T19R

4TH RMLNLU-SCC ONLINE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA LAW MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
BEFORE
THE HONOURABLE SUPREME COURT OF UPARGANJ
AT UPARGANJ
UNDER 139(A) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UPARGANJ READ WITH ORDER XL RULE 5 OF THE
SUPREME COURT RULES, 2013
WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO__/2020 (UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF

UPARGANJ)
MR. GALON KASRA…………………………………………………………….………….PETITIONER
v.
KINGDOM OF UPARGANJ………………………………………………………...……….RESPONDENT
&
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO__/2020 (UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UPARGANJ)
MR ASSARDEI JEDPARE………………………………………..………………………….PETITIONER
v.
KINGDOM OF UPARGANJ……………………………………………….………………...RESPONDENT
&
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO__/2020 (UNDER SECTION 397 OF CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE)
MR. GALON KASRA……………………………………………….……………………….PETITIONER
v.
KINGDOM OF UPARGANJ…………………………………...…………………………….RESPONDENT
&
SLP (CIVIL) NO__/2020 (UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UPARGANJ)
UPARGANJ NEWS NETWORK………………………………………………………………PETITIONER
v.
KINGDOM OF UPARGANJ…..…………………………………………………...…..…….RESPONDENT
&
SLP (CIVIL) NO__/2020 (UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UPARGANJ)
MR. GALON KASRA…………………………………………….………………………….PETITIONER
v.
KINGDOM OF UPARGANJ……………………………………….…………………..…….RESPONDENT
1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................ iv
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................... v
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ....................................................................................xii
STATEMENT OF FACTS ...................................................................................................xiii
ARGUMENTS PRESENTED............................................................................................... xv
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS .......................................................................................... xvi
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED .................................................................................................. 1
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FILED BY MR. GALON

KASRA IS MAINTAINABLE? .............................................................................................. 1
[1.1] That the essentials of maintaining Habeas corpus are not fulfilled ......................... 1
[1.2] That the seizure by police is valid ............................................................................. 1
[1.3] That there is no procedural violation ....................................................................... 2
[1.4] That it was court’s discretion to extend the detention period in interest of justice .. 2
2. WHETHER THE CHARGES FRAMED BY SESSION JUDGE COULD STAND IN

THE PRESENT CASE OR NOT? ......................................................................................... 3
[2.1]. That the deceased committed suicide as understood in law .................................... 3
[2.2]. That Maia is capable of standing trial in this case.................................................. 5
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON THE JOURNALIST,

BY THE SUPERINTENDENT OF HAMRAK PRISON, ARE REASONABLE? ......... 10
[3.1] That freedoms are subject to restrictions ............................................................... 11
[3.2] That the restrictions are reasonable under Article 19(2) ....................................... 11
[3.3]. That Restrictions are under the purview of Jail Manual ....................................... 13
[3.4]. That there is no contravention with Article 19 of I.C.C.P.R.................................. 14
ii
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER OF HIGH COURT TO CONDUCT FURTHER

PROCEEDINGS IN CAMERA, IS AN INFRINGEMENT OF THE CITIZEN’S
RIGHT TO KNOW AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS? ................................................. 15
[4.1.] That the High court has inherent power to conduct proceedings in camera. ....... 15
[4.2] That the Court has power to conduct proceedings in-camera for administration of
justice. .............................................................................................................................. 17
[4.3] That the freedom of speech and expression of press can be restricted................... 20
[4.4] That public and press does not have an absolute ‘right to know’ .......................... 20
PRAYER ..........................................................................................................................xxxviii
iii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AIR All India Reporter

ACHPR African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
ACHR American Convention on Human Rights
& And
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights
Ed. Edition
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ACHR American Convention on Human Rights
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nation
US Unites States of America
IO Investigating Officer
Cr P.C. Code of Criminal Procedure
CrLJ Criminal Law Journal
IPC Indian Penal Code
¶¶ PAGE
¶ Paragraph
r/w Read with
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
s. Section
v. Versus
iv
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
DOMESTIC CASES
S.NO BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION PAGE NO
1. ADM, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla, (1976) 2 S.C.C. 521. …1
2. Ankit Sharma and another v. State of (NCT of Delhi) and another, 2014
… 16
S.C.C. OnLine Del 3260.
3. Aruna Ramachandra Shanbuag v Union of India, (2011) 4 S.C.C. 454. …4
4. Attorney General v British Broadcasting Corporation, 1981 A.C. 303. … 20
5. Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar1997 (1) S.C.C. 283. …2
6. C. A. Thomas Master v Union of India, 2000 Cr.L.J. 3729 (Ker). …4
7. Chintaman Rao v. State of U.P., [1950] S.C.R. 759. … 12
8. Court On Its Own Motion v State And Others, 2008 S.C.C. OnLine Del
… 20
965.
9. Courts on its own motion v. Publisher, Times of India, Chandigarh.,
… 16
2013 S.C.C. OnLine P&H 6997.
10. Deepak Khosla v Union Of India & Ors.,2011 (182) D.L.T. 208. … 18
11. In re F. Vadivelu (1944) Mad. (685). …7
12. Gian Kaur vs. State of Punjab, (1996) 2 S.C.C. 648. …4
13. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, (1982) 457 U.S. 596. … 19
14. K. Raman v. Deputy Superintendent of Police National Investigation
…3
Agency Hyderabad and others, 2015 (1) M.L.J.(Crl.) 1.
15. Ishwar Singh v. State, 1993 (50) D.L.T. 428. …1
16. Janaki Ballav v. Bennet Coleman and Co. Ltd., A.I.R. 1989 Ori 225. … 18
17. Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1883. … 19
18. M. Hasan and Ors. v. Govt. of A.P. and Ors., A.I.R. 1998 A.P. 35. … 11
19. M.P.Lohia v. State of W.B. and another, (2005) 2 S.C.C. 686. … 17
20. Maganlal Jivabhai Patel v. Government of Bombay, A.I.R. 1953 BOM.
… 11
(40) 59.
21. Maruti Shripati Dubai v. State of MaharashtraI, 1987 Cr. L.J. 743. …4
22. Mohd. Shahabuddin v. State of Bihar, (2010) 4 S.C.C. 653. … 19
v
23. Naresh Shridhar Mirakjar & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr.,
… 15
A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1.
24. Nikhil Soni v. Union of India, 2015 Cr.L.J 4951. …4
25. Om Kumar and Ors. v. Union of India, (2001) 2 S.C.C. 386. … 12
26. P. Rathinam v. Union of India,(1994) 3 S.C.C. 394. …3
27. Prabha Dutt v. Union of India, (1982) 1 S.C.C. 1. … 10
28. Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration, (1980) 3 S.C.C. 526. …1
29. R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N, (1994) 6 S.C.C. 632. … 18
30. Rajinder Singh Katoch v. Chandigarh Administration and others, 2007
…2
(10) S.C.C. 69.
31. Ram Avtar Shukla v. Arvind Shukla, 1995 Supp (2) S.C.C. 130. … 19
32. Ramji Lal v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 620. … 11
33. Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 5
… 17
S.C.C. 294.
34. Rao Harnarain v. Gumori Ram, A.I.R. 1958 (Punj) 273. … 18
35. Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd. v. Proprietors of Indian Express
… 18
Newspapers Bombay (P) Ltd, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 190.
36. Ruben Banerjee v. State of Orissa, (2000) 90 C.L.T. 127. … 11
37. S. Inbaraj v. The Superintendent of Police, 2014 S.C.C. OnLine Mad.
…2
9363.
38. Saroj Iyer and Anr. v. Maharashtra Medical Of Indian, A.I.R. 2002
… 18
Bom 97.
39. Saurabh Kumar v Jailor, Koneila Jail and another (2014) 13 S.C.C.
…2
436.
40. Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Govt. of India v.
… 20
Cricket Association of Bengal, (1995) 2 S.C.C. 161.
41. Sewak Ram Sobhani v. R. K. Karanjia, 1981 Indlaw S.C. 14. … 10
42. Shamim Rehmaney v. Zinat Kausar Dehalvi and Ors., 1971 Cr.L.J.
… 17
1586.
43. Sheela Barse v. State of Maharshtra, (1987) 4 S.C.C. 373. … 13
44. Sidhartha Vashisht @ Manu Sharma v State, (2010) 6 S.C.C. 1. … 17, 20
45. Some Bhai v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1453. …2
vi
46. State of Maharashtra v. Tapas D. Neogy, (1999) 7 S.C.C. 685. …1

47. State Of Maharashtra v. Rajendra Jawnmal Gandhi, (1997) 8 S.C.C.
… 17
386.
48. State Of U.P v. Raj Narain & Ors, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 865. … 20
49. State of U.P. v. P.A. Madhu, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1523. …2
50. State v. Editor etc. of Matrubhumi, A.I.R. 1955 Ori 36. … 19
51. State v. Radhagobinda, A.I.R. 1954 Ori 1. … 19
52. Stonham v Legislative Assembly (No 1) 1999) 90 I.R 325. … 17
53. Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh v. Ram Manohar Lohia,
… 11
A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 633.
54. Surya Prakash Khatri v. Madhu Trehan, 2001(92) D.L.T. 665. … 14
55. Tapinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 1971 (1) S.C.R. 599. … 02
56. Thalappalam Ser. Coop.Bank Ltd and Ors v. State of Kerala & Ors,
… 20
(2013) 16 S.C.C 82.
57. Vineet Narain v. Union of India, (1998) 1 S.C.C. 226. … 16
INTERNATIONAL CASES
58. Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 268 (2000). … 08
59. In re Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d 790 … 05
60. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261. … 04
61. Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835. … 15
62. Heilman v. Commonwealth, 84 Ky. 457 (1886). … 09
63. Little v. State, 554 S.W.2d 312 (Ark. 1977). … 09
64. Moosbrugger v. Moosbrugger, (1912-13) 29 T.L.R. 658. … 15
65. Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539 (1976). … 17
66. Pell v. Procunier, 1974 W.L. 185930 (U.S.). … 11
67. Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
… 12
(1972).
68. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396. … 12
69. Ralli v. Troop, 157 U.S. 386 (1895). … 07
70. Saxbe v. The Washington Post Co., 1974 W.L. 186235 (U.S.). … 11
71. Scott v. Scott, [1913] 1 A.C. 417. … 16
vii
72. Sheppard v. Maxwell 1966 U.S. LEXIS 1413. … 13

