» Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 + ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET “sunt — a fon oe FR- 9588 /8 25X1 uit - — 2538 x4 {__—C7EA] _ 18 October 1984 TO: (Oficer designation, room number, ond | ATE | wane ounces | COMMENTS (Number ween commen te oh pe [ene Jesus] MIME! | aR rae a Sa oa 1 | _ To = — pcr | 7D60 HOS | Attached herewith is the translation of the Psy-Ops booklet in question. 1908-0 “fe Sanitized Can irrprovel for Release DO1O/DS/28 - CIA. RDPSGMGOBSASR001400010029.9 ¥PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN GUERRILLA WARFARE Tayacan ii (Cus -35- ere fe Se ont : Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET SUBJECT, (Opronel) a oie me 61 FO aa = - 25x! C/LA 18 October 1984 28X5by4 TO; {ORew deignaion, om wn, ord one Tia fomncens | COMMENTS (umbnr sath commas! to, how tom whom awe [rownnoa| AS | SOMO ne tt She a conse ‘ - ppcr 706011 HQS _ {| Attached herewith is the ae translation of the Psy-Ops Booklet in question. 3 ro ; 19890 - ana-es2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN GUERRILLA WARFARE Tayacan (Cursed pp 1-35 - : P vat edad Table of ones Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 PREFACE Guerrilla varfare is essentially a political war. For this reason, its i area of operations goes beyond the territorial limits of conventional warfare, aninal? defined by Ariatoteles. a politica) war. and vieved ao the nilitary target of querriila warfare, the constant struggle to doninate that area of the political mentality which {3 tne minds of the population, the entire population: Our troops, the enemy troops, and the eivit population, Welcom Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 I Intropuction 1. General Background The ain of this book is to introduce the guerrilla student to psychological operation techniques, which will have an immediate and practical value in guerrilla warfare. ‘this section is introductory ané general in nature; the following sections will cover every point mentioned here in more detail. Yhe nature of the environment in guerrilla warfare does not allow sophisticated psychological operations, and it becomes necessary for the group, detachment and squadron leaders to carry out, with minimum direction from the upper echelons, psychological action operations with the contacts who know the reality from the roots. 2. Propagandist Combatant Guerrillas In order to obtain the naximum results from psychological operations in guerrilla warfare, each combatant must be highly motivated to engage in Propaganda face to face, to the same degree that he is motivated to Fight. ‘This means that the guerrilla's individual political awareness, the reason for his struggle, must be as acute as his capacity to fight. Such a degree of political awareness and motivation is obtained through. group dynamics and self-criticism as a standard teaching method for guerrilla training and operations. Group discussions increase the spirit and the unity of thought of the guerrilla squadrons, and they exert social pressure on the weaker members to perform a better role in future training or in combat Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 actions. Self-criticisn is made in terms of one's own contribution or failures in one's contribution to the cause, the movement, the struggle, etc., and this introduces an element of positive individual commitment to the mission of the group. The desired result is a guerrilla soldier who may justify bis actions persuasively when he is in contact with any member of the Nicaraguan People, ang especially to hinself and his guerrilla companions when enduring the vicissitudes of guerrilla warfare. This means that each guerrilla will be Persuasive in face-to-face communication-~propagandist, combatant--in his contact with the people; he must be capable of giving 5 or 10 logijcal reasons why, for example, a peasant must give him fabric, needle and threaé to mend his clothes. When the guerrilla behaves this way, enemy propaganda will never turn him into an eneny in the eyes of the population. It also neans that hunger, cold, fatigue and insecurity will have a meaning, psychologically, in the struggle for the cause, because of constant orientation. 3. Armed Propaganda Armed propagande includes every action performed, and the good impression which this armed force may give will result in the population having a positive attitude towards those forces; it does not include forced indoctrination. Armed propaganda improves the behavior of the population towards its author, and it is not achieved by force. This means that an armed guerrilla unit in a rural town will not give the impression that its weapons are a force that they hold over the peasants, but rather that they are the strength of the peasants against the repressive Sandinista government. his is achieved through @ close identification with Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 the population, as follows: hanging up the weapons and working alongside then in their fields, in construction, harvesting the grain, fishing, etc.; giving explanations to young men about basic weapons, for example, giving then an unloaded weapon and allowing them to touch it, see it, etc., giving a basic description of its operation; describing, with simple slogans, how the weapons Will serve the people in winning their freedom; adopting the demands of the people for hospitals and education, a reduction of taxes, etc. The objective of all these actions is to create an identification of the people with the weapons and with the guerrillas who carry them, so that the population feels that those weapons are, indirectly, the weapons that will protect them and help then in their struggle against an oppressive regime. There is always implicit terror in weapons, since the people are internally ‘awaret that they could be used against them: however, as long as explicit coercion can be avoided, we may achieve positive attitudes about the presence of armed guerrillas in the midst of the population. Armed Propaganda Teams Armed Propaganda Teams [Equipos ée Propaganda Armada (EPA)] are constituted through a careful selection of persuasive and highly motivated guerrillas, moving within the population, motivating the people to support the querrillas and resist the enemy. They combine a high degree of political awareness and the guerrillas’ capacity for armed propaganda, towards a planned, controlled and progranmed effort. The careful selection of personnel, based on their persuasive powers in informal discussions and on their combat capability, is more important than the level of their education or than the training program. The Armed Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 Propaganda Team's tactics must be carried out covertly, and they must be parallel to the tactical efforts in guerrilla warfare. Knowledge of the Psychology of the population is a primary necessity for the Armed Propaganda Teams, but much more intelligence data will be obtained from an EPA program in the area of operations. 