Value Change in Mexico, 1980-2000: Evidence from the World Values Surveys.

Miguel Basáñez and Alejandro Moreno

Mexico is one of the countries that have participated with national samples in each of the four

waves of the World Values Surveys (WVS) conducted between 1981 and 2000, providing, along

with Argentina, the only two Latin American settings where the study has two decades of data.

Together, the four Mexican samples have measured the persistence and change of values during

the last two decades of the 20th Century in a society undergoing rapid and profound change in its

political system, its economic structure, and its social features. Since the first Mexican survey,

conducted in 1981, polling methodologies have improved substantially and survey research tech-

niques have become more widely used in Mexican social and political sciences. Although all

four surveys rely on national representative samples of Mexican adults, changes in sampling

techniques and the availability of better sampling frames in Mexico may rise some meth-

odological precautions. Even with some possible methodological differences, an analysis of the

four surveys tells us much about how Mexican values persist and change over time. In this

chapter, we go beyond the descriptive review of the 1990 World Values Survey (Basáñez and

Moreno 1994). We now analyze general patterns of value change in Mexico by looking both at

the distribution of responses to some theoretically relevant questions over time and at the

intergenerational differences in each year when the survey was conducted. Value differences

among age cohorts help us understand the nature of value change in Mexico and, also, they help

us draw new hypothesis about how Mexican society will probably change in the near future.

What persists? What has changed? As a first step, we compared the 1980 and 2000

means for all the WVS variables. Table 3.1 shows both extreme-ends of greater (above 10%) and

1
lesser (below 2%) change. It is remarkable the increase in tolerance shown by the group of vari-

ables that measure acceptance of homosexuality (66%), prostitution (30%), and divorce (28%),

as well as tolerance as a child quality (20%). Hence, the social pre-conditions for a transition to

democracy were clearly under way. Was it mass or elite driven? Will get back to this question

later. Another equally remarkable change is the geographic group the respondent self places

himself into. A 46% change from the local community to the world as a whole, which point

towards an increase in a sense of globalization probably further stimulated by the North Ameri-

can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The increase on rejection to cheat on taxes (31%), as well

as the reduction on the number of children (23%) from 3.3 to 2.5, close the group of variables

over 20% changes in the two decades.

[Table 3.1 approximately here]

On the other end, it also remarkable to find out a 0% change on the belief in god variable,

and a 1% increase on the mean value for church attendance, over the 20 years period. These two

variables point to the persistence of religious attitudes. Equally remarkable is the almost un-

changed participation in voluntary organizations of all types (labor unions, professional associa-

tions, environmental, social welfare, political parties, education), as well as on the variables that

measure political participation (join a boycott, join a strike, discuss politics, occupy a building).

Finally, on more pe rsonal issues also stand out the rejection to consider marriage outdated as

well as to abortion.

Again, what persists? What has changed? Of all possible approaches to these two ques-

tions based on the different measures that the WVS offers, we focus on some of the aspects that

we consider of greatest theoretical significance. First, we look at the possible connection between

2
the process of democratization and political attitudes. Secondly, we examine some of the value-

orientations linked with a process of economic transformation. Finally, we look at social attitudes

regarding the old and new issues that are salient in Mexican society.

Politically, Mexico experienced a rapid increase in electoral competition during the last

two decades. The political reforms that began in 1977 and that deepened in the 1990s changed

Mexican politics from a one -party regime to a competitive multi-party system, at the local level

first, and then at the national level. Survey research started helping to monitor elections and

hence to reinforce the transition to democracy since 1985 (Basáñez 1987). For the first time ever

in 1988, pre-electoral opinion polls of a preside ntial election were nationally broadcasted and

published (Basáñez 1992) anticipating a 20 points drop in the 59 years dominant Institutional

Revolutionary Party, PRI, vote. The government very negative reaction to polling as an analyti-

cal tool out of their control, proved to be a powerful and beneficial booster (Basáñez 1995).

These polls further accelerated the democratic drive of the Mexican society. Political alternation

started at the state governor level in 1989. In the presidential election of 1994, the PRI was able

to keep the office, but, as we will argue later, the federal government paid an enormous cost for

the election both socially with the Zapatista movement and financially with all the funds transfer

from government to the PRI (Basáñez 1996). Also, it was unable to avoid the cyclical term-end

crisis anticipated well in advance (Basáñez 1993a). In 1997, the PRI lost the control of Congress

for the first time since the party was founded in 1929. In 2000, the PRI lost the presidential ele c-

tion for the first time in seven decades. The Mexican party and electoral systems are regarded

now as competitive, and elections, once fraudulent, are now free and fair. Immediately after the

July 2000 elections, the majority of Mexicans, regardless of their partisan identifications, consid-

ered that Mexico was a democracy (Moreno 2003). Given the rise of democratic politics, is there

a greater sense of political confidence among Mexicans?

3
 Economically, Mexico’ transformation involves the adoption of free-trade policies initi-

ated in the 1980s and deepened in the early 1990s. Economic reforms included privatization of

state enterprises, deregulation, and economic integration. A North American Free Trade Agree-

ment between Mexic o, Canada, and the United States started negotiations in 1989 and went into

effect on January 1, 1994. Ten years later, NAFTA not only has changed much of Mexico’s eco-

nomic dynamics, but also many of Mexicans’ preferences and expectations. Mexico had fully

entered into a trend of conjunction with the U. S. and Canada (Inglehart, Nevitte, Basáñez 1996).

