IBP vs Zamora

Facts:
At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to nullity on constitutional
grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the
deployment of the Philippine Marines to join the Philippine National Police in
visibility patrols around the metropolis.   Formulated Letter of Instruction
02/2000 1 (the "LOI"), which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility
patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted. Task Force Tulungan
was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila through a
sustained street patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of high-profile
crimes especially those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose
members include those that are well-trained, disciplined and well-armed active
or former PNP/Military personnel.

Issues:
Whether or not petitioner has legal standing,
Whether or not the President's factual determination of the necessity of
calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review
Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint
visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy
over the military and the civilian character of the PNP.

Held:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO
ORDERED.

Ratio:
Petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of the requisites of
standing to raise the issues in the petition
The president did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction nor did he commit a violation of the civilian supremacy
clause of the constitution

Apart from this declaration of “bounden duty”, however, the IBP asserts no other
basis in support of its locus standi The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to
preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not
sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. None of the members of IBP
sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility
patrols. Despite no legal standing, the Court has decided to take cognizance of the
issues raised, because of their transcendental significance and their seriousness, novelty, and
weight as precedents, and because the issues will probably not go away until they’ve been
resolved.

The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the
Marines. The President as stated in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution,
specifically, has the power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Calling the armed forces is not proper for
judicial scrutiny since it involves a political question and the resolution of factual
issues, which are beyond the review powers of this Court.   By grave abuse of
discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility. When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a
discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. The court cannot agree with
the Solicitor General that the issue involved is a political question beyond the
jurisdiction of the court to review when the grant of power is qualified,
conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed
qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations respected is
justiciable—the problem being one of legality and not its wisdom.

3.) The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian
supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible
use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. Under the LOI, the police
forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures. 38 It
is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. 
Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than
assistance required in conducting the patrols. As such, there can be no "insidious
incursion" of the military in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the
civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution. The role of Marines was limited as
the civilian PNP is in charge. The real authority was with the PNP with the Manila
Police Chief as overall head. The AFP does not exercise any control. None of the
Marines were incorporated into the PNP. As such, civilian authority is still
supreme over the military. The Marines rendered nothing more that assistance.
What exist is only mutual support and cooperation. Military assistance to civilian
authorities persists, examples of previous implementation include, civil functions
such as elections, Red Cross operations, disaster relief and rescue, licensure
exams, nationwide exams, etc.

Kilosbayan v Guingona

Facts:
Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by
B.P. Blg. 42), which grants it the authority to hold and conduct “charity
sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities,” the PCSO decided to
establish an on-line lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base
and diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before March 1993, after
learning that the PCSO was interested in operating an on-line lottery system, the
Berjaya Group Berhad, “a multinational company and one of the ten largest
public companies in Malaysia,” “became interested to offer its services and
resources to PCSO.” As an initial step, Berjaya Group Berhad (through its
individual nominees) organized with some Filipino investors in March 1993 a
Philippine corporation known as the Philippine Gaming Management
Corporation (PGMC), which “was intended to be the medium through which the
technical and management services required for the project would be offered
and delivered to PCSO.” Considering the citizenship requirement, the PGMC
claims that Berjaya Group undertook to reduce its equity to 40% by selling 35%
of the original 75% foreign stockholdings to local investors.
Before August 1993, the PCSO formally issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for
the Lease Contract of an on-line lottery system for the PCSO. On 15 August 1993,
PGMC submitted its bid to the PCSO. On 21 October 1993, the Office of the
President announced that it had given the respondent PGMC the go-signal to
operate the country’s on-line lottery system and that the corresponding
implementing contracts would be submitted not later than 8 November 1993
“for final clearance and approval by the Chief Executive.”
On 4 November 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to President Fidel V.
Ramos strongly opposing the setting up of the on-line lottery system on the basis
of serious moral and ethical considerations. Considering the denial by the Office
of the President of its protest and the statement of Assistant Executive Secretary
Renato Corona that “only a court injunction can stop Malacañ ang,” and the
imminent implementation of the Contract of Lease in February 1994,
KILOSBAYAN, with its co-petitioners, filed on 28 January 1994 this petition.
Petitioner claims that it is a non-stock domestic corporation composed of civic-
spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders. The rest of the
petitioners, except Senators Freddie Webb and Wigberto Tañ ada and
Representative Joker P. Arroyo, are suing in their capacities as members of the
Board of Trustees of KILOSBAYAN and as taxpayers and concerned citizens.
Senators Webb and Tañ ada and Representative Arroyo are suing in their
capacities as members of Congress and as taxpayers and concerned citizens of
the Philippines. The public respondents meanwhile allege that the petitioners
have no standing to maintain the instant suit, citing the Court’s resolution in
Valmonte vs. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi
2. Whether or the Contract of Lease in the light of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as
amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting
lotteries “in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person,
association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign.” is legal and valid.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the challenged
Contract of Lease executed on 17 December 1993 by respondent Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and respondent Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation (PGMC) is hereby DECLARED contrary to law and
invalid.

We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The

ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral
well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the
counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery
system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal
standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its
sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which
the respondents tried to take advantage of. “Procedural technicality may be
brushed or set aside by the Court if the issue is of transcendental importance to
the public. It is the Court‘s duty to settle promptly and definitely these cases, to
determine whether the officials acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction,
given its wide discretion.”

Sec. 1 of RA 1169 prohibits PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries “in
collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company
or entity whether domestic or foreign. The language of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169
is indisputably clear. The PCSO cannot share its franchise with another by way of
collaboration, association or joint venture. Neither can it assign, transfer, or lease
such franchise. Whether the contract in question is one of lease or whether the
PGMC is merely an independent contractor should not be decided on the basis of
the title or designation of the contract but by the intent of the parties, which may
be gathered from the provisions of the contract itself. Animus hominis est anima
scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument. No one should be
deceived by the title or designation of a contract.
Undoubtedly, from the very inception, the PCSO and the PGMC mutually
understood that any arrangement between them would necessarily leave to the
PGMC the technical, operations, and management aspects of the on-line lottery
system while the PSCO would, primarily, provide the franchise. The so-called
Contract of Lease is not, therefore, what it purports to be. Woven therein are
provisions, which negate its title and betray the true intention of the parties to be
in or to have a joint venture for a period of eight years in the operation and
maintenance of the on-line lottery system.
The actual lessor in this case is the PCSO and the subject matter thereof is its
franchise to hold and conduct lotteries since it is, in reality, the PGMC that
operates and manages the on-line lottery system for a period of eight years.   As
may be expected, it will induce in PGMC an active interest and participation in
the success of PCSO that is not expected of an ordinary detached lessor who gets
to be paid his rental fee — whether the lessee's business prospers or not. PGMC's
share in the operation depends on its own performance and the effectiveness of
its collaboration with PCSO. Although the contract pretends otherwise, PGMC is a
co-investor with PCSO in what is practically, if not in a strictly legal sense, a joint
venture. The operation will only be taken by the PCSO after 8 years after the
lease has expired.