5. Development and Control of "Front Organizations The development and control of *front* organizations is carried out through internal subjective (concealed) control, through group meetings of the ‘internal cadres," and by calculating the time needed for the combination of these two elements to be applied to the rasses. Established citizens--doctors, attorneys, businessmen, teachers, etc. will be recruited initially as "Social Crusadere in typically "innocuous" movements in the area of operations. When their *involvement™ with the clandestine organization is revealed to then, this exerts psychological pressure on them so that they can be used as "internal cadres* in groups to which they already belong or groups which they could join. Then, through a cradval and skillful process, they will receive instruction in persuasion techniques for the control of target groups which will support our democratic revolution, A system for the control of cells isolates individuals from one another, and at the appropriate moment, their influence is used to fuse the groups together into a united national front. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 Control of Meetings and Mass Assemblies The control of mass meetings in support of guerrilla warfare is carried out internally through a covert commando elenent, bodyguards, messengers, shock troops (incident initiators), poster carriers (also used to give signals), and slogan shouters, all under the control of the external commando elenent. When the cadres are placed in or recruited from organizations such as labor unions, youth groups, agricultural organizations or professional associations, they will begin to manipulate the groups* objectives. he psychological apparatus of our movement, by means of these internal cadres, Will prepare a mental attitude which, at the crucial moment, coulé becone involved in a fury of justified violence. This can be carried out through a small group of guerrillas infiltrated within the masses, who will have the mission of agitating, giving the impression that there are many of them and that they have great popular support. Using the tactics of a force of 200 to 300 agitators, one can create a demonstration in which 10,000 to 20,000 could take part. 7. Support from Contacts Who are Rooted in Reality The support of local contacts who know reality down to its roots is achieved through the exploitation of the social and political weaknesses of the target society, with propagandist-conbatant guerrillas, armed propaganda, armed propaganda teams, front organizations and mass meetings. ‘The propagandist-combatant guerrilla is the result of a constant progran of indoctrination and motivation. They will have the mission of demonstrating Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 to the people the greatness and the justice of our movement, to all Nicaraguans and to the world. By identifying with our people, sympathy towards our movement will increase, which will result in greater support from the population towards the freedon commandos, taking away sympathy from the regime in power. Armed propaganda will extend this process of identification with the Christian guerrillas, providing (an awareness of] conmon traits against the Sandinista regine. ‘The Armed Propaganda Teams provide a stage-by-stage persuasive planning program in all areas of the country. These teams are also the "eyes and ears* of our movement. ‘The development ané control of front organizations in guerrilla warfare will give our movenent the ability to create the effect of a ‘whip* within the population, when the order to merge is given. When infiltration and subjective internal control have developed parallel to other guerrilla activities, one of our commanders will be able to literally shake down the Sandinista structure and replace it. The meetings and mass assemblies are the culmination of a broad base of support among the population, ané they occur in the later phases of the operation. his is the moment in which an overthrow may be achieved and our revolution can cone out in the open, requiring the close collaboration of the entite population of the country, and requiring contacts who are rooted in reality. Tactical effort in guerrilla warfare is directed at the enem weaknesses, and toward destroying their military capability to resist, and must go parallel with a psychological effort to weaken and destroy their sociopolitical capability at the same time. In guerrilla warfare, more than - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 in any other type of military effort, psychological activities must take place simultaneously with military activities, in order to achieve the desired objectives. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 IT PROPAGANDIS?-COMBATANT GUERILLA General Background The objective of this section is to familiarize the guerrilla with psychological operation techniques, which maximizes the social psychological effect of a guerrilla movement, turning the guerrilla into a propagandist, in addition to a combatant. The nature of the guerrilla warfare environment does not allow sophisticated facilities to conduct psychological operations; for this reason, we must make use of each guerrilla's effective face-to-face persvasion. 2. Political Awareness ‘The guerrilla's individual political awareness, the reason for his struggle, shall be as important as his ability to fight. This motivation of political awareness will be achieved by: - Improving the guerrilla's combat potential by increasing his motivation te fight. - Recognizing the guerrilla as a vital link between the democratic guerrilla and the support of the people, essential to the subsistence of both. - Promoting the support of the population for the national insurgency [movement] through the support of the local guerrillas, which provides a psychological base in the population for [participation in] politics, after the achievement of victory. - Developing trust in the guerrillas and the population for the reconstruction of the local and national government. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 - Promoting the value of guerrilla and popular participation in the civic affairs of the insurrection and in the national prograns. = Developing in each guerrilla the capability for face-to-face persuasion on the local level, in order to gain the support of the population, which is a key element for the success of the guerrilla warfare. 3. Group Dynamics This political awareness and motivation is obtained using group dynamics at the level of small units. The group discussion method and self-criticism are general techniques for training and guerrilla operations. Group discussions increase the [group] spirit and a unity of thought in small guerrilla groups, and exerts social pressure on the weaker menbers, so that they may better carry out their mission in future training and combat action. ‘These group discussions will place particular emphasis on: = Creating an opinion favorable to our movement. Using the national ané local history, making it understood that the Sandinista regime is *foreig pressive" and "imperialistic," and although there are sone Nicaraguans within the government, we will make it evident that they are power “puppets* of the Soviets and the Cubans, that is, foreign powers. - Always a local approach. Matters of an international nature will be explained only as support for local events in guerrilla warfare. - Our goal is the unification of the nation. This means that the defeat of the armed Sandinista forces is our priority. Our insurrectional movenent is a pluralist political platform, from which we are determined to win liberty, equality, a better economy with opportunities to work, a higher level of living and a true democracy for all Nicaraguans without exception. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 = Providing each guerrilla with a clear understanding about the struggle for national sovereignty against Soviet-Cuban imperialism. Discussion guides will lead the guerrillas to see the injustices of the Sandinista system. = pemonstrating to each guerrilla the need for good behavior in order to win the support of the population. The discussion guides must convince the t guerrillas that the attitude and opinion of the population is a determining factor, because victory is impossible without popular support. = Self-criticiem will take place in constructive terms that will contribute to the mission of the movement, and that will provide the guerrillas with the certainty that they have a constant and positive individual responsibility in the group mission, The method for instruction shall be: a) Divide the guerrilla force into squadrons for group discussions, including command and support elements, as long as the tactical situation allows it. ‘The integrity of the small units must be maintained when these groups are designed. b) Assign a political cadre in the guerrilla force to each group, to guide the discussion. The squadron leader must help the cadre to promote the study and the expression of thoughts. If there aren't enough political cadres for each squadron or detachment, the leaders must guide the discussions, and the available cadres must visit groups alternately. ¢) The cadre (or the leader) should guide the group discussion in order to cover a number of points and reach a correct conclusion, ‘The guerrillas must feel that they have made their own free decision. The cadre must act like a tutor. The cadre or leader will not act like a lecturer, but rather will help the menbers of the group to study and express their own opinions. a) At the end of each discussion, the political cadre will make a summary of the princip]al points, taking them to the correct conclusions. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 Any serious differences with the objectives of the movement must be noted by the caére and reported to the commander of the forces. If necessary, a meeting of the combined groups will be held, and the team of political cadres will explain and clear up the misunderstanding. e) Democratic conduct on the part of the political cadres: living, eating and working with the guerrillas, and, if possible, fighting at their side, sharing their living conditions. All of this will propitiate understanding and a spirit of cooperation which will help in the discussion and exchange of ideas. £) Holding group discussions in towns, and in areas of operation with civil populations, whenever possible, and not limiting them to the camps or bases, This is done in order to emphasize the revolutionary nature of the struggle and to demonstrate that the guerrillas identified with the objectives of the people move within the population. The guerrilla is focused toward the people, like the political cadre is toward the guerrilla, and they must live, eat and work together in order to achieve unity of revolutionary thought. ‘The principles for the group discussions between guerrillas and political cadres are: = Organize discussion groups at the detachment or squadron level. A cadre cannot be certain of comprehension and understanding of the concepts and conclusions on the part of the guerrillas in large groups. In a group the size of a l0-man squadron, judgment and control of the situation are greater. This way, all the students will participate! in an exchange among them, the political leader, the leader of the group, and also the political cadre. Special attention will be given to the individual ability to discuss the objectives of the insurrectional struggle. When a guerrilla expresses his Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 opinion, he will be interested in hearing the opinions of others, ané this will result in unity of thought. = Conbine the different points of view and reach a connon judgnent or conclusion. ‘This is the most difficult task for a political cadre in the guerrilla, After the group discussions about the democratic objectives of the novenent, the leader of the team of political cadres of the guerrilla force must combine the conclusions of the individual groups into a general summary. In a meeting with all the discussion groups, the cadre will provide the main points, and the guerrillas will have the opportunity to clarify or modify their