73. Silver v. United Kingdom, 5 E.H.R.R. 347 (1983). … 14
74. State v. Rico Webb, 144 So.3d 971, 2013-1681 (La. 5/7/14). … 11
75. State v. Sargent, 594 A.2d 401 (Vt. 1991) . … 08
76. Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir, 589 So.2d 474 (La.1991). … 11
77. The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2 E.H.R.R. 245 (1979). … 14
78. Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424 (1902). … 07
79. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998). … 06
80. United States v. Mackie, 65 M.J. 762 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2007). … 09
81. United States v. Randolph, 93 F.3d 656, 661 (9th Cir. 1996). … 08
82. Waterloo Distilling Corporation v. United States, 282 U.S. 577 (1931). … 06
83. Washington Post Co. v. Kleindienst, 357 F.Supp. 779. … 12
84. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2258. … 05
85. Yarish v. Nelson 27 1972 Cal. App. LEXIS 901. … 13
SECONDARY MATERIAL: ARTICLES

A Pleasant Surprise: The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict Has Both
1. Succeeded in Its Own Right and Successfully Preserved the Traditional … 10

Role of the Insanity Defense 943 (1987).
A. M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 59 Mind 433
2. … 08
(1950).
B. B. Sendor, Crime as Communication: An Interpretive Theory of the
3. Insanity Defense and the Mental Elements of Crime, 74 GEO. … 09

L.J. 1371 (1986).
Frederick J. Ludwig, Rationale of Responsibility for Young Offenders,
4. 29 NEB. L. REV. 521 (1950). See also In re Tyvonne, 558 A.2d 661, … 09
666 (Conn. 1989).
Gabriel Hallevy, The Criminal Liability of Artificial Intelligence
5. … 09
Entities, (February 15, 2010).
6. John Searle, Is the Brain's Mind a Computer Program? 27 (1990). … 07

7. Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law § 25.07 (5th ed. 2009) … 10
viii
Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood For Artificial Intelligences, 70

8. … 07
N.C. L. Rev. 1231.
Lynn A. Jansen & Daniel P. Sulmasy, Sedation, Alimentation,
9. Hydration, and Equivocation: Careful Conversation About Care at the … 05

End of Life, 136 Annals Internal Med. 845 (2002).
Margaret A. Boden, The Foundations Of Artificial Intelligence 108
10. … 08
(Derek Partridge & Yorick Wilks eds., 2006)
Michael Moore, Act And Crime: The Philosophy Of Action And Its
11. … 07
Implications For Criminal Law 156 (1993)
N.P. Padhy, Artificial Intelligence And Intelligent Systems 10 (Oxford
12. … 08
University Press 2005).
Norman L. Cantor & George C. Thomas III, The Legal Bounds of
13. … 04
Physician Conduct Hastening Death 97 (78 Buff. L. Rev. 2000).
Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational
14. … 06
Corporations 283 (1990).
Robert N. Wennberg, Terminal Choices: Euthanasia, Suicide, and the
15. … 04
Right to Die 33 (1989).
Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated View
16. … 06
943 (Cal. L. Rev.1999).
Tang Howe Hing & Musa Mailah, Simulator for Control of
17. Autonomous Nonholonomic Wheeled Robot, 8 J. OF APPLIED SCI. … 09

2534 (2008).
The Corporation as Commons: Rethinking Property Rights,
18. Governance and Sustainability in the Business Enterprise, 37 Queen's … 06

L.J. 339 (2012).
The Myth of Mens Rea for Defendants with Mental Retardation, 45
19. … 10
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1419 (2012).
20. Walter Harrison Hitchler, The Physical Element of Crime 39 (1934). … 07

21. William James, The Principles of Psychology (1890) … 08
CONVENTIONS
S.NO BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION
1. African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M.
ix
58 (1982).
2. American Convention on Human Rights, July 18, 1978, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
3. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 1948.
4. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
5. European Convention on Human Rights art. 6(1), Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
6. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9(1), Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
7. Rotunda & Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law 388 (1992).
8. U.S.C.A. Constitution Amendment VI. American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man, 1948.
9. UN Commission on Human Rights, The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and
Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
28 September 1984, E/CN.4/1985/4.
10. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art 10, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III).
SECONDARY MATERIAL: BOOKS

S.NO BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION
Andrew Nicol, Gavin Miller & Andrew Sharland, Media Law & Human Rights (2nd
1.
Ed. 2009).
2. Christian Koeing, Competition and Telecommunications Law (2nd Ed. 2009).
3. D D Basu, Constitution of India, (13th Ed. 2010).
4. Duncan Bloy & Sara Hadwin, Law and the Media (2nd Ed. 2013).
5. H M Seervai, Constitution of India, (4th Ed.).
6. Halsbury‟s Law of India (2nd Ed. 2014).
7. Halsbury‟s on Law of England (4th Ed.).
Henry Campbell Black, Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation of the
8.
Laws (2d Ed. 1911).
9. Hugo Deburgh, Investigative Journalism (2nd Ed. 2008).
10. Jerome Hall, General Principles Of Criminal Law 70-211 (2d ed. 2005).
11. Kaplan Webisbery Binder, Criminal Law, Cases & Materials, (4th Ed).
12. R. P Kathur, Supreme Court on Criminal Law, (8th Ed. 2014).
x
13. Ram Jethmalani, Cases and Materials on Media Law (2012).

14. Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, Code of Criminal Procedure, (20th Ed. 2016).
15. Rotunda & Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law 388 (1992).
16. Sarkar, Code of Criminal Procedure, (9th Ed. 2011).
17. Sarkar, Law of Evidence, (17th Ed. 2011).
18. Soonaval, Supreme Court Criminal Digest, (4th Ed. 2007).
Tom Welsh and Walter Greenwood, Mcnae’s Essential Law for Journalists (14th Ed.
19.
1997).
20. William M. Clark & William L. Marshall, LAW OF CRIMES (7th Ed. 1967).
LEGISLATIONS
S.NO NAME OF THE STATUES:
1. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act No. 2 of 1974).
2. The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act No. 45 of 1860).
3. The Constitution of India, 1950.
4. The Delhi Prisons Act, 2000 (Act No.2 of 2002).
5. The Delhi Prisons Rules.
6. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (Act No. 70 of 1971).
xi
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The respondent humbly submits to the jurisdiction of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of
Uparganj.
xii
STATEMENT OF FACTS
RELEVANT FACTS
I. The Kingdom of Uparganj is a Constitutional monarchy with a Westminster style Parliament.

In the year 2020, Dr Hadvin Ahtme, a renowned scientist of Uparganj, unveiled to the world,
Maia (Multi-faceted Artificial Intelligence Assistant), an android capable of performing all
the tasks that a human assistant is capable of. Maia was designed to look, sound and feel like
a human and has also passed the “Turing test” with flying colors.
II. One morning Dr. Hadvin Ahtme was found dead. She left an email in the inboxes of her
family members stating that- she was diagnosed with a terminal form of stomach cancer and
instead of prolonging her life through corrosive drugs; she has decided to take her own life in
a peaceful manner. She had instructed Maia to feed her with less food and water, until she
goes completely without food and water. Also, Maia did not allow the outside world to
interfere with Dr. Ahtme‟s decision. Dr. Ahtme vested Maia and all the Intellectual Property
Rights regarding Maia to her nephew, Galon Kasra. After this letter was made public, the
concerned Police Authorities of Uparganj, Ms Dyan Bell, began to make investigations and
took Maia into their custody as a part of investigation to verify correctness of Dr. Ahtme‟s
letter. Later Ms. Bell filed FIR and collected Maia as evidence, as part of investigation.
Subsequently, Galon Kasra filed a writ of Habeas Corpus in High Court against
Superintendent of Police, asking release of Maia to their custody. The High Court then
directed police authorities to detain Maia in prison and thereby Maia was moved from the
custody to police to the Hamrak Prison.
III. Meanwhile the ongoing investigation and developments in the case were covered in great
depth by the news media. A journalist of Uparganj News Network (UNN) approached the
Superintendent of Hamrak Prison seeking written permission to interview Maia in the jail
premises. The Superintendent of Hamrak Prison granted permission subject to the conditions-
not to ask any question that would undermine ongoing trial, not to violate any other law of
Uparganj and the footage of interview has to pre-approved by prison authorities. Mr. Jedpare
xiii
refused to abide by the conditions imposed and approached the High Court seeking Writ of
Certiorari, asking High Court to strike down the conditions and also to grant fresh permission
for conducting the interview.
IV. In the meantime, after completing investigation, the Uparganj police filed charge sheet with
the jurisdictional Sessions Judge. The Sessions Judge framed charges against Maia for
abetment of suicide under section 306 of the Uparganj Penal Code, punishable with
imprisonment up to ten years. Mr. Kasra challenged the order of sessions Judge by filing a
revision petition in the High Court claiming that- Dr. Ahtme did not committed suicide and
that Maia is incapable of understanding the trial. The High Court then directed police to
produce Maia before the Bench in the Court so that they can satisfy whether Maia can
understand trail in the case.
V. The Bench hearing the revision petition filed by Mr. Kasra received multiple applications
seeking permission for audio-video recording of the proceedings. Noting the possibility that
great inconvenience can be suffered by the court itself in conducting the proceedings, the
Bench dismissed the applications and directed all the proceedings of case where Maia was
present to be held in camera. U.N.N. then filed an S.L.P. before the Supreme Court asking
Supreme Court to set aside the order of the High Court for in camera proceedings. Separately
Mr. Kasra also filed S.L.P. challenging the orders of High Court for proceeding to be held in
camera.
VI. The Supreme Court of Uparganj directed that both the S.L.P. appeals should be heard
together. In addition, Supreme Court suo motu transferred to itself the pending habeas corpus
writ petition, the writ petition filed by Mr Jedpare, and the revision petition filed by Mr Kasra
as they all concerned the same set of facts and circumstances and therefore needed to be
decided in harmony, since important questions of law were raised. Now all these petitions
and appeals are tagged together for hearing by a five judge Bench of Supreme Court of
Uparjang.
xiv
ARGUMENTS PRESENTED
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FILED BY MR. GALON ASRA IS
MAINTAINABLE?
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CHARGES FRAMED BY SESSION JUDGE COULD STAND IN THE
PRESENT CASE?
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON THE JOURNALIST, BY THE

