UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

TABITHAT JONES,

Plaintiff,

v.

DELTA AIR LINES, INC.,

Defendant

PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT
 INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Ms. Tabitha Jones, filed a Complaint against Delta Air Lines, Inc. after facing

numerous unlawful employment practices. While Ms. Jones was a flight attendant-in-training,

she underwent numerous instances of racial discrimination, specifically against her hairstyle

decisions. These instances occurred due to Delta’s insensitive and Eurocentric grooming and

appearance preferences for their flight attendants, and highlighted clear stereotypes that Delta’s

own employees hold concerning what hairstyles on Black women are professional- chemically

relaxed, more “Eurocentric-conforming” hair- and unprofessional- natural, protected hair.1 Delta

has made numerous public claims about being a company supposedly focused on employing

more Black people and people of color, and providing equal opportunities to all. This case is a

clear example of how Delta is undermining their own public vows. Ms. Jones did what is

recommended of any employee and filed a complaint of the discrimination to Delta’s HR

department; soon after, the company demoted Ms. Jones.

Granting Delta’s Motion for Summary Judgment will only serve as a negative example to

other large companies, and act as an indication that they can get away with making

discriminatory comments in the workplace. Delta’s actions showed a clear disrespect for Ms.

Jones’ race, and caused Ms. Jones to suffer mental anguish and emotional distress. Denying the

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The discouragement and banning of ethnic hairstyles is discriminatory and only serves

to encourage a “notion of white supremacy.” See UPS Allows Employees to Wear Natural Black

Hairstyles and Beards, USA Today.

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opportunity for a jury to hear the issues of this case and decide on proper redress for Ms. Jones is

unfair and unjust. Delta’s Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Factual Background

1. Ms. Jones’ employment and training. Ms. Jones was hired as a Delta flight attendant in

December 2018. (Compl. ¶ 13). At the start of her employment, she had chemically straightened

shoulder-length hair. Ms. Jones began her employment with Delta in June 2019 and attended a

mandatory eight-week flight attendant training program in Atlanta, Georgia. (Id. ¶ 15). During

the second week of the program, she decided to change her hairstyle and cut her hair into a short

afro. (Id. ¶ 16). Her direct supervisor in Atlanta, Ms. Natalie Roundtree, told Ms. Jones that her

new style was “an interesting choice”, but did not suggest that she change her hairstyle. (Id. ¶

17). Ms. Roundtree was impressed with Ms. Jones’ French and Spanish speaking abilities,

acquired from her achievement of a linguistics degree with concentrations in the two languages

from Emory University in 2010. (Id. ¶ 13). Additionally, Ms. Roundtree expressed how she

believed that “Ms. Jones’ language skills and prior experience would make her a strong

candidate to work in Delta One cabins.” (Dep. ¶ 7-9). As such, she recommended Ms. Jones for

additional training and placement with the elite international flight attendants that exclusively

work in Delta One luxury cabins. (Compl. ¶ 18).

2. Ms. Jones’ secondary training and first assignment. In August 2019, Ms. Jones began an

additional two-week international flight attendant training program in Brooklyn, New York.

(Compl. ¶ 19). At the start of the program, she had her hair styled in bantu knots. (Id.). Her direct

supervisor in Brooklyn was Mark White; he was in charge of running the training program,

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assigning flight attendant schedules, performing employee reviews, and recommending

promotions for the Delta One flight attendants that he supervised. (Id. ¶ 20). Upon meeting Ms.

Jones for the first time at the training program, Mr. White made comments about Ms. Jones’

hairstyle, telling her that Delta One customers might consider the style to be “unprofessional”,

and even asked if she could “straighten her hair.” (Id. ¶ 21). Ms. Jones completed her

international flight attendant training program on August 15, and received her initial flight

assignment on August 20; she was assigned to a short route between airports in NYC and

Toronto, Canada, on planes that did not have Delta One cabins. (Id. ¶ 22-23).