viewpoints. in order to do thie, the conclusions will be summarized as slogans, whenever possible. - Honestly face the national ané local problens of our struggle. The political cadres must always be prepared to discuss solutions to the problems observed by the guerrillas. During the discussions, the guerrillas must be guided by the following three principles: -- Loyalty of thought. + Freedom of expression. =- Concentration of thoughts towards the objectives of the democratic struggle. The result desired is that 2 guerrilla may persuasively justify all nis actions whenever he is in contact with any member of the people, and especially to himself and his fellow guerrillas, while enduring the vicissitudes of guerrilla warfare. = This means that each guerrilla will be able to conduct effective face-to-face persuasion as a propagandist-combatant in his contact with the people, to the point of being able to give 5 or 10 logical reasons why, for example, a peasant should give him a piece of fabric, or needle and thread Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 to mend his clothes. when a guerrilla behaves like this, no kind of enemy propaganda will be able to make him a "terrorist" in the eyes of the people. - hus, even the hunger, cold, fatigue and insecurity in the existence of a guerrilla, will acquire meaning in the struggle for the cause, due to the constant psychological orientation. camp Procedures camping gives greater motivation to guerrilla units, in addition to reducing distractions and increasing the spirit of cooperation of the small units, relating the physical environment with the psychological atmosphere. The squadron leader will establish the regular procedure of the camp. Once they have disposed of their knapsacks, the leader will choose the suitable site for camping. He must select a site which overlooks the zone, providing for two or three ways to escape. He will choose among his men and give them responsibilities such as: - Cleaning the camp area. - Adequate drainage in case of rain. Also build trenches or holes for shooting in case of emergency. Likewise he will builé the kitchen, which will be built by making a few small ditches and placing three rocks on them; in case the kitchen is built on a pedestal, it will be filled with clay and rocks. - Build a wall for protection against the wind, the top and sides of which Will be covered with branches and leaves of the same vegetation that is present in the zone. This will serve as canovflage and protection from being seen from the air or by enemy patrols in the surrounding areas. = Build a latrine ané dig a hole where all wastes and trash will be buried; these must be covered with earth when the camp is abandoned. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 - Once the camp has been established, we recommend the establishment of a watch post at access points and at a reasonable distance, from where a cry of alarm could be heard. At that same time, a password, which must be changed every 24 hours, will be established, The commander must have previously established an alternate meeting point, in case the camp has to be abandoned suddenly, so that they can meet at this other previously established point. he patrol must be warned that if they cannot come together at the established point in a certain amount of time, they must have a third meeting point. ‘These procedures contribute to the guerrilla's motivation and improve the spirit of cooperation within the unit. the danger, the insecurity, the anxiety and the daily anxiety [entailed] in the life of a guerrilla establish the need for tangible evidence of belonging in order [for the soldiers] to retain their good spirits and morale. In addition to gooé physical condition, the guerrilla must be in good psychological condition. [vo achieve this,] we reconmend group discussions and self-criticisn, which will greatly benefit the spirit and morale of the guerrillas. - Striking camp with the effort and cooperation of all strengthens their esprit de corps. The guerrilla will then be inclined towards a unity of thought in their democratic objectives. 5. Interaction with the People To insure popular support, which is essential to the good development of guerrilla warfare, the leaders must lead to positive interaction between civilians and guerrillas, by the principle of “live, eat and work with the people," and they should maintain control of this activity. In group Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 @iscussions, the leaders and political cadres must emphasize a positive identification with the people. Talking about tactical military plans in discussions with civilians is not recommended. The conmunist enemy must be identified as the number one eneny of the people, and as a secondary threat against our guerrilla forces. As long as there is an opportunity, we must choose groups of elements who have a high degree of political awareness and high discipline in the work to be performed, to be sent to populated areas in order to conduct the armed Propaganda. ‘They must persuade people through dialogue in face-to-face encounters, following these principles: = Respect of human rights and respect of the other's property. = Helping people in community work. - Protecting people from communist aggression. - Teaching environnental hygiene or reading to the people, etc., in order to win their trust, which will result in a better ideological denocratic preparation. These activities will arouse the peasant's sympathy towards our movement, and he will immediately become one of ours, through logistical support, cover and intelligence information about the enemy, or participation in combat. Guerrillas must be persuasive through the word, and not overbearing through their weapons, When they behave this way, the people will feel that they are respected, and will be more inclined to accept our message, thus consolidating popular support. Anyplace where tactical guerrilla operations are conducted in highly populated areas, the squadron must also carry out parallel psychological actions, which must precede, accompany and consolidate the common objective, and give explanations to all people about our struggle, indicating that our Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 presence means to give peace, liberty and democracy to all Nicaraguans without exception, and explaining that our struggle is not against the nationals, but rather against Russian imperialism. This will serve to assure greater psychological achievements to augment the tactical operations of the future. 