Chapter3

An lntegrative
Theoryof
lntergroupConftict
Henti Taifet
John Tumer
Universiuof Btistol,England

INTRODUCTION D. T. Campbetl( 1965)asthe ..realistic group conflict

theory" (R.C.T.). Its pointof deparrurelortireexpla_
The aim of this chapteris to presentan outline of nation of intergroupbehavioris in what Sherif(1966)
a theory of intergroup conflict and somepreliminary has called the functional relations between social
data relating to the theory. Fint, however, this ap. groups. Ib cenbal hypothesis_..real conllict
proachto intergroup behavior and intergroup confli-ct of
gT.op-^T:oo! !*ses intergroup conflict" (camp.
must be set in context, in relation to other approaches beII,.1965,p.287)-is
deceptivetysinple, intuitiveiy
to the sameproblems. convin_cing, andhasreceivedsrong empiricatsupport
Much of the work on the social psychology of (including Sherif & Sherif, 1953; Avigdor, i{i53;
rntergrouprelations has focused on patternsof indi_ H:rvey, 1956; Sherif, Harvey, $hlte, Hooa, A
vidualprejudiceanddisqiminationandon themotiva- Sherif, I961; Blake& Mouton,I96la, 1962c;Bass&
tional sequenc€sof interp€rsonalinteraction.Out_ Dunternan,1963;D. W. Johnson,1967;Diab,1970;.
standingexamplesof theseapproaches can be found, R.C.T. waspioneeredin socialpsychologyiy
respectively,in the theoryof authoritarianpersonality _ -
the Sherifs, who provided both an ctiotogy ofitrd
(Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik,Levinson,& Sanfor4 grorp hostility anda theoryof competitionasrealistic
1950)andin the various versionsandmodificationsof and inst-umentalin charact€r,motivatedby rewards
the th:ory of frr'stration,aggression,and displace_ which,
in principle, are extriNic to the intergroup
ment (such as Be*owitz, 1962, L969, fgZli. ttr"
situation (see.Deufsch, l949bi Julian, l96gyl Op
commondenominatorof most of this work has been posed
group int€resb in obtaining scarce r€sour@s
the stess on the intraindividual or interpersonal promote
psychological processes leading to prejudiced _competition,and positively intexd€pendent
at_ (superordinate)goatsfacilitate cooperation.Conflia_
utudes or discriminatory behavior. The comolex
ing_interesbdevelop through competition into overt
a social conJlict. It appears,too, that intergroup com-
wls_s9_99@_sog!4_processesEEGEEii petition cnhancesintagroup morale, colesivcness,
3.-g-[:A*dth"="1.""h"td;ffi ; 3:d-cooperatiotr(seeVinacke, 1964;Fiedler, 1967;
ur rne rocus ol the social psycholoqisb,
Dreoccu- Kalin & Marlowe, 1968). Thus, rhe real conflicts of
group int€r€stsnot only ceate anogonistic intergroup
rclations but also height€n identification *ith, uni
The alternative to these approachesis rep- positiveattachment
rcsentedin the work of Muzafer Sherif and to, thein-group.
his as_ This identrfication with 6e in-group, however,
sociates(seeChapter 1), and has beenrcferred
to bv has been givcn relatively little promiDence.in the
34 Chap@r3
R.C.T- asa lheoreticalproblemin its own right. The
developmentof in-group identificationsis seenin the
R.C.T. almost as an epiphenomenon of intergroup
conflict. As reated by the R.C.T., theseidentifica-
tiots arcassociatedwith certainpattemsof intergroup
relations,but the theorydoesnot focus either uponthe
proc€ssesunderlying the development 8nd mainte.
nancc of group identity nor upon the possibly au-
tonomous effects uPon the in-group and intergroup
"subjective" aspects of group
behavior of these
membenhip. It is our contentionthat the relative ne-
glect of theseprocesses in the R.C.T. is responsible
for some inconsistenciesbetween the empirical data
"classical " form. In this sense,
and the theory in its
the theoretical orientation to be oudined here is in-
tendedtrot to replac€the R.C.T., but to suPPlement
it in some rcspects that seem to us essential for an
adequatesocial psychology of intergroup conflict
-partiqrlarly as the undentanding of the Psycho-
logical aspectsof social changecannot be achieved
without an appropriateanalysisof the social psychol-
ogy of social conflict.
THE SOCIALCONTEXTOF INTERGROUP
BEHAVIOR
Our point of deparhre for the discussion to
follow will be an a priori distinction between two
ext€mes of social betravior, correspondingto what
we shall call llllerpersonal versus intergrouP be'
havror.At oneexueme(whlchmostproDaolycanDot
"real life") is the
be found in is "pure" form in
hteraction between two or more individuals that is
lJly determinedby their interpersonalrelationships
and individual characteristics.and not at all affected
by various social groups or categoriesto wbich they
respectively bclong. The other extreme consists of
interactions between two or more individuals (or
groups of individuals) which are/zlly detcrminedby
their respeclivemembershipsin varioussocial groups
or categorics,and not at all affect€d by the interin-
dividual personal rclationships betrwccnthe people
involvcd. Hereagain, it is unlikely that "pure" forms
of this cxtrcmc can be found in "rEd" social situa-
tions. Examples nearing the interp€rsonal cxtrcme
would be the relations betwecn wife and husbandor
between old fricnds. Examples near the intergroup
extremeareprovidedby the behaviorof soldiers from
opposingarmiesduring abatde,or by thebehavior ata
negotiatingtable of membersrepresentingtwo-parties
in an inlenseintergroupconflict.
The main empirical questionsconc€rnthe con-
ditions that determinethe adoptionof forms of social
behavior nearing one or the olher exteme. The
first-and obvious-answer concernsiltergroup con-
flict. It canbe assumed,in accordance with our com-
mon experience,that the moreintenseis an intergroup
conflict, the morc likely it is that the individuals who
arc membersof the opposinggroupswill behavetG
ward eadrother asa function oftheir respectivegroup
memberships,rather than in terms of their individual
characteristicsor interindividual relatiorships. This
waspre.isely why Sherif (1966,for example)was able
to abolish so easily the interindividual friendships
formed in the preliminary stagesof some of his field
studieswhen, subsequently,the individuals who had
becomefriendswereassigned to opposinggroups.
An institutionalizcd or explicit conflict of "ob-
jective" interesb betweengroups,however, does not
provide a fully adequatebasis, either theoretically or
cmpirically, to accountfor many si ations in which
the socialbehaviorof individualsbelongingto distitrct
grcups can be observedto appmach the "group"
exteme of our continuum. The conflict in Sherif's
studies was ' 'institutiondized.' ' in that it was offi
cially arrangedby theholiday campauthorities;it was
"explicit" in that it dominatedthe life ofthe groups;
and it was "objective" in the sensetlat, by the terrns
of the competition, one of the groups hal to be the
winner andthe othergroup the loser. And yet, thercis
evidencefrom Shcrif's own sfirdies atrd fiom other
researcl (to which we shall refrrn lat€r) that the in-
stitutionalization, explicitness, and "objectivity" of
an intergroupconflict arenot r€ceJ.raryconditions for
behavior in terrns of the "group" exteme, although
drey will often prove to be sufrcient conditions. One
clear exanple is provided by our carli€r experimenb
(fajfel, 19?0; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament,
1971),which we shall discussbriefly below, in which
it was found that intergmup discrimination existedin
conditionsof minimal in-group affiliation , anonymity
ofgroup membership,absenceofconflicts of inter€st,
and absenceof previoushostility betwcenthe groups.

Other social and behavioral continua are
associat{ with the interpersonal_intergroup con-
tinuum. One of them may be coruidered as havins
a causal function in relation to the interpersonal_I
intergroup continuum. We shall characterizeit asain
by its two extremes,to whidt we shall refer as 4o-
cial mobility" and "$ocial change." These teifi
are Dor usedherc rn theL sociologicalsense.They
refer instead to the individuals, belief systems
about the nature and the structure of the relations
between social groups in their society. The belief
systemof "social rnobitity" is basedon the general
assumptionthat the society in *,trich the individuals
live is a flexible and permeableone, so that if thev are
Dotsatisfied,for whateverreason, with thecondiions
imposed upon their lives by membership in social
groulx or social cat€goriesto which they belong, it is
possible for them @e it through talent, hard work,
good luck, or what€ver otrer means) to move indi_
vidually into anothergroup which suits them beuer.
A good example of this system of beliefs, built into
the explicit cultural and ideological traditions of a
society, is provided in the fol.towing passagefrom
Hirsclman(1970):
lbc EaditionalAmericanide-aof successconfirrnsthc hold
.whidl cxit hashad on the D8tional
iergination. Succcss
----q, what amountsto thc same thing upward
, social
Eobility-has lotrgbccncotrccivcdin terEsof evolutionary
individualism.Thcsuccessfulindividua!
