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HOW TO COMPETE: THE IMPACT OF WORKPLACE PRACTICES AND

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ON PRODUCTIVITY


Sandra E. Black and Lisa M. Lynch*

Abstract—Using data from a unique nationally representative sample of analysis of the impact of workplace practices on productiv-
businesses, we examine the impact of workplace practices, information
technology, and human capital investments on productivity. We estimate
ity. Some of these studies have been hindered by problems
an augmented Cobb-Douglas production function with both cross section such as low survey response rates, firm-level rather than
and panel data covering the period of 1987–1993, using both within and establishment-level productivity data, limited workplace
GMM estimators. We find that it is not whether an employer adopts a
particular work practice but rather how that work practice is actually practice data, and subjective measures of productivity.
implemented within the establishment that is associated with higher Moreover, although there is ample micro-based evidence on
productivity. Unionized establishments that have adopted human resource the impact of human capital accumulation on individuals’
practices that promote joint decision making coupled with incentive-based
compensation have higher productivity than other similar nonunion plants, wages, much less is known about the direct effect of human
whereas unionized businesses that maintain more traditional labor man- capital on the productivity of businesses. Finally, although
agement relations have lower productivity. Finally, plant productivity is there has been some research using firm data on the impact
higher in businesses with more-educated workers or greater computer
usage by nonmanagerial employees. of computers on productivity, these studies have not been
able to simultaneously control for workplace practices and
I. Introduction human capital investments.
Our work builds upon this research by using a large,
H OW do managerial decisions such as whether or not to
adopt a Total Quality Management (TQM) system or
expand an employee involvement program affect labor
nationally representative sample of manufacturing busi-
nesses. Because of the survey design, we have detailed
information on workplace practices (beyond just their inci-
productivity? Does the implementation of “high-
dence), human capital investments, and a measure of the
performance” workplace practices ensure better firm perfor-
diffusion of computer usage, that can be matched with
mance? Does the presence of a union hinder or enhance the
standard cross-sectional and longitudinal measures of inputs
probability of success associated with implementing these
and outputs of the production process. More specifically, the
practices? Do computers really help workers be more pro-
EQW-NES provides information on workplace practices
ductive? These questions and others have been raised in
such as TQM systems, benchmarking, the diffusion of
recent years as many firms have reorganized or reengi-
computer usage among nonmanagerial employees, recruit-
neered their work sites from the old Fordist model of work
organization to new high-performance work systems that ment strategies, the use of profit sharing, and the extent of
decentralize decision making within a firm. Using data from employee participation in decision making. We also have
a unique nationally representative sample of businesses (the information on the average educational level of the estab-
Educational Quality of the Workforce National Employers lishment and the numbers of employees trained, along with
Survey (EQW-NES)), we begin to examine these and other other characteristics of the business such as whether or not
important questions about the determinants of productivity. it is unionized, employee turnover, the age of the capital
Although there have been many studies on the impact of stock, and the demographic composition of the workforce.
capital investments and R&D on firm or establishment Finally, one unique design feature of the EQW-NES is that
productivity, until recently there has been very little direct we are able to match it with the Bureau of the Census’
Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) so that we can
Received for publication November 5, 1997. Revision accepted for utilize the panel data dimension of the LRD.
publication August 2, 2000. We first estimate a standard Cobb-Douglas production
* Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and Tufts University and NBER, function with cross-sectional data that is augmented by our
respectively.
Part of the work reported herein was supported under the Education measures of workplace practices, information technology,
Research and Development Center program, agreement number and human capital investments. We then estimate a standard
R117Q00011-91, CFDA 84.117Q, as administered by the Office of Edu- production function on the LRD panel covering the period
cational Research and Improvement, U.S. Department of Education. This
funding was administered through the National Center on the Educational from 1987 to 1993 using both within and generalized
Quality of the Workforce (EQW), University of Pennsylvania. The authors method of moments (GMM) estimators to address omitted
have benefitted from comments by Martin Bailey, Richard Freeman, Dale
Jorgenson, John Halitwanger, and participants in seminars at the NBER,
variable and endogeneity bias. The average establishment
Census Bureau, London School of Economics, Institute for Fiscal Studies, residual over this period is then used as a measure of the
MIT, and the Universities of Bristol, Essex, Mannheim, Maryland, Ox- establishment fixed effect and is regressed on our measures
ford, and Warwick. We would especially like to thank Fabio Schiantarelli
for his extensive comments on this paper and Steve Bond, Joyce Cooper, of workplace practices, human capital investments, diffu-
Wayne Gray, Arnie Reznek, and Steve Rudolph who provided much sion of computer usage, and other employee and employer
assistance on the data used in this project. The findings and opinions characteristics to determine their association with produc-
expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the position or policies
of OERI, the U.S. Department of Education, the Bureau of the Census, the tivity. In this way, we try to see how the information on
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, or the Federal Reserve System. workplace practices we obtained in our survey is related to