3. Ms. Jones’ complaint and demotion. Ms. Jones made a complaint the following day to

Grace Evans, a specialist in Delta’s Human Resources department, due to her belief that she had

been assigned to flights without Delta One cabins because of her natural hair style, and detailed

the comments made by Ms. Roundtree and Mr. White about her hair. (Compl. ¶ 24). Ms. Evans

recommended that Ms. Jones should have a conference call with Diane Greene, a manager in

Delta’s corporate Human Resources department; during the call, Ms. Jones detailed the

discriminatory experiences that she faced, and Ms. Greene agreed to speak with Mr. White and

investigate the issue. (Id. ¶ 25). In an email between Ms. Greene and Mr. White, Ms. Green made

statements implying that Ms. Jones needed to be monitored and that she needed to refer to

Delta’s Grooming and Appearance Guidelines. (Email dated August 25, 2019). Ms. Jones

received a new flight schedule on September 15, which included Delta One cabin service on trips

to Paris and Madrid. (Compl. ¶ 26). On October 15, Ms. Jones attended a meeting hosted by Mr.

White for NYC based Delta One flight attendants. (Id. ¶ 27). There, Mr. White confronted Ms.

Jones about her sharing of flight vouchers with unauthorized individuals, and told her that he

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planned on reporting her violation of company policy. (Id.) Additionally, he noticed that her hair

was styled in knotless box braids, and commented that her hair was “much neater” than her

previous style. (Id.) Many of the other Delta One flight attends gave away their flight vouchers to

unauthorized individuals, but they were never disciplined by Mr. White for their violation of

company policy. (Id. ¶ 28). A fellow employee, Ms. Jessica Brown, even testified how Mr. White

had encouraged her “not to purchase tickets for friends, but [she had] not been formally

disciplined. (Dep. ¶ 7). Mr. White informed Ms. Jones on November 1 that she would be

assigned to domestic flights for the next six months, which was a demotion as domestic flights

required less skill and attendants received less compensation. (Compl. ¶ 29-30). Ms. Jones gave

Mr. White her two-week notice on December 15, choosing to leave her job at Delta due to his

discriminatory treatment and demotion.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment can only be granted if the movant is able to show that

there is no genuine dispute over any material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. § 56 When considering a

motion for summary judgment, the court is required to view the evidence in a way that is

favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment, and must draw inferences in favor of

said party. O’Diah v. Oasis, 954 F. Supp. 2d 261, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). The court is also required

to resolve all ambiguities and determine whether a rational jury could find in favor of the

non-moving party. Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 38 (finding that the defendant’s

motion for summary judgment could not be granted due to the fact that the plaintiff presented

sufficient proof of dispute over material facts so as for a jury to find in favor of the plaintiff).

ARGUMENT

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I. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment Should Be Denied Because A Rational Jury

Would Find in Favor Of Plaintiff.

The Court should deny Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment because a rational

jury would view the material facts and find in favor of Plaintiff. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964 prohibits employment practices that are made on the basis of race and emphasizes how it

is unlawful “to discriminate against any individual with respect to. . . [their] privileges of

employment, because of such individual’s race.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Article 15 of New York

State Human Rights Law expands on the details of what sort of employment actions are

unlawful, and defines how race is to be defined in legal cases. Article 15 § 296 highlights how it

is unlawful for an employer, on the basis of an individual’s race, to “discharge from

employment…or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions

or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296. Article 15 § 292 defines race as including

traits that have been historically associated with race, such as hair texture and protective

hairstyles, which includes “such hairstyles as braids, locks, and twists.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 292.

In cases alleging discriminatory treatment without direct evidence of discrimination, courts apply

the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. The parameters of this framework involve a

plaintiff making a prima facie case, which means that a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) she is

a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for her job and performed the job well; (3)

she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the employer sought employees from

persons of similar qualifications. A plaintiff must also demonstrate that the employer’s reason for

the adverse employment action was pretext for discrimination. The burden-shifting framework

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must be satisfied in order for a defendant employer’s motion for summary judgment to be

dismissed. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 793 (1973).

A. Ms. Jones Can Establish a Prima Facie Case Due to the Discrimination and Unfair

Employment Actions She Faced in The Workplace

A part of establishing a prima facie case involves showing that the plaintiff was qualified

for her job, which involves providing evidence showing that there was satisfactory job

performance by the plaintiff. See Stephens v. State Univ. of N.Y., 11 F. Supp. 2d 242, 246 (U.S.

