New Populism and Responses in the 21st century

Theme: Interdisciplinary Construction of Historical Narratives

By Dr Prerana Srimaal

Abstract:

Populist perspectives have taken over the way that we perceive the past, present and
future - and this has led to some striking questions. One such being, the barrage of
information and the forces of globalisation have led to increasing questions on the
relevance and the value of the past – indeed a denial even. Movies, newspapers or the
internet bombard us and expose us to the past – both familiar and unfamiliar. Within
this framework - this paper will engage with the myriad ways in which the past, though
no longer present – is a presence in our lives today. It will discuss and analyse the
possibilities through which to think historically, within the framework of populist
movements, to make ourselves more aware of the multiple perspectives that exist by
exploring how modern technology and multi- and interdisciplinary approaches and
sources – whether visual, auditory, sensory, memory-based or written ones – changed
the way historians work and address their audience.

The envisioning of the future of Historical Studies in this 21st century, especially how
understanding of History has changed with an informational blast - where the internet
has flooded everyone with data, and stories, will be attempted. The paper will be an
attempt to also put emphasis on structuring an ethical environment where all
challenges are legitimized on the basis of arguing History to be a Truth ‘making’
Discourse, and that understanding can only be experienced through an
interdisciplinary approach towards the construction of narratives.

Keywords: Interdisciplinarity, Narratives, Memory, Internet, Multiple pasts

Populism is not a very well understood concept because, over the past several decades, it has
been infrequent in emerging countries (e.g., Chávez’s Venezuela, Duterte’s Philippines, etc.) and
virtually nonexistent in developed countries. It is one of those phenomena that comes along in a
big way about once a lifetime—like pandemics, depressions, or wars. For instance, it existed as a
major force in the world was in the 1930s, when most countries became populist. Over the last
few years, it has again emerged as a major force.

Populism takes many forms, spanning continents and cutting across left–right lines. It is often
used to describe both parties of the right, that oppose immigration and seek to restore national
sovereignty; and of the left, that pit the people against an exploitative economic elite.
All contributors see populism as thin-centred and agree on many of its core features: anti-
pluralism, anti-elitism and the juxtaposition of a virtuous people against elites
With regard to the ability of populism to cut across left–right lines, all contributors agree on the
chameleon-like character of populism and argue that while right-wing populism pits the people
against a cultural elite, left-wing populism pits the people against an economic elite

Populist Template
Populism is a political and social phenomenon that arises from the common people, typically
looked at as the mass who are fed up with
1) wealth and opportunity gaps,
2) perceived cultural threats from those with different values in the country and from
outsiders,
3) the “establishment elites” in positions of power, and
4) government not working effectively for them.

These sentiments lead to strong socio-cultural-historical movements that are typically

confrontational rather than collaborative and exclusive rather than inclusive. As a result, conflicts
typically occur between opposing factions (usually the economic and socially left versus the
right), both within the country and between countries. These conflicts typically become
progressively more forceful in self-reinforcing ways. Within countries, conflicts often lead to
disorder (e.g., strikes and protests) that prompt stronger reactions and the growing pressure to
more forcefully regain order by suppressing the other side. Influencing and, in some cases,
controlling the media typically becomes an important aspect of engaging in the conflicts. In
some cases, these conflicts have also led to civil wars. Such conflicts have led a number of
democracies to become dictatorships to bring order to the disorder that results from these
conflicts.

The rebellion and the conflict that comes with it occur in varying degrees. Sometimes the system
bends with it and sometimes the system breaks. Whether it bends or breaks in response to this
flux and conflict depends on how flexible and well established the system is. It also seems to
depend on how reasonable and respectful of the system the populists who gain power are. But
most importantly, it also depends on the people, and the power dynamics and the way they both
are perceived.