There are clear changes in patterns of consumption, but strong social inequalities remain in the

country. There is no consensus about the number of poor citizens, but the most optimistic views

argue that 40 out of the 100 million Mexicans live in poverty. Given these patterns of economic

transformation, are there any changes in Mexicans’ priorities and ideological orientations?

We should expect that regional economic integration and political democratization are

accompanied by shifts in social values and priorities, as well as by some redefinition of what is

preferable, desirable, and acceptable in society. Religious orientations not only persist, but they

seem to have strengthened among all age cohorts in the last two decades. Nonetheless, Mexicans

have profound generational value differences. The 2000 survey registered some generational

gaps not observed twenty years earlier. Intergenerational value change seems to be taking place

in Mexico as evidence in the most recent surveys. Younger Mexicans seem guided by a different

set of values than those of their elders, and this has had a significant political impact. A once

strong democratic-authoritarian political cleavage that had crystallized in the party system in the

1990s has yielded centrality to rising social and cultural issues that seem to significantly affect

party support (Moreno 1999, 2003). Liberal and fundamentalist views of politics and society

contrast sharply, and age is one their main determinants. Although Mexico has a comparatively

low level of economic development, Materialist and Postmaterialist values have a noticeably

4
stronger generational gap now than before, with younger Mexicans being decreasingly Materia l-

ist and increasingly Postmaterialist. Some other attitudes towards society have also changed

dramatically, and our task in this chapter is not only to show how, but also explain why.

In the following pages we first examine the persistence in religious values as well as the

changing mix of Catholics, Protestants and non-religion. We also comment on the possible im-

pact of that religious blend-change on economic and political variables.

Secondly, we examine the trends in political confidence in a society that has experienced

rapid and significant political change. Despite a widespread wave of political democratization in

the world, the WVS has registered a decline in political trust in new democracies. Is Mexico part

of this trend? Generally yes, but a more precise answer depends on how political trust is under-

stood and measured. As Catterberg and Moreno (2003) argue “today, the number of societies

ruled by a democratic government is greater than ever. Paradoxically, political trust, broadly un-

derstood as citizen’s confidence in political institutions, has declined in new democracies during

the last two decades, and it does not seem to have increased in established democracies during

this period.” A focus on institutions shows a decline in trust that also parallels a decline in politi-

cal participation as a general “post-honey moon” trend in new and emerging democracies (Cat-

terberg and Inglehart, 2002).

Thirdly, we analyze changes in Mexicans’ belief systems by looking at two of the three

main dimensions of Mexican ideology: a value dimension that polarizes liberal and fundamental-

ist views that not only seems salient in Mexico but in other Latin American nations as well (Mo-

reno 1999), and an economic dimension that confronts a redistributive left versus a capitalist

right. Perhaps as a response to economic integration and economic reforms, there have been im-

portant shifts in the economic dimension during the last decade, which signals one of the most

significant attitudinal changes among the Mexican public. However, intergenerational differ-

5
ences are more noticeable along the liberal-fundamentalist dimension, based on views toward

homosexuals, abortion, gender roles and national pride, which suggests that this dimension has

the potential to influence the dynamics of party politics in the near future, even more so than the

democratic-authoritarian axis that prevailed during the 1990s (Moreno 2003).

Fourthly, although the four Mexican surveys evidence the persistence of religious values

over time, it is also clear that societal views and values have changed significantly in the last two

decades. On one hand, there is a shift from radicalism to conservatism. Although decreasingly,

preferences for moderate reforms have been the majority views since the early 1980s: support for

gradual reforms represented 68 percent in 1981, 60 percent in 1990, 52 percent in 1996-97, and

49 percent in 2000. However, preferences for radical change and for the continuation of the

status quo have become increasingly important and, it appears, polarizing. Moreover, “conserva-

tive” views have become more common than radical ones in the last few years, even though radi-

cal views were dominant in the early surveys. The fact that younger generations are especially

favorable to this new “conservatism” implies that the idea of “defending society against all sub-

versive forces” may have different frames of reference to the ones evoked in previous years. It is

a possibility that the desire to defend the status quo in the Mexican context of the new century

means the defense of democracy. The peasant rebellion and major political assassinations in the

mid-1990s in Mexico could have contributed to the polarization of views toward change and

continuity of society.

Finally, we look at the rise of a Materialist/Postamterialist value gap in Mexico evidenced

in the recent surveys, and explore the possible explanations of why a society with a per capita

income of slightly over 5,000 dollars in the year 2000, and almost 60 percent of income concen-

trated in the highest two deciles, seems to experience the rise of an intergenerational value gap.

Using Inglehart’s (1997) four-item values index, the pr oportion of Postmaterialists in Mexican

6
society increased from 9 percent in 1981 to 12 percent in 1990, and then to 17 percent in 1996-

97. The proportion of Postmaterialists in the 2000 survey decreased slightly to 15 percent. Al-

though still a minority, Postmaterialists in Mexico grew 66 percent from 1981 to 2000. More-

over, the gap between Materialists and Postmaterialists has narrowed among younger Mexicans,

and it has broadened among older ones.