SUPERINTENDENT OF HAMRAK PRISON, ARE REASONABLE?
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER OF HIGH COURT TO CONDUCT FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN

CAMERA, IS AN INFRINGEMENT OF THE CITIZEN’S RIGHT TO KNOW AND FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS?
xv
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. THAT THE WRIT PETITION FILED BY MR. GALON KASRA IS NOT MAINTAINABLE AND
DETENTION IS IMPOSED AS PER THE PROCEDURE ESTABLISHED BY LAW.
It is humbly submitted that the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be issued against the Jail
Superintendant. This Writ can only be issued against a human. Maia is not a human being,
therefore, Maia does not qualify the basic essential of Hebeas Corpus. Detaining Maia under
S. 102 is according to the procedure established under Code of Criminal Procedure, and
hence, there is no procedural violation.
2. THAT MAIA IS CAPABLE OF STANDING TRIAL AND THERE WAS NO ERROR IN FRAMING
OF CHARGES BY THE SESSION JUDGE.
It is humbly submitted that the Sessions Judge did not commit any error while framing
charges against Maia. Respondents submit that Dr. Hadvin Ahtme committed suicide, as
understood in law, and Maia is capable of standing trial in this case. The act of Dr. Ahtme
falls within the definition of suicide as defined in the plethora of cases. No doubt, an attempt
to commit suicide has been decriminalized, but that does not establish a right to commit
suicide by a human. The act of Maia, in the present case, will fall into the ambit of assistive
suicide, which is not legal as according to the procedure established by law. Further, Maia is
capable of standing trial, as mens rea and actus reus are present. Since, Maia is not an infant
or unsound, Maia can stand a trial. Law has recognized criminal liability over person
incompetent to stand trial. Therefore, Maia should be prosecuted for the commission of the
offence and liability should be imposed accordingly.
xvi
3. THAT THE CONDITIONS IMPOSED, BY JAIL SUPERINTENDANT ON MR. ASSARDEI

JEDPARA FOR CONDUCTING INTERVIEW OF MAIA, ARE REASONABLE AND ARE IN
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.
It is humbly contended that the restrictions upon the interview of the prisoner are reasonable
and in accordance with law and the Constitution. The freedoms guaranteed under the
Constitution and various international covenants are not absolute and are subject to
reasonable restrictions. Such right has been reasonably restricted for the maintenance of
public order, and also satisfies the test of strict scrutiny. The restrictions are imposed, under
the provisions of the Jail manual, to protect from any prejudice which might arise in this case.
Further, there is no contravention to Article 19 of I.C.C.P.R which itself provides for the
restrictions to be imposed for the maintenance of public order.
4. THAT THE ORDER OF THE HIGH COURT, DENYING THE AUDIO-VIDEO RECORDING OF
THE PROCEEDINGS AND TO CONDUCT PROCEEDINGS IN-CAMERA, FALLS WITH THE
AMBIT OF REASONABLE RESTRICTIONS.
Respondent humbly submits that High Court has inherent power under sections 327 (1) and
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to hold proceedings in-camera, in order to secure the
ends of justice. The „Freedom of press and media‟ and „citizens right to know‟ is not
absolute, and can be restricted under Article 19 (2) of the Constitution. Also, various
International Conventions empower the Court to conduct proceedings in-camera for
administration of justice, as right of public hearing is not an absolute right. It is also the duty
of court to prevent the trial by media, as presumption of innocence, before conviction, is a
basic right of the accused.
xvii
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FILED BY

MR. GALON KASRA IS MAINTAINABLE?
1. Respondent humbly contends before this Honb‟le Supreme Court that writ petition of the
nature Habeas corpus filed by Mr. Galon Kasra does not fulfill the essentials of maintaining a
writ of habeas corpus [1.1.]. Seizure made by police against Maia is valid [1.2.] without
carrying out any procedural violation [1.3.]. Also, the Court has power to extend the period of
detention [1.4.] for the purpose of further investigation in the matter.
[1.1] THAT THE ESSENTIALS OF MAINTAINING HABEAS CORPUS ARE NOT FULFILLED
2. To maintain a writ petition of Habeas corpus, the foremost ingredient to be proved about
„personality‟. This writ can be issued for the protection of human liberty.1 This writ can be
sought if the cruelty is contrary to law and degrades human dignity to a degree that it violates
fundamental rights.2 However, these rights of a „human‟ shall not be a privilege bestowed on
to Maia, for the mere reason that Maia is not a human being. Therefore, the writ of Habeas
corpus is not maintainable.
[1.2] THAT THE SEIZURE BY POLICE IS VALID

3. Police can collect evidence as a part of investigation.3 A police officer has the power to seize
any property which may be found under circumstances creating suspicion of any offence.4
Pre-conditions for applicability of s. 102(1) are as follows; it must be 'property' and secondly,
in respect of the said property there must have suspicion of commission of any offence. 5 The
aforesaid section provides power to police officer to seize an animal as well.6 The Magistrate,
in such a case, will be competent to pass an order u/s. 451, Cr.P.C..
1
ADM, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla, (1976) 2 S.C.C. 521, ¶ 680; Ishwar Singh v. State, 1993 (50) D.L.T. 428,
¶ 15. See also, De Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action 462–4 (3d ed. 1973).
2
Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration, (1980) 3 S.C.C. 526, ¶ 19
3
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 § 2(h).
4
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 § 102.
5
State of Maharashtra v. Tapas D. Neogy, (1999) 7 S.C.C. 685, ¶ 8.
6
Panjrapole, Deodar and etc. v. Chakaram Moraj Nat, Maldhari and Another, 1998 Cr.L.J. 1337, ¶ 18.
1
4. Since, Maia is definitely not a human, must be treated as an object. 7 Therefore, detaining
Maia in the guise of „property‟ is valid. The e-mail sent through the deceased‟s e-mail id,8
and the results obtained from the detailed interrogation of Maia by Ms. Bell,9 created
suspicion for the commission of an offence. Arguendo, Maia is a person. Police Officer may
arrest a person, on account of credible information in committing a cognizable offence.10
[1.3] THAT THERE IS NO PROCEDURAL VIOLATION

5. Respondent humbly contends that there is no procedural violation done by the police officials
in taking Maia into custody. Police can conduct preliminary investigation prior to the filing
of F.I.R.11 The officer in charge of a police station is not obliged to prepare F.I.R. on every
nebulous information received.12 It is open for the officer-in-charge to collect more
information containing details about the occurrence, if available, so that he can consider
whether a cognizable offence has been committed, warranting investigation thereto.13
6. The officer has a right to make a preliminary inquiry in order to find out as to whether the
information sought to be lodged had any substance or not.14 If the information received, does
not disclose a cognizable offence, but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary
inquiry may be conducted to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not.15
7. In order to find, whether the offence is disclosed or not, Ms. Bell, in the present case, took
Maia into custody as a part of investigation to verify the contents of the email of deceased. 16
After completion of the preliminary investigation, Ms. Bell filed F.I.R and seized Maia in the
form of evidence.17
[1.4] THAT THE COURT HAS DISCRETION TO EXTEND THE DETENTION PERIOD IN INTEREST
OF JUSTICE
8. Arguendo, Maia is a person and not „property‟. The Magistrate, has power to authorize
detention of the (accused) person for a further period.18 In the case of Saurabh Kumar v.
7
¶ 15, Fact sheet.
8
¶ 8, Fact sheet.
9
¶ 12, Fact sheet.
10
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, § 41, cl. 1(ba).
11
Rajinder Singh Katoch v. Chandigarh Administration and others, 2007 (10) S.C.C. 69, ¶ 6.
12
Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, 1997 (1) S.C.C. 283, ¶ 10.
13
Ibid. See also, Tapinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 1971 (1) S.C.R. 599, ¶ 21; Soma Bhai v. State of Gujarat,
A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1453; State of U.P. v. P.A. Madhu, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1523.
14
Supra note 11 at ¶ 6 & ¶ 9.
15
S. Inbaraj v. The Superintendent of Police, 2014 S.C.C. OnLine Mad. 9363, ¶ 24.
16
¶ 10-12, Fact sheet.
17
¶ 13, Fact sheet.
18
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 § 167, cl. 2(a).
2
Jailor, Koneila Jail and another19 observed a similar situation to that of the case in hand; two
things are evident from the record. Firstly, the accused is involved in a criminal case for
which he has been arrested, and Secondly, the petitioner does not appear to have made any
application for grant of bail. Hence, the petitioner cannot be said to be in an unlawful
custody.20 Writ of Habeas corpus is said to be totally mis-placed in these circumstances.
Hence, a writ of habeas corpus in the present case shall not be held maintainable.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CHARGES FRAMED BY SESSION