The Review of Economics and Statistics, August 2001, 83(3): 434–445


© 2001 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
HOW TO COMPETE 435

which businesses did better or worse on average over the resent an important contribution to the literature on work-
period 1988–1993. place practices and productivity, again it is not easy to
We find that workplace practices do matter, no matter generalize these findings for a broader segment of the
how the production function is estimated. However, it is not economy.
so much whether or not an employer adopts a particular Another research strategy is to examine a more represen-
work practice but rather how that work practice is actually tative cross-sectional sample of firms to see the impact of
implemented within the establishment that is associated workplace practices on broader measures of performance
with higher productivity. For example, simply adopting a such as productivity or profitability. Examples of this strat-
TQM system has an insignificant or even negative impact egy include Bartel (1989), Ichniowski (1990), Huselid
on productivity, whereas increasing the proportion of work- (1995), Huselid and Becker (1996), and Delaney and
ers meeting regularly to discuss workplace issues or extend- Huselid (1996). These studies have found that there is a
ing profit sharing to production workers has a significant correlation between human resource management systems
and positive impact on productivity. and business performance as measured by labor productiv-
We also see important differences across plants on the ity, Tobin’s q, or present value gain in cash flow and firm
basis of the type of labor-management relations within the market value. Unfortunately, much of this work has been
plant. Unionized plants that have adopted new workplace limited by low survey response rate, high levels of aggre-
practices such as incentive-based compensation or greater gation of human resource management practices and per-
employee participation in decision making have substan- formance measures, and the use of an index of human
tially higher productivity than similar nonunion plants or resource practices. Examining human resource management
establishments with more traditional labor-management re- practices at the firm or business line level may miss the
lations. In addition, those plants with more-educated work- degree of heterogeneity in practices within multiple estab-
ers also have significantly higher productivity, everything lishment firms. Therefore, we believe that the preferable
else constant. Finally, the greater the proportion of nonman- level of analysis for the issues we wish to examine is the
agerial workers who use computers, the higher is plant establishment level. In addition, using an index of work-
productivity. place practices can lead to ambiguities in the interpretation
of the results. Although it probably makes sense to combine
II. Background Discussion subjective responses that are centered on a particular theme
into an index, it is not clear why it is necessary to group
Our paper is not the first to examine the impact of
these responses when there are more detailed data available
workplace practices on the productivity of businesses, but
much of the previous work on this topic has been limited in on factors such as the proportion of workers involved in
several ways. Some of the most detailed research on the decision making.
adoption and nature of new workplace practices has been Nevertheless, there is a burgeoning theoretical and em-
done on a case study basis. This includes work by Krafcik pirical debate on the existence of synergies in bundles of
(1988), Womack, Jones, and Roos (1991), Ichniowski human resource management practices. The theoretical
(1992), Berg et al. (1996), and Batt (1995). These studies work of Milgrom and Roberts (1995) and Kandel and
have provided us with a wealth of information on the chain Lazear (1992), along with the empirical studies mentioned
of events that resulted in the adaptation of new workplace above, are important contributions in this area. Milgrom and
practices, but it is difficult to generalize these results to a Roberts argue that the impact of a system of human resource
broader spectrum of the economy. practices will be greater than the sum of its parts because of
One solution to this problem is to conduct a detailed the synergistic effects of bundling practices together. Kan-
intra-industry study of the adoption of workplace practices del and Lazear argue that introducing a profit-sharing plan
to see their impact on a range of industry-specific perfor- for all workers in a firm may have little or no impact on
mance measures. Examples of intra-industry studies include productivity unless it is linked with other practices that
work by Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997), Arthur address the inherent free rider problem associated with
(1994), Kelley (1994, 1996), Bailey (1993), and Dunlop and corporate-wide profit sharing plans. The empirical evidence
Weil (1996). By examining human resource practices asso- on synergies is mixed, with Huselid and Ichniowski arguing
ciated with one specific production process, it is possible to that bundles matter more than individual practices and
greatly reduce problems of the underlying heterogeneity of Delaney and Huselid finding no evidence of bundles. Em-
production processes. Most of the intra-industry studies pirically, we have opted to interact a wide range of practices
conclude that the adoption of a coherent system of new with each other to see if there are interaction effects beyond
human resource management practices such as flexible job the own effect of specific HR practices. We believe that this
definitions, cross-training, and work teams, along with ex- is a less restrictive strategy than arbitrarily grouping our
tensive reliance on incentive pay, results in substantially businesses into three or four types of HR practice bundles or
higher levels of productivity than more traditional human using factor analysis to generate an index of HR practices.
resource management practices. Although these results rep- As Osterman (1994) has shown, in spite of widespread
436 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS

diffusion in the 1980s of new workplace practices, U.S. measure of the average educational level of an establish-
companies use a range of combinations of workplace prac- ment and directly examine its effect on productivity.
tices and as a result are not neatly classified into discrete Finally, we also examine the relationship between com-
types. puter use and productivity. The impact of computers on
As part of our analysis of the role of synergies in human productivity and wages has been analyzed by several re-
resource management practices, we also look at the impact searchers, but it nevertheless remains a controversial issue.
of unions on productivity and how the results are affected Research in the 1980s (such as Bailey and Gordon (1988))
by the interaction between the presence of unions and other found little impact of computers on trends in aggregate
workplace practices. Theoretically, the presence of unions productivity growth, although more recent work by Oliner
can have a positive impact on labor productivity, because and Sichel (1994) argues that this is to be expected given
they lower the costs of introducing new workplace prac- that they represent such a small percentage of the capital
tices; workers are more willing to participate in employee stock. Researchers who have used more micro-based data
involvement programs because they feel the union will (such as Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1993)) have found a positive
protect their employment security. As discussed by Mal- relationship between computers and productivity. In addi-
comson (1983), agreements made between managers and tion, Alan Krueger (1993) found that workers who worked
workers may not be legally enforceable, so the presence of with computers were paid approximately 15% more than
unions can address incentive compatibility problems that similar workers who did not work with computers. How-
may arise at the workplace. In addition, negotiations that ever, none of these papers have the detailed information that
management undertakes with workers about the introduc- we have in the EQW-NES to control for a wider range of
tion of new workplace practices are less expensive if the factors when examining the impact of computer usage on
company has to deal only with union specialists rather than productivity.
each individual worker. In sum, this paper seeks to address many of the limita-
On the other hand, unions can lower productivity if they tions in previous work on the impact of workplace practices,
constrain the choice set of management and pursue restric- human capital, and information technology on productivity.
tive practices such as over manning rules. Empirically, the We examine a more objective measure of labor productivity
evidence on the impact of unions on productivity is mixed. using a data set that is more representative, has a higher
The range of estimates on the impact of unions on labor response rate than most previous studies on the manufac-
productivity runs from minus 3% in Clark (1984), to plus turing sector, and contains very detailed information on
22% in Brown and Medoff (1978), to no effect in Freeman specific employer practices. We allow for a less restrictive
and Medoff (1984). We try to reconcile these disparate bundling of human resource management practices, match
findings by interacting the union status of an establishment plant-level practices with plant-level outcomes, and use
with other workplace practices. In this way, we try to both cross-sectional and longitudinal data to estimate pro-
distinguish between different types of labor-management duction functions.
relations—traditional and new—and their impact on labor
productivity.1 III. The Data
We are also able to look at the effect of education on
productivity. To date, most of the micro work on education’s To understand the nature and importance of our contri-
impact on individual firm productivity has been indirect or bution, it is useful to start with a description of the data set
focused on industry-level trends.2 Researchers have exam- on which we base our empirical analysis. The EQW Na-
ined the impact of education on wages and from this tional Employers Survey was administered by the U.S.
inferred the impact of education on productivity. Empirical Bureau of the Census as a telephone survey in August and
analysis on the returns to schooling suggests that an addi- September of 1994 to a nationally representative sample of
tional year of post high-school education can raise wages of more than 3,000 private establishments with more than
a worker from 5% to 12%. Therefore, researchers have twenty employees. The survey represents a unique source of
assumed that productivity increases for a more highly edu- information on how employers recruit workers, organize
cated workforce are of similar magnitude. Again, one of the work, invest in physical capital, and utilize education and
features of the EQW-NES is that we are able to construct a training investments. The survey oversampled establish-
ments in the manufacturing sector and establishments with
1 The only other paper that has tried to do something similar to this is by more than 100 employees. Public sector employees, not-for-
Cooke (1994), where he examines the interaction of union status, profit profit institutions, and corporate headquarters were ex-
sharing, and employee involvement on productivity in a sample of cluded from the sample. The target respondent in the man-
manufacturing establishments in Michigan in 1989.
2 See Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) and Jorgenson, Gallop, and Frau- ufacturing sector was the plant manager and in the
meni (1987) for a discussion of education, labor quality, and productivity nonmanufacturing sector was the local business site man-
using industry-level data, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. De- ager. However, the survey was designed to allow for mul-
partment of Labor (1993) for a discussion of how educational attainment
and workforce composition explain patterns of productivity growth from tiple respondents so that information could be obtained from
1948 to 1990. establishments that kept financial information such as the
HOW TO COMPETE 437