In sum, the Mexican components of the WVS provide clear evidence of persisting and

changing values, and how different that society is at the turn of the century from what it was only

20 years earlier. All four waves of the WVS in Mexico are national representative samples of

adults and interviews were conducted face to face in the respondents’ homes. Samples sizes are

the following: n=1,837 in 1981, n=1,531 in 1990, n=1,511 in 1996/96, and n=1,535 in 2000. Let

us, then, review some of those changes, and discuss the possible trajectories that might be ob-

served next.

Persisting Religious Values

Religion is one of the most enduring cultural traits in society and, as Norris and Inglehart (2002)

point out, “religious legacies leave a distinct imprint on contemporary values.” As many societies

in Latin America, Mexico has a predominantly Catholic population. According to the 2000 cen-

sus, about 88 percent of the population who is at least five years old has a Roman-Catholic faith,

five percent belongs to a protestant -evangelical tradition, two percent to a biblical but non-

evangelical tradition, almost four percent have no religion, and the rest belongs to other religions.

We believe that census data over-count Catholics and under-count non-religion respondents be-

cause of a spiral of silence effect. The religious market still is a monopolistic one dominated by

the Catholic Church, as the political market used to be dominated by the PRI. According to the

7
2000 Mexican WVS, 76% of the population over 18 years old is Catholic (12% less than the cen-

sus and the 1981 WVS) and 22% have no religion (18% more than the census and the 1981

WVS). This is an important difference, because in Mexico Protestants of all traditions have been

steadily increasing and their values are very similar to those that have no religion, as Figure 3.2

below shows. Therefore, a 26% cluster of Protestants and non-religion would have the potential

of accelerating further changes in Mexico (Basáñez 1986).

In the 2000 Mexican sample of the WVS, nine out of ten respondents said that God is

important in their lives, and this proportion is very similar across all age cohorts, as shown in

Figure 3.1. Although the 1990 survey evidenced a decrease of the importance of God in people’s

lives, the importance attributed to God in 2000 is very similar to the one recorded by the 1980

survey. Moreover, there was a slight increase in 2000, suggesting that religious orientations have

actually strengthened.

Similarly to the importance attributed to God in one’s life, the self-conception of being a

religious person and the levels of self-reported church attendance have barely changed in the last

two decades. Again, the 1990 survey registered a slight decrease in both variables, but the fact is

that the 1980 and 2000 surveys provide very similar figures, which means that religious values

persisted almost unchanged. About three fourths of respondents in 1980 and 2000 (75 and 76

percent, respectively) said that they consider themselves a “religious person;” and slightly more

than half (54 and 55 percent, also respectively) said that they attend religious services at least

once a week.

[Figure 3.1 approximately here]

8
 Although age is not related to the importance that Mexicans attribute to God in their lives,

it is clear that other religious variables behave differently depending on the age cohort in each of

the survey years. The proportion of respondents that consider themselves as religious people de-

creases as we move from older to younger age cohorts and this is the case in each of the surveys.

In 2000, 85 percent of those born before 1940, and 71 percent of those born between 1970 and

1982, considered themselves religious, a gap of 14 percentage points. Twenty years earlier, the

gap between oldest and youngest (1960-69) cohorts was only six percentage points. Likewise,

church attendance is less likely among the youth, and the gap between the eldest and the young-

est is wider, as shown in Figure 3.1. In 2000, 68 percent of Mexicans born before 1940 said they

attended religious services at least once a week, and so did 49 percent of those born between

1970 and 1982, a 19 percentage point gap. Twenty years earlier, the gap in church attendance

between the oldest (1900-1939) and youngest (1960-1969) cohorts was 13 points (70 and 57 per-

cent respectively).

Suggesting an impact of religion on political and economic performance had traditionally

been provocative and controversial, to say the least. Attempting to measure that impact was very

difficult before the WVS data. The impact of GNP per capita on democracy is well established.

If we add religion as an intervening variable in a linear regression, the adjusted R Square in-

creases or decreases noticeably. Using GNP per capita as the independent variable and democ-

racy (10-years cumulative Freedom House index of political rights and civil liberties) as the de-

pendent variable, and religion from the WVS as the intervening variable, we get the following R

Square values: Orthodox 0.544; no religion 0.538; Jewish 0.536; Protestant 0.466; Catholic

0.331; Muslim 0.184; Buddhist 0.104; Hindu 0.018.

9
 The separation between Protestant and Catholic values, as well as between Protestant and

Catholic countries was firstly explored 10 years ago in the 1993 WVS Spain Conference

(Basáñez 1993b). The closeness between Protestants and no-religion, and their distance to Catho-

lics can be seen in Figure 3.2. It is built by updating with the 1980-2000 WVS data the same two

WVS variables used in 1993 (v13 respect to parents and v25 trust in people). These two vari-

ables were chosen for their impact on political an economic performance. Because of the larger

number of countries and their wider spread in terms of religions, it is now possible to plot in the

chart other major World religions too. Clearly, Protestants and no-religion are at the upper right

quadrant, trustful and autonomous (as opposed to obedient). At the opposite quadrant, not so

extreme as Muslims tough, Catholics show distrustful and obedient.