6. Conclusions The nature of the guerrilla warfare environment does not permit sophisticated facilities for psychological operations, and face-to-face persuasion from the propagandist-combatant guerrillas towards the people is an effective and available tool, which we must use as often as possible during the process of the struggle. ‘ed Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 II] ARMED PROPAGANDA General Background There is frequently a misunderstanding about “armed propaganda," that this tactic consists in prevailing over people with arms. In reality, it does not involve force, but the guerrilla must be very knowledgeable in the principles and methods of this tactic. The objective of this section is to give the guerrilla student an understanding of the armed propaganda that must be used, and which can be applied in guerrilla warfare. 2. Close Identification with the People Armed propaganda includes all actions performed by an armed force, the results of which will bring a better attitude fron the people towards that force, not including forced indoctrination. ‘This is performed by a close identification with the people at any opportunity. For example: - Hanging up one's arms and working side by sie with the peasants in the fiel building, fishing, carrying water, fixing roofs, etc. - When you work with people, the guerrillas can use slogans lik any hands doing small things, but doing then together - Participating in the people's work you can establish a strong bond between them and the guerrillas, and at the same time, you generate popular support for our movenent. During patrols or other operations near or in the middle of towns, each guerrilla must be respectful and polite with the people. Likewise, he must move cautiously and always be ready to fight, if necessary. but he must not Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 see everyone as an enemy, with suspicion or hostility. Even in war, it is possible to smile, laugh and greet people. ‘ruly, the reason for our revolutionary base, the reason why we fight, is our people. We must be respectful towards them at all times. In place and situations whenever it's possible, for example, while resting during a march, the guerrillas can explain to youths and children how to handle arms. ‘They can give them an unloaded rifle, so that they can learn to assemble it and disassemble it, how to use it; and they can point to imaginary targets, since they are potential recruits for our forces. The guerrillas must always be ready with easy slogans, to explain to the people, whether by chance or intentionally, the reason for using arms. = ‘Arms will be used to win freedom, they are for you." - ‘With arms we can set demands, such as hospitals, schools, better roads and social services for the people, for you." ~ ‘Our arms are, truly, the arms of the people, your acns.* - ‘With arms we can change the Sandinista-conmunist regime and return to the people a true democracy, so that we all may have economic opportunities.* All of this must be designed to create an identification of the people with arne and with the guerrillas who carry them. Lastly, we must make the people feel that we are thinking about then, and that the arms belong to the people, to help them and to protect them from a conmunist, totalitarian, imperialist regime, which is indifferent to the needs of the population. 3. Implicit and Explicit Terror An armed guerrilla force always entails an implicit terror, because the population, without saying it aloud, is afraid that the arms could be used Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 against them. However, if the terror is not made to be explicit, positive results can be expected. In a revolution, the individual lives under a constant thread of physical harm. If the government police cannot put a halt to guerrilla activities, the population will lose confidence in the government, which has the inherent mission of guaranteeing public safety, However, the guerrillas must be careful not to become an explicit terror, because this would result in a loss of public support. In the words of a leader of the HUK guerrilla movement, in the Philippine ‘he population is always impressed by arms, but not because of the fear present ourselves before the people, supporting them with our arms, and this will give them the message of the struggle. This is, in a few words, the essence of armed propaganda. An armed guerrilla force may occupy an entire town or small city that is neutral or relatively passive with regard to the conflict. In order to carry out armed propaganda effectively, the following must be done simultaneous) = Destroy military or police installations, and moving the survivors to a i | that they cause, but rather because they give a feeling of strength. We must | / | { | | | . | public place." ! - Cut all external lines of communication: cables, radio, messengers. = Set up ambushes, in order to delay efforts on all possible access routes. - Kidnap all Sandinista government officials and agents, and replacing them in "public places by military or civil personnel trusted by our movemént; in addition, do the following: -- Establish a public court dependent on the guerrillas, and going through the entire town or city, gathering the population together for this act. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 Shame, ridicule and humiliate the "personal symbols" of the repressive government in the presence of the people, and promoting popular participation by means of guerrillas placed within the crowd, yelling slogans and taunts. Reduce the influence of individuals sympathetic to the regime, exposing their weaknesses and removing them from the town, without damaging them publicly. Mix the guerrillas into the population, and have all members of the column ql demonstrate very good conduct, practicing the following: Any article taken will be paid for in cash. ‘The hospitality offered by the people will be accepted and this opportunity will be exploited to carry out face-to-face persuasion regarding the struggle. -- Courtesy calls must be paid to prominent and prestigious citizens of the place, such as doctors, priests, teachers, etc. -- The guerrillas must instruct the population, so that when the operation is | over and the repressive Sandinista forces interrogate them, they