book value of capital or the cost of goods and materials used those establishments in the LRD from 1987 through 1993.4
in production at a separate finance office (typically at We believe that this choice is a reasonable compromise
corporate headquarters for multi-establishment enterprises). between having a sufficiently large number of years of data
Computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) was used to obtain an estimate of the establishment fixed effect, yet
to administer each survey, which took approximately 28 few enough to allow us to assume that some of the work-
minutes to complete.3 place characteristics are more or less constant over this
The sampling frame for the survey was the Bureau of the period. Because of this balanced panel restriction, along
Census SSEL file, one of the most comprehensive and with problems of missing data, our final estimation sample
up-to-date listings of establishments in the United States. is reduced to 638 establishments. It is important to note that
Although the survey included establishments in both the the LRD is basically the universe of all manufacturing
manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors, this paper establishments with more than 250 employees but is only a
subsample of establishments with fewer than 250 employ-
examines responses from manufacturing respondents only.
ees. Therefore, by restricting our analysis to employers in
This is because we link this survey with the Census Longi-
the EQW-NES that were in the LRD from 1987 onwards,
tudinal Research Database (LRD) that includes longitudinal
we are more likely to omit smaller establishments and
information for manufacturing establishments only. In other establishments that were “born” after 1987. However, this
work (Lynch and Black (1998) and Black and Lynch does not mean that our sample does not include smaller
(1996)), we analyze the cross-sectional data from the EQW- establishments. In fact, almost 20% of our observations in
NES for both manufacturing and nonmanufacturing estab- this restricted sample are establishments with fewer than
lishments. 100 employees. In addition, we are able to compare some of
The response rate for manufacturing establishments in the the results in this paper with those obtained using a larger
EQW National Employers Survey was 75%, which is sub- sample that does not impose these restrictions (Black &
stantially higher than most other voluntary establishment Lynch, 1996).
surveys. Probit analysis (available from the authors upon
request) of the characteristics of nonrespondents indicates IV. The Model
that there was no significant pattern at the two-digit industry
level in the likelihood of participating in the survey. The We base our empirical analysis of the determinants of
only businesses more likely not to participate were manu- establishment productivity on an augmented Cobb-Douglas
facturing establishments with more than 1,000 employees. production function containing real sales (Y), labor (L),
capital (K), materials (M), and our workplace practices,
Of the 1,831 manufacturing establishments that participated
human capital, and information technology variables. We
in the survey, not all respondents completed all parts of the
test the restriction implied by constant returns to scale and
survey by the interview cutoff date of October 1, 1994.
find that for our data this restriction is always accepted.
Therefore, the final number of manufacturing establish- Therefor, our reported results use the following specifica-
ments in the sample for which all parts of the survey was tion which imposes constant returns to scale:5
completed were 1,621 establishments. This represents a
66% overall completed survey response rate. ln共Y/L兲i ⫽ ␣ ln共K/L兲i ⫹ ␤ ln共M/L兲i ⫹ ␦⬘Zi ⫹ ⑀i (1)
As mentioned above, we are able to match many of the
establishments in our survey to the Longitudinal Research and
Database (LRD). The LRD, housed at the Center for Eco-
ln共Y/P兲i ⫽ ␣ ln共K/P兲i ⫹ ␤ ln共M/P兲i ⫹ ␥ ln共N/P兲i
nomic Studies at the Bureau of the Census, was created by
(2)
longitudinally linking the establishment-level data from the ⫹ ␦⬘Zi ⫹ ⑀i ,
Bureau of the Census’s Annual Survey of Manufacturers
(ASM). The LRD data include information on shipments, and where ⑀ i is an error term and ␦⬘ is a vector of coeffi-
materials, inventories, employment, expenditures on equip- cients on Z i which are establishment-specific workplace
ment and structures, book values of equipment and struc- practices and characteristics of employees such as education
tures, and energy use. (For more information on the LRD, and turnover. In equation (1) we treat all workers identi-
see Davis and Haltiwanger (1991).) Because we are able to cally, and in equation (2) we differentiate between produc-
match the LRD with the EQW-NES, we have annual tion workers (P) and nonproduction workers (N).
establishment-level data on inputs and outputs of production Before discussing in more detail the nature of our empir-
for the manufacturing employers in our survey. ical estimation, it is necessary to describe the construction
Although we could, in theory, use data from the LRD of the input variables derived from the LRD. Because we do
from as far back as 1972, we restrict our analysis to just 4 Note that if an establishment changed ownership it would still be

included in the sample.


3 For more detail on the data set and the particular questions asked, see 5 A complete set of all the estimated equations is available upon request

Lynch and Black (1998). from the authors.