Dist. Ct. 1998). Specifically, the plaintiff must show that they were demonstrating satisfactory

job performance as set out and defined by their employer. See Taylor v. Local, 32 E SEIU, 286 F.

Supp. 2d 246, 246 (U.S. Dist. Ct. 2003). In establishing this part of a prima facie case, it is

especially important to show that the plaintiff is qualified for the position that they held at the

moment of employment, and to acknowledge that the plaintiff is not obliged to disprove any of

the defendant’s claims to the contrary; showing the plaintiff’s degree of qualification ties into the

next prima facie requirement. Id at 253.

In a prima facie case, it must be shown that the plaintiff faced an adverse employment

action, despite being qualified and performing well at their job. See O’Diah, 954 F. Supp. 2d at

272 (demonstrating how the plaintiff was considered a valuable worker, and was even promoted

prior to the adverse action). A key distinction made when a plaintiff is alleging an adverse

employment action involves highlighting the disparate treatment between white employees and

Black employees, and a lack of equal employment action despite being similarly situated. See

Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 36. (U.S. App. 2000). Examples of the adverse

employment actions that a plaintiff may face are established in Article 15 of New York State

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Human Rights Law. See Id. (noting how the plaintiff was initially fired without receiving a last

chance waiver that others would receive in similar instances).

The final element to be proven in a prima facie case is for the employment position in

question to remain available to employees who were similarly situated after the employee’s

rejection. See Lydeatte v. Bronx Overall Econ. Dev. Corp. 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644 (S.D.N.Y.

Mar. 11, 2003). When a defendant is unable to prove why other candidates for the position at

hand were more qualified, then a plaintiff can show why the defendant’s actions were

discriminatory and unlawful. See Terry v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 128, 129 (U.S. App. 2003).

(detailing how the plaintiff suffered due to defendant’s decisions to not promote him, even

though he was as equally qualified for the positions.).

As a Black woman, Ms. Jones is a member of a protected class, and the Parties concede

this requirement of establishing a prima facie case is satisfied.

1. A Rational Jury Would Find that Ms. Jones Was Qualified For Her Employment as

a Flight Attendant And Was Qualified For a Position as an International Flight

Attendant.

A jury would find that Ms. Jones was qualified for her employment because of her prior

experience, her education and her success in her training programs. Ms. Jones was recommended

by a superior, Ms. Roundtree, to attend additional training and be a permanent placement with a

team of elite international flight attendants, that worked in Delta’s luxury cabin. Ms. Roundtree

was impressed with Ms. Jones’ French and Spanish speaking skills, which she had because of

her degree in linguistics. Ms. Roundtree expressed that “Ms. Jones received very positive

reviews from all of her instructors during training… [and that they] were impressed by her

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abilities.” (Dep. ¶ 29-30). She completed both her initial flight attendant training and

international flight attendant training successfully. Should she had been given the opportunity,

Ms. Jones would have displayed a performance at her job that would have satisfied Delta’s

expectations for their attendants. See Taylor at 253.

A rational jury would be able to see that there is proof of Ms. Jones being qualified for

the international flight attendant position.

2. Ms. Jones Suffered an Adverse Employment Action After She Was Unfairly

Demoted to Domestic Flights.

Here, Ms. Jones faced a demotion from her superior, Mr. White, who was in charge of the

international flight attendant training program. He was additionally in charge of assigning these

international flight attendant schedules. Upon completing her training program, Ms. Jones

received her first flight assignment to a short route that did not have Delta One cabins, which she

had been specially trained for. After making a complaint to a member of Delta’s HR department,

she was given a flight schedule that had better international flights with Delta One cabins. Like

in O’Diah, Ms. Jones was performing her job well, and was satisfying expectations. See O’Diah,

954 F. Supp. 2d at 272. However, not long after, Mr. White informed Ms. Jones that she had

violated company policy due to Ms. Jones sharing her flight vouchers with unauthorized

individuals. This is something that many Delta One flight attendants do without facing discipline

from Mr. White. See Graham, 230 F.3d at 36. Due to this violation, Mr. White told Ms. Jones

that she would be assigned to domestic flights for the next six months; this is seen as a demotion,

because domestic flight attendants receive less compensation, and Ms. Jones would not get to

apply the training she had received to domestic flights.

