1. LOADMASTERS CUSTOMS SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs.

GLODEL BROKERAGE CORPORATION and

R&B INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 179446. January 10, 2011.
FACTS: On August 28, 2001, R&B Insurance issued Marine Policy No. MN-00105/2001 in favor of Columbia to insure
the shipment of 132 bundles of electric copper cathodes against All Risks. On August 28, 2001, the cargoes were shipped on
board the vessel “Richard Rey” from Isabela, Leyte, to Pier 10, North Harbor, Manila. They arrived on the same date.

Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the release and withdrawal of the cargoes from the pier and the subsequent
delivery to its warehouses/plants. Glodel, in turn, engaged the services of Loadmasters for the use of its delivery trucks to
transport the cargoes to Columbia’s warehouses/plants in Bulacan and Valenzuela City.

The goods were loaded on board twelve (12) trucks owned by Loadmasters, driven by its employed drivers and
accompanied by its employed truck helpers. Six (6) truckloads of copper cathodes were to be delivered to Balagtas,
Bulacan, while the other six (6) truckloads were destined for Lawang Bato, Valenzuela City. The cargoes in six truckloads
for Lawang Bato were duly delivered in Columbia’s warehouses there. Of the six (6) trucks en route to Balagtas, Bulacan,
however, only five (5) reached the destination. One (1) truck, loaded with 11 bundles or 232 pieces of copper cathodes,
failed to deliver its cargo.

Later on, the said truck, an Isuzu with Plate No. NSD-117, was recovered but without the copper cathodes. Because of this
incident, Columbia filed with R&B Insurance a claim for insurance indemnity in the amount of P1,903,335.39. After the
requisite investigation and adjustment, R&B Insurance paid Columbia the amount of P1,896,789.62 as insurance indemnity.

R&B Insurance, thereafter, filed a complaint for damages against both Loadmasters and Glodel before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 14, Manila (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 02-103040. It sought reimbursement of the amount it had paid
to Columbia for the loss of the subject cargo. It claimed that it had been subrogated “to the right of the consignee to recover
from the party/parties who may be held legally liable for the loss.”

RTC rendered a decision3 holding Glodel liable for damages for the loss of the subject cargo and dismissing Loadmasters’
counterclaim for damages and attorney’s fees against R&B Insurance.

ISSUE: WON EITHER GLODEL AND LOADMASTER MAY BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE ENTIRE AMOUNT OF
DAMAGES.

HELD: YES. At the outset, it is well to resolve the issue of whether Loadmasters and Glodel are common carriers to
determine their liability for the loss of the subject cargo. Under Article 1732 of the Civil Code, common carriers are
persons, corporations, firms, or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passenger or goods, or both
by land, water or air for compensation, offering their services to the public.

Based on the aforecited definition, Loadmasters is a common carrier because it is engaged in the business of transporting
goods by land, through its trucking service. It is a common carrier as distinguished from a private carrier wherein the
carriage is generally undertaken by special agreement and it does not hold itself out to carry goods for the general public.
The distinction is significant in the sense that “the rights and obligations of the parties to a contract of private carriage are
governed principally by their stipulations, not by the law on common carriers.”

In the present case, there is no indication that the undertaking in the contract between Loadmasters and Glodel was private
in character. There is no showing that Loadmasters solely and exclusively rendered services to Glodel.

In fact, Loadmasters admitted that it is a common carrier.

In the same vein, Glodel is also considered a common carrier within the context of Article 1732. In its Memorandum, it
states that it “is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and is engaged
in the business of customs brokering.” It cannot be considered otherwise because as held by this Court in Schmitz Transport
& Brokerage Corporation v. Transport Venture, Inc., a customs broker is also regarded as a common carrier, the
transportation of goods being an integral part of its business. 

Loadmasters and Glodel, being both common carriers, are mandated from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, to observe the extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them according to all the
circumstances of such case, as required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code.When the Court speaks of extraordinary diligence,
it is that extreme measure of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection observe for securing
and preserving their own property or rights. This exacting standard imposed on common carriers in a contract of carriage of
goods is intended to tilt the scales in favor of the shipper who is at the mercy of the common carrier once the goods have
been lodged for shipment. Thus, in case of loss of the goods, the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently. This presumption of fault or negligence, however, may be rebutted by proof that the common carrier
has observed extraordinary diligence over the goods.

With respect to the time frame of this extraordinary responsibility, the Civil Codeprovides that the exercise of extraordinary
diligence lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by, the carrier for
transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who
has a right to receive them.

Premises considered, the Court is of the view that both Loadmasters and Glodel are jointly and severally liable to R & B
Insurance for the loss of the subject cargo. Under Article 2194 of the New Civil Code, “the responsibility of two or more
persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.”

At this juncture, the Court clarifies that there exists no principal-agent relationship between Glodel and Loadmasters, as
erroneously found by the CA. Article 1868 of theCivil Code provides: “By the contract of agency a person binds himself to
render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter.”
The elements of a contract of agency are: (1) consent, express or implied, of the parties to establish the relationship; (2) the
object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person; (3) the agent acts as a representative and not for
himself; (4) the agent acts within the scope of his authority.

Accordingly, there can be no contract of agency between the parties. Loadmasters never represented Glodel. Neither was it
ever authorized to make such representation. It is a settled rule that the basis for agency is representation, that is, the agent
acts for and on behalf of the principal on matters within the scope of his authority and said acts have the same legal effect as
if they were personally executed by the principal. On the part of the principal, there must be an actual intention to appoint or
an intention naturally inferable from his words or actions, while on the part of the agent, there must be an intention to accept
the appointment and act on it. Such mutual intent is not obtaining in this case.

What then is the extent of the respective liabilities of Loadmasters and Glodel? Each wrongdoer is liable for the total
damage suffered by R&B Insurance. Where there are several causes for the resulting damages, a party is not relieved from
liability, even partially. It is sufficient that the negligence of a party is an efficient cause without which the damage would
not have resulted. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the damage would not have resulted from his
negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor.