438 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS

not have a measure of the capital stock every year in the establishment-specific effects using panel data. (See
LRD, we need to construct a measure. We use the standard Schmidt (1985) for a discussion on using panel data to
perpetual inventory method to construct an estimate of the estimate firm-level efficiency.) Consider the following equa-
value of the capital stock in each year starting from the book tion:
value in a base year and using the information on new
investment together with an estimate of the portion of the Y it ⫽ ␣⬘X it ⫹ ␦⬘Z i ⫹ v i ⫹ ⑀ it , (3)
capital stock that depreciates each year.6 We chose the total
book value of the capital stock in 1987 as our starting point.
where Y is sales per production worker;
We also tried using 1982 as the base year; however, we lose
many observations when we do this. Nevertheless, when we
␣⬘ is a vector of coefficients on capital per production
do use 1982 as the base year, the major empirical findings
worker, materials per production worker, and the num-
change little.7 In addition, we check the sensitivity of our
ber of nonproduction workers per production worker;
estimates to the inclusion of end-of-period or beginning-of-
period values of the capital stock. Again, our empirical ␦⬘ is our vector of coefficients on workplace practices
results are not very sensitive to this distinction. Generally, from the EQW-NES survey;
we prefer results using the value of the beginning of period v i is an unobserved, time-invariant, establishment fixed
capital stock on the assumption that it takes time before new effect; and
capital becomes productive. ⑀ it is the idiosyncratic component of the error term.
Finally, we do not account for the value of assets sold,
retired, scrapped, or destroyed, because these data are not If we take deviations from a firm’s mean or take first
available in the ASM after 1988. Total sales, capital, and differences of equation (3), all firm observed and unob-
material numbers were all adjusted using deflators from the served time-invariant fixed effects drop out, and we can
NBER Productivity Database assembled by Eric Bartelsman remove the bias in estimating the coefficients in vector ␣⬘
and Wayne Gray (1995). These deflators were constructed that occurs because of the omission of the establishment
from five-digit product deflators from BEA. These are fixed effect. However, this means that we are unable to
largely created from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) observe the impact of the observed but time-invariant em-
industry-based producer prices, which are extrapolated ployer fixed effects such as workplace practices and educa-
backwards using the old BLS product prices. (See the tional quality of the workforce on labor productivity. There-
appendix for more information on the deflators used.) fore, we adopt the following two-step procedure. In the first
We augment the standard Cobb-Douglas production func- step, we use the within estimator to obtain estimates of the
tion by also allowing productivity to depend upon work- coefficients (␣⬘) on capital, labor, and materials (X it ) from
place practices, plant-specific human capital measures, the the 1988–1993 LRD panel. Year-industry specific constants
diffusion of information technology, employee turnover are also included in the estimated equation to allow for
rates, age of the establishment, R&D policy in the firm, age differential technological progress by industry and to con-
distribution of the capital stock, and other characteristics of trol for industry-year specific business cycle effects that
the establishments using data from the EQW-NES. In spite lead to differential intensity of use of the factors of produc-
of the fact that we are able to control for many more tion.
managerial practices than most previous studies on produc- The use of the within estimator deals with the correlation
tivity, our cross section estimates may still be subject to between the choice of inputs and the firm-specific, time-
omitted-variable bias (Griliches & Mairesse, 1995) due to invariant component of the error term. However, if capital,
unobserved establishment characteristics. Although we be- employment, materials, and output are chosen simulta-
lieve that the detailed information contained in our estab- neously, or if there are measurement errors in the explana-
lishment survey allows us to extract much of the previously tory variables (particularly the measure of capital), the
unobserved establishment-specific effect, one can remove within estimator will be inconsistent. (See discussion by
any remaining biases due to omitted but time-invariant Griliches and Hausman (1986).) For this reason we have
also estimated equation (3) using generalized method of
6 In other words: K ⫽ (1 ⫺ ␦ ) K
t t t⫺1 ⫹ NI t ⫺ where K t is the real moments (GMM), combining the equation in differences
end-of-period capital stock, ␦ t is the depreciation rate, and NI t is real and levels. This approach involves using lagged value of
capital expenditures. The depreciation used is 0.1331 for machinery and
0.0343 for buildings. These numbers come from Hulten and Wykoff both the levels and the changes over time of capital, mate-
(1981).
7 We also tried using the reported book value of the capital stock in each
rials, labor, and output as instruments for current values of
year as our measure of the capital stock. The problem with this measure
capital, labor, and materials. These lagged values are as-
is that it does not take into account depreciation or price inflation. In sumed to be correlated with current values but independent
addition, in 1989, 1990, 1991, and 1993, the ASM did not include of the error term. The technique is an extension of Arellano
questions about the book value of the capital stock, only new investment.
We did try various imputations of these data, but the results do not seem and Bond (1991) along the lines suggested by Arellano and
very sensitive to the definition of the capital stock. Bover (1995) and is implemented in the revised version of
HOW TO COMPETE 439

the DPD program first developed by Arellano and Bond allows for interactions between various workplace prac-
(1988).8 tices.10
We generate predicted values of Y it ⫺ ␣⬘X it ⫽ ␦⬘Z i ⫹ The estimated coefficients on capital, labor, and materials
v i ⫹ ⑀ it using the within estimator or the GMM estimator of are consistent with previous estimates using the LRD
␣⬘. We then average that value over the period 1988–1993 through 1987, except that the coefficient on capital is rather
for each business to get an estimate of the firm-specific, small. This may be due in large part to measurement error,
time-invariant component of the residual.9 In the second and we return to this issue in table 2. In terms of the
step, we regress our average residual on the various human variables we use from our survey, we find that investments
resource management practices, human capital measures, a in new technology are associated with significantly higher
variable to capture diffusion of information technology, establishment productivity. Although the age of the capital
industry dummies, and other worker and employer charac- stock appears to have insignificant effects on productivity,
teristics we find in the EQW-NES in order to obtain esti- the existence of a R&D center within the firm is associated
mates of ␦⬘. with significantly higher productivity. In addition, the more
One advantage of this two-step procedure relative to the nonmanagerial workers who use computers, the higher the
estimation of the cross section production functions (which establishment’s productivity. Interestingly, in results not
include workplace practices and establishment characteris- reported here, the proportion of managers who use comput-
tics) is that we can address the issue of biases in the ers is never significant in any specification we tested.
estimates of the coefficients of capital, labor, and materials In table 1, average education of nonproduction workers
due to correlations with the firm-specific, time-invariant has a significant impact on establishment productivity. The
components of the error term, v i . The GMM estimator can coefficient on average educational level of nonproduction
also address the issue of biases due to correlation with ⑀ it . workers suggests that raising their average educational level
These advantages complement the fact that the panel allows 10% (approximately one more year of school) would in-
us to bring more information to bear in estimating capital, crease productivity by approximately 4%. None of the
labor, and materials coefficients. However, biases can still training variables we included in our regressions were ever
arise in estimating the ␦’s in the second step. These biases statistically significant. Unfortunately, in the EQW-NES, we
will be discussed further below. do not have a measure of the accumulated stock of training
for all workers, only training done at a point of time. This
V. The Results means that our estimates of the impact of training are most
likely underestimates of the true returns to training. But,
In this section, we discuss the econometric results con-
given our finding that the proportion of nonmanagerial
cerning the effect of workplace practices, establishment,
workers using computers has a significant and positive
and worker characteristics on productivity.
relationship to establishment productivity, we conclude that
human capital investments can have an important impact on
A. Cross Section Estimation
labor productivity.
Table 1 presents our cross section estimation of an aug- Workplace practices have very interesting effects on labor
mented Cobb-Douglas production function with constant productivity. In particular, we find that simply introducing
returns to scale. In equation (1), we use the total number of high-performance workplace practices is not enough to
workers as our measure of labor, and then, in equation (2), increase establishment productivity. As shown in equation
we separate employees into production and nonproduction two in table 1, the increased employee voice that is associ-
workers. Therefore, the dependent variable in the first re- ated with these practices seems to be a necessary condition
gression is the log of annual sales per worker for 1993, and to making the practices effective. For example, although
the dependent variable in equation (2) and (3) is the log of 70% of the establishments used in our analysis have some
annual sales per production worker for 1993. Equation (3) form of a TQM system in place, TQM is not itself associ-
ated with higher productivity. Instead, the percentage of
8 If the error term is white noise, one can use levels of capital, labor, workers involved in regular decision-making meetings is
materials, and sales lagged at least twice as instruments for the equations positively related to labor productivity. On average, approx-
in differences. For the equation in levels, differences of these variables
lagged at least one period are legitimate instruments under the additional imately 53% of employees in our sample are involved in
assumption that the correlation between the level of the variables and the some sort of regular meeting to discuss workplace issues.
firm-specific, time-invariant component of the error term is constant. (See Benchmarking11 and profit sharing for production workers,
Arellano and Bover (1995).) The orthogonality condition associated with
the equations in differences and levels are estimated jointly.
9 Note that ⑀ 10 All of our regressions include two-digit industry dummies. We also
it are assumed to be zero mean disturbances so that
averaging over time should eliminate (or at least very substantially reduce) tested the sensitivity of our results by including three-digit industry
its contribution to the residual. We estimate the first step using a larger dummies, and none of our major findings were changed.
sample than in the second step because we are not constrained to have 11 Benchmarking involves setting targets based on other firms’ successes