To make the point even more emphasized -

The term ‘populism’ has been used to describe contemporary politics across the world – from the
political process leading to the Trump presidency in the United States to Erdoğan’s
transformation from a reformist to authoritarian leader, to Putin’s control over the Russian state
apparatus. However, populism is not a temporarily limited phenomenon and Perón’s Argentina,
Indira Gandhi’s politics of garibi hatao, and even Jacobian politics of France has been described
as populist. However, essential features of populist politics are a subject of debate in the
scholarly literature and is invoked for a wide variety of political phenomenon – from economic
prolificacy of public authorities to confessional politics; and, from ‘sons of the soil’ premises of
political articulation to claims of unique nationhood. Even the ‘Occupy’ movements in various
parts of the world have been described as populist. Closer home, the political process around the
emergence and election of Aam Admi Party in Delhi and the three-decade-long political
mobilization by the Bharatiya Janata party and its electoral victory in the 2014 and 2019 general
elections, have all been described as populist politics.

The malleability of the term notwithstanding, more recent usage encapsulates the angst of
liberals about illiberal masses being mobilized on narrow partisan planks like xenophobia and
insular nationalism; or, concerns about rising technocratic control of governance processes,
including vast swathes of (mostly, economic) decision-making being insulated from democratic
accountability. In light of the above, it is therefore postulated that the meaning and implications
of the term populism cannot be derived only from political practice or from the visible political
phenomenon. Furthermore, it is postulated that populism is not the converse of liberalism, as is
often presumed. On the contrary, it becomes obvious, why historical narratives play a huge role
in laying a foundation to populist traditions as well - at least the contemporary expressions of the
phenomenon of populism, and is deeply connected to the theory and practice of it.

Which by default means that Historical studies have to respond to a situation where if one has to
analyse trends and narratives over time, especially within New populist tendencies, it has to also
understand where these conflicts, angst arise from.

(a) Politics of Socio-cultural Recognition

Arguably, the strongest linkage that can be established between politics of recognition and
identity, and that of redistribution/ development, lies in the realm of various tribal/ adivasi
communities in India. There is a wide variety of articulation of tribal identity in India; ranging
from those in the North-eastern States to those in Central India (Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh &
Orissa) to those in Gujarat and Maharashtra, as also to those in Kerala, Tamil Nadu and
Karnataka). The wide difference between the dynamics of identity articulation between these
tribal social groups notwithstanding, their contest for resources with the State take similar forms.
Much of this contest structured around politics of recognition is mediated through the syntax
(and sometimes, the frame of) politics of redistribution; the latter also forming the basis of a
language of dialogic engagement with the State. The question of co-equal representation remains
a central, unresolved issue of liberal theory.
(b) Politics of Recognition of a Region
The politics of recognition and representation of a regional identity also takes varied forms
across the country. Sometimes, mediated by tribal, socio-communal or other forms of politics of
recognition, such claims are often seen as a ‘more secular’ by the state. Much of regional identity
politics (e.g., that of Uttaranchal, Orissa, Himachal Pradesh and lately, Gujarat and Bihar) takes a
strong language of politics of development and is focused on leveraging public resources
controlled or structured by the state. Such representation of ‘backwardness’ also overlaps with
the belied promises of economic equity.
(c) Politics of Recognition by Exclusion
These identities, premised often on socio-religious factors, seen as the greatest threat of the
‘nation building’ process but have paradoxically, been central in structuring the national political
process. Such claims create a dispositive of a social community (e.g. Hindutva), to anchor a
politics of exclusion for other social groups. Interestingly, bases of such identities in terms of the
developmental-deficits for rest of the social space. The contest between the politics of identity
and politics of development continues and is seen to be throwing up an ‘alternative’ form of
imagination of a homogenous community as a discursive troupe that is often mobilized by the
populist political process.
(d) Politics of Recognition by Representation and Inclusion
This strand requires the mediation of politics of development for a dialogic engagement with the
state as witnessed in the recent articulation of Dalit politics in many north Indian states, chiefly,
in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Haryana and Rajasthan. The articulation of a Dalit caste identity creates
a new form of challenge to the premise of liberal democracy, especially, its stress on equity and
justice. The community-based imagination of the identity deployed by this strand of articulation
serves both purposes of acting as a counterpoint to (c) above as well as creating an alternative
imagination of political process of recognition and representation.