JUDGE COULD STAND IN THE PRESENT CASE?
9. Respondent humbly contends before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court that Dr. Ahtme (hereinafter
referred to as „deceased‟) committed suicide (hereinafter referred to as „the act‟), as
understood in law [2.1], and Maia is capable of standing trial in the present case [2.2].
[2.1]. THAT THE DECEASED COMMITTED SUICIDE AS UNDERSTOOD IN LAW

10. In order to prove that deceased committed suicide, Respondent would humbly argue that the
act falls under the definition of suicide [2.1.1]; that, there is no right to commit suicide
[2.1.2]; that, a voluntary starving until death must be interpreted as suicide [2.1.3]; and that,
assistive suicide is not legal [2.1.4].
[2.1.1.] THAT THE ACT FALLS WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF SUICIDE
11. It is humbly contended that suicide means self-destruction, the intentional taking21 of one‟s
own life,22 voluntarily and intentionally. It is a deliberate and intentional destruction of one‟s
own life by a sound mind person; one who commits or attempts his self-murder.23 Suicide
(felo de se) is where a man of age of discretion and compos mentis (having full control of
one‟s mind) voluntarily kills himself.24 Deceased, a well renowned scientist, took his own
life, in the present case, which shall be interpreted to be suicide as understood by law.
19
(2014) 13 S.C.C. 436, ¶ 20 & ¶ 21.
20
Ibid; K. Raman v. Deputy Superintendent of Police National Investigation Agency Hyderabad and others,
2015 (1) M.L.J. (Crl.) 1, ¶ 9.
21
Blacks Law Dictionary, (9th ed.).
22
P. Rathinam v. Union of India,(1994) 3 S.C.C. 394.,¶ 14.
23
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1968.
24
Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, Indian Penal Code, 1650 (31st enlarged ed.).
3
12. There is no possible distinction that could be made between suicide, as ordinarily understood,
and the right to voluntarily die.25 The right to life is a natural right embodied therein.26 On the
contrary, suicide is an unnatural termination of life, and therefore, stands incompatible and
inconsistent with the concept of right to life.27
[2.1.2]. THAT DECRIMINALISATION SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS RIGHT TO
COMMIT SUICIDE
13. It is contended that the decriminalization of suicide should not be construed as a right to
commit suicide.28 Court has decriminalized suicide so that innocent families could be spared,
and not to legitimize the act.29 In the present case, Deceased was suffering from a terminal
form of cancer,30 but a right to die can only be exercised according to a procedure established
by law.31 Since, there is no procedure established by law, deceased was incorrect in adopting
the measure of suicide violating Article 21.32
14. Therefore, it is sufficient to reiterate that the argument in support of permitting „termination
of life‟ in such cases shall not include the right to curtail the natural span of life. To reduce
the period of suffering, by committing suicide, hampers the process of a certain natural death,
and shall not be available to interpret Article 21.33
[2.1.3]. THAT VOLUNTARY STARVATION TO BE INTERPRETED AS AN ACT OF SUICIDE
15. It is submitted that a voluntary fast unto death is an act of self-destruction, which amounts to
„suicide‟. “Suicide” means an intentional killing of oneself.34 Every act of self-destruction by
a human being is, in common language, described as „suicide‟, provided, it is an intentional
act of a party knowing the probable consequence of what he/she is about to do.35
16. When a patient chooses to forego food and fluid voluntarily, this choice may seem to have an
element of suicide.36 Passive means accomplish suicide, such as by refusal to eat or drink.37
25
C. A. Thomas Master v Union of India, 2000 Cr.L.J. 3729 (Ker), ¶ 3.
26
Indian Const. art 21.
27
11 Halsbury’s Law of India 103 (2d ed. Lexis Nexis).
28
Maruti Shripati Dubai v. State of MaharashtraI, 1987 Cr. L.J. 743, ¶ 13.
29
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, ¶ 2860.
30
¶ 8, Fact sheet.
31
Aruna Ramachandra Shanbuag v Union of India, (2011) 4 S.C.C. 454, ¶134.
32
Indian Const. art 21.
33
Gian Kaur vs. State of Punjab, (1996) 2 S.C.C. 648, ¶ 22.
34
Nikhil Soni v. Union of India, 2015 Cr.L.J 4951, ¶ 3.
35
Ibid.
36
Norman L. Cantor & George C. Thomas III, The Legal Bounds of Physician Conduct Hastening Death 97 (78
Buff. L. Rev. 2000).
37
Robert N. Wennberg, Terminal Choices: Euthanasia, Suicide, and the Right to Die 33-34 (1989). See also,
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), ¶ 229.
4
In the present case, deceased voluntarily fed his body less and less food and water, until he
dies.38 Therefore, it is submitted that the act committed by deceased falls within the purview
of suicide.
[2.1.4] THAT ASSISTED SUICIDE IS ILLEGAL
17. Respondents humbly contend that assistive suicide is not permissible under law.39 The
assisted suicide and assisted attempt to commit suicide are made punishable for cogent
reasons in the interest of society.40 Therefore, Maia‟s assistance to deceased shall be taken as
to commit the act of abetment to suicide.41
18. It is an established principle that asserted right to assistance in committing suicide was not a
fundamental liberty, and the ban on assisted suicide was related to legitimate government
interests.42 The law under the provision of the Penal Code forbids the act of taking away the
life of another person.43 No support should be given to people who choose death to escape
suffering.44
19. It is further contended that the practice of both euthanasia and assisted suicide is illegal in
Uparganj.45 However, euthanasia could be made lawful only by legislation,46 but an offence
of assisted suicide has no exceptions.
20. Arguendo, if assisted suicide were permitted, many might resort to it to spare their families
the substantial financial burden of end-of-life health-care costs.47
21. Respondent humbly submits that the act of deceased comes within the ambit of suicide, as
understood in law. Therefore, all the acts done in pursuance of the act of suicide, must be
viewed in the same light.
[2.2]. THAT MAIA IS CAPABLE OF STANDING TRIAL IN THIS CASE

22. It is humbly contended that Maia is capable of standing trial in this case. The Hon‟ble
Sessions Court has rightly framed charges u/s. 30648 to prosecute Maia for the offence of
38
¶ 8, Fact sheet.
39
Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d, ¶ 591.
40
Supra note 34 at ¶ 36.
41
See, Supra note 34 at ¶ 43.
42
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2258, ¶ 2258.
43
Indian Penal Code, 1860 § 300.
44
Lynn A. Jansen & Daniel P. Sulmasy, Sedation, Alimentation, Hydration, and Equivocation: Careful
Conversation About Care at the End of Life, 136 Annals Internal Med. 845 (2002).
45
Supra note 33 at ¶ 3 & ¶ 24.
46
47
48
Indian Penal Code, 1860 § 306.
5
abetment to suicide. Criminal law recognizes both human and corporations as „person‟, 49 and
both bear criminal liability for a specific offence.50[2.2.1] In order to impose criminal liability
upon a person, two main elements must exist,51 the first is actus reus [2.2.2], while the other
is a conduct element (mens rea) [2.2.3]. Further, it is contended that Maia is capable of
standing trial in this case [2.2.4], and even liability can be imposed on lunatics and person
with unsound mind [2.2.5].
[2.2.1]. THAT CRIMINAL LIABILITY CAN BE IMPOSED ON A PERSON
23. It is humbly contended that person is a generic term, hence, when used in a statute, it
embraces not only natural persons, but also artificial persons,52 criminal liability can be
imposed against a non-human being which can either be a corporation [2.2.1.1] or an object
[2.2.1.2.].
[2.2.1.1]. THAT CRIMINAL LIABILITY CAN BE IMPOSED ON CORPORATIONS
24. Real entity theory regards corporation as a juridical unit with its own claims, much like those
of a natural person, that surpasses the circumstances of its legal creation of the state, and the
claims or interests of its shareholders.53 It is, in other words, a „person‟ in its own right.54
25. Real entity theory was influential in persuading courts to allow criminal liability to be
imposed on corporations.55 Imposing corporate criminal liability has become a well-
entrenched feature of the legal landscape, even for common law crimes like manslaughter.56
[2.2.1.2] THAT CRIMINAL LIABILITY CAN BE IMPOSED ON PROPERTY
26. Expanding the scope of criminal liability Hon‟ble Supreme Court noted, civil in rem
forfeitures of guilty property.57 The theory behind such penalties is the fiction that the action
is against a „guilty property,‟ rather than against the offender himself. 58 It is the property
49
Indian Penal Code, 1860 §11.
50
William M. Clark & William L. Marshall, LAW OF CRIMES 1-2 (7th ed., 1967).
51
Joshua Dressler, Cases And Materials On Criminal Law 126 (2007).
52
Henry Campbell Black, Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation of the Laws 199 (2d ed. 1911). See
also, Indian Penal Code, 1860 §11.
53
Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations 283- 292 (1990).
54
The Corporation as Commons: Rethinking Property Rights, Governance and Sustainability in the Business
Enterprise, 37 Queen's L.J. 339- 356 (2012).
55
Ga. Code Ann. § 16-2-22 (2011).
56
Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated View 943-972 (Cal. L. Rev.1999), ¶ 972.
57
United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998), ¶ 322.
58
Waterloo Distilling Corporation v. United States, 282 U.S. 577 (1931), ¶ 581.
6
which is „proceeded against‟, „held guilty‟ and „condemned‟ as though it were conscious
instead of inanimate and insentient.59
27. In the case of Ralli v. Troop,60 an admiralty suit in personam, the Court explained that
imputation of responsibility was neither charged on the law of agency, nor upon the ship
owners, but on the vessel itself, which was considered as the wrongdoer.61 Further, an idol is
a juridical person capable of owning property, and therefore a person.62 Therefore, in the light
of the above cases, liability can be imposed on any object which falls within the ambit of
criminal liability.
[2.2.2]. THAT THERE IS PRESENCE OF ACTUS REUS