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 A rational jury would be able to view this evidence of the prima facie case in favor of the

Plaintiff and see how impactful this adverse demotion is to Ms. Jones.

3. The Position of Being a Delta One International Flight Attendant Remained

Available to Others Who Also Had Misused Flight Vouchers.

Ms. Jones faced an unfair demotion due to her action of sharing her flight vouchers with

unauthorized individuals. However, this was something that frequently occurred amongst other

employees. One of her fellow employees told Ms. Jones that, although she had been encouraged

to not purchase flight vouchers for unauthorized individuals, she had “never been punished for

such purchases.” (Dep. ¶ 8) Many of the other attendants on the Delta One team used their flight

vouchers to book flights for friends as frequently as they so wished, without facing any sort of

demotion or commentary from Mr. White. See Lydeatte, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644 at 5. Mr.

White had expressed that he was aware of these other violations, and had not reported any one of

those violations of company policy to Delta’s corporate department. See Terry, 366 F.3d at 129.

The court would be able to see that there is a clear dispute over the reasoning behind the

decision to demote Ms. Jones, and would be able to use this single dispute of fact as reason to

deny Delta’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

B. Ms. Jones Is Able to Show How Delta’s Reasoning for their Employment Action

Was Clearly Pretext

Ms. Jones was demoted to the position of stewardess on domestic flights due to Delta’s

decision that her misuse of flight vouchers on an unauthorized individual was enough of a

justification for the denial of a promotion, but only after Ms. Jones had filed a complaint about

discriminatory commentary from her supervisors.

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 In order to satisfy the McDonnell Douglas Burden-Shifting framework, a plaintiff must

demonstrate how an employer’s stated reasoning for their actions was actually pretext for

discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. at 729. This claim of pretext requires for a plaintiff to

show that other employees reported to the same supervisor and were “subject to the same

standards governing performance evaluation and discipline.” See Taylor, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 246.

The Plaintiff party must also show that there is more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the

material facts . . .” and must show that “there is a genuine issue for trial.” See Lydeatte, 2003

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644 at 3 (quoting Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2000)).

Here, Delta Airlines’ decision to deny Ms. Jones the opportunity to be an attendant on

international flights was clearly pretext to punish Ms. Jones for speaking out against the

discriminatory statements made by her superiors. In emails between Mr. White and Ms. Diane

Greene, a member of Delta’s HR department, Ms. Greene stated that Ms. Jones’ first year of

employment would determine her success with Delta, brought to Mr. White’s attention the

misuse of flight vouchers that Ms. Jones had done, and additionally informed him that he had to

demote two flight attendants to domestic flights; Ms. Greene ended the email by saying that she

would “leave selection to [Mr. White’s] discretion.” (Email dated August 25, 2019). This was a

clear intent to encourage Mr. White to demote Ms. Jones based on her complaint against his

discriminatory actions.

Here, unlike in Taylor, no satisfactory deficiencies were identified that weren’t also

identified in other employees who did not face the same discrimination as Ms. Jones. See Taylor,

286 F. Supp. 2d at 246. In Graham, the plaintiff was able to point to two other employees who

had not been dismissed even though they had received more “last chance waivers”; by

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highlighting the disparate treatment, the Court ultimately decided that it was up to a jury to

decide whether the employees were equally treated. See Graham, 230 F.3d at 17. Additionally,

Ms. Jones has clear evidence of her superiors calling her protective hairstyles “unprofessional”

and repeatedly implying that her hair does not fit in with the image that Delta wants their flight

attendants to have. Like in O’Diah, a rational jury would see this evidence and determine that

Ms. Jones’ demotion was done out of a discriminatory motive. See O’Diah, 954 F. Supp. 2d at

27. Ultimately, a rational jury will be able to clearly infer that Delta had pretext for unlawful

employment discrimination, and that Ms. Jones was unjustly demoted.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Plaintiff requests that the Court denies Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment.

Dated: April 16, 2021

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Alexis J. Ruiz

Alexis J. Ruiz
8000 Utopia Pkwy
Jamaica, NY 11439
alexisruiz16@stjohns.edu

I certify that I have complied with all instructions and policies for this assignment.

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