may reveal EVERYTHING about the military operation carried out. For example, the kinds of weapons used, how many men arrived, from what direction they arrived and in what direction they left, in other words, EVERYTHING. -- Likewise, indicate to the population that in meetings or in private fi discussions, they may give the names of Sandinista informers, who will be removed together with the other officials of the repressive government. = When conducting a meeting, conclude it with a speech by one of the guerrilla leaders or political cadres (the most dynamic one), including explicit references to: | - he fact that the ‘enemies of the people," the Sandinista officials or | agents, must not be mistreated in spite of the criminal actions, even though Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 the querrilla forces may have suffered casualties, and that this is done thanks to the generosity of the Christian guerrillas. Give a statement of thanks for the *hospitality" of the population, as well as let them know that the risks that they will run when the Sandinistas return are greatly appreciated. he fact that the Sandinista regime will not be able to resist the attacks of our guerrilla forces, in spite of the fact that they exploit the people with taxes, control of currency, grain, and all aspects of public life through the associations, to which they are forced to belong. Making a promise to the people that they will return to make sure that the “eeches" of the repressive Sandinista regime will not be able to inpede the integration of our guerrilla with the population. <= A repeated statement to the population to the effect that they may reveal everything about this visit by our commandos, because we are not afraid of anything or anyone, or either the Soviets or the Cubans. Emphasize that we are Nicaraguans, that we struggle for Nicaragua's freedom, and to establish a wholly Nicaraguan government. Guerrilla Arms are the Strength of the People Against an Tilegal Government Armed propaganda in populated areas does not give the impression that the arms are the power of ‘the guerrillas over the people, but rather that the arms are the strength of the people against a repressive regime. Whenever it is necessary to use armed force during an occupation or a visit to a town or village, "the guerrillas must emphasize and make sure during this action that they: Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 - Explain to the population that first of all this is being done to protect them, the people, not the guerrillas themselves. - Admit frankly and publicly that this is "an act of democratic guerrillas," with the appropriate explanations. - - That this action, although not desirable, is necessary because the final objective of the insurrection is a free and democratic society, where acts of force are not necessary. - The force of arms is a need provoked by the oppressive system, and will cease to exist when the "forces of justice" of our movement assume control. - If, for example, it became necessary for one of the advance posts to have to shoot a citizen who was trying to leave the town or city in which the guerrillas are carrying out armed propaganda or political proselytism, the following is reconmended: - Explain that if this citizen were able to escape, he would alert the eneny near the town or city, and they would come in with reprisals such as rape, pillage, destruction, captures, etc., terrorizing the inhabitants of the place for having been attentive and hospitable to the guerrillas in the town. - If 2 guerrilla shoots an individual, make the population see that he was an enemy of the people, and that they shot him because the guerrillas recognized their primordial duty, which is protecting the citizens. = the commando tried to stop the informant without shooting, because he, like all Christian guerrillas, advocate non-violence. Having shot the Sandinista informer, although it is against his own will, was necessary to avoid repression on the part of the Sandinista government against the innocent people. - Wake the population see that it was the regime's repressive system, which caused this situation, that really killed the informant, and that the weapon Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 fired was one that was recovered in combat against the Sandinista regime. - Make the population see that if the Sandinista regime had ended its repression, with the corruption sponsored by foreign powers, etc., the freedom commandos would not have had to take up arms to cut down the lives of their Nicaraguan brothers, which hurts our Christian feelings. If the informant had not tried to escape, he would be enjoying life together with the rest of the Population, because he would not have tried to inform to the enemy. ‘This death would have been avoided if justice and freedom existed in Nicaragua, and this is exactly the objective of the democratic guerrilla. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 Selective Use of Violence for Propaganda Effects We could neutralize carefully selected and planned-for targets, such as court judges, cattle judges [jueces de esta], police or state security officers, CDS chiefs, etc. For purposes of the psychological effect, it is necessary to take extreme precautions, and it is essential to gather the affected population together to attend, take part in the act, and formulate accusations against the oppressor. tee ee ee - The spontaneous hostility which the majority of the population may feel against the target. - Using potential rejection or hate on the part of the majority of the affected population against the target, rousing the population and making them see all of the individual's negative and hostile acts against the people. = If the majority of the people supports or backs the target, don't try to change these feelings through provocation. = Relative difficulty of handling the person who will replace the target. The person who will replace the target must be selected carefully, on the basis of the following: - Degree of violence necessary to effect the change. - Degree of violence acceptable to the affected population. Degree of violence possible without causing damage or danger to other individuals in the area around the target. = Poresceable degree of reprisals on the part of the enemy towards the affected population or other individuals in the area around the target. The mission of replacing the individual must be followed by: - Extensive explanations to the affected population of why [this action] Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 was necessary for the good of the people. - Explaining that the Sandinista reprisals are unfair, indiscriminate, and above all, a justification for the execution of this mission. - Carefully sounding out the reaction of the people to the mission, as vell as controlling this reaction by assuring that the population's reaction is beneficial to the Freedom Commandos. 