28. It is submitted that the actus reus requirement is expressed mainly by acts or omissions.63 In
the present case, the e-mail sent by deceased‟ e-mail I.D.64 and results of the interrogation
undertaken by Ms. Bell,65 conclusively derives that Maia was acting under the instruction of
deceased for committing the impugned offence.
[2.2.3]. THAT MENS REA IS ALSO PRESENT

29. Respondents humbly contend that the mental requirements needed in order to impose
criminal liability is knowledge, [2.2.3.1] as required in the impugned offence and also, under
the general theory of criminal law.66 Maia is well equipped with sensory receptors [2.2.3.2]
and that, there is specific intent on the part of Maia to complete the assigned task. [2.2.3.3]
[2.2.3.1]. THAT MAIA POSSESSED THE REQUIRED KNOWLEDGE

30. John Searle argued in his work that, though, biologically based systems are the only systems
that can think, but we might find other systems in the universe that can produce conscious
thoughts, and we might even come to be able to create thinking systems artificially.67 An A.I.
entity that passes the Turing Test, at the bare minimum, must be able to make judgments
requiring a sense of fairness.68 Respondents humbly submit that Maia, though a robot, is
capable of having knowledge.
59
Id. at ¶ 581.
60
157 U.S. 386 (1895), ¶ 423.
61
Ibid. See, Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424 (1902).
62
In re Vadivelu Arsuthiyar, (1944) Mad. (685).
63
Walter Harrison Hitchler, The Physical Element of Crime 39 (1934).See also Michael Moore, Act And Crime:
The Philosophy Of Action And Its Implications For Criminal Law 156-68 (1993).
64
¶ 8, Fact sheet.
65
¶ 12, Fact sheet.
66
Supra note 51.
67
John Searle, Is the Brain's Mind a Computer Program? 27 (1990).
68
Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood For Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. Rev. 1231.
7
31. To ascertain as to what constitutes knowledge, Respondents rely on the assertion provided by
Gabriel Hallevy in his work69 that, the thing which constitutes knowledge is defined as a
sensory reception of factual data and the understanding of such data.70 It must be noted that
most A.I entities are well-equipped for such reception.71
32. It is expedient to notice in the present case, that the claim of deceased, of creating a
cybernetic brain, which is indistinguishable from the human brain to outside observers72,
proves that Maia is capable of having knowledge, though not by „human intelligence‟ but
through „Artificial intelligence‟. If the entity is a machine intelligence system and the human
cannot discover the same, then the machine has passed the test.73
33. Further, Maia passing the well-publicized „Turing Test,74 enables the Respondent to
emphasize even more on the above mentioned argument.
[2.2.3.2] THAT MAIA IS WELL EQUIPPED WITH SENSORY RECEPTORS

34. Maia, as other A.I entities, is well equipped with sensory receptors of sights, voices, physical
contact and touch, which are common in most AI systems.75 These receptors transfer the
factual data received to central processing units that analyze the data. 76 The process of
analysis in A.I systems runs parallel to that of human understanding.77 Therefore, Maia was
capable of understanding the assigned task.
35. The human brain receives information from eyes, ears, hands, etc., and thereafter analyze
such information to understand the surroundings. Similarly, Maia, which is based on
advanced AI algorithms, is trying to imitate human cognitive processes.
[2.2.3.3] THAT MAIA HAS SPECIFIC INTENT TO COMPLETE THE TASK

36. Specific intent is the strongest of the internal element requirements. 78 Specific intent is the
existence of a purpose or an aim that a factual event will occur. The specific intent required to
69
Gabriel Hallevy, The Criminal Liability of Artificial Intelligence Entities (February 15, 2010), available at
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1564096 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1564096.
70
Ibid. See also, William James, The Principles of Psychology (1890); United States v. Youts, 229 F.3d 1312
(10th Cir. 2000), ¶ 1317; State v. Sargent, 594 A.2d 401 (Vt. 1991), ¶ 467.
71
N.P. Padhy, Artificial Intelligence And Intelligent Systems 10 (Oxford University Press 2005).
72
¶ 2, Fact sheet.
73
A. M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 59 Mind 433 (1950).
74
¶ 5, Fact sheet.
75
Margaret A. Boden, The Foundations of Artificial Intelligence 108-11 (Derek Partridge & Yorick Wilks eds.,
(2006)
76
Ibid.
77
Ibid.
78
See, Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000), ¶ 268.
8
establish liability for murder is a purpose or an aim that a certain person will die.79 As a result
of the existence of such intent, the perpetrator of the offense commits the offense; i.e., he
performs the external element of the specific offense.80
37. Maia was programmed to have a purpose or an aim, and to act in order to achieve that
purpose. Deceased designed Maia with the specific intent to assist the elderly.81 Assistance to
humans is, no doubt, the specific aim of Maia.
[2.2.4]. THAT MAIA IS CAPABLE OF STANDING TRIAL
38. Infancy and unsoundness are two defences available under Indian Penal Code. It is contended
that Maia is neither an infant [2.2.4.1] nor unsound [2.2.4.1], therefore, Maia can stand trial
in this case.82
[2.2.4.1]. THAT MAIA IS NOT AN INFANT
39. It is humbly contended that criminal law exempts infants and mentally ill from standing trial
in the case.83 The social rationale behind the infancy defense is to protect infants from the
harmful consequences of the criminal process.84
40. Advanced A.I algorithms, such as Maia, are capable of analyzing what should be done and
what should not be done.85 Maia is designed to assist elderly, therefore, it is pertinent to
consider that Maia was assessed with the technology of differentiating between things.
[2.2.4.2] THAT MAIA IS NOT UNSOUND

41. Unsound individuals are presumed to lack the fault element of the specific offense, due to
their mental illness (doli incapax).86 In the present case, Maia functions properly, has the
capability to hold conversation with humans,87 hence, there arises no reason for it to not use
all of its capabilities to analyze the data received through its receptors.88 Maia was capable
enough to properly analyze the data as instructed by deceased, and must have forbidden the
same. On the contrary, it assisted to the act of suicide as against the deceased.
79
Wayne R. Lafave, Criminal Law 733-34 (4th ed. 2003).
80
See, United States v. Randolph, 93 F.3d 656 (9th Cir. 1996).
81
¶ 3, Fact sheet.
82
United States v. Mackie, 65 M.J. 762 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2007), ¶ 763.
83
Heilman v. Commonwealth, 84 Ky. 457, 458 (1886), ¶ 731; Little v. State, 554 S.W.2d 312 (Ark. 1977), ¶323.
84
Frederick J. Ludwig, Rationale of Responsibility for Young Offenders, 29 NEB. L. REV. 521 (1950); In
re Tyvonne, 558 A.2d 661 (Conn. 1989), ¶ 162.
85
Supra note 69. See also, Tang Howe Hing & Musa Mailah, Simulator for Control of Autonomous
Nonholonomic Wheeled Robot, 8 J. OF APPLIED SCI. 2534, 2536 (2008).
86
B. B. Sendor, Crime as Communication: An Interpretive Theory of the Insanity Defense and the Mental
Elements of Crime, 74 GEO. L.J. 1371, 1380 (1986).
87
¶ 5, Fact sheet.
88
Supra note 71.
9
42. Therefore, in light of the above arguments it is humbly submitted that Maia is capable of
standing trial in the case. Maia satisfies all essentials necessary for imposing criminal liability
upon a legal person. Therefore, Maia shall be prosecuted for the aforesaid offence.
[2.2.5]. THAT CRIMINAL LIABILITY SHOULD BE IMPOSED AGAINST PERSON
INCOMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL
43. Arguendo, courts have rejected the presumption that „lunatics‟ and „idiots‟ are criminally
irresponsible by adopting verdicts like „guilty but mentally ill‟ and „guilty but mentally
retarded‟, which impose culpability and a criminal sentence.89 Modern law takes a more
discriminating, more expansive approach to the issue of mental illness than did the common
law,90 by imposing liability on lunatics and idiots.
44. When it has been proven that a person committed the offence with knowledge or intent, that
person is held criminally liable for that offense, Maia being a property.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON THE

JOURNALIST, BY THE SUPERINTENDENT OF HAMRAK PRISON,
ARE REASONABLE?
45. Respondents humbly contend before this Hon‟ble Court that a Jail Superintendent can refuse
to allow any interview to which a prisoner is ordinarily entitled, if a sufficient cause arises.91
Press is not conferred with unrestricted access to means of information [3.1].92 The
opportunity of journalist to interview prisoner(s) may be denied, when a prisoner himself is
not willing to address the interview; or when Article 19(2)93 provides for it [3.2]. The
imposed restrictions fall under the purview of Jail Manual [3.3]. In addition, the imposed
restrictions are well within the purview of restriction mentioned under Article 19(3) of
I.C.C.P.R. [3.4]
89
The Myth of Mens Rea for Defendants with Mental Retardation, 45 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1419, 1455 (2012).
See also, Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law § 25.07 (5th ed. 2009); Alaska Stat. § 12.47.050 (2012).
90
A Pleasant Surprise: TheGuiltyButMentallyIll Verdict Has Both Succeeded in Its Own Right and Successfully
Preserved the Traditional Role of the Insanity Defense 943, 987-91 (1987).
91
Delhi Prisons (Prisoners’ Welfare Fund, Appeals, Petition, Interviews and Communication) Rules, 1988 § 38.
92
Prabha Dutt v. Union of India, (1982) 1 S.C.C. 1, ¶ 2.
93
Indian Const. art 19, cl. 2.
10
[3.1] THAT FREEDOMS ARE SUBJECT TO RESTRICTIONS

46. The freedom of journalist is an ordinary part of the freedom. 94 However, apart from the
statute law, a journalist has no other and no higher privilege than what is provided to him as a
right under freedom of speech.95 Restrictions can be imposed when serious administrative or
disciplinary problems will directly and immediately result.96 Therefore, freedom of speech
and expression are subjected to certain reasonable restrictions.97
[3.2] THAT THE RESTRICTIONS ARE REASONABLE UNDER ARTICLE 19(2)

