Futures 85 (2017) 42–57

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Futures
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/futures

Original research article

Democracy in the ageing society: Quest for political

equilibrium between generations
Yongseok Seo*
Korea Institute of Public Administration, Room 203, Jinheung-ro 235, Eunpyoung-Gu, Seoul 03367, South Korea, South Korea

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Article history:
Received 6 March 2016 The ageing of society looms large as having a huge impact on the future political landscape,
Received in revised form 28 September 2016 and is increasingly being acknowledged as a serious threat to the sustainability of
Accepted 7 November 2016 democracy. The ageing of the voting electorate is contributing to the political imbalance
Available online 11 November 2016 between the old and young generations, and has the potential to levy excessive burden on
future generations. With this background in mind, this research seeks to point out, through
Keywords: reform of the electoral system, the problems of silver democracy caused by societal ageing,
Ageing and to suggest ways to achieve political equilibrium between generations. Key suggestions
Democracy
are: 1) changing the basis of electoral districts from geographic area to age-cohort; 2)
Future generations
establishment of a new future generations district which can speak for the rights of those
Intergenerational justice
who are currently underage; and 3) weighting of votes cast by the younger generations,
who may be at a numerical disadvantage in elections.
© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Major industrial societies, such as Western Europe, Japan and Korea, are experiencing rapid demographic change due to
low birth rates and societal ageing; in essence, the percentage of the elderly in the voting electorate is increasing.1 This
phenomenon can have drastic impact on these countries’ future political landscape and democracy. To the average
politician, the most important goal is winning the next election. Therefore, from the politician’s perspective, it makes
logical sense to advocate for the elderly at the expense of future generations, as the elderly possess the most voting power
and thus can most directly influence election results.2 This results in a systematic political disadvantage for a) youths in
their 20 s and 30s, who are fewer in number; b) the under-aged, who cannot exercise their voting rights; and c) those who
have not yet been born, resulting in a huge political imbalance between generations. On this course, the future of
democracy would be, to modify a famous Abraham Lincoln quote, ‘of the elderly, by the elderly, for the elderly’—a
silvercracy.3
The problem of generational imbalance is most apparent in social security and public finance. Fiscal and financial issues,
such as welfare benefits, public pensions, healthcare and taxation, are political matters which are strongly impacted by

* Correspondence to: Dongan-gu, Sammaul Limkwang, Apartment 308-702, Anyangshi, Kyounggi Province, South Korea.
E-mail address: yongseoks@gmail.com (Y. Seo).
1
Kashiwase Nozaki, and Tokuoka, 2012.
2
Campbell, 2002; Caplan, 2007; Harney, 2013; OECD, 2011; Yashiro, 2014.
3
‘Silvercracy’ is a portmanteau of ‘silver’ and ‘democracy’, with ‘silver’ signifying the elderly.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2016.11.002
0016-3287/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
 Y. Seo / Futures 85 (2017) 42–57 43

politics. An increasing political demand for budget expenditure has resulted in a high frequency of fiscal deficits, and these
deficits are usually borne by specific generations.4 In particular, under-aged younger generations who do not possess voting
rights can be potentially exploited by an older generation with voting rights and political power, as the cost of fiscal deficits
are, to use a colloquial term, ‘kicked down the road’ to be handled by future generations.5 Put simply, expansion of a social
security system and an increase in public debt, if not accompanied by financial resources, can be a disaster for future
generations. In order to prevent such a catastrophe, a fundamental reform to restore the balance of social security benefits
needs to happen; however, such reforms are not happening.6 The reason for this falls on the older generations, who use
numerical advantage to expand their political influence.
Societal ageing will have a dramatic impact on the future political landscape, and is increasingly regarded as something
that threatens the very foundations of democracy. In the contemporary democracy, ‘age’ and ‘generations’ are vital keywords
with significant impact on political decision-making; this is being seen in the increasing inequality between generations.7 As
society will age even more in the future; the imbalance between youths and the elderly is projected to increase accordingly.
In the upcoming silvercracy era, if we are to address the imbalance between generations and achieve fair distribution of
resources, there needs to be a fundamental reform of the current democratic system.8 In particular, there needs to be a more
equal distribution of political power between generations, achieved through a reform of the electoral process.9 This research
seeks to assess the impact of societal ageing on democracy and the political process, and explore new political structures
based on the co-existence of different generations. To do so, this research will first look at the final piece of the puzzle of
general elections: the securing of political rights for minors and future generations. Next, this research will search for ways to
increase the political influence of the younger generation (in their 20s and 30s), which has decreased due to low voting rates
and low numbers of people, by observing Korea’s demographic shifts.

2. Does ‘silvercracy’ exist?

2.1. The ageing of society, and the expansion of intergenerational inequality

In many industrial societies today, it is possible to observe lower birth rates and societal ageing as demographic
phenomena. Medical advancements and increases in quality of life and public health have dramatically increased average
human life expectancy, resulting in societal ageing in both developed and developing states.10
Today’s global population aged 60 and over numbers around 760 million today, and that number is projected reach 2
billion by 2050. By that year, the number of people who will be aged 80 and over alone will be close to 400 million, according
to the same projections. This trend will be stronger in the developed world, with Japan notably being heavily affected. The
developing world is not free from this trend either, with both India and China expected to have demographic shifts that
reflect this.11
In light of the demographic change, it is easy to observe ‘intergenerational inequality’ in resource distribution, which
exacerbates the social impact of this phenomenon.12 Arguments have been made that the reasons for this inequality stem
from the imbalance in the allocation and burden of social welfare.13 The market economy works on a principle of reciprocity,
with ‘equivalent exchange’ being the basis of the rules of exchange. However, when it comes to social security systems, which
are responsible for the redistribution of wealth, the distribution tends to go in one direction. According to Johnson, Conrad
and Thomson, if the social welfare policies of today—which are characterized by redistributing wealth from the young to the
elderly—are continued, enmity between generations will continue to fester, eventually destroying the implicit agreement
that is fundamental to the establishment of a welfare state.14 While this sort of social welfare policy is operated and managed
through government financing, the problem is that many developed countries are doing so while carrying significant
amounts of public debt.15
Budget formulation is a political process, and a budget deficit usually occurs due to political influence. Political
economists cite the political business cycle, the strategic motivation of politics, and the common resource problem as causes