information on all of the workplace practices to do this estimation. By and attempting to meet these goals. For example, a manufacturer might
including a larger number of observations, we hope to improve the use a competitor’s or even another industry’s scrap rate to establish
precision of our estimates for capital, labor, and materials. standards for their own scrap rate.
440 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS

TABLE 1.—DETERMINANTS OF LABOR PRODUCTIVITY: CROSS SECTION RESULTS


Eq. (2) Eq. (3)
Mean Eq. (1) Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Variable (s.d.) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic)
Log (capital/workers) 0.024* (1.77) 0.034** (2.32) 0.035** (2.41)
Log (materials/workers) 0.54** (29.81) 0.57** (29.04) 0.56** (28.59)
Log (Nonproduction/production) — 0.18** (10.86) 0.18** (10.98)

Technology
Share of equip ⬍ 1 yr. 0.069 (0.076) 0.09 (0.443) 0.06 (0.32) 0.05 (0.24)
Share of equip 1–4 yr. old 0.198 (0.191) 0.11 (1.42) 0.13 (1.58) 0.12 (1.43)
R&D center 0.77 (0.42) 0.07* (1.98) 0.08** (2.17) 0.08** (2.14)
Proportion nonmanagers using computers 0.36 (0.31) 0.13** (2.59) 0.12** (2.31) 0.11** (2.10)

Worker Characteristics
Log (avg ed) 2.54 (0.06) 0.38 (1.45) — —
Log (avg ed nonproduction workers) 2.68 (0.083) — 0.45** (2.02) 0.45** (1.97)
Log (avg ed production workers) 2.51 (0.055) — 0.05 (0.16) 0.10 (0.30)
Turnover (proportion employees less than one year) 0.10 (0.12) ⫺0.29** (⫺2.18) ⫺0.18 (⫺1.34) ⫺0.21 (⫺1.51)
Proportion employees women 0.34 (0.20) ⫺0.07 (⫺0.84) 0.03 (0.30) 0.03 (0.30)
Proportion employees minority 0.24 (0.22) ⫺0.10 (⫺1.52) ⫺0.10 (⫺1.43) ⫺0.11 (⫺1.52)

Use of High-Performance Work Systems


TQM 0.71 (0.45) ⫺0.005 (⫺0.15) ⫺0.022 (⫺0.66) ⫺0.08 (⫺1.32)
Benchmarking 0.49 (0.50) 0.072** (2.46) 0.07** (2.24) 0.06** (1.97)
Number of managerial levels 2.9 (2.0) 0.001 (0.20) 0.003 (0.43) 0.003 (0.30)
# employees per supervisor 24.4 (21.7) 0.0003 (0.40) 0.0004 (0.55) 0.0004 (0.62)
Proportion workers in self-managed teams 0.145 (0.264) 0.05 (0.90) 0.04 (0.72) 0.05 (0.85)
log number of employees in training 4.69 (2.45) ⫺0.004 (⫺0.66) ⫺0.003 (⫺0.47) ⫺0.002 (⫺0.31)

Employee Voice
Unionized 0.50 (0.50) 0.04 (1.18) 0.03 (0.75) ⫺0.10 (⫺1.48)
Proportion workers meeting regularly in groups 0.528 (0.407) 0.09** (2.39) 0.08** (2.17) 0.05 (0.58)

Profit Sharing
Managers and supervisors 0.78 (0.42) ⫺0.027 (⫺0.60) ⫺0.04 (⫺0.78) ⫺0.04 (⫺0.76)
Production/clerical/technical 0.64 (0.48) 0.064* (1.67) 0.067* (1.64) 0.013 (0.02)

Recruitment Strategies
Grades a top priority in recruitment 0.20 (0.40) ⫺0.006 (⫺0.17) ⫺0.008 (⫺0.21) ⫺0.011 (⫺0.29)
Communication a top priority in recruitment 0.73 (0.45) 0.033 (1.03) 0.03 (0.96) 0.027 (0.80)