47. Honb‟le Judges, in the case of Ruben Banerjee v. State of Orissa,98 examined the reasons
advanced for denying the rights of a journalist to interview. The State may impose reasonable
restrictions on such right, in the interest of public order.99
[3.2.1] THAT RESTRICTIONS ARE NECESSARY FOR MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC ORDER
48. The power to make law, regarding prisons and persons detained therein, is a state affair.100
This sphere is exclusively of the detaining authority, which is the custodian of public order,
and not that of the court.101 The words „in the interests of public order‟ are wider in
connotation than the words „for the maintenance of public order‟.102 The expression „public
order‟ is synonymous with public safety and tranquility, which involves, breach of national
upheavals, within the scope of permissible restrictions under Article 19(2).103
49. The Jail authorities may refuse or restrict an interview or video recording if it is found that,
eliciting of such information or recording videography is not in the public interest or such can
disrupts the public order.104 Therefore, reasonable restrictions can be imposed on the rights
guaranteed in the public order.105
[3.2.2]. THAT RESTRICTIONS SATISFIES THE TEST OF STRICT SCRUTINY
94
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 19, cl. 1, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. See also
Indian Const. art 19, cl. 1(a).
95
Sewak Ram Sobhani v. R. K. Karanjia, (1981) 3 SCC 208, ¶ 35.
96
Pell v. Procunier, 1974 W.L. 185930 (U.S.), ¶ 47. See also, Saxbe v. The Washington Post Co., 1974 W.L.
186235 (U.S.), ¶ 55.
97
Supra note 95. See also Indian Const. art 19, cl. 2.
98
(2000) 90 C.L.T. 127.
99
Indian Const. art 19, cl. 2.
100
Indian Const. sch. 7, List II, item 4.
101
Maganlal Jivabhai Patel v. Government of Bombay, A.I.R. 1953 BOM. (40) 59, ¶ 7.
102
Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh v. Ram Manohar Lohia, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 633, ¶ 9.
103
Ibid, ¶ 34.
104
M. Hasan and Ors. v. Govt. of A.P. and Ors., A.I.R. 1998 A.P. 35, ¶ 14.
105
Ramji Lal v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 620, ¶ 14.
11
50. Restrictions imposed in public interest and to maintain social control, stand to the test of the
reasonableness.106 Laws restricting fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny, as they
are considered to be so essential for our society, in which citizens enjoy ordered liberty.107
51. It must be noted that the test of strict scrutiny is twofold, where, the impugned law shall serve
a compelling governmental interest [3.2.2.1], and the law is narrowly tailored to serve that
compelling interest [3.2.2.2].
[3.2.2.1]. THAT THERE IS COMPELLING GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST
52. It stands construed that an interview may be denied, when a serious danger of administrative
or disciplinary problem is involved due to the conditions at the prison.108 In addition, the
governmental interest in regard to the restrictions shall be made on an individual basis, not
through broad classifications.109 In the present case, the restrictions, so imposed, are limited
in individual circumstances and does not advocate of an absolute ban on such interviews.110
53. Moreover, the maintenance of order, discipline and other affairs related to prison and
prisoners falls under the State List.111 Also, the restrictions are imposed in total consonance
with the Jail Manual. Therefore, the restrictions imposed on the interview have a significant
governmental interest.
[3.2.2.2] THAT THE LAW IS NARROWLY TAILORED
54. Law mandates the restrictions to be reasonable,112 which are necessary to protect legitimate
government interests.113 Legislation which invades fundamental right must struck a proper
balance between the rights guaranteed and the control permissible under Article 19(2).114 It
shall be noted that the restrictions, are not to out-rightly reject the interview,115 but to limit
the Freedom of speech and expression116 as meager as possible.117 Therefore, the restrictions
imposed are generally necessary to protect the aforementioned governmental interests.
106
Supra note 104 at ¶ 25; State v. Rico Webb, 144 So.3d 971, 2013-1681 (La. 5/7/14), ¶ 977.
107
Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir, 589 So.2d 474 (La.1991), ¶ 478.
108
109
Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), ¶ 101.
110
Washington Post Co. v. Kleindienst, 357 F.Supp. 779, ¶ 782.
111
Indian Const. sch. 7, List II, item 4.
112
Chintaman Rao v. State of U.P., [1950] S.C.R. 759, ¶ 7.
113
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, ¶ 414.
114
Om Kumar and Ors. v. Union of India, (2001) 2 S.C.C. 386, ¶ 36(II).
115
116
Indian Const. art 19, cl. 1(a). See also, Supra note 95.
117
Supra note 113.
12
55. In the present case, the ban on interview of the under-trial prisoner is not absolute and the
imposed restrictions have stood firmly to the test of strict scrutiny. 118 Therefore, the
restrictions imposed shall be construed as reasonable restrictions under Jail Manual119
[3.3]. THAT RESTRICTIONS ARE UNDER THE PURVIEW OF JAIL MANUAL

56. It is humbly contended that weighty reasons are present to put restrictions on the interview
with prisoner, which are in accordance with the Jail Manual. The press, while enjoying the
freedom of speech and expression, has to abide by the restrictions in the Jail Manual.120
57. A Superintendent of Jail may terminate an interview with any prisoner at any moment and
even may refuse to allow any interview to which a prisoner is entitled, if he considers a
sufficient cause exists.121 In the present case, Mr. Jedpare‟s refusal to follow the prescribed
conditions,122 proves to be such sufficient cause, in the opinion of the Jail Superintendant.
[3.3.1] THAT RESTRICTIONS ARE NECESSARY FOR FAIR TRIAL
58. A trial is undergoing in the present case, to which Maia is related to.123 Section 6254124 sets
forth exemptions to a general rule that, Public records are open for inspection. Above said
section provides for the non-disclosure of records pertaining to pending litigation to which
the public agency is party. Serious prejudice to a fair trial could result from an eventual
release of the prison document to the representatives of the press. The agency may withhold a
record for public policy reasons as well. As a mandate of public policy, certain
communications and documents shall be treated as confidential and are not open for public
inspection.125 Maia is a public record, in the present case, therefore, any information sought
from it, with regard to the ongoing trial, shall be prohibited.
[3.3.2] INTERVIEW FOOTAGE TO BE PRE-APPROVED BY PRISON AUTHORITIES
59. Respondents humbly submit that in order to prohibit every unauthorized entry or misuse of
the permission, the Jail Superintendent must follow the guidelines126 provided by the Central
Government. It shall be noted that every visitor shall hand over all their equipments like
118
Supra note 104.
119
Delhi Prisons Act, 2000 & Delhi Prison Rules, 1988.
120
Sheela Barse v. State of Maharshtra, (1987) 4 S.C.C. 373, ¶ 2.
121
Delhi Prisons (Prisoners‟ Welfare Fund, Appeals, Petitions, Interviews and Communication) Rules, 1988 §
31 & 38.
122
¶ 18, Fact sheet.
123
¶ 16, Fact sheet.
124
Cal. Govt. Code § 6254.
125
Yarish v. Nelson, 27 Cal. App. 3d 893, ¶ 903. See also, Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, ¶ 363.
126
Guidelines for allowing visit inside jails by individuals/ NGOs/ Company/ Press, No.V-11018/3/2010-P.R.,
Ministry of Home Affairs (Centre-State Division), Government of India.
13
camera, tape recorder, and any other equipment to the jail superintendent for a period of three
days,127 for the purpose of careful scrutiny. The Jail Superintendent shall also delete any
portion of the footage, which he finds objectionable.128 Therefore, a jail visitor is bound to
follow these guidelines prescribed by the Central Government.
[3.4]. THAT THERE IS NO CONTRAVENTION WITH ARTICLE 19 OF I.C.C.P.R.

60. It is humbly contended that this freedom of press is not absolute, unlimited, giving an
unrestricted freedom of speech. Unrestricted freedoms would lead to disorder and anarchy.129
[3.4.1] THAT RESTRICTIONS ARE ESSENTIAL FOR MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC ORDER
61. State agents responsible for the maintenance of public order shall be subject to controls in the
exercise of their power through the parliament, courts or other competent independent
bodies.130 It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, which are provided by law and
are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of
national security or of public order, or of public health or morals.131
62. The Respondent further submits that the restrictions imposed are in accordance with Article
19 of I.C.C.P.R and other international covenants. Further, A.C.H.R.132 declares that
everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. However, restrictions, which are
expressly established by law, can be put to such freedom of speech and expression.133
[3.4.2] THAT THE RESTRICTIONS ARE PRESCRIBED BY LAW
63. Law as prescribed, must be adequately accessible and formulated with sufficient precision to
enable citizens to regulate their conduct.134 A permissible restriction must be authorized by or
pursuant to statute, statutory instrument, by a common law rule, or by E.U legislation.135 The
infringement of free speech is prescribed by the Jail Manual. It is also expedient to note that
the restrictions have stood firmly to the test of strict scrutiny.136
64. Henceforth, the Respondents humbly submit that the Jail Superintendent has put reasonable
restrictions on taking interview of Maia in furtherance of public order.
127
Id., item 3(l).
128
Id., item 3(m).
129
Surya Prakash Khatri v. Madhu Trehan, 2001(92) D.L.T. 665.
130
UN Commission on Human Rights, The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 28 September 1984, E/CN.4/1985/4.
131
Supra note 94 art 19, cl. 3.
132
American Convention on Human Rights, 1978 art 13, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
133
Ibid.
134
The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2 E.H.R.R. 245 (1979), ¶ 271.
135
Silver v. United Kingdom, 5 E.H.R.R. 347 (1983), ¶ 54.
136
Supra note 130, Annex. I(A), item 10.
14
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER OF HIGH COURT TO CONDUCT

