TR

ISTANBUL MEDENIYET UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF ARTS AND HUMANITIES
HISTORY DEPARTMENT

HIST 305 - Ottoman Military History I (1300-1774) Fall 2021

MIDTERM EXAM

Military Revolution and Its Impact to Ottoman Empire

Halil İbrahim Bozatlı

17011011036

Instructor

Mehmet Mert Sunar

03.12.2021
 Military Revolution and Its Impact to Ottoman Empire

The European military revolution paradigm includes the innovations made in the
Early Modern period after realizing the weakness of the former existing system. This
period included subjective and quantitative changes in warfare, particularly in infantry
tactics and the size of the armed forces of the major powers, and a significant increase
in the firepower and trained manpower available in large armies. Besides, With the
Military Revolution, Europe began to acquire new tactics and strategies.
Correspondingly, Tactical changes for defense and attack, such as Trace Italienne,
using cannons and volley fire, and the widespread use of firearms and the
establishment of large armies to implement these changed tactics are the results of the
Military Revolution. These superior innovations especially in Western gave rise to
both social and political consequences. Politically centralized governments with the
Military novelties that came hinge upon the idea of the Military Revolution
experienced problems with their people due to the social effects of the revolution.
Since these problems require a detailed study on their own, we will not touch on this
subject in this study. It is possible to see the sequence of events that occurred under
the influence of the Military Revolution, in Michael Robert's theories and the works
of other researchers. This study deals with the theory of the Military Revolution, its
emergence process, its reflections in Europe, and the effects of these changing
military tactics and strategies on the Ottoman Empire.

The modern age, a period of main changes in war and military organization, began to
be seen as the age of ‘‘Military revolution’’. Michael Roberts was a valuable
personality who theorized and analyzed the changes taking place in the military
during this period. Roberts' military revolution paradigm consisted of four effective
arms. One of them was the changing tactical understanding, a kind of tactical
revolution. According to Roberts, these new methods of warfare have far reaching
logistical consequences. They needed well trained and disciplined armies, and men
who worked like the wheels of a machine; gears must learn to take every step and
make their movements in perfect harmony. Individual heroism was no longer needed.
Of course, all this labor had a cost; and so it would no longer be as economical for
governments to demobilize the military. These educated men needed to be kept on a
permanent footing. The second arm of the paradigm was strategic change. These new
strategies would require new troops. The third arm of the paradigm was concerned
with the conformation of these military units to the new system and the increase in
their numbers. Successful implementation of the new strategy required fragmented
but articulated structures and large numbers of troops capable of adapting to complex
plans. Governments have become much more effective than before, both in managing
the increasing these military units and in meeting their logistics needs. The last piece
of the paradigm was actually on the positive and negative effects of this changing
order. Briefly, what is described as the ‘‘Military revolution’’ is hinged upon four key
components: tactics, strategy, army size, and their overall impact.