4
Binstock & Quadagno, 2001; Cremer & Pestieau, 2000; Tokuoka, 2012.
5
Thompson, 2009; Turner, 1989; Turner, 1998.
6
Auerbach & Chun, 2006; Hollanders & Koster, 2011; Kashiwase & Rizza, 2014.
7
For more on ageing and politics, see Meijdam, Harrie, & Verbon, 1996; Hamil-Luker, 2001; Legros, 2003; Ney, 2003; Sproten, Diener, Fiebach, &
Schwieren, 2010.
8
Fry, 2011; International Monetary Fund, 2011; Kolmar, 2001.
9
Campbell, 2002; Teitelbaum, 2001.
10
OECD, 2011.
11
Bloom, Canning, & Fink, 2011.
12
Attias-Donfut & Wolff, 2000; Binstock, 2010; Lee, 1994, 2003.
13
For more on intergenerational justice in the allocation of public resources between generations, see Callahan, 1981; Daniels, 1988; Thomson, 1996;
Johnson, Conrad, & Thompson, 1989; Campbell, 2002; Johnson, 1995, 1999; Laslett & Fishkin, 1992; Andrew, Lee, Tung, Lai, & Miller, 2009; Myles, 2002;
Walker, 1990.
14
Johnson et al., 1989. For more on intergenerational accounting, see Auebach, Gokhale, & Kotlikoff, 1991; Auerbach & Kotlikoff, 1999; Kotilikoff, 2002;
Kotlikoff & Burns, 2004.
15
Kashiwase & Rizza, 2014.
44 Y. Seo / Futures 85 (2017) 42–57

Fig. 1. Percentage point difference in voting rates between 55+ and 16–35 years old.68

for the political formulation of budget deficits.16 Of these, the cause that is most often noted as the biggest one is the common
resource problem. Common resources are more likely to be overused compared to private resources, and this overuse may
result in the resource’s depletion—the ‘tragedy of the commons.’ Even so, because the costs and benefits of social welfare are
difficult to clearly link to individual entities, it is easy to override doubts as to who is actually going to bear the costs.17 Thus,
as political demand for budget expenditure rises, the possibility of a budget deficit increases, possibly resulting in fiscal
bankruptcy.
Budget deficits have a high possibility of burdening a specific generation.18 In order to maintain generational fairness, it is
important to maintain a healthy budget and refrain from expanding public debt compared to GDP except when absolutely
necessary.19 The current political setup, however, which has parties focus on maintaining political power above all else, it is
very easy for parties to announce policies that would most benefit those with the most voting power.20 Thus, there is a gap
between the ideal distribution of resources and the reality of how resources are distributed. Within the framework of
democracy, the future generations which do not currently possess voting power are vulnerable to exploitation from older
generations which do possess voting power, as the younger generation may be left to pay the future costs of current budget
deficits.21
There have been discussions and deliberations within the current political system to solve the aforementioned problems
of inequality. However, due to the presence of group selfishness amongst the political stakeholders, the possibility of a
political agreement to solve this problem is extremely low.22 Hence, fundamental reform has not progressed much at all and
the current situation, where the older generation equipped with voting rights and political power pass the costs of budget
deficits to future generations, is ongoing.

2.2. The increasing political influence of the elderly

According to the OECD’s Society at a Glance (2011), the percentage of people aged 55 and over who vote is much higher
than the percentage of younger people who vote. The gap is especially wide in Korea, Japan and the United Kingdom. In
national elections, the high rate of participation of the elderly, as well as the increase in the number of elderly citizens who
vote due to societal aging, has a significant impact on the political process; and this makes it more likely that policies which
disproportionately favor the elderly are produced (Fig. 1).23
The United Kingdom is in a similar situation, where the younger generation possesses less voting power than the elderly;
this gap is expected to increase in the future. According to a dataset by Fair Pay, a British NGO, voter turnout amongst people

16
Seo, 2013; Cremer & Pestieau, 2000.
17
Razin & Sadka, 2002.
18
Hamil-Luker, 2001; Irwin, 1996; Irwin, 1998.
19
OECD, 2011.
20
Ney, 2003; Poundstone, 2008.
21
Shimasawa & Yamashita, 2009.
22
Poundstone, 2008.
23
OECD, 2011.
68
OECD. (2015). Society at a glance 2011. OECD.
 Y. Seo / Futures 85 (2017) 42–57 45

Fig. 2. UK general election turnout 1983–2020.69

Fig. 3. Future forecasts for Japan’s electorate breakdown by age.70

aged 18–34 has been steadily decreasing since 1983.24 In contrast, voter turnout for the elderly has steadily increased since
1997. This gap in voter turnout was expressly shown in the 2001 and 2005 general elections. The problem with this situation
is that if the trend continues, over 50 percent of voters in the United Kingdom will be 55 and over by the year 2037 (Fig. 2).25
Japan has also experienced a rise in elderly voter turnout as Japanese society has undergone aging. In elections after 2000,
voter turnout of people in their sixties and seventies has risen dramatically, regardless of election type and date. When
inquired, older people were more likely to consider voting as one’s ‘civic duty,’ and the older the person was, the more likely
it was for them to have time and have less of an opportunity cost when voting.26 As the voter turnout of the elderly has
increased, the percentage of the electorate which qualifies as elderly has increased sharply as well. In 2010, the percentage of
the Japanese electorate aged 60 and over was 38%, nearly a twofold increase from 1980. In the same time period, the
percentage of voters in their twenties has decreased from 20 percent to 13 percent.27 As low birth rates lower the number of
younger people, the number of elderly people is increasing, resulting in a marked advantage for the elderly in voter turnout.
This has led to politics being heavily influenced by the desires of the elderly. The problem is that this scenario looks set to
grow worse in the future. According to forecasts, the percentage of the Japanese electorate that is aged 60 or more is set to be
45% in 2030, and 53 percent in 2050; the percentage of twenties at those points in time are projected to be 11 percent and 9
percent respectively (Fig. 3).28
In the case of Korea, low birth rates and societal aging are projected to increase the percentage of voters who are elderly.
Voter turnout is especially low amongst voters in their twenties and thirties compared to other age groups. In the 2012
Korean presidential election, voters in their twenties and thirties participated at a rate of 65.2% and 72.5% respectively; in the