[Figure 3.2 approximately here]

For centuries, religions have encapsulated and transmitted fully integrated values sys-

tems, which already contained the geographic and climate influences of the regions were those

religions elicited. The daily usages and practices of those traditions normally evolved into formal

and informal institutions. At a later point in time, all the former crystallized into legal systems

and countries. Inglehart (2000) has captured this evolution into what is called cultural zones,

making reference to the historically cultural (religious-legal) zone a country belongs to. He

originally identified eight zones, ten now, which are distinctive and empirically testable: Protes-

tant Europe, English-speaking, Catholic Europe, Confucian, Orthodox, Catholic Latin American,

South Asia, Islamic, African, and Jewish.

10
 Mexico belongs to the Catholic Latin American zone, and is enclosed into a region that

shows, despite their internal differences, cons istent patterns of values and performance among its

different countries. Table 3.2 shows mean scores for the ten-cultural zones on four measures of

economic, political, social, and tolerance indicators. GNP per capita ranks from the lowest

$2,448 dollars average for the South Asian countries included in the 2000 WVS (India, Philip-

pines, and Vietnam) to the highest average of $21,408 dollars for the English-speaking countries.

Democracy is measured by a 10-years cumulative Freedom House index of political rights and

civil liberties. The original index is inverted, so the higher the score the more democratic a coun-

try is. Again, it ranks in a 140-point scale from a low 56 average for Islamic countries to a high

135 for English Speaking. The same pattern is repeated for the proportion of the population en-

gaged in the service sector. It ranks from 27% in South Asia to 71% in the English zone. Finally,

tolerance to homosexuals ranks in a 1 to 3 point scale from the lowest Islamic 1.1 to the highest

Protestant Europe of 2.2. Catholic Latin America ranks in the middle in the four indicators

($6,477, 96, 64%, and 1.6) signaling the range where Mexico falls in.

In sum, persistence rather than change is observed in the most basic religious orientations

in Mexico during the last two decades. Although age seems to influence religious self-

descriptions and patterns of church attendance, such influence is almost insignificant in the im-

portance that Mexicans attribute to God in their lives. However, more and more individuals are

moving away from Catholicism and embracing a different value system. A clear political, eco-

nomic, and social impact from this shift should not be expected soon, though. Two reasons ex-

plain the delay. One, it is still a minority of population shifting. Second, and more important, the

structural environment (law, institutions, practices, etc) is Catholic. Let us now look at some of

the values that changed in Mexico during the last two decades of the 20th Century.

11
 Lesser Political Distrust

Based on the 1981-2000 WVS, Catterberg and Moreno (2003) found evidence of a de-

cline in political trust in new democracies of Latin America, Eastern Europe, and post-

Communist societies. Their dependent variable was a composite index of confidence in the legis-

lative body (parliament or congress, depending on the case) and confidence in the civil service.

These authors noticed that confidence in institutions has been used as an indicator of political

trust in cross-national studies, many of them using WVS data, but that the American literature,

based heavily on the National Election Studies, has focused on other measures that reflect ele-

ments of ethics, honesty, and integrity of governance. Besides the typical question of confidence

in institutions, the WVS questionnaire also offers a similar component to one of the items of trust

in government used in the American National Election Studies since 1964: “Generally speaking,

would you say that this country is run by a few big interests looking out for themselves, or that it

is run for the benefit of all the people?” (See Citrin and Muste 1999, 483). The response that

government acts for the benefit of all the people represents political trust. If this is the case,

Mexicans became less distrustful over the last decade , though political distrust continues to

dominate their political values.

The proportion of Mexicans who believe that a few big interests run their country de-

creased from 75 to 65 percent from 1990 to 2000. Despite a significant increase in political com-

petition and more regular alternation, two thirds still distrust government. This may have

changed after the presidential elections of July 2000, when the PRI lost the presidency to PAN-

candidate Vicente Fox. The values survey was conducted in February 2000, almost five months

before the election. However, there is evidence that the election outcome changed many Mexi-

cans’ views of their political system, not only increasing confidence in political institutions (Mo-

12
reno 2002b), but also increasing the propor tion of citizens that regarded Mexico as a democracy,

from 37 percent one year before the election to 47 percent one month before the election, and to

66 percent one month after the election (Moreno 2003). The idea that Mexico is in fact a democ-

racy almost doubled during the election year that brought political alternation in the highest rank-

ing office: the presidency.

Before that historical event, most Mexicans remained skeptical of government, and, in the

best of cases, political distrust only lessened in the previous years. However, the proportion of

respondents who said that the country is run for the benefit of all people changed from 18 percent

in 1990 to 26 percent in 2000, increasing the level of political trust—according to this indica-

tor—in 44 percent during the decade. Still, the percent of Mexicans who shared political distrust

are dominant.

[Figure 3.3 approximately here]

The reduction in political distrust seems to have erased a moderate impact of age, as

shown in Figure 3.2. Although there was not a monotonic relationship between political trust and

age in 1990, the youngest cohorts of Mexicans were clearly more distrustful than the oldest ones

that year: the net proportion of those who expressed distrust minus those who expressed trust was

71 percent among Mexicans born between 1960 and 1969, the youngest cohort, whereas that

proportion was 56 percent among those born between 1900 and 1939, the oldest cohort. How-

ever, this relationship disappeared in the 2000 survey, when the net percent of political distrust

was 50 and 49 percent among those same age cohorts, and 46 percent among the new and

youngest cohort, born between 1970 and 1982.

