise if the applications are under Ss. 14C to 14D, the summons should state accordingly. That would indicate the scope of the defence of the tenant for obtaining leave referred to in sub-section (5) of S. 25B. Under sub-section (5), the tenant would contest the application by obtaining leave with reference to the particular claim in —___ 1. 1990 (1) RCR 347 SC. 2. Ibid p. 352.