24
Although it did start to pick up again for the 25–34 year olds in 2005 and for the 18–24 year olds in 2010.
25
Fair Pay, 2016.
26
Shimasawa & Yamashita, 2009.
27
Asian Century Institute, 2015.
28
Japan National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, 2016.
46 Y. Seo / Futures 85 (2017) 42–57

Fig. 4. Voter turnout in Korea’s general elections and presidential elections.71

Fig. 5. Demographic projections by age group (1960–2060).72

June 4th regional elections that year, the voter turnout was 48.4% and 47.5% respectively. In contrast, voters in their forties
and fifties participated in the presidential election at a rate of 78.7% and 89.9% respectively; for the regional election, the
voter turnout rate was 53.3 percent and 63.2 percent respectively. The results point to a trend where voter turnout is
positively correlated with increasing age (Fig. 4).29
Author points to numerical disadvantage as a reason for Korean youths’ lack of interest and participation in politics. In a
questionnaire for identifying the reasons for the low rate of voter turnout among youths for the 2012 presidential election,
28.6% of voters in their twenties listed “my vote does not have any impact on the results” as their answer.30 Korean youths are
feeling the effects of being outnumbered in the political arena by the older generation and have already begun to despair and
lost interest in politics, as they increasingly feel that their ballot has no real influence on policies.
The problem is that if the current trend of low birth rates and societal aging continues, this mindset will continue to
expand. According to projections by Statistics Korea, the percentage of the Korean population that is over 65 years of age will
reach 15.7 percent by 2020, 24.3% by 2030, 32.3% by 2040, and 40.1 percent by 2060. When estimated against the number of
people who are eligible to vote (i.e. age 19 and up), it is projected that by the 2040s, the percentage of voters that are over 65
years of age will be over half of the voting populace (Fig. 5).31

70
Japanese National Institute of Population and Social Security Research. Reconstituted based on the Population Projections for Japan (January 2012): 2011
to 2060, Japanese National Institute of Population and Social Security Research.
29
Korea National Election Committee, 2016.
69
Fair Pay. (2016). UK general election turnout 1983–2020. http://fairpay.org.uk/133/How_an_Ageing_Population_Affects_Voting_Power_in_the_UK_-
_Fair_Pay133_1.html/ Accessed 16.02.06.
30
Seo, 2013.
31
Statistics Korea, 2011.
71
Korea National Election Committee (2016). http://www.nec.go.kr/portal/VtMain.do/ Accessed 15.06.17.
72
Statistics Korea (2011). Future population forecast, 2010–2060. http://kostat.go.kr/portal/eng/index.action/ Accessed 16.02.10.
 Y. Seo / Futures 85 (2017) 42–57 47

This means that the elderly will claim political majority in the present and the future. Put another way, society will be
structured in a way that a few are responsible for the many. If the political structure is maintained in a way where the desires
of the elderly are more easily represented in politics, the gap between generations will continue to grow. This is a pitfall of the
democratic system which has, up to now, operated on the principle of simple majority. Viewed this way, the Korean political
system is on the precipice of the unknown.
In a political economy context, the progression of low birth rates and societal aging increases the median age of voters and
reinforces the political standing of the elderly. This, in turn, gives credence to the theory of silvercracy, where political
processes result in policies that primarily benefit the elderly. Some may argue that in many democratic countries, political
decision-making follows the majority rule, so the formation of policies which favor those with a numerical majority—in this
case, the elderly—is only natural. However, with low birth rates, societal aging and economic stagnation ongoing, a political
process which is controlled by those who prioritize their own benefits at the expense of long-term societal stability poses
serious problems. Thus, a silvercracy will primarily benefit the elderly and increase the inequality between generations.

3. Preceding suggestions to reduce the intergeneration gap

The literature on intergenerational justice reaches back further than one might expect, encompassing a wide range of
approaches—philosophical, environmental, economic, and legal etc. John Rawls was the first philosopher who framed the
topic of future generations and intergenerational justice within the domain of justice, putting forth a normative inquiry on
the subject.32 Rawls’s primary notion lies within the principle of ‘just savings’, which posits that the current generation has a
certain responsibility and duty to future generations: to establish a basic set of conditions that future generations can use to
build and maintain a certain basic structure.33 Since then, the debate on sustainability—whether environmental or fiscal—
has incorporated the obligation to future generations and intergenerational justice.

3.1. Contemporary discourses on future generations and intergenerational justice

Obligations and responsibilities to future generations bring up moral matters concerning persons who have not yet been
born, but may later come into existence. Questions such as whether future generations are important, whether they have a
right to have their voices heard, whether the current generation is obligated to undertake certain actions for the sake of
future generations’ happiness, whether concern for future generations can retract moral obligations and responsibilities to
existing persons, and what kinds of assets and societies the current generation is obligated to pass to them are just a few of
the questions being examined regarding the matter.34
Environmental issues was the first field to develop an application of intergenerational justice with an emphasis on the
interests of future generations. Issues such as climate change, natural resource depletion, and environmental pollution are at
the hub of discourses focused on the interests of future generations and the obligation of the present generation.
Philosophers dealing with environmental issues and intergenerational justice often utilized ideas and methods from other
fields of study to address such issues. For example, in order to estimate the costs and benefits between generations, Robert
Lind, John Broome and David Ulph, Tyler Cowen and Derek Parfit, Thomas Schelling, Paul Portney and John Peter Weyant,
Andrew Caplin and John Leahy discussed the way in which economists take advantage of the social discount rate in
intergenerational relations, and how this can affect the fairness of those relations.35
Future generations also raise significant concerns in the arena of constitutionalism. A constitution represents the work,
ideas and values of a single generation, while constitutional provisions and their effects surpass the lifespan of its drafters.
Joerg Tremmel suggests several concrete proposals for national constitutions to address this problem. By developing a
‘matrix of written law versus new institution’, Tremmel argues that both articles in constitutions and new institutions can be
considered to handle issues of future generations.36 Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, World Future Council Councilor, further
investigated various national constitutions in existence and categorized into five groups preamble, complementary,
responsibility, practical, and comprehensive approach.37
Possible concrete actions and institutional designs have been introduced to implement concerns for the well-being of
future generations. As an example, Emmanuel Agius proposed a ‘Guardian for Future Generations’. Agius proposed that the
assignment of a proxy for future generations, whose function would be to alert the international community of dangers
posed to the well-being of future generations, would be the most appropriate step to protect the decent livelihoods of future
generations. The Commission for Future Generations in the Israeli parliament has been set up to prioritize the rights of future
generations at the legislative and administrative level.38 Among others, Bruce Tonn has suggested an amendment to the U.S.

