MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA, v.

 COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIA BENITEZ

LIRIO AND FEODOR BENITEZ AGUILAR, G.R. No. 105625 January 24, 1994

Facts

Vicente Benitez, husband of Isabel Chipongian died on November 13, 1989 intestate.
Isabel predeceased him on April 25, 1982.

Vicente's sister, Victoria and his nephew, Feodor, filed a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration of Vicente's estate in favor of Feodor, they alleged that the
spouses died without heirs and that the Marissa Benitez-Badua, whom the spouses
raised from childhood, was not related to the spouses in blood, nor legally adopted.
This fact made them the remaining heirs of the late Vicente.

Marissa denies the allegations and submitted documentary evidences supporting her
claim. She presented her Certificate of Live Birth, Baptismal Certificate, Income Tax
Returns and Information Sheet for Membership with the GSIS of the late Vicente
naming her as his daughter and School Records. She also testified that the said spouses
reared and continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter.

Victoria and Feodor tried to prove, mostly thru testimonial evidence, that the said
spouses failed to beget a child during their marriage; that Isabel was referred to an
obstetrician-gynecologist, for treatment. Their primary witness, Victoria Benitez-Lirio,
elder sister of the late Vicente, then 77 years of age, categorically declared that Belen
was not the biological child of the said spouses who were unable to physically procreate
and that the people from their neighborhood never saw Isabel pregnant in 1954, the
year alleged to be the birth year of Marissa.

Another evidence presented was the Deed of extrajudicial settlement

that Vicente Benitez and Nilo Chipongian executed which stated that they are the sole
heirs of the deceased ISABEL CHIPONGIAN because she died without descendants or
ascendants"

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:

The RTC ruled in favor of Marissa relying on Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

Reversed the ruling of the RTC saying that the lower court erred in their reliance on
Article 166 and 170 of the Family Code. The CA declared that Marissa Benitez is not the
biological daughter or child by nature of the spouses and therefore, not a legal heir of
the deceased.

Issue:
a. Whether the indicated parents in the Certificate of Live Birth be rebutted by
sufficient evidence.

Ruling of the Supreme Court:

 Yes, the weight of the factual findings will not be negated by a Certificate of
Live Birth purportedly showing her parents on record.

The totality of contrary evidence presented sufficiently rebutted the truth of

the content of Belen's Certificate of Live Birth, of said rebutting evidence, the
most telling was the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the
Deceased Isabel Chipongian executed on July 20, 1982 by Vicente Benitez, and
Dr. Nilo Chipongian, a brother of Isabel. In their notarized document, they stated
that "(they) are the sole heirs of the deceased Isabel Chipongian because she died
without descendants or ascendants". In executing this Deed, Vicente Benitez
effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of Belen where it appeared
that he was Belen's father. The repudiation was made twenty-eight years after he
signed Belen's Certificate of Live Birth.

b. Whether Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code will apply to a case
where the impugned fact is that the child is not the biological child of a certain
couple?

Ruling of the Supreme Court:

No, Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 do not contemplate a situation where a
child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple.
Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as
his own child of his wife.

Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of

said child. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this as they speak of the prescriptive
period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action
impugning the legitimacy of said child. The foregoing articles then will not apply
to this case since the heirs of the late Vicente are not contending that Belen is not
his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that Belen was not born to
Vicente and Isabel.

Dispositive: The petition for review is dismissed for lack of merit.

VIOLETA CABATBAT LIM, LIM BIAK CHIAO and CALASIAO
BIJON   FACTORY,  vs. 
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, CONSORCIA FRIANEZA GOLEA, MARIA
FRIANEZA VERGARA,  et al  G.R. No. L-69679 October 18, 1988

Facts

Esperanza Cabatbat died without issue on April 23, 1977. The sisters and nephews of
Esperanza filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for the partition
of her estate. They alleged that Violeta Cabatbat Lim is not a child of Esperanza, but
was only an ampon of the spouses Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat who sheltered and
supported her from childhood, without benefit of formal adoption proceedings.

Ruling of the Trial Court:

The RTC finds that Violeta is not the offspring of Esperanza Cabatbat; hence not her
legal heir.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child under Article 263 of the New
Civil Code [now Article 170 of the Family Code] applicable to a case where the claim is
that the child is not the decedent’s child at all?