In all the above claims demanding recognition of difference and fairer terms of representation.
The impact of this process is deeper than it would appear at first glance. By allowing almost all
such claims to fester unaddressed and unresolved for decades, has created the basis for its own
subversion. The longer these are ignored or undermined claims of recognition and representation,
the more was the necessity of such identity claims to engender autonomous forms of imagination
of a homogenous community striving for recognition.

As of January 2021 there were 4.66 billion active internet users worldwide - 59.5
percent of the global population. Of this total, 92.6 percent (4.32 billion) accessed the
internet via mobile devices.

Internet penetration rate in India went up to nearly around 45 percent in 2021, from just
about four percent in 2007. Although these figures seem relatively low, it meant that nearly
half of the population of 1.37 billion people had access to internet that year.

One such being, the barrage of information and the forces of globalisation have led to increasing
questions on the relevance and the value of the past – indeed a denial even. Movies, newspapers
or the internet bombard us and expose us to the past – both familiar and unfamiliar. Within this
framework - this paper will engage with the myriad ways in which the past, though no longer
present – is a presence in our lives today. It will discuss and analyse the possibilities through
which to think historically, within the framework of populist movements, to make ourselves
more aware of the multiple perspectives that exist by exploring how modern technology and
multi- and interdisciplinary approaches and sources – whether visual, auditory, sensory,
memory-based or written ones – changed the way historians work and address their audience.
The envisioning of the future of Historical Studies in this 21st century, especially how
understanding of History has changed with an informational blast - where the internet has
flooded everyone with data, and stories, will be attempted.

There are nearly as many formulas for defining the concept of populism as there are books,
papers, and treatises on the topic. The formulas, however, tend to fall within, or at least near,
three interpretive models. The first might be called the European model, because it derives
mainly from the European context and that is where it is often applied. This is also the simplest
and most direct of the definitions: populism is the nationalist politics of hate. This is a definition
provided, for example by John Lukacs, who, from his vantage point as a historian of the
European carnage of the 1930s and 1940s, used the term broadly. Lukacs experienced the
nationalist hatreds of war close at hand in his native Budapest before departing Hungary for the
United States in 1946, where he began a long career writing about the European catastrophe.
Lukacs wrote of the dangers in the "popular sentiments" unleashed by democracy, sentiments
that led to national hatred – that is to say populism – and which were widespread "almost
everywhere" during the long twentieth century.

Then there is the Latin American model, whereby populism has represented an inclusive
alternative to exclusive structures of power. In the name of the people, under conditions when
formal liberal democracy has represented the narrow politics of oligarchs, populism has
expanded political space to include workers, the poor, and the marginalized. In places, populism
has also involved a more racially inclusive politics, especially regarding the indigenous and
black communities of the Andes, the Caribbean, and elsewhere. Another feature of the Latin
American formula has been the key role played by the charismatic leader. From Juan Perón of
Argentina and Getúlio Vargas of Brazil in the mid-twentieth century, to Hugo Chávez of
Venezuela and Evo Morales of Bolivia in the early twenty-first century, populism has
represented a personalized politics that has tended towards a type of authoritarian rule that has
recurred on the Latin American scene (Halperin, D., 1993: 258-66).
This brings us to the third and most perplexing of the models, that is the American model in
which populism reveals itself as a shape-shifting phantom. In its classic iteration, this takes the
form of a narrative about the People's Party (or Populist Party) of the 1890s, which originally
pursued progressive and leftwing politics, but which in the second half of the twentieth century
reemerged as rightwing bigotry and intolerance. This is the narrative associated with the
historian Richard Hofstadter and an influential group of mid-twentieth century social scientists
concerned with the social psychology of mass movements.
describe Joseph McCarthy as "the quintessential populist."