32
Rawls, 1971.
33
Rawls, 2001: 159.
34
For more on obligations and responsibilities to future generation, see Barry & Sikora, 1978; Ernest Partridge, ed., Responsibilities to Future Generations.
Agius, 2006; Institute for the Integrated Study of Future Generations, 1995; Kim & Dator, 1994; Kim & Dator, 1999; Partridge, 1981; Slaughter & Tough, 1997.
35
Broome & Ulph, 1992; Caplin & Leahy, 2000; Cowen & Parfit, 1992; Lind, 1982, 1990, 1995, 1999; Portney & Weyant, 1999; Schelling, 1995.
36
Tremmel, 2006.
37
Segger, 2014.
38
Shoham & Lamay, 2006.
48 Y. Seo / Futures 85 (2017) 42–57

Constitution to create a ‘Court of Generations,’ whose purpose would be to protect the well-being of future generations by
judging current activities.39
Public debt and fiscal policy are another field that has been discussed regarding its impact for future generations. Bernd
Süssmuth and Robert K. von Weizsäcker discuss the seriousness of public debt in the context of intergenerational justice by
arguing that increasing public debt would be a serious burden to future generations.40 Peer Ederer, Philipp Schuller and
Stephan Willms further suggested the devising of indicators that measure capital transfer levels between generations. They
measure net capital that can be transferred from present generation to future generations, indicated as a percentage of how
much net capital these current generations have inherited.41
To summarize, the discussion of the interests of future generations and intergenerational justice cover moral values,
environmental studies, constitutional reform, committees within the legislature, fiscal policy, and other elements.42 Of
these, this research will look at several solutions focusing on the fundamental basis of democracy—elections—and possible
measures to address the inequality between generations and protect the rights of future generations.

3.2. Representation of future generations through proxy

As Andrew Dobson noted, the future generation does not exist in the present, rendering them unable to vote or to be
represented.43 Thus, the question becomes how such future generations can nevertheless have their voices and desires heard
in the present democratic policymaking process. Several academics have crafted proposals where an agent can act as a proxy
for the future generation, and bestow matching authority to this agent so that it may act to protect the rights of future
generations within the present day democratic process. If somebody existing in the present can act as the proxy and cast
votes accordingly, there may be a way to have the interests of future generations represented in policymaking.44
Gregory Kavka and Virginia Warren have suggested that a representative for future generations be appointed within the
legislative branch. According to this, a select few appointed representatives can work together with existing representatives
within the legislature, and thus will work to protect the rights of future generations in this manner.45 Robert Goodin, on the
other hand, presents an option different from Kavka and Warren’s process-oriented approach; he states that the rights and
interests of future generations must go through a process of ‘deliberation’ by the general public and by politicians. Goodin’s
reasons that the current democratic system fundamentally cannot give voice to future generations, and thus their interests
must be internalized within those who are eligible to participate in elections and the legislative process—the current voting
electorate.46
Dobson argued for institutionalizing the political representation of future generations, suggesting the concepts of ‘proxy
representation’ and ‘proxy electorate.’ A set number of people would be set aside as proxies for future generations, and
representatives selected by that group would participate in representative meetings to participate in the policymaking
process as agents of future generations. Dobson posited that these representatives must be selected from a lobby called the
‘Environmental Substantiality Lobby.’ The Substantiality Lobby would provide candidates to represent future generations as
well as a proxy electorate, and the right to represent future generations in the election cycle would be restricted to those
coming from the Substantiality Lobby. In Dobson’s model, only this organization can select representatives for future
generations, and only members of the lobby have the right to select these representatives.47
Kristian Skagen Ekeli criticized Dobson’s model as a ‘restricted franchise model’ limited to the Substantiality Lobby, and
suggested a new model that suggested a more expansive way to strengthen the political representation of future generations.
The fundamental difference between Dobson’s and Ekeli’s models is that while the Dobson model restricts the eligibility to
represent future generations and proxy electorates to members within the Substantiality Lobby, the Ekeli model gave the
right to select representatives of future generations to all members of the voting electorate. Ekeli dubbed his model, where
all voters have the right to select a representative of the present and the right to select a representative for future
generations, the ‘extended franchise model’.48
The above suggestions have something in common: the idea that in order to represent the interests and rights of future
generations, a proxy representative must be selected so that those interests and rights can be argued for in the current
democratic system. Goodin focuses on the principle of deliberative democracy, choosing to protect the rights and interests of
future generations through careful decision-making and ethical consideration. Dobson and Ekeli, in contrast, argue for a
political system that can represent the future generations within the legislature.

39
Tonn, 1991.
40
Süssmuth & von Weizsäcker, 2006.
41
Ederer, Schuller, & Willms, 2006.
42
For more on policy alternatives for future generations, see Dobson, 1996; Eckersley, 2000; Ekeli, 2005, 2006, 2009; Goodin, 1996, 2000, 2007; Kavka and
Warren, 1983; Stein, 1998; Thompson, 2009, 2010; Tremmel, 2006; Van Parijs, 1998; Ward, 2011; World Future Council, 2012; World Future Council, 2014.
43
Dobson, 1996.
44
For more on political representation for future generations, see Dobson, 1996; Ekeli, 2005; Goodin, 1996; Goodin, 2000; Goodin, 2007; Kates, 2009;
Kavka & Warren, 1983.
45
Kavka & Warren, 1983.
46
Goodin, 1996; Goodin, 2000.
47
Dobson, 1996.
48
Ekeli, 2005.
 Y. Seo / Futures 85 (2017) 42–57 49