Ruling of the Supreme Court:

No, recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code is not well-taken.

This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this

case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of
the private Corazons to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased
aunt. They do not claim that Belen Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the
deceased, but that she is not the decedent’s child at all. Being neither a legally adopted
child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza
Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.

Dispositive: The petition is denied for lack of merit.

GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA
ALMONTE, G.R. No. 123450. August 31, 2005

Facts
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married on December 29, 1989. After their marriage,
they lived with Ma. Theresa's parents in Fairview, Quezon City. Almost a year later, on
December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo.
It was proven that nine years before Gerardo married Ma. Theresa on December 10,
1980, she had married Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled. Gerardo also
found out that Mario was still alive and was residing in Loyola Heights, Quezon City.

Thus, this marriage was annulled by the Regional Trial Court for being bigamous. The
RTC declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child and the custody of Jose Gerardo
was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights.

Ma. Theresa moved for the reconsideration of the decision which granted Gerardo
visitation rights. She argued that there was nothing in the law granting "visitation rights
in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child. She further maintained that Jose
Gerardo's surname should be changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name,
following the rule that an illegitimate child shall use the mother's surname.

Gerardo opposed the motion. He insisted on his visitation rights and the retention of
'Concepcion' as Jose Gerardo's surname.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:

The RTC ruled in favor of Gerardo applying the principle of the best interest of the
child.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

The CA reversed the ruling of the RTC on Ma. Theresa’s Motion for reconsideration
based on evidence that Ma. Theresa was married to Mario Gopiao, and that she had
never entered into a lawful marriage with Gerardo since the so-called "marriage" with
the latter was void ab initio Ma. Theresa was legitimately married to Mario Gopiao
when the child Jose Gerardo was born on December 8, 1990. Therefore, the child Jose
Gerardo - under the law - is the legitimate child of the legal and subsisting marriage
between Ma. Theresa and Mario Gopiao; he cannot be deemed to be the illegitimate
child of the void and non-existent 'marriage' between Ma. Theresa and Gerardo.

Issue:
Whether the Jose Gerardo is an illegitimate son of Gerardo Concepcion or a legitimate
child of Mario Gopiao?

Ruling of the Supreme Court:

Jose Gerardo is the legitimate son of the valid and subsisting marriage of Ma. Theresa
and Mario Gopiao.
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly
during the period of conception. To overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article
166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was
no access that could have enabled the husband to father the child. This presumption is
quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical impossibility of
coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child.

Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in Fairview,
Quezon City, Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in Quezon City.
Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a scant four kilometers apart. No evidence at all
was presented to disprove personal access between the spouses. The separation
between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not such as to make
it physically impossible for them to engage in the marital act.

Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the assumption
should be presented by him who asserts the contrary. There is no such evidence here.
Thus, the presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the
marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands.

The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family
Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is
legitimate. As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy,
Article 167 of the Family Code provides:

Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy.

Gerardo has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo in accordance with
Article 166 (1-b). Only Ma. Theresa's husband Mario or, in a proper case, his heirs, who
can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife. Impugning the
legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases,
his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very
beginning, he never became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn
the legitimacy of her child.

Dispositive: The petition is hereby DENIED. As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall
have the right to bear the surnames of his father Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in
conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames. Gerardo cannot impose
his surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law, not related to him in any
way. Also, since no parent-child relationship existed between Gerardo and Jose
Gerardo, the former has no legally demandable right to visit Jose Gerardo.
BELEN SAGAD ANGELES, vs. ALELI "CORAZON" ANGELES MAGLAYA, G.R.
No. 153798 September 2, 2005

Facts
Francisco Angeles died intestate on January 21, 1998. Aleli “Corazan” Angeles,
petitioned for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco M.
Angeles alleging that she is the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva
Mercado, and, together with Belen S. Angeles, decedent’s wife by his second marriage,
are the surviving heirs of the decedent.

Belen Angeles opposed the petition averring that Corazon could not be the daughter of
Francisco for, although she was recorded as Francisco’s legitimate daughter, the
corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Belen further alleged that
Corazon, despite her claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva
Mercado, has not presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or
produced any acceptable document to prove such union. To debunk Corazon’s claim of
being the only child of Francisco, Belen likewise averred that she and Francisco had,
during their marriage, legally adopted Concesa A. Yamat, et al. Belen thus urged that
she, being the surviving spouse of Francisco has superior right to the administration of
his estate.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:

The RTC ruled against the legitimacy of Corazon and appointed Belen as
administratrix.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

The CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The Trial Court was ordered to appoint Aleli
"Corazon" Angeles as administratrix of the estate of Francisco Angeles.