\to starrsoutat a
low rung of the socialladder,neccssadlyleaveshis own
groupasheriscs;he ..passes " into,or is ..acrepted,,
by,
lhcncxthighergoup. Hc tak6 his immcdiatefamily alon!,
buthardlyanyonc elsetpp.lO8-1091.
At the other extrcme, the bclief systemof . !o-
cial change" impli€s that lhe naturc and sfiuctur€of
the relations betwe€o social groups in the society is
p€rcciv€d as chrracterized by markcd statificad;n,
naking it impossibleor vcry difficxlt for individuals,
as individuals, to invest themsclvcsof an unsatisfac_
tory, underprivilcged, or stigmatizcd group membcr-
ship. A castc system, bascd on tace or anv other
criteria perccivcd as immutablc, is an obvious cxam_
ple, but it nced not be thc main cxample. The
economicor social r€alities of a society may be such
(as, for example, in the caseof the millions of unem-
An lntegrative Th@ryof lntergrcup hnflict
ployedduring the depressionof the 1930s)that
the
impossibitityof ..geaingout" on one's own, as arl
individual, becomesan everydayreality thdt det€r_
mrnesmany forms of intergroup social bdravior- But
even this exampleis still relatively extreme. Many
socialintergroupsituationsthatcontain,for whatever
reasons, stong elementsof stratificati on perceivedas
srct will move social behavioraway from the pole of
interpenolat patternstoward the pole of intergroup
Pure*:.@'
this belief system is that, in tte relevant intergroup
situatiotrs,individualswill not int€ractas individuals.
on thebasisof theirindividualcharacteristics
or inteF
personalrclatiorships, but asmernbersof theL groups
standingin c€rtain defined relationships to memb€rs
of othergmups.
Obviously, one must exp@t a marked correla_
tion betweenthe degreeofobjective sEatification in a
social system(howevermeasurcd)and the social dif_
fusion and intensity of the belief system of ..social
change." This, however, cannotbe a one-to_onerela_
tionship for a numberof reasons, some of which will
be discussedbelow, although we cannotin this cha}.
ter go i nlo thedetailsof themany social_psychological
conditionsthat may deGrminette bansition in crrtain
social groups from an acceptanceof stratification to
behavior characteristicof the int€rgoup pole of our
first conti.nuum-that is, to lhe sreation of social
movemetrtsaiming to change (or to preserve) the
status quo (tajfel, in press). It may be interesting,
however, to point to the close relationship that exislts
betw€enan cxplicit intergroup conflict of interesC on
,
the one hand, and the ..social change" system of
beliefs on the other. One of the rnain featuresof this
belief systemis the perceptionby the individuals con-
cemed that it is iurpossibleor extremely difficutt to
move individually firom thcir own group to another
group. This h precisely thc situation in an intense
intergroup conflict of intaests, in which it is cx-
ftmely diftiodt for an individual to conc€ive of the
possibility of "beraying', his or her own group by
moving to thc opposing group. Although this does
happenon occasion,sanctionsfor sucha mov€are, otr
the whole, powerful, andthc value systems(at leastin
 Chaptet3
our cultures)are in flagrant oppositionto it. To usean
exampleftom social-psychologicalresearch,it seems
hardlypossiblethat oneof theboys in Sherif's holiday
campswould decideto changesides, even though
some of his previously contractedfriendships over-
lappedgroupboundaries.
The intensity of explicit intergroup conflicts of
interestsis closely related in our cultures to the de-
gree of opprobrium attachedto the notion of "rene-
gade" or "traitor. " This is why rhe belief systems
conespondingto the "social change" extremeof our
continuumare associatedwith intenseintergroupcon-
flicts. Theseconflicts can be conceived,therefore, as
creatinga subclassor a subcategoryof the subjective
intergroup dichotomization characteristicof that ex-
treme of the belief continuum. They sharethe basic
feanrre of the "social change" system of beliefs, in
the sensethat the multigoup sFuctureis perceivedss
claracterizedby the eKteme difficulty or impossibil-
ity of an individual's moving from one group to
another.
Tbe continuum of systemsof beliefs disorssed
so far has be€n seen to have a causal function in
sbifting social behavior toward menbers of out-
groupsbetweenthepolesof''iDterpersonal" and ''in-
tergroup" behavior. To concludethis part of our pre-
liminary discussion, we mustcharacterizebriefly two
firther and overlapping continua, which can be con-
sidercd as encompassingthe majot consequencesof
social behaviorthat approaclesoneor the otherend of
the interpersonal-int€rgroupcontinuum. They both
have to do with the variability or uniformity within a
group of behavior and attitudes concerning the rele-
vant out-groups. The first may be describedas fol-
lows: the nearcrare membersof a grouo to the ' 'social
change'' extremeof the belief-systernscotrtinuum and
the int€rgroupexFemeof the behavioralcontinuum.
ggfe.nprmity they will show in their behavior
E
iowardmemb@-
funcse
continua will be correspondingly associarcd with
great€rin-group variability of behavior toward mem-
bcrsof the out-group.The seaondstaGmentis closely
r€latedlo lhe first the nearerarc merrbirs of a group
to the'social chatr=e-Fdl5d--lnterEmup--€x-
e South African Bantus-frequently tend to derogate
oulgroup as undifferentiateditems in a unified social
""E;,r,ffir
charact€ristics. The vastliteraturein socialpsychbl-
oli-ofr-fi6Eictioning of group stereotypesin situa-
tions ofintense intergrouptensionsis no more than an
exampleof this generalstatement.
Thus, this preliminary conc€ptualization rep-
resentsan approachto the social psychologyof inter-
group rclations that takesinto accountsoci4lE)alities
aswellastheirreflection-li6iiiiTdiifiGiJh
.
just discussed:at the beginning,becauseit can be
assumed without much difficulty that the "social
change" belief system is likely to reflect either an
existing and markedsocial stratification or an intense
intergroup conflici of interests,or both; at the end,
becausethe consequencesof the systemsof beliefs
arising from fte social situatioDsjust mentioned are
likely to appearin t}le form of unifred group actions
-lhat is, in ttre form of social movementsairning
either to createsocial changeor to prcs€rvethe status
quo. We shall return later to an elaboration of the
kinds of hypothesesthat can be put forward concern-
ing the creation of change versus the preservation
of status quo. But before this is done, the realistic
group conflict theory must be consideredagainstthis
generalbackground.
The implications of this conceparalizationfor
intergroup relations in stratifi€d societies ard insti.
tutions are both evident and direct. Whenever so-
cial stratification is basedupon an unequal division
of scarce resources-such 8s power, prestige, or
wealth-betwe€n social groups, the social situation
should be characterizedby pervasive ethnocentrism
and out-grcup antagonismbetweenthe over- and un-
derprivilegedgroups(Oberschall,1973, p. 33; see
also Chapt€rs 5 and f2). Howe-v-er,decadesof rc-
search into cthnic-group relations strggestthat eth-
nocentsismamongsratifi eCgroupsis]6iii-i6i]ilras
b€€n, v€ry much a one-waystreet.Two rcc€ni book
(MGAJy/5;cil-6Fftives6'd, 1976)surnrnarize
a great deal of cvidencethat minority or subordinate
group.members-such as lbe American Blacks, the
French Canadians,the New Zealand Maoris, or the
 An lntegrative Theoryot lntergroup Conflict
:ial the in-group and display positive attitudestoward the
ual the-processesof change bccome very rapid.
dominantout-group. In other words, deprivedgrcups 11hen
Stanrsdifferenc€sbetweengroupsoflen do nitreiain
ol- 8re not always elhnocentric in the simple meaningof unilaterallyassociatedwith low levelsof intergroup
ua- the tccm; |lley may, in fact, be positively oriented conflicb. For example, the generalization
an toward the depriving out-group. Data of this kind are madl
above-that certainformsof political,economic.
notconsistent with asimpleapplicationofthe R.C.T. and
social subordinationof a socialgroup tend to eiimi_
cp- Sornewriters (including Gregor & Mcpherson,
]lt-
nate or even reverse its ethnocentrism_is already
1966;Modand, 1969;Milner, 1975,p. 93) havear_ dated. Researchconducted in the last decade
ies gued that the status relations betwe€ndominant and or so
rcveals a changing pattern in intergroup relations.
rgh subordinate groups deterrnine the latters' identitv American Blacks (see N. Friedman, 1969; Hraba
fs. problems. (By sociat stlo,tuswe mean a .anking oi &
Grant, l9?0; Paige, 1970; Brigham, f97l; Harris
lc€ hierarchyof perceived prestige.) Subordinategroups & Braun, t97I), Rench Carudians(Berry, Kalin, &
b€ often se€mto intemalize a wider social evaluation of Taylor, 1976), New Zealand Maoris
:id lhemselvesas "inferior" or ..secondclass," and {aughan, in
an this consensual inferiority is rcproduced as rela_ ry-To,_utd rhe Wetsh (Bourhis, Giles, & Tajfel,
1973;Giles & Powesland,1976;,for instancc,now
nsc tivc self-d€rogationon a numberof indices that have se€m to b€ lejecting their previously negative in_
od, been uscd in the various studies. Consensualshtus group evaluations and developing a positive e6no-
cfs iself-where subjeclive and accorded prestige are c€ntrtc group identity. This .construclion of positive
AI€ identical-is problematic for the R.C.T., which con_ in-group attitudes is often accompaniedby a
)ns ceptualizesprestige as a scarccresource,like wealrh new
militancy over political and economicobje,ctives(see
ing or F)wer. Status differences betwean groups, like Tomlinson,1970).