Now let’s try to find answers to questions such as what results did these new
applications have and which countries used them first. If we attribute the military
revolution to the years between 1560 and 1660, this time interval will form the core of
our assessment. In the late 16th century, Maurice, the army general of the Dutch
Republic, who fought for freedom against the Spaniards, and Gustavus Adolphus,
who in the early 17th century is considered one of the greatest military commanders
in modern history, were forced to overhaul their armies after suffering disastrous
defeats. First of all, important tactical innovations appeared in the army of the Dutch
Republic. They reduced the size of tactical units and significantly increased the
number of units; increased the number of Musketeers and Archers ("strikes") in each
unit; and they repeatedly introduced the classic "counter-operation" technique, in
which the musketeer ranks advanced, fired, and sequentially retreated to recharge.
The last-mentioned innovation, the volley, formed an essential core of the military
revolution. In the second place, the crucial impact of strategic thinking in the
sixteenth century began with the appearance of a new defensive fortification called
the ‘Trace Italienne’. The fact that the thin and high walls in the Middle Ages were no
longer effective in defense revealed the structure that represented Trace Italienne, that
is, a circuit of low, thick walls punctuated by quadrilateral bastions. Military
architects in Italy, where siege warfare was most common, were the first to try this
structure. It was a revolutionary innovation in a defensive and offensive war. It was
understood that the castles built in Trace Italienne could not be captured by traditional
 1
attack methods. The only way was to starve the fort and wait for them to surrender.
Subsequently, the increase in military manpower numbers is deeply dependent on
both internal factors such as tactical changes and external factors. Therefore, strong
governments had to emerge to retain this main military power. With the
administrative reforms made in the western part of Europe, the government always
aimed to keep the army commanders under strict control.2 Detailed records of units
began to be kept. In early modern times, banknotes with historical traces belong to
soldiers.3 Another external factor affecting the expansion of the army was the
development of technology. Because food was to be supplied for such a large number
of soldiers, enough carts to carry loads and tents to provide accommodation were only
possible with the technology of the late sixteenth century. 4 With increasing wealth
during this period, it was the Dutch expanded their army and provided the financing
for war techniques. The commercial and financial wealth of Amsterdam was the basis
of this source of income.5 However, it was not easy to implement the reforms in the
military structure in other regions and caused conflicts between the people and the
rulers as well as increased state authority. For this reason, caused wars affect people
much more than before.

Looked the Ottoman perspective, as the Ottoman Empire was militarily the most
sophisticated rival of the European powers, its response to the military revolution has
also become a subject of scholarly debate in recent years. These discussions were
based on two perspectives. These two aspects were whether the Ottoman Empire
benefited from the military revolution thought to have taken place in Europe, or were
Ottoman military technology and techniques already sufficient to cope with what
Europe had gained from the military revolution? Agoston Gabor was a notable
researcher particularly in terms of looking at the points that it needed to answer, such
as whether the Ottomans needed this military revolution, did this military revolution
1
Parker, The ‘‘Military Revolution,’’ 1560-1660 - a Myth?, The Journal of Modern
History, Vol.48, No.2. (Jun.,1976), pp.204
2
G. Parker, The ‘‘Military Revolution,’’ 1560-1660 - a Myth?, The Journal of
Modern History, Vol.48, No.2. (Jun.,1976), pp.208
3
G. Parker, The ‘‘Military Revolution,’’ 1560-1660 - a Myth?, The Journal of
Modern History, Vol.48, No.2. (Jun.,1976), pp.209
4
G. Parker, The ‘‘Military Revolution,’’ 1560-1660 - a Myth?, The Journal of
Modern History, Vol.48, No.2. (Jun.,1976), pp.209
5
G. Parker, The Emergence of Modern Finance in Europe, 1500-1730 (London,
1974), pp.38-67
strengthen the Ottoman Empire or did it cause problems in its own system. The group,
who thought that the Ottomans had successfully adapted to the military revolution,
used the description of the gunpowder empire for them, implying that firearms were
of vital importance for the Ottomans to establish and consolidate their empire. The
opposing view, as a classical interpretation, said that the Ottomans could not adapt to
the west and fell behind their European opponents by the end of the sixteenth century.
After the general approaches to the military revolution, let's focus on the existing war
technology of the Ottoman Empire. Seen from the military revolution aspect,
Firearms were not something the Ottoman state learned from Europe. They had been
used by the Ottomans since the 1350s. When we look at the use of cannons, the
Ottomans used them in the siege of Istanbul, Thessaloniki, Antalya, Novoberda,
Smederevo, Belgrade, and Germehisar. It should also be noted that the use of cannon
in Europe began after the 1420s. The number of cannons and rifles specified in table
1.1 is found in both European and Ottoman sources. 6 Besides, The Ottomans had
established Ocaks, which specialized in gunpowder production and firearms,
compared to their rivals. Thanks to this, unlike their Mamluk and European rivals, the
Ottomans equipped their elite regular troops with firearms. In the table 1.2, it is
clearly seen that Kapıkuls of the Sultan were equipped with firearms.7 However, the
Janissaries could not readily adapt to these firearms. It is possible to see in table 1.3
that this transformation took place gradually among the Janissaries.8 The Janissaries
dominantly used weapons with corded or miquelet firing devices. In the sixteenth
century, the Ottomans switched to flintlock rifles.