Issue:

Whether Aleli Corazon Angeles is a legitimate child of the deceased.

Ruling of the Supreme Court:

No, Corazon is not a legitimate child of Francisco having not proven the marriage
between the putative parents of Corazon.

Legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage.
Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between
parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the
matter: "Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate."

The Birth Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco against whom legitimate
filiation is asserted. Not even by Genoveva. It was signed by the attending physician,
one Rebecca De Guzman, who certified to having attended the birth of a child. Such
certificate, albeit considered a public record of a private document is, under Section 23,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, evidence only of the fact which gave rise to its execution:
the fact of birth of a child.Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered
as validating proof of paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must be signed by
the father and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses.

It cannot be over-emphasized that the legitimate filiation of a child is a matter fixed by

law itself.29 It cannot, as the decision under review seems to suggest, be made
dependent on the declaration of the attending physician or midwife, or that of the
mother of the newborn child. For then, an unwed mother, with or without the
participation of a doctor or midwife, could veritably invest legitimate status to her
offspring through the simple expedient of writing the putative father’s name in the
appropriate space in the birth certificate

Save for Corazon’s assertion and an entry in her certificate of birth, there is absolutely
no proof of the decedent’s marriage to Corazon’s mother, Genoveva Mercado. To stress,
no marriage certificate or marriage contract – doubtless the best evidence of Francisco’s
and Genoveva’s marriage, if one had been solemnized was offered in evidence. 

Dispositive: The decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed and the RTC Decision
was reinstated.
DOROTEA, VIRGILIO, APOLINARIO, JR., SULPICIO & DOMINADOR, all
surnamed UYGUANGCO, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Judge SENEN PENARANDA
and GRACIANO BACJAO UYGUANGCO, G.R. No. 76873 October 26, 1989 

Facts

Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in 1975, leaving his wife, Dorotea, four legitimate
children and considerable properties which they divided among themselves. Graciano
claims that he was born in 1952 to Apolinario Uyguangco and Anastacia Bacjao, making
him an illegitimate child of the deceased. He filed a complaint for partition against all
the petitioners because he was left out in the extrajudicial settlement of his estate.

Graciano that he had none of the documents mentioned in Article 278 to show that he
was the illegitimate son of Apolinario Uyguangco. These are "the record of birth, a will,
a statement before a court of record, or any authentic writing." Regardless, Graciano
insists that he has nevertheless been "in open and continuous possession of the status of
an illegitimate child," which is now also admissible as evidence of filiation.

Thus, he claims that he lived with his father from 1967 until 1973, receiving support
from him during that time; that he has been using the surname Uyguangco without
objection from his father and the petitioners, among others.

Issue:

Whether Graciano should be allowed to prove that he is an illegitimate child of his

claimed father, who is already dead, in the absence of the documentary evidence
required by the Civil Code.

Ruling of the Supreme Court:

No, Graciano is barred from proving that he is an illegitimate child of the deceased.

Since Graciano seeks to prove his filiation under the second paragraph of Article 172 of
the Family Code, his action is now barred because of his alleged father’s death in 1975.

Article 172 paragraph 2 in relation to Article 175 of the Family Code states that:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the

following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except
when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

It is clear that Graciano can no longer be allowed at this time to introduce evidence of
his open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child or prove his
alleged filiation through any of the means allowed by the Rules of Court or special
laws. The simple reason is that Apolinario Uyguangco is already dead and can no
longer be heard on the claim of his alleged son’s illegitimate filiation. library

In her Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy
explains the rationale of the rule, thus: "It is a truism that unlike legitimate children who
are publicly recognized, illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy
and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. Who then can be sure
of their filiation but the parents themselves? But suppose the child claiming to be the
illegitimate child of a certain person is not really the child of the latter? The putative
parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the child’s filiation, and
this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead."

Considering that the private respondent has, as we see it, established at least prima
facie proof of his alleged filiation, we find it regrettable that his action should be barred
under the said article. But that is the law and we have no choice but to apply it.

Dispositive: The petition is GRANTED