.nlS othcr inequalities,should tend to acc€trtuat€ lhe inter- But &ese developments do not rescue the
lhc group conflics of inter€s$. Therefore, acaording to
R.C.T. in its original form. The very suddennesswith
m- tbe R.C.T., the impact of low statusupon a suboidi-
ion nate group should be to illensify its antagonismto- t
;tic objective deprivation and tl'e e
wad tfie high-status group (fhibaut, teSOy. yet,
his undersomeconditionsat lest, low socialstatusse€rns @ul
to be conelated with an cnhancement,rather than a 9rd@99s4cEs. on-E" "*Gry,
for uerc rs otten less ..objective" deprivation than there
lessening, of positiveou&groupaftirudes. has been in the past. Atr active and new searchfor a
tti- It could be arguedthat only conllicrs of inter€st
sG.
positive group identity seems!o be one of the critical
p€rc€ivedas such create hostility. This requhes
&at lactors r€sponsible for the reawakeaing of these
ion groupsmustcomparetheir respectivesitrations . And
, groups' clains to scarc€resourc€s(Dizad, 1970).
o( accordin€to some views, it is only dativcly similar
ion gmupslhat engagein mutual comparisons;thcreforc, _ . In summaqr, the R.C.T. states that opposing
sm
clains to scarc€rcsourcrs,suchaspower, prortig", oi
many forns of stau$ diffcrences will reduce per_ wealth, generateethnoccntrismand ant gonis; be-
tn- c€ivcd similadry (sce Fe tinger, f 954; Kidder
tce
e twc€n grcups. Thcrefore, low stafis should tend to
Jtcwart, 1975). It follows that sanrs systems rnay
rc- intensiry out-goup hostility in groups that 8re politi_
reducesocial conflict by resticting thc rangeof
lh-
mean_ caxy, cconomic€lly, or socially subordinate. The
colnoisgns availablc ro any given goup. This evloenc€ suggesb, howwer, that whcre social-
ns lnSt{
qypottsls may be I uscfi.rl
lool aosccormtfor soc of shuctural differcnc€s in the distribution of rcsources
,ks thc-deErminatrbofsocial stability; but if it is taken
nc to havc b€eninstibtionalized, lcgitimizrd, andjustifried
Its logical conclusion, it can ac€ountfor no morc than
atc tbrough a consemually acc€ptcdst8t|s system (or at
that. It fails to accountfor social changc(in the
the
scnse reasta staorsEystemtrat is sufficiently frrm andperva-
of changes in the mutual relations, bchavior,
the and sive to preventthe creationofcognitive altemadvesto
attitudesof large-scalehuman groups that have
ate
be€n it), the resulthasbeenlessandnot moreethnocentrism
dlstlnctly different in status in the past), panicularly
in the different statusgroup6. The price of this has
 A lnEgrctlve Theoryot tntergroup @nflict
:i8l &e in-group and display positive auitudestoward the when the-processesof changebecomevery rapid.
ual dominantout-gmup. In otrer words, deprivedgroups Sta[rs differcnc€sbetwe€ngroupsoften do notrentain
ol- are not always ethnocenfic in the simple meaningof unilatcrally associatedwitr low levels of intergroup
ua- fie tcrm; ftey may, in fact, bc positively oricnted conflicb. For example, the generalizationmadl
an toward the depriving out-group, Daraof this kind are above-lhat c€rtainforms of political, economic,
notconsistent wift a simpleapplicationoftheR.C.T. and
social subordinationof a socialgroup tend to eiimi_
q' Some$Titers (including Gregor & Mcpherson, nate or even reverse its ethnoc€ntism_is already
Dt- 1966;Modand, 1969;Milner, 1975,p. 93) havear_ dated. Researchconducted in the last decade or
ies gued that the status relations betweendominant and sl
reveals a changing pattern in intergrcup relations.
lgh subordinale groups determine the latt€rs' identitv American Blacks (see N. Friedman, 1969; Ilraba &
fs. problems. (By sociat Jbt[.r we mean a ranking or Grant, 1970; Paigc, 1970; Brigham, l97l; Harris
lc€ hierarchyof perceived prestige.) Subordinategroups & Braun, t97I), Rench C:nadians(Berry, Kalia, &
b€ often s€cmto intcrnalize a wider social evaluation of Taylor, 1976), New Zealand Maoris (Vaughan, in
:id drcmselves as "inferior" or ..second class," and
ln this consensual iofcriority is rcproduced as rela_ ry-.),_gd the Wetsh @ourhis, ciles, & Tajfet,
1973;Giles & Powesland,1926),for instance.now
nsc tivc self-derogationon a number of indice that have se€m to be rejecting their previously negative in_
0d, been used in the various studies. Consensualshtus group evaluations and developing a positive ethno_
cfs i8ef-whcre subjective and accorded prestigc arc c€ntnc group identity. This construction of positive
are identical-is problematic for the R.C.T., which con_ itr-group attitudes is often accompaniedby a new
)ns ceptrslizes prcstige as a scarceresourc€,like wealth militaacy over potitical and economicobje,ctives(see
ing or power. Stanls differenc€s between groups, like Tomlinson,1970).
Ars other inequalities, should tend to accentuatethe int€r- But these developmenE do not rescue the
lhe group conflics of hter€sb. Therefore, according to
R.C.T. in its originat form. The vcry suddennesswith
ln- the R.C.T., thc irnFact oflow statusupon a subordi_
ion nate group should be to int€nsify its antagonismto_ t
rtic oljdve deprivation and rherdor ne
ward thc high-sh0rs group (fhibaut, 1950). yet,
his undersomcconditions at least,low socialstat$ seems @uI
to be correlated with an enhanc€ment,rather than a
gu$@eeesun.
..objective"
on-E" *oE y,
for rDerc$ ottcn less deprivation than there
lessening, of positiveout-groupattitudes. has been in the past. Atr aclive and new searchfor a
rti- It could be arguedthat only conflicts of interest positive group identity scemsto bc one of the critical
to- p€rc€iv€das such createhosdfiry. This requires that
tactors responsible for the reawakaning of these
ion grcup'smustcomparetheir respectivesiO.rations . And , goups ' claims to scarce!€sourc€s(Diz:d I 970).
q
accordingto some views, it is only telatively similar ,
ion groupsthat engagein mutual comparisons;thcrefore, , _ In summary, the R.C.T. states that opposing
clair.nsto scarcercsourc€s, suchaspow€r, prcstige, oi
sm many forrrs of staus diff€rences will rcduce oer_
ln- wealth, gcnerateethnocentrismand anhgonisi be-
ceivcd similariry (see Fcstinger, l95a; Kiddei & twe€n gmups. Thcrefore, low stat$ should tend to
tog stewart, 195). It follows that statussystemsrDay
te-
intensify ourgroup hostility in grroupsthat are politi_
reduccsocial conflict by restiixing the rangcof urean_ cat-ty, cconomically, or socially subordinate. The
rh- ugur-comparisonsavailableto any givcn group. This cvidence sr,rggess, howcver, that where social-
ras lypot[csa may be I useftl tool to accauntfor som of stuctrral diff€rcnces in thc distribution of resources
*s &e_dcbrminants of social stability; but if it is takcn !o
'tzc have bccn instiurtionalized,lcgitimizcd, andjust'rfied
tB logical conclusion, it can acaountfor no morc than
atc ulrougn a @nsensuallyacceptrd 6tahs system (or at
thrt. It fails to accountfor social change(in the sense
tle leasta staarsB)6temthat is sufficicntly firm andp€rva_
of changcs in the mutual relations, bchavior,
the and sive to pr€ventthe creationofcognitive altcrnativesto
aftihdes of large-scalehuman groups that havc be€n it), the resulthasbern lessandnot moreethnocentrism
a@ dlstindly different in shrus in the past), panicularly
in the differcnt statusgroups. The price of this has
 Chapter3
been the subordinategroups' self-€ste€m.On the
other hand, whenevera subordinategroup begins, for
whatever reasons,to question or deny its presumed
characteristicsassociatedwith its low status, this
seemsto facilitate the reawakeningof a previously
dormant conflict over objective resourc€s. At the
sametime, it is likely that oneof the counterrcactions
from the dominantgroupsin suchsituationswill be to
work for the preservationof the previously existing
"subjective" and "objective" differertiations.