COMMON CARRIER - are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of

carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering
their services to the public.

2. AGAPITO FUELLAS, petitioner, vs. ELPIDIO CADANO, ET AL., respondents.

No. L-14409. October 31, 1961
FACTS: Two separate actions were instituted for serious physical injuries sustained by Pepito Cadano, son of plaintiff-
appellee Elpidio Cadano. A civil case for damages against Agapito Fuellas, father of the minor Rico Fuellas, who caused the
injurires and criminal case against Rico Fuellas for serious physical injuries. A judgment of conviction in the criminal case
was rendered, finding Rico Fuellas guilty of the offense charged. The same court rendered its decision in the civil case
making defendant-appellant Agapito Fuellas liable under Art. 2180 NCC.
1. Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, son of defendant-appellant Agapito Fuellas were both 13 yrs old at that time. They
were classmates at St. Mary’s High School, Dansalan City.
2. In the afternoon of Sept 16, 1954, while Pepito was studying in their classroom, Rico took the pencil of one Ernesto
Cabanok and sneakily placed it inside the pocket of Pepito. When Ernesto asked Rico to return the pencil, it was
Pepito who returned the same, and act which angered Rico, who held the neck of Pepito and pushed him to the
floor. Villamira, a teacher, separated the two and told them to go home. Rico went ahead, with Pepito following.
3. When Pepito had just gone down of the schoolhouse, he was met by Rico, who was still in an angry mood. Angelito
Aba, a classmate, told them to shake hands, Pepito extended his hand to Rico. Instead of accepting the proffer to
shake hands, Rico held Pepito by the neck and with his leg, placed Pepito out of balance and pushed him to the
ground.
4. Pepito fell on his right side with his right arm under his body, then Rico rode on his left side, Pepito suddenly cried
out that his arm was broken. Rico got up and went away.
5. That same evening Pepito was brought to the Lanao General Hospital for treatment. An X-ray was taken showing
there was a complete fracture of the radius and ulna of the right forearm which necessitated plaster casting.
6. More than a month after Pepito’s release from the hospital, the plaster cast was removed. Up to the last day of
hearing, the right forearm of Pepito was seen to b shorter than the left forearm, still in bandage and could not be
fully used.
7. The appellant argued the contention of the CA where it held that petitioner liable pursuant to Art. 2180[2] CC in
connection with Art. 2176 of the same code; that according to the last article, the act of the minor must be one
wherein “fault or negligence” is present; and that there being no fault or negligence on the part of petitioner-
appellant’s minor son, but deliberate intent in the commission of an act negates the presence of fault or negligence
in its commission. Appellant therefore submits that the CA erred in holding him liable for damages for the
deliberate criminal act of his minor son.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner was civilly liable for the criminal act of his son.

HELD: Yes
In the case of Araneta vs. Arreglado it provides that: “the civil law liability under Art.2180 is not respondeat superior but
the relationship of pater familias which bases the liability of the father ultimately on his own negligence of his minor son,
the law presumes that there was negligence on the part of his father.

In the case of Exconde vs. Capuno, the Court held the defendants jointly and severally liable withi his minor son Dante for
damages arising from the criminal act committed by the latter, and gave the following reason for the rule:
The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother for any
damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is a necessary consequence
of parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the “duty of supporting them, keeping
them in their company educating them in proportion to their means”, while on the other hand, gives them the right
to correct and punish them in moderation” (Arts. 134 and 135, Spanish Civil Code). The only way by which they
can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage. (Art. 1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code).

And a noted Spanish commentator (Manresa, 649-650):

Since children and wards do not yet have the capacity to govern themselves, the law imposes upon the parents and
guardians the duty of exercising special vigilance over the acts of their children and wards in order that damages to
third persons due to the ignorance, lack of foresight or discernment of such children and wards may be avoided. If
the parents and guardians fail to comply with this duty, they should suffer the consequence of their abandonment or
negligence by repairing the damage caused”

It is true that under Art. 101 of the Revised Penal Code, a father is made civilly liable for the acts committed by his son only
if the latter is an imbecile, an insane, under 9 years of age, or over 9 but under 15 years of age, who act without discernment,
unless it appears that there is no fault or negligence on his part. This is because a son who commits the act under any of
those conditions is by law exempt from criminal liability (Art. 12 [1,2&3] RPC). The idea is not to leave the act entirely
unpunished but to attach certain civil liability to the person who has the delinquent minor under his legal authority or
control. But a minor over 15 who has acts with discernment is not exempt from criminal liability, for which reason the
Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his parents should he stand convicted. In that case, resort should be had to the
general law which is our Civil Code.
The particular law that governs this case is Art. 2180, the pertinent portion of which provides: “The father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.” To
hold that this provision does not apply to the instant case because it only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts
and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere
negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no liability
would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. Verily, the void apparently exists in the Revised Penal Code is
subserved by this particular provision of our Civil Code, as may be gleaned from recent decisions of this Court which cover
equal or identical cases.

The responsibility for fault or negligence under Art. 2276 upon which the action in the present case was instituted, is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from fault of negligence under the Penal code (Art. 2177), and
having in mind the reason behind the law as heretofore stated, any discussion as to the minor’s criminal responsibility is of
no moment.

3. FELINA RODRIGUEZ-LUNA, JOSE R. LUNA and ROBERTO R. LUNA, JR., petitioners, vs. THE HON.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JOSE E. DELA ROSA and LUIS DELA ROSA, respondents.

No. L-62988. February 28, 1985.

FACTS:
-  The petitioners are the heirs of Roberto R. Luna who was killed in a vehicular collision. The collision took place on
January 18, 1970, at the go-kart practice are in Greenhills, San Juan. Those involved were the go-kart driven by the
deceased, a business executive, and a Toyota car driven by Luis dela Rosa, a minor of 13 years who had no driver’s license
-  In a suit for damages brought by the heirs of Luna against Luis dela Rosa and his father Jose dela Rosa, the CFI of Manila
sentenced the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiffs the sum of PHP 1,650,000 as unearned net earnings of
Luna, PHP 12,000 as compensatory damages, and PHP 50,000 for the loss of his companionship with legal interest from
July 3, 1973, and PHP 50,000 as attorney’s fees. . The defendants appealed to the CA, which affirmed in toto that of the trial
court.
-  However, the CA modified its decision, changing the originally adjudged PHP 1,650,000 to PHP 450,000 only, as
Roberto R. Luna’s unearned net earnings.
-  The instant case is the separate appeal of the Lunas to set aside the modification of CA, which was given due course by
the Court. The private respondents are then hereby ordered to pay the petitioners the PHP 450,000 as unearned net earnings
of Luna, PHP 12,000 as compensatory damages, and PHP 50,000 for the loss of his companionship with legal interest from
July 3, 1973, and PHP 50,000 as attorney’s fees. However, the following shall still to be resolved:
- W/N the award for unearned net earnings shall be increased to PHP 1,650,000; and
- W/N the award for attorney fee’s shall also be with interest at the legal rate
- Respondents failed to pay the amounts and when required to explain they said that they had no cash money. Accordingly,
this Court directed the trial court to issue a writ of execution but the execution yielded only a nominal amount.
- In the meantime, Luis dela Rosa is now of age, married with two children, and living in Madrid, Spain with an uncle but
only casually employed. It is said: “His compensation is hardly enough to support his family. He has no assets of his own as
yet.”
ISSUES w/ HOLDING:
1. W/N the award for unearned net earnings shall be increased to PHP 1,650,000
- YES, the CA erred in modifying the original decision
a. The award of PHP 1,650,000 was based on two factors: 1) that the deceased Roberto R. Luna could have lived for
30 years more, and 2) that his annual net income was PHP 55,000 (PHP 75,000 annual gross income less PHP
20,000 annual personal expenses)
b. On life expectancy
i. The trial court established the fact that according to medical experts, since Roberto Luna, at age 33, was of
good health, he could reasonably expect to have a life expectancy of 30 years (63 years old). The CA
sustained this. The CA likewise sustained the trial court in respect to Luna’s annual income and expense.
 ii. However, acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the dela Rosas, the CA took into account the
fact “that the deceased Roberto R. Luna had been engaged in car racing as a sport, having participated in
tournaments both here and abroad,” and consequently concluded that Luna could not have lived beyond 43
years, reducing life expectancy from 30 to 10 years. Hence, the CA also modified its ruling in respect to
Luna’s annual income and expense.
iii. In its modified decision, the CA increased his personal expenses to PHP 30,000, and establishing the fact
that his annual gross income is PHP 45,000 (PHP 75,000 annual gross income less PHP 30,000 personal
expenses), multiplied by 10 years of life expectancy and the product is PHP 450,000.
c. The Court, however, ruled otherwise.
i. It was an error on the part of the CA to have disturbed the determination of the trial court which it has previously
affirmed. That Luna was engaged in go-kart racing cannot be categorized as a dangerous sport for go-karts are
extremely low-slung, low- powered vehicles.
ii. It was an error for the CA to reduce the annual income of the deceased by increasing his annual personal expenses
but without at the same time increasing his annual gross income.
2. W/N the award for attorney fee’s shall also be with interest at the legal rate
- YES, attorney’s fees may be allowed legal interest from the time of trial court’s decision
1. The trial court awarded attorney’s fees to the petitioners in the sum of PHP 50,000, and was affirmed by the
CA, and later on reaffirmed by the resolution. However, the two decisions, as well as the resolution, do not
provide for interest at the legal rate to be tacked to the award.
2. The petitioners now pray that the award of attorney’s fees be with interest at the legal rate from the date of
the filing of the complain.
3. The attorney’s fees were awarded in the concept of damages in a quasi-delict case under the circumstances
interest as part thereof may be adjudicated at the discretion of the court. As with other damages, the interest
should accrue only from the date of the trial court’s decision.
3. W/N Jose dela Rosa, the father, should be primarily or subsidiarily liable with his son, Luis dela Rosa -
PRIMARILY LIABLE

a. The private respondents invoke Elcano v Hill, where it was held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code applied to
Atty. Marvin Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of his son Reginald Hill, but since Reginald had
attained age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill had become merely subsidiary to that of his son.

i. It is now said that Luis dela Rosa is now married and of legal age and that as a matter of equity, the liability of his
father should be subsidiary only.

b. However, the Court ruled otherwise.

i. Equity will not be applied if to do so will not serve the ends of justice. Father’s liability for damages made by his
son who later become emancipated but is now abroad and could hardly support himself cannot be merely
subsidiary.

4. Magjowa, nag away. Pinatay ni guy si gurl kasi ayaw makipag balikan, then nag suicide sya. Liability ng parents ni
guy sa family ni girl, solidary hindi subsidiary. Whether cause of action is quasi ex delicto (2180) or criminal
neglince (101-penal code), solidary pa din.
CRESENCIO LIBI and AMELIA YAP LIBI, petitioners vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, FELIPE GOTIONG and SHIRLEY GOTIONG, respondents.

FACTS:
● Julie Ann Gotiong (18 y.o.) and Wendell Libi (19 y.o.) were sweethearts until December, 1978 when Julie Ann
broke up her relationship with Wendell after she supposedly found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. Wendell
demanded reconciliation with Julie, but was refused by the latter. This prompted the former to resort to threats
against her. Julie, in order to avoid Wendell, stayed in the house of her best friend.
● Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith and Wesson
revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was recovered from the scene of the crime inside
the residence of private respondents at the corner of General Maxilom and D. Jakosalem streets of the same city.Due
to the absence of an eyewitness account of the circumstances surrounding the death of both minors, their parents,
who are the contending parties herein, posited their respective theories drawn from their interpretation of
circumstantial evidence, available reports, documents and evidence of physical facts.
● Private respondents, bereaved over the death of their daughter, submitted that Wendell caused her death by shooting
her with the aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself to commit suicide. On the other hand,
Petitioners, puzzled and likewise distressed over the death of their son, rejected the imputation and contended that an
unknown third party, whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics
informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have caused Wendell’s death and then shot Julie
Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification.c
● As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case No. R-17774 in the then Court of First Instance of
Cebu against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter’s vicarious liability under Article
2180 of the Civil Code. The court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence, and the counterclaim of the
defendants were likewise denied for lack of merit.
● On appeal to respondent court, said judgment of the lower court dismissing the complaint of therein plaintiffs-
appellants was set aside and another judgment was rendered against defendants-appellees who, as petitioners in the
present appeal by certiorari, now submit for resolution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by respondent court to make petitioners liable for
vicarious liability.

RULING:

The Court held that the issue of parental civil liability should be resolved in accordance with the provisions of
Article 2180 of the Civil Code to hold that the civil liability under Article 2180 would apply only to quasi-delicts and not
to criminal offenses would result in the absurdity that in an act involving mere negligence the parents would be liable but
not where the damage is caused with criminal intent. Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be
effected against the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth
Welfare Code which provides that the same shall devolve upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the
mother or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a
relative or family friend of the youthful offender. However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without
such alternative qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the minor
offender. For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in accordance with
Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code
Yes. The parents are civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the minor children under Art
2180 of the Civil Code and Art. 101 of Revised Penal Code, covered obligations arising from both quasi-
delicts and criminal offenses. The court held that the civil liability of the parents for quasi-delict of their
minor children is primary and not subsidiary and that responsibility shall cease when the persons can
prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

Wendell’s mother testified that her husband owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside
a drawer in their bedroom. Each of the spouses had their own key. She likewise admitted that during the
incident, the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. Wendell could not have gotten hold of the gun
unless the key was left negligently lying around and that he has free access of the mother’s bag where the
key was kept.

In the case at bar, whether the death of Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a felony or a quasi-delict
committed by Wendell Libi . Respondent court did not err in holding petitioners liable for damages
arising therefrom. The Court stated that the petitioners failed to duly exercise the requisite diligentissimi
patris familias to prevent such damages.

Article 221 of the Family Code states that “Parents and other persons excercising parental authority
shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated
children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses
provided by law.” In this case, Wendell was under the parental authority of his natural parents, and was
living and staying with them. Hence, Wendell’s parents are liable for the damages caused by his quasi-
delicit act.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioners
 5. Nasa school si Teresa cuadra at Teresa monfort, nagbubunot ng damo, instruction ni teacher.
Teresa Monfort pulled a prank on Teresa Cuadra kaso tumama sa mata nya at nairritate,
nagrequire ng surgery eventually nabulag sya. SC – walang vicarious liability kasi hindi culpa
aquiliana yung gawa nung bata. Prank daw. And under supervision ng school, no way na
masupervise ng parent while nasa school.

MARIA TERESA Y. CUADRA, minor represented by her father ULISES P. CUADRA, ET AL.,
plaintiffs-appellees, vs. ALFONSO MONFORT,defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

This is an action for damages based on quasi-delict, decided both by the CFI and the CA favorably in
behalf of the plaintiff.

Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates in Grade 6 at the Mabini
Elementary School in Bacolod City, and where the latter – as a practical joke
– threw a plastic object (headband) at the former saying there was a worm in it, hitting her in the right
eye.

She subsequently rubbed it, treated it with powder, and the eye thereafter got worse and was swollen.
Such condition further deteriorated, necessitating two operations, but to no avail because Maria Teresa
eventually still lost use of her right eye.

The legal issue posed in this appeal is the liability of a parent for an act of his minor child which causes
damage to another under the specific facts related above and the applicable provisions of the Civil Code,
particularly Articles 2176 and 2180 thereof, which reads:

ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death
or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company.

X X X The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

ISSUE:

W/N Alfonso Monfort (Maria Teresa’s father) is liable for the action of her daughter that caused
damage to her classmate (causing blindness in one eye)? [NO]
HELD:

The SC ruled that there was nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could have
prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of
his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it.

If the defendant is at all obligated to compensate her (Ms. Cuadra’s) suffering, the obligation has no legal
sanction enforceable in court, but only the moral compulsion of good conscience.

The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint is dismissed, without pronouncement as to
costs.

RATIO:

The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is the fault or negligence accompanying the
act or the omission, there being no willfulness or intent to cause damage thereby. When the act or
omission is that of one person for whom another is responsible, the latter then becomes himself liable
under Article 2180, such as that of the father or the mother under the circumstances above quoted.

The basis of this vicarious, although primary, liability is, as in Article 2176, fault or negligence, which is
presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or omission. The presumption is merely prima
facie and may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the
last paragraph of Article 2180, which states "that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage."

BARREDO,J.,dissenting:

I am afraid I cannot go along with my esteemed colleagues in holding that the act of appellant’s daughter
does not constitute fault within the contemplation of our law on torts. She was 13 years and should have
known that by jokingly saying “aloud that she had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the
Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her,” it was likely that something would happen to her friend, as in fact, she
was hurt.

As to the liability of appellant as father, I prefer to hold that there being no evidence that he had properly
advised his daughter to behave properly and not to play dangerous jokes on her classmate and playmates, he
can be liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. There is nothing in the record to show that he had done
anything at all to even try to minimize the damage caused upon plaintiff child.
 6. Si Jayson, nag experiment sa science class, nasabugan yung left eye nya so kinailangan
isurgery. Si teacher wala sa room when that happened. Nagbigay daw sya instructions pero
hindi sumunod si jayson. Teacher and school solidarily liable – failed to exercise diligence
required. Jayson may contributory negligence so yung babayaran lang ni school ay yung part
na at fault sila.

ST. JOSEPH’S COLLEGE, SR. JOSEPHINI AMBATALI, SFIC, and ROSALINDA TABUGO,
petitioners, vs. JAYSON MIRANDA, represented by his father, RODOLFO S. MIRANDA,
respondent.

Facts:
 Jayson Val Miranda belonged was conducting a science experiment about fusion of sulphur
powder and iron fillings under the tutelage of Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the subject teacher and
employee of SJC.
Tabugo left her class. In the middle of the experiment, Jayson’s classmates checked the result of the
experiment by looking at the test tubes with a magnifying glass. One of the group mates of Jayson held the
tubes close to his eyes. At that instance, the compound in the test spured out and several particles of which
hit Jayson in his left eye and some of the body parts of his group mates.
As a result of the incident, Jayson’s mother, who was working abroad had to come home, spending
money for her fares and had to forego her salary.  Then, too, [Jayson] and his parents suffered sleepless
nights, mental anguish and wounded feelings as a result of his injury due to fault and failure to exercise the
degree of care and diligence incumbent upon each one of them. Thus, they should be held liable for moral
damages. Also, [Jayson] sent a demand letter to [petitioners] for the payment of his medical expenses as
well as other expenses incidental thereto, which the latter failed to heed. Hence, [Jayson] was constrained to
file the complaint for damages. [Petitioners], therefore, should likewise compensate [Jayson] for litigation
expenses, including attorney’s fees.
 Petitioners make much of the fact that Tabugo specifically instructed her students, including
Jayson, at the start of the experiment, not to look into the heated test tube before the compound had cooled
off. Petitioners would allocate all liability and place all blame for the accident on a twelve (12)-year-old
student, herein respondent Jayson.

Issue:
W/N the proximate cause of Jayson’s injury was due to his own negligence making SJC not liable
for damages.

Held:
No. As found by both lower courts, the proximate cause of Jayson’s injury was the concurrent
failure of petitioners to prevent the foreseeable mishap that occurred during the conduct of the science
experiment. Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of care, caution and foresight
incumbent upon the school, its administrators and teachers.
 Article 218 of the Family Code, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, bestows
special parental authority on the following persons with the corresponding obligation, thus:
“Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution
engaged in child care shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor
child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
 
“Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or
outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.

“Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
“ Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused
by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.”
Petitioners negligence and failure to exercise the requisite degree of care and caution is
demonstrated by the following:
 1. Petitioner school did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to its students
although it had full information on the nature of dangerous science experiments conducted by the students
during class;
2. Petitioner school did not install safety measures to protect the students who conduct experiments
in class;
3. Petitioner school did not provide protective gears and devices, specifically goggles, to shield
students from expected risks and dangers; and
4. Petitioner Tabugo was not inside the classroom the whole time her class conducted the
experiment, specifically, when the accident involving Jayson occurred. In any event, the size of the class of
fifty (50) students conducting the experiment is difficult to monitor.

7. Si Alfredo Amadora, graduating student. Before graduation rites, habang nasa auditorium
sya with friends, binarily na lang sya ni Daffon, student din sa school. Ang liable dapat ay
teacher in charge pero walang evidence kung sino. Si head of school magiging liable lang
kung ang school ay trades and arts. Walang liable sa respondents actually.

JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA JR., NORMA A. YLAYA,

PANTALEON A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA, ROSALINDA A.
AMADORA, PERFECTO A. AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA, VICENTE A. AMADORA and
MARIA TISCALINA A. AMADORA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH, SERGIO P. DAMASO, JR.,
CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON, thru his parents and natural
guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN, and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian,
ATTY. FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents.

FACTS:
On April 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a
classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as
well. The victim was only seventeen years old. Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence
. Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article
2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the
dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective
parents. The complaint against the students was later dropped.
His parents contend that their son was in the school to show his physics experiment as a prerequisite to his
graduation; hence, he was then under the custody of the private respondents
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos submit that Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school only for the purpose of
submitting his physics report and that he was no longer in their custody because the semester had already
ended.
RTC- Liable
CA- Absolved. Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of
arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. It also held that the students were not in the custody
of the school at the time of the incident as the semester had already ended, that there was no clear
identification of the fatal gun and that in any event the defendant, had exercised the necessary diligence in
preventing the injury. 

ISSUE:
WON the respondents are liable based on Art 2108.
WON Article 2180 covers even establishments which are technically not schools of arts and trades, and, if
so, when the offending student is supposed to be "in its custody."
HELD:
1. NO. In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is supposed to fall directly
on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the school,
whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof under the
general principle ofrespondeat superior, but then it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had
exercised the diligence of abonus paterfamilias.
Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades directly
held to answer for the tort committed by the student. As long as the defendant can show that he had taken
the necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of, he can exonerate himself from the liability
imposed by Article 2180.
a. NO, there was no teacher in charge. Evidence does not support who teacher in charge was asifde from the
fact that he just submitted his Physics report.
The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was
the teacher-in-charge as previously defined.
Each of them was exercising only a general authority over the student body and not the direct control and
influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of particular classes or sections and thus immediately
involved in its discipline. The evidence of the parties does not disclose who the teacher-in-charge of the
offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that day in connection with
his physics report did not necessarily make the physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-
charge of Alfredo's killer.
At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no showing that Dicon was negligent in
enforcing discipline upon Daffon or that he had waived observance of the rules and regulations of the
school or condoned their non-observance. His absence when the tragedy happened cannot be considered
against him because he was not supposed or required to report to school on that day. And while it is true
that the offending student was still in the custody of the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was physically
absent when the tort was committed, it has not been established that it was caused by his laxness in
enforcing discipline upon the student. On the contrary, the private respondents have proved that they had
exercised due diligence, through the enforcement of the school regulations, in maintaining that discipline.
In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys who should be held liable especially
in view of the unrefuted evidence that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from one of the students
and returned the same later to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to higher
authorities. While this was clearly negligence on his part, for which he deserves sanctions from the school,
it does not necessarily link him to the shooting of Amador as it has not been shown that he confiscated and
returned pistol was the gun that killed the petitioners' son.
b. Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the article because only the teacher or
the head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage caused by the student or
apprentice. Neither can it be held to answer for the tort committed by any of the other private respondents
for none of them has been found to have been charged with the custody of the offending student or has been
remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection with such custody.
2.
a. It applies to academic and non academic.
There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the non-academic schools insofar as
torts committed by their students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the
students under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching. The
Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance should be exercised by the school authorities on the
basis only of the nature of their respective schools. Notably, the injury subject of liability is caused by the
student and not by the school itself nor is it a result of the operations of the school or its equipment. The
injury contemplated may be caused by any student regardless of the school where he is registered. The
teacher certainly should not be able to excuse himself by simply showing that he is teaching in an academic
school where, on the other hand, the head would be held liable if the school were non-academic. Article
2180, however, remains unchanged. In its present state, the provision must be interpreted by the Court
according to its clear and original mandate until the legislature, taking into account the charges in the
situation subject to be regulated, sees fit to enact the necessary amendment.
b. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the custody of the authorities of Colegio de
San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had formally ended. It was immaterial if he
was in the school auditorium to finish his physics experiment or merely to submit his physics report for
what is important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. As previously observed, even the mere
savoring of the company of his friends in the premises of the school is a legitimate purpose that would have
also brought him in the custody of the school authorities.
DOCTRINE:
Custody requirement- As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of
a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a
legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the
school authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more than
relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and
atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities
under the provisions of Article 2180
Custody does not connote immediate and actual physical control but refers more to the influence exerted on
the child and the discipline instilled in him as a result of such influence..
It does not mean that the student must be boarding with the school authorities, it does signify that the
student should be within the control and under the influence of the school authorities at the time of the
occurrence of the injury. This does not necessarily mean that such, custody be co-terminous with the
semester, beginning with the start of classes and ending upon the close thereof, and excluding the time
before or after such period, such as the period of registration, and in the case of graduating students, the
period before the commencement exercises. In the view of the Court, the student is in the custody of the
school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises,
whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended.
It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes under the discipline of the school only upon the start of
classes notwithstanding that before that day he has already registered and thus placed himself under its
rules. Neither should such discipline be deemed ended upon the last day of classes notwithstanding that
there may still be certain requisites to be satisfied for completion of the course, such as submission of
reports, term papers, clearances and the like. During such periods, the student is still subject to the
disciplinary authority of the school and cannot consider himself released altogether from observance of its
rules.
During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-charge who must answer for his students' torts, in
practically the same way that the parents are responsible for the child when he is in their custody. The
teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the dean, principal, or other administrative superior to exercise
supervision over the pupils in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned. It is not necessary
that at the time of the injury, the teacher be physically present and in a position to prevent it. Thus, for the
injuries caused by the student, the teacher and not the parent shag be held responsible if the tort was
committed within the premises of the school at any time when its authority could be validly exercised over
him.
OTHERS:
Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos has been directly impleaded and is
sought to be held liable under Article 2180; and unlike in Palisoc, it is not a school of arts and trades but an
academic institution of learning. . The suggestion in the Exconde and Mercado Cases is that the provision
would make the teacher or even the head of the school of arts and trades liable for an injury caused by any
student in its custody but if that same tort were committed in an academic school, no liability would attach
to the teacher or the school head. All other circumstances being the same, the teacher or the head of the
academic school would be absolved whereas the teacher and the head of the non-academic school would be
held liable, and simply because the latter is a school of arts and trades.

8. Desiderio Cruz (lone witness) and Virgilio Daffon (defendant) were making their machin
group project and deceased Dominador Palisoc were just looking at them so daffon made a
remark “para kang foreman ah” then a fight ensued between them. Daffon threw fist blows
sa tyan ni palisoc and na shock nad pale and namatay si palisoc. RTC held only daffon liable.
It absolved from liability yung school officials kase hindi naman daw nagboboard sa school si
palisoc so hindi under custody nila as contemplated by law.
Spouses MOISES P. PALISOC and BRIGIDA P. PALISOC, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. ANTONIO C.
BRILLANTES and TEODOSIO V. VALENTON, owner and President, respectively, of a school of
arts and trades, known under the name and style of “Manila Technical Institute” (M.I.T.),
VIRGILIO L. DAFFON and SANTIAGO M. QUIBULUE, defendants-appellees.

FACTS:

Deceased Dominador Palisoc and defendant Virgilio Daffon were automotive mechanics students
at the Manila Technical Institute (MTI). In the afternoon of March 10, 1966 during recess, an altercation
transpired between the deceased and the defendant. At the time of the incident, Dominador was sixteen
years old while Virgilio was already of age. Virgilio was working on a machine with Dominador looking at
them. The situation prompted Virgilio to remark that Dominador was acting like a foreman. As a result,
Dominador slapped Virgilio on the face. Virgilio retaliated by inflicting severe blows upon Dominador’s
stomach, which caused the latter to stumble upon an engine block and faint. The latter died, the cause of
death being “shock due to traumatic fracture of the ribs”. The parents of Dominador filed an action for
damages against (1) Virgilio, (2) Valenton, the head/president of MTI, (3) Quibule who was the teacher in
charge at the time of the incident, and (4) Brillantes who is a member of the board of directors and former
sole proprietor of MTI.
The trial court held Virgilio liable but absolved the other defendants-officials. It stated that the clause “so
long as they remain in their custody” contained in Article 2180 of the Civil Code applies only where the
pupil lives and boards with the teachers, such that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of
the parents., and such control and responsibility for the pupil’s actions would pass from the father and
mother to the teachers. This legal conclusion was based on the dictum in Mercado v. CA, which in turn
based its decision in Exconde v. Capuno. The trial court held that Article 2180 was not applicable in this
case, as defendant Virgilio did not live with the defendants-officials at the time of the incident. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:

Who must be held liable for damages for the death of Dominador together with the defendant?

HELD:

The head/president and teacher of MTI (Valenton and Quibule respectively) were held liable
jointly and severally with the Virgilio for damages. No liability attaches to Brillantes as a mere member of
the MTI board of directors. Similarly, MTI may not be held liable since it had not been properly impleaded
as party defendant.
The phrase used in Article 2180, “so long as the students remain in their custody” means the protective and
supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as
long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires
that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortuous act must live and board in the
school. The dicta in the cases of Mercado as well as in Exconde v. Capuno on which it relied are deemed to
have been set aside. The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their
pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that they stand, in loco parentis to a certain
extent to their pupils and students and are called upon to “exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct
of the child.” In this case, The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the protagonists-students
could have been avoided, had said defendants complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision
over the activities of the students in the school premises to protect their students from harm. Since Valenton
and Quibule failed to prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage, they cannot likewise avail of the exemption to the liability. The judgment of the appellate court
was modified, while claim for compensatory damages was increased in accordance with recent
jurisprudence and the claim for exemplary damages denied in the absence of gross negligence on the part of
the said defendants.
 9. Si Reynaldo pasco habang naglalakad sa Araneta univ, bigla na lang inaway ng group ni
Teng, tapos sinaksak sya so nasugod sa hosp and opera. Inimplead nya sa case yung
university pero case dismissed kase yung sabi lang sa provisions “teachers or heads” di kasali
school mismo.

REYNALDO PASCO, assisted by his father PEDRO PASCO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF BULACAN, BRANCH V, STA. MARIA and ARANETA UNIVERSITY,
respondents.

Facts: Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon were classmates and, together with
another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room located on the ground
floor. At that time the classes were in recess, Cruz and Daffon were working on a machine while
Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at them. Daffon made a remark to the effect
that Palisoc was acting like a foreman. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the
face. Daffon, in retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face, followed by
other fist blows to the stomach. Palisoc retreated, but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows
until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block causing him to fall face downward.
Palisoc became pale and fainted. First aid was administered to him but he was not revived, so he was
immediately taken to a hospital. He never regained consciousness.

Trial ensued, with the trial court giving credence to Cruz’s version of the incident. The trial
court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. It
held that "(T)he act of Daffon in giving the deceased strong fist blows in the stomach which
ruptured his internal organs and caused his death falls within the purview of this article of the
Code."

Issue: Did the trial court err in absolving the defendants-school officials instead of holding them jointly
and severally liable with defendant Daffon, for the damages awarded them as a
result of their son's death?

Held: Yes. The Court ruled that the lower court’s decision to absolve was based on Mercado v. CA,
which was based in turn on another dictum in the earlier case of Exconde vs.
Capuno, The dictum in such earlier case that "It is true that under the law above-quoted, teachers
or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while
they are under their custody, but this … applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any
academic educational institution." The case at hand was instituted directly against the school
officials and squarely raises the issue of liability of teachers and heads of schools under Article
2180, Civil Code, for damages caused by their pupils and students against fellow students on the
school premises.

There is no question, either, that the school involved is a non-academic school, the Manila
 Technical Institute being admittedly a technical vocational and industrial school. With this in
mind, the Court holds that under the cited codal article, defendants head and teacher of the Manila
Technical Institute ( Valenton and Quibulue, respectively) are liable jointly and severally for
damages to plaintiffs-appellants for the death of the latter's minor son at the hands of defendant
Daffon at the school's laboratory room.

In the law of torts, the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and
teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents. It becomes their
obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students' activities
during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school, including recess time,
as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and
hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some student
themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students.

There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach, the pupil or student who commits
the tortious act must live and board in the school, as erroneously held
by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be
deemed to have been set aside by the present decision.
‘

10. Jimmy Abon is an amorer of BFC ROTC unit. Records show that he is not employed by BFC
but is receving salary from AFP and instructions from Commandant of BCF ROTC likewise
employed by AFP. Jimmy is a student of BCF. One night, he shot Napoleon Castro and the
latter died.

BENJAMIN SALVOSA and BAGUIO COLLEGES FOUNDATION, petitioners vs. THE

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, EDUARDO B. CASTRO, DIOMEDES B. CASTRO,
VIRGINIA B. CASTRO and RODOLFO B. CASTRO., respondents.

FACTS:
Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF, hereafter) is an academic institution and also an institution of arts and
trade. Its brochure shows that BCF has a full-fledged technical-vocational department offer
Communication, Broadcast and Teletype Technician courses as well as Electronics Serviceman and
Automotive Mechanics courses. These courses divest BCF of the nature or character of being purely or
exclusively an academic institution.

Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit, which is under the 5th control of the AFP. ROTC, by way
of accommodation to the AFP, is provided by the BCF an office and an armory located at the basement of
its main building.
The BCF ROTC Unit had Jimmy B. Abon as its duly appointed armorer. He was not employed by the BCF
- he receives salary from the AFP and orders from Ungos, the Commandant of the BCF ROTC Unit,
concurrent Commandant of other ROTC units in Baguio and an employee of the AFP. Jimmy Abon was
also a commerce student of the BCF.

One day, Abon shot and killed Napoleon Castro, a student of the University of Baguio with an unlicensed
firearm which Abon took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. Abon was then convicted of the
crime of Homicide.

The heirs of Castro sued for damages against Abon, Ungos, Benjamin Salvosa (President of BCF), Jesus
Salvosa (VP of BCF), Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and Executive Trustee of BCF and the
Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc. Trial Court sentenced defendants Abot, Salvoso and BCF jointly and
severally liable. Respondent Court affirmed.

ISSUE: WON petitioners (BCF and its president) can be held solidary liable with Abon for damages under
ART 2180 CC as a consequence of the tortious act of Abon

HELD:
NO. The SC reversed the ruling of the lower court. According to Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or
heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for “damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The rational behind this is that so long as the student
remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter “stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis as to the student
and is called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the student.” Likewise, "the
phrase used in Art. 2180 — 'so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and
supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as
long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time."

The Court used the explanation given by the respondent court in ruling that the Abon was under the custody
of the petitioner:

it is true that Abon was not attending any class or school function at the time of the shooting incident,
which was at about 8 o'clock in the evening; but considering that Abon was employed as an armorer and
property custodian of the BCF ROTC unit, he must have been attending night classes and therefore that
hour in the evening was just about dismissal time for him or soon thereafter. The time interval is safely
within the "recess time" that the trial court spoke of and envisioned by the Palisoc case,

But in the Palisoc case, it was explained that a student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be in
"recess" thereat. A "recess," as the concept is embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school,"
contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains
within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises, or the area within which the
school activity is conducted. Recess by its nature does not include dismissal. Likewise, the mere fact of
being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute "attending
school" or being in the "protective and supervisory custody' of the school, as contemplated in the law.
Hence, Abon cannot be considered to have been “at attendance in the school” or in the custody of BCF,
when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, petitioner cannot under Art 2180 of the CC be held solidary
liable with Abon for damages from his acts.

Besides, the record shows that before the shooting incident, Ungos, ROTC Unit Commandant, AFP, had
instructed Jimmy Abon “not to leave the office and [to keep armory] well guarded. Apart from negating a
finding that Jimmy B. Abon was under the custody of the school when he committed the act for which the
petitioners are sought to be held liable, this circumstance shows that Jimmy B. Abon was supposed to be
working in the armory with definite instructions from his superior, the ROTC Commandant, when he shot
Napoleon Castro.
Petitioners also raise the issue that, under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, a school which offers both academic
and technical/vocational courses cannot be held liable for a tort committed by a student enrolled only in its
academic program; however, considering that Jimmy B. Abon was not in the custody of BCF when he shot
Napoleon Castro, the Court deems it unnecessary to pass upon such other issue.

MAXIMINO SOLIMAN, JR., represented by his judicial guardian VIRGINIA C.

SOLIMAN, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE RAMON TUAZON, Presiding Judge of Branch
LXI, Regional Trial Court of Region III, Angeles City, and the REPUBLIC CENTRAL
COLLEGES, represented by its President, respondents.

Facts: On March 22, 1983, petitioner Soliman filed a civil complaint for damages against private
respondent Republic Central Colleges, the RL Security Agency Inc and one Jimmy Solomon, a security
guard, as defendants. The complaint alleged that on August 13, 1982, while the plaintiff was in the campus
ground and premises of the defendant, Republic Central Colleges, as he is a regular enrolled student and
taking his morning classes, the defendant Solomon, without any provocation, in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner, with intent to kill, attack, assault, strike and shoot the plaintiff
on the abdomen with a .38 Caliber Revolver. The plaintiff was treated and confined at Angeles Medical
Center, Angeles City, and as per doctor’s opinion, the plaintiff may not be able to attend to his regular
classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a duration of from three to four
months before his wounds would be completely healed.

Private respondent Colleges filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the complaint stated no cause of
action against it. Private respondent argued that it is free from any liability for the injuries sustained by
petitioner for the reason that private respondent school was not the employer of the security guard
charged, Jimmy Solomon, and hence was not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon. Private
respondent school further argued that Article 2180, 7th paragraph, of the NCC did not apply, since said
paragraph holds teachers and heads of establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices, while security guard was not a pupil or apprentice of the school.

In an order dated November 29, 1983, respondent Judge granted private respondent school’s motion to
dismiss, holding that security guard Solomon was not an employee of the school. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, without success.

In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, it is contended that respondent trial judge committed grave
abuse of discretion when he refused to apply the provisions of Article 2180, as well as those of Articles
349, 350 and 352 of the NCC and granted the school’s motion to dismiss.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to damages and the judge committed grave abuse of
discretion when he refused to apply provisions of Arts 2180, 349, 350 and 352.

Held: The Court resolved to grant due course to the petition, to treat the comment of respondent Colleges
as its answer and to reverse and set aside the order dated November 29, 1983. The case was remanded to
the court a quo for further proceedings consistent with the Resolution.

Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the obligation to respond for damage inflicted by one against
another by fault or negligence exists not only for one's own act or omission, but also for acts or omissions
of a person for whom one is by law responsible.
The first paragraph of Article 2180 offers no basis for holding the Colleges liable for the alleged wrongful
acts of security guard Jimmy B. Solomon inflicted upon petitioner Soliman, Jr. Private respondent school
was not the employer of Jimmy Solomon. Since there is no question that Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil
or student or an apprentice of the Colleges, he being in fact an employee of the R.L. Security Agency Inc.

Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for damage inflicted upon a third
person by the child or person subject to such substitute parental authority. In the instant case, as already
noted, Jimmy Solomon who committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to petitioner, was not a
pupil, student or apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges; the school had no substitute parental
authority over Solomon.

In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract
between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper
security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of
negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of
Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that
negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other
words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the
school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set
out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.

The Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the obligation of schools, above-
mentioned, for conceptually a school, like a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students against
all risks. This is specially true in the populous student communities of the so-called "university belt" in
Manila where there have been reported several incidents ranging from gang wars to other forms of
hooliganism. It would not be equitable to expect of schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass upon
their premises, for notwithstanding the security measures installed, the same may still fail against an
individual or group determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside school premises and environs. Should
this be the case, the school may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual obligation
to the students was not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of
diligence which is required by the nature of obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of person,
time and place.

In the PSBA case, the trial court had denied the school's motion to dismiss the complaint against it, and
both the Court of Appeals and this Court affirmed the trial court's order. In the case at bar, the court a quo
granted the motion to dismiss filed by respondent Colleges, upon the assumption that petitioner's cause of
action was based, and could have been based, only on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. As PSBA, however,
states, acts which are tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at the same time constitute breach of a
contractual, or other legal, obligation.
Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of
action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather
should have, in the interest of justice, allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an
obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of respondent Colleges.

In line, therefore, with the most recent jurisprudence of this Court, and in order to avoid a possible
substantial miscarriage of justice, and putting aside technical considerations, we consider that
respondent trial judge committed serious error correctible by this Court in the instant case.