Interaction Terms
union*profit sharing for nonmanagerial workers 0.29 (0.46) — — 0.11* (1.72)
union*TQM 0.36 (0.48) — — 0.08 (1.21)
% meet*profit sharing for nonmanagerial workers 0.36 (0.42) — — 0.014 (0.19)
% meet*TQM 0.42 (0.43) — — 0.04 (0.51)
N⫽ 638 638 638 638
Adjusted R 2 ⫽ 0.78 0.82 0.82
t-statistics in parenthesis.
** denotes significant at the 5% level and * denotes significant at the 10% level.
Estimated equations also include a constant term, two-digit SIC industry controls, age of the establishment, a dummy variable if the establishment is part of a multiple-establishment firm, and a dummy variable
if the primary product is exported.

both considered high-performance workplace practices, are and TQM, unionization and profit sharing for nonmanagers,
also associated with higher establishment productivity. the percentage meeting in groups and profit sharing for
Given the impact that certain workplace practices seem to nonmanagers, and the percentage meeting in groups and
have on establishment productivity, we turn to an examina- TQM. When these interactions are included, the own effect
tion of the synergistic effects of bundling certain practices. of unionization becomes negative although not statistically
We tried a wide range of interaction effects and found that significant, whereas the interaction of unionization and
most were not even remotely significant. However, equation profit sharing for nonmanagers is significant and positive.
(3) in table 1 presents results when we interact unionization This indicates that more traditional labor management rela-
HOW TO COMPETE 441

tions, where employees have little voice in decision making mator are reported in column 1 of table 2. As in table 1,
and pay is not linked to performance, is associated with capital is small although still significant and positive.13
lower establishment productivity. At the same time, more Because we had to construct a measure of the capital stock,
cooperative unionized labor management relations (where there is likely to be significant measurement error in our
employees have a greater role in decision making but also proxy for the capital stock. The estimated coefficient on
have part of their compensation linked to firm performance) materials is larger than in table 1, while that on nonproduc-
are associated with higher labor productivity.12 tion workers is smaller.
Our regression coefficients in equation (3) of table 1 Using these first-step estimates, we then calculated the
imply that a unionized plant with no benchmarking, no average residual for each establishment in the sample.14 The
TQM, no profit sharing for nonmanagerial workers, and no second column in table 2 contains the second-step results
employee involvement programs will have 10% lower pro- obtained from regressing the average residual on various
ductivity than an otherwise similar plant that is nonunion. A workplace practices and employee characteristics.15 Almost
nonunion plant that uses benchmarking, TQM, has 50% of all of the estimated effects are similar to those in equation
its workers meeting on a regular basis, and profit sharing for (3) of table 1. Again we see that the proportion of nonman-
nonmanagerial workers will have 4.5% higher productivity agerial workers using computers has a significant and pos-
than an otherwise similar nonunion plant that has not itive effect on having higher-than-average productivity over
adopted any of these “high-performance workplace” prac- the period 1988–1993. The average educational level of
tices. However, a unionized plant with benchmarking, nonproduction workers and benchmarking are also posi-
TQM, 50% of its workers meeting on a regular basis, and tively related to those businesses that did better on average
profit sharing for nonmanagerial workers will have 13.5% over this six-year period. Our finding on the importance of
higher productivity than an otherwise similar nonunion worker education for labor productivity is consistent with
plant with none of these high-performance workplace prac- evidence presented by Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske
tices. (1996). Unionization itself has no significant effect on
Finally, it is interesting to note the lack of significance of which businesses did better or worse on average, but the
the percentage of employees who are women or minorities. interaction of unionization and profit sharing for nonman-
Other results of interest that are not reported in table 1 agers is associated with better than average performance.
include the fact that newer establishments have significantly One result that does change is that we now find that those
higher productivity, all else constant, than older establish- employers who cite communication skills as a priority in
ments. We also tried interacting capital, materials, and labor recruitment also did better than average over the period
with industry to see how robust our estimates of the effect 1988–1993. In addition, we find that those establishments
of workplace practices on labor productivity were when a with a larger share of new capital (one to four years old) in
more flexible specification for the impact of capital, mate- their capital stock have higher productivity. All of these
rials, and labor was allowed for. Our estimates on workplace findings are consistent with the idea that increased em-
practices were unchanged with the exception of TQM, ployee voice is positively related to establishment produc-
which became significantly negative. tivity and that new forms of labor-management relations are
significantly related to better-performing businesses.
B. Panel Data Two-Step Estimation Based on Within
C. Panel Data Two-Step Estimation Based on GMM
Estimator
Estimator
In this section, we discuss how the results in table 1 alter
Although the fixed-effects estimator corrects for the
when we incorporate panel data on establishment inputs and
omitted-variable bias associated with unobserved time-in-
outputs into the estimation in order to begin to address the
variant factors in the cross section estimation, the fact that
problem of unobserved time-invariant characteristics of the
establishment. Our first step is the estimation of a simple 13 The coefficients on capital, materials, and nonproduction workers
Cobb-Douglas production function with establishment fixed cannot be exactly compared with those in table 1 because the sample is
effects using the panel data from the LRD that includes different (and larger) in the first step in table 2 than in table 1.
14 The first stage is estimated on the larger sample of 984 establishments
controls for capital, labor, materials, and industry by time
in order to obtain more-precise estimates of the first-stage coefficients,
dummies. We run this on the full set of establishments in our because we will use these estimates to calculate the average residual over
survey that are matched to the LRD and contain data from the period for each plant. The second stage contains fewer observations
1987 through 1993 (984 establishments). We again test and (638) due to missing workplace practices data. We have also redone the
first-stage estimation just using the sample of 638 plants that we examine
accept the restriction of constant returns to scale; our de- for the second stage. This does not significantly affect any of our
pendent variable is sales per production worker. The esti- second-stage results, only the standard errors in the first stage.
15 It is important to note the distinction between the results presented in
mates from the first-stage estimation using the within esti-
this table and those in table 1. In table 1, the dependent variable was labor
productivity at a point in time (1993), whereas, in table 2, the dependent
12 We tested the joint null that all four interaction terms are equal to zero variable in the second step is the average residual (that is, the firm fixed
and rejected it at the 5% level. effect) over the period 1988–1993.
442 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS

TABLE 2.—DETERMINANTS OF LABOR PRODUCTIVITY 1988–1993 TWO-STEP ESTIMATES USING WITHIN AND GMM ESTIMATORS IN THE FIRST STEP
Within Estimator GMM Estimator
First Step Second Step First Step Second Step
sales/production sales/production
Dependent Variable: employees avg. residual 1988–1993 employees avg. residual 1988–1993
Independent variables:
Log (capital/production workers) 0.03** (3.16) 0.18** (4.24)
Log (materials/production workers) 0.61** (58.54) 0.42** (9.38)
Log (nonproduction/production) 0.07** (7.47) 0.15** (4.36)
Sargan
test ⫽ 44.8
[p ⫽ 0.25]