A tentativehypothesisaboutintergroupconflict
in sratified societiescan now be offered:An unequal
distribution of objective resourcespromotes antag-
onism between dominant and subordinate groups,
provided that the latter group rejecb its prcviously
acc€ptedand consensuallynegative self-image, and
with it the statusquo, and starts working toward the
developmentof a positive group ideotity. The domi-
nent group may reactto thesedevelopmenbeither by
doing everything possibleto maintain andjustify the
status quo or by attempting to find and create new
differentiationsin its own favor, or both (seeChapter
12). A more detailed specification of some of the
sEategiesand "solutiors " that can be adoptedin this
situation can be found in Tajfel (in press); we shall
retnrn later to a discussionof some of them. For the
Fesent, it will be sufficient to statethat, whethervalid
or not, the hyp,othesisraisessomeimportant theoreti-
cal problems that necd to be considered. The first
questionis: what social-psychological procBSEs-arc
iffin-
r@
u-ftFwnich-fi rrurrrdirerrft d6E6;;;ocial
MC
quEsn'olls,
wemustnowabandon andcon-
speculation
sidersomerelevantdata.
SOCIAL CATEGORIAT ION AND
I NTERGRO UP DI SCRIM I NATION
The initial stimulus for the theorizing presented
hcre was providcd by c€rtainexpcrimenal investiga-
tions of intcrgroupbehavior.Thc laboratoryanalogof
rlzl-worl<i erinocenrsm is inGi6SiilGiGihe
ctendencyto favor tle in-groupover the out-groupin
evaluationsand behavior,Not only are incompatible
group intefesb not alwayssufficient to generatecon-
flict (as concludedin th€last section), but there is a
good deal of expetimentalovidencathat thesecondi-
tions are not alwaysnecessaryfor the developmentof
competition and disqimination betweengroups (for
example,Ferguson& Kelley, 1964;Rabbie& Wil-
kens, l97l; Doise & Sinclair,1973:Dojse & Wein-
berger, 1973).This doesnot mean,of course, that
in-groupbias is not influencedby the goal relations
betweenfre groups(seeHarvey,1956).
All this evidenceimplies that in-group bias is a
remarkably omnipresentfeatrre of intergroup rela-
tions. The phenomenonin iis extremeform has been
investigatedby Tajfel and his associates.There have
be€na numberof studies(Tajfelet al., l97l; Biuig &
Tajfel, 19?3;Tajfel & Billig, 1974;Doisc, Csepeli,
Dann,Gouge,Lanen, & Ostell,1972;Turner, 1975),
all showing that thc mere perceptionof belonging
!o two distinct grouDs-rhat is, so-Al-eaEEbfiZatbn
per se-is sufficient to higger intcrgm-ttlFcdmina-
iioffi.r"
a*GnG oim-eTl f an ouLgroupis sufficient
to provoke intergroup compaitive or discriminatory
responseson Oe part of the in-group.
In the initiat experimental paradigm (fajfel,
1970;Tajfel et d., lg?l), thesubj€cb(borhchildren
and adul6 have acted as subjecb in the various
studi€s) are randonily classified as membersof two
nonoverlapping groups---astensiblyon the basis of
some tsivial performancecriterion. They then make
"decisions," awarding
amountsof moneyto pairs of
otlrer subjects(excluding self) in specially designed
booklea. The recipien8 are anonymous,except for
their individual code numben and their group mem-
benhip (for example, membernumber 5l .of the X
group and membernumber 33 of rhe I group). The
subjec6, who know their own group membership,
award thc amounts individually and aaonymously.
The responseformat of the bookletsdoesnot force th€
subjectsto act in termsofgroup membcrship.
In this situation, there is neither a conllict of I
interess nor previously cxisting hostility betweenOre I
"groups." No social interactiontskesplace
bctwecn fl
the subjecs, nor is th€re 8Dy rational link betwern ll
economicself-inter€stand the strategyof in-groupt

I
Thus, thcsegroupsare purelycognitive,
I favoritism.
and can be refened to asmininnl.
I 1975) shows that they do not shary any common con-
The basicandhighly reliablefinding is rhatrhe
fivial, ad hoc intergroup categorizationleads to in_
goup favoritism and discrirnination against the out_
group. Faimessis also an influential strategy.Thereis
alsoa good dealof evidencethat, within lhe pattem of
r€spondingin termsof in-gmup favoritism, maximum
difference(M.D.) is more importantto the subjects
than maximumin-group profit (M.I.p.). Thus, they
s€emto be competing with the out-gloup, rather than
following a strategy of simple economic gain for
membersof the in-group. Other data from several
exp€rimenb also show that the subjects' decisions
weresignificandy n€arerto the maximumjoint payoff
(M.J.P.) point when these decisions applied to the
division of money betwe€ntwo anonymousmcmbes
of the in-group than when they applied to two mem-
b€rsof theout-group;thatis, retativelylesswasgiven
to the out-group, even when giving more would not
havealfected the amountsfor the in-group. Billig &
Tajfel (1973) have found the sameresults even when
the-assignment to groupswas madeexplicitly random.
This eliminated the similarity on the performance
criterion witrin the in-group ss an alt€rnativeexplana-
tion of thc results(see Byrne, l97t). en expiiciOy
randomclassific{tiotr into groupsproved in this sOdy
to bea morc potentdeterminantof discrimination than
perc€ivedinterpersonalsimilarities and dissimilarities
not associatedwith categorizationinto groups.
. Thequestion that arisesis whetherin_groupbias
in these "minimal,' situations is produced-by some
form of the cxperimenter effect or of the demand
charact€risticsof tle exp€rimentalsitration_in other
words, whedrerexplicit rcferenc€sto goup member-
ship communicate to the subjects thit they are ex-
p€ctedto, or ought to, discriminate. The first Doint to
bc madcabout lhir interpreation of the resutt is that
crplicit referencesto gmup menrbershipare logicalty
nc.essaryfor opcrationalizing in thescminimal situa_
tions the major independentvariablo--that is, social
cat€gtrizationper se. This requircsnot merely that the
subJectsp€rceivethemsclvesassimilar !o or different
ftom others as individuals, but that they are mem-
bers of discrete and discontinuous cateeories--tlEt
is, "groups." Second, a detaited anal-ysisof the
An lntegrc ve Theory of lntergroup C;onflict 99
posaession r€porrs (Bilig, 1972; Turner,
llbjecs'
ception of the ',appropriate" or ..obvious,, way
to
behave, that only a tiny minority have,o-"
ido
of the hypothesis, and that this minority does not
always conform to it.
The rnore general theoretical problem has been
refened to elsewhere by one ofus as follows:
Sjmply and briefly stared,rhe argument(e,g., Gerard
&
Hoyt, 1974)amountsto the following: thc subjectsacted
in
terms of the inter$oup categorizstionprovidcd or imposcd
by the cxperimentcn not neccssarilybectuse this bas bccn
suca€ssful in iDducingany genuincawarencssof member-
ship in sepa.ate8nd distinct groups, but probably bccausc
they fclt that this kind of bchavic wasexpectcdof rhem by
thc expcriment rs, and ther€fore thcy conformcd to this
cxpectation. The filst question to ask is why should the
subjectsbc expe€tingthe cxp€rimentarsto crDe_.tof them
thiskind ofbchavior?Thc Goard andHoy aruwerto this is
that thc cxperimcntalrituatjon wasrigged aocausethis kind
ol cxp€ctafonin thesubjects.This answerrrtainsib ptausi-
bility only if wc assumethatwhat wasno moreOtaoa hiot
from thc cxp.riment€rs aboutthe notion of ,,groups,, being
rclevant to the subjects' behavior had becn suffrcicnt ti
dctenninc, powcrful ly andconsistently, apanicularform of
lnt€rgroup behavi6. Il turn, if we assumc this___-and the
assumption is by no mcans uoreasonable_-wemust also
rssume dut this particulsr forr! of intetgroup behavior is
onc which is capableofbcitrg iuduccd by the cxpcrimetrters
much morc €asily than othcr forms (such as cooperation
betwcenthc groupsitr exto(ing tbe maximumtotaLamount
of money from the erpedmcntcts, or a fair division of the
spoils.between the groups,or simply |ardom rcspordi8g).
-by
And- this last assumptionmust bc backcd up in iL turn
aaothcr presupposition: aamcly, that for somc reaons
(whatever thcy may bc) competitive behaviq between
groups, 8t least in out culture, is cxFaordinarily aasy
to
Eigger off-at which point wc are back where we startcd
&om. Thc problcn thcn mustbcres&tedin ten|l! offhe occd
to.spccify why 8 certain tr'nd of inlcrgroup bchavia can bc
cllcrtcd so much Dore easily tha! otbcr linds: and this
specifrc€tioDis ccdainly rct Dadc if wc tlst contcnt with
thc cxplanatiotr that thc bchavior occurrpd bccauscit w6s
vcry casy for thc cxp€rimcntcG to makc it occur
ffajfal,
inprcssl.