13
 As mentioned earlier, political trust is an ambivalent term, but by looking at some of its

components we can reach some conclusions. Broadly understood as the “faith people have in

their government” (Citrin and Muste 1999, 465), political trust is quite low in Mexico, but its

evolution is quite unclear. If we look at the trends in confidence in institutions, trust has declined

(Catterberg and Moreno 2003). However, if we look at the perceptions of government as work-

ing for the benefit of all people versus government run by a few big interests, the fact is that dis-

trust has decreased. Recent changes in Mexican politics lead us to rethink the way Mexicans per-

ceive government, and, thereby, their ability to trust government. Not long ago, government and

PRI were indistinct. Today, alternation at the national, state and local levels has redefined the

frames of reference.

As we have seen, value change in the last two decades in Mexican society pr oduced the

pre-conditions for a democratic transition. However, one question we posed at the introduction

remains unanswered. Who drove the transition, the masses or the elites? Preliminary explorations

to this question in Latin America looked into color and democracy (Basáñez 2001). We now rep-

licate a model developed from the Afrobarometer (Mattes and Bratton 2003) to measure democ-

racy supply (elites) and demand (masses). We here measure demand with an average score from

the WVS the economy runs badly in democracy (v169), democracies are indecisive (v170), and

democracies aren't good at maintaining order (v171). The stronger the respondent oppose those

statements, the higher is demand for democracy. Supply is measured from satisfaction with de-

mocracy (v168), satisfaction with respect for human rights (v173), and satisfaction with govern-

ment (v174). The more satisfied people are, the best democracy supply they receive.

Figure 3.4. shows that Mexico’s democracy (similarly to South Africa, Nigeria, and Peru)

is a balanced elites’ pull and masses’ push. However, that is not the case for the majority of

countries plotted in the chart. Countries below the line, indicates that the masses’ push is stronger

14
than the elites’ push. The opposite happens for those above the line. Philippines, India and Vie t-

nam elites stand out for their high supply of democracy. In the other end, Moldova, Pakistan,

Zimbabwe, Montenegro, and Albania socie ties stand out for their demand of democracy, as

measured by these indicators.

[Figure 3.4 approximately here]

Shifts in Economic and Social Values

During the 1990s, Mexicans were deeply divided along a democratic-authoritarian dimension of

political conflict that had a strong influence on party competition (Moreno 1999). Those who

held authoritarian views of politics were likely to support the long-ruling PRI, and those who

shared pro-democratic views were likely to support opposition parties. Political alternation may

have changed this, and, in fact, the salience of other two dimensions was evidenced since the

1996 survey and confirmed in 2000. One of those dimensions taps liberal and fundamentalist

views about society, including attitudes toward abortion and homosexuals. The other involves

left and right positions on socio-economic issues, such as preferences for economic individual-

ism versus state responsibility, and preferences for economic payoffs based on individual

achievement as opposed to higher income equality.

Liberal and fundamentalist views of society are significantly influenced by age. The most

fundamentalist age cohort is the one born before 1940, and fundamentalism tends to decrease in

the next two younger cohorts: those born in the 1940s and 1950s, as shown in Figure 3.5. Liber-

alism is predominant among those born in the 1960s, and mucho more so among those born be-

tween 1970 and 1982, that is, Mexicans who were 18 to 30 years old by the time of the 2000

15
survey. In fact, liberal views grew from 1990 to 2000 among the youngest cohort, as those born

between 1973 and 1982—not interviewed in 1990 because they were not 18 years old yet—

joined the adult population. Conversely, the oldest cohort became slightly less fundamentalist,

not because of value change during their life cycle, but simply because the cohort born between

1900 and 1939 was naturally reduced from 1990 ad 2000. In the 1990 survey, 16 percent of re-

spondents said they were born before 1940, whereas 10 percent did so in the 2000 survey. Ac-

cording to the 2000 census, about 8 percent of Mexicans were 61 years or older in 2000, that is,

they were born before 1940. Despite the mortality rate in oldest cohort, it remained the most fun-

damentalist of all, that is, the most opposing group to abortion and homosexuals.

[Figure 3.5 approximately here]

Interestingly, all three cohorts born in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s show a similar pattern

of change from 1990 to 2000: they become either less liberal or more fundamentalist. This sug-

gests that, with the exception of the youngest generation—with new Mexicans bought into adult-

hood—and the oldest generation—naturally reduced by mortality rates—the Mexican society

became less liberal and more fundamentalist in the last decade of the 20th Century. The most

notorious shift is observed in the cohorts born in the 1950s and 1960s. As we will show in the

next section, this shift is consistent with a trend from radical to conservative views in the last two

decades, and with a gradual shift to the right on a left-right scale reported somewhere else (Mo-

reno 2003). Let us return to this point later.

One of the most noticeable shifts in Mexicans’ attitudes and values during the last decade

is the one observed along the dimension of socio-economic issues, which shows a significant

movement from a capitalist, individually-oriented right, to a redistributive, state-interventionist

16
left, as shown in Figure 3.3. The 1990s were a decade of privatizations and free trade policies in

Mexico. Generally, Mexicans support free trade, but they are more critical of the North Ameri-

can Free Trade Agreement’s performance (Moreno 2002a). Despite support for free trade, Mexi-

cans turned to the left side of the socio-economic dimension during the 1990s. Perhaps the 1994

Peso Crisis explains a great deal of this shift. The Peso Crisis almost crashed the recently privat-

ized banking system, reduced Mexico’s GDP in 7 percent in only one year, and caused a signifi-

cant loss of Mexicans’ acquisition power, not to mention high rates of unemployment and a sig-

nificant devaluation of the peso against the U.S. dollar. As shown in Figure 3.5, Mexicans of all

ages moved significantly to the left on the socioeconomic dimension from 1990 to 2000. A more

moderate version of this shift is observed in the 1996-2000 period, but mostly among some seg-

ments of the population, especially those PRI partisans (Moreno 2003).