3.3. Pursuit of political balance between generations through election reform

The concept of “voting districts by age/cohort” has come up in discussing ways to find political balance while
accommodating an increase in the number of elderly voters. This would mark a change from current voting districts, which
are currently divided by geography. The concept was first introduced in Japan, where rapid societal aging was driving the
political marginalization of youths. Toshihiro Ibori of Tokyo University first promoted the idea of voting districts delineated
by age or cohort; it is an idea to defend the rights and interests of the younger generation, who have low voter participation
rates and are steadily decreasing in number.49
Ibori’s ‘voting districts by age/cohort’ was allotting voting districts by incorporating the perspective of demographic age.
For example, districts could be divided into three groups: people in their twenties and thirties (“Youths”), people in their
forties and fifties (“Middle-Aged”), and people 60 or older (“Elderly”). Divided this way, even if many youths were to forego
their voting rights, the district would correspond to the changing number of voters and still select a number of
representatives that had the interests of youths in mind. If we were to assume that Japan’s electorate consisted of 90 million
people and the entire country was to be divided into 300 districts, each district would consist of 300,000 voters. The districts
would be then divided so that each area where the population of those in their twenties and thirties reaches 300,000 would
be a “youth” district; a similar process would follow for the “middle-aged” and “elderly” groups. The end result would be that
Japan would consist of 300 districts which may be either youth, middle-aged or elderly. As demographics vary from region to
region, the geographic allocation of these districts may be uneven.50
Ibori also argued that the allocation of voting districts should not be left to Congress, but that a third-party organ should
systematically determine district allocation per each election. The reason for this was it would facilitate making adjustments
to the system with a minimum of administrative delay. Under this system, a candidate would declare him/herself as
representing a certain age group of a certain area. Therefore, the voter is not ‘weighed down’ by the power to vote, and can
directly vote for a candidate that would represent his/her generation’s interests. By evaluating districts from the viewpoint of
different generations, the expenses and burdens of each generation are more clearly correlated with policy, leading to a fairer
election process between generations.51
Demeny believed that Europe’s dwindling birthrates was connected to the limitation of minors’ voting rights. The
rationale was that while the elderly possess the right to vote, minors do not; therefore, national resources would naturally be
focused towards the interests of the elderly. Demeny argued that in order for minors to have their rights represented, the
parents of minors could exercise the voting rights of their children by proxy. The Demeny vote allows for the parents of
minors to exercise the minor’s right to vote until he/she reaches voting age and can exercise the right to vote directly. In
essence, a voter with a minor child can exercise votes as proxies for their children, in addition to the right to vote he/she
already possesses. For example, if a married man and woman have one minor child, the mother and the father can each
exercise one-half of a vote as proxies for their child.52
While the exact number varies by country, it is estimated that 15  20% of the general population are minors; as they
cannot exercise their right to vote, their interests and opinions are summarily ignored in the political process. If Japan were to
apply the Demeny method, the percentage of total votes cast by the parents would rise from 24% to 37%; meanwhile, the
percentage of votes cast by those 55 and over would fall from 43% to 35%, establishing equilibrium between youths’ votes and
the elderly’s votes. In 2003, Germany, suffering from low birth rates and societal aging, has a national referendum on
whether to adopt the Demeny vote; the result was negative. A reform was also suggested in Hungary, where mothers would
exercise an extra vote per child.53

4. An alternative for the coexistence of generations

4.1. Electoral system reform

For a long time, politics was a male arena. While the roots of democracy go back all the way to ancient Greece, the history
of female participation in politics is barely 100 years old. In the United Kingdom, the birthplace of parliamentary democracy,
universal suffrage for men was only obtained after World War I.54 The United States, often thought of as the bastion of
liberalism, only granted the right to vote to African-Americans in the 1870s, while Native Americans and women had to wait
until after 1920 for suffrage.55 Even today, there are countries which deny women the right to vote.
Universal suffrage became established around 1900. After the French Revolution, the bloody struggle to expand suffrage
continued for 150 years. The modern right to suffrage has constantly been expanded, ever since Britain’s Magna Carta
established the suffrage rights of nobles in writing. This expansion originally involved social classes; when social classes no

49
Ihori, 2013.
50
Ihori, 2013.
51
Ihori, 2013.
52
Demeny, 1986.
53
Phillips, 2011.
54
Carstairs, 1980.
55
Steinfeld, 1989.
50 Y. Seo / Futures 85 (2017) 42–57

longer existed, the rights were set according to property rights. In the 20th century, women’s rights activists fought to give
women the same rights of suffrage, resulting in many countries granting universal suffrage to women as well.56
The laissez-faire modern state, achieved through people’s revolution, usually operated around the bourgeoisie, who
possessed much private property. As a result, the classes with little private property—namely, the workers and farmers—
were excluded from the political process and could not have their interests represented. The demand for giving these classes
suffrage grew stronger starting from the Chartist movement in Britain. As a result of these struggles, universal suffrage was
established in the 20th century.57 However, the basic rights resulting from people’s revolution were not all established at the
same time. The basic rights that people enjoy today were achieved through citizens’ valiant efforts and resistance. The French
Revolution proclaimed the right to freedom; the workers’ efforts to achieve suffrage followed; after that, the movement for
social rights which could provide practical equality arose.58
A reform of the electoral system is a massive change, and will undoubtedly entail massive resistance. However, it is
important to understand that today’s democracy has evolved according to changes in socioeconomic conditions. In arriving
at the current electoral system, there were two major expansions of the electorate—the granting of universal suffrage, and
the granted of suffrage to women.59
Universal suffrage is an agreement by the rich to grant suffrage to those who have nothing. The preexisting electorate
chose to reduce the influence that their vote possesses by increasing the size of the electorate. By the same token, men
accepted that their voting power would be cut in half if they granted women the right to vote, yet they did. In each era, there
were ways to limit suffrage. As socioeconomic conditions changed, however, new parts of society needed to be incorporated
into the decision-making process. This is not to say that electorate extension was a purely altruistic measure by the
establishment; they chose to do so because they stood to gain from it as well. Namely, the elite extended the franchise in
order to avoid a revolution or social unrest.60
For example, as a result of the Industrial Revolution, the labor market was formed and the labor class was established.
Ignoring labor’s demands had the potential to result in a violent revolution. Acemoglu and Robinson state that the
bourgeoisie incorporated labor into the political process to let their voices be heard because the alternative would have been
a workers’ revolution.61 In addition, with the labor market becoming established, accumulation of human capital—i.e.
education of children—became important, and there was an incentive to give women responsibility for nurturing children.
Dodepke and Tertilt point out that the expansion of women’s’ rights was to give women incentive to act independently.62
The history of democracy can be seen as the history of voting rights expansion, and voting rights have expanded in
accordance with the demands of the times. The rapid increase in the population of the elderly, brought on by low birth rates
and societal aging, is an unprecedented social phenomenon. This change will shake the foundation of political, economic and
social systems, bringing forth the issue of ‘the even distribution of resources between generations.’ The problem is that
adjustments to this change are currently non-functional, both socially and politically (Figs. 1–5).