Two points stand out: fint, minimal itrte.rgroup
_.
discrimination is not based on incompatible group
 Chaptet3
interests;second,the baselineconditionsfor inter-
group conpetition seemindeedso minirnal asto cause
the suspicionthat we aredealingherewith somefactor
or proc€ssinherent in the intergroup situation ihelf.
Our theoretical orientation wasd€velopedinitially in
rcsponseto theseclues from our earlier experiments.
We shall not trace the history of its development,
however,but shalldescribeits prcsentform.
SO CIAL IDENTITYAN D SO CIAL COM PARISON
Many orthodoxdefinitionsof "sociat groups,'
are unduly restrictive when applied to the context of
intergmup relations. For example, when membersof
two national or ethnic categoriesinteract on the basis
of their reciprocal beliefs about their respective
categoriesand of the generalrelationsbetweenthem,
this is clearly intergroup behavior in the everyday
senseof the term. The "groups " to which the inter-
actantsbelong need nat depqd upon the frequency
of intermember interaction, systems of role rela-
tionships, or interdependentgoals. From the social-
psychological pcrspective, the essential criteria for
group membership, as they apply to large-scaleso-
cial categories,arc that the individuals concemedde-
fineliemselves and aredefined by othersasmembers
ot a grcup.
We can conc€ptualizea group, in this sense,asa
collection of individuals who perceivc thernselvesto
be memb€rsof the samesocial category,sharesome
cmotional involvement in this common definition of
themselves,and achieve some degrecof social con-
sensusabouttlte evaluationof their group and of their
membenhip of it. Following ftom this, our definition
of intergroup behavior is basically identical to that of
Sherif(1966,p. 62): anybehaviordisplaycdby oneor
more actorstowsrd oneor moreothersthat is basedon
the actors' identification of themselvesand the others
asbelonging to different social categorics.
Social categorizations arc conccived here as
cognitive tools that segment,clsssify, and cder the
social environment, and thus enable.theindividual to
undertakemany forms of social action. But they do
not mercly systematize the social world; they also
provide a systemoforientation for sefreference: they
crcate and define the individual's placc in society.
Socialgroups,undentoodin this sense,providetlrcir
memberswith anidentificationofthemselvesin social
terra. Theseidentificationsare to a very large extent
rclational and comparative:rhey define the individ-
ual as similar to or different from, as ..bett€r" or
"worse"
than, membersof oher groups. (For a more
detaileddiscussion,see Tajfel, 1972b.) It is in a
stictly limited sense,arisingfrom theseconsidera-
tions,thatwe usethe te'.]l;.socialidentity.It consists,
for the purposesof the presentdiscussion,of those
aspectsofaD individual'sself-imagethatderivefmm
the social categoriesto which he perc€iveshimself as
belonging.With thislimitedconceptof socialidentity
in rnind, our argumentis basedon the following gen_
eralassumptions:
1. Individuals strive to maintain or enhanc€
their self-csteem: they strive for a positive self-
concePt.
2 . Socialgroupsor categoriesandthe member_
ship of lhem are associatedwilh positive or negative
value connotations. Hence, social identitv mav be
positive or negativeacmrding to dre evaluaions
(which tendto be socially consensual,either within or
acrossgroups) of thosegroups that contribute to an
individual'ssocialidentity.
3. The evaluationof one's own group is deter_
mined wi6 referenceto spe€ificother groups through
social comparisonsin termsof value-ladenattibutes
andcharacteristics. Positivelydiscrepantcomparisons
betweenin-group and out-g.oup produce high pres-
tige; negatively disoepant comparisonsbetweenin-
group andouGgroupresultin low prestige.
From thescassumptions,somerelated theoreti-
cal principlescanbe derived:
1. Individuals srive to achieveor to maintain
positive socialidentity-
2. Positive social identity is based to a large
cxtent on favorable comparisonsthat can be made
bctweenthe in-group and somerelevatrtout-groups:
the in-goup mustbe perccivedaspositivcly differcn-
tiat€d or distinct from the relevantout-groups.
3. When social identity is unsatisfactory,indi-
viduals will strive cither to lcavetheir existing group
ard join somemorepositivetydistinct group snd/orto
makc their existinggroup morepositively distinct.
The basic hypothesis, then, is that pressures

h€it to evaluate one's own group positively through
rcial in-group/out-groupcomparisonslead social groups to
:tcnt attempt to differentiate themselvesfrom each other
vid- (seeTajfel, 1974a,1974b;Tirrner,1975).Therearcat
'or
least thlee classesof variablesthat should influence
0ore intergroup differentiation in concrete social situa-
lna tions. First. individualsmust haveinternalizedtheir
lcra- group membershipas an aspe.t of thcil self.ccncept:
ists, they must be subjectively id€ntified vith the rclevant
tose in-group. It is not enoughthat the othersdefine them
'rom
asa group, although consensualdefinitions by othe$
lf as can become, in the long run, one of the powerful
otity causalfactors for a group's self-definition. Second,
gcn- the social situation must b€suchas to allow f6-iTfrter-
group comparisons that enable the selection and
&nc€ evaluationof the relevant relational attributes. Not all
sclf- betwe€n-groupdifferences have evaluative sisnifi_
-ftom
cancc(tajfel, 1959), and those that do vary
6er- group to group. Skin color, for instance,is apparently
ive a more salient sttribute in the United State.sthan in
tbe Hong Kong (Morland, 1969); whereas language
ions seernsto bean especiallysalientdimension ofseDarate
in or identity in Rench Canada, Wates, and B jgium
Dan (seeGiles & Powesland, 1976;Fishman A Giles, in
pr€ss).Third, in-groupsdo Dotcomparethemselves
?.tgr- with cvery cognitively available out_group:the out-
)ugh group must be perceived as a rclevant comparison
utes group. Similarity, proximity, and situational sa-
sons lience are among the variables that detcrmine out-
rr1es- group comparability, and pressurestoward in_group
lm- distinctivenessshould increaseas a function of thii
comparability. It is important to state at rhis point
rcti- ttlat, in many social situations, comparability reaches
a much wider range than a simply cooceived..simi_
tain ladty " bctwe€nthe goups.
The aim of differentiation is to maintail or
arge acldevesup€riority over an out-gmupon somedimen_
rade sroos.Ary suchact, th€refore, is essentiallycompai_
ups: tive. This conpetition requinesa situation of mutual
$cn- comparisonand diffcrentiation on a sharcdvalue di-
m€trsion. In theseconditions, intcrgroup ompctition
, being due not to conflict over monetarygains, but to ,
indi- wtuch may bc uDrelatcdto thc . .objectivc' ' goal rela_
roup tions bctwc€a the groups, catr bc pledic{cd to occur.
0r to Timer (1975) has disringuishedberwe€nsocial and
.. instsumental,or ..realistic, " competition. The former
iures r3 motivated by self-evaluation and takes place
An lntegrativeTheoryof lntergroup Conflict
41
throughsocialcomparison,whercasthe latter is based
on "realistic" self-intdest and representsembryonic
conflict. lncompatiblegroup goali are necessary
for
rcalisticcompetition,but mutualintergroupcompari_
sons are neccssary,and often sufficient, for social
competition.The latter point is consistentwith the
data from "minimal" group experimenbtlnt mere
awarenessof an out-group is sufficient to stimu-
late in-group favoritism, and the observations(Fer_
guson& Kelley, 1964;Rabbie& Wi.lkens,l97l;
Doise & Weinberger, 1973) ttrat the possiUi ty oi
social comparisongenera0es.,spontaneous,,inter_
group competition.
Socialandrealistic competition alsodiffer in the
predictionsthat can be made about lhe @nseouenc€s
for subsequent intergroupbehaviorof winninjor los_
ing.
realistic competition, the losing groups
-After_
shouldbe hostileto the out-groupvicton, UotfrUe,-\
cause they have been deprived of a reward andJ
becausetheir interactionhasbeenexclusively conllic_
tual. However, when winning and tosing establish
shared group evaluations concerning comparative
superiority and inferiority, then, so long as rhe terlr
of the competitionare perceivedaslegitimate and the
competitioniBelf as fair accordingto theselegitimate
teflns, the losing goup may acquiescein the superior-
ity of the winning out-group. This acquiescenccby a
group consideringi$elf aslegitimately . .inferior ,, has
been shown in a rccent study by Caddick (1924).