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN CAMERA, IS AN INFRINGEMENT OF
THE CITIZEN’S RIGHT TO KNOW AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS?
65. Respondents humbly contend before Hon‟ble Supreme Court that the order of Honb‟le High
Court to conduct proceedings in-camera is valid, and it does not violates the citizens‟ right to
know and freedom of the press. High Court has inherent power to the conduct proceedings in
camera [4.1.], for proper administration of justice [4.2.]. Further the right of „public hearing‟
is not an absolute right. The freedom of speech and expression and freedom of press can be
restricted under Article 19 (2) [4.3.]. Also the citizens „right to know‟ is not an absolute right
[4.4.].
[4.1.] THAT THE HIGH COURT HAS INHERENT POWER TO CONDUCT PROCEEDINGS IN
CAMERA.
66. It is humbly contended that power to conduct proceeding in-camera can be derived from
Code of Criminal Procedure [4.1.1.], Constitution of Uparganj [4.1.2.], various international
conventions and under the [4.1.3.]. Further, the proceedings are conducted in camera to
prevent trail by media [4.1.4.].
[4.1.1.] THAT THE POWER CAN BE DERIVED FROM CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
67. High court under section 327(1)137 has the power to deny access to the general public and
press to the court room while conducting any court proceedings. Also, the High Court under
section 482138 has inherent power to conduct proceedings in camera and also to prevent
publication and recordings of proceedings139 to secure the ends of justice.
68. There may be cases where the requirement of the administration of justice itself may make it
necessary for the court to hold a trial in camera.140 Judiciary is to do justice between the
parties, and if satisfied, it is open for the court to exercise inherent power to hold the trial in
camera, either partly or fully, to help the administration of justice.141 The Court has inherent
137
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 § 327, cl. (1).
138
139
Moosbrugger v. Moosbrugger, (1912-13) 29 T.L.R. 658. See also Naresh Shridhar Mirakjar & Ors. v. State
of Maharashtra and Anr., A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1, ¶ 59.
140
Naresh Shridhar Mirakjar & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr., A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1, ¶ 30.
141
Ibid ¶ 36. See also, Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835.
15
jurisdiction to pass an order excluding the public, when the nature of the case necessitates
such a course to be adopted.142
69. Therefore, the suo motu action of the Uparganj High Court to conduct all the proceedings in
camera, where Maia is present, is within the ambit of inherent powers of the High Court, to
secure the ends of justice.143
[4.1.2] THAT THE POWER CAN BE DERIVED CONSTITUTION OF UPARGANJ
70. As a norm, judicial proceedings should be open to public scrutiny, but there is a need to
restrain the same in some exceptional circumstances.144 The proceedings being held in
camera shall only be to the extent necessary in the public interest and to avoid prejudice to
the accused, also to secure the administration of justice.145 If found necessary, the Court of
records under Article 129 or 215146 may order for such in-camera proceedings while taking
suo motu action.147
[4.1.3] THAT THE POWER CAN BE DERIVED FROM VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTIONS
71. Respondents humbly contend that various International Conventions empower the Honb‟le
High Court of Uparganj to conduct court proceedings in camera, where the administration of
justice so requires. Also, Uparganj being a monist state accepts all the international laws and
conventions.148
72. Article 14 (1) of I.C.C.P.R149 though necessitates it to conduct public hearing but also
empowers the court to exclude the public, press and media in the interest of justice. Also,
Article 6 (1) of the European Convention on Human Rights150 confers the same power upon
the court.
73. Further, Article 8 (5) of the American Convention on Human Rights151 also provides that the
proceedings must be conducted in open court also in exceptional circumstance empowers the
court to conduct proceedings in camera.
142
Scott v. Scott, [1913] 1 A.C. 417.
143
144
Courts on its own motion v. Publisher, Times of India, Chandigarh., 2013 S.C.C. OnLine P&H 6997, ¶ 11.
145
Vineet Narain v. Union of India, (1998) 1 S.C.C. 226.
146
Indian Const. art. 129 & 215
147
Ankit Sharma and another v. State of (NCT of Delhi) and another, 2014 S.C.C. OnLine Del 3260, ¶ 38.
148
Note c, Fact sheet.
149
Supra note 95.
150
European Convention on Human Rights, art. 6(1), Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
151
Supra note 132 art. 13, cl. 2.
16
[4.1.4] THAT THE PROCEEDINGS CAN BE CONDUCTED IN CAMERA TO PREVENT
TRIAL BY MEDIA
74. It is humbly contented that it is the duty of the court to prevent the trial by media as
presumption of innocence is held to a basic right of accused.152 The Hon'ble Supreme Court
has observed that the course of justice must not be interfered through publications, which
constitute opinions upon the merits of the case or create an atmosphere for or against an
accused person before his or her case is finally decided.153 In addition to the reasonable
restrictions imposed, in order to interview Maia, the High Court has prohibited the trial to be
public, when Maia is present, as it may interfere with the administration of justice.
75. Court access to media was refused, when proceedings were at an interlocutory stage, for the
purpose of full and fair reporting. As, there was a further risk of trial by media if premature
access to the documents and court proceedings were granted to the media.154 The court can
conduct proceedings in camera to prevent trial by media when the issue involved in a
particular case is subjudiced, as trial by media interferes with the administration of justice.155 A trial
by press, electronic media or public agitation is very antithesis of rule of law. It can lead to
miscarriage of justice.156 Presumption of innocence of an accused is a legal presumption and
should not be destroyed at the very threshold through the process of media trial.157
[4.2] THAT THE COURT HAS POWER TO CONDUCT PROCEEDINGS IN-CAMERA FOR
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
76. It is humbly contented before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court that High Court is empowered to
conduct the proceedings in camera for proper administration of justice.158 Section 38 of
Siracusa Principles159 also gives power to the court to hold proceedings in camera to avoid
prejudicial publicity [4.2.1.]. As any criminal case that generates a great deal of publicity, the
threats of publicity may compromise the right of the accused to a fair trial and justice
152
Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 5 S.C.C. 294, ¶ 35.
153
Shamim Rehmaney v. Zinat Kausar Dehalvi and Ors., 1971Cr.L.J. 1586, ¶ 9.
154
Stonham v Legislative Assembly (No 1), (1999) 90 I.R 325.
155
M.P.Lohia v. State of W.B. and another, (2005) 2 S.C.C. 686, ¶ 10.
156
State Of Maharashtra vs Rajendra Jawnmal Gandhi, (1997) 8 S.C.C. 386, ¶ 1.
157
Sidhartha Vashisht @ Manu Sharma vs State (Nct Of Delhi), (2010) 6 S.C.C. 1, ¶ 1.
158
See, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 § 482.
159
Supra note 95.
17
[4.2.2.].160 Moreover, the right of public hearing is not an absolute right [4.2.3.], and
publishing court proceedings amounts to contempt of court [4.2.4.].
[4.2.1] THAT THE RECORDINGS CAN BE EASILY MANIPULATED
77. As the technology of audio/video recording is advanced these days, so is the technology of
fabricating such recordings. Anybody can either delete the relevant portion from the
recording or by creating similar frequency/pitch of voice in computer, audio and video clips
can be added in the recording.161 Liberty of the press is subordinate to the administration of
justice.162 The principle underlying the „insistence on hearing cases in open court‟ is to
protect and assist fair and impartial administration of justice; but if the requirement of justice
itself dictates the necessity of trying the case in-camera, it cannot be said that the said
requirement should be sacrificed because of the principle that every trial must be held in open
court.163
[4.2.2] THAT THERE IS THREAT TO ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
78. It is at the discretion of the court to order the trial of any suit to be held in camera.164 In
exceptional and appropriate cases after exercise of due care and caution, the court may direct
that the proceedings shall be conducted in camera.165 The test formulated, in order to grant
preventive injunction against the press must be based on reasonable grounds for keeping the
administration of justice unimpaired, and there must be reasonable ground to believe that the
danger apprehended is real and imminent.166 If the court is satisfied beyond a doubt that the
ends of justice themselves would be defeated if a case is tried in open court, then it can pass
an order to hold the trial in camera.167 The very object behind empowering the courts to
devise such methods is to see that the administration of justice is not perverted, prejudiced,
obstructed or interfered with.168
79. Therefore, the High Court has inherent jurisdiction to hold a trial in camera if the ends of
justice necessarily require the adoption of such a course.169 Similarly, in the present case, the
160
Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539 (1976), ¶ 3(a).
161
Deepak Khosla v Union Of India & Ors, 2011 (182) D.L.T. 208, ¶ 4.
162
Rao Harnarain v. Gumori Ram, A.I.R. 1958 (Punj) 273.
163
Supra note 141 ¶ 21. Also Saroj Iyer And Anr. vs Maharashtra Medical Of Indian, A.I.R. 2002 Bom 97, ¶ 9
164
Janaki Ballav v. Bennet Coleman and Co. Ltd., A.I.R. 1989 Orissa 225, ¶ 4.
165
Ibid.
166
Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd. v. Proprietors of Indian Express Newspapers Bombay (P) Ltd, A.I.R. 1989
S.C. 190, ¶ 34.
167
Saroj Iyer and Anr. v. Maharashtra Medical Of Indian Medicine, Bombay and Anr., A.I.R. 2002 Bom 97, ¶1.
168
R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N, (1994) 6 S.C.C. 632, ¶ 21.
169
Ibid at ¶ 9.
18
High Court has inherent power to conduct in-camera proceedings, and ensure that no
inconvenience is suffered by the Honb‟le court in doing so.
[4.2.3] THAT RIGHT OF ‘PUBLIC HEARING’ IS NOT AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT
80. Respondents humbly contend that the right of „public hearing‟ is not absolute and denial of
the same does not amount to violation of freedom of speech and expression. The right of
public-trial is not absolute. It can be restricted by the court in its inherent jurisdiction if the
necessities of administration of justice so demand.170
81. As a general rule, the case brought before the court must be heard in open court, but this rule
cannot be treated as inflexible and universal, and has exceptions.171 Public trial, though
important and valuable to ensure fair administration of justice, is a means not an end.172
Therefore, in the instant case Maia‟s right to public hearing is not absolute and may be
restricted.
[4.2.4] THAT PUBLICATION OF SUCH PROCEEDINGS AMOUNT TO CONTEMPT OF
COURT
82. It is humbly contented that the publication of in-camera proceedings amounts to Contempt of
Court. Arguendo, a publication of in-camera proceedings is done, which interferes or tends to
interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any manner,
shall amount to criminal contempt.173 The Contempt of Courts Act provides that where the
court conducts in-camera proceedings for reasons connected with public order, the
publication relating to such proceedings shall amount to criminal contempt of court.174
83. Publications/coverage which interfere or tend to interfere with the administration of justice
amount to criminal contempt under the Contempt of Court Act and if, in order to preclude
such interference, the provisions of that Act impose restrictions on freedom of speech, such
restrictions would be valid.175 Liberty of press cannot stand in the way of inherent powers of
the Court to punish any publication calculated to interfere with the administration of
justice.176 The law of contempt is to prevent the due process of law from getting perverted.177
170
Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1883, ¶ 107. See also Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court, (1982) 457 U.S. 596, ¶ 33; Mohd. Shahabuddin v. State of Bihar, (2010) 4 S.C.C. 653, ¶ 1.
171
172
173
The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 § 2, cl. (c)(iii).
174
The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971§, cl. 7(1)(c).
175
Supra note 161. See also, State v. Radhagobinda, A.I.R. 1954 Ori 1, ¶ 14; State v. Editor etc. of Matrubhumi,
A.I.R. 1955 Ori 36, ¶ 28.
176
Supra note 163.
19
[4.3] THAT THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION OF PRESS CAN BE RESTRICTED
84. It is humbly contented before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court that the freedom of press, as
guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) is not an absolute right, it can be restricted under Article
19(2).178 Further, the basic principle does not include a right to record court proceedings.179
85. In the case of Sidhartha Vashisht @ Manu Sharma v State (N.C.T. of Delhi)180 Freedom of
press protected under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution has to be carefully and cautiously
used, so as to avoid interference in the administration of justice and leading to undesirable
results in the matters subjudice before the Courts. There is danger of serious risk of prejudice,
if the media exercises an unrestricted and unregulated freedom. There cannot, therefore, be an
unrestricted access to all the details of the investigation.181 The restriction under Article
19(2) are conceived in the interest of ensuring and maintaining conditions, in which the said
right can be exercised by the citizens of this country.182
[4.4] THAT PUBLIC AND PRESS DOES NOT HAVE AN ABSOLUTE ‘RIGHT TO KNOW’
86. It is humbly submitted that the citizens and press do not have an absolute right to know. The
right to know, which is derived from the concept of freedom of speech, under Article 19(1)(a)
is not absolute.183 Right to know does not outweigh the administration of justice.184
87. Between the two interests of great public importance, freedom of speech and administration
of justice; administration of justice has to be given the priority. 185 Absolute or uncontrolled
individual rights cannot exist in any modern State.186 Citizen‟s Right to know can be
regulated, restricted and curtailed for a larger public interest.187
88. The citizens, in the present case, shall not be entitled to an absolute right to know. Such right
can be restricted when the administration of justice demands so.
89. Therefore, it must be humbly submitted before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court that the right of
citizens to know and the freedom of press, can be restricted reasonably.
177
Ram Avtar Shukla v. Arvind Shukla, 1995 Supp (2) S.C.C. 130, ¶ 1 & ¶ 5.
178
Indian Const. art. 19, cl. 2.
179
The Madrid Principles on the Relationship between the Media and Judicial Independence,1994 § 6.
180
Supra note 158 at ¶ ZA.
181
Norms of Journalistic Conduct, Press Council of India (ed. 2010), Item 41(A)(v), Part A.
182
Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Govt. of India v. Cricket Association of Bengal, (1995) 2
S.C.C. 161, ¶ 151.
183
State Of U.P v. Raj Narain & Ors, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 865, ¶ 6.
184
Court On Its Own Motion vs State And Others, 2008 S.C.C. OnLine Del 965, ¶ 77.
185
Attorney General v British Broadcasting Corporation, 1981 A.C. 303, 354.
186
Thalappalam Ser. Coop. Bank Ltd and Ors v. State of Kerala & Ors, (2013) 16 S.C.C 82, ¶ 61.
187
Ibid.
20
PRAYER
Therefore, in the light of issues involved, arguments advanced, reasons given and the
authorities cited, this Hon‟ble Court may be pleased:
a) To dismiss the Writ Petition filed by Mr. Galon Kasra and hold that the detention, of
Maia by the Superintendent of police, is legal and as per the procedure established
by law.
b) To dismiss the revision petition filed by Mr. Galon Kasra on behalf of Maia and
hold Maia to be capable of standing trial in this case.
c) To dismiss the Writ Petition filed by Mr. Assardei Jedpare and hold that the
conditions imposed by the Superintendent of Jail are reasonable and in accordance
with law.
d) To dismiss the appeal filed by Uparganj News Network and uphold the order of the
High Court, to conduct the proceedings in-camera and not to permit media outlets to
conduct audio-video recordings of the court.
Any other and further relief which this Hon‟ble Court may be pleased to grant in the interests
of Justice and Equity. All of which is respectfully submitted.
For This Act of Kindness, the Respondent Shall Duty Bound Forever Pray.
Sd/-
(Counsels for the Respondent)
xxxviii