6. Conclusions wy Ce Armed propaganda includes all actions performed and the impact achieved by an arned force, resulting in positive attitudes on the part of the population towards that force, not including forced indoctrination. However, armed Propaganda is the most effective instrument available to a guerrilla force. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 IV. ARMED PROPAGANDA TEAMS 1. General In contact with the very reality of their roots, in a campaign of psychological operations in guerrilla warfare, the commanders will be able to obtain maximum psychological results from a program of Armed Propaganda Teams. The purpose of this section is to inform the student guerrilla of what the Armed Propaganda Teams are in the milieu of guerrilla warfare. 2. Combination: Political Awareness and Armed Propaganda ‘The Armed Propaganda Teams combine political consciousness-raising with armed propaganda, which will be conducted by carefully selected guerrillas (preferably with combat experience), for personal persuasion within the populagtion. The selection of personnel is more important than the training, because we cannot train guerrilla cadres solely to demonstrate the feelings of ardor and fervor, which are essential since person-to-person persuasion is important. However, it is even more important to train persons who are intellectually cultivated and agile. | An Armed Propaganda Team includes from 6 to 10 members. This number, or a smaller number, is ideal, because then there is more camaraderie, solidarity, ) and esprit de corps. ‘The subjects discussed are assimilated more rapidly, an¢ the members react more rapidly to unexpected situations. In addition to being a combined armed combatant and propagandist, each member of the team must be well prepared to conduct constant person-to-person, face-to-face communications. The leader of the team will have to be the commando who is most highly t motivated politically and most effective in face-to-face persuasion. | Position, hierarchy, or rank will not be the determining factor for Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 performing this function, but rather it will be performed by whoever is best qualified for communication with the people. The source of basic recruitment for guerrilla cadres will be the sane social groups of Nicaraguans toward whom the psychological campaign is Airected, such as peasants, students, professionals, housewives, ete. The peasants must be made to see that they have no land; the workers, that the state is closing down the factories and industries; the doctors, that they are being displaced by Cuban paramedics, and that as doctors they cannot exercise their profession because of lack of drug A rewquirenent for recruiting them will be their skill in expressing themselves in public. ‘The selection of personnel is more important than the training. Individual consciousness-raising and capacity of persuasion in the discussions of groups for motivation of the guerrilla as conbatant-propagandist, selecting as cadres and organizing into teams those who have the greatest capacity for this work. The training of guerrillas for armed propaganda teams is focused on the method, not on the content. A training of two weeks is sufficient if tshe rescruitment is conducted in the form indicated. If a wrong selection process has been followeé, the individual selected will not produce a very good result, no matter how good the training provided. The training will have to be intensive for 14 days, by means of @iscussions within the team, alternating the position of discussion leader among the member$ of the group. The topics to be discussed will be the same; a different topic will be introduced each day, for varied practice. ‘The topics will have to refer to the local conditions and to the significance which they have for the residents of the locality, such as Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 speaking about crops, fertilizers, seeds, irrigation, etc. The following topice may also be include: - Lumber, tiles, carpentry tools for houses and other buildings; = Boats, launches, roads, horses, oxen for transportation, fishing, and agriculture; - Problems which they may have locally with neighbors, offices of the regime, visitors, taxes, ete.; - Forced labor, service in the militias; = Porcea association in Sandinista groupings, such as women's clubs, youth associations, workers associations, etc; = Availability and prices of consumer goods and articles of prime necessity in local grocery stores ané shops: - characteristics of the education in public schools: = Concern of the population about the presence of Cuban teachers in the schools and political interference, that is, using the schools for political purposes rather than for educational purposes, as they should be used; = Indignation over the lack of freedom of religion and over the persecution of which the priests are victim and over the participation of priests such as D'Bscoto and Cardenal in the Sandinista government, against the explicit orders of Bis Holiness the Pope. NOTE: Other topics may be developed by the members of the team. The target groups for the Armed Propaganda Teams are not the persons with sophisticated political knowledge but those whose opinions are formed from what they see and hear. The cadres will have to use persuasion to carry out their mission. Some of the methods of persuasion which may be used are the followin - Internal group/external group, It is a principle of psychology that we Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 Techniques of Persuasion in Chats or Speeches = Be simple and concise. Avoid the use of difficult words or expressions. Prefer popular words and expressions, that is, the language of the people. in dealing with a person, make use of concise language, avoiding complicated verbiage. It should be recalled that we use oratory to make our people understand the reason