On the other hand, what we describe as a military revolution was tactics and the
ability to manage a large number of soldiers, and the state's ability to use these
structures. From this point of view, the emerging Volley tactic was completely
pointing to the western style. The Ottomans used this tactic, which was an indication
of their interaction with Europe. The invention of tactic came about in response to a
lack of firearms that were slow to reload. Under ordinary conditions, an experienced
Musketeer could fire only one bullet every two minutes; The reload time between
shots is sufficient for the enemy to advance. The only effective solution to this

6
Emecen F, Osmanlı Klasik Çağında Savaş (istanbul: Timaş, 2010), p.35-36
7
Agoston G, Osmanlı’da Strateji ve Askeri Güç (İstanbul: Timaş, 2012), p.177-78
8
Agoston G, Osmanlı’da Strateji ve Askeri Güç (İstanbul: Timaş, 2012), p.177-78
problem was to arrange the Musketeers in line and program them to fire in turns.
Thus, a continuous fire barrage would be provided against the enemy. The European
military began implementing this program in the late sixteenth century and made it
‘‘the foundation of European infantry tactics’’ in the seventeenth century, particularly
9
during and after the Thirty Years' War. The Dutch army was the first to use and
perfect this technique in Europe. However, the chronicle of Abdülkadir Efendi from
Ottoman sources proves that the Janissaries used volley fire until 1605 and possibly
before. In a seventeenth century Ottoman narrative, it is clearly stated that during the
second Ottoman campaign against the Hungarian fortress of Esztergom, Lala İbrahim
Pasha taught and practiced the volley fire tactic to the Musketeer Janissaries under his
command.10 This example highlights the importance of hot warfare in finding,
learning, imitating, and perfecting new military techniques. Similarly, Ottoman
commanders experienced the innovation and influence of the Petard, a new and highly
effective high-tech incendiary weapon used by the Habsburgs during their surprise
attack on the Ottoman garrison defending Győr in 1598. Correspondingly, Buda
governor Süleyman Pasha designed and successfully detonated similar bombs to Petar
against the Habsburg forces besieging Buda in 1602. 11Briefly, These are important
examples of the vigilance of the Ottoman Empire commanders and the fusion of
military culture between the two imperial armies during the long war.

In addition to the aforementioned, although it is difficult to say that the military