Technology
Share of equip ⬍ 1 yr. ⫺0.04 (⫺0.19) 0.01 (0.03)
Share of equip 1–4 yr. old 0.16** (2.13) 0.14* (1.67)
R&D center 0.05 (1.53) 0.05 (1.36)
Proportion nonmanagers using computers 0.15** (3.17) 0.05 (1.02)

Worker Characteristics
Log (avg ed nonproduction workers) 0.57** (2.78) 0.31 (1.43)
Log (avg ed production workers) 0.24 (0.76) 0.22 (0.64)
Turnover (proportion employees less than 1 year) ⫺0.32** (⫺2.51) ⫺0.16 (⫺1.17)
Proportion employees women ⫺0.02 (⫺0.25) ⫺0.01 (⫺0.07)
Proportion employees minority ⫺0.11* (⫺1.74) ⫺0.13* (⫺1.89)

Use of High-Performance Work Systems


TQM ⫺0.03 (⫺0.47) ⫺0.11* (⫺1.87)
Benchmarking 0.07** (2.34) 0.07** (2.19)
Number of managerial levels ⫺0.001 (⫺0.08) ⫺0.008 (⫺1.04)
# employees per supervisor ⫺0.001 (⫺1.12) ⫺0.0002 (⫺0.23)
Proportion workers in self-managed teams ⫺0.02 (⫺0.40) 0.01 (0.20)
Log number of employees trained 0.001 (0.19) 0.004 (0.63)

Employee Voice
Unionized ⫺0.012 (⫺0.21) ⫺0.12* (⫺1.81)
Proportion workers meeting regularly in groups 0.17** (2.31) 0.09 (1.15)

Profit Sharing
Managers and supervisors ⫺0.03 (⫺0.76) ⫺0.08* (⫺1.67)
Production/clerical/technical 0.014 (0.22) 0.034 (0.50)

Recruitment Strategies
Grades a top priority in recruitment ⫺0.005 (⫺0.37) ⫺0.01 (⫺0.80)
Communication a top priority in recruitment 0.03** (2.08) 0.03 (1.49)

Interaction Terms
union*profit sharing for nonmanagerial employees 0.09* (1.62) 0.15** (2.34)
union*TQM 0.02 (0.32) 0.10 (1.52)
% meet*profit sharing for non-managerial workers ⫺0.05 (⫺0.69) ⫺0.02 (⫺0.34)
% meet*TQM ⫺0.05 (⫺0.68) 0.02 (0.30)
N for the first stage ⫽ 984 N for the second stage ⫽ 638
Adjusted R 2 ⫽ 0.22 0.07
T-statistics in parenthesis.
** Significant at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. First-stage estimation also includes a constant term, year dummies, and two-digit SIC industry controls interacted with the year dummies. Second-stage
equations also include a constant term, two-digit SIC industry controls, age of the establishment, a dummy variable if the establishment is part of a multiple-establishment firm, and a dummy variable if the primary
product is exported. Appropriately lagged values of capital, labor, materials, and sales are used as instruments for the GMM estimator. The Sargan test is distributed as ␹2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number
of instruments minus the number of estimated coefficients.

current values of capital, labor, and materials are simulta- mates of the vector of coefficients ␣⬘ on capital, labor, and
neously determined with output leads to an upward bias of materials in the opposite direction. To attempt to correct for
the estimates. However, measurement error in the capital these potential biases, we use GMM techniques to instru-
and materials variables may be biasing our first-step esti- ment for capital, labor, and materials in the first stage.
HOW TO COMPETE 443

If the coefficients in the equation using the within esti- high-performance workplace practices in 1993 were also the
mator are relatively more tainted due to measurement error, more productive plants in 1982 (a period well before the
we would expect to see larger and more significant coeffi- introduction of many of these practices in U.S. manufactur-
cients in the GMM first-differences estimation. This is, in ing). If they were also more productive in the earlier period,
fact, what we see for capital in the third column of table 2. one might worry that it is really some omitted firm fixed
If one calculates what our reported GMM estimates in table effect that is driving our results. To do so, we estimated
2 imply about the share of capital and share of labor equation (3) from table 1 but used the 1982 LRD data for
(production and nonproduction workers) in value added labor productivity, capital, and materials instead of our 1993
(output minus materials costs), we find that labor accounts data. We find no evidence that firms with high-performance
for two-thirds of value added and capital one-third. This is workplace practices were more productive; in fact, none of
consistent with what we see in national income and product our workplace practices variables were significant except
accounts. Note that the Hansen-Sargan test of overidentify- average education of nonproduction workers. This suggests
ing restrictions does not suggest misspecification of the that it is not just the most productive firms that implement
model. these workplace practices.
When we look at the second-step estimates based on the Nevertheless, an omitted variable that may be correlated
GMM estimation (the fourth column of table 2), we see a with our workplace practices and consequently generate
similar pattern of results compared to the within estimator biases is managerial quality. It could be argued that the
or even the cross section estimates presented in equation (3) presence of good managers is more likely to be observed in
of table 1. One major change, however, is that the percent- firms with high-performance workplace practices. There-
age of nonmanagers using computers becomes insignificant. fore, what looks like an effect of workplace practices on
This may reflect in part the improved precision in the productivity is just good management. But if good manag-
estimate on capital. In addition, TQM now enters with a ers are those who adopt incentive-based compensation, get
large negative and statistically significant coefficient. a higher proportion of their workers involved in decision
While our two-step procedure in table 2 addresses the making, and train a higher proportion of workers to use
biases that may arise in estimating the vector of coefficients computers, then the fact that we are able to include these
␣⬘ on capital, labor, and materials, it does not address biases variables explicitly as regressors in our analysis means that
that may arise in the second step when we estimate the it is unlikely that there is much unobserved managerial
vector of coefficients ␦⬘ associated with observed workplace quality left.
practices and characteristics. These biases may be due to One might think that having a follow-up survey on
correlations between the second-stage regressors and unob- workplace practices would at least help us address any bias
served, time-invariant, plant-level characteristics or with the associated with unobserved but time-invariant employer
average of the idiosyncratic shocks (because the time period fixed effects. Unfortunately, short panels on workplace
over which we average is relatively short). Although we practices are not going to be a magic elixir. First, workplace
believe that our vector ␦⬘ extracts a substantial part of the practices change very slowly, so if the period of time
previously unobserved fixed effect and that most of the between surveys is not long enough there may be very few
endogeneity issues are related to labor, capital, and materi- employers who change practices. Second, measurement
als, these potential biases may be affecting our estimates of error affecting workplace practices may bias our coeffi-
the impact of workplace practices on labor productivity. For cients. Huselid and Becker (1996) present estimates on the
example, a firm’s decision to adopt particular workplace impact of measurement error on the coefficients on work-
practices may be related to business performance, although place practices on various firm outcome measures for a
it is unlikely that it will be performance in just one year. If two-period panel of 218 employers. They find large mea-
an employer decides to adopt a new workplace practice in surement error (some variables containing a 30% to 40%
times of trouble because it becomes less expensive to switch error variance), and, when they try to adjust for this, they
systems (as suggested theoretically by Caballero and Ham- find that their corrected coefficients on workplace practices
mour (1994) and shown empirically for a sample of British are similar to those found in cross section estimation. In
employers by Nickell, Nicolitsas, and Patterson (1996)), other words, the upward bias associated with omitted em-
then our coefficients on workplace practices will likely be ployer fixed effects is almost exactly offset in their sample
biased downwards. This would mean that it would be more with the downward bias associated with measurement error.
difficult to find a positive effect of a workplace practice on Nevertheless, in recent work (Black & Lynch, 2000), we
labor productivity. If, instead, employers are more likely to find that many of the results presented in this paper on the
adopt new workplace practices when times are very good, impact of workplace practices on productivity persist when
then our coefficients will be biased upwards. we examine a panel of manufacturing establishments over
Therefore, as a further check we adopted a strategy the period 1993–1996. Clearly, a long panel on establish-
detailed by Doms, Dunne, and Troske (1997) to see if the ments that included repeated information on workplace
plants that have implemented our various measures of practices would be preferable so that we could use a GMM
444 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS

estimation procedure to adjust for endogeneity and omitted place practices on productivity. Nevertheless, by using this
fixed-effects biases on these variables. Even though these two-step method, this paper has highlighted the importance
types of data are unlikely to be produced in the near future, of measuring the intensity of workplace practices in an
we believe our results shed some light on the impact of establishment and not just the incidence. In addition, it
workplace practices and information technology on produc- suggests an important role for considering synergies among
tivity. workplace practices. Understanding what constitutes a pro-
ductive workplace environment is not limited to whether or
VI. Conclusion not an establishment has TQM, but also how it is imple-
mented including the mechanisms and institutions in place
New technologies and changing workplace practices have to address incentive compatibility problems that may arise
altered the nature and organization of work. There have as employers seek greater employee involvement in labor
been many stories in the popular press about the successes productivity improvements. Other studies have been limited
associated with the introduction of high-performance work- in their ability to identify these important relationships or by
place systems and the revolution computers have caused on the fact that it was not easy to generalize their findings to a
the job. At the same time, the gains to completing a college broader segment of the economy.
degree relative to a high school diploma have doubled over
the past fifteen years in response to what many have argued
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no. 5626 (June 1996). 1994), 173–187.
Hulten, Charles, and Frank Wykoff, “Measurement of Economic Depre- Schmidt, Peter, “Frontier Production Functions: A Review,” Econometric
ciation” (pp. 81–125) in C. R. Hulten (Ed.), Depreciation, Infor- Reviews 4 (1985), 353–355.
mation, and the Taxation of Income from Capital. (Washington, Womack, James, Daniel Jones, and Daniel Roos, The Machine That
DC: Urban Institute, 1981). Changed the World (New York: Rawson/Macmillan, 1991).
Huselid, Mark A., “The Impact of Human Resource Management Prac-
tices on Turnover, Productivity, and Corporate Financial Perfor-
mance.” Academy of Management Journal 38(3) (1995), 635–672. APPENDIX
Huselid, Mark A., and Brian E. Becker, “High Performance Work Systems
and Firm Performance: Cross-Sectional Versus Panel Results.” The capital deflator was created by first generating a three-digit
Industrial Relations 35(3) (1996), 400–422. industry real net capital stock value. The three-digit data are converted to
Ichniowski, Casey, “Human Resource Management Systems and the the four-digit level by assuming that the industry-asset type flows are the
Performance of U.S. Manufacturing Businesses,” NBER working same for all four-digit industries within a three-digit industry. With this
paper no. 3449 (1990). information, four-digit investment deflators were created for equipment
, “Human Resource Practices and Productive Labor-Management and structures separately. The materials deflator was created by averaging
Relations” (pp. 239–271), in D. Lewin, O. Mitchell, and P. Sherer together price deflators for 529 inputs (369 manufacturing industries and
(Eds.), Research Frontiers in Industrial Relations and Human 160 nonmanufacturing industries), using as weights the relative size of
Resources. (Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, Cornell University Press, each industry’s purchases of that input in the Input-Output Tables. The
1992). inflation in materials prices was calculated as a Tornquist index (weighting
Ichniowski, Casey, Kathryn Shaw, and Gabrielle Prennushi, “The Effects each product’s inflation rate by the average of the previous and current-
of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity,” year’s shares in total materials used).
American Economic Review, 87(3) (1997), 291–313. The energy price deflator is based on each industry’s expenditures on
Jorgenson, Dale, and Zvi Griliches, “The Explanation of Productivity six types of energy (electricity, residual fuel oil, distillates, coal, coke, and
Change,” Review of Economic Studies 34(3) (1967), 249–283. natural gas). These six types of energy represent 94.6% of all energy
Jorgenson, Dale, Frank Gallop, and Barbara Fraumeni, Productivity and expenditures by the manufacturing sector in 1976. They were a majority
U.S. Economic Growth. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, of the energy costs for all but one industry, and more than 90% of energy
1987). costs for 300 of the industries.
Kandel, E., and Edward Lazear, “Peer Pressure and Partnerships,” Journal Finally, because the deflator data were unavailable for 1993, we
of Political Economy 100(4) (1992), 801–817. regressed current price levels (using two- or three-digit level SIC data,
Kelley, Maryellen, “Information Technology and Productivity: The Elu- depending upon availability) on the previous year’s price level and the
sive Connection,” Management Science 40(3) (1994), 1406–1425. current year’s producer price index for stage of processing groupings from
, “Participative Bureaucracy and Productivity in the Machined the BLS. We then generated an imputed value for 1993 deflators using the
Products Sector,” Industrial Relations 35 (1996), 374–399. predicted values from this regression.

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