for our struggle and not to show our knowledge. - Use vivid and realistic examples. Avoid abstract concepts, such as those used in universities in the higher years; instead of then, give concrete examples such as children playing, horses galloping, birds in flight, ete. - Use gestures to communicate. In addition to verbal communication, we can conmanicate through gestures, such as moving our hands expressively, movenents of the back, facial expressions, focusing our glance, and othi aspects of "body language", projecting the individual personality in the message. - Use the appropriate tone of voice. If in addressing the people one speaks about happiness, one will have to use a happy tone. If one speaks of something sad, the tone of voice must be of sadness; in speaking of a heroic act or act of valor, one will speak with an animated voice, etc. ~ Above all, be natural, One must avoid imitating others, since people, especially simple people, can easily detect a charlatan. One will have to project one's individual personality when addressing the population. 3, Eyes and "Ears* within the Population The abundance of information for intelligence which the deployment of Armed Propaganda Teams will generate will permit us to cover @ large area with our commandos, who will become the eyes and ears of our movenent within the population. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 - The combined reports of an Armed Propaganda Team program will provide us with exact details on enemy activities. - The intelligence information obtained by the Armed Propaganda Team cadres will have to be reported to the chiefs. Nevertheless, it is necessary to emphasize that the first mission of the Armed Propaganda Teams is to conduct psychological operations, not to obtain intelligence information. Any intelligence report will be made through external contact of the Arned Propaganda Team, so as not to compromise the population. ‘The Armed Propaganda cadres are capable of doing what others cannot do in a guerrilla campaign: determine personally the development or deterioration of popular support, and the sympathy or hostility which the people feel toward our novenent. = The program of Armed Propaganda Teans, in addition to being very effective psychologically, increases the capacity of the guerrilla group to obtain and use the information. - Likewise, the Armed Propaganda Cadre will report to his superior the reaction of the people to the radio broadcasts, insurrectional leaflets, or any other medium of our propaganda. - The expressions or gestures of the eyes ané face, the tone and strength of the voice, and the use of suitable words greatly influence face-to-face Persuasion with the people. With the intelligence reports supplied by the Armed Propaganda Teans, the commanders will have exact knowledge of the popular support, which they will use in their operations. Psychological Tactics, Maximum Flexibility Psychological tactics will have the maximum flexibility within a general plan, permitting a continuous and immediate adjustment of the message, and Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 making sure to create an impact on the indicated target group, at the monent at which it is most susceptible. Tactically, a program of Armed Propaganda Teans should cover the greater part, and if possible all, of the operational territory. The communities in which this propaganda will be conducted will not necessarily have to coincide with political units of an official character. A complete understanding of their structure or organization is not necessary, because the cadres will operate by applying social-political action and not academic theory. The target populations of the Armed Propaganda Teams will be selected because they are part of the operational area, and not because of their size or the extent of their territory. - The objective will have to be the people, not the territorial area. = .1n this respect, each work team will have to cover approximately six population centers, for the purpose of developing popular support for our novenent. The team will always have to move in a covert manner within the population centers of its area. - It will have to vary its route radically, but not its itinerary. this is so that the inhabitants who are cooperating may depend on its itinerary, that is, on the time at which they may frequently contact it to give it information. - The danger of betrayal or ambush can be neutralized by varying the itinerary slightly, using different routes, as well as by arriving or leaving without advance notice. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9 While the surprise factor is used, vigilance will have to be exercised in order to detect the possible presence of hostile elements. one should not stay more than three consecutive @ays in one populated place. ‘The three-day limit has obvious tactical advantages, but it also creates a psychological effect on the people when they see the team as a source of current and up-to-date information. Also, it may overexpose the target audience and cause a negative reaction. Basic tactical precautions will have to be taken. ‘This is necessary for greater effectiveness, as was indicated in the discussion of the topic of ‘armed Propaganda’. When it is conducted in a discreet manner, it increases the respect of the population for the team and enhances its credibility. The basic procedures are: covert elements who exercise vigilance before and after the departure and at intervals, ‘There should be at least two of them, and they should meet at a predetermined place at a signal or before any hostile action. ‘Phe goal of the team is to motivate the entire population of a place, but to remain constantly aware that specific target groups exist within this general configuration of the public. Although meetings are held in the populated place, the cadres will have to recognize, and keep in contact with, the target groups, mingling with them before, during, and after the mecting. The method of conducting this type of meeting was included in the topic of "Armed Propaganda*, and it will be covered in greater detail under the title of "Control of Mass Meetings and Demonstrations’ ‘The primary focus of the Armed Propaganda cadres will have to be on the residents of the populated place, where their knowledge as shapers of Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/28 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9