The shift to the left in socio-economic issues was most significant among Mexicans born

in the 1940s, that is, those who were between 51 and 60 years old by the time of the 2000 survey.

This age cohort had lived four previous and serious political or economic crises: the 1968 stu-

dents’ massacre a week before the Olympic Games in Mexico City, the 1976 100% peso de-

valuation, the 1982 bank’s nationalization (Basáñez and Camp 1984), and the 1987 crash of the

stock market (Basáñez 1990). Hence, by the 1994 Peso Crisis, this age cohort was well aware

that the cycle was repeating for the fifth time.

In sum, Mexicans experienced a profound shif t in ideological orientations that reflect the

socio-economic context of the 1990s, and they are clearly divided on their views toward society

depending on the age cohort to which they belong. Younger Mexicans are more liberal, and older

ones are more fundamentalist. Age differences are also noticeable in attitudes that are supportive

of either radical change or defense of the status quo.

17
 Radicalism and Conservatism

The WVS questionnaire has kept track of an item that reflects attitudes toward the speed

in which society should be transformed, if at all. It discriminates those who believe that “The

entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action”, from

those who feel that “Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive

forces,” and, on a middle point, those who think that “Our society must be gradually improved

by reforms.” The latter view represents the largest proportion in each of the four surveys in Mex-

ico. Nonetheless, the percent of respondents taking that position has diminished over time, from

68 percent in 1980 to 49 percent in 2000. Consequently, there has been an increase in the other

two options: radical views slightly moved from 11 to 13 percent in 1980 and 2000, respectively,

while conservative views significantly increased from 9 to 21 percent in that same period. For

some reason, there are six other countries from the WVS sample, which fall in the same para-

doxical pattern found in Mexico. They are Hungary, Finland, South Korea, Brazil, Bulgaria and

Bangladesh as Table 3.3 shows. We cannot explore further this communalities now, but it seems

interesting to at least point them out for further review.

[Table 3.3 approximately here]

As shown in Figure 3.6, the proportion of radical views about societal change was greater

than the proportion of conservative ones in the 1980 and 1990 surveys, perhaps reflecting the

revolutionary discourse that permeated Latin America in the 1970s and the wave of democratiza-

tion of the 1980s. However, this was reversed in the 1990s, when the strongest expressions of

radicalism were personified in the Zapatista movement, a peasant rebellion in Mexico’s south-

18
ernmost state of Chiapas. On January 1, 1994, the same day that NAFTA went into effect, a

group of masked Indians engaged in violence and declared war to the Mexican government, de-

manding democracy and Indian rights, and expressing their opposition to the trade agreement.

Although severe violence lasted a few days before an armistice was called, the Zapatista

spokesman, who called himself Subcomandante Marcos, maintained a high-profile movement

through electronic media and frequent letters to the press.

[Figure 3.6 approximately here]

There are two observable phenomena related to radical and conservative attitudes during the last

20 years. The first is the change from radicalism to conservatism just mentioned. The second is a

change in the relationship between those attitudes and age. The 1990 survey shows a positive yet

moderate relation between views on change and age. Both radical and conservative views in-

crease as one moves from the youngest to the oldest age cohort. This means that the youngest

cohorts were more likely to take a position in favor of gradual reforms, not so much for radical

change or for defense of the status quo. However, in the mid 1990s and in 2000, that relationship

was reversed: younger cohorts were more likely to take the radical and conservative views,

which means that the last few years witnessed a certain polarization among the youth. About 88

percent of all respondents born after 1970 and interviewed in 2000 took either a radical position

(47 percent) or a conservative position (41 percent). The sum of responses that took either of

those polarized positions among the other age cohorts was less than 50 percent. This phenome-

non had been observed since the 1996-97 survey.

In sum, Mexicans have changed the balance between radicalism and conservatism, with

latter being predominant view in recent years. At the same time, a positive but moderate influ-

19
ence of age in those attitudes not only increased in significance, but also reversed in direction.

From being a positive one, the relation between polarizing societal attitudes and age became

negative: the lower the age cohort, the higher the percent of individuals taking either a radical or

a conservative position. The rising influence of age is also observed in a phenomenon widely

studied in advanced industrial society: Materialist and Postmaterialist values.

Materialism and Postmaterialism

Given their importance in the literature of value change during the last two decades, looking at

the trends of Materialist (Mat) and Postmaterialist (Postmat) values, even in developing societies,

is a sine qua non for analysis. Materialist values are broadly understood as those that emphasize

economic and physiological security, while Postmaterialist values refer to priorities related to

quality of life and self -expression (Inglehart 1997). It appears that, since 2000, Mexico should

not be an exception to the analysis of Mat/Postmat values. Evidence from the WVS depicts an

interesting change in the balance of Mat/Postmat values in that country. Let us make no mistake:

Postmaterialist values represent a small proportion in Mexico and has hardly increased overall.