Severalother strdies reoort findings that arc in line
wilh this interpretation: losing in-groups do not al-
ways d€rogate,but sometimesupgrade,their cvalua_
tions of the wirming out-groups(tbr example, Wilson
& Miller, 196l; Bass& Dunteman,1963).
Retrosp€ctively, at least, the social_idetrtitv/
social-compar.ison theory is consistent with manv of
the studiesmentionedin tbe preccding seaion ofihi{-)
chapter.Itr partiorlar, in thc paradigm of the ..miiri_V
nul group" experinenb (such asTajfel et aJ.,lyll\,
&e intergoup discrimination can be conccivcd as
differcntiations basedon camparisonsmadein terms:
of moneta4rrcwards. Money firnctioned as a dimcn_
sion of comparison(the only one available within the
experimentaldesign), and the data suggestthat larger .
absolute gains that did not €stablish a differelcc in
42 ChapEr3
favor of the in-group werc sacrificedfor smallercom-
parativegains, whenthe two kinds of gainsweremade
to conflict.
There is further evidence Cfurner, in press-a)
that the social-competitive pattern of intergroup
behavior holds even when it conflicts with obvious
self-interest. In this study, the distribution of either
monelar5/rcwards or "points " was made, within the
''minirnal" intergroupparadigm,
betwe€dselfandan
anonymous"other," who waseitherin the in-group
or in &e out-group.As long as minimal conditions
existed for in-group identification, the subjectswere
preparedto give relatively lessto themselveswhenthe
award(eitherin points or in money) wasto be divided
betwecn self and an anonJ.mousmember of the il-
group, ascomparedwith dividing with an anonymous
memberofthe out-group. Theseresultsseemparticu-
larly important, since the categoryof "self, " which
is by no means "minimaf" or ad hoc, was set herc
against a tuly minimal in-gmup category, identical
to those used in the earlier experiments. Despite
this stark asymmetry, the minimal gmup affiliadon
affectedthe responses.
The theoretical predictions were taken outside
of the minimal categorizationpdadigm in a further
study by Turner (in press-b). He used face-to-face
groupsworking on a disclssion task. In eac.hsession,
two thre€-persongroups discussedan identical issue,
supposcdlyto gain an assessment of thefuverbal intel-
ligence; and then briefly comparedtheir respective
performance. The subjects were lM male under-
graduatcs.The criterion for intergroup differentiation
was the magnitude of in-group bias shown in the
ratingsof thegoups' work. llalf &retriads, composed
of Arts students, believed that verbal intelligence was
importart for them (High Importance, or H.I.); half,
composedof Sciencestudents,did not (Low Impor-
tance,or L.I.). Half thesessions involvedtwo Arts or
two Sciencegroups (Similar Outgroup), and half in-
volved one Arts and one Sciencc group (Dissimilar
Outgoup). Finatly, in rhe Stable Differencr cord!
tion, subjectswerc instructedthat Arts stsdens were
defnitely sup€riorand Sciencestudentsdefinitely in-
ferior in verbal intelligencc; in the Unstable Differ-
ence condition, therc was no explicit statementihat
one c€tegory was better than the other. These vari-
ablesweremanipulateAin a2xzxz factorial design.
The resultsshowedthat the Afis goups (H.I.)
weremore biasedthan the Sciencegroups(L:I.); that
similar gmups differentiated more than dissimilar
gI
49l9_9!gs9qano_!9m9gmgleventessso) m the Un_
stab& cogrtjgg and ttrat, onl6frE-6fthdFddlFs,
therewasa signihaantmaineffectfor out-groupsimi- t
larity: in-groupbias increasedagainsta similar out- /
group-Although thesedata are relativelycomplex,/
they do supportsomeof our theoreticalexpectationsfl
andprovidean illustation thatvariationsin in-groupr
bias can be systematically predicted from lhe
social-identity/social-comparison thmry.
We havearguedthat social andrealistic compe-
tition are conceptualy distinct, although most often
they are empirically associatedin "real life." In an
expaiment by Tumer and Brown (1976), an attempt
was madeto isolatethe effectson intergroup behavior
of the postrlatedautonomouspro@ssesattributedto a
searchfor positive socialidentity. Ctrildren were used
as subjects,and the manipulationsinvolved decisions
by the subjectsaboutthe distributiotr of paymentsfor
participation in the experiment,to be sharedequally
by the in-group, betweenthe in-group and out-grcups
that were made rclevant or irelevant to compari-
sonswith the in-group's performance.Monetary self-
interest (of a magtritudeprcviously asc€rtainedto be
of genuine significance to the subjec6) would have
produced no difference in the distribution decisions
involving the two kinds of out-group; it would also
have led to decisionstending toward maximum in-
group profit (M.I.P.) ratherthan toward maximum
difference(M.D,).
M.D. was the most influential strategy in the
choices.Furthermore, whenthesubjecbcouldchoose
in-groupfavoritism(M.D. +M.I.P.) and/ora fairness
strategy,they wereboth morc discriminatory andless
fair towardtherclevantlhan the irrelevantcomparison
group. Other measuresof in-group favoritism pro-
ducedan interactionbetweenrcward level and typc of
out-group: more discrimination against the relevant
than thc irrelevant goup with bigh revarG, and l€ss
with low rewards. Whatev€f,may be other explaft-
tions for this interaction,we can at lcast concludethat
when reward levels are morc meaningful, in-group
favoritism is cnhanccd against a more comparable
out-group, independendyof the group members'eco-

nomic interests.Indeed, insofar as the subiectsused
the M.D. strategy,they sacrific€d..objectivc" per-
sonaland group gain for the sakeof positive in_grbup
distinctiveacss.
On the whole, these studi€s provide some
confirmation for the basic social_identity/social_
comparison hypotheses. We shall now attemDt to
apply this analysisto somgofthe problemsraisedin
theeadier sectionsof this chapter.
STATUS H I ERARCHI ES AN D SOCIALC HAN GE
The r€conc€ptualization of social status at-
temptede{rlier in this chapterneedsnow to be made
moreexplicit. Stafiisis not considercdhereas a scarce
resour€eor commodity, suchaspower or wealth: it is
the outcomc of intergroup comparison.It reflec8 a
group's relative position on some evaluative dimen_
sions of comparison. Low subjective statusdo€s not
prcmoteint€rgmup competitiondircctly; its effects on
int€rgroup behavior are mediated by iocial identity
processes.The lower is a group's subjective status
positionin rclationlo relevatrtcomparison
groups,the
lcss is the conribution it can makl to posltiveiocial
identity. Thevadery ofreactions to negadveor threat-
ened social idendty to be discussedbelow are an
elaboration of the principles outlined earlier in this
chapt€r.
l. In4ividual MobrTrry.The morean individual
approachesthe structureof beliefs(mostofrcn socially
slnred) desoibed in the Introduction to this chapter
as
that of ''social mobility, " the more it is likety that
-his he
will ry to leave, or dissociatehimself froln,
".rr
yll:.etllp. This usualty implies anempts,on an
ndividual basis,to achieveupwardsocialmobility,
to
fuq a.Iower- to r higher-statusgroup. ln a
P*
rour--goup hicrarchy, G. F. Ross (1975) fodd
a di_
rcd. linear relationship betwcetr tow statJs
and the
oes[ie to passupwardsinto anothergroup. Many
ear_
licr studies rcport the cxistencc of itong for&
for
upwad social movement in status hierarchies.
Ten-
denciesto dissociateonesclf psychologically
from
reuow membersof low-prestigecategories
are lqown
maDyoj us from everyday erperience; they
lo- have
oeon notedmoresystematically by Jahoda(196l) and
A.lheb€f,8and Zavalloni (1969), among
others,and
An lntegrativeTheoryol lnteercup @nflict
49
indirectlyby rhe whole lireratureon racial
identifica_
tion and prefer€nce. The most important
f""tu." of
individualmobility is tiat thelow stahsof
one,sown
group is not thereby changed:it is an
individualist
approachdesigned,at least in the shortrun, to achieve
a personal,not a group, solution. Thus, individual
mobility irnpliesa disidentificationwith the erstwhile
in-group.
Z
.l:r\lCreativity. The group membersmay
, positive
seet distinctivenessfor the in-groupby rede_
f.ning or altering the elements of thi comparative
situation. This need not involve any changi
in the
group's ectual social position o( accessto
objective
resourcesin relation to the out-group. It is a group
rather than an individualistic .fut"gy thut
_.y
focus upon:
(a) C-omparingthein-group to thc outgroup
on
somc-new dimension.Lemaine(1966)found, for
ex_
ample, that childrcn'sgroupswhich could not com_
pare themselvesfavorably with othen in
terms of
constructing a hut--because they had be€n
assisned
poorcr building rnaterialslhatr the ouGg-up_t
id"d
seekout oth€r dimensionsof compaison invotvine
. ,-to
new consfructionsin the hut's surroundings.