4.2. Electorate reform through weighting

In a democracy, voters ultimately participate in political decision-making through voting. However, future generations
lack the right to vote, and thus cannot have their interests represented in current politics. Previously, this paper gone over the
concept of districts by age groups and the Demeny vote method as ways to reform the electoral process in order to have
future generations be represented in politics. The former is a way to establish voting districts by age, in order to better
represent the opinions and interests of youths. This idea is based on the premise that seats in parliament are distributed
according to actual population numbers, regardless of voter turnout rates. However, there are downsides to this. A key
downside is block voting, which becomes more effective when voter turnout is low. If one can harness a few votes from the
youth group, who have lower voter turnout rates, it becomes much easier to obtain parliamentary seats than to obtain them
through the elderly, who have higher voter turnout rates. Furthermore, people who can move organizations are not unique to
youths; plenty of elderly people are capable of doing just the same. As a result, the division of voting districts may not
necessarily give accurate representation of youths’ interests in policymaking, and it may be just as difficult to achieve
political equilibrium between the young and the old.
The Demeny voting method works to represent future generations in politics by giving parents the votes that belong to
their children. This also has the potential side benefit of raising birth rates. It may be pertinent to apply the Demeny method
to states such as Korea and Japan, who are currently experiencing incredibly low birth rates. For example, a mother with two
or more children could be given an additional vote. In this scenario, one vote would be the mother’s original vote, and the
additional vote could be cast for a party or candidate that would serve the child’s best interest. This system incentivizes
having children, and can also have beneficial effects on advancing women’s rights. When the child reaches the legal voting

56
Przeworski, 1991.
57
Brown, 1998.
58
Cole & Campbell, 1989.
59
Carstairs, 1980.
60
Acemoglu & Robinson, 2000.
61
Acemoglu & Robinson, 2000.
62
Doepke & Tertilt, 2009.
 Y. Seo / Futures 85 (2017) 42–57 51

Fig. 6. Korea’s population by age group (unit: persons).73

Table 1
Korean population forecast, by age group (2010–2060, unit: person).74

Age 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060

estimate population estimate population estimate population estimate population estimate population estimate population
Total 49,410,366 51,069,017 51,148,967 49,319,811 45,640,682 40,624,464
0–19 11,442,553 8,875,939 7,799,964 6,475,461 5,182,672 4,435,873
20 29 7,001,498 6,801,842 4,785,845 4,167,940 3,683,759 2,829,793
30 39 8,128,301 7,035,164 6,781,185 4,767,739 4,150,426 3,667,490
40 49 8,507,226 8,037,819 6,934,965 6,689,739 4,709,943 4,103,566
50 59 6,676,317 8,436,823 8,000,739 6,934,754 6,712,931 4,740,371
60 69 4,048,525 6,455,666 8,240,584 7,901,172 6,904,047 6,727,477
70 79 2,645,334 3,521,845 5,820,012 7,567,957 7,403,251 6,572,005
Over 80 960,612 1,903,919 2,785,673 4,815,049 6,893,653 7,547,889

age, the right of the mother to exercise a proxy vote on behalf of the child is automatically revoked. However, a significant
criticism of the Demeny system is that by giving parents an additional vote, the possibility exists that parents use that vote
for their own interests instead of the child’s.
A system that attempts to address the problems present in the age-based voting district system and the Demeny system is
the weighted vote system. This system assumes that the current voting district system, with its classification according to
geography, is changed to an age group-based district system. For example, let us assume that the entire population is 100
people, with 20 youths, 30 middle-aged, 40 elderly, and 10 minors (under 20 years of age). In such a situation, an election
would disproportionately favor the interests of the elderly. The middle-aged and elderly people combined make up 70% of
the population; youths and minors are only 30% of society, and thus cannot easily have their voices heard in the political
realm. Weighted voting is a way to overcome this obstacle. A weighted voting program places differing amounts of “weight”
on a single vote from a particular group, in order to have each demographic group have roughly equivalent power per vote. In
order to do this, an age group needs to be set as the standard weight. For example, we can use the group with the most
people—the elderly—and weigh the other groups’ votes to make them equivalent in value. In this scenario, if the weight of
one elderly vote is 1, a youth vote would have 2 weight, a middle-aged vote would have 1.5 weight, and a minor’s vote would
have 3 weight, reducing the voting deficit that exists between generations.
Whether to actually follow through with this weighting of votes is a critical question. Putting aside the already high voter
turnout amongst the elderly, demographic trends indicate that the number of voters aged 60 and up is set to drastically
increase. Fig. 6 Indicates that in Korea, those in their 40 s and 50s—the so-called “baby boomers’—currently comprise 25% of
the entire population. In contrast, due to declining birth rates in the past 10 years, the percentage of the population that is
under 20 years of age is about half that number. With advances in medical technology and increases in life expectancy, it is
highly likely that a vast majority of baby boomers will still be alive in 2050. While this may not be a problem in the present,
the political influence that the baby boomers will have in 2050 will be immense.
According to the Korea Statistical Information Service’s future population estimates by age group, it is projected that in
2060, Korea will have a population of 40.6 million, and over half of that number—27 million—will be over 60 years of age.
Furthermore, the current baby boomer generation, who would be over 80 years old by that time, would number over 7.5
million (Table 1). If we were to think in terms of those who can exercise their right to vote, instead of the entire population,

73
Statistics Korea (2016). Korea’s population by age group. http://kostat.go.kr/portal/eng/index.action/ Accessed 16.02.10.
74
Korean Statistical Information Service (2015). Population forecast 1960–2060. http://kosis.kr/statisticsList/statisticsList_01List.jsp?vwcd=MT_ZTI-
TLE&parentId=A/ Accessed 15.06.17.
52 Y. Seo / Futures 85 (2017) 42–57

Table 2
Estimation for the number and percentage of voters over 60 in Korea (2020–2060).

2020 2030 2040 2050 2060

20  60 30,311,648 26,502,734 22,560,172 19,257,059 15,341,220
Over 60 11,881,430 16,846,269 20,284,178 21,200,951 20,847,371
Total 42,193,078 43,349,003 42,844,350 40,458,010 36,188,591
Over 60 Ratio 28% 39% 47% 52% 58%

Table 3
Weighted value of one vote per age group according to demographic projections for 2050.

Age Age group Population Weighted value of one vote

0 19 Futures 5,182,672 2.8 votes
20–39 Youths 7,834,185 1.8 votes
40–59 Adults 11,422,874 1.3 votes
60–79 Middle-aged 14,307,298 1 vote
80 over Elderly 6,893,653 2.1 vote

the percentage of the voting population that is more than 60 years of age only grows higher. Extending the forecast to 2060
paints an even direr picture. In 2060, voters over age 60 are projected to number 20.8 million, as opposed to 15.3 million in
between 20  60 years of age (Table 2).
In this context, changing the current geographic voting district system into an age group-based voting district system is a
distinct need of the times, for the sake of the future of democracy. The current voting system, which does not take into
account age group demographics, provides virtually no chance for current youths to elect a politician that represents their
interests, to say nothing of future generations; by contrast, the middle-aged and elderly can easily select politicians that
stand for their interests. Therefore, voting district reform is crucial for giving voice to the younger generations in the political
arena (Ihori, 2013). In this spirit, this research seeks to divide future voting districts by age and generation, and apply
weighting to each age group to suggest a voting system that can achieve political equilibrium between generations.
This research proposes that the timing of voting district reform be set for the year 2050, and that the districts be divided
into five types: futures, youths, adults, middle-aged, and elderly. First, the ‘futures’ voting district represents those who
cannot exercise their right to vote because they are underage (under 19). While there has been recent discussion regarding
whether to lower the voting age, there are several problems with allowing those under 18 years of age to exercise their right
to vote. Regardless of advancements in technology and society, a certain level of physical and mental maturity is required in
order for people to accurately judge what is best for their rights and interests. A system where a representative works for the
futures by proxy would help mitigate those concerns and represent the interests of futures in the political system. Therefore,
selecting a proxy electorate and proxy candidates from the older generation to represent the futures could be considered.
Candidates selected to represent futures by proxy would work to protect the futures’ rights and interests in the political
process.
The youth districts would represent those aged 20 to 40, and those elected from these districts would represent this age
group’s interests. Adult districts would represent those aged 40 to 60, and middle-aged districts would represent those aged
60–80. In the future, there will be a very different standard for determining ‘elderly.’ What we would define as ‘elderly’
today—age 60 and over—would probably fall under ‘middle-aged’ around the year 2050. In 2050, only those aged 80 or more
would be classified as elderly. That is why the ‘elderly district’ would only include those aged 80 and up. The important part is
that the representative of an age group does not necessarily have to be a member of that group. A representative who is 60
years old can represent youths, and a 20-year-old could represent an elderly district. A representative is not restricted to
members of a specific age group; if one possesses the passion and capacity to represent an age group’s interests, then he/she
may run for office regardless of age (Table 1).
Elections for selecting members of Congress, who represent various regions and citizens, utilizing an age-based voting
district system can help reduce the imbalance of power between generations. However, in a direct presidential election63
which foregoes electoral colleges and congress, there needs to be another way to reduce the imbalance between generations.
One possible solution is weighting votes per different age groups. Specifically, age groups which have the most members—
the middle-aged and the elderly—are set as the baseline, and votes from age groups which have fewer members are given
additional weight. For example, the middle-aged group is projected to be the age group with the largest number of people in
2050; therefore, a middle-aged group member’s vote would have a value of 1—no additional value. In accordance with
demographic projections for 2050, one vote from a futures group would be worth 1.46 votes; one vote from youth, 1.35 votes;
and one vote from adults, 1.2 votes. While each person will exercise one vote, the weight of the vote varies depending on one’s

63
Korea’s presidential elections occur once every five years, and are a direct election. Thus, each citizen aged 19 and over receives one vote in the election.
 Y. Seo / Futures 85 (2017) 42–57 53

age. This system would be in place not just for presidential elections, but also for national referendums on critical national
subjects. Table 3 calculates the weighted value of one vote from each age group according to projections for the year 2050.
This method will work to bridge the gap between age groups in the political realm. This may also precipitate the birth of a
political party aimed at futures or youths, as a result of the increased influence of a youth or futures vote. The end result
would be the greater representation of futures’ and youths’ interests in politics, which would in turn create an environment
where youths and futures feel that politics matters, increasing voter turnout amongst those age groups.

5. Conclusion

This research pointed out the danger of silvercracy, which is rapidly progressing due to low birth rates and societal aging,
and suggested an electoral reform in order to establish political equilibrium between the elderly and youths and future
generations. The key points of this proposal are 1) the changing of voting districts, from ‘geography-based’ to ‘age group-
based’; 2) the establishment of a ‘futures voting district’ which would represent the interests of future generations; and 3)
the weighting of votes in age-based voting districts to aid youths, who are at a numerical disadvantage. However,
implementing the changes suggested here into the political system will not be easy; many political and institutional
difficulties will need to be overcome, and the changes will need a long time to establish themselves. Nevertheless, if these
changes become institutionalized, the political impact and significance of these measures will be immense, as they can
contribute to lessening the gap between generations and increasing the sustainability of the current political system.
The following research and discussion are necessary to supplement the limitations of this research. First, there needs to
be analysis of case studies to ascertain whether the changing of voting districts into age-based ones actually improve
political equilibrium between generations. Next, research must be carried out to identify who will represent the interests of
future generations if ‘futures voting districts’ are established. Finally, one must remember that modern democracy relies on
the principle of ‘one person, one vote’ as one of its fundamental tenets. Therefore, the suggestion that votes be weighted
differently must be subject to further discussion, and analyzed in the context of value systems and legal frameworks.
Above all, in order to turn these suggestions into reality, there must be a redefining of the concept of ‘equality,’ which is
present in most countries’ constitutions. This research is suggesting that the concept of ‘time’ be added to the existing
concept of equality, which would increase the scope of equality to include ‘equality between life cycles’ and ‘equality
between generations.’ As sustainable development is under threat, there is room to discuss whether the constitutional
concept of equality can be redefined and expanded. These suggestions, if implemented, will work to decrease the political
inequality between generations, thereby overcoming silvercracy and helping sustain a democratic system which would be
feasible in a more elderly society.
The modern principle of universal suffrage grants the right to vote to citizens over a certain age, with no restrictions.
However, the rise of silvercracy, brought forth by societal aging, and the increasing imbalance between generations is
threatening the sustainability of democracy. Democracy has changed its form in response to changes in the times; therefore,
democracy can change again in the face of the demands of current times—the specter of an elderly society.