However, what is striking about the last two decades is the gradual appearance of a vale gap

among age cohorts.

Almost inexistent in 1980, the relationship between Mat/Postmat values was statistically

significant in 2000. Older and younger cohorts were almost equally Materialist and Postmateria l-

ist twenty years ago. However, in the 2000 survey, 41 percent of respondents born before 1940

held Materialist values, whereas 21 percent of those born between 1970 and 1982 did so. Con-

versely, 10 percent of the pre-1940 generations were Postmaterialist (as well as 7 percent of

those born in the 1940s), and 17 percent of the post 1970 cohort.

20
 The Mexican is far from being a predominantly Postmaterialist society, but the evidence

of a generational value change is clear in the last two decades. This is leading Mexicans to a

strong value gap in which older cohorts are clearly Materialist, while younger cohorts are divided

in their value -orientations. This is definitively a topic in which we need to keep an eye in future

surveys.

Discussion

The Mexican society has experienced significant changes in its value system during the last two

decades, evidenced by a moderate yet important decrease in political distrust, a shift to the left in

socio-economic issues, a shift from radical to conservative views, and the rise of significant ge n-

erational gaps observed in some value-dimensions of political relevance: a liberal-fundamentalist

axis of conflict and the balance of Materialist and Postmaterialist values. Younger Mexicans,

those born during the period of political reforms and socialized under greater political and eco-

nomic competition—the NAFTA generation—seem more polarized in several issues, which

points out the possibility that Mexican politics consolidates its competitiveness in the near future.

For many years, political scientists observed a decreasing support for the long-ruling PRI

among younger voters, who were more likely to support opposition parties. In 2000, the election

of change and alternation, the younger electorate voted disproportionately in favor of opposition

presidential candidate Vicente Fox. Exit polls show that the vote share for Fox and Labastida, the

PRI candidate, among voters 18-29 years old, was 47 and 33 percent, respectively. Howeve r, the

recent Legislative election on July 2003 diminished the age gap between PAN and PRI. PAN

candidates obtained 35 percent of the vote among voters 29 years old or younger, while the PRI

maintained a 33 percent among the same segment.

21
 Religion not only persists, but also it has strengthened among Mexicans. Nonetheless, there

is evidence of changes in values and attitudes in social and political aspects. There is more toler-

ance for homosexuals, yet, in comparative terms such level of tolerance is low.

References

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Basáñez, Miguel and Pablo Parás. 2001 “Color and Democracy in Latin America” in Roderic Ai
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Catterberg, Gabriela, and Alejandro Moreno. 2002. “The Individual Bases of Political Trust:
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Inglehart, Ronald F. 2000. “Culture and Democracy” in Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P.
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Inglehart, Ronald F. (ed.). 2003. Human Values and Social Change: Findings from the Values
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racy. Boulder, Co.: Westview Press.

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Moreno, Alejandro. 2003. El votante mexicano: Democracia, actitudes políticas y conducta elec-
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24
Table 3.1. Mean Values for Selected WVS Variables: Mexico 1980-2000.

1980 2000 Dif Dif %

1980- 1980-
2000 2000
V208 Homosexuality 2.26 3.75 1.49 66%
V214 Geographic group 1.78 2.61 0.83 46%
V206 Cheating on taxes 3.35 2.31 1.04 31%
V209 Prostitution 2.45 3.17 0.72 30%
V211 Divorce 3.69 4.71 1.02 28%
V107 How many children 3.32 2.54 0.78 23%
V19 Child quality: tolerance 1.61 1.28 0.32 20%
V213 Suicide 2.16 1.75 0.41 19%
V11 Happiness 1.86 1.51 0.35 19%
V106 Marital status 3.28 2.69 0.59 18%
V104 Business management 2.14 1.77 0.37 17%
V15 Child quality: independence 1.85 1.56 0.29 16%
V17 Child quality: responsibility 1.45 1.22 0.23 16%
V12 State of health 2.58 2.18 0.40 16%
V216 National pride 1.49 1.26 0.22 15%
V194 belief in hell 1.48 1.27 0.22 15%
V136 Attend demonstration 2.45 2.80 0.36 15%
V182 Think meaning of life 2.11 1.82 0.30 14%
V122 Nation’s goals(2)-1 2.02 2.30 0.28 14%
V20 Child quality: thrift 1.88 1.62 0.26 14%
V23 Child quality: unselfishness 1.75 1.51 0.23 13%
V21 Child quality: determination 1.90 1.65 0.25 13%
V126 Willing to fight in war 1.11 1.25 0.15 13%
V139 Left-Right self-placement 7.52 6.56 0.97 13%
V68 Neighbors: criminals 1.50 1.31 0.19 12%
V204 Claim benefits 3.36 3.72 0.36 11%
V191 Belief in god 1.02 1.02 0.00 0%
V42 Vol. org: labor unions 1.93 1.93 0.00 0%
V111 Marriage outdated 1.81 1.80 0.01 0%
V47 Vol. org: professional associations 1.95 1.96 0.01 0%
V123 Nation’s goals (2) - 2 2.55 2.53 0.01 1%
V95 Job interesting 1.57 1.57 0.01 1%
V46 Vol. org: environment 1.97 1.95 0.01 1%
V135 Join boycott 2.78 2.76 0.02 1%
V210 Abortion 2.69 2.67 0.02 1%
V39 Vol. org: social welfare 1.91 1.93 0.02 1%
V127 Less emphasis on money 1.65 1.63 0.02 1%
V43 Vol. org: pol. parties 1.98 1.96 0.02 1%
V185 Church Attendance 2.96 2.93 0.03 1%
V137 Join strike 2.85 2.82 0.03 1%
V41 Vol. org: education 1.93 1.91 0.03 1%
V32 Discuss politics 2.30 2.27 0.03 1%
V149 Confidence: press 2.68 2.65 0.03 1%
V138 Occupy building 2.84 2.88 0.04 1%