revolution directly caused serious problems in the Ottoman Empire, it may be
necessary to take into account that it was the source of some problems in the empire.
According to Halil İnalcık, the overcrowding of the Janissary Corps and the
employment of rural militias using rifles (Sekban and Levend) in the army in
9
Börekçi G, A Contribution to the Military Revolution Debate: The Jannisaries Use
of Volley Fire During The Long Ottoman–Hansburg War of 1593–1606 and the
Problem of Origins, Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hung. Volume 59 (4),
407–438 (2006), pp.410
10
Börekçi G, A Contribution to the Military Revolution Debate: The Jannisaries Use
of Volley Fire During The Long Ottoman–Hansburg War of 1593–1606 and the
Problem of Origins, Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hung. Volume 59 (4),
407–438 (2006), pp.415
11
Börekçi G, A Contribution to the Military Revolution Debate: The Jannisaries Use
of Volley Fire During The Long Ottoman–Hansburg War of 1593–1606 and the
Problem of Origins, Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hung. Volume 59 (4),
407–438 (2006), pp.428
exchange for money must have resulted from the need to balance Habsburg firepower
during the long war period. According to available sources, the number of janissaries
of 12,798 in 1567 had more than tripled in 1609. But military growth and change
should not be explained simply by the need to respond to the European Military
revolution. This increase is actually due to the troops established during the reign of
Suleiman and the struggle for the throne of the princes. During the reign of Suleiman,
the need for soldiers increased to besiege the resistant castles (Trace Italienne) to
cannon fire. The other reason for the growth was the demilitarization of the
Janissaries sent on Celalis and became a problem. The transformation of the
Janissaries into the merchant class and the transformation of the merchant class into
Janissaries due to the privileges given to the Janissaries caused an increase in the
number of recruits. This military transformation was a reflection of the socio-
economic factors in the empire rather than keeping up with the changes in Europe.
From this point of view, while the military revolution centralized the state in Europe
and created a superior military and financial structure, it caused military corruption in
the Ottoman Empire. In this regard, the idea that the ‘‘European Military Revolution’’
gave an advantage over the Ottomans was not very true until the end of the
seventeenth century. In addition, even the Habsburg victories after the seventeenth
century can be better explained by the Ottomans' captures in terms of numbers and
logistical skills for the first time, as a result of their advanced troop and resource
recruitment capabilities, rather than the technological and tactical superiorities that
emerged in the ‘‘European Military Revolution’’. Until that time, the Ottoman Empire
was ahead of its rivals in terms of logistics. Another factor was the ability of the
Habsburgs to find allies and forge alliances against the Ottomans. This situation
forced the Ottomans to fight on four different fronts. The growing Ulufeli army and
the forces of the provincial notables continued to be surprisingly effective in the early
18th century. With these forces, the Ottomans nearly captured the capital of the Holy
Roman Empire in 1683. Again with these forces, they defeated Peter the Great in
1711, defeated the Venetians in 1715-1717 and re-conquered the Morea, and
recaptured Belgrade in 1736-1739, and won a series of victories against both Austria
and Russia. Briefly, This information shows us that we should not accept the thesis
that the Ottoman Empire fell behind and collapsed because it did not benefit from the
military revolution.
On the whole, the European military revolution proved useful to the extent that it was
able to respond to European needs. The military revolution marked not only the
widespread construction of enduring castles (also known as Trace Italienne), but also
the massive spread of firearms, a marked increase in army size, and the
implementation of new infantry tactics. However, we mentioned above that these
developments did not weaken the Ottoman Empire until the end of the seventeenth
century. I think that this revolution neither destroyed nor weakened the Ottoman
Empire. Of course, we see that the Ottomans kept up with these innovations, but as I
mentioned above, what really impressed the Ottomans, rather than a few techniques,
was the fact that Europe overcame the logistics organization problem, which was the
most superior difference between the Ottoman in the late seventeenth century, and the
beginning of the eighteenth century. In this context, it would be a mistake to think of
the military revolution as separate from economic factors. The expansion of the
military structure in the Ottomans was only partially due to external military threats,
and internal socio economic factors also played an efficient role in the transformation
of the sultan's military forces.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
Agoston, Osmanlı’da Strateji ve Askeri Güç

Agoston, The Ottoman Empire and the Technological Dialogue Between Europe and
Asia: The Case of Military Technology and Know-How in the Gunpowder Age

Börekçi, A Contribution to the Military Revolution Debate: The Jannisaries Use of

Volley Fire During The Long Ottoman–Hansburg War of 1593–1606 and the
Problem of Origins, Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hung. Volume 59 (4),
407–438 (2006)

Emecen, Osmanlı Klasik Çağında Savaş

Inalcık, Military and fiscal transformation

Parker, The Emergence of Modern Finance in Europe, 1500-1730 (London, 1974)

Parker, The ‘‘Military Revolution,’’ 1560-1660 - a Myth?, The Journal of Modern
History, Vol.48, No.2. (Jun.,1976)

Parker, Askeri Devrim, 2006

ADDS
Table 1.1

Table 1.2

Table 1.3