ThJ
problems that obviously arise here are dose of
legitimizing the valuc assigned to the new
social
produc6-f[st in the in-group and then in
the other
groups involved. To the extentthat this legitimization
maythreatentheout-group'ssuperiordistinctiveness.
an increasein intergroup tensioncanbe predict€d.
(b! Changing the valuesassignedro the
. attri-
butes of the group, so that comparisonswhich.
were
eS,evUystl negative are now perceived as positivc.
rne chsslc exampleis .,Black is beautiful.,,
The
salient dirnension---skin color_remains tfie
same,
bur the prevailing value syst€m conceming
it is
andr€verscd.The sameproccssmay undertie
:Je:y
Peabody's(1968) fnding that even when various
groupsagr€cabouttheir rospcctivecharacteristics
, the
trait is evaluatedmore positively by the group
rhat
possessesit.
(c) Changing the ou-Broup (or selectin*
the
out-g_roup)with which the in_groupis comparei_in
particul4r, ceasingor avoidhg to usethe iigh_status
our-group as a comparativc
Jrame of relerence.
rynerecornparisons are not madewith thehigh_status
 44 ChapEr3
out-grcup, the relevant inferiority should decreasein
salience,and self-esteemshouldrecover.Hyman's
(1942)classicpaperon the psychologyof statussug-
gestedthat discontentamong low-satus-group mem-
bexsis lessenedto the degreehat intaclass ratherthan
intergroup comparisons are made. More recently,
Rosenbergand Simmons (1972) found that self-
esteem was higher among Blacts rylo made self-
comparisonswith other Blackggther than Whites.
Other work also suggests(seeI. Kae,, 1964;Lefcourt
& Ladwig, 1965)that,in certaincircumstances, Black
performancewas adversely affected by the low self-
esteeminducedby the presenceof the membersof the
dominantout-group. It follows that self-este€mcanbe
enhanced by comparing with other lower-sanrs
groupsrather than with thoseof higher sbnrs. This is
consistentwith the fact that competitionbetweensub-
ordinate groups is sometimcs morc intensethan be-
twe€n subordinateand dominant groups-hence, for
example,lower-classor "poor white" racism.
3. Social Competition. The group members
may seekpositive distinctivenessthroughdirect com-
petition with the out-group. They may try to revcrse
therelative positionsof the in- groupandthe out-group
on salient dimensions. To the degreethat this may
involve comparisonsrelated to the social structure, it
implies changesin the groups' objective social loca-
tions. We can hypothesize, therefore, following the
R.C.T., that this stategy will generateconflict and
antagonism between subordinate and dominant
groups insofar as it focuseson the distibution of
scarceresourc€s.Data relevant to this strategy have
beenreferredto earlier in this chapter.
lrt us assumeas an ideal casesomestratifica-
tion of social groups in which the social hierarchy is
reasonablyconelated with an unequaldivision of ob.
jective resourcesand a correspondingstatus system
(basedon tle outcomesof comparisonsin t€rms of
thoseresources).Under what conditions will this nrt
lead to intergroup conflict----or,more precisely, to the
developmentof competitive ethnoceutrismon the part
of the subordinategroup?
First, to the extent that the obieaive and the
subjeEiild prohibitions to "passing"- are weak (see
our earlierdisclssionof the "social rnobility" stuc-
c)o,tn"
ture of beliefs), low status may tend, in conditions of
unsatisfaclory social identity, to prcmote the wide-
spreadadoptionof individual mobility strategies, or at
least initial attempGto makeuse of thesestrategies.
Insofar as individual mobility implies disidenrifica-
tion, it will tend to loosen the cohesivenessof the
subordinategroup. This weakeningof subjective ar
tadlment to the in-groupamongits memberswill tend:
(a) to blur the perceptionof distinct group interests
correspondingto the distinct group identity; and (b) to
createobstaclesto mobilizing group membersfor col-
lectiveactionov€t their commoninterests.Thus. the
low morale that follows from negativesocial identity
can set in motion disintegrativeprocessesthat, in the
long run, may hirder a changein the group status.
Second,assumingthat the barrie$ (objective,
mordfil'iEeological lrohibitions) to leavingone's
grcup arc strong, unsatisfactorysocial identity may
stimulate social creativity that tends to reduce the
salietrc€of the subordinate/dominant groupconflict of
int€rest. Stategy 2{c) mentionedaboveis likely to be
crucial hcf,esinc!, in general,accessto r€sourcessuch
as housing,jobs, income,or educationis sufliciently
cetrtral to the fate of any group that the relevantcom-
parisons are not easily changed or devalued. Few
underprivileged groups would accept poverg/ as a
virtue, but it may appearmorc tolerable to the de-
gee lhat comparisonsare made wilh even poorcr
groups rather than with thosc drat are better off (see
Runciman.1966).
As notedabove,somewriters(Festinger,1954;
Kidder & Stewart,1975)imply that sFategy2(c) is a
dominant response to status differences between
groups. The assumptionis that intergroupcomparabil-
ity decreases asa directfunctionof perceiveddissimi-
ladty. If this were the whole story, then, somewhat
paradoxically, lhe creaiionof a consensualstatussys-
tem would protectsocial identity froin invidious com-
parisons.The causalsequenceworild bc as follows:
similar groupscomparewith cachotheq he outcome
dercrmincstheir relativeprestige;the perceivedstatus
difference r€duces their .similarity and hence com-
parability; intergroup comparisonsceasbto be made;
subjective superiority and inferiority decreasein sa-
lience; mrrespondingly, the groups' respectiveself-
este€msretlm to theL original point. There may be
occasionswhen this social-psychologicalrecipe for
the maintenanceof the statusquo can be obeervedin
 An lnEgrative Theoryof tnteryroup Conflict

somethinglike its pureform. However,we shall areue tions 8re p€rc€ivedas immuable, a part
prescntlythat thereare manyshtus diffcrencesdraido of the fixed
order of things, then social identity is
not reducecomparability. secure..Itbe_
comes inseclre when the existing state
For the moment, we can note that bodr indi- of affairs be_
b be.erystio1ed.An important coroltary
vidual mobility and someforms of socialcreativity llm to this
argumentis that the dominant or high_status
can work to r€duce intergroup conflict over scarce groups,
too, can experienceinsecuresocia
resourc€s-though with different implications. The iOentit!. eny
former is destructiverf subordinate-groupsolidarity gT., . dt. superior
9i"!i":,jvely position
,rl groui,
lmpt.iesa polential loss of positivecomparisoniani
andprovides no antidoteto.negativesocial identiw at posslble negative comparisons,which
grolp level, The lattermayrestorcor creat!a posiive must be
guarded against. Sudr a threat may
self-imagebut, it can be surmised,at thepriceeidrer derive from the
a:qvjry of rhe low-statusgroup or from
of a collective repressionof objectivc deprivation or, a conflict
*".high_sratus. gmup,s own value sysrem
perhaps_, of spuriousrivalry with someotherdeprived :1Tn
(lor rhe sociopoliticalmorality) ani he
group.Ilis in tlds context that :nmple,
actual foundationsof its sup€riority. Like low_status
Canadians,
groups,the high-statusgroupswill react
more to insecue
social by searchingfor enhancedgroup
(see _idetrtity
q$uncuveness -
In brief, then, it is tue that clear_cut
By revming the conditions underwhich social sta s
. maf ro a quiesc€ntsocial sysremin
stratificatioo do€snot produceintergroupconflict, we !ifl11ence1. .leaa
whrch neitter the ..inferior', nor the .,superior,,
c:n hypothesiz€that negativesocial identity promotes
groupswill showmuchethnocentism.But
subordinategroup competitivenesstoward the dom_ this ..ideal
type" situation must be consideredin relation
tnatrt group to the degre€that (a) subjective to tre
iden- p€rc€ivedshbility and tegitinacy of the
ufi:1tr:l wi_rhrhe subordinaregroup is mainrained; system.per_
c€tvd luegittmacy and7orinstability provide
alld O) the dominart group continuesor beginsto new di_
be mensionsof comparability Oat aredirectly
a relevant comparisonFoup. As a grear relevantto
fTi:"d I me atutudes and belravior of the social groups
deal of work has becn done in social psycholog-y in-
on volved, whatevertheir positionin dresystem..ibis
the determinantsof cohesivcnessand loyalty iirhin is
th€social-psychologicalcouDterpart!o what is
groups,we shall conc€ntrateon the seconi widely
condition. known today as .,the revolutionof rising expecta-
let us consider a comparison betwe€ntwo
foofball tions. ' ' Providing that individual mobitity is unavail_
teamsthat have come first and secondin their
league, able or undesirable,consensualinferiority wilG
respectively. There is no argumentabout wh.ich
bas rcjected rnostfapidly when the situation is perceived
the bigher stafirs, but alternative corparativc
out- botr u:srabl-e. illegitimate. This is'prcbabiy
cojncswere 8nd, h the futue, still will be possible. T Td
lynen the new seasonbegins,the teams the s€t of conditions underlying the devilopncnt
wh be as ot ethnocentrism among Black Americans,
comparatle and competitive as they hadbeen French
bcfore. Lanadrans,and New Zaland Maoris, for
rn |hrs rnshnc€, tle saoJs differencc instance.
does not re_ V.aughan(in prcss) reporb that the perceivcd
ducc-the meaningfulnessof comparisons feas!
becausei, Durry ot social change (probably including,
can be changed. in this
usr'4c€, tbc pcrccivcd illegitimacy of thi prcscnt
This cxampleilusbares Tajfel,s (1974a)distinc-
-. .
uon Dctwe€nsecrra andirsrcure itrle{group i, an important pt€dictor of fte deveJoping'
compari- lltual*).