25
Figure 3.1. Persistence of Religion. Importance of God, Religiosity, and Church Attendance in Mexico, 1980-2000.

Percent “God is important in my life” Percent “I am a religious person” Percent that attends religious services
(Codes 7-10 in a 10-pinto scale ) at least once a week

1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000

100 100
100

80 80 80

60 60 60

40 40 40

20 20 20

0 0 0
1900-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-82 1900-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-82 1900-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-82

Year of Birth

26
Figure 3.2. Mean Religious Placement on Trust-Distrust and Obedi-
ence-Autonomy Axes, 1980-2000.

Religions Placement 1980-2000

Protestant
40%
(30, 40)
Buddhist
Hindu
Other
No religion
Trust

Jew

8% 13% 18% 23% 28%

Muslim
Catholic
(17, 25)
Orth

20%
Obedience - Autonomy

27
Table 3.2. Ten Cultural Zones in the WVS.

GNP per capita Freedom % Service popula- Tolerance to homo-

House tion sexuals
1 Protestant Europe 19,952 131 65 2.2
2 English-speaking 21,408 135 71 2.0
3 Catholic Europe 17,064 125 58 1.9
4 Confucian 17,614 81 53 1.5
5 Orthodox 4,756 73 43 1.4
6 Latin America 6,477 96 64 1.6
7 South Asia 2,448 76 27 1.6
8 Islamic 3,571 56 34 1.1
9 Africa 3,723 73 47 1.3
10 Jewish 16,861 117 70 2.0
Total 10,341 94 55 1.6

28
Figure 3.3. Changes in Political Trust by Year of Birth.
Percent who said that “this country is run by a few big interests looking
out for themselves” minus percent who said that “this country is run for
the benefit of all the people.”

1990 2000

80

60

40

20

0
1900-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-82

29
Figure 3.4. Democracy: Driven by Masses or Elites?

Democracy: driven by masses or elites?

3.00
Vietnam
2.90

2.80 China Tanzania

Philippines Canada Sweden
S 2.70 India Japan
u US Spain
2.60 P. Rico Indonesia
p S AfricaJordan & Iran
Nigeria Chile & Uganda
p Venez Serbia
2.50 Mexico S. Korea
l Peru Algeria Montenegro
y 2.40 Argentina Bosnia & Albania
Maruecos
Macedonia Zimbabwe
Pakistan
2.30
Moldova
2.20
2.20 2.30 2.40 2.50 2.60 2.70 2.80 2.90 3.00
Demand

30
 Figure 3.5. A Ten-Year Shift in Mexicans’ Belief Systems.
Average Placement of Age Cohorts on Variables from Factor Analysis.

0.4
Fundamentalist-----VALUE DIMENSION-----------Liberal

1970-82

0.2 1960-69 1970-72

FACTOR I

0.0 1950-59

1940-49

-0.2
1900-39

-0.4
-0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
Redistributive left---ECONOMIC DIMENSION---Capitalist right
FACTOR II
Year of survey: 1990 2000

31
Figure 3.5. Radicalism and Conservatism in Selected Countries, 1980-2000.

wave radical reform defend Total

Mexico 1981 12% 77% 11% 1610
2000 15% 61% 25% 1302
Hungary 1990 6% 77% 17% 887
1995 2% 72% 26% 594
Finland 1990 3% 88% 9% 532
1995 2% 82% 16% 938
S. Korea 1981 22% 74% 4% 849
1999 10% 59% 32% 1199
Brazil 1990 16% 74% 10% 1725
1995 18% 61% 21% 1137
Bulgaria 1990 22% 59% 19% 928
1995 7% 81% 13% 879
Bangladesh 1995 11% 61% 29% 1372
1999 13% 42% 44% 1430
Total earliest 13% 73% 14% 7903
last 9% 65% 25% 7479

32
Figure 3.6. From Radicalism to Conservatism: Attitudes towards society by year of birth, 1980-2000
(Percent who agrees with each statement).

1980 1990
50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

10 10

0 0
1900-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-82 1900-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-82

1996 2000
50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

10 10

0 0
1900-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-82 1900-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-82

The entire way our society is Our present society must be

organized must be radically valiantly defended against all Series1

changed by revolutionary action subversive forces

33
Figure 3.5. An Increasing Generational Value Gap in Mexico.
Percent of Materialists (MAT) and Postmaterialists (PM) by Year of Birth.

50
1980
40

30
MAT

20

10 PM

0
1900-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-82

50
1990
40

30 MAT

20

10
PM
0
1900-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-82

50

40 2000

30
MAT
20

10 PM

0
1900-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-82
Year of birth

34