Appendix A. Possible objections

This section will address possible objections that could be made to A) the notion of future generations, and B) some of the
ideas put forth in section four.

64. Will the elderly only vote for their own self-interest?

In recent times, inter-generational conflict in the form of welfare benefits, pensions, healthcare, housing, etc. has
risen as a critical election issue. The rise of such inter-generational conflict reflects the fact that each generation, regardless of
age, is voting in order to maximize its own benefits. The most famous recent example is the recent British referendum on
leaving the European Union—the ‘Brexit’ referendum. TIME magazine declared that “The UK’s old decided for the young in
the Brexit vote”. The demographics of the vote were split along generational lines, with young voters voting to remain in the
E.U. and old voters voting for a breakaway from the E.U. In particular, those who came of age before the formation of the E.U.
the pensioners showed a decidedly anti-E.U. tendency, with a staggering 59% wanting their country to leave. The Brexit
result is a direct answer to the question of whether people would really vote for the interest of themselves and their groups
over the collective good of their country—a resounding “yes.”64

65. Is it true that what appears to be in the self-interest of the elderly does not overlap with the interests of voters of other age
groups?

The benefits of the elderly in areas such as welfare, pensions and healthcare do not align with those of other generations.
Even if one assumes that both the young and the old will act in a selfish manner, the incentive structure for the two groups

64
Shuster, 2016.
54 Y. Seo / Futures 85 (2017) 42–57

varies wildly. Put simply, the young are at a temporal disadvantage: the old do not have to worry about becoming young
again and thus do not necessarily have to consider the benefits that would go to younger generations. By contrast, the young
are faced with the fact that one day, they will be old and the policies they put forward at this point in time can come back to
haunt them down the road, restricting their options in policy proposals due to the resulting different calculus of costs and
benefits.
Andy Furlong and Fred Cartmel insist that there are significant differences in policy priorities between age groups in the
British Election Survey.65 Their analysis examined the diverging perspectives of different generational groups, placed within
the context of an election that centered on issues of relevance to the younger electorate. Differences in political priorities can
be extrapolated to mean a conflict of interests. Such conflicts lead to an outcome closer to zero-sum than win-win, as
different generations push forward agendas designed to increase the benefits of one's own group—at the expense of other
groups if need be.

66. Is it true that the elderly do not care about younger generations (such as their own children, grandchildren and great
grandchildren)?

It is natural for the elderly to care for their descendants, their children. However, this viewpoint is suggesting that as long
as one’s own bloodline are well-off, generational conflict does not matter. What this paper is discussing is the fair
distribution of resources between generations in a national or social context. Kim and Dator distinguish between their own
offspring and the future generations this way;
Many people think of their own children and grandchildren or at least of their own biological descendants when they
think of “future generations.” But this may not be the best meaning of this term. Being mindful of and helping provide for the
needs of your own descendants is relatively easy though not exactly duck soup either, as the children of parents with maxed
out credit cards, one hundred year mortgages, and other malingering debts well know. But it is very difficult indeed,
perhaps impossible for humans to care sufficiently for the unborn they will never see, never know, and who are not their
own descendants. And yet that is precisely what the term “future generations” may need to signify: not our descendants; not
even others children who we can come to see and know, but people we will never know, and who can never thank us for
caring for them, or bring us to task for failing to do so.66
Of course there are members of the elderly who are magnanimous and genuinely care for the future well-being of young
and future generations, regardless of blood relations; that is not this paper’s contention. Rather, this paper contends that
such magnanimous individuals are a small minority; most elderly members will vote for the benefit of one’s own generation,
even at the expense of others. The recent Brexit referendum says it all.

Is it true that the elderly do not care about future generations (ex. the environment, energy issues, sustainability programs)?

Many people, including the elderly, discuss matters of sustainability with regards to the environment, climate change,
and natural resources. However, changes in the environment and the global climate do not immediately and directly impact
the lives of the elderly the ways welfare benefits, healthcare and pension do. On matters which will impact the relatively
distant future, such as climate change and environmental degradation, many elderly people will worry about sustainability.
However, on matters which have a direct and immediate impact on their livelihood, such as welfare benefits and pensions,
the elderly have shown that they will naturally gravitate towards self-interest and fall into sharp conflict with other
generations.

Can it really be argued that the views of younger generations are more justified than the views of the elderly population?

This paper is not stating that the views of the younger generation are more justified that those of the elderly. Rather, this
paper seeks to shed light on the fact that there is a structural flaw with the current system of democracy. Due to demographic
changes both within and beyond their control, the young and future generations are becoming increasingly marginalized in
the political spectrum while older generations are buoyed by the same demographic changes. Compounding this flaw is the
fact that younger generations will be the ones left to handle the consequences of political decisions made today, a scenario
that the Brexit referendum casts a sobering light on. It is also important to recognize that public policy is not something that
can simply be undone if it is unsuccessful; the initial impact of policy implementation, especially in fields such as pensions
and healthcare, often cannot be reversed even if the policies themselves are. This makes it even more important to address
the growing flaw in the system now rather than later.

65
Furlong & Cartmel, 2012: 13–28.
66
Kim & Dator, 1999: 9–10.
 Y. Seo / Futures 85 (2017) 42–57 55

67. Can it really be argued that democracy is indeed at risk simply because of the demographics of an ageing society?

Demographic change matters to democracy. The system of democracy and the principle of “one person, one vote” were
designed in order to make sure that none were unduly privileged or marginalized within the political system. However, that
system has always had a flaw, sometimes referred to as “the tyranny of the majority”—groups which are smaller in number
will always be marginalized by the democratic system. If one looks back into the history of representative democracy,
democratic systems with near-universal franchises have always coincided with a certain national demographic profile—a
pyramid-shaped age distribution, with the young outnumbering the old. The current demographic trends of industrial
societies, as mentioned above, are changing shape to become an inverted pyramid where the old outnumber the young. This
means that the upcoming era is a first-of-its-kind social experiment: the combination of a representative democracy and an
inverted pyramid-shaped age distribution demographic. If population ageing trends persist, the impact on society will
increase in kind, ultimately undermining the legitimacy of democracy itself by eliminating the over-representation of voters
most likely to be impacted by the outcomes of the democratic process.67

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