Maori cftnocentrism; N. Friedman (1969)
sons.fte crudilEid?G-6-G?Ftinction ariui
is whcther *F1 wc nry tenn the ..cognitive alteiaa_
c:g:*-:h?natives to rhe actual ourcomc arc 9il
avarraDtg-wh€thtr other outcomes tive" of Black nationalism in the de-vclopingcoun_
arc conccivable. dT
Jtatus diffe(ences betwccn social groups ,*". influentiat in cnhancingBlack Aierican
in social socialidentitv.
s)ttcms showitrg various degrecs
of stradficationcan On the other hand, wher the dominantgrcup
oe oEttnguishedin the sameway. Whcrc _ or
statusrrla_ seclionsof it perceive their superiority as teg'itir;b,
46 Chapter3
they will pmbably react in an intenselydiscriminatory
fashion to any attempt by the subordinaF group to
changethe intergroupsituation. Suchpedrapswasthe
post-bellum sinration in the Southern United States:
the Whites, threatenedby those who had been their
slaves, rapidly abandoned their Patemalistic ste-
"childlike" in favor of
reotypesof the Blacks as
openly hostile and derogaory ones (see Van der
Berghe, 1967). The reactionsof illegitimately su-
perior'groups arc more complex (I\rmer & Brown,
1976). It se€msthat conflicts of valuesarereducedby
greaterdiscriminationwhensuperiority is assued, but
by lessdiscrimination whenit is unstable.This calls to
mind somePrisonerDilemma surdiesin which White
discrimination againstBlack opponentsincreasedthe
more cooperativewasthe opponent,but decreasedthe
more comptitive he was (Baxter, 1973; Cederblom
& Dien, 19?0). Baxter suggestedin the tide of his
")
article ("Prejudiced Liberals? that a conflict of
valuesmay underliehis data.
Many of the points and hypotheseswe have
advancedin this chapter are not, in thernselves' new
(see,for instance,M. Sherif,1966;Runciman,1966;
Milner, l9?5; Billig, L976).What is trew,we think,
is the integration of the three processesof social
categorization, self-evaluation through social iden-
tity, and inte{grcup social comparison,into a coher-
ent and testable framework for contributing to the
explanationof various forms of intergroup behavior,
social conllict, and social change. This framework
contains possibilities of further development, and,
to this extent, we hope that it may stimulate theo-
retically dirccted researchin areasthat haYenot be€n
consideredhere.
But some cautionarypoins should be made.
The equation of social competition and intergroup
conflict madeaboverestson thc assumptionsconc€rn-
ing an "ideal O?e" of sociat statification in which
the salientdimensions of intergrouPdiff€rentiation are
those involving scarceresources.In this resPect,we
have simply bonowed the central tenet of the R.C.T.
Thcre is no reason,in fact, to assumethat intergroup
diffe.rentiationis inhcrently conflictual. Some of the
experimentalwork that is proceedingat pr€scntat the
University of Bristol points to the conclusion that
eyaluativederogationof an out-group is conceptually
and empiricallydistinctfrom out-grouphostility. On
the otherhand, social-identityprocessesmay provide
a sourceofintef,groupconflict (in additionto the cases
outlined above)to the degee that the groups develop
conflicting interestswith respectto themaintenanceof
the comparativesituation asa whole. It seemsplausi-
ble to hypothesizethat, when a group's action for
positivedistinctiveness is frustrated,impeded,or in
any way activelypreventedby an out-group,this will
promote overt conflict and hostility between the
groups.This prediction,like many others, still re-
mainsto be tested.
"O BJECTIVE' AN D'SU BJ ECTIVE"
CONFLICIS
None of the argumentsoutlined in this chapt€r
must be understoodas implying.that the social-
psychological or "subjective" t)?e of conflict is
being consideredherc as having priority or a more
important causal function in social rcality than the
"objective'' determinantsof social conflict of which
the basic analysismust be soughtin the social, eco- ,
nomic, political, and hisorical strucnrresof a soci-
ety. The major aim of the presentdiscussionhasbe€n
to determine what arc the points of insertion of
social-psychologicalvariablesinto the causal spiral;
and its argumenthas becn that, just as the effects of
thcsevariablesare powerfully determinedby the pre-
vious social, economic,and political pmc€sses,so
they may also acquire, in turn, an autonomousfunc-
tion that enablesthem to deflect in one direction or
anotherthesubsequentfunctioningof theseprocesses.
It is rle-adyimpossible itr most natural social
situations to distinguish betweendiscriminatory in-
tergroup behavior based on real or perceived con-
flict of "objective" interests betwe€n the gmups
and disgimination based on attempts to establish
a positively-valued distinctivene,ssfor one's own
group. However, as wc have argued,the two can be
distinguishedtheoretically, since the goals of actions
aimed at the achievementof positively-valued in-
group distinctivenessoften relain no value outside of
the context of intergrouPcomparisons.An examPle
would be a group that does not necessarilywish to
increasethelevel of its own salariesbut actsto prevent
other groupsfrom getting nearerto Ois level so that

differentialsarenot eroded. B ut the difficulty w ith this
example---aswith many other similar examples-is
that, in this case,the preservationof salary differen-
tials is probably associatedwith all kinds of "objec-
tive" advantagesthat cannot be defined in terms of
moneyalone. In turn, .rone of theseadvantageswill
againmakesCSg only in lte comparativeframework
of intergroup -ompetition. Despite this confusing
network of mutual feedbacks and interactions. the
distinctions made here are important becausethey
help us to understandsome aspccb of int€rgroup be-
havior which haveoften beenneglectedin the past.
A fifther distinction must be made betwe€n
"explicit" and "implicit" conflicts-a
distinction
that has to do with objectivity in a different way. A
conflict can be "objective" despite the fact that the
goalsthe groupsare aiming for haveno valueoutside
of the contq(t of intergoup comparison. This is so
when the conflict is instiqrdonalized and legitimized
by rules and Dofms, whatev€r their origin, that are
acccptedby the groups involved. This was the casein
Sherif's studi€sin their phaseof competition betwecn
lhe groups;andit alsois the casein any footbau match
atrd in countlessoth€r social activities. The behavior
toward out-groupsin this kind of cotrflict can be clas-
sificd, in tum, into two categori€s,one of which can
bc rcfcrre;d to I instrununtal and the other as
noninstrumental.The instrumental category consists
of all thoseactioDswhoseexplicit aim can be directly
rclated to crusing the group to win the competition.
Thc noninstrumcntatcategory, which could be re-
ferred to as "gratuitous" discrimination against the
out-goup, includes the creation of negativc stereo-
An lntegntive Theoryof tntergroup Conflict 47
types and all other aspects of the ..irrelevant"
in-group/out-groupdifferentiationsso well described,
for example, in Sherift s[rdies. The fmt categoryof
actions is both commonsensicallyand theoretically
ac@untedfor by assumingnothing more than the
group's desire to win the competition-altfrough this
posesall the theoretical"comparison" problemsdis-
cussedin this chapter;the secondcategoryof actions
can be directly and parsimoniously accountedfor in
terms of the social-comparison-social-identity_
positiveingoupdistinctivenesssequencedescribed
here.
The "implicit" conflicb are tlose that can be
shown to exist despite the absenceof explicit in-
stitutionalization or even an informal normative ac-
c€ptanc€of their existenceby the groups involved.
The proof of their existenceis to be found in the large
number of studies (and also everydayoccurrencesin
" teal life')
in which diff€rentiations of all kinds are
madebetweengroups by their membersalthough, on
the face of it, there are no "r€asons" for thesedif-
ferentiations to occur. Clear examplesof this have
been provided in several studies mentionod in this
chapt€r in which the intoduction by the subjecn of
various intergroup differentiationsdirectly decreased
the "objective" rewards that could otherwisc have
been gained by the in-group, or evendirectly by the
individual. Findings of this kind, which can be
generalizedwidely to many natural social situations,
provide a clear example of the n€edto introduc€into
the complex spiral of social causation the social-
psychological variabtes of the ..rclational " and
"cornparative "
kind discussedin this chapter.