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4TH RMLNLU-SCC ONLINE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA LAW MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO__/2020 (UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................ iv

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................... v

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ....................................................................................xii

STATEMENT OF FACTS ...................................................................................................xiii

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS .......................................................................................... xvi

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED .................................................................................................. 1

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FILED BY MR. GALON

2. WHETHER THE CHARGES FRAMED BY SESSION JUDGE COULD STAND IN

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON THE JOURNALIST,

4. WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER OF HIGH COURT TO CONDUCT FURTHER

AIR All India Reporter

46. State of Maharashtra v. Tapas D. Neogy, (1999) 7 S.C.C. 685. …1

72. Sheppard v. Maxwell 1966 U.S. LEXIS 1413. … 13

SECONDARY MATERIAL: ARTICLES

1. Succeeded in Its Own Right and Successfully Preserved the Traditional … 10

3. Insanity Defense and the Mental Elements of Crime, 74 GEO. … 09

6. John Searle, Is the Brain's Mind a Computer Program? 27 (1990). … 07

Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood For Artificial Intelligences, 70

9. Hydration, and Equivocation: Careful Conversation About Care at the … 05

17. Autonomous Nonholonomic Wheeled Robot, 8 J. OF APPLIED SCI. … 09

18. Governance and Sustainability in the Business Enterprise, 37 Queen's … 06

20. Walter Harrison Hitchler, The Physical Element of Crime 39 (1934). … 07

SECONDARY MATERIAL: BOOKS

13. Ram Jethmalani, Cases and Materials on Media Law (2012).

1. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act No. 2 of 1974).

2. The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act No. 45 of 1860).

3. The Constitution of India, 1950.

4. The Delhi Prisons Act, 2000 (Act No.2 of 2002).

5. The Delhi Prisons Rules.

6. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (Act No. 70 of 1971).

I. The Kingdom of Uparganj is a Constitutional monarchy with a Westminster style Parliament.

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON THE JOURNALIST, BY THE

4. WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER OF HIGH COURT TO CONDUCT FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN

3. THAT THE CONDITIONS IMPOSED, BY JAIL SUPERINTENDANT ON MR. ASSARDEI

ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.

AMBIT OF REASONABLE RESTRICTIONS.

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FILED BY

[1.2] THAT THE SEIZURE BY POLICE IS VALID

[1.3] THAT THERE IS NO PROCEDURAL VIOLATION

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CHARGES FRAMED BY SESSION

[2.1]. THAT THE DECEASED COMMITTED SUICIDE AS UNDERSTOOD IN LAW

[2.1.1.] THAT THE ACT FALLS WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF SUICIDE

[2.1.2]. THAT DECRIMINALISATION SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS RIGHT TO

[2.1.3]. THAT VOLUNTARY STARVATION TO BE INTERPRETED AS AN ACT OF SUICIDE

[2.1.4] THAT ASSISTED SUICIDE IS ILLEGAL

[2.2]. THAT MAIA IS CAPABLE OF STANDING TRIAL IN THIS CASE

[2.2.1]. THAT CRIMINAL LIABILITY CAN BE IMPOSED ON A PERSON

[2.2.1.1]. THAT CRIMINAL LIABILITY CAN BE IMPOSED ON CORPORATIONS

[2.2.1.2] THAT CRIMINAL LIABILITY CAN BE IMPOSED ON PROPERTY

[2.2.2]. THAT THERE IS PRESENCE OF ACTUS REUS

[2.2.3]. THAT MENS REA IS ALSO PRESENT

[2.2.3.1]. THAT MAIA POSSESSED THE REQUIRED KNOWLEDGE

[2.2.3.2] THAT MAIA IS WELL EQUIPPED WITH SENSORY RECEPTORS

[2.2.3.3] THAT MAIA HAS SPECIFIC INTENT TO COMPLETE THE TASK

[2.2.4]. THAT MAIA IS CAPABLE OF STANDING TRIAL

[2.2.4.1]. THAT MAIA IS NOT AN INFANT

[2.2.4.2] THAT MAIA IS NOT UNSOUND

[2.2.5]. THAT CRIMINAL LIABILITY SHOULD BE IMPOSED AGAINST PERSON

INCOMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL