Personalizing Politics and Realizing Democracy

Advance praise for Personalizing Politics

and Realizing Democracy
This book is a masterful exposition of the influential role of personality factors
in political behavior, providing unparalleled breadth and depth of analysis of
intrapersonal determinants of democratic life in society.
—Albert Bandura, David Starr Jordan Professor Emeritus of Social
Science in Psychology, Stanford University
At this precarious time throughout the world where totalitarian regimes are once
again gaining support among the masses, we all need to understand the essential
human dimensions of democracy as its vital counterpoint. Authors Caprara and
Vecchione present a uniquely brilliant analysis of their decades of research on
the interplay of personalities of leaders and their followers, as well as their path
outlined for democracy to be realized and succeed.
—Philip Zimbardo, author of The Lucifer Effect:
Understanding How Good People Turn Evil
Caprara and Vecchione’s book is a magnificent contribution to political psychology.

It demonstrates that ethics is a foundational part of politics and democracy. Self-
reflective and morally conscious citizens play a crucial role in shaping healthy
politics and well-functioning democracy. One should not underestimate the
citizen’s moral development and civic education in catalyzing social change.
—Laszlo Zsolnai, Professor and Director, Business Ethics Center,
Corvinus University of Budapest and President,
European SPES Institute, Leuven
This is an insightful contribution to the complex interplay between the various

factors that account for how we relate to politics. Personalizing Politics and Realizing
Democracy makes concepts understandable, providing sound evidence for the material
presented. As people in many parts of the world express growing disenchantment
with political processes, corruption, and the widening gap between themselves and
those who govern them, this timely volume should improve our understanding of
the political choices that we make.
—Saths Cooper, President of the International Union of Psychological
Science, and Professor, University of Limpopo
This is an insightful examination of the moral foundations of political action! From

an impressive array of perspectives from genetics through philosophy to every
branch of psychology, Personalizing Politics and Realizing Democracy dissects the
psychological underpinnings of democracy. It identifies the key role of personality

traits and values in shaping all aspects of political behavior. Solidly grounded in
research across diverse countries, this book raises many unanswered questions to
inspire future research.
—Shalom H. Schwartz, Professor Emeritus of Psychology,
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Gian Vittorio Caprara and Michele Vecchione have written a timely and outstanding
volume that explores the crucial role of personality psychology in understanding the
continuing evolution of democracies. It is informative, data-driven, and compelling.
Personality psychology provides the bridge for us to interconnect advances in
genetics, epigenetics, and the neurosciences with our deepening knowledge of
developmental and social psychology. “Agency” and “communion” are key
elements that shape our personalities and deeply influence who “I am” and who
“we are” within our democratic societies. The discrepancies in wealth and power
between those at the top and the majority of citizens continue to challenge our
democratic ideals and fuel political campaigns. Consequently, this book is a must-
read not only for students and scholars, but also for our political leaders as well as
“we the people”—voters and non-voters alike. As the authors emphasize, this is our
moral responsibility, as well as our obligation to future generations, if we are to have
governments that are accountable and open to the participation of all the people.
—James F. Leckman, Neison Harris Professor of Child Psychiatry,
Psychiatry, Pediatrics and Psychology, Yale University
There is no need for politics to “become more personalized,” as the authors

outline in their introductory statement, to attribute to personality the highest
level of importance for the study of the functioning of political entities and the
underpinning of political behavior. Throughout history, traits, needs, norms,
values, and beliefs of actors at all levels of the political process have been pivotal in
shaping their political behavior and its outcomes. Caprara and Vecchione show in
their seminal work in which ways and to what extent this also applies to modern
democracies. To cover their subject they address a wide range of fundamental
questions from the anthropological bases of political behavior to the dynamics of
political change. In their approach, which is based on a firm endorsement of the
principles of participatory democracy, they bridge the gap between biological
and social sciences. They show that the approaches and findings of neurosciences
can be compatible with a view that sees the development of democracy and that
of citizens as reciprocally conditional. Based on a comprehensive study of the
recent literature (a significant part of which has been contributed by the authors
themselves), this work of Caprara and Vecchione holds the prospect of becoming
a leading reference book in the field of political psychology for scholars and
wider circles of politically interested readers alike.
—Heinrich Best, Senior Professor of Sociology, University of Jena,
and Director of the Research Committee of Political Elites of IPSA

Personalizing Politics

Series in Political Psychology
Series Editor
John T. Jost
Editorial Board
Mahzarin Banaji, Gian Vittorio Caprara, Christopher Federico, Don Green,
John Hibbing, Jon Krosnick, Arie Kruglanski, Kathleen McGraw, David Sears,
Jim Sidanius, Phil Tetlock, Tom Tyler
Image Bite Politics: News and the Visual Framing of Elections

Maria E. Grabe and Erik P. Bucy
Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification

John T. Jost, Aaron C. Kay, and Hulda Thorisdottir
The Political Psychology of Democratic Citizenship

Eugene Borgida, Christopher M. Federico, and John L. Sullivan
On Behalf of Others: The Psychology of Care in a Global World

Sarah Scuzzarello, Catarina Kinnvall, and Kristen Renwick Monroe
The Obamas and a (Post) Racial America?

Gregory S. Parks and Matthew W. Hughey
Ideology, Psychology, and Law

Jon Hanson
Representing Red and Blue: How the Culture Wars Change the Way Citizens Speak
and Politicians Listen
David C. Barker and Christopher Jan Carman
On Voter Competence
Paul Goren
The Ambivalent Partisan: How Critical Loyalty Promotes Democracy

Howard G. Lavine, Christopher D. Johnston, and Marco M. Steenbergen
The Impacts of Lasting Occupation: Lessons from Israeli Society

Daniel Bar-Tal and Izhak Schnell
Competing Motives in the Partisan Mind: How Loyalty and Responsiveness Shape

Party Identification and Democracy
Eric W. Groenendyk
Personalizing Politics and Realizing Democracy

Gian Vittorio Caprara and Michele Vecchione

Gian Vittorio Caprara
Michele Vecchione
1

1
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Contents
Preface ix
Acknowledgments xiii
1 Personality and Politics in Contemporary Democracies 1
2 Personality in Politics 29
3 Moral Foundations of Political Action 73
4 Personal Determinants of Political Divisions 121
5 Diversities and Commonalities in Political Attitudes 171
6 The Private and Public Personality of Politicians 217
7 Political Participation and Efficacy 251
8 A Congruency Model of Political Behavior 309
Concluding Remarks 349

References 361
About the Authors 399
Index 401
vii

Preface
Few people would challenge the legitimacy of democracy as the form of gov-
ernment most congenial to the contemporary perception of citizens as reflec-
tive and responsible agents. Yet a number of facts challenge these ideals and
question the extent to which the principles and procedures of representative
democracy developed in Western societies may continue to represent a global
model in the pursuit of the optimal form of government. Declining political
participation, as well as skepticism and dissatisfaction with the functioning
of democracy among citizens of established democracies, may seem at odds
with their increasing capacity to control their own circumstances within their
private, social, and economic spheres.
While competence and trustworthiness are among the qualities that
voters most appreciate in politicians, contradictory pressures challenge the
effectiveness of parties’ programs and of politicians’ promises. Indeed, all
politics has become more personalized, as political preferences are increas-
ingly dependent on the likes and dislikes of citizens and on the personality
characteristics of political candidates capable of attracting voters’ preferences.
All this directs legislators to a better appreciation of the significant changes
that have occurred in citizens’ political reasoning and actions, as well as of
the diversities among citizens in different political contexts. Likewise, sci-
entists are urged to investigate and reveal the psychological structures and
mechanisms that set the conditions for individuals’ democratic participation.
In this volume, we see democracy as the preferable form of governance
and argue that the development of citizens and democracy are reciprocally
conditional: while democracy should set the ideal conditions for the full
expression of people’s talents to be achieved, citizens’ commitment to demo-
cratic institutions is decisive in maintaining and promoting democracy.
To achieve its goals, democracy requires members to respect each other
and to cooperate in the pursuit of life conditions that maximize both the
realization of individuals’ talents and the achievement of public welfare.
ix

xPreface
The more people are aware of their own properties and rights as deliberative
agents, the more they expect political institutions to respect their opinions
and choices. Likewise, the more democratic procedures are perceived as fair,
and the more leaders are perceived as accountable for meeting voters’ needs
and expectations, the more citizens are committed to contribute to the effec-
tive functioning of democracy.
We argue that democracy is a moral enterprise that rests largely upon
the public morality of its citizens. Thus, knowledge regarding citizens’ values
and moral reasoning in the choices they make is crucial for the functioning of
democratic institutions and ultimately for the realization of democratic ideals
like freedom, equality, and tolerance. To this aim, the study of personality
assumes an increasingly central role in the analysis of political behavior as
individual differences in traits and values have proved to be more useful than
traditional sociodemographic characteristics, such as gender, age, educational
level, occupation, and income, in explaining political preferences. Ultimately,
individuals’ personality seems to play a crucial role with regard to the dis-
tinctive feature of democratic systems, namely, the freedom of voice given to
citizens by voting and choosing the representatives that best suit their opin-
ions and interests. All of this gives the science of personality a decisive role
in addressing traditional issues about human nature and political action, par-
ticularly by taking advantage of recent progress in genetics, neurosciences,
and psychology.
Knowledge regarding the functioning of citizens as self-referencing and
moral agents is no less important than knowledge regarding the functioning
of social and political institutions, as the former largely account for the latter.
In the first chapter, we discuss the contribution of psychology in addressing
the current challenges of democracy associated with the size of polities, the
variety of vested interests, the quality of political leadership, and the engage-
ment of citizens. We position personality at the core of our discourse and
review major contributions of past psychological inquiry.
In Chapter 2, we focus on personality as a self-regulatory system, show-
ing multiple features at service of adaptation. We review recent findings from
neuroscience and psychological research pointing to the vast potential of
human beings, and we detail the major features of personality targeted by
psychological inquiry.
In Chapter 3, we address the assumptions one can make about human
nature and the moral underpinnings of political behavior. We point to agency
and communion as the two fundamental dimensions of human existence. We
then view basic traits as the potentials that equip people to value life and
to meet the requirements of their physical and social environments. Moral

Preface xi
development provides the general principles that dictate what is wrong and
what is right, and guides how people should relate together to live a good life.
We highlight the moral properties of human beings as responsible agents and
discuss the extent to which worldviews, moral concerns, and religious beliefs
may account for political choices.
In Chapter 4, we address the function of political ideology and the degree
to which traditional right-left and conservative-liberal distinctions may still
serve to orient citizens’ political choices. We then review current findings
attesting to the significant role of personality basic traits and basic values in
accounting for political choice in Western democracies.
In Chapter 5, we examine how basic values turn into political orientation
through core political values, namely, social attitudes toward specific issues
such as state intervention in the economy and society, military defense, civil
rights, traditional morality, acceptance of immigrants, and law and order. We
then examine the degree to which citizen’s positions toward these social and
political issues can be traced to consistent patterns of relations that are associ-
ated with political ideology and are largely invariant across Western demo-
cratic countries.
In Chapter 6, we address the personality of politicians, mostly focusing on
the image that results from their self-presentations and from voters’ percep-
tions. We proceed by focusing on the heuristics that people can use to navi-
gate through politics, highlighting the role of similarity and traits as major
organizers of voters’ evaluations of politicians.
In Chapter 7, political engagement is addressed as the result of social-
ization, personal dispositions, and experiences conducive to valuing political
participation and to engaging in personal and collective political action. As in
any other domain of functioning, it is unlikely that people will feel efficacious
in politics unless they believe they can produce the desired results by their
actions. This requires both personal competence and trust in institutions.
Likewise, democracy’s full realization is unlikely unless males and females
are given equal opportunities to engage in politics. This may require decisive
actions to dismantle the barriers that have traditionally confined women to an
ancillary role in politics.
In Chapter 8, we argue that there is a congruency among the beliefs peo-
ple hold about themselves, their values, and the choices they make in poli-
tics. Indeed, the images that citizens have of themselves serve as a compass
with which to navigate the world of politics, and their priorities dictate the
menu offered to them by parties and politicians much more than in the past.
Thus a major task of political leaders is to interpret and meet what critical
citizens expect from politics. To this aim, psychology provides alternative

xiiPreface
models regarding how traits and values account for political preferences and
engagement. These models can be complementary, rather than alternative.
Whereas limited mandate may prove instrumental in enlarging the number
of citizens that prove their talents in political offices, psychology may provide
transparent procedures to assess and develop the qualities that are desirable
in politicians.
We conclude the volume by summarizing the most relevant issues that
have been addressed throughout. It is a common belief that the functioning
of democracy rests upon the capabilities and moral values of its citizen. In
this regard, psychology indicates that the capacities and values of individu-
als rest upon the conditions available for the realization of their potentials.
Thus democracy can succeed in being the best form of governance only to the
extent that its functioning enables citizens to achieve and to express the best
of their humanity.
The volume is directed to a multidisciplinary readership, including
scholars, scientists, and graduate students from philosophy, political science,
psychology, and sociology, as well as politicians and sophisticated readers
acquainted with politics and social change.

Acknowledgments
The preparation of this volume, the idea for which developed over several
years, has benefited greatly from constructive comments on early drafts by
Augusto Blasi, Donatella Campus, Ada Fonzi, and Marco Santambrogio, and
enormously by the incisive and continuous assistance of our editor, Verona
Christmas-Best. We would also like to express our gratitude to John Jost for
his sound and invaluable comments on earlier versions of the volume.
The realization of the volume was made possible thanks to the two semes-
ters spent by Gian Vittorio Caprara at the Swedish Collegium for Advanced
Study (SCAS) in Uppsala in 2013 and 2014. Both authors are grateful to Bjorn
Wittrock, to all fellows, and to the staff of SCAS for the sympathy and discus-
sions that nurtured our thinking and writing.
Finally, we would like to express our gratitude to our companions, Laura
and Silvia, for their unconditioned patience and encouragement.
Gian Vittorio Caprara and Michele Vecchione
xiii


CHAPTER 1
Personality and Politics

in Contemporary Democracies
DEMOCRACY AND ITS CHALLENGES

Democracy can be viewed as the form of governance that has at its core the
self-determination of citizens and the realization of their potentials as self-
reflective and social agents. In this book, we take individuals’ potentials,
social agency, and self-reflection to be distinctive features of personality that
are crucial for the assessment and promotion of the functioning of democracy.
Thus we come to argue that the development of citizens and democracy are
reciprocally conditional, as their functioning and development depend upon
each other.
Although it is common to speak of democracy as an ancient institution,
in most countries the original concept of democracy still belongs more to the
sphere of ideals than to that of well-established practice of good government.
Further, while most contemporary scholars refer to democracy as a desirable
form of governance, one should not disregard the fact that, in the past, as
nowadays, the word has often been met with mixed feelings of approval and
refusal, depending on the historical and political context.
Earlier forms of participatory government, including the Poleis of ancient
Greece and the governing assemblies of Northern Europe, such as the Ting,
differed substantially from contemporary constitutional democracies (Dahl,
1998, 2007; Sartori, 2007). Among ancient forms of polities, Athenian democ-
racy represents the prototype and the most successful form of direct participa-
tion of ordinary people in collective self-governance. Indeed, the positioning
of freedom and equality at the core of modern democracy and our percep-
tion of the civic education and empowerment of citizens as conditional to the
functioning of government are legacies of this ancient system (Hansen, 2006;
Ober, 2008, 2012). Yet more than twenty-t wo centuries separate the unique and
exceptional case of participatory governance that was Athenian democracy
from modern democracies; one has to question why it took so long for liberty
1

2 Personalizing Politics and Realizing Democracy
and equality, and the conditions under which these values are achieved, to be
re-established as a priority for governance.
One should not disregard the fact that the liberty and equality of Athenian
democracy were less universal in scope than those of today; participation and
collective self-governance did not include the majority of the population,
especially not females and slaves. Nor, as today, did the authority and respect
of law rest on a body of constitutional rules; neither could society count on
established institutions that were able to balance the exercise of legislative,
judiciary, and executive powers. Athenian democracy’s direct participation,
representation, and rotation of citizens in political offices did, however, enable
the distribution of authority, the reduction of inequality, and the maintenance
of people’s confidence in self-government. Nevertheless, Athenian democracy
did not extend beyond the borders of Athens and did not survive its encoun-
ter with the Roman Empire; only in the last two centuries has democracy been
rediscovered and posited as an ideal model of governance.
A set of fundamental principles and a body of representative institutions
distinguish modern democracies from that of ancient Athens. The basic prin-
ciples of a constitution and the right of citizens to have a voice in political mat-
ters, mostly through representatives who are committed to operate within the
realm of the law and in the pursuit of the common good, was foreign to earlier
forms of government. Both constitution and representation were the outcome
of a long and tortuous journey. It took several centuries to base democratic
government on a set of rules that respect the fundamental rights of citizens
and limit the power of legislative bodies, and it took several centuries to give
a voice to all components of society through universal suffrage and represen-
tation. Indeed, only gradually, and mostly over the last two centuries, have
freedom of speech and of the press, regular elections, and open competition
for power become the distinctive features of democratic polities.1
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, only the United States and the
United Kingdom showed, at least in part, the main features of representative
democracies, and even at the beginning of the twentieth century, established
democracies numbered no more than a dozen. More surprisingly, even at the
beginning of the third millennium, no more than a third of the world’s popu-
lation could claim to be under a form of government that grants all citizens
the respect and recognition of individual dignity, the freedom to voice their
own opinions, equal treatment under the law, equal access to public offices,
and equal opportunity to exert control over the use of power, that we associ-
ate with democracy today.
The path toward democracy has been long, discontinuous, and different
for the various societies that finally landed on democratic shores. Currently,

Personality and Politics in Contemporary Democracies 3
a number of countries may claim the status of established democracies, but

countries claiming a long and continuous familiarity with democracy are out-
numbered by others that over the last century achieved, lost, and regained
democracy. In reality, the assessment of democracy is more than problematic
when one compares political systems that, despite the appeal to common ide-
als, function quite differently.
As stated earlier, the basic principles from which modern democracy
draws its legitimacy are liberty, equality, and dignity, whereby each per-
son is held to be the owner of his or her actions and deserves respect for
simply being a person. Citizens are viewed as agents responsible for the
outcomes of their behavior, with equal say in public matters, and whose
needs and aspirations are treated with equal concern by government and
before the law. As stated by Sen (1999), democracy is a demanding system
that requires the protection of individuals’ freedom, the respect for legal
entitlements, and the participation of all citizens to set the conditions for
the full expression of their personalities and the pursuit of societies’ wel-
fare. This rests upon the moral psychology of citizens, namely their dispo-
sition to respect each other, to treat one another as socially equal, and to
operate in concert in the pursuit of the common good. To this end and for
the functioning of democracy, it is crucial that individuals acknowledge
and protect each other’s dignity. As individuals draw a measure of their
own value largely from the respect of others, democracy should capitalize
on the rewards and the sense of self-realization that citizens may derive
from contributing to its functioning.
Equal opportunities concerning access to public office, and the rotation of
officeholders, are also conditions that grant citizens control over the account-
ability of their representatives. Ideally, to paraphrase Abraham Lincoln, gov-
ernment by the people for the people is the aim of democracy. In practice,
however, the various democracies across the world differ in the degree to
which their citizens are granted the liberty to voice and change their opin-
ions, are afforded equality in respect and treatment within society, and have
effective control over the mechanism of representation. Thus one may assess
the status of democracy by the extent to which minorities feel and are actually
secure in voicing their opinions, by the opportunities that are given to citi-
zens to make reasonable choices, and by the degree to which they can monitor
and have an impact on the legitimate use of representatives’ power.
The level of citizens’ engagement in the democratic process further attests
to the degree of realization of democratic ideals to the extent that exercising
civil and political rights and duties is an important component of an indi-
vidual’s life as a social being. This may occur when political participation

earns others’ recognition and respect and assumes an intrinsic value as the
realization of one’s personality.
People have reason to participate if they have a say in the choices of those
entitled to use power, if they believe that those in authority consider their
interests to be as valuable as those of others, and if they judge their argu-
ments to be influential in decision-making. Both voicing one’s opinion and
exerting control over one’s representatives are crucial features of democracy
that unavoidably have an impact on citizens’ self-concept and social identity.
People are concerned about how they are treated by institutions because
it influences how they feel about themselves. Therefore, the more people
grow and live in communities that value political participation, the greater
will be the impact of their social commitments and obligations on their per-
sonal identity. Likewise, the more institutions recognize citizens’ opinions
and choices as worthy of respect, the more citizens will attend to the good
government of their communities.
Thus the fairness of democratic procedures for selecting leaders and the
fairness of those leaders once in a position to exert authority are both key to
understanding citizens’ engagement, commitment to, and satisfaction with
democracy. The more leaders are accountable for meeting citizens’ needs and
expectations, the more they contribute to democracy by conveying a sense of
equity, respect, and personal and collective efficacy.
Whereas democracy claims equality before the law, freedom of speech,
respect of personal dignity, and fairness of treatment for all and through all
institutions, it is crucial for citizens to have the best conditions to express
their talents in order for these ideals to be realized. Likewise, it is crucial
for democracy to pursue the full realization of citizens’ potentials beyond
the satisfaction of their needs and the recognition of their abilities. In this
regard, knowledge about the functioning of personality is no less important
than knowledge regarding the functioning of social institutions and govern-
ment. In particular, a certain degree of optimism is needed when facing the
challenges associated with the establishment and diffusion of democracy in
a multicultural world.
As politics in modern democracies aims to be the realm within which
citizens operate in order to pursue the optimal conditions for personal, social,
and communal growth, such ambitious goals can be better achieved the more
one understands the psychological process underlying political choices, con-
sent formation, concerted political action, and effective governance. It can
be assumed that social and political conditions largely contribute to shap-
ing citizens’ values and views about governance and society. Yet the more
citizens are active in meeting their needs for self-realization, carrying their

personal values and aspirations to the political arena, the more they influence
the forms and the agenda of government.
Ideally, democratic institutions should establish and preserve the condi-
tions that allow society to function in harmony while also engaging all citi-
zens in the pursuit of public welfare. We are aware that not all would agree
that democracy is the best political system among past and current forms of
government (Bell, 2006; Bell & Li, 2013). Yet we believe that democracy might
be the most congenial form of governance for human development to the
extent that collective self-government goes hand in hand with the satisfaction
of citizens’ needs for recognition and respect, autonomy, competence, and
relatedness, and for the promotion of their civic values. Likewise, we believe
that autonomy in government, equality in society, and distributed responsi-
bility rest upon citizen’s self-governance, equality of democratic agency, and
effective engagement.
In practice, however, the various democracies differ in the degree to
which citizens are free to voice their opinions and have equal opportunities
to influence the government of society, and the degree to which governments
are concerned with the welfare of all components of the society they govern.
Indeed, even citizens of established democracies appear to be only moder-
ately satisfied with the functioning of democratic institutions. Current symp-
toms of a general democratic malaise include a lack of trust in politicians,
falling levels of electoral participation, declining party identification and
party loyalty, growing electoral volatility, and increasing indifference and
skepticism toward politics (Dalton, 2004; Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000; Mair,
2006; Rosanvallon, 2006; Torcal & Montero, 2006).
One may view people’s disappointment with democracy’s functioning
among the unexpected effects of the irruption into politics of mass move-
ments of citizens, who replaced the notables of the past. In certain cases, the
tendency toward polity withdrawal may stem from the increasing complex-
ity of political matters and processes, even though the average citizen tends
to be better educated, better informed, and more capable of making choices
than has been true in the past. Thus public indifference may be linked to the
growing contradiction between citizens’ increasing capacity to control their
own circumstances within their private social and economic sphere, and a
perceived lack of control over the political sphere, especially in times of rapid
social change.
In other cases, the dissatisfaction may reflect citizens’ higher expectations
and more critical evaluations of parties and the performance of politicians.
Rational citizens may find no reason to expend the energy, intelligence, and
passion that political involvement may require when involvement in other

forms of civic engagement, such as pro-environment movements, support for

the arts, or campaigns against poverty and illness, may better reward their
participatory and agentic needs.
Much of this criticism comes from inside democracy, since most critics
of this system of government do not believe in the existence of alternative
forms. Such criticism, in fact, does not appear to be nostalgia for past regimes,
nor does it underscore the dangers to which democracy is still exposed in
large parts of the world. Rather, it attests to the significant rise in the level
of citizens’ aspirations and urges legislators and political scientists to better
appreciate the significant changes that are likely to have occurred in public
perceptions, expectations, and motivations that set the mental conditions for
political participation and democratic functioning.
The novel challenge of our times is related to the extension of democracy
and how to enable multitudes of citizens to voice their opinions and to rec-
oncile their differing views, claims, and interests following the principles of
democracy. On the one hand, this challenges the ideals of free expression and
equality in light of visions of humanity and society that at first sight seem
incompatible. On the other hand, it challenges the ideals of fairness in light
of living conditions that preclude large numbers of people from achieving a
decent life and from fully expressing their human potential. Taken together,
since the civic virtues of citizens can be said to both rest upon and set the
conditions for the proper functioning of democratic institutions, the develop-
ment of citizens and of democracy cannot be seen as other than reciprocal
and conditional.
The tension one may perceive between democracy’s efficiency and citizens’
satisfaction in established democracies should lead to a view of democracy as
an ideal system that constantly pushes the limits of possible achievements,
with the understanding that the more individuals become aware of their
rights to self-determination and recognition, the higher will be their expec-
tations and demands concerning the functioning of democratic institutions.
This requires an understanding of the constraints that may limit the
full actualization of democracy, where it already can be seen as an exer-
cise in self-regulation and self-determination at the individual and collec-
tive level. This understanding is particularly needed in times of extreme
transformation regarding traditional political identities tied to nations
and states that are also undergoing profound change concerning the level
of belonging and representation of their citizens. As major political deci-
sions are transferred from states to sovra-ordered political entities like the
European Union, NATO, or the United Nations, the power of citizens to
have a voice regarding the legitimacy of decisions and the accountability of

politicians may be further reduced, unless new forms of education, infor-

mation, and consent formation are implemented to sustain participation
within a global democracy.
All this leads to the question of how to convince citizens that their votes
still count, despite the size of polities and their own increasing distance from
government; that liberty and equality imply pluralism; that solidarity rests
upon reciprocal respect; and that fairness requires the recognition of talent
and merit.
Democracy requires voicing, listening, and acting—not only voting, but
also debating and being vigilant over the conduct of one’s representatives and
fellow citizens. Knowing how people think and what people cherish most is
needed to understand what might lead citizens to invest into the promotion
of democracy. Indeed, as stated by Huddy, Sears, and Levy (2013), “the dem-
ocratic process may be messy, unsatisfying, and frustrating, but it is inher-
ently psychological” (p. 4). As democracy rests upon the moral psychology of
its citizens, namely their ideas of good, fairness, and well-being, promoting
democracy requires us to focus on citizens as agents who actively contribute to
shaping the conditions and course of their lives, and to capitalize on their men-
tal capital to make society prosper and flourish in a rapidly changing world.
Democracy is an evolving project that requires an understanding of how
human agency expresses itself and develops, of how people adjust to their
social environments and agree to their transformation, of how political and
social institutions can set the conditions that foster the growth of disposi-
tions, values, habits, and interpersonal relations most congenial to the well-
being of individuals and to the functioning of societies.
PERSONALIZING POLITICS
Politics involves institutions and systems of norms and principles of power
management, ideally designed and set in motion for the common good.
Personality involves intra- individual systems and self- regulatory mecha-
nisms that guide people toward achieving individual and collective goals,
while providing coherence and continuity in behavioral patterns and a sense
of personal identity across different settings (Caprara & Vecchione, 2013).
How such societal and individual systems might be related has long been
a source of speculation and serious concern for philosophers, political scien-
tists, psychologists, and laypeople. Although these entities have often been
conceptualized as functioning at different levels and with different opera-
tional structures, we believe that viewing their reciprocal influences unavoid-
ably leads to their rapprochement.

As citizens bring their needs and aspirations for personal and social well-
being to the political arena, their personalities influence the agenda of politics
no less than the behavior of politicians. This is particularly true today since
the ethos of modernity has placed the person as reflective agent at the core of
any discourse on government and politics. In this regard, a broad debate on
the personalization of politics is long overdue, although the contribution of
current discussions on the personalization of politics to seeing the individual
as both the source and the end of political action, and to a better understand-
ing of how personality and politics may influence each other, cannot be taken
for granted.
Most recent debates, in fact, have been somewhat one-sided in that they
have focused on personality characteristics that may support political suc-
cess and to the personal qualities of leaders that are most likely to attract
citizens’ consent. In reality, the personalization of politics includes not only
the significant impact of a politician’s personality characteristics on voter’s
preferences, but also the determining part that voters’ personalities play in
politics through their decisions and behaviors. The same concept is likely
to encompass diverse phenomena that reflect at least two distinct order of
factors, which, as we will see later, reflect two different ways to address per-
sonality: those related to personality as perceived, and those related to per-
sonality in operation. Both focus on the function of personality, and both
lead to an understanding of how personality expresses itself in the political
domain.
The term personalization of politics has led to a focus on the personal-
ity characteristics of the leaders that may attract and seduce their followers
(Garzia, 2011; McAllister, 2007). This has been instrumental in the crafting and
marketing of images best able to secure and to strengthen leaders’ authority
and attractiveness. We, however, prefer to use the term personalizing, in that it
puts the person at the center of politics and conveys the idea that a better poli-
tics is the one that is able to grant the full expression of people’s personalities.
Thus, using personalizing rather than personalization should lead to our valuing
the personality of the many rather than that of the few, to a better understand-
ing of the mental processes underlying political behavior, and ultimately to
being able to assess the extent to which democracy may represent the form
of government most congenial to promoting the development and well-being
of citizens.
In recent decades, there have been many changes in the political land-
scape of major democracies with regard to consensus formation, the selec-
tion of elites, and citizens’ political engagement. Among the most evident
changes are shifts in focus from group affiliations to individual choices and

from issue-centered politics to more person-centered politics. While the

epistemic status of ideology is a matter of debate, ideological divisions vary
across polities and are less marked than in the past, as opposing political
parties form coalitions and move toward positions with little to distinguish
between them. Likewise, sociodemographic factors, like income, education,
and occupation, which traditionally have accounted for most ideological
cleavages, also seem much less important in most countries than they have
been in the past.
Consequently, the personality of both voters and candidates has gained
salience. In particular, the electorate of modern democracies increasingly
bases its decisions on personal factors—that is, on personal beliefs, moral pri-
orities, aspirations, and expectations—thereby making use of cognitive strat-
egies aimed at helping them cope with the complexity of political issues, and
with the image of candidates playing a central role in coloring and anchor-
ing their impressions and decisions. As a result, politicians have become
concerned with conveying favorable impressions and appealing narratives,
with the media playing a major role in crafting the images and shaping the
messages that are most desirable to voters. Among other elements that have
contributed to assigning particular importance to politicians’ personalities
are: the electoral system, which often leads to the formation of electoral coali-
tions that converge into a single leadership or that restrict voters’ choices to
two single candidates; the shifting of opposing political coalitions toward
more pragmatic platforms aimed at attracting a larger share of the electorate;
the vanishing distinctiveness of electoral programs; and the influence of the
media. Above all, television has been seen as a potent vehicle of personaliza-
tion, capable of highlighting personal characteristics and significantly con-
tributing to the fortunes of political actors.
Although much of the current debate on personalization focuses on the
personality characteristics of political candidates and on the impact of lead-
ers’ personalities on voters’ preferences, politicians’ concern for conveying
a favorable image is also the result of the higher influence that voters’ needs
and aspirations exert on their choices.
Among the various elements that lead particular importance to be
assigned to voters’ personalities, the following are particularly notewor-
thy: the higher education level of the electorate; citizens’ higher awareness
of their political rights and duties; and particularly, the view of voters as
reasoning agents who pursue the best match between their beliefs and
values and political offers. Ultimately, it is voters’ unique organization of
affect, cognitions, and habits that, taken together, make sense of their politi-
cal choices.

Thus focusing on voters’ personalities appears no less important than

scrutinizing the personalities of leaders (Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004). In par-
ticular, voters’ personalities become crucial in systems that reward the active
participation of citizens and offer a plurality of choices. Where this occurs,
individuals’ likes and dislikes, their beliefs and cognitive strategies, and their
moral concerns replace previous obligations related to given social identities
and affiliations.
As individuals free themselves from conditions of poverty and become
upwardly mobile, they are confronted with multiple worldviews and oppor-
tunities. In many cases, social and geographical mobility have eroded the ties
between individuals and bounded communities, such as those traditionally
associated with religion and occupation. Personal interests are still at the
basis of political preferences, yet they increasingly include a variety of sym-
bolic interests connected to non-material goods, such as self-respect, social
belonging, the regard of others, and the power to express one’s own ideas and
to share common projects.
As current knowledge is largely inadequate to account for the influence of
such symbolic interests, individually or in combination, across political con-
texts, or at different times, it is generally accepted that more empirical and
interdisciplinary thought and research are needed. To this aim, personality
psychology may form a bridge between the normative ideals of political phi-
losophy and the sphere of political practices by clarifying how people think,
attribute value, and behave under given circumstances.
In fact, neither philosophy nor political science can avoid crucial questions
about human reasoning and motivations to make sense of people’s beliefs,
aspirations, and ideas about forms of government that are able to maximize
citizens’ well-being. Even though these questions may lead us to revisit the
intuitions of the classics, our notions of mind, consciousness, and intention-
ality rest upon a knowledge that was not available in the past and that no
longer justifies previous speculations about human nature and human mind.
Indeed, it is fascinating to find in the intuitions of great men of the past some
anticipation of what we have come to discover about learning, emotions, will,
morality, and the self; however, it would be unwise to rest upon those intu-
itions and to ignore what has since been revealed to us and what they could
not have foreseen. It would also be particularly unwise if the philosopher
or political scientist in question would discount what science has to tell us
about the psychological properties that distinguish human beings from other
animals, the interplay of genes and environment, the plasticity of the brain,
cultural diversity, and the extraordinary changes that have occurred in our
relations with the environment.

To acknowledge that human beings are endowed with extraordinary

potential, whose actualization is dependent on opportunities provided by the
environment, has tremendous implications for the analyses of philosophers
and political scientists when addressing individuals’ rights and the condi-
tions that make peoples’ lives worth living.
The current political debate is about liberty, equality, and justice, and most
would agree that the maximization of citizens’ welfare is the main goal and
the measure of political action. Yet, we still face different political views of
how the common good should be pursued. It has been common to champion
the primacy of liberty under forms of government mostly concerned with
granting the expression of individuals’ freedom, as far as possible free from
any interference. Likewise, it has been common to celebrate the primacy of
equality, under forms of government mostly concerned with granting all peo-
ple the resources required to satisfy their needs and to express their capacities
to the full.
After the disillusions of real socialism and of uncontrolled capitalism, lit-
tle remains of their traditional utopias. Certainly, the recent tragedies related
to these extremities attest to the limitations of great ideals and warn against
any form of humanism that does not rely on firm knowledge about how peo-
ple function. It is not surprising, therefore, that there is a current interest in
views that seem to reconcile the concern for liberty and equality around the
notion of justice and that in many ways confirm the new attention on the indi-
vidual as a self-reflective and responsible social agent.
The main issue under discussion is the just society, namely the social
system and the form of government that accord all members the funda-
mental rights to liberty and dignity and that acknowledge the equal impor-
tance of one’s own self-interest (Dworkin, 2011; Rawls, 1971; Sen, 2009).
Associated with this is the concept of fairness, which is attested to by the
degree in which liberty finds its limit in others’ liberty, and equality finds
its limit in the need to grant everyone the opportunity to realize one’s own
potential. Fairness allows individuals’ merits to be rewarded and promotes
wealth and innovation, while also protecting those in need and preserving
social harmony.
Various versions of contractualism and utilitiarianism continue to provide
the main axis of reasoning about political orders and institutions and about
how to rule states and markets. Government should rest upon an agreement
and be evaluated on the basis of the benefits to contracting parties. While
citizens should be informed, politicians should be accountable. The growing
attention to persons and their rights mostly distinguishes established democ-
racies and attests to their well-functioning.

The lexicon of fairness includes many psychological concepts like needs,

aspirations, obligations, values, agency, responsibility, efficacy, and trust that
require a theory of personality that is able to make sense of the links between
thought, feelings, and action. Such a theory, however, is often implicit and is
of little help in understanding how individual behaviors can turn into out-
comes and collective endeavors that have political relevance. To be useful, it
must be examined and proved true.
It is intuitive to accept that different assumptions about the links between
needs and actions, capacities and opportunities, will and accountability, lead
to different conjectures about how fairness, trust, and collective efficacy may
be achieved. Bringing current knowledge about personality to the fore, there-
fore, should help us to examine the extent to which philosophical arguments
may hold in real situations and to assess the extent to which certain policies
may foster the proper mindsets and habits that enable citizens to contribute
to the effective functioning of democratic institutions.
As reviewed by Gregory Mitchell and Philip Tetlock (2009), turning phi-
losophers’ thought experiments into laboratory experiments may allow us to
test competing principles by elucidating the variables and mechanisms con-
ducive to the judgment of fairness. Thus one may systematically address the
tensions that citizen face when dealing with choices that contrast equality
and liberty, meritocracy and redistribution, efficiency and welfare by using
individual differences in personality to examine the extent to which ideal
principles can be generalized to different conditions.
Likewise, comparative and longitudinal studies may allow us to assess
the validity of alternative policies aimed at the promotion of political engage-
ment and deliberative capacities, using individual differences in personality
to highlight the needs and values that lead people to gather together and the
influence they exert in making common decisions.
Among the many questions that personality psychology may help to
address through empirical study is that concerning differences in the condi-
tions under which principles of fairness operate and the extent to which habits,
attitudes, causal attributions, and contingencies may lead individuals to devi-
ate from making optimal choices. Other such questions concern how much
time is required and what experiences are conducive for people to embrace the
notions of equality, liberty, community, and justice, and the degree to which
different criteria of value may lead to assigning different priorities across
different situations and cultural contexts. The importance of these values in
maintaining individuals’ personal and social identity and in their commit-
ment toward the common good is also a potential topic for examination.

Knowledge about personality should help to shed light on the needs

and aspirations of citizens and to nurture their confidence in the value of
civic and political engagement. This is crucial for democracy, as it rests on
citizens’ commitment and cannot fully function without a diffuse sense of
civic responsibility. Therefore, despite the many limitations of contemporary
democracies, we agree with Christian Welzel and Ronald Inglehart (2005) in
viewing democratization “as part of a broader process of human develop-
ment” (p. 84).
Although it is impossible to establish clear relations of cause and effect
between democracy, economic progress, and cultural changes, the better
quality of life in democratic countries and the diffuse aspirations to demo-
cratic ideals in large parts of the world attest to the benefits and to the per-
ceived appeal of democracy. Higher levels of health, education, and safety, in
addition to greater freedom, also attest to the merits of democracy, despite
persistent and extreme inequalities. In fact, although inequalities remain,
they have not precluded large masses of disadvantaged citizens from freeing
themselves from misery and achieving decent living conditions.
One country that contradicts this argument, however, is China. Despite
the toll imposed on citizens’ freedom, its tremendous progress—not only
economic, but also in the areas of health and education—challenges the pre-
viously celebrated merits of democracy. It is too soon to say whether, and to
what extent, the Chinese “experiment” will be able to meet the rise of citi-
zen’ aspirations and to what degree it will represent a real alternative to
democracy.
Another element that, in our opinion, further attests to the merits of
democracy is the reduction of conflict between nations and within nations, at
all levels, which has led to a revision of the categorization of politics in terms
of friend and foe. There also have been no significant conflicts among demo-
cratic nations in the last 70 years, while citizen safety has increased within
all established democracies (Pinker, 2011). Economic inequalities between
and within countries have not resulted in broader conflict, but have instead
heightened governments’ concern about the unforeseen effects of the global
economy.
As stated earlier, ideological divisions are in general less marked than in
the past, and where they do occur they are often related to issues that reflect
tensions in the sphere of values among traditional moralities, modern world-
views, and individuals’ rights. These issues further underscore the role of
personality differences, rather than the role of socio-structural aspects, like
education, labor, and income.

Thus the cleavages that had previously distinguished one party from
another across countries and time now fluctuate depending on circumstances.
In particular, ideologically based differences in party programs, which tend
to be highlighted during electoral campaigns, often become leveled in daily
practice when the pressures of problem resolution, the limitations of national
resources, and the constraints of international agreements may enforce solu-
tions beyond ideologies.
Yet diversities in political views and ideals still make sense and should be
valued the more they represent instances that may complement each other at
the service of the common good. When democracy functions, diversities may
result in virtuous circles, as changes of government associated with politi-
cians’ competing promises and commitments may carry better policies and
continuous improvements of democratic institutions (Nozik, 1989).
These are issues to which we will turn later by arguing that ideological
differences reflect basic personality differences in the fundamental dimen-
sions of human existence, whose calibration is needed for optimal function-
ing. We will advocate the function of ideology in enabling people to debate, to
choose, and to move democracy onward, on the premise that human beings
are naturally equipped to make democracy function.
VIEWS OF PERSONALITY
Personality is a concept as difficult and as familiar as many others related
to psychology, and several ideas appear in various combinations in the tra-
ditional and common usage of the word: human being; person; the quality
of being a person; the quality or fact of being a particular person; patterns
of habits and qualities of any individual as expressed through physical and
mental activities; the sum of such properties as impressing or likely to impress
others; and what makes an individual conspicuously different from others.
In reality, no one can elude constructing a concept of personality, just as
one cannot avoid a theory of personality. In particular, one cannot avoid a
conceptual network of interrelated notions with which to organize knowl-
edge, impressions, and conjectures about one’s own and others’ personality,
to dialogue with oneself and to make commerce with others. The fact that
this theory is often implicit does not limit its influence. Personality includes
behavioral tendencies and systems, structures, and mechanisms that regulate
affective, cognitive, and motivational processes. It involves internal systems
and processes that guide people toward the attainment of individual and col-
lective goals, accounts for coherence and behavioral continuity across con-
texts, and ultimately, accounts for one’s own personal identity.

The current notion of personality addresses the functioning of the entire

person and covers phenomena that, in the past, were traced to the notions of
temperament, character, and intelligence. Research on personality, therefore,
seeks to integrate knowledge from the different domains of psychological
inquiry and to build bridges between psychology and other social sciences.
Contemporary scholars have addressed personality under two distinct
perspectives that focus on different features and that require different,
although interdependent, courses of inquiry. From an external perspective,
as seen by others, personality may be viewed as the architecture of psycho-
logical characteristics that distinguish individuals from one another. These
include individual differences in habits, beliefs, and values that enable us
to make conjectures and predictions regarding individuals’ conduct. People
observe others’ behavior and use these observations as data with which to
form impressions of them. These impressions of others’ personalities are
organized into a unitarian system of personal attributes using a concep-
tual apparatus to describe, distinguish, and assign meaning that reflects a
knowledge which is socially transmitted. From this perspective, personality
is largely a social construction involving systems of beliefs about the qualities
of individuals that dictate how differences in observed behaviors should be
acknowledged and treated.
From an internal perspective—that is, individuals’ views of themselves—
personality can be viewed as an enduring collection of personal qualities,
attributes, and inclinations that accompany and convey a sense of personal
identity. From this perspective, personality is a self-referencing system that
interacts with the environment in conformity with personal criteria and goals.
These two views of personality also provide two distinct perspectives
when addressing personality in the political domain. The first may serve the
interests of politicians who are mostly concerned with the personal charac-
teristics that are most likely to attract consent and success. The second may
account for voters’ preferences, for how they reason, feel, and behave in
response to politicians’ offers and appeals. Obviously, these two perspectives
are not independent of one another, and both are crucial for the prediction
and explanation of everyday interactions. Individuals have access to their
own inner state using the language and knowledge made available by their
culture, and can make sense of others’ behavior by self-reflection and com-
parisons, drawing on their own experiences.
With regard to research into these two areas, attempts to prioritize one
view over the other have led to diverse questions and different methods,
and thus to distinct research programs. Some programs have focused on
the individual and on variables most likely to influence the impressions and

evaluations stemming from how individuals present themselves and habitu-

ally behave. Other research programs have focused on the organization of
affect and cognitions conducive to the beliefs and goals that guide individu-
als’ behavior from within.
Ultimately, personality can be thought of as a dynamic system of psycho-
logical structures and processes that mediates the relation of the individual
with the environment and accounts for what a person is and may become.
The overall organization of this complex system results from synergistic
interactions among multiple subsystems (cognitive, affective, and behavioral),
which convey, foster, and preserve a sense of personal identity. Looking at the
exchanges of personality as a system with the environment, one may focus
either on the basic structures of personality or on the functions exerted by its
various components in service of development and adaptation.
In relation to this, and based on the notion that people demonstrate con-
sistent, stable patterns of thoughts, feelings, and actions, which distinguish
them from one another, some personality psychologists point to internal
structures that determine an individual’s basic potential and that dictate the
kind of person they may become under given conditions. Other personality
psychologists, instead, point to processes through which people adapt to their
environment and to the dynamic organization of components from which
each individual’s unity, coherence, and continuity are derived.
Trait approaches and social cognitive approaches in the last decades attest
to the legacy of research traditions that no longer are as distinctive as they
were in the past (Caprara & Cervone, 2000). Trait theorists have identified
broad, basic traits that organize lower-level personality characteristics, which
in turn supervise lower-level behavioral habits. Basic traits correspond to
broad and stable patterns of experience and action that attest to biological
potentials that support the basic requirements of human existence. However,
traits alone cannot account for the entire functioning of personality, that is,
for how an individual’s predispositions operate in relation to adaptation, and
what role they may play in how each person experiences his or her environ-
ment. To this end, one should view personality as capable of influencing the
processes and mechanisms from which consistency, directionality, and the
sense of one’s own individuality are derived. This takes us beyond the study
of individual differences in traits to examine the incorporation of their activa-
tion and orchestration under given physical and socio-historical conditions
within a comprehensive model of personality functioning—in other words,
to take into consideration the fact that people grow and live in a social context
that provides the opportunities and constraints for their development and
gives meaning to their behavior.

In this regard, social learning theories and interactionism have paved the
way to current social cognitive approaches by pointing to the influence that
a social environment exerts in setting the conditions for the construction and
functioning of personality through the continuous and reciprocal interac-
tions between persons and situations. Social learning theorists have viewed
personality as a stable architecture of habits resulting from learning and
socialization and have emphasized the power of situations conducive to sta-
ble patterns of responses, including motives and cognitive styles (Atkinson,
1964; Kelly, 1955; McClelland, 1985). Interactionism has provided a paradigm
capable of reconciling previous disputes regarding the role of internal (dis-
positions) and external (situations) factors in accounting for both consistency
of behavior and distinctiveness of personality (Magnusson & Endler, 1977).
Indeed, human beings develop and function in an ongoing process of
reciprocal interaction with their physical and social environments. Internal
factors, in the form of cognitive, affective, and biological events, behavior, and
the environment, all operate as interacting determinants of what personal-
ity is at any moment within a network of reciprocal causation, and of what
personality may become within the boundaries set by biological and social
constraints.
Advances in knowledge on the functioning of the brain, genetics, and
human development have led scientists to acknowledge and to increase their
appreciation of the vast potentials of genetic endowment, the plasticity of
brain functioning, the malleability of conduct, and the variety of developmen-
tal pathways conducive to well-being, successful adaptation, deviant behav-
iors, or suffering. These advances also have led to a focus on the reciprocity of
person-situation interactions as they develop over time and through the life
course, and on the variety of exchanges that take place continuously and con-
currently among biological, psychological, and social subsystems, especially
that of the family.
Social cognitive approaches have moved beyond social learning and have
fully embraced interactionism, thereby turning their focus from the influence
of external situations to the properties of personality that allow individuals to
make sense of experiences and to interact purposively with the environment
as active agents that are able to construe, select, and change the environments
in which they live. This has led theorists to view personality as an agentic
self-regulatory system and to pay special attention to the cognitive and affec-
tive process and structures at the core of individuals’ properties to assign
meaning to the world, to monitor their feelings, and to regulate their actions
in accordance to their own goals and standards (Bandura, 1986, 2001; Caprara
& Cervone, 2000; Mischel & Shoda, 1995).

Indeed, to achieve a comprehensive view of the major determinants and

manifold expressions of individuality, one needs to consider the person as a
whole across the entire life course. The functioning of a whole person can be
fully understood only by focusing on the concerted action of affect, cogni-
tion, and behavior over the entire course of her or his transactions with the
environment, and on the sociocultural context that sets the constraints and
opportunities of her or his development.
Ultimately, most of contemporary personality psychology draws on a few
basic assumptions that provide a common ground even for distant research
traditions:
1. Personality is a complex system of psychological structures—cognitive,

affective, and behavioral—whose functioning results from synergistic
interactions among multiple subsystems. While the various psychologi-
cal structures operate within a network of reciprocal causation, neuro-
physiological subsystems form the basis of personality, providing a vast
amount of potential, and setting the boundaries of its expression.
2. Social contexts are crucial in shaping the orchestration of the preceding
structures by providing the opportunities and setting the constraints
that turn potential into behaviors, attitudes, and interpersonal styles.
3. Enduring interindividual differences in behavioral tendencies (e.g.,
traits), priorities (e.g., values), aims and goals (e.g., motives), and beliefs
about oneself and the world disclose different aspects of personal-
ity functioning. Yet personality is a whole whose single components
cannot be fully understood unless they are viewed in concert with
each other.
4. Distinct psychological processes manage distinctive patterns of experi-
ence and action, and contribute to the establishment of a coherent and
unique sense of self, whereas self-reflective and self-regulatory proper-
ties enable people to interact proactively with their environment, and
thus to chart the course of their own life.
5. Personality development can be viewed as a process aimed at the
full realization of individuals’ potentials for self-determination and
governance.
EARLIER STUDIES ON PERSONALITY AND POLITICS

Discussions about the influence of personal qualities in politics are long-
standing, especially if one includes the seminal insights of classical politi-
cal philosophers like Niccolò Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. In particular,

concern for the role that temperament, character, and passions play in the
fortune of leaders and in the behavior of followers precedes the inquiry of
psychologists among prominent social scientists (Durkheim, 1933; Le Bon,
1895; Marx, 1844; Tarde, 1903; Weber, 1904).
Earlier contributions of psychology go back to the early 1930s and devel-
oped over the subsequent decades in accordance with the approaches that
dominated the field of personality at that time: first psychoanalysis, then
social learning, and, finally, social-cognitive psychology. In addition, most
earlier studies were confined to North America, thus limiting the generaliz-
ability of research findings and questioning the applicability of the methods
of inquiry to different cultures.
Until very recently, most of the studies have focused of the personal-
ity of leaders. As brilliant reviews focusing on personality and politics of
earlier decades can be found in the work of Jeanne N. Knutson (1973), Fred
Greenstein (1975), Dean Keith Simonton (1990), and William McGuire (1993),
in the following we will limit our coverage to a recap of the major contribu-
tions at various turning points of last millennium.
Psychodynamic and Social Learning Approaches

Early works based on psychodynamic approaches show the main contribu-
tions of psychology to politics prior to World War II and during the decade
following. Those were the times when psychoanalysis seemed to provide a
good basis for selecting and organizing empirical findings that related per-
sonality types to political orientation and motivation.
For clinicians like Harold Lasswell, and social thinkers like Theodor
Adorno and his colleagues, political preferences and choices made by leaders
and followers were mostly interpreted by making reference to unconscious
drives and mechanisms. For example, Lasswell applied Freudian psychoana-
lytic concepts to study the personality of political activists. In Psychopathology
and Politics (1930), he argued that engagement in politics is a way to fulfill
unconscious needs that are repressed and unsatisfied in private life. In par-
ticular, the accumulation of power was viewed as a means to compensate for
low self-esteem and feelings of inadequacy. Later, however, when it became
clear that the compensatory explanation could not account for the variety
and complexity of political leadership in democratic systems, these views
were revised (Lasswell, 1948). Likewise, psychoanalytic concepts related to
unconscious strivings, defense mechanisms, and psychodynamic conflicts
were used by Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel Levinson, and Nevitt
Sanford in The Authoritarian Personality (1950) to account for power motives,

mass submission to authority, and the uncritical adherence of people to totali-

tarian movements and regimes.
People with an authoritarian personality were described as people
inclined to prejudice, to intolerance of diversity, to follow strong leaders, to
admire strength and toughness, to submit to symbols of power, and to prefer
traditional and conventional values.
The family and child-rearing practices were assigned a critical function in
shaping a child’s character and in determining the authoritarian personality.
The hierarchical structure of the patriarchal family, characterized by a harsh,
punitive parental discipline, in particular, was posited as being at the root
of deference toward authorities and thus at the core of a diffused mentality
functional to the maintenance of past regimes whose totalitarian devolution
lead to fascism and Nazism.
The Authoritarian Personality can be considered the first systematic study
on the personality determinants of political ideology, and its impact spread far
beyond psychology. A number of criticisms, however, followed earlier enthu-
siasm (Christie & Jahoda, 1954), leading to a progressive loss of confidence in
the heuristic validity of the theory and its constructs. Some criticisms were
related to the unidimensionality of the construct and to the psychometric
properties of the measure (Allport, 1954; Christie & Cook, 1958; Wilson, 1973).
Others concerned the ideological biases of the authors, leading to the view
of authoritarianism as prototypical of right-wing ideologies (Eysenck, 1954;
Rokeach, 1956).
Indeed, the authors were largely influenced by the revisions of Marxist
theory made within the Frankfurt school of social theory (Horkheimer, 1936),
which concerned the role of the family in the formation of individuals’ char-
acter and in the reproduction of society, and which was inclined to endorse
the left-wing ideals of the time. Hans Eysenck (1954), however, contended that
extremists on both the political left (communists) and right (fascists) were
more tough-minded (e.g., highly authoritarian and aggressive) than mod-
erates (liberals and conservatives). In a similar vein, Milton Rokeach (1956)
found that extremists of the left and right shared a dogmatic personality and
a rigid thinking that led them to be more resistant to change and more recep-
tive to closed-minded belief system than moderates. Subsequent findings
have shown that authoritarianism can be found among supporters of leftist
ideologies, but is much more common on the right of the political spectrum
(Rokeach, 1960).
As the prevailing tendency of psychological research gradually moved
toward a functionalistic approach, which is able to account for change and
adaptation, social learning replaced psychoanalysis as the dominant theory

of personality. At the same time, distinct, although related constructs, such

as intolerance of ambiguity, uncertainty avoidance, dogmatism, mental
rigidity, and closed-m indedness, came to the fore as cognitive counterparts
to psychoanalytically based concepts, like drive and defense. This has led
to considerations of authoritarianism in terms of way of thinking, needs,
and value priorities, largely grounded in socialization experiences and
learning.
Lester Milbrath (1962) showed that conservatives scored higher than
liberals on measures of self-control and orderliness. Silvan Tomkins (1963)
pointed to the “normative orientation” of conservatives, who were more
motivated than liberals by orderliness, norm attainment, and rule follow-
ing. Gordon Di Renzo (1963) found that members of Partito Comunista, sit-
ting on the extreme left of the Italian Houses, scored lower on dogmatism
than members of neo-fascist Movimento sociale, sitting on the extreme right.
Paul Sniderman (1975) associated defective self-esteem to political passiv-
ity, authoritarianism, and extremism, highlighted the close connection
between the value that individuals place on themselves and their percep-
tion of the political world, and pointed to the importance of self-worth and
self-confidence in motivating and sustaining citizens’ democratic political
engagement.
Over the last two decades, right-wing authoritarianism and social domi-
nance became major topics of investigation, especially through the contribu-
tions of Robert Altemeyer (1981, 1998), Jim Sidanius and Felicia Pratto (1999),
and John Duckitt (2001). As these topics have been entirely removed from ear-
lier psychodynamic underpinnings, we believe that earlier intuitions about
the associations between defective self-esteem and a view of the world as a
threatening place still might help to achieve a better understanding of how
self-beliefs and social attitudes relate to each other and account for political
choices and engagement.
The Personality of Leaders

The 1960s were a turning point for the study of personality and politics. With
the decline of psychoanalysis, social learning theory provided an alterna-
tive conceptual framework for the understanding of political behavior by
emphasizing the influences of early experiences and environmental factors
within the family and social classes (Campbell, Converse, Miller & Stokes,
1960), and set the basis for later social cognitive approaches. Modeling and
social reinforcement were viewed as the basic mechanisms leading people
to acquire habits and to internalize normative social values. While family

was considered the major agent of political socialization, party identifica-

tion mostly accounted for the stability and transmission of political ideology
across generations.
At the same time and concomitant with the flourishing of biographies of
prominent politicians, several scholars focused on the personality character-
istics of great leaders, presidents, and legislators and utilized a variety of new
methods for their work. The psycho-biographical studies of Erik Erikson on
Martin Luther King (1958) and on Mahatma Gandhi (1969) offer examples of
psychodynamic approaches aimed at capturing in depth the uniqueness of
individuals’ lives.
The study by James Barber (1972) on Presidential Character provides an
alternative example of a psycho- biographical approach using memoirs,
archival documents, and available historical data. First, he identified three
major personality components: (1) character (the stance toward life, the main
thrust and broad direction); (2) style (habitual way of performing three polit-
ical roles and of dealing with three political tasks: rhetoric-words, personal
relations-people, and homework-business, resulting from the convergence of
motives, resources, and opportunities); and (3) worldview (beliefs system,
cognitive maps of politics). He then identified two main dimensions, namely
activity/passivity (i.e., the energy put into the job) versus positive-negative
affect (i.e., the personal satisfaction toward one’s activity) from which he
derived four types: active/positive, active/negative, passive/positive, and
passive/negative. Whereas John F. Kennedy showed the qualities of the
active/positive type, Richard Nixon was a better match with the qualities of
the active/negative type.
Lloyd Etheredge (1978) used scholarly works, biographies, and auto-
biographies to examine the role of interpersonal traits like dominance and
introversion-extraversion in affecting the foreign policies advocated by politi-
cal elites, including 36 US presidents, secretaries of state, and presidential
advisors who served between 1889 and 1968.
From this, he derived four types of leader: high-dominant introverts,
high-dominant extraverts, low-dominant introverts, and low-dominant extra-
verts, showing different foreign policy preferences and orientations. While
the policies of high-dominant extroverts, such as Theodore Roosevelt, were
defined by a quest for global integration, the policies of low-dominant extro-
verts, like Dwight Eisenhower, were distinguished by a quest for conciliation.
Further, whereas dominant introverts, such as Woodrow Wilson, showed a
prominent inclination toward establishing and consolidating alliances, low-
dominant introverts, such as Calvin Coolidge, have shown a marked prefer-
ence for maintaining the status quo.

Among the first to assess politicians’ personality through self-reports,

Edmond Costantini and Kenneth Craik (1980) addressed a large number of
politicians who were members of California’s presidential delegation slate
across five US presidential campaigns, from 1968 to 1976. The use of a stan-
dard personality inventory, such as the Adjective Check List (ACL; Gough &
Heilbrun, 1965), made possible comparisons between politicians and the
general public, and among politicians of opposite parties. From such work,
it was found that party leaders reported a higher tendency than the general
public to seek and maintain a role as leader of a group (dominance), to be
assertive, outgoing, and ambitious (self-confidence), and to be determined to
do well (achievement), but a lower tendency to seek and maintain subordi-
nate roles in relations with others (deference), to express feelings of inferi-
ority (abasement), and to solicit sympathy or emotional support (succorance).
Republicans showed a higher tendency than Democrats to express optimism
and positivity toward life, to be cheerful, interested in others, and ready to
adapt (personal adjustment), to be tidy, neat, and well-organized (order), to be
diligent and responsive to their obligations (self-control), and to be persis-
tent in activities undertaken (endurance). Democrats showed a higher ten-
dency than Republicans to act independently (autonomy), to avoid stability
(change), to be flexible, spontaneous, and unconventional (liability), to main-
tain personal friendships (affiliation), to seek the attention of others (exhibi-
tion), and to solicit their sympathy or support (succorance). As we will see in
Chapters 4 and 6, most of the personality features that differentiate between
Republicans and Democrats remained the same over years, despite the use
of different measures.
Studying Leaders at a Distance

Over the past decades, the study of leaders’ personality has continued to
flourish in accordance with the major changes of paradigm and focus that
have occurred in the discipline of psychology and in the study of personality.
The cognitive revolution reaffirmed the mind as the center of psychological
inquiry and led to a focus on the psychological processes and mechanisms
that determine behavior and make sense of its impact and direction. This
led to the examination of how thought, emotions, and decision processes are
deployed in political matters, how motives and cognitive styles affect leader-
ship, how political cognition gets stored and organized in memory, how it gets
retrieved, and how existing knowledge structures influence attitudes, attribu-
tions, and expectations about political issues, parties, and candidates (Lau &
Sears, 1986; Sniderman, Brody & Tetlock, 1991; Suedfeld, 2010; Winter, 2013).

This new ethos led to a novel use of archive data to assess the distinctive
qualities of leaders, and to new concepts and methods with which to investi-
gate the talents, cognitive styles, operational codes, and motives at the core of
their leadership.
To gain a comprehensive and in-depth knowledge of leaders at a distance,
it has been increasingly common to engage knowledgeable scholars from his-
tory and political science and to take advantage of new computer-assisted
content analysis in order to process a large variety of private and public
documents.
For example, Simonton (1986, 1988) engaged political scientists and histo-
rians to assess the personality of 42 US presidents from George Washington
to George W. Bush by applying standard psychological constructs to the
analysis of biographical materials. The highest correlation with leadership
performance was observed for the traits of Machiavellianism, forcefulness,
moderation, poise and polish, and flexibility, for leadership styles charac-
terized by charisma and creativity (Simonton, 1986, 1988), and for intellec-
tual brilliance (1996), which included “originality of ideas, profoundness
of apprehension, pervasive cognitive activity and drive, and intellectual
versatility.”2
A somewhat different approach was used by Rubenzer, Faschingbauer,
and Ones (2000), who asked several experts to rate the personality profiles
of US presidents through the use of structured questionnaires and adjective
lists related to extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism,
and openness to experience.3
US presidents showed higher levels of conscientiousness and extraversion
compared to the average US population. Whereas openness to experience was
the most valid predictor of presidential success, conscientiousness showed
the strongest association with ethical behavior in office.
Along a contiguous line of research, Suedfeld and Tetlock (1977) addressed
the cognition of leaders, with particular focus on integrative complexity,
namely the level of complexity with which politicians approach specific prob-
lems or situations (Suedfeld & Tetlock, 2014). In the realm of politics, integra-
tive complexity mostly concerns the process of differentiating and integrating
multiple points of view when addressing political matters. Whereas differen-
tiation leads people to acknowledge and distinguish all the various aspects of
an issue or a decision, integration leads people to make connections among
various ideas and elements of judgment.
Tetlock (1983, 1984, 1985) used indirect methods of assessment, such as
content analysis of interviews, to address differences in integrative complex-
ity between liberal and conservative politicians. Findings from these studies

revealed that liberal parliamentarians (US senators, and UK Members of

Parliament) managed policy issues in more integratively complex ways than
their conservative colleagues.
Suedfeld and colleagues (e.g., Guttieri, Wallace & Suedfeld, 1995; Suedfeld &
Leighton, 2002; Suedfeld & Rank, 1976; Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1977) analyzed
archival materials to assess the role of cognitive complexity in the success and
failure of political and military leaders. In these studies, the level of complex-
ity of information processing by political leaders (and changes in level before,
during, and after critical decisions) was used to interpret relevant political
and diplomatic events, such as the international crises that preceded World
Wars I and II, the Cuban missile crisis, and the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
(see Suedfeld, 2010, for a comprehensive review of the role of integrative com-
plexity in politics).
Felix Thoemmes and Lucian Conway (2007) have applied a similar meth-
odology to evaluate the complexity of several US presidents. While the high-
est complexity of thinking was estimated for John F. Kennedy, results suggest
that what makes a successful leader is the match between one’s own level of
complexity and the characteristics of the situation.
A somewhat different focus led other scholars to investigate the motiva-
tions of leaders. Using content analysis of speeches, interviews, and other
sources, Margaret Hermann and David Winter have focused on motives of
world leaders. Hermann (1977, 1980a, 1980b; Hermann & Preston, 1994) exam-
ined leaders’ needs for power and affiliation in combination with self-
confidence (e.g., beliefs in one’s own ability to control events), interpersonal
style (e.g., degree of distrust or suspiciousness of others), and decision-making
style (e.g., complexity in structuring and processing information). Need for
power, overstated self-confidence, suspiciousness, and low complexity were
found to be often associated with aggressive rather than conciliatory relations
with other nations.
Winter’s research program, which has spanned over 40 years, addressed
motives as stable tendencies to pursue certain goals, and developed a scor-
ing system aimed to capture the predominant motives—often implicit or
even unconscious—that help make sense of individuals’ preferences across
domains of functioning. This underscores the assumption that motives are
reflected in the way individuals communicate, and can therefore be inferred
from content analysis of available public documents, such as interviews,
speeches, and memoirs (Winter & Stewart, 1977).
In accordance with a well- established tradition of studies on social
motivation (McClelland, 1985), Winter has typically focused on three major
motives: power (i.e., the desire to have impact on others), achievement (i.e.,

desire to excel), and affiliation (i.e., desire to be liked and accepted by oth-
ers). Based on this, he examined the motives of US presidents from George
Washington to Barack Obama, and of other political leaders (e.g., former
Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev, and Iraqi president Saddam Hussein) in
combination with their major achievements, ratings of greatness, charisma,
and electoral success during presidential campaigns (e.g., Winter, 1987, 2002,
2005, 2013). Whereas achievement motivation was not found to play a distinc-
tive role in political leadership, leaders scoring high in power motivation were
more inclined toward strong and forceful actions than leaders scoring high in
affiliation motivation who, instead, were more inclined toward cooperation.
Despite this seemingly obvious result, the findings raise a number of ques-
tions regarding the extent to which leaders’ motivational profiles simply mir-
ror the requirements of the times and of the situation, as well as concerning
the degree to which the course of events can be linked to the leaders’ views.
The Personality of Voters

Until very recently, the study of personality in the field of politics mostly
focused on that of leaders, it being difficult to address large components of
the electorate. Socioeconomic factors were viewed as major determinants
of citizens’ political attitudes and preferences, and focusing on general
processes related to cognition, attitude formation, and decision-making
seemed more promising than attending to individual differences in person-
ality of very heterogeneous populations. The lack of consensual methods
with which to classify and assess traits, motives, and values did not help
researchers to move toward a comprehensive theory of personality that was
able to account for links among them or for how they may affect citizens’
political behaviors.
Major changes, however, occurred in the last decade of the past cen-
tury, thanks to the consensus achieved on how to deal with traits and
values. This consensus, although not universal and still controversial, pro-
vided the conditions for extended nomothetic studies on large popula-
tions and across different polities. It opened new avenues to understanding
the links between personality and politics and the pathways conducive to
political preferences and engagement. It allowed a move from description
to prediction and did not exclude some form of prescription regarding what
to do to assess political preferences and to promote political engagement.
Since then, studies on personality have continued to burgeon.

In the next chapters, we reveal the growing importance of personality in

the context of all citizens and present findings that attest to the unique contri-
bution of personality psychology to assess and to better understand citizens’
political preferences and participation.
CONCLUSIONS
We started with the premise that democracy is mostly a matter of moral
psychology, concerning the ways people relate to each other and the degree
of respect that is granted to every citizen as an individual. Thus, as the
functioning of democracy is inherently psychological, the contribution of a
comprehensive science of personality is crucial to understanding the pro-
cesses and mechanisms that lead to assigning value to political engage-
ment in a political system that aims to treat each person with equal concern
and to realize the conditions that maximize the well-being of all citizens.
This science must also account for the intra-i ndividual systems that regu-
late the affective and cognitive processes underlying behavioral tenden-
cies, and for the influence that social and cultural contexts exert on their
development and expression.
Following these assumptions, by saying “personalizing politics” we
go beyond the traditional associations of personality and politics and
see that the personality of all citizens and the unique factors embodied
in each person must be at the core of any discourse on government and
politics. The more we know about citizens’ development and functioning,
the more we can understand the conditions required for a larger and more
informed democratic participation and consent. This is particularly needed
in times of profound transformations at the global level concerning behav-
ior, values, economic interactions, and systems of representativeness and
of government.
A better knowledge of citizens’ psychology may set the conditions for
enabling people to voice their needs and aspirations more efficaciously, for
extending access to public offices on the basis of merit, and to grant citizens
greater control over the activities of their representatives.
To this end, after having reviewed major contributions of the past, in the
following chapters we focus on the conceptual frameworks that guide current
research and on the most relevant findings that corroborate our view of per-
sonality and the functionality and development of democracy as reciprocally
dependent.

NOTES
1. We call democracy what others may refer to as liberal democracy. We prefer

democracy without any descriptor, thereby avoiding the ideological connota-
tion of liberal and referring to the best actualization of democratic principles.
2. In a first study (Simonton, 1986), biographical data on 39 US presidents, from
Washington through Reagan, were converted to ratings on 300 descrip-
tors from the ACL. This led to identify 14 personality dimensions, includ-
ing Moderation, Friendliness, Intellectual brilliance, Achievement drive,
Forcefulness, Poise and Polish, Wit, Machiavellianism, Physical attrac-
tiveness, Pettiness, Tidiness, Conservation, Inflexibility, and Pacifism.
Personality profiles on these dimensions showed meaningful relations
with subjective judgments of presidential success (as rated by historians),
and with objective indicators of presidential performance (e.g., number of
legislative victories). Specifically, presidents rated as most successful were
found to be Machiavellian, forceful, moderate, poised and polished, and
flexible. In a second study (Simonton, 1988), biographical information on the
same 39 US presidents was rated by independent judges on 82 items con-
cerning presidential style. Five broad dimensions of leadership style were
identified: interpersonal, charismatic, deliberative, creative, and neurotic.
Charismatic and creative leaders obtained high scores on objective indica-
tors of performance and were consistently rated as high in presidential suc-
cess. Interpersonal and deliberative leaders were found to be less inclined
to experience cabinet resignations. Finally, neurotic presidents were nei-
ther more nor less prone to presidential success. In a third study, Simonton
(2006) provided a detailed evaluation of the intellectual abilities of 42 US
chief executives, from George Washington to George W. Bush. The highest
correlation with leadership performance, as rated by political scientists and
historians, was observed for intellectual brilliance.
3. These traits are commonly referred as the Big Five traits of personality and are
the constituents of what is currently the consensual model for assessing and
describing personality. A detailed description of each of them will follow in
the next chapter.

CHAPTER 2
Personality in Politics
GENES, BRAIN, AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

The extraordinary progress made recently in the fields of genetics and neurosci-
ence can be taken to be particularly helpful for democracy, not just because all
progress in knowledge is beneficial, but because these areas of research promise
to help in understanding the remote roots of political preference and participa-
tion, and in designing strategies that promote life conditions most favorable for
realizing genome-based potential. Further, just as it is difficult to fully under-
stand the functioning of democracy without taking into consideration the way
people behave and relate to each other, individuals’ functioning cannot be
understood unless the biological determinants and mechanisms that form the
basis of individuals’ distinctive properties and personalities are addressed.
Indeed, personality functioning rests upon the concerted action of the
multiple neurophysiological subsystems that form the foundation of an indi-
vidual’s potential and that set the boundaries for its expression. In this regard,
scientists have come to recognize that personality development and function-
ing cannot be properly understood without addressing the brain systems
that are the proximal determinants of mind functioning and behavior and
the genetic factors that are the distal determinants of both brain and mind
functioning.
The human brain, mind and personality have co-evolved under the pres-
sure of adaptation through epigenesis and culture. This coexistence of brain
structures, whose functioning served diverse adaptation strategies over the
course of evolution, is reflected in human mental functioning that oscillates
between lower level operations (rather primitive) and those of higher levels
(rather sophisticated). Today, studies of brain functions promise to elucidate
the biological underpinnings of affect and cognition and to help us better
understand the conditions under which the human mind may function in
relation to rational, civic, and democratic values. Such studies may also help
to uncover the conditions under which people may regress to antisocial, hos-
tile, less collaborative, and less rational ways of functioning.
29

It is now evident that genetic endowment equips people with a vast array
of potentials whose actualization is conditional on the experiences made
available to individuals. As neuropsychological subsystems are the expres-
sion of genetic endowments, genetic studies promise to clarify how the best
expression of genetic potential can be achieved, particularly by stressing the
role played by genes’ continuous interplay with the environment and by elu-
cidating how epigenesis operates in their expressions. On the long path from
genes, to brain, to mind, to behavior, personality is the endpoint where one
can appreciate how genetic potentials turn into cognitive and non-cognitive
abilities, motives, values, and ideals, and where one can acquire the concep-
tual tools needed to address the bio-psychological underpinnings of political
preferences, participation, and leadership.
Studies focusing on heredity-environment interactions, within the field
of behavioral genetics, have shown that the environment plays a critical role
in activating genetic endowments. In particular, they have demonstrated that
non-shared environmental effects due to accidents, differential parenting,
and treatment by peers account for the expression of genetic potentials more
than shared environments due to social class, income, and housing (Plomin,
De Fries, Craig, & McGuffin, 2002; Rutter, 2006).
The importance of the continuous gene-environment interplay is ampli-
fied the more an individual experiences extra-familial events over the course
of his or her social adjustment. In addition, although most personality fea-
tures have a hereditary component, their expression differs as multiple gene
interactions determine the ultimate outcomes. These findings also indicate
that traditional measures of heritability tell us only a part of the story about
heredity since they assess what is actualized in certain environments and
leave unknown what could be actualized in others.
Thus it is no longer appropriate to oppose the nature-versus-nurture
explanations of personality development, as the issue at stake concerns the
ways in which nurturing experiences can facilitate the best expression of indi-
viduals’ potentials. This leads us to view personality as a psychological sys-
tem that is fundamentally embodied, but whose reaches can be continuously
extended as one views the environment as a source of opportunities.
Early contexts set the conditions for the activation of processes and the
deployment of mechanisms leading to knowledge structures, emotional pat-
terns, and habits that confer unity, continuity coherence, and agentic power
to people. Over the entire course of development, and the more an indi-
vidual’s opportunities and challenges are dependent on their own choices,
self-awareness, self-reflection, and self-regulation make people increasingly
responsible for the construction of their own personality. Indeed, it is a

Personality in Politics 31
unique property of human beings to contribute actively to the expression of

their genetic endowments.
In viewing personality as a complex system of psychological structures
and processes through which people regulate their actions and experience,
the self-referent person can be taken as the main causal source of his or her
own personality development, in conjunction with nature and nurture. In
addition, individuals' capacity for self-reflection, for learning from their own
and others’ experiences, and for forethought accords each person the power
to regulate one’s own behavior in accordance with one’s own aims and stan-
dards, to exercise control over one’s environment, and to be proactive in con-
tributing to one’s own own development.
All this leads to understanding personality as something that is selective,
generative, and proactive, rather than simply reactive and adaptive. People do
not consist of a set of tendencies that progress in a predetermined sequence
toward inevitable end states. Thus, although both cultural and biological fac-
tors contribute to the development of personality, people should not be seen
as passive vessels who merely store genetic endowments and absorb environ-
mental influences. More appropriately, people are active agents who have a
causal effect on the course of their lives.
Viewing personality as a self-regulating system that is developing and
functioning in an ongoing process of reciprocal interactions with the envi-
ronment allows one to appreciate the merits of both stability and change.
Stability is critical for preserving one’s own identity, as well as for establish-
ing and keeping relations with others. However, it can be fully appreciated
only by looking at the person as a whole in continuous transition toward new
forms of organization across the life span. Change is no less critical over the
entire life course to meet environmental continuous change and to grant the
full expression of one’s own individuality.
Ultimately, the realization of people depends upon their capacity to match
their substantive life to their values and ambitions, which is contingent on
their capacity to continuously adjust their strivings to the opportunities and
constraints of their environment (McAdams & Olson, 2010). Following this
reasoning, a mix of optimism and caution is justified when examining recent
findings from genetic and brain studies that promise new explanations of
political preference and behavior.
Heredity
Until very recently, traditional views of political preference and participa-
tion emphasized the influence of socio-demographics, socialization, and
contingent circumstances. Earlier twin studies that showed a substantial

portion of variability of political preferences to be linked to heredity have

long been discounted (Eaves & Eysenck, 1974; Martin et al., 1986). Recent
findings, however, have corroborated and extended previous findings and
have shown that heredity accounts for a significant portion of variability
in different political outcomes, such as liberal-conservative ideology, vot-
ing turnout, and political attitudes. Indeed, across different studies and
cultures, heritability coefficients were consistently found in the range from
.30 to .64 (Alford, Funk, & Hibbing, 2005; Bouchard & Lohelin, 2001; Eaves
et al., 1989, 2011; Fowler et al., 2008; Funk, 2013; Funk et al., 2013; Hatemi et al.,
2010; Hatemi, Medland, Morley, Heath, & Martin, 2007; Verhulst, Hatemi, &
Eaves, 2012; Verhulst, Hatemi, & Martin, 2010). Nevertheless, caution is
needed when interpreting estimates of heritability. Heritability coefficients
in fact estimate the amount of variability in a trait that can be accounted
for by heredity in a population at a given time; they do not tell the amount
of that trait that is due to heredity in an individual. Thus, one should not
disregard substantial variations across populations, across time, and across
individuals.
Whereas it is intuitive that political behavior is genetically determined, as
any other behavior, the issue is how, and to what extent, genetics may account
for complex psychological phenomena like political preference and engage-
ment. This obviously can occur only in polities where people are given the
possibility to voice their opinions and to make their choices.
Studies have shown that early political attitudes remain stable and influ-
ence subsequent choices (Alwin & Krosnick, 1991; Franklin, 2004; Sears &
Brown, 2013; Sears & Funk, 1999). However, the extent to which stability is
due to heredity or the environment needs to be ascertained.
If one stays with results from twin studies attesting to an effect of herita-
bility on political attitudes, one should start by examining the extent to which
the stability of political choices is contingent on the stability of the political
offer. For example, the stability one may find in established democracies may
be quite different from the stability found in countries with only a recent his-
tory of democracy. Even in established democracies, the political offer may
change significantly as a result of emerging pressures and priorities, which
in turn may change the issues considered pertinent and programs related to
traditional ideologies, thereby influencing their power to attract people with
different proclivities, whether genetic or due to life experiences.
One should acknowledge the increasing number of people who abstain
from voting in well-established democracies, as well as the increasing num-
ber of voters whose preferences change from one election to another across
parties that hardly can be traced to the same or to any traditional ideology.

Furthermore, one should examine the causal chain that leads from genes
to political preferences and attitudes. In this regard, different perspectives can
be inferred from the literature. A first view considers the contribution of genes
to political attitudes as mediated by broader personality dispositions. In par-
ticular, one may view basic traits as distal causes that precede and influence
political attitudes, as depicted in the upper part of Figure 2.1. According to
this view, heredity accounts for a significant portion of variability in dispo-
sitions associated with political preferences (Alford, Funk, & Hibbing, 2005;
Bouchard & Lohelin, 2001; Hatemi, Medland, Morley et al., 2007), which
would emerge later under the influence of social experiences.
A different perspective views the relationship between genes and political
attitudes as direct, as illustrated in the middle section of Figure 2.1. According
to this view, both personality traits, like the Big Five, and political attitudes,
like egalitarianism, have significant heritable components. However, they are
mostly shaped by a different set of genetic influences. Thus, although specific
political attitudes can be empirically related to broader personality disposi-
tions, they are driven by genetic causes that are mostly separate from those
affecting the Big Five (Funk et al., 2013).
Personality Political
Genes
Traits Attitudes
Genes affect political attitudes indirectly, through personality traits
Political
Genes
Attitudes
Genes affect political attitudes directly
Genes
Personality Political
Traits Attitudes
Personality traits and political attitudes

have a shared genetic influence
Figure 2.1 Schematic representation of the relationship between genes and politi-

cal attitudes: three alternative views.

An alternative view suggests that personality traits and political attitudes

are due to a common set of genetic influences, which affects both (Verhulst,
Eaves, & Hatemi, 2012), as shown in the lower section of Figure 2.1. Thus the
relationship between personality traits and political attitudes is mostly the
expression of the same underlying genetic factor.
Indeed, we believe that a number of issues remain to be clarified. First,
one should identify which “gene x environment” interactions make individu-
als’ sensitivities to particular features of the environment to turn into stable
attitudes and political preferences. Then, it should be possible to establish
the extent to which the influence of traits on political preferences is medi-
ated by values, and whether other genetic factors, operating in concert with
environmental factors, shape both traits and values conducive to ideologi-
cal placement. Finally, the degree to which congruency among traits, values,
and ideologies reflects not only individuals’ needs but also their social roles,
which shape personal identities in accordance with the principles governing
social systems at different times and in different cultural contexts, should be
examined.
All this leads to the belief that premature conclusions about either the
causes of stability of political choices or about the pathways through which
genes may affect traits, values, political attitudes, and preferences are unwar-
ranted. At the same, however, it leads again to the question of what a scholar
of political behavior should expect from genetics, beyond heritability coeffi-
cients. As current progress in molecular genetics allows the entire genome to
be addressed, one could expect the various constellations of genes, which may
contribute to political outcomes in attitudes and behaviors in various ways, to
be investigated (Dawes & Fowler 2009; Fowler & Dawes, 2008; Hatemi et al.,
2011). Indeed, findings in molecular genetics point to the pervasive influence
of “gene x environment” interactions and reveal that probabilism, more than
determinism, accounts for the influence that genes exert over personality.
Genes, in fact, do not work in isolation. Growing evidence attests to the
continuous interplay of genes with the environment, underlying the great
plasticity of an individual’s genetic program and the prodigious influence that
environment exerts on its expression over the entire life course. In this regard,
epigenetics has caused something of a revolution in genetic studies, pointing
as it does to the continuous changes in the expression of genes due to exoge-
nous factors and to behavior itself. From this standpoint, one may assume that
genes account for a remote sensitivity toward certain ideologies, but the road
from genes to political attitudes is long, and environmental opportunities are
crucial to turn proclivities into stable preferences and behavioral tendencies.

With regard to probabilism, this fits better with a potentialist view of

humans as beings endowed with a vast array of latent capacities that can be
realized within appropriate environments. The development of potential, in
particular, draws attention to the fact that personal qualities advance and
express themselves through dynamic and reciprocal influences between per-
sons and their sociocultural environment, and assigns individuals a proactive
role in selecting and changing the situations they encounter. As personality
expresses itself as a self-referencing and self-regulatory system, beliefs about
one’s self, personal standards, and goals are likely to exert a notable influence
on an individual’s ability to seize opportunities and to create situations that
enable genetic proclivities to take particular pathways that ultimately end in
political choices.
As the road from gene expression to personality functioning is open to
different encounters, pathways, and trajectories and is compatible with mul-
tiple outcomes, a better understanding of how genes affect the functioning of
the brain is a precondition to understanding how genes may affect personal-
ity in politics. In reality, genetic and brain studies have only lately started to
be combined, thanks to the advancement of new technologies that allow the
multiform expressions of genes and the flexibility of the brain to be addressed.
BRAIN SYSTEMS AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES

IN PHYSIOLOGICAL RESPONSES
Until recently, little attention has been paid to brain systems and to the mech-
anisms that may underlie emotions, attitudes, and motivation, despite the
growing body of research attesting to their influence over social behavior.
Nowadays, things have changed, due to the tremendous progress achieved
in brain studies through neuroimaging techniques like functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron emission tomography (PET). These,
in addition to traditional techniques like electroencephalography (EEG), now
provide standard and noninvasive procedures that extend our assessment
and knowledge of brain functioning under specific conditions.
Political scientists have also looked with increasing interest at the concepts
and methods of social neuroscience (Cacioppo & Visser, 2003; Lieberman,
Schreiber, & Ochsner, 2003) and at the application of neuroimaging to the
understanding of political behavior—what has been called neuropolitics or
political neuroscience. This has promised to advance our understanding of
many key issues in political science, particularly by highlighting the neuro-
logical correlates of politically relevant phenomena (Jost & Amodio, 2012).

Yet, the conclusions drawn from many of the studies, which often cor-
roborate the embodied nature of political motivation, reasoning, and action,
tend to raise questions more than provide solutions. Most of the research in
this area, in fact, has been largely exploratory and locationist, attesting to the
interconnection among multiple systems and subsystems that operate in the
brain. In reality, mapping patterns of neural activity across different regions
of the brain is not sufficient to give a full explanation of the major connections
that turn into complex psychological phenomena (Jost, Nam, Amodio, & Van
Bavel, 2014).1
In addition, the important role of neurotransmitters (e.g., norepineph-
rine and dopamine), neuroregulators (among them enzymes, such as mono-
amine oxidase), and endogenous peptides, such as endorphins and hormones
(e.g., cortisol, androgens, and estrogens), in mediating and moderating brain
connections and activities has been acknowledged. For example, it has been
speculated that genes associated with serotonin make the human brain
more sensitive/reactive to threat and that people with such brains are more
inclined to vote for conservative or right-wing parties. Genes associated with
dopamine, on the other hand, have an effect on the brain that makes people
more open, less concerned with order and structure, and thus more inclined
to vote for liberal and leftist parties.
A parallel line of research in brain studies has investigated physiological
differences associated with political attitudes and orientation.2 A contiguous
area of research has investigated how ideological factors are associated with
a basic, automatic behavior that develops during infancy and is retained as
largely innate, such as gaze following (Baron-Cohen, 1994).3
Other research, in parallel with a growing number of psychological stud-
ies focusing on personality correlates of political ideologies, have addressed
individual differences in brain functioning over a variety of physiological
responses in an effort to integrate established knowledge about the pheno-
typic expressions of personality with current discoveries about their bio-
logical underpinnings. In this regard, the contributions of John Jost and
colleagues (Jost, 2006a; Jost & Amodio, 2012; Jost et al., 2003; Jost, Federico, &
Napier, 2009) are particularly noteworthy, as they aim to integrate the study of
individual differences at the physiological and neurophysiological level with
a comprehensive and coherent view of ideology as motivated social cognition.
As we will turn to the issue of ideology later, it is sufficient here to give
the essence of Jost’s theoretical position and to summarize the findings that
may support his reasoning. First of all, his basic premise is that political ideol-
ogy is a cognitive device with which people make sense of political matters,
and a potent motivational force that serves basic needs—epistemological,

existential, and relational—to achieve existential security. Then he holds that,

under conditions which allow a certain level of choice, people’s political pref-
erences turn to political programs, platforms, and offerings that best meet
their personalities, namely to political ideologies that fit with their way of
pursuing the satisfaction of their basic needs and of managing themselves in
relation to others and to the environment.
Thus, in polities that provide some range of possible options, individ-
uals tend to choose parties and programs that better resonate with their
needs and fears, because of a sort of elective affinity between their per-
sonalities and competing political offers (Jost, 2009). For example, find-
ings from various sources have shown that conservative ideologies have a
greater appeal for individuals who are more sensitive to threat and fear and
are more concerned with order and structure, while at the same time show-
ing a higher tolerance of social inequality and higher resistance to change.
Liberal ideologies, instead, attract people who are more open to new expe-
riences, more tolerant of uncertainty, and less tolerant of social inequality
(Jost et al., 2003).
Following these premises and assumptions, Amodio, Jost, Master, and
Yee (2007) investigated the nature of personality differences of Republicans
and Democrats in the United States with the aim of corroborating previous
findings at a neurological level. Using electroencephalography, the authors
found that participants who held liberal, as opposed to conservative, views
presented a stronger activity of the anterior cingulate cortex when exposed to
cues requiring the inhibition of a prepotent response in an experimental task.
This area of the brain is associated with conflict monitoring, a basic mecha-
nism of self-regulation aimed at detecting when one’s own habitual response
tendency is incompatible with what is required by the situation in hand. This
seems to suggest that liberalism is associated with higher neurocognitive sen-
sitivity to response conflicts than conservatism.
Among other studies, Schreiber and colleagues (2013), using fMRI on
participants engaged in a risk-taking task, found a different pattern of brain
activity between Republicans and Democrats. Republicans showed greater
neuronal activity in the amygdala, which plays a critical role in generat-
ing loss aversion (De Martino, Camerer, & Adolphs, 2010), in comparison
to Democrats. In contrast, Democrats showed greater activity in the insula
part of the brain, which is thought to be important for guiding choice in risk-
sensitive organisms and to modulate learning concerning uncertain rewards
(Preuschoff, Quartz, & Bossaerts, 2008).
These results, as with other findings from studies on genetic polymor-
phism, brain functioning, and sympathetic reactivity, have been viewed as

consistent with the hypothesis that links conservative ideology to higher

physiological and psychological sensitivity to threat and to a higher intoler-
ance of uncertainty (Jost & Amodio, 2012). Other major underpinnings of ide-
ological differences (e.g., tolerance of social inequality) are still to be properly
investigated at a neuropsychological level.
Following a review of the pertinent literature, however, Hibbing, Smith
and Alford (2014) have rephrased much of the argumentations of Jost and
Amodio (2012). They point to negativity bias as a pervasive trait reflecting the
tendency of individuals to amplify their response to negative events.
As it is well established that people respond more strongly, pay more
attention, and assign more value to losses and negative events than to gains
and positive events (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001), it
is likely that this tendency has played an important role in the evolution of
the species in warning against threats to safety and life in general. Yet some
people are more attuned than others to potential threats, more sensitive to
sources of contagion, and more in need concerning protection. These psy-
chological individual differences are also associated in various degrees to
avoidance/aversive tendencies, are stable, and have similarly significant phys-
iological variations. For these reasons, one may expect that these individual
differences are also reflected in political choices, as indeed they are: liberals
and conservatives have been shown to differ consistently at the psychological
and physiological levels across a variety of dimensions that can be ultimately
traced to a greater basic sensitivity to a negative perspective. Conservatives
have shown greater physiological and reflexive response to threat and to
unpleasant events than liberals.
Furthermore, as previously mentioned, conservatives have scored higher
than liberals in traits and attitudes related to self-control, order, conserva-
tion, security, and avoidance motivation, while liberals have scored higher
in openness, change, and approach motivation. All this, however, must be
seen against the fact that, even in the case of established individual differ-
ences between liberals and conservatives, effect sizes are relatively modest.
Ultimately, there is no doubt about the contribution of genetics and neu-
roscience to a better understanding of political behavior, although many
relevant topics have been addressed only marginally (like leadership), and
much still remains to be clarified, even in domains that have been thoroughly
examined, such as political attitudes and ideologies. The interplay between
genes and the environment, the malleability of the brain under various cir-
cumstances and over the course of development, and the changes of hab-
its and attitudes due to people’s experiences and choices should be further
investigated.

Similarly, there is no doubt that the most promising research approach

is the one that is able to integrate genetics with physiology and psychology.
In this regard, the study of individual differences is a powerful instrument
with which to address neurophysiological and psychological processes, as it
allows us to assess how differences in brain processes are related to specific
polymorphisms, how they manifest themselves through behavior, how they
are related to each other, and how they are sensitive to change.
To this end, however, nothing is more important than a comprehensive
theory of personality that supports the selection of phenomena to be scru-
tinized and that makes sense of their various connections as they develop
and become evident across situations. A comprehensive theory of personality
should also account for how individuals’ potentials turn into habits, abilities,
values, and achievements, thereby explaining political attitudes and political
engagement.
The focus on individuals’ potentials is particularly important because
potentials, in the form of physiological sensitivities and psychological pro-
clivities, turn into stable qualities that distinguish one person from another,
depending upon their interactions with the cultural environment and in
particular upon the activities and affordances that are then made avail-
able. A comprehensive theory of personality should be able to demonstrate
the crucial paths from an individual’s potential to its actualization, and to
explain which distinctive features of individuality are relevant for politics.
Concerning political attitudes and political engagement, these are probably
the endpoints of sequences and constructions where abilities, together with
traits, motives, values, and self-appraisal, play a major role.
POTENTIALS, ACTIVITIES, AND ABILITIES

The human mind allows people to interpret the situations they encounter, to
react accordingly, and thereby to contribute actively in shaping the course of
their lives. This capacity to symbolize allows people to transform experiences
into internal representations that guide judgment and actions, to generate
ideas that transcend sensorial experiences, to communicate with others, and
to examine and test alternative behavioral options without first taking action.
The ability to anticipate future events and to foresee the consequences
of one’s actions and reactions allows people to make plans, to set goals, and
ultimately to extend control over their future. The faculty of human beings to
learn from their own and others’ experiences allows people to expand their
knowledge and mastery of themselves and their environment. While the
capacity for self-reflection enables people to analyze their own experiences

and to scrutinize their feelings and thoughts, the capacity for self-regulation
allows people to match their feelings, thoughts, and actions to the pursuit of
goals they hold to be of value.
However, these capacities are not set from birth and are not invariant
throughout the life course, but develop gradually and to the extent that they
are properly nurtured. Capacities, therefore, reflect potentials that have turned
into a stable arrangement of mental activities, dependent on the opportunities
people have been given to put them into practice.
Human personality is constructed to provide people with the necessary
equipment to manage the environment together with other people. This
equipment provides the means for dealing with everyday problems, for estab-
lishing collaborative relations with others, and for assessing what has to be
avoided or achieved, or is worth being valued, in themselves, in others, and
in the environment.
Genes account for potentials whose actualization in the form of basic
capacities or dispositions depends to a considerable extent on the resources,
opportunities, and challenges provided by the environment, and ultimately
on the activities that allow people to express their talents and inclinations.
Over the last decades, the notion of human agency has being critical in
acknowledging that individuals actively contribute to the course of their
development. People, in fact, are not inert beings who are merely predisposed
to react to their environment, but rather are causal agents that select, inter-
pret, and transform the environments they encounter. Likewise, the notion
of potentials is critical to recognizing that much of human strengths derive
from people discovering and nurturing their endowments. Indeed, people
may exert a considerable influence over their experiences by the choices they
make and by the extent to which they practice and master their talents.
As stated earlier, findings of genetic research point to the great potentials
of the human genome and to the extraordinary variety of phenotypes that
may result from gene-environment interplay. The same genes, in fact, can be
expressed in many ways, can operate in various combinations, and may be
active at different times or may remain silent.
Addressing potentials in the domain of personality and politics has sev-
eral implications. First, it expands the traditional focus from what people are
like to what they could become, thus extending research horizons to include
conditions of life that enable the full expression of an individual’s human-
ity. Second, it draws attention to the fact that personal qualities develop and
express themselves through dynamic interactions between persons and their
social environments under conditions that may preclude or promote their
deployment. In other words, people may have the potential to achieve many

things, but their possibility to realize this potential depends on their life con-
ditions. Third, potentials are not inherent properties of isolated individuals,
but pertain equally to the person and to the environment. Environments, in
fact, carry opportunities and impediments that may elicit, support, or pre-
clude activities that are crucial for assessing and broadening individuals’
agentic powers.
In many nations, expanded economic resources, greater access to knowl-
edge, and higher concern for individuals’ rights have broadened the oppor-
tunities available to individuals to nurture their talents and to extend control
over their life course. Yet, one may doubt that individual potentials are fully
realized even in the wealthiest societies, despite evidence showing that citi-
zens’ mental capital is decisive for societies to prosper and flourish in a rapidly
changing world (Beddington, Cooper, Field, Goswami, Huppert, Jenkins, Jones,
Kirkwood, Sahakian, & Thomas, 2008). Individuals’ assets and strengths do not
automatically turn into desirable outcomes unless they are actively pursued.
It is therefore not surprising that special attention is paid to citizens’ capa-
bilities in the assessment and promotion of economic and political develop-
ment across the world. Here, the work of Nussbaum (2011) and of Sen (2009),
which uses the capabilities approach, has been extremely influential in placing
the person and his or her rights to dignity and happiness at the center of the
agenda of scholars and legislators. Yet it is surprising that there is little focus
on psychology in writings that aim to change traditional views of human
development and to convey new ways to promote individuals’ dignity. In
reality, research needs to specify where capabilities come from and how they
develop, what prevents the realization of potential, and how to remove the
major obstacles that prevent people from achieving levels of functioning that
would provide them with a better life.
To this aim, findings from psychology could provide some indications
that may help social scientists and legislators to set priorities and goals to
be pursued in order to provide the majority of people with the conditions to
actualize their potentials and to reduce disparities, and to benefit fully from
having rights. Here, the contributions of Lucien Sève (1975), Melvin Kohn
(Kohn & Schooler, 1983), and recently of James Heckman (2008) are particu-
larly worthy of note, although, again, it is surprising that none is a psycholo-
gist strictu sensu.
The basic arguments of Sève’s contribution are derived from Karl Marx’s
assumptions tracing the essence of human beings to their social relations
reflecting their position in the division of labor (Marx, 1859). According to Sève,
the kind of person one becomes depends upon the access she or he is given to
resources, opportunities and experiences that dictate functioning and growth

opportunities. From this perspective, the investment of time, the needs to be

satisfied, the knowledge that is accessible, the activities that are made available,
and the abilities that are required are not invariant across societies and across
the positions people hold in different societies. Still, the organization of sev-
eral societies deprives most of the people of the opportunities to fully nurture
their talents. This occurs when most of a person’s time is taken by repetitive
actions that have little economic return, and where there is no chance to extend
one’s own abilities because the satisfaction of basic needs absorbs all available
resources and precludes the emergence of more advanced needs.
These arguments are very provocative, and it is easy to point to many
shortcomings, especially concerning speculations that are not supported
by empirical findings. A major flaw is the lack of systematic research on the
mechanism through which activities influence the development of capacities
and on the experiences that allow people to transcend their primary needs
and to exert a more active role in the choices they make.
While ethics prohibit research experiments on topics like famine,
neglect, abuse, and misery, psychology has made some progress in pro-
viding findings that in part clarify the mechanism of inequality and pov-
erty reproduction and leave us in no doubt about its psychological cost.
In this regard, the seminal contributions of Kohn and colleagues, which
have focused primarily on occupational self-d irection and have examined
how people’s position in the work organization may influence their sense
of freedom and autonomy, and how this may extend from one generation
to another, are particularly noteworthy (Kohn & Schooler, 1983; Kohn &
Slomczynski, 1990).
According to Kohn, the more a person’s occupation allows him or her free-
dom and autonomy, the more he or she is confident in self-direction, and the
greater his or her personal confidence. The variety of activities, the freedom of
choice in how to organize one’s activities, and the challenges of tasks all con-
tribute to people’s self-image and their attitudes toward the world in general.
In addition, as self-confidence drawn from one’s occupation affects how peo-
ple present themselves and interact with others, occupational self-direction
may significantly impact on children’s personality development through the
models, values, and aspirations conveyed by their parents. Despite the cor-
relational nature of his work, which prevents the estimation of effects that
in most cases result from reciprocal interactions among individual charac-
teristics and situations that unfold in complex and diverse contexts, Kohn’s
reasoning is corroborated by his longitudinal findings.
We are quite aware that acknowledging the influence of social status
and work activities should not embrace a mechanistic view of personality

development that risks losing sight of the great potential and diversity of each
individual. Nor should we lose sight of the rapid changes occurring in the
organization of labor. In reality, occupations requiring limited abilities and
scarce opportunities for self-direction have not precluded parents’ invest-
ment in their children’s education. Likewise, parents’ high occupational sta-
tus cannot offer any guarantee that their children will achieve a satisfying
occupation.
As many repetitive activities have been passed to robots, unemployment
represents a source of major concern in many developed countries since it
carries threats to self actualization, even for those that are highly educated.
One cannot contend that basic education is available to most of the people,
and that prestigious careers are accessible to people with talent more so than
in the past. Yet family’s income remains an important predictor of children’s
future attainments, especially when one remembers that the social context in
which maturation and development occur strongly conditions the expression
of their abilities, the value given to their competencies, and their aspirations.
Although disparities among people from different social milieu may have
been attenuated by welfare politics and higher personal mobility, we believe
that both Sève and Kohn still deserve attention with regard to the transmis-
sion of inequalities.
Probably, neither family’s social status nor the position parents occupy
at work can fully account for the consequences of economic disparities on
personality functioning and development since the transfer of a family’s
advantages and disadvantages is largely mediated by society’s structures and
contingency, like by children’s personal assets.
All varieties of interpersonal and intrapersonal factors contribute to place
people on life trajectories that give access to different opportunities and result
in the different actualization of their potentials. It is important, therefore, to
understand the mechanism through which the position of an individual’s
family in society impinges on his or her development and experiences. In this
regard, personality psychology supplies us with new concepts and explana-
tions, such as attachment, self-esteem, self-efficacy, self-regulation and con-
trol, values, level of aspirations and goals, which contribute in various degrees
from birth to put people on diverse life trajectories.
Focusing on children, we know they are born with predispositions that
set the premises of how they view the self and the world, which uphold the
formation of habits and goals. Furthermore, current psychological research
warns us against viewing children as passive recipients of environmental
influences, but encourages us to see them as agents that influence their envi-
ronments, even from birth.

Yet, to distance oneself from the environmental determinism of the past

should not mean that one should lose sight of the constraints of both nature
and nurture and of the interplay of children with their social environments.
Thus one should not disregard the influence that the demands, rewards, and
models children encounter during their life exert on their personality by
turning potentials into stable feelings, needs, cognitive styles, self-beliefs, and
behavioral tendencies. In addition, as the development of humans depends
more than in any other species on prolonged care during infancy, a child’s
emotional and cognitive growth largely reflect parental investment that, in
turn, reflects the personal and social assets of caregivers. This early care
forms the basis of children’s self-recognition and trust in themselves and in
the world, and the conditions under which they are cared for and interact
with their significant others help to shape their personal identity. In this way,
the early exchanges that occur, the models to which children are exposed,
and the treatment they receive in the social environments in which they grow
largely define the horizon of their wishes and aspirations of what they may do
and of who they may become.
Environments, of course, can be marked by deprivation, either because
of lack of material and/or affective resources, often in combination with nox-
ious and abusive experiences. Parental economical resources carry a vari-
ety of relational advantages such as time, attention, concern, and emotional
support—all intangible resources that facilitate children’s acknowledgment
of their potentials and which foster their actualization. A shortage of basic
goods may, instead, severely jeopardize a child’s personal and social identity,
especially when it is combined with a lack of care. Stress and poverty are
major causes of parental inability to nurture effectively, of childhood depriva-
tion, of inadequate modeling, and of a lack of emotional support.
Indeed, a large body of literature attests to the long-term consequences of
childhood deprivation concerning nurturing relations on the development
of self-esteem, trust, and well-being. Where the family does not provide suit-
able conditions for the development and practice of the basic skills needed
for communication with others, to exert control over one’s emotions, and to
conform to normative standards of behavior, children carry the legacy of
their social environments into preschool and are likely to suffer as a con-
sequence. Even small deviations in intellectual performance, communica-
tion skills, and emotional control may be aggravated when compared to
better equipped peers, thereby leading to isolation, rejection, or compensa-
tory reactance that further compromise children’s adaptation. Unavoidably
early social experiences affect children’s self- concept, expectations, and

subsequent educational choice, which is likely to be crucial for the full devel-
opment of their potentials.
It is not necessary to reiterate the arguments of the vast amount of litera-
ture showing that most disparities in learning proficiency, of school failure
and abandonment, and of lack of qualifications when entering the job markets
are due to an earlier lack of opportunity to discover and exercises one’s talents.
As shortcomings due to under-stimulation and defective learning opportuni-
ties extend across domains of functioning and tend to be exacerbated over
time, it is unavoidable that deficiencies in cognitive abilities coalesce with
deficiencies in social abilities to further compromise personality development
and functioning.
As educational attainment is increasingly important in knowledge societ-
ies, children who remain behind at school miss the opportunities to fully nur-
ture and express their potentials and most of the possibilities of upward social
mobility. Unfortunately, it is hard to reverse the adverse effects of early depriva-
tion, particularly concerning cognitive ability. Findings warn against the long-
term negative effects of hardships encountered at early critical and sensitive
periods. Here, the studies of Heckman and colleagues are particularly worth
consideration. Their findings in fact attest to the negative outcomes of earlier
deprivations and show the large cost that early inequalities of opportunities
carry for all society (Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, & Kautz, 2011; Cunha &
Heckman, 2009; Heckman, 2008). Both cognitive and non-cognitive features of
personality are significantly affected by earlier conditions of life and parental
investment. Both are malleable, but less so with the passing of time.
Whereas the effects of adverse environments on relational and social abil-
ities can be compensated for more than deficiencies in intelligence, which are
fixed earlier, both have long-term adverse consequences for school achieve-
ment, work attainment, social adjustment, and health.
Indeed it is difficult to separate the effects of adverse environments on
cognitive and non-cognitive abilities, as they ultimately coalesce into less than
optimal social adjustment. When people become accustomed to activities that
provide limited opportunities to practice skills and develop capacity, social
abilities may compensate for intellectual skills, but only to a limited degree.
Therefore, the earlier that remedial interventions can occur, the greater the
return in terms of reparation, compensation, and cost effectiveness. Activities
are also crucial for the assessment of one’s abilities and for the development of
capacities. In fact, capacities are coordinated abilities that rest upon talents no
less than upon experiences conducive to the expression, the acknowledgment,
and the mastery of one’s own psychological equipment.

Linked to the role of activities is the issue of ownership. A sense of own-

ership is crucial to turn skills, motives, and values into goals and achieve-
ments. People are agents who behave in accordance to the representations of
themselves that they draw from what they have been able to accomplish and
from what others have sanctioned as worthy of merit. People cannot engage
in activities that are not accessible to them, nor will they engage in endeavors
and ventures that they perceive to be beyond their reach. Likewise, people
will be precluded from discovering and developing their capacities if the
environment does not provide them with the necessary opportunities, and in
particular if the expectations of others discourage them, put their reputations
at stake, and foster self-debilitating beliefs.
Through the family and schools, the activities to which children have
access are crucial to turn intellectual and dispositional potentials into valu-
able outcomes, while self-beliefs are crucial to perceive these outcomes as the
product of one’s own actions. Throughout life, activities to which people have
access and the recognition they receive from others are decisive in shaping
their personal and social identities.
One may easily guess what the implications of this reasoning are for
political behavior and for the functioning of democracy. People who have
been deprived of the opportunity to fully express their talents are unlikely
to take an active role in politics because of lack of skills and trust. Findings
also attest to a negative correlation between poverty and education, civic-
mindedness, and political participation (Rindermann, 2008; Welzel, Inglehart,
& Klingemann, 2003).
Democracy pays a large toll when significant portions of its constituen-
cies are estranged from its functioning because of lack of capacities and moti-
vations, since its progress mostly depends upon the talents, the desires and
the endeavours of all citizens. Intellectual development requires the proper
opportunities to enact, to acknowledge, and to practice one’s cognitive abili-
ties. Likewise, civic commitment requires proper opportunities to develop
certain judgmental abilities and to appropriate certain values.
Turning potential into capacity, cognitive and non-cognitive, has obvi-
ous political implications, as the political order and government of society
depend upon who is given access to greater opportunities and upon the use
that is made of individuals’ assets. For example, autocratic and oligarchic
governments need capable citizens, but they mostly require obedience and
compliance. They have, therefore, only a limited interest in investing in mass
education and critical judgment, having no incentive to meet subsequent
requests for self-determination, freedom, and equity. On the contrary, demo-
cratic systems may settle and progress to the extent that citizens’ talents are

properly nurtured and used for the betterment of society. This requires free-
dom, trust, and efforts in the pursuit of common good. These, in turn, rest
upon mutual respect, care, and fairness.
Whereas modernization theorists have pointed to close relations between
socioeconomic development, effective democracy, and human development
(Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Welzel & Inglehart, 2005; Welzel, Inglehart, &
Klingemann, 2003), scientists in the field of personality point to the influ-
ence of personality development in providing the psychological ingredients
needed to compete in the labor market, to enhance labor productivity, for
scientific innovation, and to achieve better living conditions for all. For this
reason, democratic governments should worry seriously whether sufficient
efforts are being made to present people with the opportunities they need
to actualize their potential and to nurture their commitment to the well-
functioning of democratic institutions. This is crucial if citizens are to have
trust in and respect for the rule of law, if they are going to select their repre-
sentatives with due diligence, and if they are going to feel directly committed
to supporting the functioning of democracy.
INTELLIGENCE, TRAITS, NEEDS AND MOTIVES, AND VALUES

People come into the world with a vast repertoire of psychological potentials
that equip them to cope with the requirements of life and that crystallize over
the course of development into abilities, preferences, and habits. It is likely
that evolution has selected some bio-psychological structures that predispose
humans, by knowing and feeling, to assign meaning to experience and value
to life, and to manage their transactions with others and the environment, by
doing. While nature provides the basic equipment with which to perform the
essential functions involved in our relationship with the physical and social
environment, it is social and cultural contexts that lay the conditions for the
expression and realization of an individual’s potential.
Personality has been traditionally referred to as the organization of men-
tal structures and processes that characterize the relationship of the indi-
vidual with the world, which gives consistency and continuity to his or her
experience, and from which the sense of one’s own individuality is derived.
It operates through a variety of bio-psychological systems that provide the
cognitive, motivational, and executive functions needed for an effective inter-
action with the environment.
The conceptual repertoire of personality psychology includes intelligence
and cognitive abilities, evaluative and executive dispositions, such as traits,
needs and motives, and values and self-judgments, such as self-esteem and

self-efficacy beliefs. All are features of individuality that, in different degrees,

attest to how experience and culture contribute to shape people’s natural
equipment, causally contribute to stable behavioral tendencies, and account
for the coherence of personality functioning.
The inclusion within personality of these various features and their dis-
tinctions are matters of convenience and conventions since each of them is the
expression of the bio-psychological systems that operate in concert to serve
adaptation and development. In fact, all serve to highlight the multiple func-
tions of personality and the unique qualities that distinguish people from one
another.
In the following section we will address the components of personal-
ity that one may mostly infer from what people do and which allow us to
distinguish people one from the other on the basis of their performances,
choices, and habits. In the subsequent section we will address the com-
ponents of personality that mostly attain to the self and to individuals’
personal identity, which may only be accessed through what people say of
themselves.
Intelligence
Intelligence involves a large variety of abilities related to reasoning and learn-
ing, which operate in tandem in relation to problem-solving. It also involves
the capacity to organize a variety of mental operations with which to address
numerical, verbal, and spatial tasks, to comprehend complex ideas, to think
abstractly, to engage in reasoning and planning, and to learn from one’s own
and others’ experiences.
Although intelligence has often been treated separately from personality,
most would agree that cognitive abilities of the sort expressed in academic
problem-solving, such as verbal, logical, spatial, and mathematical reasoning,
should also be part of a comprehensive view of personality. In this regard, a
common distinction has been made between fluid intelligence, which is the
ability to solve novel problems without depending heavily on previous knowl-
edge, and crystallized intelligence, which depends on an individual’s store of
knowledge and learned operations. It is also generally accepted to trace under
the domain of intelligence personality features mostly related to emotional
and social competences. In the last few decades, emotional intelligence, social
intelligence, and wisdom have extended the notion of intelligence beyond the
traditional cognitive components to cover other relevant manifestations of
mental capital in everyday life within a comprehensive view of personality
(Caprara & Cervone, 2000).

There is no doubt that both the traditional and the various new forms of
intelligence that have become popular topics of contemporary investigation
may be significant in accounting for political knowledge, engagement, and
leadership. Yet, to our knowledge, empirical research in this area has been
less consistent than one would expect.
It is probable that intelligence influences how predispositions turn into
stable behavioral tendencies, how needs turn into motives and values, how
people reflect upon their own experiences and construe their personal and
social identities, and how they derive a sense of personal efficacy from their
achievements. Indeed, most of preceding arguments about potentials turn-
ing into capacities fit with intelligence more than with any other personal-
ity feature. Intelligence is, in fact, the prototype of endowments that develop
into abilities conditionally to given opportunities and constraints. Whereas
brain development and the maturation process may include sensitive periods,
social and physical environments perform a critical function in setting the
conditions for the enactment and practice of the various mental operations
required for the storage, processing, and organization of knowledge in sup-
port of personal and social achievements.
Findings tell us that intelligence, as general cognitive potential, is largely
inherited and that it conditions the expression of most personality features,
such as needs, values, and attitudes. Yet the influence of genes does not oper-
ate invariantly across physical and social context; due to social class and
material conditions, the influence of shared environments in affluent families
is minimal, but very relevant in poor families, even in developed countries
(Hunt, 2012).
When working-class children are adopted into middle-class homes, the
importance of the environment is estimated as increasing IQ (a measure that
in various degrees combines fluid and crystallized intelligence) somewhere in
the range of 12 to 18 points. This has been related to the findings that children
raised in poverty are less likely to develop their full genetic potential (Nisbett,
Aronson, Blair, Dickens, Flynn, Halpern, & Turkheimer, 2012; Turkheimer,
Haley, Waldron, D’Onofrio, & Gottesman, 2003).
Other findings have also shown that early experiences exert a crucial
influence on promoting and sustaining the development of cognitive abili-
ties and point to the long-term harm and cognitive deficits of early severe
deprivation (Feinstein, 2003; O’Connor, Rutter, Beckett, Keaveney, Krepner, &
the English and Romanian Adoptees Study Team, 2000). This is exacerbated
by the fact that the negative consequences of early deprivation and cognitive
deficits extend over time, are almost irreversible, and carry an enormous toll
in terms of problems related to crime, mental health, and productivity (Doyle,

Harmon, Heckman, & Tremblay, 2009). Related to this, we know that impair-
ments in intelligence due to poverty accumulate over the course of life as
daily preoccupations impinge on the cognitive systems, compromising their
limited capacities. Ultimately, this seems to mean that those in poverty are
less capable because the very context of poverty imposes loads that impede
cognitive capacity and further perpetuate poverty (Mani, Mullainathan,
Shafir, & Zhao, 2013).
Research tells us that the average phenotypic intelligence of nations has
increased dramatically over the last century, mainly due to the tremendous
advancement in mass education and technologies. In particular, the compo-
nents of intelligence related to abstract and logical reasoning have benefited
from the increased demand of intellectual skills, from better schooling, and
from the higher accessibility of knowledge in modern societies (Flynn, 2007).
Nevertheless, the influence of economic wealth on cognitive development
is substantial, even in developed countries. Children living in poverty have
a higher probability of being left behind in a world that prizes intelligence,
especially where economic and moral progress requires cognitive abilities
that must be nurtured from birth. Consequently, we fully agree with the
claim that “countries must invest in early human development” (Doyle et al.,
2009, p. 1) and with the assertion that they must “learn how to capitalize on
their citizens’ cognitive resources if they are to prosper, both economically
and socially” (Beddington et al., 2008, p. 1057).
In this regard, intelligence is the domain par excellence, in which one may
assess the effectiveness of democracy in fostering human development and
where one may challenge our view of democracy and personality develop-
ment as mutually dependent. Research has suggested a strong and positive
linkage between intelligence, education, and the functioning of democracy,
and has implicated cognitive abilities as major determinants of economic and
social progress. Whereas education shows a stronger impact on democracy
than vice versa, cognitive ability shows a stronger positive impact on democ-
racy than education, pointing to intelligence “as a relevant phenomenon
for politics and itself a relevant political phenomenon” (Rindermann, 2008,
p. 319).
Intelligence sustains education, which in turn supplies democracy with
the moral judgment and obligations that are needed to comply with the rules
of law, to cooperate with others under a condition of mutual respect, and to
actively engage in politics. Democratic institutions in their turn should grant
the freedom, the trust, and the due recognition of merit required for the
encouragement of innovation and to sustain economic progress.

Whereas politics is a highly demanding task, democracy requires intel-

ligent and informed citizens no less than enlightened leaders. Thus, where
intelligence does not operate across all society as an escalator of reason, thereby
leading to greater moral and civic commitment, democracy is at the risk of
failure. To make democracy work, intelligence cannot be disjoined from the
collective endorsement of values that operate at service of democratic ideals.
All said, the fact that other governmental systems can be equally concerned
with the promotion of intelligence, even more successfully than democracy,
cannot be disregarded.
In this regard, China again represents a serious challenge to our reason-
ing, since it seems able to surpass many established democracies in education,
innovation, and many other intellectual attainments. Thus, one may ques-
tion the degree to which freedom of voice and pluralism of values is needed
to achieve and maintain a well-ordered society. Likewise, one may question
the extent to which concern for equality is compatible with efficiency and
where the recognition of merit is always compatible with the even distribu-
tion of talent. The near future will probably make this clear, including how
cultures that have for centuries harmonized obedience to authority with hard
work and merit will stand in comparison to the broader liberties promised by
democratic institutions.
Basic Traits
Traits typically refer to tendencies to exhibit particular types of responses
across a variety of situations in a consistent manner. They manifest them-
selves in enduring patterns of thoughts, feelings, and habitual behaviors that
are fixed from the earliest stages of development and that usually remain
stable throughout the life course. People who are high or low on a trait like
extraversion are people who, on average, tend to exhibit more or fewer indica-
tors of that trait, such as entertaining people, enjoying others’ company, being
social, talkative, and assertive.
The epistemic status of a trait is still matter of contention among scien-
tists. By trait, some refer just to a recurring pattern of behavior (e.g., Saucier &
Goldberg, 1996), while others refer to psychological structures that are the
source of that pattern (Funder, 1991; McCrae & Costa, 1996). The former con-
ceive traits merely as phenotypes, with no causal power, so that saying that a
person has a trait is merely to describe that person’s typical, average behavior.
The latter, instead, argue instead that basic traits are endogenous dispositions
corresponding to the genotype of personality. A reasonable compromise is to
view traits as consistent, stable patterns of experience and action that serve

to distinguish people one from another, and to accord to a limited number of

basic traits the property of biologically based potentials predisposing indi-
viduals to how to manage themselves in various domains of functioning
(McCrae & Costa, 1999).
To address personality traits, most current research relies on the Big
Five Model (Digman, 1990; McCrae & Costa, 1996, 1999), which is a common
framework for organizing major individual differences in personality, since
an impressive body of research has accumulated over the past three decades
positing five basic factors at the root of major individual differences in the
sphere of traits. The Big Five represent the meeting point of two traditions of
research: the lexicographic and the factorial tradition.
Despite some divergence among various authors regarding how to name
the various factors across cultural contexts (Digman, 1990; Goldberg, 1990;
John, 1990), there is substantial agreement on the following:
I: Extraversion (or Energy);

II: Agreeableness;
III: Conscientiousness;
IV: Emotional stability; and
V: Openness to experience (or Intellect).
Extraversion refers to an individual’s tendency to behave and react vigor-

ously in different situations and is usually described by adjectives such as
sociable, active, and dynamic. Agreeableness refers to an individual’s concern
for altruism, generosity, and loyalty and is usually described by adjectives
such as honest, sincere, and kind. Conscientiousness refers to the tendency to
pursue order and to meet one’s own obligations and is usually described by
adjectives such as diligent, reliable, and precise. Emotional stability refers to the
control of impulses and emotions and is usually described by adjectives such
as calm, patient, and relaxed. Finally, openness to experience refers to an interest
in culture and curiosity for new experiences and is described by adjectives
such as innovative, imaginative, and creative. Table 2.1 presents a short defini-
tion of the Big Five and their lower-order features, as measured by the Big Five
Questionnaire (BFQ, Caprara, Barbaranelli, Borgogni, & Perugini, 1993), and
gives a sample item for each.
It is evident that the Big Five does not provide a fine-grained description
of personality because more than five dimensions are needed to capture the
multifaceted aspects of individuality and the many complex interactions of
traits that give rise to the uniqueness of personality. Yet, the Big Five cur-
rently represent the most widely accepted model with which to address major

TAB L E 2 . 1 . DEFINITIONS OF GLOBAL TRAIT DOMAINS, TRAIT FACETS,

AND SAMPLE ITEMS, TAKEN FROM THE BIG FIVE QUESTIONNAIRE
Energy: Level of activity, vigor, Dynamism: Activity and enthusiasm (“I am an
sociability, talkativeness, active and vigorous person”)
need to excel, persuasiveness, Dominance: Assertiveness and self-confidence
competitiveness (“Generally I tend to assert myself rather than
give in”)
Friendliness: Concern and Cooperativeness: Altruism, empathy, generosity,
sensitiveness toward others and unselfishness (“I understand when people need
their needs my help”)
Politeness: Kindness, civility, docility, and trust
(“Usually I’m cordial even to people I dislike”)
Conscientiousness: Self-regulation Scrupulousness: Dependability, orderliness, and
in both its proactive and precision (“Before completing a job I spend a lot
inhibitory aspects of time revising it”)
Perseverance: Capability of fulfilling one’s
own tasks and commitments, tenaciousness,
persistence (“I always pursue the decisions I’ve
made through to the end”)
Emotional stability: Capability Emotion control: Absence of anxiety, depression,
to control one’s emotional and vulnerability, mood stability (“I often feel
reactions, absence of negative nervous”)
affect, psychological adjustment Impulse control: Capability of controlling irritation,
discontent, and anger (“I’m rather touchy”)
Openness: Broadness of one’s Openness to culture: Intellectual curiosity, interest
own cultural interests, in being informed, appreciation of culture (“I’m
tolerance of diversity, always informed about what’s happening in the
exploration of novelty world”)
Openness to experiences: Openness to novelty,
tolerance of values, interest toward diverse
people, habits, and lifestyles (“I’m fascinated by
novelties”)
Source: Caprara et al. (2006).
individual differences in personality traits in manifold contexts, including

politics.
The strength of the Big Five Model is derived from its pragmatic value of
representing a well-substantiated and agreed-upon framework for describ-
ing personality. Insofar as it provides a common language for research and
assessment in personality psychology, it provides a useful mapping of indi-
vidual differences. Furthermore, insofar as the model identifies the main
dimensions underlying the reports and ratings that people make of their own

and of others’ personalities, it may guide investigations of the relationships

between these dimensions and relevant social outcomes.
Over the last decades, the usefulness of the Big Five Model has been
clearly demonstrated (Digman, 1990). More specifically, several empirical
studies have documented the high predictive validity of the five dimensions
when applied in such diverse areas of human functioning as mental health
(Widiger, Costa, & McCrae, 2002), subjective well-being (Gutiérrez, Jiménez,
Hernandez, & Puente, 2005; Weiss, Bates, & Luciano, 2008), academic achieve-
ment (Paunonen & Ashton, 2001; Poropat, 2009), and job performance (Barrick,
Mount, & Judge, 2001).
As will be discussed later in the book, a number of findings that have
endorsed quantitative and nomothetic assessment procedures have high-
lighted how individual differences in personality traits, like the Big Five, may
underpin political engagement and ideological orientations, such as conserva-
tism and liberalism, and therefore influence political choices. The influence of
these traits appears largely indirect, as they serve as distal predictors of polit-
ical behavior. In interaction with environmental factors, these dispositions
shape sociopolitical attitudes, value orientation, and self-beliefs (Caprara,
Vecchione, & Schwartz, 2009; Lee, Ashton, Ogunfowora, Bourdage, & Shin
2010; McCrae, 1996; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008), which in turn affect political opin-
ions and preferences and engagement in politics.
Although the five factors were initially conceived as basic orthogonal
traits, and thus were placed at the highest level of the hierarchical structure
of personality (Goldberg, 1993), empirical findings revealed a meaningful pat-
tern of correlations among the Big Five, which can be summarized in terms
of two higher-order factors. John Digman (1997) was the first to identify two
superordinate traits underlying the Big Five. These factors were labeled as
Alpha, which reflects the shared variance of agreeableness, conscientiousness,
and emotional stability, and Beta, which reflects the shared variance of extra-
version and openness.
These higher-order factors, however, have been the subject of different
interpretations. Digman (1997) saw them as the product of socialization and
personal growth, respectively. Wiggins and Trapnell (1996), however, felt they
could be interpreted as Communion and Agency, namely as two meta-traits
accounting for the general tendency to come together and cooperate with oth-
ers and to focus on their welfare, and for the predisposition to assert and
magnify oneself, ambition, dominance, competence, and power, respectively.
As we will see in the next chapter, the concept of Communion and
Agency fits with David Bakan’s (1966) fundamental dimensions of human
existence, as they may account for the various ways in which people meet two

basic requirements arising from their relations with the physical and social
environment. While extraversion and openness respond primarily to needs
related to agency and mastery, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and emo-
tional stability respond primarily to needs related to communion and belong-
ing. The various tendencies that characterize discovery and control of the
environment originate from the former, while the tendencies that character-
ize the maintenance of balance and relationships are derived from the latter.
Needs and Motives

Needs and motives are associated with people’s conscious or unconscious
wishes, desires, or goals (Winter, John, Stewart, Klohnen, & Duncan, 1998).
These two concepts have been used interchangeably, and often synony-
mously, to account for social behaviors traceable to the action of internal states
or forces experienced as wishes and desires that provide an impetus for the
achievement of certain goals, which vary in the pressure they exert over peo-
ple’s choices. Both have been sited at the core of various theories of motivation
to account for the enactment and direction of behavior. In general, the notion
of need has been used to refer to internal pressures to pursue certain goals,
whereas the notion of motives has been used to refer to individual tendencies
to assign value to certain kinds of incentives.
The systematic study of human motivation has been central to personal-
ity psychology since the origin of the discipline, and most of the classic the-
ories of personality have theories of motivation at their core. For example,
psychoanalysis claimed that people are motivated to reduce aversive states
of tensions (Freud, 1923). Learning theories have also viewed personality as
a hierarchy of behavioral tendencies resulting from multiplicative combina-
tions of drives and habits (Guthrie, 1944; Hull, 1943), and humanistic theories
claim that people are inherently motivated toward psychological growth and
maturity (Allport, 1950; Maslow, 1954; Rogers, 1961).
Many attempts have been made to identify fundamental motivational
tendencies that characterize human nature, ranging from early speculations
on instincts and drives (James, 1890; McDougall, 1908) to current theories on
basic needs (Deci & Ryan, 2002).
Originally, Maslow (1954) postulated five classes of needs, which he
defined as physiological, safety, love, esteem, and actualization. These needs
can be arranged in a hierarchy that conveys their order of importance over
the course of personality development. Whereas the physiological needs
associated with conditions of deficiencies (e.g., sleep, food, security) domi-
nate the earlier stages of development, their satisfaction allows the emergence

of self-regard and self-actualization needs (self-respect, justice, creativity)

that fully attest to the unique spontaneous drive of human beings toward
self-fulfillment.4
Later, Deci and Ryan (1985, 2002) have pointed to autonomy, competence,
and relatedness as universal basic needs whose pursuit and satisfaction are
at the core of self-determination and personal development. The pursuit
of goals that are personally meaningful and the actualization of one’s own
potential are in line with our view of democracy and personality develop-
ments as being mutually dependent.
Viewing motives as stable individual differences in strength of needs,
McClelland (1985) pointed to three basic motives: achievement, affiliation,
and power. The influence that each of these motives may exert on individual
life choices results from early experiences and socialization processes, and
depends on the degree of predominance over other motives. Each motive
may reflect and combine desires and fears, which in different degrees show
approach and avoidance components. Achievement may reflect a desire for
success and a fear of failure, whereas affiliation may reflect a desire for protec-
tion and fear of rejection by others. Power may mirror both a desire for domi-
nance and a fear of dependency. Individuals differ in the relative strength
of each motivational orientation, and different situations will mean that the
degree to which they tap into each will vary.
Achievement, affiliation, and power have been found to be meaningfully
related to basic traits in accordance with the Big Five Model (e.g., Costa &
McCrae, 1988; Engeser & Langens, 2010; Paunonen, Jackson, Trzebinski, &
Forsterling, 1992; Stumpf, 1993). Motives related to achievement are posi-
tively related to conscientiousness, while motives associated with affiliation
are positively related to agreeableness. Power-related motives are positively
linked to extraversion and negatively to agreeableness.
Winter (2013), to whom we have already referred in Chapter 1, has high-
lighted how individual differences in power, affiliation, and achievement
motives may account for political leadership and politicians’ success.
Other researchers, in pursuing an approach that aims to integrate the study
of motivation and of social cognition, have identified a variety of enduring
individual differences in the cognitive structures that underlie motivational
tendencies (Kruglanski, 1996). This approach highlights the “motivational
underpinnings” of social thinking on the assumption that ideas and beliefs, as
well as ways of viewing and reasoning about the world, arise from psychologi-
cal needs, such as epistemic needs for knowledge and meaning (e.g., the need
for order, structure, and closure), existential needs for safety and reassurance
(e.g., the need to reduce and manage uncertainty and threat), and relational

needs for affiliation and social identification (see Jost et al., 2003, for a review).
The extent to which individual differences in basic needs draw upon heredity
or experiences, and the degree to which they relate to basic traits and form the
basis of basic values, however, remain to be investigated.
Within a comprehensive and thereby inclusive conception of personality,
basic traits and motives can be viewed as individual tendencies that operate
as distal causes or potentials that precede and influence values that emerge
later following social experiences. It is likely that both traits and motives play
a role in politics, among elites and citizens, and with regard to preferences
and participation. In the following chapters we will address these issues in
detail.
Basic Values
Values are cognitive representations of desirable, abstract, trans-situational
goals that serve as guiding principles in people’s lives. They refer to what
people consider important, and they vary in their relative importance as stan-
dards for judging behavior, events, and people. In this context, we should note
that basic traits like the Big Five are mostly related to executive functions as
they concern habitual ways to interact with the social and physical environ-
ment, whereas basic needs reflect basic priorities, whose attainment is needed
for people to maintain a positive stance toward themselves and life in general.
With regard to traits, needs, and motives, basic values form a bridge
between the functioning of individuals and of society. On the one hand, val-
ues attest to the pervasive influence that socialization practices and mem-
bership of different groups, such as family, class, and community, exert on
an individual’s development, identity, and functioning. On the other hand,
values attest to the crucial role that individuals play in preserving and chang-
ing the guiding principles and the functioning of social systems (Caprara &
Cervone, 2000; Hitlin, 2003).
The importance of values for political behavior was first underlined by
Rokeach (1973, 1979) and later acknowledged by a number of scholars, who
pointed to the central role of values in politics as major organizers of political
judgments and preferences (Feldman, 2003; Knutsen, 1995a; Mitchell, Tetlock,
Mellers, & Ordonez, 1993; Schwartz, 1994). More specifically, the importance
of emancipative values, such as tolerance of human diversity, civic engage-
ment, liberty aspirations, and trust in people, for the effective functioning
of democracy has been confirmed by the results of extensive World Values
Surveys across nations, regions, and cultural zones (Welzel, Inglehart, &
Klingemann, 2003).

Recently, Schwartz and colleagues have addressed the nature, origins,

organization, and the function of values at the individual and societal level
(Schwartz, 1992, 2005, 2006; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987) and have provided new
instruments for their measurement (Schwartz, 1992, 1996, 2006; Schwartz,
Melech, Lehmann, Burgess, & Harris, 2001). According to Schwartz’s theory,
values can be conceived as the cognitive representation of universal require-
ments of the human condition, such as the needs of individuals as biological
organisms, and the needs for coordinated action and welfare of groups and
communities (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987).
Through socialization and cognitive development, basic needs are rep-
resented cognitively, taking the form of values. Individuals progressively
“learn to represent basic needs as conscious goals and values, to use cul-
turally shared terms to communicate about these goals and values, and to
attribute varying degrees of importance to them” (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987,
p. 878). Results from more than 300 samples from 83 countries (Sagiv &
Schwartz, 1995; Schwartz, 1994, 2005; Schwartz & Bardi, 2001; Schwartz &
Bilsky, 1990) led to a comprehensive theory of a universal psychological
structure of human basic values.
Ten distinct values are recognized cross-culturally, each being defined
in terms of its central motivational goal, that is, the end state to which it is
directed. These include achievement (i.e., valuing personal success through
demonstrating competence according to social standards), power (social sta-
tus and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources), hedonism
(pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself), stimulation (arousal and
variety), self-direction (independent thought and action—choosing, creating,
exploring), universalism (understanding, tolerance, and protection for the
welfare of all people, even those who are outside one’s in-group), benevolence
(preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in
close contact), tradition (respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs
and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide the self), conformity
(restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others
and violate social expectations or norms), and security (safety, harmony, and
stability of society, of relationships, and of self). Table 2.2 provides a schematic
definition of each value, with an example of an item from the Portrait Values
Questionnaire (PVQ), a widely used measure of the 10 value types (Schwartz,
2003).5
In Schwartz’s model, the value system is conceived as an integrated
whole, rather than a fragmented set of values, and a circular structure of rela-
tions among the values is specified, with the 10 values forming a motivational
continuum based on their pattern of compatibility and conflict, as depicted in

TAB L E 2 . 2 . DEFINITIONS OF TEN VALUE CONSTRUCTS AND SAMPLE

PVQ ITEMS
Value and Motivational Goal Sample Itemsa
Power: Social status and prestige, “He likes to be in charge and tell others what
control or dominance over people to do. He wants people to do what he says.”
and resources
Achievement: Personal success through “Being very successful is important to him.
demonstrating competence He likes to stand out and to impress other
according to social standards people.”
Hedonism: Pleasure and sensuous “He really wants to enjoy life. Having a good
gratification for oneself time is very important to him.”
Stimulation: Excitement, novelty, and “He looks for adventures and likes to take
challenge in life risks. He wants to have an exciting life.”
Self-direction: Independent thought “He thinks it’s important to be interested in
and action—choosing, creating, things. He is curious and tries to understand
exploring everything.”
Universalism: Understanding, “He wants everyone to be treated justly, even
appreciation, tolerance, and people he doesn’t know. It is important to
protection for the welfare of all him to protect the weak in society.”
people and for nature
Benevolence: Preservation and “He always wants to help the people who are
enhancement of the welfare of close to him. It’s very important to him to
people with whom one is in care for the people he knows and likes.”
frequent personal contact
Tradition: Respect, commitment, and “He thinks it is important to do things the way
acceptance of the customs and ideas he learned from his family. He wants to
that traditional culture or religion follow their customs and traditions.”
provide the self
Conformity: Restraint of actions, “He believes that people should do what
inclinations, and impulses likely to they’re told. He thinks people should follow
upset or harm others and violate rules at all times, even when no one is
social expectations or norms watching.”
Security: Safety, harmony, and stability “It is important to him to live in secure
of society, of relationships, and surroundings. He avoids anything that
of self might endanger his safety.”
Source: Caprara et al. (2006).

a
The PVQ forms were gender appropriate, varying only in the pronouns.
Figure 2.2. It is therefore relatively easy to pursue values that lie close together
in the circular space (e.g., power and achievement, which both involve high
levels of self-enhancement) simultaneously. Conversely, it is difficult to pur-
sue values in the circle that stand in opposition to each other (e.g., universal-
ism and power).

Openness to Self-direction Universalism Self-

Change Transcendence
Stimulation
Benevolence
Personal Focus
Social Focus
Hedonism
Conformity
Tradition
Achievement
Self-
Conservation
Enhancement
Power Security
Figure 2.2 Theoretical model of relations among Schwartz’s 10 basic values.
The set of 10 values can also be represented within a two-dimensional

space. Values related to openness to change (self- direction, stimulation),
which encourage independence of thought, feelings, and action, and recep-
tiveness to change, conflict with conservation values (conformity, tradition,
security) that call for submissive self- restriction, preserving traditional
practices, and protecting stability. Similarly, values associated with self-
transcendence (universalism, benevolence), which emphasize accepting oth-
ers as equals and concern for their welfare, conflict with self-enhancement
values (power, achievement) that encourage the pursuit of one’s own success
and dominance over others. Hedonistic values share elements of both open-
ness and self-enhancement. Self-enhancement and openness to change values
can be viewed as personally focused values, whereas self-transcendence and
conservation can be viewed as socially focused values.
The 10 values have demonstrated high predictive validity for numerous
behaviors in several domains of functioning (Schwartz, 1996), such as sub-
jective well-being (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000), national identification, favorit-
ism toward the in-group (Feather, 1994), trust in institutions (Devos, Spini, &

Schwartz, 2002), religiosity (Schwartz & Huisman, 1995), and political orienta-
tion (Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna, Vecchione, & Barbaranelli, 2006).
As values remain at the core of both personal and social identities, they
can attest both to an individual’s level of freedom in determining the kind of
person he or she will become, as well as demonstrating the pervasive influence
of socialization practices on individual development. Social theories focus-
ing on the special properties of human agency view individuals as agents
endowed with broad degrees of autonomy in selecting environments, activi-
ties, and people, in pursuing goals that accord with their own values, and in
advocating a unique sense of one’s own self (Bandura, 2001). However, other
social theories focusing on the influence that membership in social groups,
such as family, class, and community, exerts on an individual’s development
and functioning remind us that self-belief, attitudes, and values are largely
dictated by shared social conventions, as well as by the place people occupy in
society (Emler, 2002). In reality, personal and social identities are inextricably
linked and reflect the influence of socialization and the individual’s autono-
mous appropriation of social values.
Empirical research has found systematic relations between basic values
and the Big Five traits that are consistent with assumptions made by the
circular model of Schwartz (Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, & Knafo, 2002). Not
surprisingly, individuals who score high on openness attribute more impor-
tance to independence of action and thought (self-direction), receptiveness
to change (stimulation), tolerance of all people and ideas, and appreciation of
beauty and nature (universalism), and less importance to protecting stability
(security), preserving traditional practices (tradition), and avoiding what is
different and new (conformity). Individuals who score higher on agreeable-
ness tend to attribute more importance to concern for the welfare of oth-
ers (benevolence), and less importance to dominance over others (power).
Conscientious people are inclined to obey social rules calling for impulse
control and thereby value security and restraint concerning behaviors and
inclinations that are likely to violate social norms or expectations (confor-
mity). Extraverted people tend to attribute more importance to the pursuit
of pleasant arousal in novel ways (stimulation) and to personal success
(achievement).
While these findings have been corroborated by different studies across
different cultures (Bilsky & Schwartz, 1994; Dollinger, Leong, & Ulicni, 1996;
Herringer, 1998; Luk & Bond, 1993; Olver & Mooradian, 2003; Yik & Tang,
1996), it is difficult to make inferences about the causal processes through
which the relations between traits and values operate. However, given the
vast literature attesting to the significant genetic component of basic traits

(Jang, McCrae, Angleitner, Riemann, & Livesley, 1998; Loehlin, McCrae,

Costa, & John, 1998) and to the early expression—of at least some—in tem-
perament as early as in infancy (Bouchard & Loehlin, 2001; Clark & Watson,
1999), it is reasonable to assume that traits precede values.
As basic values have been shown to account for a significant portion of
political preferences and political engagement across countries, we will turn
extensively to the topic in the following chapters. At the same time, we will
address the issue of core political values, namely values specifically related to
politics, to provide new elements attesting to how different features of per-
sonality may contribute to our understanding of political behavior.
THE SELF-SYSTEM
Stable, coherent, and functional patterns of responses across settings reflect
the given attributes of persons and situations. More specifically, they attest
to properties of the mind that reflect and capitalize on experiences derived
from pursuing goals that correspond to one’s own values and from regulat-
ing one’s own behavior in accordance with one’s own capacities and stan-
dards. From this perspective, intelligence and basic dispositions may be
viewed as inherited potentials, and value priorities may be seen as their
ultimate projections. Yet neither traits nor values alone can account for the
sense of self and agency that are distinctive of human experience. In reality,
people not only react to internal and external stimuli, but also assign mean-
ing and directions to their actions in accordance with their sense of self.
This leads us to focus on personality as an agentic self-regulatory system,
and thereby to the gradual construction and functioning of an intrapersonal
system, which one may identify with the system of self that enables people
to make sense to their personal experiences and to interact proactively with
the environment.
As stated earlier, interactions with the social world, especially family
experiences during childhood, lay the foundation for turning genetic poten-
tials into capacities that enable people to become aware of themselves, to exert
a broad influence on their own being and on the outside world, to negotiate
actively with the environment, to exert extended control over their personal
experiences, and to contribute as causal agents to the further development of
their own capabilities.
This would not be possible if the mind was not equipped to develop
basic capacities, such as symbolization, imitation, memory, and anticipation,
which in turn set the conditions for the development of the more advanced
capacities of self-reflection and self-regulation. Through symbolization,

experiences are transformed into symbols, verbal and figural, and thus
internal models that assign meaning to thoughts and actions, and allow
people to produce ideas that transcend sensorial experience and to com-
municate with others. Imitation allows people to take advantage of others’
behaviors and experiences and thus to extend their control over the con-
sequences of their own actions. Memory allows people to take advantage
of past experiences and to set the conditions for a sense of personal conti-
nuity. Anticipation allows people to transcend their present conditions, to
imagine future scenarios, to assess behavioral options before enactment,
and to extend their control over time. It is plausible that the development of
these basic capacities accompanies and contributes in various ways to the
emergence of a unified sense of self and to the development of conscious-
ness and self-awareness.
Thus we come to identify the self-system with the variety of structures
and processes that gradually take control over cognitive and non-cognitive
predispositions and put them at service of adjustment. This system of self
includes personal memories, cognitive representations (like self-concepts,
especially that of the ideal self), and theories of self that integrate personal
memories and self-representations into personal narratives and identities.
The self-system operates through processes and structures that enable people
not only to express their natural tendencies in response to the environment,
but also to select and to shape them in order to transform the environment in
accordance with their own goals and in support of the actualization of their
own potential.
Self-evaluation allows people to take advantage of positive experiences
and of positive affect to nurture confidence in life, in themselves, and in the
future. Self-reflection allows people to acquire and revise knowledge about
themselves and the social world, their priorities, and their standards for
evaluating the value of their actions. Self-regulation allows people to moni-
tor and harmonize their actions according to their own desires, values, and
standards, and to contribute to their personal development.
Ultimately self-evaluative, self-reflective, and self-regulatory processes
grant continuity and coherence to one’s own experience and effectiveness
to one’s actions. This can happen because they arrange an individual’s dis-
positions and skills so that they can cope effectively with the various tasks
presented by life, and thus to interact actively and efficaciously with the envi-
ronment on all levels. Among self-structures that attest to self-referencing
systems and mechanisms capable of conferring unity, continuity, and direct-
ness to an individual’s actions, none is more influential than self-esteem and
perceived self-efficacy.

Self-esteem
The pervasive influence of self-esteem on well-being has been well docu-
mented by findings from diverse lines of research and across domains of
functioning. Self-esteem affects level of aspirations, resiliency in the face of
adversity, and tolerance of others’ rejections, while it fosters optimism, secu-
rity, and popularity.
A number of authors point to self-esteem as the expression of a basic need
for self-enhancement that reveals itself in a general tendency of people to
feel positive about themselves, to be self-praising and positively biased when
asked to report, remember, or anticipate their own performances. Whereas
average people score moderately high in self-esteem, defective self-esteem is
often associated with anxiety, and lack of self-esteem is a major symptom
of depression (Diener & Diener, 1995; Greenberg, 2008; Kernis, 1995; Orth,
Robins, & Widaman, 2012).
In the past it has been common to believe that self-esteem is formed
mostly from socialization experiences of acceptance, nurturing attachment
to others, and self-confidence. This has led to early deprivations being cited
as a major cause of low self-esteem, turning later into low levels of aspira-
tion and achievement. Recent findings, however, have suggested that a sig-
nificant variation of self-esteem is due to genetic factors (Caprara et al., 2009).
Nevertheless, this has not led to a demotion of the effect of earlier experi-
ences, which remain decisive in the promotion and maintenance of a realistic
sense of self-worth, and as such deserve attention as an important component
of an individual’s dignity (Harter, 2006).
Whereas it is unlikely that defective self-esteem, either due to heredity
or to a lack of early care, can foster success, self-esteem alone is also not suf-
ficiently beneficial for success, unless supported by effort and requisite skills.
Further, to succeed, self-esteem needs to be complemented by perceived self-
efficacy. This is all the more so in politics, where self-esteem provides the
confidence needed to engage in the fray, to face new challenges, and to risk
failure, and where self-efficacy is no less important, it being crucial to take on
active roles and to be a successful leader.
Self-efficacy Beliefs
Perceived self-efficacy refers to the belief that people hold about their capabil-
ity to exert control over events that affect their lives. It is both an indicator of
what people can do and of what they expect to accomplish in given domains
of functioning. Indeed, a vast body of research suggests that self-efficacy

beliefs are a central feature of human agency and that they play a key role in
the full realization of individuals’ potentials (Bandura, 1997).
Self-efficacy beliefs do not refer to feelings of self-worth, although they
are related, but to beliefs about one’s capacity to execute courses of actions,
to accomplish a given task, and to orchestrate the various activities needed
to achieve desirable results. The degree of perceived mastery varies across
task and situation; thus self-efficacy beliefs do not correspond to general self-
appraisal tendencies, but rather to highly contextualized knowledge struc-
tures regarding one’s own abilities to face specific challenges.
Claiming the specificity of perceived self-efficacy and pursuing a multifac-
eted approach in the study of its various expressions across task, situations, and
subjective states have been critical to address the self-regulatory process and
mechanism from which their properties derive. However, self-efficacy beliefs
do not operate in isolation from one another and may generalize across activi-
ties as people reflect on their experiences across various settings. Moreover,
people develop interrelated beliefs about their capabilities pertaining to broad
domains of functioning and beyond specific performances and situations.
Discovering the kinds of self-efficacy beliefs that exert a higher influence
on behavior and well-adjustment, that can be more widely generalized, and
which are more accessible to change is crucial to design interventions aimed
at promoting individual growth, health, and well-being. A vast amount of
literature documents the pervasive influence of self-efficacy beliefs on moti-
vation and performance, level of aspirations and achievements directly and
indirectly, and across various domains of functioning (Bandura, 1986, 1997).
The same literature, attests to perceived self-efficacy as the best indicator and
determinant of the effective use of people’s capacities.
Unless people believe that they can produce desired results by their
actions, they have little incentive to undertake activities or persevere in the
face of difficulties. Similarly, people will not even try to face activities and
tasks that they perceive as beyond their reach and will not insist on undertak-
ing activities where they have experienced repeated failure.
Thus, perceived self-efficacy is conditional for the full expression of people’s
capacities. It may happen that people believe they have capacities that they do
not have, but any sense of efficacy they may claim is rapidly lost through the
experience of failure. Thus people may pretend to be able, but they are very cau-
tious when it comes to putting abilities into practice. Likewise, it may happen that
people’s confidence in their own ability is lower than deserved, because of a lack
of opportunities to prove their capabilities, or because others have low expecta-
tions of them, people’s confidence in their own ability is lower than deserved.

In the past, people have been discouraged from attainments within their
reach through prejudices related to factors such as gender, race, and religion.
Even today, many people are left behind because of a lack of confidence in
their own ability to succeed to the same level as many others.
Self-efficacy beliefs add value to people’s capacities as they attest to a
sense of ownership that allows people to fully dispose of their talents. People
who doubt their own effectiveness tend to avoid challenges, to withdraw
when confronted with difficulties, and to experience debilitating anxiety
when faced with setbacks. People who are confident about their efficacy tend,
instead, to commit themselves to more challenging goals, to attribute positive
outcome to stable and controllable factors, and to develop superior strategies
for coping with highly complex tasks.
In fact, self-efficacy, more than any other personality factor, attests to the
ability of the mind to capitalize on experience, through self-reflection, and
for a person to master his or her own reactions to the environment though
self-regulation. Whereas activities set the conditions for the discovery and
practice of one’s abilities, mastery experiences allow people to fully appropri-
ate their capacities. As people develop their sense of efficacy through practice,
mastery experiences nurture the motivation and trust needed to address new
challenges.
Ultimately, self-efficacy beliefs become crucial in turning mere potentials
into capacities and achievements. Self-efficacy theory not only provides find-
ings that prove its relevance but also provides guidance about what to do in
order to build self-efficacy. A vast body of literature points to the development
of self-efficacy through assisted mastery experiences and capitalizing upon
self-reflection, learning by doing, and through imitation, goal setting, and
feedback (Bandura, 1997).
Whereas one knows that even basic traits are malleable, as they may
change over time, until recently the trait literature has not had much to say
about how to intervene in order to promote their best expression. Recent
findings, however, attest to the role that beliefs people hold about their
efficacy in dealing with emotions and interpersonal relations may play in
shaping dispositions like emotional agreeableness and emotional stability
(Caprara, Alessandri, & Eisenberg, 2012; Caprara, Vecchione, Barbaranelli, &
Alessandri, 2013). Other findings suggest that children’s beliefs about their
ability to learn and to control their activities at school exert a strong influence
on their academic attainments, and that these beliefs operate in concert with
conscientiousness and openness (Caprara, Fida, Vecchione, Del Bove, Vecchio,
Barbaranelli, & Bandura, 2008).

Although self-esteem and self-efficacy refer to different structures, they

do not operate in isolation one from the other. Self-esteem contributes to self-
efficacy in setting the basic trust that is needed to put oneself at risk, but
self-efficacy is crucial in nurturing self-esteem, as it may carry achievements
and recognition. Indeed, recent findings attest to the reciprocal influence of
emotional self-efficacy and self-esteem over the course of youth develop-
ment (Caprara, Alessandri, Barbaranelli, & Vecchione, 2013) and point to self-
efficacy as instrumental in the development of a resilient self-esteem.
Ultimately, self-efficacy may be the instrument through which change of
enduring dispositions and self-esteem may be achieved. Together with self-
esteem, self-efficacy beliefs contribute to the level of aspirations and goals
that people intend to achieve, as well as to the standards through which they
assess their achievements.
The importance of self-efficacy beliefs for politics and for our arguments
about the mutual influence that democracy and personality may exert over
each other is enormous, both directly and indirectly. Whereas democracy
should grant to everyone the development and ownership of one’s own tal-
ents, citizens’ self-efficacy is decisive in supplying democracy with the capaci-
ties and the motivation that its functioning requires.
Self-efficacy beliefs, however, may have a different impact on society,
depending on individuals’ values. One cannot doubt the sense of mastery
that tyrants, autocrats, and corrupt politicians may hold. In many cases their
fortunes rest upon a combination of mastery beliefs and power needs, with
the satisfaction of the latter largely depending on the reliability of the former.
Indeed, self-efficacy beliefs account for the attainment of goals, not for their
qualities.
In order for self-efficacy to serve good causes, such as democracy, people
need to value democracy and assign priority to democratic values. Citizens
should appropriate the values upon which democracy rests, no less than the
habits that allow democracy to function. This implies that citizens must be
convinced that democracy is worthy of their efforts and thus be enabled to
put their passion and abilities at service of democracy. This requires a moral
education upon which to lay their civic and political education.
Citizens’ political efficacy is no less crucial than politicians’ efficacy to
grant the engagement and the moral commitment that is needed through all
the political body to make democracy functioning. For this reason, in the next
chapter we will address morality, with the aim of underscoring its primacy in
the understanding of political action. This will also support following chap-
ters, where we will deal extensively with the distal and proximal determinants

of political preference and participation in the domains of traits, values, and

self-beliefs.
CONCLUSIONS
A comprehensive theory of personality should account for all relevant bio-
logical and psychological factors that contribute to political attitudes and
behaviors. Although still in its infancy, recent progress in genetics and neuro-
sciences is promising as it attests to great potentials of human genetic endow-
ment and to the great plasticity of human brain.
The study of individual differences has proved to be a powerful instru-
ment with which to address neurophysiological and psychological pro-
cesses and to link specific genes’ expressions to neural and brain systems
and through them to relevant psychological phenomena, including political
attitudes and behaviors. However, major integrative efforts are needed at
various levels to reveal how the multiple connections within and among sys-
tems develop and operate. Further investigation is needed to account for how
potentials related to our genetic endowments turn into brain structures, and
into the processes underlying cognitive and affective functions.
There is already plenty of evidence that turning potentials into capacities
and accomplishments is not invariant across situations, as it largely depends
on available opportunities. Likewise, a growing body of knowledge is avail-
able to account for how distinct psychological structures, such as cognitive
abilities, traits, motives, values, and self-appraisals, contribute to individuals’
choices and achievements.
Most scientific disciplines claim to put the person at the core of human
progress, but it is primarily through psychology that we are able to detect the
determinants of people’s thoughts and actions and to understand how they
operate. Early contexts where people are born, nurtured, and educated exert
a great influence in setting the conditions for the activation of processes and
the deployment of mechanisms that are conducive to knowledge structures,
emotional patterns, and habits.
To warn against the negative and long-term impact of social disparities
associated with earlier deprivation does not imply an underestimation of chil-
dren’s degree of freedom with regard to the influence of their parents and of
their social milieu. Rather, it reminds us that children do not grow up alone
and that much of their development depends upon the opportunities they are
given to express their potential and to make their own life.
Over the course of development, individuals’ self- awareness, self-
reflection, self-regulation, and intentionality make them partly responsible

for the construction of their own personality, as more challenges depend

upon their choices. Interpersonal relations are crucial in mediating the influ-
ence of cultures and communities and in promoting the construction of the
self. Values serve both social and personal identities as they attest either to
the influence that society exerts on individuals’ identities and to the influence
individuals may have in changing societies.
Personality is malleable, and its development largely reflects the context
in which it occurs. Contexts are not invariants and largely reflect the will to
grant most people the optimal conditions for growth.
The aim of politics and of economics is to create the best conditions for the
realization of human potentials. We are convinced that democracy can be the
system of governance where citizens, through institutions, can best operate
to pursue the optimal conditions for personal, social, and communal growth.
Democracy, in fact, appears to be the system of government that best satisfies
the basic needs of autonomy, competence, and relatedness that form the basis
of individuals’ growth.
Likewise, we are convinced that the full actualization of individuals’
potentials is crucial for the functioning of democracy, as it rests upon indi-
viduals’ self-determination and in their capacities to exert control over the
environment and to support each other. Such ambitious goals, however, can-
not be achieved without grounding our thought and action on knowledge
drawn from empirical evidence. Thus, in the following chapters, we will rely
mostly upon this knowledge to highlight the contribution of personality sci-
ence to politics and democratic functioning.
NOTES
1. Zamboni and colleagues (2009) found that conservative statements, regard-
less of political orientation, were associated with intensified activation of
brain areas like the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which has been associated
with avoidance motivation, negative affect, and response inhibition in earlier
research. Westen and colleagues (2006) found that thinking about information
threatening to one’s own candidate activated brain regions involved in emo-
tion regulation, such as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the anterior
cingulate cortex, as well as regions reflecting elicitation of negative emotion,
like the insula and amygdala. Other work by Knutson and colleagues (2006)
found that evaluations of presidential candidates were associated to neural
activations in regions implicated in both deliberative (the lateral prefrontal cor-
tex) and automatic emotional responses (the ventral medial prefrontal cortex),
with lower engagement of the former than of the latter in people who held
partisan attitudes, as if their evaluations were based more on reflexive than

reflective reasoning. In their research on brain activity and political orientation,

Kaplan and colleagues (2007) found that being shown a political candidate’s
face invoked brain activity that was modulated by the political orientation of
the viewer. In particular, they found that when participants were confronted
with images of opposing candidates instead of that of their preferred one, the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate cortex, two areas that
recruit cognitive control and monitors response to conflict, were activated.
These effects were stronger when respondents were emotionally involved with
the target politicians.
2. Here we find studies such as that by Oxley and colleagues (2007), who found
higher increases of sympathetic activation (e.g., electrodermal activity) in con-
servatives after negative visual stimuli. Subsequent findings have shown that
political attitudes vary with physiological traits and that conservatives are
more responsive to disagreeable and unpleasant stimuli relative to agreeable
and pleasant stimuli, while left-wing individuals showed the opposite tenden-
cies (Dodd et al., 2012; Oxley et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2011).
3. Because of their unique morphology, human eyes are especially adapted
to following the direction of another individual’s eye movements or gaze
(Dodd et al., 2011), to infer others’ mental states (Emery, 2000), to mediate
nonverbal communication (Kobayashi & Kohshima, 2001), and to modu-
late social interactions (Emery, 2000). Detecting where other individuals
are looking can reveal what they are paying attention to (Deaner & Platt,
2003), can signal potential sources of reward or danger, and can activate
basic motivational-emotional, approach-avoidance responses (Hietanen &
Leppanen, 2003). In humans, reflexive social attention has proved sensitive
not only to physical dominance (Jones et al., 2010) and physical similarity
(Hungr & Hunt, 2012), as already found in primates (Shepherd, Deaner, &
Platt, 2006), but also to social status and social similarity (i.e., group affilia-
tion, Pavan, Dalmaso, Galfano, & Castelli, 2011). Strikingly, ideological dif-
ferences affect the likelihood that one will be distracted by a face gaze. In
relation to this, Dodd, Hibbing, and Smith (2011) found that gaze cue effects
are moderated by political orientation. Specifically, liberals exhibited a
marked tendency to be distracted by a schematic face gaze, while this effect
was not found among conservatives. Two recent studies (Cazzato, Liuzza,
Caprara, Macaluso, & Aglioti, 2015; Liuzza et al., 2011) used a gaze following
paradigm, where the directional gaze of left-or right-w ing Italian politi-
cians was aimed at affecting the oculomotor behavior of voters. Participants
in these studies were requested to make a right-or a leftward saccade if a
central fixation point turned into blue or red, respectively. During this task,
a picture of a political leader gazing in the same or different direction than
the one dictated by the color was shown. Results showed that the distracting
effect of the averted politician’s gaze activated the dorsal and ventral fronto-
parietal attentional network, two areas of the brain known to play a role in

attentional target selection. Importantly, the proneness to follow the gaze of

political candidates was significantly related to voting intention. This effect
was increased by the perceived similarity of participants’ personality with
that of the politician being observed. A subsequent study (Liuzza et al., 2013)
further revealed that the tendency to follow the gaze of political candidates
increased when (a) participants had a positive attitude toward the target
politician, and (b) participants perceived the politician as particularly influ-
ential in the political context. The latter finding accords with earlier studies
that attested to the role of social status in affecting the strength of gaze-fol-
lowing behavior, both in humans and in nonhuman primates (e.g., Shepherd
et al., 2006). This study also found that voting intention toward two candi-
dates competing for the position of governor in an Italian election campaign
was predicted by the extent to which electors reflexively followed the gaze
of the politicians involved (Liuzza et al., 2013).
4. Maslow’s theory proved to have considerable practical value in education and
management, providing a model to account for people’s motivation to learn
and to perform successfully at school and in organizations. Inglehart (1990,
1997) has referred to Maslow’s theory in his reasoning about modernization
and post-modernization, and has used it to account for change in value pri-
orities when the satisfaction of materialistic values—mostly associated with
needs deficiencies—set the conditions for pursuing post-materialistic values,
such as self-expression and free choice.
5. The PVQ includes short verbal portraits of different people, each describing a
person’s goals, aspirations or wishes that point implicitly to the importance of
a value. For example, “It is important to her/him to listen to people who are different
from her/him; even when she/he disagrees with them, she/he still wants to understand
them” describes a person who holds universalism values important. For each
item, respondents are asked to indicate how the portrayed person is similar to
themselves on a six-point scale, ranging from “very much like me” to “not like
me at all.” Respondents’ values are inferred from the values of the persons they
consider similar to themselves.

CHAPTER 3
Moral Foundations of Political Action
HUMAN NATURE
Assumptions and beliefs about human nature have been critical for the
inspiration of political philosophers in the past and of political scientists in
recent time, at least in the Western Hemisphere. Typically, these inspirational
assumptions and beliefs have tended toward the pessimistic, so that from
Thucydides, through Thomas Hobbes, to recent scholars like Carl Schmitt
and Hans Morgenthau, politics seems to have been assigned a tremendous
remedial mission to control, restrain, repress, and domesticate human nature.
Based on that assumption, various ideologies have paved the way for the
importance of power to achieve and maintain peace within societies, of rules
and laws to dictate citizens’ obligations, and of governmental institutions to
preserve the unity of nations and to pursue national interest.
Ultimately, of course, human nature can be tamed and contained, and
where this is successfully done, peace, unity, and happiness can be pursued.
Indeed, not all Western philosophy shared such a pessimistic view. Here, one
may recall Jean Jacques Rousseau, David Hume, and Adam Smith as exem-
plars of alternative ways of thinking in this regard. In theory, Rousseau ideal-
ized the goodness of humanity’s primordial state of nature, but in practice, he
was mostly concerned with humans’ irremediable social degradation.
Hume and Smith, instead, were notable exceptions in positing sympathy
as among the human qualities that moderate hate, greed, envy, and fear, and
in viewing self-interest as not incompatible with the pursuit of common good.
Smith’s theory of moral sentiments, in particular, can be regarded as among
the major contributions challenging the diffused prejudices about the misery
of the human condition and the frailties of social institutions.
Yet it is difficult not to agree with Sahlins’s (2008) statement that no
other civilization has been so negatively biased toward human nature as
the Western one. Earlier negative ideas of nature mostly reflected the harsh
conditions of life, where lack of rules and institutions left people defense-
less against the most primitive manifestations of anger and fear, leading to
73

predation, violence, and revenge. Later, the same pessimistic views served
to legitimize forms of government based on obedience and hierarchy as the
most effective means to contrast threat, hatred, and fear.
Insufficient knowledge about the properties of the human mind was a
major flaw of the thinking in antiquity. We evolved to live in groups, and our
brains and minds co-evolved to meet the requirements of adjustment under
the direction and pressure of nature and culture. We discovered that empathy
and sympathy equip us for sharing experiences and operating in concert with
others, and we came to appreciate the strength of bonds and the binding of
groups in the pursuit of mutual interest and common good. We also came to
acknowledge the importance of political institutions and rules in setting the
conditions that grant individuals’ development and social progress, and to
appreciate the relevance and the richness of cultural diversity as a projection
of extraordinary human potentials.
Insufficient knowledge about the diversities of cultures was another major
flaw of the thinking of previous eras.
Cultures, in fact, are dynamic systems of symbols, practices and of socially
transmitted instructions with which to assign meaning to oneself and to the
world, that have a deeply pervasive effect on every aspect of human experi-
ence: affect, thought, and action (Geertz, 1973). This view open the eyes of
students of human nature to a world of diversities, to multiple ways of human
functioning and being, to multiple endpoints of individuals’ development,
and to multiple ways of construing the same psychological phenomena.
Studies of individual and cultural differences complement each other
in disclosing the great potentials that are associated with the extraordinary
plasticity of human nature. Recent developments in genetics have led us to
appreciate the richness of our genetic endowments and to understand the
continuous interplay of nature and culture over the course of human devel-
opment and its adaptation in different environments. Whereas nature is now
known to be more malleable than was once believed, nothing seems to justify
the pessimistic views held in antiquity.
The delocalization and hybridization of cultures show how diversity and
flexibility are two faces of the same human nature: while people in differ-
ent regions of the world tend to share habits, values, and aspirations, intra-
individual differences within the same region may vary even more than
groups that are geographically remote. This further challenges the ideas of a
given nature, fixed traits, and common stages of development of personality,
while emphasizing its extraordinary potentials.
Good and evil are equally within the reach of human beings, with the
extension of life attesting to the extraordinary progress we have witnessed in

Moral Foundations of Political Action 75
being able to live free from violence and fear. Indeed, the history of civiliza-
tion largely corresponds to the decline of violence and to the advancement of
cooperation in setting human affairs (Pinker, 2011). Probably, this is linked
to developments in empathic concern, self-regulation, and moral reasoning,
which point to potentials in people that predispose them to refrain from evil
and to pursue the common good.
In this regard, however, political institutions and rules have also proved
to be of tremendous importance by establishing the conditions for individu-
als’ talents to be valued, for the promotion of cooperation among groups, and
for the pursuit of peaceful relations among nations. Even earlier forms of par-
ticipatory democracy were effective in creating forms of government and of
citizenship that provided individuals with security, mutual respect, economic
growth, and advancement of knowledge.
Proper institutions of governance have set the conditions for channeling
humans’ endowments into mental structures, processes, and behaviors that
have resulted in a dramatic decline of violence over the centuries, in the large
increase of world population, and in an extension of expected life span for a
large number of people. For these reasons, and generally speaking, humans
today can enjoy the benefits of a prolonged peace, continuous economic
growth, and forms of government that respect individuals’ dignity more than
at any time in the past.
Nevertheless, a return of past miseries cannot be excluded. Past and recent
genocides and massacres prove that empathetic concerns can be dismissed,
that moral reasoning can become distorted, and that self-control can be dis-
missed and replaced by anger, hatred, and fear, particularly when people feel
their lives are threatened.
In other words, the malleability of humans’ genetic endowment can account
for the most extraordinary and for the most deplorable of actions. Indeed, the
brain has not changed as much as the institutions that have improved the
chances for the expression of its potential. Whereas aggression and altruism,
predation and cooperation, attraction and rejection, inclusion and exclusion,
hatred and love are equally possible with regard to human brain function, the
form they take via motives, attitudes, beliefs, habits, and interpersonal and
social relations depends on the conditions that are offered and required to pre-
serve life by the physical and social environment. Ultimately, the basic aspect
of human nature that is difficult to dispute is that of survival and the desire of
people for life. This forms the basis of caring for themselves no more than for
others, society, and nature, and can take manifold expressions.
The history of cultures can also be traced to the different modes in
which individuals and groups have managed to protect their life under

dangerous conditions. With time, however, moral reasoning and confidence

in the law gradually replaced anger, fear, and revenge to deal with offenses
and threats, broadening the number of others whose life deserves care equal
to one’s own. In addition, increasing social diversity, which led first to isola-
tion and conflict, has furthered tolerance and mutual respect, depending
on how cultures have been able to mesh with each other and to nurture the
best of each other.
To prosper and flourish in a rapidly changing world requires societ-
ies to capitalize on their citizens’ mental capital to transform the environ-
ments they encounter. To this end, capacities for self-regulation through
self-reflection, self-evaluative reactions, and forethought are unique prop-
erties of human beings that allow them to adjust cognitive, affective, and
behavioral responses in order to attain personal goals and thus to exert a
considerable influence over their experience and course of life. As noted in
previous chapters, the notion of potential has become crucial in pointing
to the large and rich array of human endowments, and in highlighting the
fact that many human assets derive from people discovering and nurturing
their predispositions while acknowledging environmental opportunities.
It must be remembered, however, that environments contain resources,
opportunities, and challenges whose influence varies across people and
remains latent in the absence of active choice. In reality, people are causal
agents who can contribute to the full realization of their personalities to the
degree that they become aware of their potentials, and through the choices
they make.
Thus, a basic goal of potentialist and agentic views is to shed light on the
psychological structures and mechanisms that predispose and enable peo-
ple to regulate their experiences and actions, thereby contributing to the full
development and the best expression of their endowments.
The Life Instinct

In accordance with a view of well-being as a state in which individuals manage
their lives successfully and contribute effectively to their community, inter-
est in the positive features of individual functioning has gained increased
attention over recent decades. At the same time, a number of authors have
been engaged in the identification of major determinants and accurate indi-
cators of optimal functioning, with a view to designing effective interven-
tions aimed at enabling people to fully express their potentials. A number of
these authors, in various ways and under different names, have argued about
a general disposition that enables individuals to address experience with a

positive stance, such as positive thinking (see Scheier & Carver, 1993) and
positivity (see Diener, Scollon, Oishi, Dzokoto, & Suh, 2000). Self-esteem and
optimism have been often associated with well-being and success across a
variety of domains of functioning, while life satisfaction has been viewed as
both a determinant and an outcome of optimal functioning (Diener, Emmons,
Larsen, & Griffin, 1985; Harter, 2006; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994).
In recent studies, psychometric results converged with cross cultural
findings and twin studies in attesting to a latent dimension that lies at the
core of self-esteem, optimism, and life satisfaction. This was first named
positive thinking, then positive orientation, and finally, positivity (Caprara &
Alessandri, 2014).
Findings were similar across different cultures and languages, including
Japan, the United States, Brazil, Canada, Serbia, Spain, Germany, and Poland,
attesting to a latent dimension, largely due to common genetic factors (Borsa,
Damasio, de Souza, Koller, & Caprara, 2015; Caprara et al., 2009, 2012a, 2012b;
Caprara, Steca, Alessandri, Abela, & McWhinnie, 2010; Fagnani, Medda, Stazi,
Caprara, & Alessandri, 2014; Heikamp et al., 2014). The mean distribution of
positivity was skewed on the positive side, as people in general tend to be
positive when reporting about themselves, their future, and their lives.
Earlier findings have shown that positivity is stable over time, with males
scoring slightly higher than females, and with a tendency to decline in late old
age. Subsequent findings have attested to a positive association between posi-
tivity and desirable features of personality in the domain of traits, values, and
self-beliefs, such as prosociality, resiliency, trust, and self-efficacy. Positivity
was associated with psychological well-being and adjustment across various
contexts, such as family, school, work, and citizenship. Positivity was a strong
predictor of quality of friendships, work performance, civic engagement, and
health, with marginal variance left to self-esteem, life satisfaction, and opti-
mism, once positivity was controlled for (Alessandri, Caprara, & Tisak, 2012a;
Alessandri, Caprara, & Tisak, 2012b). Negative associations, on the other
hand, have been found with depression, shyness, hostile rumination, irrita-
bility, violence, and somatic complaints.
Longitudinal findings have shown that positivity predisposes people to
feelings of joy, contentment, serenity, and love, all of which are commonly
viewed as expressions of happiness. Most likely, positivity fosters positive
emotions and enables people to benefit from these emotions. All these find-
ings attest to the importance of appraising life and experience with a posi-
tive outlook. It has therefore been reasoned that a positive disposition is part
of the natural endowment of our species. Unless people were adequately
predisposed to address life under a positive stance, they could not meet the

challenge of experience, nor could they cope with adversities, setbacks, and
death, nor could they maintain an interest in growing and aging, despite
unavoidable suffering and death.
One may guess that many psychological phenomena that have, over the
years, been labeled under self-interest, self-enhancement, positive illusion,
and self-serving positive distortion and bias can be traced to this disposition,
at least to a certain extent (Caprara, Colaiaco, Zuffianò, & Alessandri, 2013). In
this regard, do not underestimate the risk of exaggerated overconfidence and
blind optimism, particularly in cases where exhibited positivity may mask
self-deceptive or compensatory maneuvers.
Yet all findings leave no doubt about the benefits that positivity carries for
health, well-being, and interpersonal relations (Caprara & Alessandri, 2014).
Indeed, positivity tells us much about the assets that enable human beings
to continuously readjust the allocation of their resources in order to take the
best advantage of opportunities presented by their environment. It is likely
that positivity sets the conditions for the development of the self-system
in conjunction with the impact that earlier emotional experiences exert on
self-awareness, self-perception, and self-evaluation. Self-awareness, in fact,
can be seen as a key to human well-being only to the extent that people are
equipped to face the challenges of life and the cost of being aware of their own
states, desires, and limitations. Likewise, self-reflection and anticipation of
the future can be viewed as extraordinary assets to the extent that people are
predisposed to balance the unavoidable uncertainties of the future by ampli-
fying the agreeable sides of experience. In this regard, we believe that what
people think and feel about themselves plays a special role in anchoring their
views of life, while positive affect is crucial in sustaining their growth as it
nurtures their trust in development.
Generally speaking, we can assume that nothing is more important than
one’s own life and that humans, like all other species, are naturally predis-
posed to protect their lives. Yet the life that humans care about is the one they
are aware of living, and that they experience as their own. At the beginning
of life, when the sense of one’s own life and of oneself as a living being are
practically indistinguishable, any experience of pleasure is the prototype of
what is worthy of value. In becoming aware of themselves as beings whose
life depends upon the presence and care of others, children could not afford
the experience of their distinctiveness or the discovery of their limitations,
unless equipped with a basic predisposition to view life and themselves as
sources of pleasure and thereby worthy of value.
A kind of life instinct predisposes children to form an attachment to
their caregivers, to benefit from pleasant sensations and from any source of

pleasure, and to capitalize on any experience of satisfaction that nurtures

their sense of worth. As cognitive maturation allows children to be aware of
themselves as autonomous agents, to compare themselves with others, and to
imagine the future, they could not meet the challenges of growth unless they
were predisposed to take a positive stance toward themselves and their expe-
riences. This accounts for the general tendency of children to overestimate
their capabilities and to show an exaggerated confidence in their power to
control events. This also accounts for the importance of self-esteem for well-
being over the entire life course, taking the value that people assign to them-
selves as unique beings as a core component of positivity.
In Chapter 2, we referred to negativity bias as another individual qual-
ity supporting the survival of the human species and its evolution (Hibbing,
Smith, & Alford, 2013). We do not exclude the possibility that both positiv-
ity and negativity bias operate in concert to promote well-being, although at
different levels, either by amplifying the pleasant components of life or by
increasing sensitivity to various sources of risk and threat. Whereas negativ-
ity bias is mostly reflexive and is rooted in automatic mechanisms of warn-
ing and avoidance, positivity is mostly reflective, as it remains at the core of
people’s view of themselves, their life, and their future, which is necessary for
them to grow and to flourish.
This reasoning leads us to contend traditional views of human nature as
naturally selfish and brutish, and to revise notions of education as more con-
cerned with control than with promotion of development. Indeed, this means
we need to acknowledge the merit of earlier intuitions and contributions by
a number of scholars, such as Karen Horney, Erik Erikson, and John Bowlby,
who pointed to earlier rewarding relations as the basic ingredients of confi-
dence in life that shape the self and make life worth living. The work of such
scholars suggests that pleasant relations with significant others provide the
conditions to nurture positive affect and to turn positive predispositions into
mental representations of experience, which in turn promote self-confidence
and a positive attitude toward life in general, and to turn natural tendencies
for risk-and threat-avoidance into virtues such as prudence and wisdom. The
same reasoning also leads us to focus on positivity as an asset that has not yet
been fully appreciated in pursuing either the well-being of individuals or the
welfare of societies.
People are most likely equipped by nature to avoid displeasure and to
embrace the world with a positive outlook. Yet the right experiences are
needed to turn largely inherited predispositions into views, feelings, atti-
tudes, goals, and performances that can contribute to the betterment of the
human condition.

Agency and Communion

Human beings have to face unavoidable tasks in order to survive and to
develop, due primarily to the needs of their body and the challenges of the
environment, and to their limitations in dealing with both. Whereas they
carry a vast array of potentials to cope with these tasks, the actualization of
most potential depends on opportunities provided by others, who make pos-
sible attainments that would otherwise be impossible to achieve.
Thus humans must face two fundamental tasks to live and to grow: to
master the environment and their body, and to rely on others for being effec-
tive in doing so. This leads to a view of humans as social agents whose actions
are always embedded in networks of relations with others.
Here, one can agree with David Bakan (1966), who pointed to Agency
and Communion as the two fundamental modalities of human existence.
This idea is not completely new, insofar as it figured in the thinking of other
authors who pointed to the singularity and commonality of human beings as
unique persons (Mounier, 1949; Rosenberg, Nelson, & Vivekananthan, 1968;
Rosenvallon, 2011). We believe that Bakan’s work is of paramount importance
because of its clarity and simplicity, as well as its connections to current
research on basic personality traits and values.
Agency is about autonomy, competence, intentionality, will, ownership of
action, and responsibility. This is manifested through individuals’ ability to
master, to exert control, to select and to change environments, and to make
things happen. Communion is about reciprocity, interdependence, and inclu-
siveness, and manifests itself in the sense of being at ease with similar others,
in feelings of attachment and belonging, in individuals’ faculty to empathize
and sympathize, and in capacities to engage, obey, and to sacrifice their own
interest in the pursuit of the common good.
Although Agency and Communion have often been viewed in opposition,
both rest upon the properties of the person as a self-referent/self-reflective
social being and are central to its functioning. To manage their life, people
need to meet the requirements of both agency and communion. Agency
requires Communion because people must rely on others’ capabilities no less
than on their own capabilities to achieve the goals they cherish. Communion
requires Agency because bonds cannot be maintained unless people are com-
mitted as individuals to the pursuits of common values. Self-expression, self-
assertion, and self-protection are central to the self no less than belonging,
attachment, being recognized and accepted by others, and being sensitive
and responsive to their demands.
Both Agency and Communion stay at the core of the self and of individu-
als’ identity as embedded in a community. It would, therefore, be a mistake to

lose sight of the agentic components of being part of a community, as it would

be misleading to exaggerate the tensions and conflicts among individuals’
self-interest. Rather, one should refer to persons as agents who are pursu-
ing communal values through self-regulation and moderation and who are
achieving their own personal goals through concerted action and synergistic
efforts.
The strength of bonds among individuals and the binding of groups
contrast the selfish negative view of human nature and show that Agency is
largely at the service of Communion. As a consequence, the notion of humans
moved by mere self-interest is misleading when it conveys the view of indi-
viduals as separate beings competing with each other over material posses-
sions: there is no enterprise that can be undertaken without others, nor an
interest that is not shared with others, nor a self that is not embedded with
other selves.
In reality, people are equipped with agentic and communal dispositions
that complement each other. As we have seen in Chapter 2, empirical findings
have shown that basic traits, such as those encompassed by the Big Five, can
be traced to the two fundamental dimensions of Agency and Communion,
with extraversion and openness traceable to Agency, and agreeableness,
emotional stability and conscientiousness being traceable to Communion.
Intuitively, one can also trace basic needs and motives, like autonomy, com-
petence, achievement, and power, to Agency, while tracing relatedness and
affiliation to Communion. Likewise, in the domain of values, one may trace
self-enhancement and openness to change mostly to Agency, while tracing
self-transcendence and conservation values mostly to Communion. Looking
at the circular structure of values in accordance with Schwartz’s (1992) model,
self or personally focused values, like self-direction, stimulation, hedonism,
achievement, and power, can be traced to Agency, while socially focused val-
ues, like universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, and security, can
be traced to communion.
Yet one should avoid enforcing one or the other component over traits,
needs, and values, which in various degrees reflect their combinations. Thus
the duality between Agency and Communion should not be overemphasized,
as stated earlier. Rather, they should lead to focus on the distinctive features
of persons, no less than of cultures, whose expressions and combination have
significant implication for social orders and forms of government.
In the domain of social and political thought, one may find an echo of
Agency and Communion in the various ideals that predicate how people
should live together and how society should be organized and function.
Whereas prioritizing Agency leads to an emphasis on an individual’s freedom,

prioritizing Communion leads to an emphasis on social harmony. Thus,

movements that claim liberty and rights for the individual have opposed
movements that demand communal obligations and duties. However, as one
cannot be entirely separated from the other, their combination may account
for quite different political outcomes. Authoritarian regimes may take advan-
tage of both Agency and Communion, as the former provides the power
component needed to impose control, and the latter provides the obedience
and respect for authority and hierarchy that are required to maintain order.
Likewise, democratic regimes rest upon both Agency and Communion, as
their functioning requires both individual and collective action in the pursuit
of individuals’ self-actualization and social welfare.
Even traditional ideological divides, like left and right, can be traced to
various combinations of Agency and Communion through the mediation
of basic traits and basic values. As we will see in the next chapter, agentic/
extraverted voters and communal/conscientious voters are more inclined
to make right-leaning/conservative choices than agentic/open to experience
and agreeable voters, who instead are more inclined to make left-leaning/
liberal choices. Whereas extraversion can be the conservative/ right-
lean-
ing version of Agency, openness can be its liberal/left-leaning version, and
whereas conscientiousness can be the conservative/right-leaning version of
Communion, agreeableness can be its liberal/left-leaning version. As basic
traits turn into value priorities, Agency may find its foremost right-leaning
expression in power, and its major left-leaning expression in self-direction,
whereas Communion may find its major right-leaning expression in security
and its major left-leaning expression in universalism.
As we will see in Chapter 6, voters’ perceptions and assessments of polit-
ical leaders can also be traced to Agency and Communion since the basic
dimensions that mostly account for voters’ judgments are blends of Agency
and Communion, such as competence and leadership, on the one hand, and
loyalty and accountability, on the other.
MORALITY
Human beings are, by nature, social animals that cannot live and grow unless
they are part of a community that dictates and upholds the rights and respon-
sibilities of living together. Morality concerns what is good and bad, right and
wrong, fair and unfair, for the individual and for the society. We are aware
that different ideas about morality as a social and cultural construct hold in
different contexts and at different times. By morality, we refer to the instruc-
tions and obligations regarding how people should treat each other in order

to live well together under the assumption that, to paraphrase Dworkin (2011),
being good and living well are interdependent.
Indeed, we believe that modern democracy is largely based on this con-
cept of morality, in that it requires mutual obligations about the common
good, justice, and welfare so that conditions for a life worth living are pursued
and realized. Current political discourse about the realization of democracy
is about moral values like fairness, honesty, and rightness. Political leaders
promote their policies on the premises that they are morally grounded and
are aimed at the pursuit of the common good. Citizens expect politicians to
be morally accountable, and when they are disappointed with government, it
is mostly on moral grounds, with complaints typically involving issues such
as the deficit of honesty and the defective accountability of their representa-
tives, the diffusion of corruption among public officeholders, and the lack of
fairness in the administration of justice. On the other hand, the functioning
of democratic institutions rests largely on the moral psychology of citizens.
Returning to Bakan’s concept of Agency and Communion, morality con-
cerns all that promotes or jeopardizes the full expression of human beings
in both of these spheres. Whereas love and happiness represent assets for
individuals and communities alike, the threat of harm and pain endangers
individuals’ well-being no less than societies’ harmony.
Moral functioning implies thought and action imbued with feelings.
Thus it may often appear discontinuous as it moves back and forth between
intuition and reasoning, thoughts and wishes, fears and desires, obligations
and aspirations. In psychology, moral reasoning has been the focus of much
speculation and investigation about how people should relate to each other in
accordance to principles of fairness and care. Following the Kantian tradition,
Kohlberg (1981, 1984) was extremely influential in focusing on justice while
conveying the view that individuals are reasoning agents who have equal
worth and who must be treated as ends in themselves.
In subsequent work, Gilligan (1982) acknowledged the importance of feel-
ings and paired justice with care, while Turiel (2006) defined morality as the
domain of “prescriptive judgments of justice, rights and welfare pertaining to
how people ought to relate to each other” (p. 3). People should avoid harming
each other physically and psychologically, should be respected for their per-
son, should deserve equal opportunities to express and develop their poten-
tials, and thereby to enjoy life, should be treated fairly, and should be cared
for when in need.
The most important moral imperatives are to protect life and to avoid
harming others. Nature has equipped human beings with feelings of empa-
thy that make the interdependence of one’s own and others’ pleasure and

well-being salient. Moral development is a process in which individuals

move gradually from childhood’s reactions to anticipated reinforcements to
the appropriation of values through the exercise of reason. Thus moral devel-
opment proceeds from heteronomous to autonomous prescriptions, namely
from external reinforcements to internal commands, that dictate how people
should behave and relate to each other.
Over the course of development, special cognitive and affective structures
enable children to distinguish good from evil and to conform their reac-
tions to pursue the former and to avoid the latter. Gradually, children absorb
moral principles and values that dictate what is or is not desirable, while self-
regulatory structures allow thoughts and actions to be kept in accordance with
those principles. As children may anticipate the course and consequence of
their actions and regulate their behavior, their willpower makes them respon-
sible for their choices and their actions, while anticipatory self-approval and
self-blame align their conduct to their moral standards. As values of mutual
recognition and respect become part of one’s identity, the protection of oth-
ers’ needs and rights may become as important as the protection of one’s own
needs and rights, even at some cost to oneself (Blasi, 1995, 2004, 2005).
While the social environment is an important source of models and rein-
forcements, children are not passive vessels that limit themselves to internal-
ize and transmit the moral values of the significant others who take care of
them. Indeed, children play an important role in picking, construing, and cre-
ating the experiences from which they draw the values that by appropriation
become a constitutive part of their own identity and personality. Ultimately,
morality is a matter of how cognition and affect uphold motivations that turn
into moral goals and actions.
In recent years, emotions and feelings have gained major attention in
addition to reasoning (Haidt, 2008, 2012). It has become evident that people’s
actions are not always in accordance with the principles they declare and that
they are more often related to how people feel than to how they reason. It has
also become evident that much of people’s responses to moral violations is
often spontaneous and carries very little reasoning, so that events that may
carry harm, threats, insults, and impurity elicit immediate reactions of avoid-
ance that seem to be rather more reflexive than reflective. Indeed, reason-
ing seems to follow rather than precede moral judgment in most cases where
people are asked to account for their spontaneous reaction of repulsion or to
justify behavior from which they should refrain. Anger, fear, sadness, and
disgust often precede the moral assessment of an event that has threatened
individual’s safety or that of someone for whom they care. Likewise, uncom-
fortable feelings of embarrassment often precede rather than accompany

actions that may deviate from the values people cherish. Ultimately, it seems
that post hoc rationalization accounts for many of the judgments we make
about our and others’ moral violations.
In reality, morality concerns cognitions that carry large affective compo-
nents and operate through a mix of conscious and unconscious mechanisms.
As morality concerns duties and obligations about what is good and what is
evil, about what should be achieved and what should be avoided, and about
what deserves reward and what deserves punishment, it is remotely rooted
in the primary affect system whose major functions are to signal threats and
benefits and to command the experience of harm and pleasure.
From the beginning, people have been equipped to avoid harm and to seek
pleasure through spontaneous reactions of avoidance and approach. These
reactions stay at the core of basic emotions that represent the primary moti-
vational systems dealing with the physical and social environment. Among
basic emotions, anger, sadness, disgust, and fear are usually viewed as nega-
tive emotions because of the unpleasant feelings they carry and because of
the function they exert in alerting, preventing, and reacting to events that
carry or anticipate pain, harm, damage, and loss. Joy, pride, and love, instead,
are viewed as positive emotions, because they occur in response to experi-
ences that result in pleasure and enhanced well-being and which one would
seek rather than avoid.
Basic emotions are at the service of survival and are largely prewired in
our brain. Each rests upon the functioning of specific and interrelated biologi-
cal systems that dictate their somatic and behavioral expressions. Thus one
may say that they are largely innate. Yet the eliciting causes, the feelings and
the behaviors that distinguish any of these emotions, may vary significantly
across individuals and situations, depending on how the pleasure (in the case
of joy) or the harm and the loss (in the case of anger, sadness, fear, and dis-
gust) that have occurred, or have been anticipated, are appraised. Appraisal,
which is largely a matter of cognition that affects regulation, is a particular
feature of human functioning, where evolution has expanded the distance
from other species enormously and where culture has exerted a great influ-
ence on how emotions are experienced and expressed.
In sum, one may say that the machinery is largely biological, but its func-
tioning depends upon socialization and experience, as the neural connections
that become activated during reasoning largely rest on practice, learning, and
control. Basic emotions can be said to represent the motivational systems on
which other emotions, which we call moral emotions like pride, guilt, and
shame, are subsequently modeled. These emotions mostly reflect the influ-
ence of learning, culture, and one’s own unique individuality.

Approach and avoidance, which are quasi automatic reactions, distin-

guish primary emotions from moral emotions, which have self- approval
and self-blame at their core. Basic emotions put affect at the service of basic
fundamental needs, whereas moral emotions recruit affect at the service of
individuals’ and society’s ideals. Moral emotions may show somatic features
and feelings similar to those of basic emotions because the same biological
systems may be engaged in the various manifestations of both. Feelings of
disgust, or ones similar to those of disgust, may accompany a sense of shame
and guilt for the damage caused to other people. Yet, while basic emotions
rest largely on automatism and also occur in other species, moral emotions
are unique to the human species as well as being conditioned by the develop-
ment of the self-system. This system enables people to acknowledge what, to
them, represents a threat or a reward, to assign purpose to their actions, and
to take responsibility for the consequences of their own reactions.
Primary emotions serve as precursors that provide the prototypes of how
to react to harm and pleasure and which supply the affective charge of moral
emotions, because of continuity and contiguity along the approach-avoidance
polarity. Yet moral emotions are responsive to different causes and serve dif-
ferent functions. Whereas the causes of basic emotions are mostly perceived in
the outside world, moral emotions are self-reactions dictated by people’s own
imperatives. Moral emotions also attest to the extension and integration of
Agency and Communion in the domain of morality, as they are functional in
preserving an individual’s self-respect and appropriate relations with others.
People select and change the environment in accordance with the pur-
suits of their goals, but do so in accordance with their personal and shared
criteria of value. As personal standards dictate what is right and wrong and
the extent to which people should feel responsible for the outcomes of their
behavior, moral emotions help to align one’s own conduct with one’s own
values. Indeed, people can resist impulsive reactions through self-regulatory
processes, such as thoughtful operations, which extend people’s control over
their feelings and allow them to align their conduct to their thoughts and
ideals. This is particularly true in the domain of morality, where people can
choose among various options that are examined in light of their possible
cost and consequences. Among self- regulatory processes, emotional self-
reactiveness plays a special role that further attests to how affectivity may be
put at the service of reason.
Pride, shame, and guilt operate as warnings, and self- sanctions that
keep thought and action in line with moral standards. As stated by Bandura
(2001), people “do things that give them self-satisfaction […] and refrain from
behaving in ways that give rise to self-dissatisfaction, self-devaluation and

self-censure” (p. 8). By making self-respect conditional on matching personal

ideals, people draw a sense of pride by fulfilling their duties and realizing
their ideals. On the other hand, people draw a sense of shame and guilt from
behaving in ways that jeopardize their concept of self-worth. In this way, the
power of moral emotions becomes paramount in accounting for individuals’
moral agency to the extent that the values they cherish are central to their own
self-system and are experienced as core components of their own personal
identity (Blasi, 2004, 2005, 2013; Blasi & Glodis, 1995).
Reasoning not only is necessary to justify feelings of rejection or attrac-
tion, but also is a determining factor in eliciting those feelings in view of
behaviors that are considered morally reprehensible or desirable and thus
in assigning moral meaning to those feelings. Placing the self at the core of
morality and acknowledging the decisive role of forethought, intention, and
willpower are crucial to account for both the inhibitive and proactive aspects
of morality. Whereas anticipated loss and gains in self-worth dictate when to
refrain from deleterious purposes and when to engage in meritorious endeav-
ors, willpower allows people to accord their conduct to the pursuit of the
values they cherish and to make them responsible for the outcomes of their
actions. The close links between morality and rationality are further corrobo-
rated as moral development goes hand in hand with cognitive development
and emotion regulation. As morality becomes closely related to autonomy
and identity, the focus moves from moral reasoning and moral emotions to
moral agency and to its promotion through education, from inhibition to self-
control and mastery of oneself in accordance with one’s own values, ending
with the individual as the owner of his or her own actions.
Thus, acknowledging the importance of emotions in moral reasoning
cannot lead to the role of reason being ruled out and ultimately to people’s
responsibility for the consequences of their actions being downplayed. Rather,
it leads us to question the values to which people assign priority in guiding
their life, the mechanism that grants the adoption and transmission of moral
instructions, and the criteria that sanction the moral consequences of people’s
actions. From this we can formulate three major sets of questions:
• Which values and moral principles are good and right for individuals
and for the society?
• How do individuals appropriate these values and principles?
• Which criteria are used to assess the extent to which people should be
held responsible for the good or evil that results from their actions?
Intuitively, we can say that moral values and principles should be conducive
to increasing the happiness of individuals and the harmony of society. These

aims dictate how people should treat each other. Yet one cannot discount sig-
nificant differences among communities and cultures, and among individu-
als within the same community and culture.
People discover and appropriate values through socialization, experience,
and imagination. Thus moral development varies across conditions of rear-
ing and across individuals under the same conditions due to significant indi-
vidual differences in temperament, sensitivity to others’ needs, and cognitive
abilities.
One may distinguish the content and the praxis of morality. The former
concerns the values, principles, and thought (i.e., the mental representations
of moral duties and ideals); the latter concerns the elements that make actions
and their outcomes morally relevant. Weiner (2006) has pointed to intention-
ality, ability, effort, and fate as major criteria for individuals assuming and
attributing responsibility for the consequences of individuals’ actions. Moral
assessment relies primarily on intentionality and effort, under the assump-
tion that the higher degree of control people exert over their behavior, the
more they should be held responsible for the moral consequences of their
actions.
Importantly, intentionality and effort lead to rewards and self-satisfaction
in the case of morally desirable outcomes, but they aggravate the severity of
punishment and blame, as well as intensifying feelings of guilt and shame
when related to immoral endeavors. Lack of intentionality mitigates punish-
ment, blame, shame, and guilt in the case of moral offenses due to defective
ability. Lack of intentionality in presence of ability, instead, is not excusable
when distracting from the pursuit of one’s own obligations. Likewise, lack
of effort in pursuing one’s own obligations and in resisting immoral behav-
iors, despite ability, aggravates blame, shame, and guilt. The inclusion of fate
in a discussion of individual responsibility may sound like an oxymoron in
Western societies, but is much less so in other societies where it is not uncom-
mon to consult diviners to negotiate one’s future.
These criteria are far from objective. Some people, in fact, are more con-
vincing than others in excusing their misbehavior and in taking merit for
their achievements; some may count on others’ indulgence and encourage-
ment more than others; some may be blamed for bad character and lack of
effort, whereas others may be absolved for lack of fortune. Depending on
the loci of causality, different attributions lead to the same violation being
condoned, excused, or punished, or to the same accomplishment being either
rewarded or devalued. Even fate may become a source of moral merit or dis-
credit in societies and among people who believe that one can bargain with
destiny. Some people are more vigilant than others in taking responsibility

for their misbehavior, whereas others are more inclined to self-indulgence

and self-deception. Likewise, some people are more inclined than others to
exaggerate their merits.
Acknowledging the importance of cultural variations and individual dif-
ferences further attests to the role of reflection and reasoning in moral func-
tioning. If morality were primarily a matter of hardwired intuitions, the great
diversity and variability of means that people utilize to navigate conflicting
values and to handle the many moral dilemmas of everyday life could not be
accounted for. Also, the reasons behind the bravery of individuals who do not
hesitate to sacrifice their life to follow their moral obligations might not be
fully appreciated, or the use of reason to habituate common people to behave
inhumanely without any feeling of disgust or empathy might be misjudged.
Indeed, both moral courage and moral disengagement attest to the power of
thought to control affect, namely to the use one may make of reason in the
regulation of emotions. Certainly reasoning may be used either to uphold
moral motivations or to circumvent moral emotions in order to justify the
pursuit of immoral goals. Thus, it is crucial to better understand what allows
human beings to operate as moral agents who are able to choose, strive for,
and behave in accordance with principles of goodness, integrity, honesty, and
justice.
Moral Agency
Moral agency corresponds to the human capacity to feel, decide, and behave
on moral grounds and thereby to refrain from evil and to engage in good.
This requires individuals who understand, value, and pursue moral goals,
who know how to behave to achieve these goals, and who feel fully respon-
sible for the consequences of their own actions, both when achieving goals
that are morally valuable and when behaving in ways that do not fit with
accepted moral standards.
As moral agents, people commit themselves to treating one another
justly and in accordance to principles of fairness, honesty, and integrity.
By addressing this topic, we are particularly indebted to the reasoning of
Albert Bandura (2001, 2008a, 2008b) and Augusto Blasi (1995, 2004, 2005,
2013) so that, although we have already referred to the work of these
authors, in this and the following paragraphs we will reiterate and further
clarify the relevance of their arguments for the thesis we are proposing in
this volume.
Both these scholars have, in fact, thought extensively about moral agency,
positioning the person who behaves morally (i.e., the individual with a sense
of being the source of his or her own actions and who feels fully responsible

for the consequences) at the center of their inquiry on morality. However, the
reasoning of Bandura and Blasi is derived from quite different backgrounds,
so their contributions can be viewed as distant from, and even in contrast to,
one another. Nevertheless, we believe that their argumentations are particu-
larly illuminating when viewed as complementary rather than as divisive.
Whereas Blasi’s contribution aligns with a tradition of research that has
focused on the most intimate, unique, and subjective components of moral
agency, that of Bandura has focused primarily on the structures, process, and
experiences, mostly social, that enable people to extend control over them-
selves and their environment in the pursuit of moral goals. Both contributions
position the self at the core of personality functioning and view its properties
as setting the conditions for human beings to behave morally.
Moral agency, in fact, rests upon a sense of personal agency that starts
in earlier stages of development, with the processes of self-recognition and
self-awareness leading to a stable sense of self as a whole and unique entity.
As a stable sense of self sets the conditions for owning one’s own actions,
self-
reflection, moral judgment, intentionality, and self- regulation set the
conditions for making moral choices and for conforming one’s own behavior
to them.
Self-reflection and moral judgment imply the understanding and appro-
priation of moral principles. People operate as moral agents to the extent that
they acknowledge and value moral principles as core components of the self.
In fact, the more moral values represent a core component of an individu-
al’s personal identity, the more her or his self-respect and sense of personal
realization depend upon how she or he operates as an effective moral agent.
Intentionality implies forethought and value attribution. People choose and
commit themselves to the pursuit of moral ends that they perceive as being of
value and within reach.
Both Blasi and Bandura distance themselves from ideas such as those of
Jonathan Haidt, who emphasizes the unconscious determinants and intu-
itionist components of moral judgment and behavior. Indeed, both Blasi and
Bandura keep self-awareness and intentionality at the core of moral reason-
ing, while forethought and self-regulation are taken as decisive in matching
behavior to moral values.
The distinctive contributions of Blasi and Bandura that may ultimately
complement each other are derived from the different foci of their analyses.
Blasi focused on the psychological states and processes that accompany feel-
ing and thinking morally. Thus, his major endeavor has been to elucidate the
subjective and experiential components of moral agency: namely, the sense
of “mineness” that accompanies moral desires and actions. Bandura, on the

other hand, addressed the social cognitive determinants of behaving mor-

ally and focused on the self-regulatory mechanism that accounts for both the
inhibitive and proactive aspects of moral agency: namely, the power to pursue
moral aims and to refrain from behaving inhumanely. Thus, understanding
how moral reasoning turns into moral action has been a major contribution
of Bandura.
According to Blasi, people are moral agents to the extent that they per-
ceive themselves as the source and owner of their conduct, and that they feel
responsible for the positive and negative consequences of their actions on oth-
ers. According to Bandura, people are moral agents to the extent that they
match their actions to their personal standards of right and wrong. According
to Blasi, the appropriation of moral values and willpower qualify and guide
moral action, while, according to Bandura, the internalization of moral val-
ues and self-reactiveness upholds the desire to behave morally and to refrain
from behaving immorally.
Major differences between Blasi and Bandura concern the sources and
expressions of morality, and thereby its development. Blasi views morality
as a genuine orientation to the moral good for its own sake. The notion of
appropriation implies an autonomous discovery and endorsement of values.
Bandura, instead, views morality as culturally situated, acknowledging that
societies and subgroups vary in the types of activities and social practices
they consider to be central to morality. Although people are not simply ves-
sels of values transmitted from one generation to another; the social context in
which people develop is decisive in defining their moral horizon.
Despite these differences, Blasi and Bandura converge in viewing human
beings as agents capable of choosing and behaving in accordance with estab-
lished criteria of goodness, fairness, and honesty that serve the well-being of
individuals and the harmony of societies. Their intentional positing of will-
power and responsibility at the core of moral reasoning and behavior is par-
ticularly relevant today in that it sets limits for the ethical relativism that can
be derived from current views of morality as a mere social construction and
from views of morality as largely governed by genetic mechanisms or guided
by unconscious and automatic brain mechanisms. Their views of morality
acknowledge the significant variations in moral obligations one may notice
across societies and cultures. This, however, does not preclude them from
viewing the pursuit of good as within the reach of human development.
To this aim, Blasi’s contributions on moral character and virtues deserve
special considerations to promote and cultivate the components of personality
that distinguish and sustain moral purposes and behavior, such as will and
integrity. Likewise, Bandura’s contribution on moral disengagement warrants

special attention in that it warns against the subtle maneuvers people and
societies can use to circumvent moral obligations. In making progress along
these pathways, psychological inquiry can help us better understand, and
thus address, the malaise of democracy associated with the defective moral-
ity of citizen and politicians.
Public Morality
It is seeing people as reasoning agents that leads us to view democracy as
a moral enterprise, and in this way to lament defective morality as being
among the major causes of democracy’s malaise. Democracy’s ideals, in fact,
rest upon morality to the extent that the protection and empowerment of indi-
viduals and communities represent values that can be pursued through the
exercise of reason.
As citizen choices should be guided by moral principles that lead to the
pursuit of the common good, politicians’ merits should be assessed by their
efficacy and accountability in promoting people’s welfare. To this end, it is
critical that use is made of reason to keep emotions under control and to
mobilize feelings at support of the right causes and toward good ends. Moral
appeals imbue politics with affect when promises and warnings activate feel-
ings of fear, anger, sadness, disgust, joy, shame, pride, and guilt.
The ways in which events are construed and emotions are used to gain
consensus and to engage citizens are crucial to the functioning of democ-
racy. Citizens may be led to experience different emotions depending on how
events are framed in terms of responsibility and consequences, and to dif-
ferent political choices depending on how they attribute causality. The same
events may elicit anger, fear, or sadness to different degrees, depending on
the feelings that are evoked and the metaphors that are used to reactivate
experiences of threat, harm, pain, or loss.
The devastations of war can lead to different feelings and judgments
when framed under the metaphors of ethnic cleansing, collateral casualties,
or tributes to freedom. Likewise, the same life conditions may elicit compas-
sion, pity, sympathy, or blame and rejection, depending on the criteria used to
assess causality and responsibility. Poverty elicits anger and neglect if attrib-
uted to negligence and laziness, but it elicits sympathy and help if attributed
to misfortune and hardship (Weiner, Osborne, & Rudolph, 2011).
Successful leaders are particularly good at managing citizens’ emotions
in support of their political pursuits, both when they issue warnings against
threat and harm, and when prizing loyalty, merit, and compassion. The more
citizens are morally vigilant, the more politicians are morally accountable.

The claim for the moral vigilance of citizens and for the moral accountability
of politicians, however, requires a diffuse sense of integrity and concern for
the common good, at all levels of society. It is fundamentally a matter of civic
virtues and public morality.
It is unlikely that democracy can continue to develop and flourish unless
its citizens are ready to endorse the obligations that respect for individuals’
human dignity and the pursuit of public good entail. In light of this, a number
of scholars have warned that the lack of widespread sense of civic responsibil-
ity could be a major obstacle to the development of modern democratic culture
(Almond & Verba, 1963; Putnam, 1993). Others have noted the pervasiveness
of civic code violations by people in all walks of life, even among advanced
democratic polities (Gabor, 1994). Trustworthiness, civic-mindedness, legality,
and related concepts have become popular in sociological and political dis-
course as the basic ingredients of liberal democracy and progress of nations.
However, the psychological underpinnings of these concepts have been often
disregarded, despite the common belief that the morality of citizens remains
at their core and ultimately makes democracy work.
Here, the contributions of Blasi and Bandura also represent notable excep-
tions that in some way complement each other. Blasi (2005, 2009, 2013) has
written extensively on moral character, pointing to the proactive components
of morality, namely the virtues that provide the meanings and the motiva-
tional underpinnings of moral behavioral tendencies. Among the former, one
finds empathy, compassion, kindness, respectfulness, thoughtfulness, gener-
osity, loyalty, trustfulness, fairness, justice, courage, and humility. Among the
latter, one finds willpower, determination, perseverance, self-discipline, self-
control, self-consistency, integrity, responsibility, accountability, autonomy,
sincerity, transparency, and honesty to oneself. Whereas the former derive
their stability from the strength of the latter, findings show that both can be
properly nurtured. Some people are genuinely predisposed to endorse moral
values; others internalize the values of the communities to which they belong,
while others appropriate values gradually, primarily through autonomous
reflection and discovery.
The pathways to moral reasoning and action vary across people in relation
to the degree of their moral commitment. Being moral requires judgmental
abilities, willpower, and self-efficacy, but it does not necessarily depend upon
extraordinary talents. As reported by scholars who have studied the moral
attitudes of individuals demonstrating moral character, such as the rescuers
of Jews in Nazi Europe (Monroe, 1994; Oliner & Oliner, 1988), ordinary people
often attest to a strenuous commitment to moral ideals. It could be that a sus-
tained commitment to moral ideals is derived from different sources and that

it is linked to a particular kind of personality and social experiences. What

is decisive, however, is the centrality of moral issues in people’s lives, namely
the extent to which morality is a constituent of an individual’s self. As stated
earlier, the more that being good and caring for others’ well-being remain
at the core of individuals’ personal identity and self-respect, the greater the
degree to which moral virtues organize and guide people’s lives.
As much of public life requires interactions that rest upon citizen’s capacity
to collaborate with others, to care for others, and to be recognized and prized
by others, democracy should capitalize on the development and exercise of
ordinary virtues, like kindness, honesty, and fairness, to enable people to feel
good and to treat each other well. The exercise of public morality requires
skills with which to discern and choose among values that may run into con-
flict with each other and, to this end, the capacity to resist self-serving cogni-
tive distortions. It also requires a strong sense of one’s own citizenship and
civic obligations, built on a careful reflection about the importance of moral
values in one’s own life, a clear understanding of the common good and of its
primacy relative to particular interest, and a vigilant concern against exces-
sive self-indulgence and self-deception.
Following lines of reasoning leading to similar conclusions, Bandura has
distinguished two aspects of the exercise of moral agency: inhibitive and
proactive. The inhibitive form is demonstrated by the power to refrain from
behaving in a malevolent way, mainly through emotional self-reactiveness
and anticipatory self-sanctions. As stated earlier, moral emotions, such as
shame and guilt, restrain people from misbehaving and help them conform
their actions to their values and standards. The proactive form is manifested
in the power to behave humanely when people invest their self-worth in prin-
ciples and values for whose affirmation they do not hesitate to sacrifice their
self-interest.
The unique contribution of Bandura (1986, 1991, 2001, 2008a, 2008b,
2016) stems from his special focus on the links between moral thought and
moral action. In particular, he addresses the psychosocial cognitive mecha-
nism that allows people and societies to dismiss their misbehaviors and to
avoid taking responsibility for any detrimental consequences, despite their
moral reasoning, the values they cherish, and the principles they claim to
hold. In reality, being able to acknowledge one’s own moral obligations and
to distinguish what is right from what is wrong is not sufficient for behaving
morally, unless associated with the vigilance, the willpower, and, ultimately,
the capacity to behave accordingly.
Mechanisms of moral disengagement largely account for the “banality
of evil” when ordinary people behave inhumanely under a veil of moral

ignorance and social indulgence with regard to their actions (Arendt, 1963;
Zimbardo, 2007). Moral disengagement, in fact, allows people to divorce
moral thought from action, to give free rein to detrimental behaviors with-
out having any moral concern, and even to behave inhumanely without
incurring any form of self-blame or anticipated punishment. This occurs
when misconduct is seen as somewhat compatible with the moral principles
they claim to hold, even when these are blatantly violated by their conduct,
when these violations do not diminish their confidence in the system of
moral rules they are breaking, and when the acknowledgment of damage
and injury to other human beings would imply an injury to their own self-
respect. This may happen because the surveillance that is usually exerted
by anticipatory punishment and by moral emotions is deactivated through
cognitive distortions that lead people to misinterpret their reprehensible
conduct and to feel relieved of any moral responsibility for the detrimental
consequences that may result.
Originally, Bandura addressed moral disengagement in the context of his
research on aggression, pointing to the self-exonerative maneuvers that allow
people to uphold aggression and violence and to circumvent self-reactiveness
in support of self-interest. He identified four points at which self-sanctions
can be deactivated, making allowances for detrimental conduct: (a) the behav-
ior itself, (b) the locus of responsibility, (c) the harmful consequences, and
(d) the victim. He then pointed to eight mechanisms—moral justification,
euphemistic labeling, advantageous comparison, displacement of responsi-
bility, diffusion of responsibility, distortion of consequences, attribution of
blame, and dehumanization—which operate at the preceding four points.
Moral justification, euphemistic labeling, and palliative/ advantageous
comparison operate on the construal of reprehensible behaviors. Through
moral justification, detrimental conduct is made personally and socially
acceptable by portraying it in the service of valued social or moral purposes.
The negative valence of injurious activities can be diluted or even erased by
the use of words that relieve those who engage in them from any sense of
personal responsibility. Even massacres can be glossed over by using euphe-
misms like “cleansing” to refer to genocide. Through advantageous com-
parison, serious abuses can be treated as though they were of minor or little
severity when contrasted with more extreme violations of human dignity and
integrity.
Displacement and diffusion of responsibility operate by distancing agents
from reprehensibility and the detrimental effects of their own conduct, as
they allow people to view their actions as being caused by external pressures
rather than omissions or intentions for which they are directly responsible

(see also Darley, 1992, for a discussion of these issues). Ignoring, minimiz-
ing, or distorting the harm caused by one’s own conduct allows people to
circumvent moral emotions such as guilt and shame, and thus to stay in har-
mony with their own conscience. Blaming the victim and degrading his or
her humanity further allows one to avoid distress arising from sympathy
or empathy directed at the target of harm and thus to place some distance
between oneself and one’s immoral behavior while preserving the illusion of
being a good person.
A large body of research has documented the disinhibiting power of
moral disengagement in fostering aggressive behavior and its strong asso-
ciations with a variety of antisocial behaviors and undesirable personality
traits (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996; Bandura, Caprara,
Barbaranelli, Pastorelli, & Regalia, 2001; Caprara, Tisak, Alessandri, Fontaine,
Fida, & Paciello, 2014). However, it would be a mistake to view moral disen-
gagement simply as a self-serving device or as a cognitive distortion associ-
ated in various degrees with personality disorders and social deviancy. Bad
apple theories would suggest that moral disengagement occurs only or primar-
ily among people who are especially inclined to self-deception or callous-
ness, because of either temperament or education. In reality, this is true only
to a limited extent. Although some people (such as those who value power,
achievement, and hedonism in the pursuit of self-interest) are inclined to
resort to moral disengagement more than others, even common and decent
people may turn to moral disengagement under conditions that make it avail-
able, convenient, and seemingly inevitable.
Earlier studies of Zimbardo at Stanford and the tragic abuses in Abu
Ghraib prison in Irak attest to the frailty of human beings no less than to the
seduction and contagion of evil (Zimbardo, 2007). It would also be unwar-
ranted to confine moral disengagement within the realm of hostile and
detrimental behaviors. In reality, the mechanism of moral disengagement
operates pervasively throughout society and across all walks of life, constitut-
ing a major source of defective public morality (Bandura, 2016). Most people
would accept that taxes have to be paid, that workers must be treated fairly,
that each citizen is responsible for keeping cities clean and safe, that hold-
ing public office requires a special commitment to the common good, and
so on. Surprisingly, many daily transactions attest to persistent violations of
moral standards that are not accompanied by feelings of personal distress.
How many people would relinquish using charm or praise to obtain a favor
or to avoid a sanction? How many people would be able to resist a favor? How
many decent people would resist social pressures to commit the wrongdoing
that “everybody does” or would admit their own responsibility for damage

done to others in order to reach their own goals, to limit their own liabilities,
or simply to conform to organizational roles.
A division between thought and action seems to take place when consid-
erate people break the rules or get involved in “dirty business,” especially
when their interests are at stake, through neutralization of self-evaluative
reactions that habitually refrain from transgression. In all probability, resis-
tance to moral disengagement depends on the strength of moral values that
people preach and on the general consensus that protects these values. The
same self-exonerative maneuvers that have been found to uphold violence
were observed by Bandura, Caprara, and Zsolnai (2000) to be at work in
famous cases of corporate transgression. The same mechanisms have also
been examined in the context of civic life using a scale designed to address
moral civic disengagement (Caprara, Fida, Vecchione, Tramontano, &
Barbaranelli, 2009). Findings suggest that people who agree more with state-
ments such as those listed in Table 3.1 (with each item associated with one
of the eight mechanisms described earlier) tend to be less committed to civic
duties, such as voting and contributing actively to the functioning of com-
munities, tend to assign less importance to obeying laws and social regu-
lations, tend to be less prone to engage in endeavors aimed to protect the
natural environment, and tend to be less concerned with promoting welfare
and solidarity among people when compared to people who disagree with
the same statements.
TAB L E 3 . 1 . ASSERTIONS FROM THE SCALE OF MORAL CIVIC

DISENGAGEMENT
Moral justification A manager is not guilty if he inflates balance sheet items in order
to avoid his company going bankrupt.
Advantageous Given the widespread corruption in society, one cannot disapprove
comparison of those who pay for favors.
Euphemistic labeling Pornography is basically cheap eroticism.
Diffusion of There is no sense for the individual to worry about environmental
responsibility deterioration since the harmful effects are produced at the
collective level.
Displacement of When there are no efficient refuse disposal services, there is no
responsibility sense reproaching citizens who leave trash on the street.
Distortion of Thefts in large department stores are irrelevant compared to the
consequences stores’ earnings.
Attribution of blame Victims are generally unable to stay out of trouble.
Dehumanization In order to force some people to work, they have to be treated like
beasts of burden.

At the same time, it would be a mistake to address moral disengagement

only as an individual feature that is independent from the social context in
which it occurs. In reality, moral disengagement is a social device that may
function to the extent that it serves social interests and there is consensus
with respect to its utility. In many cases of rule violations and misconduct
in daily transactions, people are not bothered by their conscience, do not
fear any sanction, and do not feel obliged to make reparations. This occurs
because others do the same under a shared veil of ignorance or a common
system of justifications that allows people to maintain their confidence in the
system of rules they are breaking.
Bandura (2016) has documented the use of moral disengagement by
the tobacco industry, the weapons industry, the pharmaceutical industries,
the oil industry, the financial markets, and the media to justify morally unten-
able decisions, to cover the detrimental consequences of business and policies,
to discount the responsibilities of managers and politicians, and to minimize
the appearance of losses and the damages related to victims. More frequently,
the health of citizens, the care of the environment, and the future of following
generations are put at risk by ways of presenting, framing, and interpreting
the events that impose severe tolls on all of humanity.
A major problem for contemporary democracy is how to contrast moral
disengagement on a large scale that spans from the “dirty business” of brib-
ery to corporate transgressions with and without governmental complicity. It
is not a problem caused by “bad apples.” It is fundamentally a matter of public
morality. Morality in politics, as in other domains, such as education, econ-
omy, work, and health, has often been concerned mostly with the prohibition,
limitation, and prevention of harm and evil, rather than with the promotion
of happiness and welfare. In other words, morality typically has been more
concerned with getting people to refrain from evil, rather than getting them
to engage in the pursuit of good behavior.
Thus, educators and legislators have been more concerned with the man-
agement of emotions associated with harm and pain than with the promotion
of emotions associated with well-being and pleasure. This has been consistent
with the negative view of human nature that has often prevailed in Western
literature, and with the primacy of preserving and defending life under con-
ditions that were miserable. Indeed, it is not surprising that negative emotions
outnumber positive ones, have stronger effects, and are more represented in
the language (see Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001, for a
review). Whereas our species has been equipped to voice anger, fear, disgust,
and sadness in the protection of life, social institutions have cultivated shame

and guilt to keep order in society. On the other hand, the hardship of current
times has left little space for moral imagination in the sphere of virtues and
happiness.
The power of evil has been enhanced by technology in making available
arms capable of mass destruction, and societies have shown sophisticated
forms of moral degradation by supplying justifications, rationalizations, and
absolution to any kind of atrocity. Nevertheless, we believe that real progress
has been made toward the attainment of better conditions of life for many, but
not yet for all people, as would be desirable. The growth of population, the
reduction of famine and poverty, the extension of life and the survival of the
planet despite the destructive power of weapons and the manifold conflicts
across the globe attest to the betterment of the human condition.
We believe that most people would agree that most progress and growth
are due to the extension of reason through education and science. They would
also probably agree that most of the progress would have been impossible
unless it had been accompanied and sustained by significant progress in the
sphere of private and public morality. We believe that the power of positive
events, of the feelings they carry, and of the view of life they nurture, has
been underestimated. In reality, as stated earlier, positivity is not incompat-
ible with sensitivity to threat, loss, and painful events. Both exert important
functions for the evolution and the lives of individuals as they complement
each other. While sensitivity to threats and losses keeps people vigilant for
adverse stimuli and attentive in valuing and protecting assets, positivity
provides the sense of accomplishment, self-confidence, and optimism that is
needed to view life as worth living.
Positivity and positive emotions represent extraordinary resources upon
which societies should capitalize to foster collaboration and a sense of fair-
ness, to empower individuals and communities, and to enhance citizens’ hap-
piness. This does not imply any indulgence in illusory optimism. Rather, it
calls for major efforts to understand, value, and nurture the aspects of an
individual’s mind that operate in the service of his or her humanity.
Plenty of evidence attests to the contribution of a positive stance toward
life and of positive affect to health, generosity, cooperation, trust, productivity,
and creativity (Fredrickson, 2009). Findings attest to the importance of being
confident in oneself and in the future to uphold prosocial behaviors and civic
engagement and to contrast social estrangement and moral disengagement.
Ultimately, public morality, too, can capitalize on positivity to the extent that
concern and care for one’s life may ultimately predispose individuals to treat
others well and to lay the groundwork for continuing to treat each other well.

WORLDVIEWS AND MORAL BELIEFS

How beliefs about human nature, agency, and communion, as well as moral
reasoning and emotions, relate to each other and exert their influence on poli-
tics cannot be fully understood unless one takes into account the systems of
assumptions, values, and practices in which they acquire meaning. This leads
us to consider the variety and complexity of cultural systems and the distinc-
tive characteristics of the worldviews they may express. It has been usual to
trace the origins of Western civilization to the great thinkers of classical antiq-
uity, starting in the fifth century bc, unfolding through the Roman and Holy
Roman Empires, and extending through the Renaissance and the periods of
the British and French Enlightenment to the threshold of modernity. Much of
modern political thought rests on this tradition, and most of our democratic
institutions are on a trajectory that still claims to be fulfilling the legacy of
Athenian democracy.
Today we know that this trajectory was neither linear nor continuous,
just as we know that views about politics and democracy in antiquity can-
not be compared to those we find today. Moreover, we know of the parallel
development of other civilizations, reaching from North Africa to Southeast
Asia, both as ancient and sophisticated as those of the West. Other civiliza-
tions took other pathways toward modernity. While Western civilization has
been the target of much investigation, unfortunately we know much less of
the Islamic world, of India, of China and East Asia, despite their prominent
roles in today’s world politics and economics. Therefore, it follows that the
worldviews to which we typically refer tell only part of the story regarding
how people may deal with humans’ fundamental quests for Agency and
Communion and how these quests are mirrored in their views of personality,
self, morality, and democracy.
Though both the science of personality and the idea of democracy have
mainly developed in the Western world, at least so far, one cannot ignore
the fact that alternative views about personal growth and good governance
have been developed elsewhere. Nor can one avoid thinking that such core
concepts of Western legacy, like liberty, equality, justice, and democracy, may
have different meanings in China and India, or in much of the Islamic world,
as they may rest upon different assumptions about human beings and the
ideal society. Yet we do not know enough to attempt any comparison.
The Western view of the person that has been conveyed and that is at
the core of our reasoning is one of “a bounded, unique, more or less inte-
grated motivational and cognitive universe—a dynamic center of awareness,
emotion, judgment and action organized into a distinctive whole and set

contrastively against other such wholes and against a social and a natural
background” (Geertz, 1973, 1975). Despite many variations of this view, a kind
of tension between passion and reason, nature and culture, individual and
society has been viewed as a characteristic feature of Western thought. The
Western notion of person has the self and its unique attributes at its core, and
its full realization entails autonomous growth in communion with others. To
grant each human being the full respect of her or his dignity and the rights to
be free and to be treated fairly is the ultimate aim of politics, and defines what
is considered to be good governance. To enable individuals to feel responsible
for their actions and the consequences of their actions is what makes the func-
tioning of a society depend ultimately on the moral capacities of its citizens.
The concept of “worldview” has been used across disciplines to address
the stance people take when confronting fundamental questions about
human nature and the afterlife, the relations of human beings with the physi-
cal environment and other species, moral beliefs and obligations, the social
order of society, and the control that individuals may exert over their lives.
Thus worldviews have been encompassing shared assumptions and beliefs
about right and wrong and good and evil, as well as those desires and fears
that people hold and use as an interpretive lens of their existence. They have
been referring not only to contents and semantics, but also to feelings and
cognitions accounting for how people perceive, categorize, reason, and com-
municate with each other about themselves, others, and the world (Jaspers,
1919; Koltko-Rivera, 2004; Naugle, 2002).
Sylvan Tomkins (1963, 1995), in particular, emphasized the special role
that worldviews play in accounting for political orientations. He understood
worldviews as “ideo-affective postures,” that is, sets of ideas through which
people select and process information from the environment, react emotion-
ally, relate to each other, and internalize their sociocultural surroundings. He
distinguished Humanism and Normativism as opposite poles of a unique
continuum, with the former associated with a positive and glorifying view of
human beings as passionate and worthy of love, and with the latter associated
with a more severe view of human fragilities and limitations that can be com-
pensated for only through discipline, emotion regulation, and conformity
to external norms. Ultimately he came to associate Humanism with liberal
(or leftist) ideology and Normativism with conservative (or rightist) ideology.
Subsequent studies identified two dimensions that were negatively
related to each other and that were associated, respectively, with benevolent
and ordered worldviews. The dimension associated with benevolent world-
views was linked largely to moral beliefs about fairness, harm avoidance,
preference for equality, self-transcendence values, and left-wing ideological

self-placement, whereas the dimension associated with ordered worldviews

was linked mostly to moral concerns about authority, economic system justi-
fication, resistance to change, self-enhancement values, and right-wing ideo-
logical self-placement (Nilsson & Jost, 2016).
Yet, it remains problematic to trace the notion of worldview to a common
core and to a common set of features that may be assessed and connected
across individuals and situations, as can happen with traits and values. While
words carry different meanings in different contexts, different assumptions
lead to framing events in different ways, to different causal explanations, to
different expectations, and to different evaluations.
The knowledge we have accumulated about how nature and nurture co-
act since conception in shaping individuals’ personalities leaves little room
for the pursuit of taxonomies that are able to make sense of all possible com-
binations of thoughts and feelings that contribute to assigning meaning to
peoples’ experiences and to predispose them to actions across domains of
functioning and across cultures. Rather, it seems more convenient to focus on
the function that worldviews exert for individualism, serving as a compass
with which to navigate through life, and thus to assist in coping with the
fundamental questions and problems of human existence.
In accordance with this reasoning, we believe that the notion of world-
view as an ideo-a ffective stance toward life, the self, and the world retains
its validity, at a very abstract or very personal level. At an abstract level,
it may serve to convey the idea of a conceptual frame for cognitions that
become connected to feelings and thereby serve as a lens through which
people view the world. At a personal level, it may prove useful to capture
the unique configuration of beliefs, priorities, and aims that distinguish a
person from all others.
Yet, other constructs are needed to make sense of how worldviews oper-
ate in various domains of life and generalize across individuals and social
groups. In this regard, embodied moral cognitions, intuitions, and convic-
tions have been given a special role, respectively by George Lakoff (1996,
2008), Jonathan Haidt (2008, 2012), and Linda Skitka and colleagues (Skitka &
Morgan, 2014), in explaining citizen’s political preferences and engagement.
Embodied Moral Cognitions

Lakoff takes the traditional Western family as the basic unit in which chil-
dren are prepared for their membership in society. He identifies two mod-
els of morality that are associated with different sets of moral concerns and
reactions that influence people’s worldviews throughout their lives: the strict
father morality and the nurturing parent morality.

The strict father morality rests on the assumption that life is difficult,
that the world is a dangerous place divided into good and evil, and that to
remain good in front of the evil, one must be morally strong. Thus, people
have to strengthen their moral character to achieve self-reliance through dis-
cipline, self-restraint, and self-denial. Obedience to authority and defense of
the established order are conditional to the pursuit of self-interest and the
common good. All this gets translated into preferences for political policies
that do not interfere with the pursuit of self-interest by self-reliant responsible
actors, that promote punishment as a means of upholding authority, and that
protect people from external evils.
The nurturing parent morality, instead, rests on the assumption that chil-
dren develop best through being loved and loving. People’s self-reliance
and responsibility toward others is derived from having been cared for and
respected, from the realization of their potential, and from the fulfillment of
their needs and aspirations. Moral character and authority rest upon empa-
thy, nurturance, compassion, and fairness. All this gets translated into pref-
erences for political policies that promote fair distribution of wealth, pursue
universal welfare, help those who cannot help themselves, protect the envi-
ronment, limit the harshness of punishment, oppose the death penalty, care
about the rights of minorities, and welcome diversity.
The assumptions that form the basis of Lakoff’s arguments are that the
mind is inherently embodied, that reasoning is dependent upon chemi-
cal reactions and neural connections that take place within the brain, and
that most thought is unconscious. Most people’s reasoning and preferences,
including political choices, are based on various kinds of prototypes, framing,
and mostly metaphors that rest upon neural connections that are activated
and operate largely unconsciously. Metaphors are pervasive in everyday lan-
guage and thought and are grounded in unconscious cognitive processes
that connect words, mental representations, and feelings to neural circuits.
Metaphors are embodied forms of knowledge that allow people to make
sense of most disparate experiences while maintaining a stable and coherent
view of the world.
The views people have of life, nature, and society reflect consistent reac-
tions and neural connections that have consolidated in the brain over the
course of evolution and development. Ideals, values, and policies make sense
within worldviews where the same words may acquire different meanings,
and where the same events may lead to different attributions, elicit different
feelings, and prompt different reactions. All this takes place largely uncon-
sciously through reflexive rather than reflective chains of thought that rely
upon brain connections and semantic associations. The strict father and the

nurturing parent are metaphors that refer to the different neural connections
and the different meanings, feelings, and moralities that provide the basis for
the political views of conservative and liberals.
Thus, the lenses through which liberals and conservatives pursue what
they see as good for their country may lead them to endorse quite different
policies, despite the fact that both may hold its prosperity and vitality to be
of central importance. This occurs in part because concepts such as fairness,
care, loyalty, bravery, authority, and order evoke different experiences, associ-
ations, and neural connections that (once activated) prompt different images,
feelings, judgments, and behaviors.
Different worldviews and sets of moral concerns may account for why
people reporting to be politically conservative are more reluctant than those
with liberal leanings to help the less fortunate, such as the poor and single
mothers, whom they see as responsible for their own plight. Likewise, differ-
ent worldviews and sets of moral concerns may account for why liberals who
profess a moral duty to assist people in need and to provide health services
for all can be less generous than their conservative fellows in other forms of
altruism, like church donations.
Lakoff’s intent is to make people aware of the unreasoned nature of much
of political discourse and thus to extend the power of reason to serve the
cause of human dignity and the betterment of our societies. He assumes that
better knowledge about brain functioning and the reflexive, automatic, and
unconscious elements that imbue political discourse might help to dismantle
fears, prejudices, and exclusions by highlighting new forms of awareness and
responsibility. Little attention, however, is given to the unique properties of
human agents to chart the course of their lives in accordance with priorities
and standards that they deliberately chose.
We do not exclude the possibility of reconciling Lakoff’s narrative with the
usual criteria of nomothetic research, but much remains to be done in order to
assess the extent to which language may be the medium through which one
can address neural connections and can change attitudes and behaviors. Even
more remains to be clarified about the pathways of relations between brain
functioning, moral reasoning, and political choices.
Moral Intuitions
Haidt, like Lakoff, believes that the links between morality and politics are
largely accounted for by unconscious mechanisms. In particular, he moves
from the assumption that moral judgments are largely dictated by moral intu-
itions that precede and orient deliberative thoughts. Basic moral intuitions
include care versus harm (“Compassion for those who are suffering is the

most crucial virtue”), liberty versus oppression (“People should be free to

decide what group norms or traditions they themselves want to follow”), fair-
ness versus cheating (“When the government makes laws, the number one
principle should be ensuring that everyone is treated fairly”), in-group loyalty
versus betrayal (“I am proud of my country’s history”), authority and respect
versus subversion (“Respect for authority is something all children need to
learn”), and purity and sanctity versus degradation (“People should not do
things that are disgusting, even if no one is harmed”).1
These intuitions largely draw their roots from basic emotions like dis-
gust, fear, anger, and sadness, and rest upon spontaneous reactions of care
and rejection, in which reasoning exerts a post hoc justificatory function
rather than an explanatory one. People reject harm, cheating, and betrayal
even before a careful consideration of their moral implications. Attributions,
explanations, and moral judgments follow later to sanction and make sense of
reactions that have occurred spontaneously.
According to Haidt, the natural predisposition to distinguish right from
wrong and good from bad, and to associate them with pain and pleasure in
ourselves and in others (through empathy, imitation, and contagion), sets the
basis of moral intuitions first and of moral reasoning later. Thus, the reflexive
components come to play a major role in a view of morality where automatic
reactions precede, and often exceed, the reflective components. This in par-
ticular may occur in politics, where it may be easier to elicit passions than
to make people understand difficult issues and where feelings may be more
persuasive than reasons.
Because US liberals are more concerned than conservatives with fairness,
care, and liberty, whereas conservatives are more concerned than liberals
with in-group loyalty, authority, and purity, Haidt and Graham (2007) came
to the conclusion that conservatives have moral intuitions about what is right
and wrong that liberals “may not recognize.” This may stem from the major
concern of conservatives for religion, and from the appeal of religion to values
like loyalty, authority, and purity. Whereas liberals are mostly concerned with
the recognition and promotion of individuals’ needs and rights, conservatives
and religious people are equally concerned with virtues that bind individuals
into moral communities that protect groups, institutions, and souls. Haidt’s
conclusions have been criticized by Jost, who re-examined findings showing
that (1) liberals tend to assign higher priority to fairness and harm avoid-
ance than conservatives; (2) conservatives tend to assign higher priority to
authority, loyalty, and sanctity than liberals; and (3) conservative judgments
tend to be less differentiated than liberal judgments (Jost, 2012; Kugler, Jost, &
Noorbaloochi, 2014).

Indeed, one may wonder whether less differentiated judgments reflect true
morality or moralistic compliance. Likewise, one may question the extent to
which loyalty, authority, and sanctity operate always for the common good. In
particular, one may worry about recent findings demonstrating positive asso-
ciations between the values that conservatives cherish and social attitudes
associated with authoritarianism, social dominance, and intergroup hostil-
ity (Kugler et al., 2014). Ultimately, one may appeal to in-group authority and
purity to justify authoritarianism, whereas concern for individual rights can go
along with equal concern for communal and collective welfare, and can reject
authority and loyalty when they conflict with fairness or harm avoidance.
Likely Haidt’s ideas fit with the rediscovery of traditional values of religion and
purity, and accord with the diffuse malaise of a fragmented society that feels
disappointed with the most mundane and uncritical celebrations of modernity
and desperately calls for new and better forms of communion. Thus, his ideas
may be appealing to conservatives in warning against the liberal perspective
of most social scientists, and in reminding us to pay due attention to the values
of tradition, to the benefits of belonging, and to the role that religion still may
exert in moderating selfishness and in binding individuals into communities.
Yet a rhetoric of compassion cannot account for an ethic of responsibility. In
this regard, the degree to which moral intuitions are related to each other and
to basic dispositions and values still needs to be properly addressed. Likewise,
the extent to which socialization experiences shape the expressions of moral
intuitions over the course of development and across different cultural contexts
needs to be further investigated. Finally, the degree to which basic emotions
are at the core of moral intuitions and how mere feelings can help free will,
responsibility, and effective moral agency have to be clarified. Addressing these
issues, however, may be an impossible task unless supported by a comprehen-
sive theory of personality development and functioning that appropriately val-
ues our potential for growth as autonomous moral agents.
Moral Convictions
Moral convictions regard attitudes “grounded in core beliefs about funda-
mental right and wrong” (Skitka & Morgan, 2014, p. 96). In politics they can
be viewed as imperatives or mandates that dictate the position to be taken
when confronting platforms, policies, and actions that are perceived as mor-
ally relevant.
The distinctiveness of moral convictions among beliefs and the major
importance of attitudes rooted in moral convictions in comparison to other
attitudes carrying preferences and obligations consists in their being per-
ceived as objectively and universally true. Their being perceived as objective

and true makes them indisputable, with an extraordinary motivational force.

Moral convictions have been associated with higher levels of political engage-
ment and higher autonomy from authority, peer influence, and pressure to
conform to the majority. One might conjecture that the more strongly people
appropriate moral principles and identify with them, the more their choices
and actions would be in agreement with their moral convictions. Thus moral
convictions would appear as the needed ingredients of moral agency insofar
as they foster moral virtues and sustain moral courage. Furthermore, appeal-
ing to moral convictions would lead to the restoration of the importance of
reason and will in the moral discourse.
In reality, the situation looks more complex, as moral convictions may
operate as a double-edged sword, for or against alternative views of right and
wrong and not necessarily at the service of individuals’ moral development,
and for the promotion of a more just and humane society (Skitka & Morgan,
2009). Moral convictions, in fact, have also been associated with greater intol-
erance of social diversity, greater distrust of authorities, and rejection of those
rules and procedures that do not conform to one’s moral ideals, with a greater
willingness to limit the freedom of speech accorded to those with different
points of view, with stronger resistance to compromising with those hold-
ing different moral convictions, and with greater acceptance of violence to
achieving one’s moral ends (Skitka & Morgan, 2014).
Ultimately, the cost of moral convictions that are divorced from tolerance
are unsustainable in multicultural societies, because the clash of competing
worldviews and values may overcome the respect for law and override respect
for human dignity. Thus, one should further clarify the nature of moral con-
victions and their functioning in a given social context at a given time. This,
however, calls for a psychology able to account for how morality accords with
both personal development and social adaptation, and for how the organiza-
tion of societies may accord with individuals’ development.
In current politics, moral convictions come to the fore whenever prin-
ciples regarding life, family, solidarity, security, freedom, merit, equity, and
human dignity—not to speak of justice and truth—are at stake. A theory of
moral priorities is needed to account for how these principles operate and are
organized. In this regard, the theory of basic values of Schwartz (1992), which
we presented in the previous chapter, may provide a useful model. In the next
two chapters we will extend this theory to address political preferences.
As moral convictions, like values, are related to dispositions, motives,
beliefs about one’s self, and social attitudes, one should further clarify the
extent to which they accord with the harmonious development of individuals
and with the functioning of societies. This calls for an attentive consideration

of the functions that moral convictions may exert in the service of individuals’
self-actualization and of ordered societies. In this regard, one may question
the extent to which moral convictions rest upon genuine moral concerns and
judgments, when they lead to legitimize oppressive governments, to exclude
masses of people from basic civil and social rights, and to severely under-
mine respect for basic human rights. Likewise, one may question the extent
to which moral convictions rest upon true morality when they lead people to
sacrifice innocent lives in acts of terrorism and of war. Finally, one may ques-
tion the extent to which moral convictions rest upon true morality when they
lead some people to the justification of dissuasion and repression through
means like torture that undermine respect for basic human rights, even in
democratic societies.
Most current forms of violence and terrorism seem to be motivated by
moral convictions no less than the justifications given to violence repres-
sion. Kruglanski and colleagues have pointed to the quest for personal sig-
nificance as among the “major motivational forces that may push individuals
toward extremism” (Kruglanski, Gelfand, Bélager, Sheveland, Hetiarachchi,
& Gunaratna, 2014, p. 69).
One may guess that when moral convictions are or become associated
with a strong quest for significance, even radical thoughts and actions, which
otherwise would be unthinkable, become accessible. Likely the same moti-
vational forces that are at the core of the moral convictions of extremists are
at the core of many advocates of an ordered, civil democratic society. In both
cases, it is the quest for personal significance, namely for the realization of
values with which agents identify, that dictate their action and that support
their sacrifices. Likewise the same mechanism of moral disengagement may
lead terrorist and civil servants to selectively disconnect their actions from
the moral principles they advocate when this may serve individuals’ and soci-
eties’ interest. The variety and complexity of the variables that one should
take into account at the individual and social levels, and the variety of points
of view one should acknowledge, are such that any conclusion could not be
but superficial. Rather, one has an idea of the amount of research that would
be needed to arrive at some understanding of how cultural, personal, and
situational factors operate in concert with moral judgment, and how they ulti-
mately affect politics.
RELIGION AND RELIGIOSITY

Most authors who have addressed how personality, morality, and politics
relate to each other have also acknowledged the important role exercised by

religion in people’s moral education and their orientation toward the govern-
ment of society (Geertz, 1973; Putnam & Campbell, 2010; Weber, 1922). Indeed,
religion still can be viewed as an overarching and unifying system of pre-
scriptions and justifications, carrying aspirations and goals whose achieve-
ment is important to preserve one’s self-respect and one’s social identity. It
binds together assumptions, reasons, obligations, and ideals regarding what
makes a good person and how a just society should function.
One may, therefore, view religion as the worldview par excellence, capa-
ble of extending human Agency and Communion to include the supernatu-
ral and to offer a response to the ultimate question about the sense and the
destiny of societies. Religion is a system of attributions of meaning and of
practices, which adds to beliefs, aspirations, and obligations the power of an
apparatus of institutions aimed to protect and transmit across generations the
views and values that are advocated. Its institutional components are crucial
to sustain its effectiveness in responding to basic needs of knowledge, belong-
ing, and significance in life.
In all great civilizations, religion has been a potent psychological and
social force in shaping the minds and habits of people and in contributing to
the organization and government of societies. History attests to the power of
religion and shows how it supplied the answers needed by ordinary people
to cope with life and death, and the moral legitimacy of obedience to their
rulers. Differences about religious matters, however, have been the cause of
atrocities from antiquity until today, throughout the world. Yet we know little
about the role that diverse religions have exerted and still exert in shaping the
minds and the course of lives of people through institutions and education.
Only recently, in fact, has Western literature come to appreciate the unique
impact of Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam in defining the
social and political history of three-quarters of the world.
From such new insights we have come to acknowledge significant differ-
ences in the treatment of gender, in the moderation of passions, in the use of
reason, in family and generational relations, in attitudes toward authorities,
in the importance of rituals and traditions, in the moral obligations toward
others, and in fears and promises associated with the concept of an afterlife.
All these differences, in various ways, reflect the responses given by religion
to the fundamental questions about life and afterlife, about the individual
and society, and about love and hate.
Most current knowledge remains confined to the great influence that
Judeo-Christian religion has exerted in shaping the minds, habits, and moral-
ity of Western civilization, and thus in contributing to the organization of
societies and in legitimizing their political order. In most countries, religion

has been the guardian of the common good and the upholder of the tradition,
identity, and legacy of cultures, communities, groups, and families. Religion
has also proved tremendously effective in binding people together through
bonds of loyalty, trust, cohesiveness, and mutual support and, in many ways,
has been entrusted with moral education, exercise of justice, and provision
of care.
Although religion does not subsume morality, none can doubt the perva-
sive influence of religion on moral reasoning and behavior. Even today, the
catechism taught in Christian-affiliated and Koranic schools is the medium
for moral development for a large number of people in the world; even among
non-believers, religious-based festivities are a reminder of belonging to a
common super-ordered community, while to obey the Ten Commandments,
such as loving one’s neighbor as oneself, still represents the most common
viaticum to a good life.
Among believers, religion dictates the divide between good and evil, in
one’s public and private life, within the family, and within the community.
Religious beliefs carry explanations that make sense of misfortunes, make
virtues out of necessity, help to preserve self-respect, despite failures and
rejections, and encourage believers to cherish their own lives, despite illness
and aging. The extent to which religion may exert either a progressive or a
conservative function—as a palliative to justify the existing social order—is a
matter of a recurring debate (Jost et al., 2014). Religion and its institutions have
served both change and conservation in the past, depending on time and
context. Contemporary European history warns us against superficial gen-
eralizations, confronting us with the alliance of the Catholic Church in Spain
with Franco’s regime, or with the role that the Polish Catholic Church played
in overturning the communist regime. The role of religious institutions has
often been decisive in either sustaining or fighting political ideologies.
Recent literature documents the broad influence that religiosity exerts
on people’s well-being and on the functioning of communities by promot-
ing self-control and proper self-regulation, by fostering prosocial behavior,
by strengthening individual compliance with group norms, and by promot-
ing civic engagement (Galen, 2012; McCullough & Willoughby, 2009). Tragic
events, on the other hand, document the power and the cost in human life of
religious appeals to heroism and sacrifice, as in the case of fundamentalism.
In the United States, religion has been said to exert a bridging function
among different communities, serving as a sort of civic glue for the entire
nation (Putnam & Campbell, 2010). Two issues, then, appear to be particu-
larly relevant to our discourse. One concerns the contribution of religiosity,
namely of being devoted to a religion and of following its rules and practices,

to individuals’ development and well-being. The other concerns the contribu-

tion of religious institutions and of citizens’ religiosity to the functioning of
democracy.
Most findings that concern the relation among personality characteris-
tics, religiosity, well-being, and political preferences and participation have
been derived from research based on Western countries and particularly on
US samples. For these reasons, our arguments must be limited to the litera-
ture about Judeo-Christian influences in this part of the world. Nevertheless,
keeping these limitations in mind, one can say that, in general, religious peo-
ple are healthier, wealthier, and happier than non-religious people (Brooks,
2008; Norris & Inglehart, 2004).
As one may distinguish two kinds of religiosity—one more intimate
and the other more social—it is a matter of debate whether the latter carries
more tangible benefits than the former (Allport, 1950; Batson, 1976; Putnam
& Campbell, 2010). Religiosity may equally serve people’s quest for knowl-
edge and significance, as well as their quest for belonging and safety. Because
belonging is as beneficial as believing, religion may be crucial in moderating
selfishness, in valuing obedience and self-restraint, in making people more
cooperative, and thus in putting Agency at service of Communion. Ultimately
it may nurture heroism, compassion, and sacrifice, either for the sake of one’s
humanity or the welfare of one’s own community.
Empirical research suggests that individual religiosity varies as a func-
tion of stable personality dispositions, like basic traits and personal values.
For example, a meta-analytic review of 71 studies published in 19 countries,
which employed the Big Five Model as a framework for organizing the rela-
tionship between basic personality traits and religiosity (Saroglu, 2002, 2010),
found that religious people rated more highly on Communion traits, like
agreeableness and conscientiousness, than individuals with secular orienta-
tions. These findings suggest that religious commitment is associated with
the tendency to be altruistic, tender-minded, compliant, and concerned with
order and control, although the observed relationships are generally moder-
ate in size. Links to other Big Five dimensions were less consistent and were
found to vary for specific dimensions of religiosity. Openness to experience,
for example, was found to be positively related to mature spirituality, but neg-
atively related to religious fundamentalism (Saroglu, 2002).
Other studies have shown associations between value priorities and an
individual’s degree of religiosity. Links between values and religiosity were
first noticed by Rokeach (1969a, 1969b, 1973), who found that religious people
attributed more importance to forgiveness and obedience and less impor-
tance to values related to pleasure and excitement than non-religious people.

Subsequent studies have widely documented the systematic relationship of

religiosity with the integrated structure of Schwartz’s values that we have
presented in Chapter 2 (e.g., Fontaine, Luyten, & Corveleyn, 2000; Schwartz
& Huismans, 1995).
A meta-analytic review that included data from 15 different countries
(Saroglou, Delpierre, & Dernelle, 2004) showed that people committed to
religion attribute relatively high importance to conservation values (e.g., con-
formity, tradition, and security), which express self-restriction, order, and
commitment to the customs and ideas of traditional culture. They also attri-
bute relatively low importance to openness to change values (self-direction,
stimulation, and hedonism), which emphasize independence of thought and
action and are therefore likely to conflict with accepting religious dogma.
Values supporting tradition showed the highest positive association with
religiosity, as they emphasize submission to transcendental authority and
maintenance of beliefs and practices promulgated by religion. The most nega-
tive correlation was observed for values linked to hedonism (i.e., values that
conflict with a primary function of religion, namely the tendency to tem-
per self-indulgent tendencies; see Roccas, 2005). Correlations with the other
values decreased monotonically in both directions around the motivational
circle. This pattern of correlations was remarkably stable across different
cultures and religions, including Catholics, Protestants, Jews, and Muslims
(e.g., Caprara & Vecchione, unpublished manuscript; Fontaine, Luyten, &
Corveleyn, 2000; Roccas & Schwartz, 1997), and was independent of the socio-
economic development of the country (Saroglou et al., 2004).
As religious people seem to present an image of themselves that in
most cases accords with personal attributes that are socially valued, such as
sympathy, empathy, self-restraint, and diligence, one may wonder whether
this is due to the practice of compliance, obedience, modesty, prudence, or
charity. Religious people have also been perceived as better neighbors and
citizens, as more prone to fulfill norms of civic responsibility and more
apt to serve their communities (Monsma, 2007; Putnam & Campbell, 2010).
Moreover, a host of empirical studies have suggested a positive link between
religious commitment and several prosocial outcomes, such as generosity,
sharing, cooperation, donation, and volunteerism (e.g., Batson, Schoenrade,
& Ventis 1993; Pichon, Boccato, & Saroglou, 2007; Preston & Ritter, 2010;
Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007). Some scholars have raised questions about
the nature of these associations (Galen, 2012), which might be due to bias
in the self-perceptions of religious people. However, evidence from experi-
mental studies and sources of information other than self-reports suggest
that this result is not entirely artifactual. The findings suggest that there is

a tendency for religious people to act prosocially (e.g., Pichon, Boccato, &
Saroglou, 2007; Saroglou, Pichon, Trompette, Verschueren, & Dernelle,
2005), although this tendency is generally weak and is mostly limited to the
benefit of proximal, in-g roup targets (Blogowska & Saroglou, 2011; Pichon &
Saroglou, 2009; Saroglou, 2006, 2012).
It could, of course, be said that parochial religiosity fosters altruism
toward one’s family members, in-group favoritism, and obedience to one’s
own religious authority, but not necessarily acceptance of other views of exis-
tence and tolerance of other religions. However, while religious intolerance
is still common in many countries, in others, like the United States, religi-
osity is generally associated with high tolerance of other faiths (Putnam &
Campbell, 2010).
As most available findings have been generated in recent decades, we
need to consider the extent to which covariations among religiosity, health,
well-being, and successful adjustment are stable and generalizable across
generations. This is particularly relevant when we consider that frequency of
participation is the indicator most associated with positive outcomes. Despite
the large majority of people saying they believe in some supernatural agent
and do not exclude the existence of an afterlife, there has been a general
decline of attendance at religious services in the United States, as in the other
Western societies.
In post-communist countries, where regular attendance was previously
impeded, pre-and post-communism comparisons are dubious, as the post-
communism resurgence of religion could be seen as a reaction to the former
state-imposed atheism. In all Western industrialized democratic countries,
where reasonable comparisons with the past are available, decline in religious
attendance is particularly pronounced among the youth. It is, however, dif-
ficult to say whether the youth of today will turn or return to religion with
aging, or whether religious functions will attract fewer and fewer people in
the future.
It is also important to note that the decline in religious participation is
not equally diffused across countries and that certain countries are decidedly
more secular than others. Whereas secularization has pervasively expanded
through traditionally Protestant countries in northern and central Europe, and
has been significant in some traditionally Catholic countries, like France, in
other Catholic countries, like Italy, Spain, and Portugal, the decline in church
attendance has been slower and less consistent. In post-communist countries,
as already mentioned, it is generally difficult to assess the degree of secular-
ization because of the return of free access to religion after half a century of
its interdiction. In Poland, it is difficult to assess the health of Catholicism

because of the merit with which it is still credited regarding its role in resist-
ing and dismantling the communist authoritarian regime. Further afield,
such as in South America, where Catholic religion has exerted a pervasive
influence, it is difficult to say to what extent it will be able to countervail the
general secularization of society.
It should also be noted that recent trends concerning participation in
religious practices have not been unidirectional. For example, the seculariza-
tion of Israeli society has been counteracted by the growing influence and
expansion of Orthodox Judaism, whereas Turkey’s modernization enforced
by Ataturk’s regime has started to yield to the pressure of a revitalized Islam.
The general picture that one can draw from available evidence, there-
fore, is that of a fluid situation whose direction and endpoints are difficult to
capture and predict. This would appear to be particularly true of the United
States, where different religions make different offers that appeal to different
forms of religiosity (Putnam & Campbell, 2010). Compared to other Western
countries, the United States has a relatively high rate of weekly attendance at
religious services, although a continuous decline has been evident over the
last decades, with a notable estrangement of youth from religion.
In most European countries, people who cease to attend religious services
usually relax their ties to their traditional religion without committing them-
selves to another religion and only rarely become true non-believers. In the
United States, instead, conversion to other religions is quite frequent, as is the
migration from one congregation to another among evangelical Protestants,
who today represent the majority of committed believers.Whereas most tradi-
tional confessions have lost followers in the last decades, evangelical congrega-
tions have remained stable or have increased their membership. Yet evangelical
Protestants are the most diversified congregations, offering religious services
together with education, child care, self-help groups, and entertainment.
Thus one may guess that the reasons for many conversions and for migra-
tion from one congregation to another concern not only matters of faith, but
also matters of pragmatic convenience, such as moving to a new community,
seeking to extend or renew one’s network of relations, wanting a school or
entertainment for one’s children, to fight loneliness, and to feel protected and
supported when in need.
Given these reasons, it is not surprising that congregations are the most
common form of association in a country that still has a large number of new-
comers who need to be integrated and where a large number of people regu-
larly move their residence, work, and families from one place to another. Nor
would it be surprising that in some cases the need to belong supersedes the
quest of a true faith.

Whereas intimate forms of religiosity may not reveal themselves in church

attendance, the communitarian forms of religiosity may largely depend
on available offers. Unfortunately, findings with which to disentangle the
orchestration of personal and situational factors that account for US religious
choices are not readily available, nor are findings from other countries, which
we would need in order to establish the extent to which religious people are
homogenous and traceable to specific personality variables and life condi-
tions. Thus, care must be taken not to jump to any premature conclusion or
to make generalizations regarding how personality and religiosity relate to
each other.
Regarding the contribution of religion to the advancement and function-
ing of democracy, caution is recommended because of the diversity of poli-
ties, as well as the diversity of religious convictions. Historically, European
Catholic and Protestant religions were often the companions of governments
in legitimizing the power of authority, the respect for hierarchy, and a social
order in which conservation of the status quo prevailed over change. In con-
temporary Europe, however, there are now polities with a long tradition of
politics and religion being separate and independent of each other, though
there are still others in which the separation between religion and govern-
ment has never been fully achieved, and yet others where the influence of
religion on government has been restored.
Spain, Italy, and Poland share the same Catholic religion, but the relations
between religion and government have been quite different until recently.
Today the situation is so fluid in these countries that it is difficult to assess the
extent to which Catholic institutions still have and will maintain an influence
on government and on citizen’s political choices.
Even in the United States, where—despite the appeal to God at all major
public and political events—the separation between religion and state has
been taken for granted and is used as a model for other countries, no one can
predict how things will evolve in the future. In the past, traditional religions
have been consistent in the message given from the pulpit supporting the noble
experiment in accordance with the motto on the seal of the United States, e plu-
ribus unum—“out of many, one.” Whereas originally this referred to the many
states and sometimes to many different peoples, it can be extended to refer to
many religions. Religious obligations served to mitigate the agentic striving
in the New World to discover and to succeed, to strengthen communion, and
to create bonds by nurturing admiration for the achievers and by promoting
compassion for those in need.
Traditional religions were largely indifferent to political partisanship,
being mostly concerned with preserving the traditions and values of their

followers, who shared not only a common faith but often a common ethnic
background. By contrast, modern congregations are more inclined to take
an explicit political position, as more frequently politics is polarized around
issues that are religiously sensitive. The more Republicans endorse tradi-
tional values, such as pro-life causes, in favor of the purity of sex and the
sanctity of traditional nuclear families, the more they receive the approval
of congregations that offer stronger community bonds. The more Democrats
endorse a vision of personal freedoms and rights that collide with religion,
the more they run the risk of alienating a large portion of the religious elector-
ate (Putnam & Campbell, 2010).
Coming back to the question of how personality, morality, religiosity, and
politics relate to each other, one can only guess about the kind of personal-
ity variables that are more frequently associated with religiosity and about
the extent to which religiosity may foster civic engagement and contribute
to democracy’s functioning. Different religions, in fact, may attract differ-
ent personalities, as their appeal to needs, values, and goals operate within
the range of choices that are made available. In some countries there is little
choice between belonging to the faith of one’s ancestors and not believing, but
in other countries people may choose from among multiple religious options.
Religions, in their turn, carry different obligations and practices,
depending on how holy scriptures are interpreted in different times and
contexts. Most great religions promote views of people and lives that accord
with individuals’ moral development, typically prizing values linked to
self-transcendence, responsibility for one’s own actions, and concern for
others’ well-being. Likewise, most religions share such ideals of democracy
as respect for individuals’ dignity, fairness, and peace. Yet no religion can be
considered immune from having indulged in practices that fall short of full
respect for human dignity, and all religions, to various degrees, have served
to legitimize forms of authority and power that conflict with democracy and
equality (Jost et al., 2014).
Whereas modern democracy grew and developed in countries in which
Christians were the majority, the real contribution of religion to the establish-
ment of democratic values and institutions is debatable. In this regard, his-
tory provides arguments for and against religion, in different contexts and
at different times. Today, most Christian religions express their preference
for democratic forms of governments, insofar as they better accord with the
evangelical messages of love, brotherhood, and compassion. Yet the principles
of authority and obedience that rule most religious institutions still maintain
much of past regimes.

In democratic countries, citizens are given the freedom to choose among

multiple ideological offers, and most constitutions separate religion and gov-
ernment. Yet religion continues to exert a significant influence on citizens’
political preferences and engagement in several democracies. The number
and power of European parties that carry the adjective “Christian” in their
name may attest to this influence. Likewise, the debate over the Christian leg-
acy of the European Union provides an example of the current importance of
religious issues. Yet our present knowledge cannot answer most of the ques-
tions concerning whether and how religion may contribute to democracy.
Even if one confines himself or herself to the analyses concerning one
country, such as the United States, where findings are more available than
anywhere else, it is not easy to glean information about how religiosity, politi-
cal preferences, and participation relate to each other. Only a minority of the
US population is, in fact, made up of highly active religious people who regu-
larly attend religious services, and it is difficult to estimate the impact of the
messages delivered from the pulpit on the political choices of different people
and in different social contexts. Thus, it is difficult to fully account for the
impact of religion beyond church attendance.
In reality, one cannot say the degree to which various religions are genu-
inely committed to uphold one ideology or another and also are able to engage
their followers to sustain one party or another on the basis of contingent
moral priorities. One may just guess, on the basis of recent debates, that evan-
gelical Protestants have been more inclined to take sides with conservative
Republicans against abortion and gay marriage. This, however, may account
for the recent past, but does not say much about the future. One in fact may
doubt that the current convergence of political interest will last forever among
religious fundamentalists or among supporters of economic liberalism.
As we noted earlier, in most cases, belonging is as important a part of
religion as believing. However, it may happen that belonging becomes more
important than believing when congregational choices are mostly attributable
to pragmatic conveniences (such as schooling, neighborhoods, entertainment,
and care services). In these cases, we need to estimate the extent to which
belonging to a congregation that clearly sides with a political party reflects a
moral conviction, and thus the extent to which partisans’ moral priorities rest
upon in-group pressures or upon genuine moral reasons.
The personality variables one should consider alone or in various com-
binations, like traits, values, beliefs, and habits, are many, the situations are
fluid, and the contexts are so different that, again, caution has to be exercised
against premature generalizations. Thus, we need to examine the structure

of ideologies that organize political knowledge and orient political choices

contextually and in depth, then to investigate how personal values relate to
religiosity and to political ideology, and finally to address how religiosity
contributes to political ideology. In the following chapters we will address
some of these issues, focusing on comparisons of findings from various
democracies.
CONCLUSIONS
One cannot address beliefs, values, and norms regarding how citizens should
relate to each other or concerning how a polity should be ruled unless we can
establish the ideals and moral underpinnings of living together. At the same
time, one cannot disregard the fact that optimistic and pessimistic views of
human nature may lead to different arguments about how power should be
exercised, how harm should be punished or condoned, and how harmony in
society should be pursued. In this regard we believe that good and evil are
in equal reach of all human beings depending on the opportunities given, at
different times and in different contexts, to actualize human potentials.
The basic aspect of human nature that is difficult to dispute is the desire
of people for life. A kind of life instinct forms the basis of care for themselves
no less than for the care of others, society, and nature, as it expresses itself
in the form of a fundamental drive for life throughout all its manifestations.
Likewise, it is difficult to dispute that Agency and Communion represent
two fundamental modalities of human existence. Agency is about autonomy,
competence, and mastery, and manifests itself in individuals’ faculty to exert
control over themselves and their environments. Communion is about reci-
procity, interdependence, and belonging, and is associated with individuals’
ability to empathize and sympathize with others and to act in the pursuit of
common interest.
Morality concerns the ideas of good and evil that are at the core of people’s
thoughts, feelings, actions, and their relations in society. In this way, it provides
the general principles that dictate what is wrong and what is right and how
people should relate to one another to live a good life. Pleasure and pain are
the embodied and prototypical manifestations of good and evil. Nature equips
humans, as other species, with a primary affect system that automatically
responds aversively against sources of harm while being attracted by sources
of pleasure. Likewise, nature sets the potentials and operates in concert with
nurture to support the development of sophisticated mechanisms related to
self-restriction, such as moral emotions and moral reasoning, through which

the person becomes the ultimate source of his or her own actions. This leads us
to view persons as moral agents whose devotion to the pursuit of good and jus-
tice may continue to grow through the exercise of reason and self-regulation.
Being good and living well are mutually supporting, and both are needed for
people to live together.
The close links between morality and rationality are further corroborated
when we remember that moral development goes hand in hand with cogni-
tive development and emotion regulation. Human beings are moral agents
that commit themselves to the pursuit of righteous causes and take responsi-
bility for the consequences of their actions. Although the inhibitory features
of morality have received more attention than the proactive components,
moral reasons and emotions are important propellers of human and social
development. In practice, morality requires the capacity to refrain from evil
no more than the desire to seek that which is good. Placing the self at the
core of morality and acknowledging the decisive role of intentionality and
willpower are crucial when attempting to account for both the inhibitive and
proactive aspects of morality.
Unique psychological properties, such as self-reflection and self-reactive-
ness, enable people to match their lives to the moral principles they cherish.
Likewise, the sophisticated social cognitive mechanism of moral disengage-
ment allows people and societies to circumvent their moral principles in the
pursuit of contingent self-interest. Thus, extraordinary moral accomplish-
ments and reprehensible behaviors can be put within reach of ordinary peo-
ple, depending on their moral engagement or disengagement. Private and
public moralities are mutually dependent. Individuals’ potentials for the pur-
suit of good and justice allow the formation of communities where people can
come together in pursuit of the common good. Individuals’ moral potentials,
however, do not necessarily turn into moral obligations and endeavors unless
properly nurtured and rewarded.
From this standpoint, we can view democracy as a deeply moral enter-
prise. Democracy’s ideals, in fact, rest upon morality to the extent that the
protection and empowerment of individuals and communities are worthy of
value and can be pursued through the exercise of reason. Democracy appeals
to morality in the pursuit of common good on the assumption that it can be
achieved dependent upon the moral values shared by its citizen, leaders, and
institutions. As citizens’ choices should be guided by moral principles lead-
ing to pursue the common good, politicians’ merits should be assessed by
their efficacy and accountability in attending to the welfare of the people.
This requires the cultivation of moral virtues and effective vigilance over

individuals’ and societal maneuvers that may lead to the circumvention of

moral ideals and even to inhumane behavior under the illusion of moral
innocence.
Some authors have pointed to worldviews as the interpretive lens that
orient people and help them make sense of their moral choices, while other
authors have pointed to moral concerns, intuitions, and convictions as the
cognitive-affective structures that organize moral reasoning and pose moral
choices that are at the basis of political preferences. Indeed, different points
of view, conceptual models, and constructs converge in connecting morality
to politics and in pointing to personality and culture as the overarching sys-
tems that are able to contextualize and make sense of individuals’ choices and
actions. Yet a comprehensive theory is still missing.
Religion may be seen as a worldview par excellence, providing a pervasive
system of beliefs that helps people to deal with fundamental questions about
life and to shape the choices they make. Moreover, religion can be viewed as a
cultural system whose institutions and practices enable the preservation and
transmission of consistent patterns of thought and actions about right and
wrong and good and evil from one generation to the next.
In the past, religion exerted a kind of monopoly over moral education
in most countries and has preceded political ideology in orienting people in
matters of power and government. Even today, religion exerts a notable influ-
ence in many polities, despite the increasing secularization of societies.
In the next chapters we will turn to worldviews by addressing political
ideology as a device that enables people to orient in politics in accordance with
their quests for agency and communion. Likewise, we will turn to morality
and religion by addressing values as the guiding principles in people’s lives,
insofar as they attest to their ideas and ideals of right and wrong and thus
directly impact on their political choices.
NOTE
1. Examples of items measuring moral intuitions were taken from Graham et al.
(2011) and Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, and Haidt (2012).

CHAPTER 4
Personal Determinants of Political Divisions
POLITICAL IDEALS AND IDEOLOGIES

Ideology is an all-encompassing term that one may use extensively or restric-
tively as it combines ideals with worldviews in many ways. Whereas one
refers to political ideology as an interrelated set of attitudes and beliefs about
the correct order of society and how it can be achieved (cfr. Heywood, 2012),
views about how society should be governed cannot be disassociated from
competing views about human nature and society, and about how life should
be lived.
Shared beliefs and ideals, in fact, have provided both an interpretation of
life in communion with others and guidelines for how social life should be
organized long before most people had been given any thought or voice about
their political preferences.
In political science, ideologies have been viewed as configurations of
ideas and attitudes whose elements are bound together by some form of con-
straint or functional interdependence (Converse, 1964). They may also serve
as devices for structuring political knowledge and expertise, or they may take
the form of broad postures that, more or less, consciously explain and justify
different states of social and political affairs (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009).
Obviously this occurs where people are given the opportunity to form and
express their ideas in political matters. In reality, however, people form ideas
about matters that they perceive as accessible, and contend with issues and
pursue goals they perceive as within their reach.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the attitudes of political elites have
often been found more congruent, stringent, and constraining than those
of voters. This can be related to the low level of electorate’s sophistication
and mostly occurs when voters are poorly educated and at the beginning of
their apprenticeship to democracy. Indeed, one may argue about the extent to
which, in established democracies with educated electorates, the attitudes of
the political elite shape or attend to citizens’ political aspirations. Likewise, it
is also not surprising that democratic ideals, which are associated with voters’
121

choice, may have less appeal in countries like China, where the citizens’ lack
of familiarity with democracy goes together with limited freedom to acquire
information about alternative political systems and to voice one’s own opin-
ion on political matters (Bell & Li, 2013).
Most countries claiming a prolonged usage of democratic institutions
belong to what one may view as Western political culture. In this political
context, three major issues are still debated about the extent to which ideology
may be used to navigate a complex political world and thus to predict citizen’s
political choices. These issues concern
1. Whether one single ideological dimension, such as the traditional left-

right or liberal-conservative, can be functional when organizing citi-
zens’ political knowledge and thought (e.g., Conover & Feldman 1981;
Jost et al., 2009; Kinder 1998; Peffley & Hurwitz 1985);
2. The degree to which the left-right or liberal-conservative ideological
distinction refers to the same differences in value priorities across dif-
ferent political contexts;
3. The extent to which left-right or liberal-conservative ideological dis-
tinctions have the same meaning and correspond to a set of connected
beliefs and aspirations that dictate stable preferences across times and
situations.
Since the time of the French revolution, political opinions have been classi-
fied typically in terms of a single left-right dimension. After the establish-
ment of the National Constituent Assembly in July 1789, the terms left and
right reflected the political positions held by the various constituencies of the
Assembly: those that were sitting to the right of the presidency represented
the interest of aristocracy and part of the clergy and were mostly concerned
with the defense of the ancient régime, while those sitting to the left included
republicans, liberals, democrats, and monarchists that to various degrees
advocated a change of régime (Revelli, 2007). In this way, the ideological posi-
tions of French left and right can be seen to correspond approximately to the
positions of the Tories and Whigs in late seventeenth-century England, being
respectively pro-king and pro-Parliament. In fact, in the early usage of such
terminologies, much of the ideological conflict was over preserving or over-
turning the social order of the ancient regimes. Particularly, the ideals of lib-
erty, equality, and fraternity became icons of change that opposed authority,
hierarchy, and obedience and thereby set the stage for the political confron-
tations of the subsequent centuries. Later, and until recently, change versus
conservation has been the major cleavage of ideological divisions (Jost, 2006a).

Personal Determinants of Political Divisions 123
As stated earlier, one should not lose sight of the historical and social con-
text, nor of the ideals that set the premises of the issues under contention.
Here, the social context was that of Europe at the end of absolute governments
and at the beginning of the industrial revolution. The ideals were those of the
Enlightenment: the primacy of reason, the rule of law, the right of all human
beings to freedom and fair treatment by government. Liberty was the major
issue under contention, and the major impetus for political change that set
liberals in opposition to conservatives, namely the interests of a new bour-
geoisie, of commerce, and of industry against the interests of the aristocracy
and of landowners.
Distinctions between left and right have largely diversified over time
and across countries, and usually in concomitance with great changes result-
ing from the industrial revolution and the extension of markets, from the
increased mobility of people and the organization of labor, from changes in
the distribution of wealth and in the stratification of society. Equality gradu-
ally became an issue of contention and the major claim for political and social
change. It contended for primacy with liberty and represented a new source
of divisions between liberals and conservatives and between left and right
in concomitance with the growing power of the working class, the spread of
socialist ideals, the enlargement of suffrage.
At the turn of the twentieth century, differences among various expres-
sions of left and right ideologies in Europe mostly reflected the trajectories of
different countries toward the attainment of national sovereignty, the inclu-
sion of the bourgeoisie in governmental institutions, the political awakening
of both the rural and industrial proletariat, the crucial role of trade unions
and political parties in representing and managing the conflicting interests
of society, and the extension of universal suffrage. Despite the diversities, the
original conservation versus change claims of those sitting at the left and the
right in the French National Constituent Assembly of 1789 continued to be the
distinctive features of left and right ideologies in continental Europe to the
extent that citizens were entitled to voice their political opinions.
In Great Britain, Liberals and Labourites largely replaced the Whigs,
while Tories identified mostly with conservatives. Democracy in the United
States, on the other side of the Atlantic, was a unique experiment in a land
of opportunities where politics had been released from the prejudices and
impediments of the old regimes, and where the divide between major politi-
cal parties, the Democrats and the Republicans, found little correspondence
with the ideological divisions of various European left and right ideologies.
Other than the king’s authority and class struggle, relations among races and

slavery posed the major challenges that both liberals’ and democrats’ ideals
of liberty and equality had to face.
Over the entire twentieth century, significant changes in the political
programs and goals advocated by the left and the right and reflected first
the illusions and the aspirations of mass movements and then the treacheries
and perversions of left and right ideals that ended in the rise of authoritarian
regimes in several countries.
In Europe, between the two world wars, the pervasive influence of
Marxism over the socialist and communist parties of the left balanced the
major commitment of right-wing parties to endorse the values of tradition
and social conservation, viewing authority and hierarchy as the cornerstones
of social order and progress, and defending the interests of property owners
and traditional dominant class, and celebrating the sovereignty of national
states. The atheism of Marxism deterred religion from most social communist
movements in most Christian countries (Eley, 2002; Sassoon, 2014).
The radicalization of the political debate carried unprecedented combina-
tions of ideas from both left and right and led ultimately to antidemocratic
regimes in countries like Germany, Italy, Spain, and the Soviet Union. In the
United Kingdom, and in Commonwealth states like Canada, New Zealand,
and Australia, an emphasis on social justice and a major commitment to
extending citizens’ welfare set liberals in opposition to conservatives, while
a more favorable attitude toward extending public policies in economic and
social matters differentiated liberals and conservatives in the United States.
In the United Kingdom, this was mostly due to the growing importance of
the Labour Party, which was one of the most strenuous advocates of the wel-
fare state. In the United States, the New Deal and the presidency of Democrat
Franklin D. Roosevelt significantly extended the intervention of the federal
state in economics in order to manage a severe economic crisis and to achieve
a broader social justice (Gerring, 1998; Noel, 2013).
The left-right (or liberal-conservative) ideology continued to mirror the
original pro-change versus pro-conservation cleavage across the different
polities that attained or preserved some sort of democracy in Europe, the
Americas, and Oceania. After World War II, the division of the globe into two
major areas of political influence of two superpowers resulted in an increased
polarization between left and right and between liberals and conservatives in
the political debate of established, re-established, and new democracies. The
end of colonial empires opened the door to self-government for multitudes
whose worldviews, values, relations among people, and practices of gov-
ernment were quite distant from the ideals that posed the basis of Western
democracies and their institutions.

In this regard, the ideals of the left were mostly congenial to libera-
tion movements striving for a political change carrying freedom, equality,
and self-government for the people. In this way, most national liberation
movements in Africa and Asia looked to the ideals of democracy during
their fight against colonialism and imperialism. Nevertheless, the route
to democracy was and still is particularly tortuous for countries where
authoritarian forms of government replaced the past regimes under for-
eign domination. Ultimately, in most countries, the transition to democracy
proved to be no less difficult than the achievement of freedom from foreign
domination.
Over the four decades of the cold war, the Soviet Union provided a model
and support to most left-wing movements across the world, while capital-
ist democracies did not hesitate to cooperate with authoritarian regimes to
oppose communism worldwide. However, as communism, or Real Socialism
as it was also called, lost its appeal after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the
major issues of contention and distinction between left and right and left and
between liberal and conservative in most democratic countries became how a
free market economy should be managed, and whether it might be compatible
with an extended system of welfare.
As already noted, in established democracies like Australia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, left and right are often equated with liberal
and conservative ideologies, respectively. While left and liberal parties have
been mostly associated with political movements that endorse a major role of
the state in ruling markets and in granting everyone conditions supportive
of a decent life, right-wing and conservative parties have shown a propensity
to celebrate capitalism’s virtues. Gradually, the left and the right, as well as
liberals and conservatives, have come to reflect a variety of combinations of
ideals that pertain to both the private and public spheres of politics and to
the social and economic spheres of life, which may differ significantly across
polities.
The end of the twentieth century has attested to a remarkable rapproche-
ment between the two traditional political ideologies in several countries,
mostly under the pressure of pragmatic contingencies (Noel & Therien, 2008).
The right and conservatives have softened their claims for market competi-
tion and minimum state, while the left and liberals have acknowledged the
value of merit and efficiency. Ultimately, both right-conservatives and left-
liberals have shared their concern for human rights, civil liberties, and social
justice in face of the challenges raised by the globalization of economy and by
the pluralism of faith. However, this did not occur equally in all countries, as
significant differences persist on ethical and economic issues.

In most countries where democracy is not under threat, distributive

justice and traditional morality represent major cleavages between left and
right and between liberals and conservatives. Claims for change based on
social justice reinstate the primacy of solidarity, as the legacy of revolution-
ary ideals of fraternity under which liberty and equality can be reconciled.
There cannot be liberty without acknowledging and granting others’ liberty,
as there is no equality without acknowledging and granting others’ equal-
ity in dignity and respect. In certain cases, the tension is between individu-
als’ liberty and communities’ morality. In other cases, the tension is between
rewarding entrepreneurship and merit and granting universal care and
welfare.
Yet, few people in any democratic polity—left, r ight, liberal, or conserva-
tive—would dispute that every person is worthy of value and respect, and
that democracy should grant all citizens fundamental civil, social, and politi-
cal rights and the conditions for a reasonable life.
As Freeden (2010) has noted, ideologies shade off into each other and
cut through one another. Indeed, most modern democracies have become
more egalitarian in terms of civil rights and access to health services, educa-
tion, and work opportunities, although achieving the optimal combination
of individual freedom and social justice is an arduous challenge for both left
and right in most countries. In reality, the greater concern for equal respect
and the claims for equal opportunities may appear rhetorical in face of the
growth of inequalities that occurred in the last decades, even within dem-
ocratic countries (Piketty, 2013) Thus, to discern what is common among
parties and movements that claim to endorse the same ideology can be
no less arduous than capturing the diversities among competing political
programs.
Looking retrospectively, we believe that change versus conservation is
the common cleavage that has sets left against right, and liberals against
conservatives. Initially, the major claim for change concerned liberty, fol-
lowed by equality, and finally by social justice. Thus one may recognize in
the diverse claims for change a correspondence between the priorities that
have marked the progress of democratic debate and developments in those
priorities over the course of human development: first the need for safety
and autonomy, then the need for social inclusion and recognition, and finally
the need for self-realization. This is in accordance with the earlier views
of Maslow (1954) on motivation and personality, and with the recent argu-
ments of Inglehart and Welzel (2005) regarding how economic growth and
democracy march together with changes in people’s motivations toward and
beyond modernity.

THE DIMENSIONALITY OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

The left-right distinction still dominates the political discourse in most con-
temporary democracies, despite a number of studies that have attested to dif-
ficulties in tracing the variety of political attitudes to a single dimension and
thus to accommodate their expressions along the same continuum (Ashton
et al., 2005; Feldman & Johnston, 2014). Some scholars have suggested com-
plementing the traditional left-right distinction with additional dimensions,
such as radicalism versus moderation (Ricolfi, 2002) in order to make sense of
the various forms of extremism and populism. Other scholars have suggested
deconstructing the left-right distinction into economic and social dimensions
(Feldman, 2013).
The current idea to trace political attitudes to two major dimensions
is not new in psychology, as in political science. The precursors of a two-
dimensional approach to ideology can be found first in earlier works by
Ferguson (1939) and Eysenck (1954). Ferguson pointed to two factors that he
called religiosity and humanitarianism: religiosity was defined by belief in
God and by opposition to birth control and the theory of evolution, whereas
humanitarianism was defined by rejection of capital punishment and by paci-
fism. After a factor analysis that included a large number of political attitudes
items, Eysenck (1954) extracted two factors that he called conservatism versus
radicalism, and tough-mindedness versus tender-mindedness. The content of
these factors were later disputed and revised with the addition of a third fac-
tor. A 45-degree rotation of Eysenck’s factors led Rokeach and Hanley (1956)
to identify a first factor contrasting religious morality and secularism, and
a second factor contrasting racism, militarism, and punitiveness with racial
egalitarianism, pacifism, and leniency. The two factors were very similar
to Ferguson’s religiosity and humanitarianism factors, respectively. Finally,
whereas Ferguson (1973) added a third factor that opposed nationalism to
communism and which correlated positively with religiosity and negatively
with humanitarianism, Eysenck (1975) added a third factor that saw political-
economic conservatism as standing in opposition to socialism.
At the same time, the many changes occurring on the world political
scene could not, of course, happen without having an effect on the politi-
cal attitudes of electorates, or on the targets and focus of political scientists’
investigations. With regard to voters’ attitudes, it is unlikely that they have
not changed with regard to communism, socialism, peace and war, capital
punishment, moral issues concerning sex and life, and civil rights following
world-changing events such as the end of Cold War, the fall of Berlin Wall,
the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the emergence of new democracies,

and the rise of new political and economic superpowers like China and India.
The increasing influence of women in business and government throughout
the world will also have impacted on voter attitude. All this has led scien-
tists to have a better appreciation of diversities within and among cultures
and to consider new constructs and more comprehensive theories regarding
citizens’ political beliefs and preferences. Nevertheless, the left-liberal versus
right-conservative distinction has survived, while the two-dimensional dis-
tinction was further strengthened.
Boski (1993) found that political attitudes in Poland could be organized
in terms of orthogonal factors corresponding to religious versus secular
attitudes and in capitalist versus socialist attitudes. Duckitt and colleagues
(Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002) and others
have pointed to established constructs like Social Dominance (SDO; Pratto,
Sidanius, Stallworthj, & Malle, 1994) and to Right Wing Authoritarianism
(RWA; Altemeyer, 1981, 1996) as two basic dimensions of social and political
ideology. In Duckitt’s dual process model, both RWA and SDO are viewed
as political attitudes resulting from a combination of different worldviews
and personality differences, where high scores are predictors of conserva-
tive preferences. Whereas RWA was associated with low openness, high
conscientiousness, and a view of the world as a dangerous place, SDO was
associated with low agreeableness and a view of the world as a competi-
tive place. Low correlations among RWA and SDO and different correla-
tions with others’ social attitudes and values have further attested to their
distinctiveness.
Ashton and colleagues (2005) have identified in the United States and
Canada two dimensions that they labeled, respectively, moral regulation ver-
sus individual freedom, and compassion versus competition. These factors are
very similar to the religiosity and humanitarianism factors of Ferguson, and
to the liberalism versus conservatism and tough-mindedness versus tender-
mindedness factors of Eysenck. The moral regulation versus individual free-
dom dimension correlated with the conservation versus openness to change
dimension of Schwartz’s values taxonomy (1992), and with the ideological
dimension of right-wing authoritarianism. The compassion versus competi-
tion dimension correlated with Schwartz’s self- transcendence versus self-
enhancement value dimension, and with the ideological dimension of social
dominance.
Recently, Feldman (2013) has been among the more convinced advocates
of a two-dimensional space in which most political attitudes could be accom-
modated. According to Feldman, one should distinguish the economic and
social dimensions of political ideology, as they are grounded in very different

social and psychological forces. Economic preferences oppose equality/com-

passion against market competition/self-interest and welfare against limited
state involvement, while social preferences oppose modern against tradi-
tional values, social freedom against order, and religiosity against secularism
(Feldman & Johnston, 2014).
Indeed, principles of freedom, equality, and justice in politics and in
economics are often difficult to reconcile under one left-right dimension in
modern democracies. The right has been generally identified with political
programs that curtail citizens’ freedom in the sphere of civil rights but which
advocate maximum freedom in the sphere of economics pro- capitalism.
Likewise, the left has been often identified with political programs that advo-
cate the regulation of the market and that limit individuals’ economic free-
dom but which claim for maximum freedom in the sphere of civil rights. In
between these positions, new libertarians’ advocacy of high freedom in both
economy and individual rights have further attested either to the return of
earlier forms of liberalism or to the continuous recombination of ideals car-
ried by modernity.
Equality has been viewed as the flag of the left and the major cleavage
between left and right (Bobbio, 1996). Yet few on the right or the left would dis-
pute that each person is entitled to equality of rights and is worthy of respect.
Likewise, few would argue in favor of equality in wealth allocation unless
due consideration is given to talents and merit. Rather, the debate among both
the reasonable right and the reasonable left would seem to be about the extent
to which equality of opportunities can be achieved.
The constant tensions between liberty and equality in politics and eco-
nomics make the pursuit of justice open to multiple political options that may
vary significantly across polities and over time. Also, one should not under-
estimate the extreme position of movements that locate themselves beyond
any conventional idea of left and right on a variety of issues such as sex, race,
and morality. Probably, a multidimensional conceptualization of attitudes is
convenient in the domain of the political, no less than in the economic domain
and in other domains of life, such as family, work, and religion. Thus, we do
not doubt that a multidimensional conceptualization of political ideology is
needed to capture the heterogeneity of beliefs, values, and habits that from
different domains of functioning ultimately converge in a political choice like
voting.
Yet we do not lose sight of the fact that the left-right and liberal-con-
servative cleavages still orient the political choices of a large majority of
people, while providing the most important predictors of voting in most
countries. This can be due to the dynamics of representative institutions and

of government under the rule of the majority, where stability of government

requires stability of coalitions, as in multi-party systems, and when politi-
cal systems turn into bipolar systems of majorities and oppositions. Then
location on a single dimension may either facilitate or constrain the alliance
among political parties and extend citizens’ control over their representatives,
making their behavior comprehensible and predictable.
Furthermore, one should not underestimate the tremendous influence
exerted by the media in shaping and channeling political discourses and nar-
ratives along a simple continuum. In most Western democracies, the use made
by the press, radio, and television of left-right and liberal-conservative dis-
tinction is continuous and pervasive in commenting on political events and
in conveying political information.
Thus one may say that a unidimensional conceptualization of ideology
may serve as a heuristic device that is convenient for both politicians and vot-
ers to organize political knowledge, to choose among allies and adversaries,
and to assess the accountability of representatives (Vassallo, 2006).
In reality, we believe that most of the power of political ideology is due
to the motivational function it exerts in meeting both agentic and communal
needs. The fact that citizen’s ideological identification still relies on the left-
right or liberal-conservative continuum, despite the diversities of meanings
and of contents that can be associated with each of these poles, is mostly due
to the symbolic value of ideological self-placement in voting, where belonging
is no less important than believing. Voting attests to the principles of liberty
and equality, which celebrate self-respect and inclusion. People vote despite
knowing little about politics and economics, while being aware that their sin-
gle vote is quasi-irrelevant in itself. Voting becomes relevant when it is per-
ceived as part of a collective endeavor. Thus, by voting, people may express
their individual autonomy, assert their equal dignity as citizens, and attest to
their trust in concerted action, being confident that their individual choices
will turn into collective outcomes.
Thus left and right, as liberal and conservative, can be seen as social con-
structions, the validity of which is more ecological than psychometric. Their
value derives from their usage and from the functions they exert, such as a
form of tacit knowledge about what matters in politics, as a device to orga-
nize intuitions, feelings, and affinities, and as a signature of one’s own social
identity. Ideological identities allow people to gather together despite signifi-
cant individual differences and to distinguish each other despite individual
similarities.
As the importance of having and keeping a stable identity should not
be underestimated for people’s self-respect and well-being, the contribution

of ideological identification to people’s social identity should also be better

appreciated. Whereas much of literature on left-right and liberal-conserva-
tive ideologies predates the progress made and the contribution of social psy-
chology to better understanding group relations and social identities (Huddy,
2013; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), contemporary scholars may fully appreciate the
function that ideology may exert in attesting to a sense of belonging and in
conferring a social status that is respected by others (Conover & Feldman,
1981; Devine, 2015).
Indeed, identifications along the left-right or liberal-conservative contin-
uums may have an intrinsic value, even if they do not always share the same
meanings or carry the same priorities across different polities. Ideological self-
identification may in fact satisfy people’s need for social inclusion, despite the
diversity of contents assigned to the same poles across polities, and despite
the diversity of meanings that may be assigned to the same poles within the
same polities. The same ideological commitment may express multiple needs,
attest to different beliefs, serve manifold purposes, and predispose to different
actions. Ideological social categorization may provide reliable criteria for the
selection of acquaintances and for the recognition of friends, allies, and foes.
Ultimately, the psychosocial function of ideology may largely subsume the
congruency of its contents and fully justify the heterogeneity of its meanings.
An emphasis on belonging, however, should not lead to an underestima-
tion of the advantage of ideology as a cognitive device for the organization
and stabilization of beliefs across different political contingencies. As policies
continuously change to meet the constraints and opportunities of different
contexts and times, ideology serves citizens and politicians as a compass for
navigating the sea of political ideas and programs and of coalitions, alliances,
and oppositions. Furthermore, it allows citizens to feel they are being consis-
tent with their political ideals, despite the contents of the ideology that may
change to meet the requirements of times and context.
Self-identifying along a unique ideological dimension serves to simplify
people’s political choices where competing ideological positions claim com-
mon values, like liberty and justice, where they seem to pursue common goals,
like economic growth and people’s well-being, and where differences in poli-
cies and programs that are supported are difficult to understand. Although
the underlying principles are complex and difficult to grasp, the traditional
left-right distinction still helps voters to assess political programs, to struc-
ture their judgments about them, and to express their individuality.
Unidimensionality does not exclude people on the opposite side of
the continuum from organizing their opinion about the political world
in different ways. Rather, it leaves to people a large degree of freedom

regarding how to organize their knowledge and how to make sense of their
beliefs, in ways that fit best with their own experiences and personalities
(Cochrane, 2010).
As we will see from the following, the left-right distinction may allow
citizens to leave their signature on politics by voting in accordance with their
personal tendencies. At the same time, left and right, and liberal and con-
servative ideologies may act as attractors that enable people to take a stance
with regard to the positions of others, to strengthen consensus, and to commit
themselves to coordinated action.
People vote despite being aware that their single vote is almost irrel-
evant with respect to the final outcome of an election. People also vote
regardless of their position in society, as voting attests to the personal and
social identity they cherish, to their being persons worthy of respect, to
the equal value of their views as citizens, and to their belongingness and
inclusiveness.
All this leads us to view ideology as more than a device that simply
allows people to cope with complexity and to see it as something that meets
the human fundamental need to express one’s individual personality and to
exert one’s own will, while feeling part of a community.
Evidence and Properties of Traditional Ideological Distinctions

That single ideology dimension can serve as a meaningful predictor of polit-
ical choices is supported by a recent cross-national study by Caprara et al.
(2017a) that examined associations between ideological self-placement and
voting in Australia, Brazil, Chile, Finland, Germany (East and West),1 Greece,
Israel, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom,
and the United States.2 In this study, ideology was measured along one
dimension by using two distinct indicators. The first was a self-placement
item on the left-right scale: “In political matters, people sometimes talk about
‘the right’ and ‘the left.’ How would you place your views on this scale, gener-
ally speaking?” Scores ranged from 1 (left) to 10 (right), without intermedi-
ate labels. The second was a self-placement item on the liberal-conservative
scale: “In political matters, people sometimes talk about ‘conservatives’ and
‘liberals.’ How would you place your views on this scale, generally speak-
ing?” Possible answers were extremely conservative (1); conservative (2);
slightly conservative (3); moderate/middle of the road (4); slightly liberal (5);
liberal (6); extremely liberal (7).
Moreover, respondents were asked to report the political party for
which they voted in the last election. Responses were coded as an ordered

categorical variable, by positioning political parties along the left-right or

the liberal-conservative continuum. The number of categories varied across
nations, from two (US) to six (Israel), depending on the number of political
parties that were considered in each country.
Table 4.1 reports correlations between ideological self-placement on the
left-
right and the liberal- conservative continuum. Correlations between
the two indicators of ideology were significant in all countries, except for
the Ukraine, although the strength of correlations varied widely. The low-
est significant correlation (.12) was found in Slovakia and the highest in the
United Kingdom (.76), where left and right are commonly associated with lib-
eral and conservative, although their meanings do not entirely coincide.
Table 4.1 also presents correlation coefficients of voting with left-right (or
liberal-conservative) ideological self-placement. Based on the common usage
of terms in various countries, we used the conservative-liberal scale in the
United Kingdom and the United States and the left-right scale in all other
TA B L E 4 . 1 . CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE LEFT-RIGHT (L/R)

AND THE LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE (L/C) SCALES (FIRST COLUMN),
AND BETWEEN VOTING AND EITHER L/R OR L/C (SECOND
COLUMN)
L/R—L/C Voting—L/R or L/(C)
Australia .51** .56**

Brazil .38** .48**
Chile .47** .70**
Finland .37** .67**
Germany—East .31** .70**
Germany—West .32** .53**
Greece .61** .61**
Israel .48** .80**
Italy .50** .74**
Poland .33** .49**
Slovakia .12* .39**
Spain .64** .75**
Turkey .45** .60**
Ukraine .07 –.01
UKa .76** .42**
USa .53** .54**
Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01.

a
Correlations with voting are calculated using the liberal-conservative scale.
Data from Caprara et al. (2017a).

countries. Correlations were substantial and significant in all countries except

Ukraine.
Ideology accounted for voting not only in established democracies but
also in post-communist societies, like Poland and Slovakia, where voters have
little familiarity with representative democracy, where the left had been asso-
ciated for half a century with forms of socialism that gave little space to lib-
eral ideals, and where the demise of socialist ideals has carried tremendous
changes in the political landscape. Ukraine, another post-communist coun-
try, constituted the only country that showed near zero correlations between
ideology and voting. Here, the traditional ideological self-identifications of
Western democracies do not correspond to each other and appear to have no
significant impact on voting.
In this regard, one may speculate about the different historical vicissitudes
and political traditions of Ukraine in comparison to Poland and Slovakia. It
is possible that Ukraine, both before and during the time of the Soviet Union,
was more estranged from the ideas of intellectuals and the political debates
that formed the basis of the distinctive characteristics of left-right and liberal-
conservative ideologies than was the case in Poland and Slovakia. After the
fall of Berlin Wall and the disintegration of Soviet Union, both Poland and
Slovakia joined the European Union and NATO, whereas Ukraine continued
to remain under Russian political influence, although reluctantly. Indeed, it
would be helpful if future studies could investigate further the extent to which
past and contingent ideological forces impinge on voting in post-communist
countries, whose transition to democratic institutions is still far from being
fully achieved.
With regard to Western democracies, above findings show that left-lib-
eral and right-conservative self-placement still holds, even in countries where
opposing political coalitions have adopted more pragmatic platforms that are
much less distinctive than in the past in order to attract a wide portion of
the electorate. Likely, the more party coalitions lead to bipolar polities and
pose a choice between two major options, the more the traditional ideological
divide can serve as a knowledge and communication compass that helps citi-
zens to orient themselves in a complex political universe. The same compass
may also provide scientists with a quick, stable, and comprehensive view of
people’s political orientation better than any other single measure of political
attitudes.
As anticipated earlier and attested to in the following paragraphs, self-
placement on the left-r ight or liberal-conservative continuum may have an
affective value in itself. This is because it enables voters to make choices

that accord with their basic dispositions and with the values they have
appropriated over the course of socialization. It helps voters express them-
selves and sort the political world into “us” and “them,” and ultimately
express their own individuality while feeling part of a more global political
community.
In this regard, there is a large body of literature that attests to the role
of basic personality traits in predisposing people to take sides ideologically.
Likewise, there is a growing body of literature that supports the role of basic
values in subsuming traits and mediating their impact on political choices. As
voters’ personalities, namely their dispositions and value preferences, match
the contents of ideologies, political elites are obliged to examine whether their
offers match voters’ proclivities more than before.
In several countries, people have been found to change their political
preferences, to swing across the entire political offer, or to abstain from vot-
ing. Yet a change of political preferences does not necessarily reflect ideo-
logical changes. In certain cases, it may reflect the need to strengthen one’s
ideological commitment by moving further to the political right or left. In
other cases, instead, it corresponds to changes in the political offerings of
parties that have required to adjust their programs in line with contingent
pressures and priorities in order to maintain their electorate and to attract
new voters. Only in certain cases does change in voting reflect a real change
of ideology due to a revision of an individual’s worldviews and a recalibra-
tion of priorities.
In particular in multiparty systems, change in voting is rarely accompa-
nied by feelings of guilt or betrayal, as it seldom implies a pervasive change
of one’s attitude and opinions on substantial political issues. Rather, dif-
ferent perceptions of political options allow people to allocate their vote to
different parties while preserving their own sense of personal ideological
coherence.
The higher volatility of the electorate forces parties to continuously adjust
their agenda to fit with the electorate’s expectations, although this may lead
to reduce the distance and distinctiveness of their political platforms on
most substantial issues. In most established democracies, few would dispute
the importance of granting everybody the basic rights of health, education,
and respect. Thus, most conservatives would agree with liberals that people
in need should be granted what is required for a decent life. Likewise, none
would contest the importance of promoting individuals’ freedom, talents, and
merit. Thus, most liberals would agree that progress largely rests upon hard
work, entrepreneurship, and self-discipline. In this way, the agendas of both

the right and the left have to struggle to balance welfare aspirations against
market competiveness and limited resources against unlimited aspirations.
This occurs in most European democracies, as well as in Canada, the United
States, and other established democracies, although to a different degree.
Over time, party identification has become less stringent, while the tradi-
tional ties of family, social class, and religion have significantly relaxed. The
divide among ideologies has become vaguer, and the appropriation and use
of ideology have become more personalized. The more ideologies correspond
to political worldviews that accord with personal inclinations and values
rather than to party identification, the more citizens feel free to transfer their
preferences to the parties and coalitions that appear more able to interpret
their views and to meet current challenges.
In reviewing the current literature on the relevance and personal deter-
minants of the ideological divide, one has the impression that the empha-
sis on differences has led to the commonalities between left and right being
obscured. Likewise, the attention paid to stability may have led to the mal-
leability of political preferences being underestimated. In reality, one should
note that in several cases what distinguishes the choices of right versus left is
more a matter of contingent priorities than of substance.
Liberty, equality, and fairness are ideals that have nurtured political
thought and action over the centuries and that today represent the common
core of both the right and the left of established democracies. As we will see
later, in many cases the value that ranks first among right-leaning voters
ranks second among left-leaning voters, and vice versa. In several cases, vot-
ers on the right and on the left make the same choices when asked to indicate
the two or three values they see as most important.
Competing ideologies should not necessarily be viewed as opposite to
each other, in particular when facing pragmatic solutions that are largely con-
strained by given resources and opportunities. Yet they can be crucial to ori-
ent citizens’ political choices and to express their individualities and social
identities.
In the following, we present findings that further attest to the vitality and
functions of the left-right and liberal-conservative divide as grounded in indi-
viduals’ personality. These findings show that ideological differences corre-
spond to individuals’ proclivities that, in concert with personal experiences,
result in values that substantiate the pattern of beliefs and aspirations that
distinguish the two ideologies.
Caution, however, must be taken against viewing differences as mostly
divisive. In reality, competing political views are needed to make democ-
racy work when surface diversities rest upon core commonalities that hold

the pursuit of common good as the ultimate end of political action. To

this end, personality psychology brings to politics the knowledge that is
needed to understand how rival coalitions may work for the betterment of
democracy.
PERSONALITY BASIC TRAITS
Though many studies have investigated the relationship between individual
differences in traits and political choice (e.g., Block & Block, 2006; Elms, 1976;
Eysenck, 1954; Tomkins, 1963), we focus our attention on the studies that have
used the Big Five Model of personality. As argued in previous chapters, this
model provides a consensual description of the main surface behavioral ten-
dencies of personality that has proved to be generalizable to different lan-
guages and cultures (Pervin & John, 1999).
Studies conducted on a variety of samples drawn from different countries
have shown that distinct personality profiles on the Big Five factors of person-
ality were associated with a variety of political outcomes, such as ideologi-
cal self-placement, voting choice, candidate preference, party affiliation, and
policy preferences (Mondak, 2010). First, McCrae (1996) pointed to openness to
experience as the personality trait that mostly distinguishes between liberal
and conservative in the political realm. In his conceptualization, this trait is
characterized mainly by fantasy, active imagination, openness to feelings and
to actions, and tolerance of ideas and values. McCrae also notes that “within
Western societies, open individuals have an affinity for liberal, progressive,
left-wing political views, whereas closed individuals prefer conservative, tra-
ditional, right-wing views”(McCrae, 1996, p. 325). In his review on the social
consequences of openness, he reports the results of several studies that provide
“ample evidence that political conservatism is in fact related to psychological
conservatism” (McCrae, 1996, p. 325), with low sensation-seeking, behavioral
rigidity, social conformity, and conventionality in moral reasoning as its major
expressions and correlates.
Trapnell (1994), using a sample from the United States, reported nega-
tive correlations between a measure of political conservatism and scores on
the openness to experience scale of the Revised NEO Personality Inventory
(NEO-PI-R; Costa & McCrae, 1989, 1992). And Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann
(2003) found that liberals tend to score significantly higher than conserva-
tives on openness as measured by the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI;
Gosling et al., 2003), a short measure of the Big Five. Conservatives, by con-
trast, scored higher than liberals on conscientiousness, a trait that includes
the tendency to obey social rules calling for impulse control.

Using large samples of US college students and other respondents, Carney,

Jost, Gosling, Niederhoffer, and Potter (2008) examined correlations between
political orientation and scores on Big Five dimensions from the NEO-PI-R
and the Big Five Inventory (BFI; John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991). Findings
revealed that liberals scored higher than conservatives on self-report mea-
sures of openness, being more open-minded, creative, and novelty seek-
ing, whereas conservatives scored higher on conscientiousness, being more
orderly, conventional, and organized than liberals.
Barbaranelli, Caprara, Vecchione, and Fraley (2007) used a set of 25 adjec-
tive markers of the Big Five to identify distinct personality profiles among
voters for the two US presidential candidates in the 2004 election. Intention
to vote for George W. Bush was associated with higher scores on conscien-
tiousness and lower scores on openness; while the opposite personality pro-
file characterized people inclined to vote for John Kerry. In relation to this,
Mondak and Halperin (2008) showed that people scoring higher on open-
ness are more likely to identify themselves as Democrats, while those scoring
higher on conscientiousness are more likely to identify as Republicans. These
findings were further corroborated in research by Gerber and colleagues,
based on a large, nationally representative sample of US voters (Gerber,
Huber, Doherty, Dowling, & Ha, 2010).
Similar studies were carried out in several European countries. In
Germany, Riemann, Grubich, Hempel, Mergl, and Richter (1993) reported a
negative relation between the openness dimension of the NEO-PI-R (Costa
& McCrae, 1992) and a measure of conservatism. More recently, Schoen and
Schumann (2007) used a shortened version of the NEO-PI-R (i.e., the NEO-
Five-Factor Inventory, NEO-FFI; Costa & McCrae, 1992) to investigate the
associations of personality traits with voter choice in Germany. They found
that supporters of leftist parties (Social Democratic Party, Left Party, and
Green Party) scored higher on openness and agreeableness, whereas support-
ers of rightist parties (Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union,
and Free Democratic Party) scored higher on conscientiousness. Analogous
results were found in Poland and Belgium by Van Hiel, Kossowska, and
Mervielde (2000), who reported a negative relation of the NEO-FFI openness
scale with right-wing political ideology in samples of students and adults.
In Italy, Caprara and colleagues found that self-reported personalities of
center-left voters scored higher on openness and agreeableness and lower in
conscientiousness and energy/extraversion3 than center-right voters (Caprara,
Barbaranelli, & Zimbardo, 1999; Caprara et al., 2006; Caprara, Schwartz,
Vecchione, & Barbaranelli, 2008). These findings, generalized across various
Italian samples collected during diverse election campaigns using the Big

2008 2006 2001 1996

0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
En Ag Co St Op
–0.05
–0.1
–0.15
–0.2
Figure 4.1 Correlations of the Big Five with voting for center-left (1) and center-
right (0) Italian coalitions (coefficients for each trait were estimated by partialing
out the other traits).
Positive correlations indicate higher scores for center-left voters; negative correlations indi-
cate higher scores for center-right voters.
En = Energy/Extraversion; Ag = Agreeableness; Co = Conscientiousnes; St = Emotional sta-
bility; Op = Openness.
Five Questionnaire (BFQ; Caprara, Barbaranelli, Borgogni, & Perugini, 1993),

can be seen in Figure 4.1.
A recent cross-cultural study explored whether the impact of traits on
voting is consistent across five European countries that differ considerably
in terms of political systems, parties, and democratic tradition (Vecchione,
Schoen, González Castro, Cieciuch, Pavlopoulos, & Caprara, 2011). The study
first considered Italy, Spain, Germany, and Greece, four countries in which
the political system is essentially organized around two ideological poles
(left and right), and features two dominant parties, one for the center-left, one
for the center-right. It then extended the analysis to Poland, where the main
electoral competition was between two right-wing parties: the Civic Platform
party (PO), which is more left-wing on social issues, and the Law and Justice
party (PiS), which is more left-wing on economic issues. This represents an
unusual case in the European political scene. While the study focused on vot-
ers’ choices concerning the two main national parties, voters of minor parties

were included when number of cases was large enough to obtain reliable
estimates.
In Italy, Spain, and Poland, traits were assessed through a shortened
version of the BFQ (Caprara, Barbaranelli, Borgogni, & Perugini, 1993). In
Germany and Greece, the NEO-FFI was used. Results showed that open-
ness significantly predicted the choice between the two main center- left
and center-right parties in Italy, Spain, and Germany. It also predicted the
choice between two rightist parties with different policy stances, as in Poland,
but failed to discriminate between center-right and center-left parties with
blurred ideological boundaries, as in Greece. Conscientiousness was also a
valid predictor of voting behavior, although its effect tended to be smaller
than that of openness.
Differences between nations in the role of traits in affecting voter choice
appeared to be related to differences in the salience of policy dimensions in
political competition. For example, the role of energy/extraversion in affect-
ing political choice seems to be a distinctive feature of the Italian case. This
trait was clearly related to the primary aims and images conveyed by the
center-right, which in recent decades campaigned mostly on entrepreneur-
ship and business freedom (Caprara et al., 2006).
A particularly interesting finding was that the five personality fac-
tors failed to differentiate between center- left and center-
right voters in
Greece. This result might be accounted for by the decreasing ideological
differences between the two main Greek parties (New Democracy [ND]
and the Panhellenic Socialist Movement [PASOK]), which shared common
roots in the post–World War II civil war that ended with the defeat of the
communist army.4
When third parties, such as the orthodox communists KKE and the radi-
cal left SYRIZA, were included, openness exhibited a considerable effect on
voter choice for parties on the extreme left compared to center-left and center-
right parties. This finding suggests that disregarding third parties or conflat-
ing them with main parties may lead to biased results concerning the impact
of personality on voter choice.
Whereas the findings just discussed are limited to the United States and
European countries, recent data collected in Chile provide insights concern-
ing the links between traits and political preferences in cultures that previous
works have neglected. In Chile, as in most other countries, openness pre-
dicted a leftist self-placement, whereas conscientiousness predicted a rightist
self-placement. Moreover, conscientiousness predicted preference for a right-
wing political party (i.e., the Independent Democratic Union) versus parties
that are located more on the left of the political spectrum. Taken together, the

Big Five accounted for 4% of the variance in ideological self-placement and 8%

of the variance in voting choice.
In sum, openness was consistently associated with a preference for politi-
cal programs that encourage pluralism and multiculturalism. This trait rep-
resents the strongest determinant of political orientation in a wide range of
countries with different experiences of democracy. Higher scores on consci-
entiousness went with preferences for political programs that promote indi-
vidual entrepreneurship and belief in the virtues of a free market. Indeed, it is
very clear that openness predisposes people to lean to the left in the domain
of Agency, whereas conscientiousness predisposes them to lean to the right in
the domain of Communion.
Unlike openness and conscientiousness, the validity of which is gener-
ally consistent and robust, energy/extraversion, agreeableness, and emotional
stability have shown weaker and less consistent relationships with political
orientation. The criterion validity of agreeableness cannot be generalized to
all countries examined in the studies reported earlier. Agreeable people are
sympathetic and altruistic, so they may be predisposed to support the welfare
state (Schoen & Schumann, 2007). This trait was found to be related to a pref-
erence for liberal ideologies in some European countries, like Italy, Germany,
and Spain, whereas in the United States the results are mixed. The relation
between agreeableness and political orientation would seem to be complex
and is likely to vary with different cultural contexts and political systems,
with different facets of the trait (Jost, 2006) and with different dimensions
(social and economic) of political ideology (Gerber, Huber, Ha, Dowling, &
Doherty, 2009). As shown by Hirsh and colleagues (2010), distinct components
of agreeableness, such as empathy and politeness, may exert countervailing
effects, with the former predisposing people to left-liberal preferences and the
latter to right-conservative preferences.
Emotional stability played a marginal role in most of the research we
examined. Exceptions were found in Germany and the United States, where
this trait predicted ideological self-placement, although in different directions.
Whereas people high in emotional stability showed a preference for liberal
parties in Germany (Schoen & Schumann, 2007), the inverse relationship was
found in the United States, where people with high levels of emotional stabil-
ity were more oriented toward conservative policies (Mondak & Halperin,
2008) and political parties (Gerber et al., 2010). These effects, however, were
considerably smaller than those found for conscientiousness, agreeableness,
and openness.
Finally, energy/extraversion predicted political orientation only in Italy.
This seems to represents a distinctive feature of the Italian case, where the

personality of Silvio Berlusconi, the leader of the center-right coalition for over
two decades, was repeatedly associated with plenty of energy and successful
entrepreneurship. There is little empirical evidence that energy/extraversion
predicts political orientation in other countries (e.g., Jost, 2006).
Taken together, the variance of political orientation accounted for by the
Big Five ranged from 5% to 29% across samples and countries. Despite the
difference of issues under contention and of meanings that “left” and “right”
may take in different countries, the patterns of significant relations between
traits and political ideology are remarkably similar.
The variability in the strength of the effect that traits exert on voters’ pref-
erence may stem from a number of factors. These include the fundamental
policy cleavages that characterize each country, the instrument used to assess
the Big Five, the outcome variable (e.g., voting or ideological self-placement),
and the numbers and types of parties taken into account. Regardless of these
factors, the effect of the Big Five was consistently higher than that exerted by
basic demographic variables typically used as predictors by political scien-
tists, like gender, age, income, and educational level (e.g., Caprara et al., 2006;
Gerber et al., 2009), which in most cases do not account for more than 10% of
variance.
Beyond the Big Five, there is no evidence of other basic traits, such as
self-esteem or positivity, being significantly related to political preference.
For example, in the meta-analysis by Jost et al. (2003a), the link between self-
esteem and preference for conservative ideologies was found to be particu-
larly weak and in most cases non-significant (the reported correlation was
–.09). In Italy, neither self-esteem nor positivity resulted in a significant rela-
tion to political preference.
While these and the other findings discussed earlier attest to stable and
consistent patterns of relations between personality dispositions and ideo-
logical preferences, at least among citizens of Western established democ-
racies, the extent to which traits constrain or simply accompany political
choices still remains unclear In this regard, other findings suggest that
personality differences between liberals and conservatives begin in early
childhood and affect political orientations throughout life (Block & Block,
2006), that parenting attitudes and child temperament in early childhood
affect ideological orientation in young adulthood (Fraley, Griffin, Belsky, &
Roisman, 2012), and that political ideologies are shaped by genetic inheri-
tance (Alford et al., 2005; Funk, 2013; Hatemi et al., 2007; Kandler, Bleidorn, &
Riemann, 2012). Data from an ongoing longitudinal study carried out in
Genzano, a small town a few miles south of Rome, showed that ideological
self-placement was substantially stable when monitored over a period of

eight years (Caprara & Vecchione, unpublished data). The correlation coef-
ficient across time (i.e., from 2004 to 2012) was .74 (p < .001).
One might guess that the more preference and engagement rest upon
dispositions that are largely due to genetic influence, the less their change
will be manageable over the life course. Yet, it is unlikely that heredity
dictates political and ideological preferences invariantly across politi-
cal contexts where political offerings are different and ideological cleav-
ages reflect contingent and contextual issues and priorities. Rather, it is
likely that genes set potentials that largely turn into habits and prefer-
ences through experiences that are socially situated. As has been argued
(Franklin, 2004), first encounters with voting extend their influence over
the entire life course to a notable extent, with voters and abstainers repeat-
ing their original choices at any election. After all, one may guess that early
choices, whatever their distal determinants, tend to be repeated over the life
course quasi-automatically as habits that originally reflect the expressive
value of voting, and that later lead to ideological self-placement through
self-perception mechanisms (Bem, 1972). Yet, it may be difficult to establish
the extent to which ideology drives voting versus the extent to which vot-
ing reinforces ideology.
Ultimately, the habit of voting is far from irrational to the extent that its
negligible objective impact is largely compensated by its symbolic value. Thus
it would be an unwarranted conclusion to hold that stability is due to heredity
more than to experience.
In this regard the metaphor of “elective affinities” used by Jost (2009) pro-
vides an elegant solution to the traditional dilemma about the primacy of
person or situation. According to Jost, ideological preferences result from a
combination of “top-down” processes associated with the political offerings
of political elites and of “bottom-up” processes associated with the psycho-
logical predispositions and receptiveness of citizens. Indeed, it seems likely
that in most democratic societies bottom-up cognitive and motivational pro-
cesses play a significant role in structuring individuals’ ideological prefer-
ences. The more the electorate is composed of educated citizens and the more
polities provide a diversified range of possible options, the greater the room
for the influence of personality dispositions.
NEEDS, MOTIVES, AND BASIC VALUES

As already mentioned in Chapter 2, Jost et al. (2003a) see political ideology as a
form of motivated social cognition, the manifestations of which can be found
in brain functioning (Jost & Amodio, 2012; Jost et al., 2014). Indeed, findings

from a meta-analysis that included 88 samples, 12 countries, and 22,818 cases

not only attest to the function of existential needs for safety and reassurance,
and epistemic needs for knowledge and meaning in social adaptation, but
also to the major role they play in orienting political preferences. For example,
among existential motives, the need to reduce and manage social, economic,
and political threat (average r was .47), fear and prevention of loss (r = .18), and
fear of death (r = .50) were found to be positively related to political conserva-
tism (Jost et al., 2003a). Conservatism, in turn, was found to be associated with
greater neural sensitivity to threat and loss, as noted in Chapter 2.
Positive relationships were also found with need for cognitive closure (i.e.,
an epistemic motive to reach a firm, solid, knowledge in a given topic with
the aim of avoiding uncertainty and ambiguity; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996),
as well as with psychological needs for order and structure (r = .26). Need
for closure was found to be related to conservative and right-wing political
orientation in several countries, namely the United States, Poland, Italy, and
Germany, accounting for a proportion of variance that ranged from 2% to 8%
across cultures (Chirumbolo, 2002; Golec de Zavala & Van Bergh, 2007; Jost
et al., 1999; Kemmelmeier, 1997).
Although available results are based on correlational data, it is reason-
able to expect that the needs detailed in the preceding play a role in orienting
individuals’ political choices. Yet, one cannot say what is their unique contri-
bution with regard to personality traits, since there does not appear to be any
systematic research designed to address this issue. Nor can one say whether
such needs still contribute to political preferences once values, which are
shown increasingly by the literature to be important, are taken into account
in addition to traits.
The importance of values for political behavior has been championed by
the seminal contributions of Rokeach (1973, 1979), and later acknowledged by a
number of scholars, who pointed to the central role of values in politics as major
organizers of political judgments and preferences (Feldman, 2013; Knutsen,
1995a, 1995b; Mitchell, Tetlock, Mellers, & Ordonez, 1993; Schwartz, 1994). In
the last decades, the contribution of Schwartz and his colleagues has led to a
comprehensive theory on the nature, organization, and function of basic values
(Schwartz, 1992, 2005, 2006; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987). This theory has, in turn,
paved the way for systematic research and comparisons among countries on the
impact that values exert on both voting choice and ideological self-placement.
In numerous studies based on Schwarz’s work, basic values were mea-
sured with the Portrait Values Questionnaire (see Chapter 2 in this volume).
In particular, studies conducted using samples drawn from different coun-
tries have shown that Schwartz’s 10 basic values discriminated significantly

between voters of different political parties, and that the relevance of par-
ticular types of values to voting is a function of the ideological content of
the political discourse (Barnea & Schwartz, 1998). In the 1988 Israeli elections,
for instance, voters for Israeli left-liberal parties attributed higher importance
to values related to self-direction and universalism, which endorse individ-
ual autonomy and self-actualization, and the acceptance of others as equal,
respectively, than voters for right-conservative parties. Voters for Israeli con-
servative parties gave higher importance to security values, which endorse
protection of the social order and of the status quo, than voters of liberal par-
ties (Barnea & Schwartz, 1998).
In the 2001 Italian elections, voters for the center-left attributed higher
importance to the self-transcendence values of universalism and benevo-
lence than voters for the center-right, who gave higher importance to the self-
enhancement and conservation values of power, achievement, security, and
conformity (Caprara et al., 2006). These results accord with the traditional
view in Western democracies that sees right and conservative ideologies as
mostly concerned with individual success and social order, and liberal ideolo-
gies as mostly concerned with equality and social justice.
Links between values and left-right ideology have recently been inves-
tigated by four cross-national studies that include a large number of coun-
tries (Aspelund, Lindeman, & Verkasalo, 2013; Caprara et al., 2017a; Piurko,
Schwartz, & Davidov, 2011; Thorisdottir et al., 2007). Thorisdottir and col-
leagues (2007) analyzed data from 19 countries included in the second round
(2002–2003) of the European Social Survey (ESS) to examine how resistance to
change and acceptance of inequality are related to left-right orientation, and
the extent to which the pattern of relations can be generalized across western
and eastern European countries. Resistance to change was operationalized
with a single item of the PVQ that measures tradition: “Tradition is important to
her/him. She/he tries to follow the customs handed down by her/his religion or her/his
family.” Acceptance of inequality was operationalized with an item that mea-
sures universalism: “She/he thinks it is important that every person in the world
should be treated equally. She/he believes everyone should have equal opportunities in
life” (reverse-coded).
Results showed that resistance to change was related with a right-versus
left-wing orientation, and that this relationship was stronger in western than
in eastern Europe. The Czech Republic was the only country in which a null
relationship was found. Acceptance of inequality was also related to right-
wing political orientation, but only in western countries (no significant asso-
ciations were found in eastern countries like the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, and Slovenia).

Similar results were found by Piurko and colleagues (2011), who employed
the same wave, with the addition of one country (France). They used the
whole set of Schwartz’s basic values, which were measured with a shortened
version of the PVQ, and made a distinction between countries, which were
classified into three groups. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom were categorized as secular and liberal countries that share a politi-
cal tradition of liberal democracy and are all welfare-state systems. Greece,
Ireland, Israel, Poland, Portugal, and Spain were categorized as traditional
countries, where religion plays a pivotal role in the political discourse and
a substantial part of the public is religiously active. The Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia were categorized as post-communist countries,
as they share the experience both of an extended period of imposed com-
munist rule and of a subsequent collapse of the communist regime and an
opening to the West.
Results showed that in both liberal and traditional countries, self-
transcendence values (i.e., universalism and benevolence) explained a left
orientation, whereas conservation values (i.e., conformity, tradition, and secu-
rity) explained a right orientation. Values, by contrast, had little explanatory
power in post-communist countries.
Aspelund and colleagues (2013) analyzed data from 15 western European
countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
and the United Kingdom). Thirteen former communist central and eastern
European countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine)
were included in the third (2006–2007) and fourth (2008–2009) rounds of the
ESS. This study found that conservation (which is referred to as resistance to
change) versus openness to change was significantly related to right-wing ori-
entation in almost all western countries (the median value of the correlation
coefficients was .16). Relationships in central and eastern European countries,
by contrast, were much less consistent (correlations were evenly distributed
between positive, negative, and not significant).
Self-enhancement versus self-transcendence (a proxy of acceptance of
inequality) was significantly related to right-wing orientation in the vast
majority of western European countries, although more weakly than resis-
tance to change (the median value of the correlation coefficients was .09). Few
correlations were found to be significant among central and eastern European
countries.

The study by Caprara and colleagues (2017a), to which we referred earlier,

extended the analysis to several countries not included in previous studies,
among which were Turkey (a society at the crossroads of Europe and Asia),
and four non-European countries from three continents: the United States,
Australia, Brazil, and Chile.5
As shown in Table 4.2, universalism values were the most consistently
related to a preference for a left (or liberal) ideology: correlations were signifi-
cant in each country except for Poland, Slovakia, and Turkey. Self-direction
was associated with a left (or liberal) ideology in most countries, although to
a lesser extent. Values related to a preference for right (or conservative) ideol-
ogy are the conservation values of tradition, security, and conformity. The
proportion of variance in ideological self-placement jointly accounted for by
basic values ranged from .04 (Slovakia) to .26 (Italy, Finland).
Among post- communist countries, both East Germany and Poland
aligned with the western democracies in showing significant correlation
TAB L E 4 . 2 . CORRELATIONS OF BASIC VALUES WITH LEFT-RIGHT

(OR LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE) IDEOLOGY
SE CO TR BE UN SD ST HE AC PO
Australia .21** .24** .15 –.16* –.38** –.27** –.07 –.08 .14 .24**
Brazil .16** .23** .14** –.14** –.33** –.15** –.12** –.10** .12** .13**
Chile .18** .23** .14** –.06 –.25** –.11 –.09 –.05 –.05 .04
Finland .31** .26** .12* –.14** –.42** -.14** –.06 –.11* .04 .10
Germany— .14 .05 .21** –.10 –.24** –.06 –.10 –.04 –.02 .08
East
Germany— .24** .22** .25** –.13** –.26** –.15** –.08 –.13** –.01 –.02
West
Greece .24** .05 .23** –.24** –.43** –.15** –.14* –.04 .19** .15**
Israel .21** .13** .38** –.10 –.28** –.15** –.08 –.09 –.07 –.01
Italy .27** .20** .13** –.24** –.42** –.18** –.12* –.04 .17** .21**
Poland .15** .07 .21** .08 .05 .02 –.12** –.17** –.15** –.17**
Slovakia –.11 –.06 .02 .11 .03 .05 .03 –.05 –.02 .03
Spain .06 .19** .26** –.14* –.35** –.24** .00 –.06 .09 .17**
Turkey .15** .12* .24** .02 –.07 –.18** –.08 –.10 –.10 .00
UK .27** .20** .25** –.22** –.37** –.27** –.13* –.04 .12* .15**
US .11* .10 .14** –.04 –.24** –.06 .05 –.05 .02 .02
Notes: *p < .05; **p < .01; SE = Security; CO = Conformity; TR = Tradition; BE = Benevolence;
UN = Universalism; SD = Self-direction; ST = Stimulation; HE = Hedonism; AC = Achievement; PO = Power.

between tradition and right-wing ideology, but only East Germany showed
a positive correlation between left-wing ideology and universalism. Poland,
instead, showed positive correlations between left-wing ideology and self-
enhancement values like power and achievement, in contrast to what is usu-
ally found in western countries. The case of Slovakia is unique in that all
correlations between basic values and ideological self-placement were close
to zero and were not statistically significant. Finally, Turkey aligned with
Western democracies concerning relations between right-wing ideology and
conservation values, and with regard to relations between left-wing ideology
and self-direction values.
The same analyses were performed at the level of the higher- order
dimensions. Table 4.3 presents the correlations between ideological self-
placement and the two bipolar dimensions of values, namely conservation
versus openness to change, and self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence. As
can be observed, a right (or conservative) orientation is related to a prefer-
ence for conservation and self-enhancement values over self-transcendence
and openness to change values. In most countries, left-right ideologies were
TABLE 4.3. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN LEFT-RIGHT (OR LIBERAL-

CONSERVATIVE) IDEOLOGIES AND VALUE DIMENSIONS
S-Tran vs. S-Enhan Cons vs. OpChg R-squared
Australia –.14* –.40** 18**

Brazil –.20** –.24** .12**
Chile –.08 –.21** .06**
Finland –.22** –.23** .13**
Germany—West –.09* –.27** .09**
Germany—East –.11 –.17* .05**
Greece –.30** –.22** .18**
Israel –.08 –.27** .09**
Italy –.30** –.24** .20**
Poland .15** –.16** .04**
Slovakia .01 .04 .00
Spain –.23** –.23** .10**
Turkey .03 –.20** .05**
Ukraine .01 .05 .00
UK –.28** –.39** .23**
US .03 –.20** .05**
Notes. * p < .05; ** p < .01; S-Tran = Self-Transcendence; Cons = Conservation;

OpChg = Openness to Change; S-Enhan = Self-Enhancement.

distinguished more clearly along the conservation versus openness dimen-

sion than along the self enhancement versus self-transcendence dimension.
In a further analysis using data from the study by Caprara and colleagues
(2017a), basic personal values were considered as predictors of voting behav-
ior. As shown in Table 4.4, voters of right-wing and conservative parties
attributed more importance to conservation values than voters of left-wing
and liberal parties (except for in Slovakia, Turkey, and Ukraine). Voters of
left-wing and liberal parties, by contrast, attributed more importance to self-
transcendence values than voters of right-wing and conservative parties, with
the significant exceptions of Ukraine, Poland, and Slovakia, where the oppo-
site pattern was found. It is likely that these differences reflect the diverse
associations of self-interest with political preferences among non-communist
and post-communist countries. Whereas conservation is the distinctive value
of the right across all countries, openness to change seems most strongly
associated with self-enhancement in post-communist countries, where open
to change voters are more likely to report individually centered values, like
power and achievement.
TA B L E 4 . 4 . CORRELATIONS OF THE FOUR HIGHER-ORDER

VALUES WITH VOTING
OpChg Cons S-Tran S-Enhan
Australia –.08 .31** –.20* .21**

Brazil –.08* .11* –.07 .08*
Chile .03 .19** –.02 .07
Finland –.06 .29** –.17** .06
E/Germany .08 .30** –.06 .22**
W/Germany –.01 .30** –.08 .09
Greece –.09 .23** –.06 .16*
Israel .03 .35** –.06 .08
Italy –.08 .22** –.20** .23**
Poland –.07 .15** .07 –.14**
Slovakia –.15* .02 –.02 –.12*
Spain .03 .26** –.10 .21**
Turkey –.22** .07 –.07 –.10
Ukraine –.07 –.03 –.05 –.10*
UK –.03 .12* –.07 .05
US –.03 .19** –.02 .05
Note. * p < .05; ** p < .01; S-Tran = Self-Transcendence; Cons = Conservation;

OpChg = Openness to Change; S-Enhan = Self-Enhancement.

Figure 4.2 compares the proportion of variance in voting accounted for

by basic values and ideology in each country. As can be observed, although
the contribution of values was substantial in most countries, ideology
always accounted for more variance than the 10 basic values taken together.
Moreover, when ideology was taken into account, the contribution of values
decreased substantially. Correlations between ideology and voting, by con-
trast, remained high and significant, even after differences in basic values
were taken into account.
From all the findings, however, it is evident that the role of basic values in
making sense of political choices cannot be ignored. Rather, they support our
reasoning regarding the manifold functions of ideology. Nevertheless, while
values account for much of the cognitive contents of ideology, they cannot
represent all its motivational components.
The longitudinal study conducted in Genzano, Italy, revealed that
the pattern of relationships between values and ideology tends to remain
approximately the same over time (Caprara & Vecchione, unpublished data).
Ideology Basic Values

0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
rm y/E
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il
ly
ey
ia
ile
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rm nd
Sl nd
ce
K.
S.
W
az
ai
Ita
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ak
ra
rk
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y/
U.
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la
ee
Sp
Br
tr
n
nl
Is
Tu
ov
Po
an
a
Gr
s
Fi
Au
Ge
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Figure 4.2 Proportion of variance of voting accounted for by left-right (or liberal-

conservative) ideology and basic values.

Figure 4.3 reports the correlations between basic values and ideological self-
placement at three time points that span over a period of eight years. This is
not surprising, given that (a) basic values, as abstract, fundamental principles,
are typically quite stable across time, changing only slowly (e.g., Rokeach,
1973; Schwartz, 2006); and (b) that left-right (or liberal-conservative) ideology
corresponds to a set of beliefs that tends to remain stable over the course of
time, as reported earlier.
In sum, findings from studies presented here revealed that the pattern of
correlations between values and ideology may vary across polities, depending
on the diversities of historical and contextual situations. Diversities are partic-
ularly evident in post-communist countries, where ideological self-placement
may carry different meanings. It is likely that decades of real socialism left
various legacies after its dissolution that still account for diversities and
exceptions to what occurs in established democracies. Among major differ-
ences, self-enhancement values in these countries do not correlate (Slovakia,
Ukraine) or correlate positively (Poland) with left ideological self-placement.
This might reflect a reaction to the imposed collectivism of the past, which
leads left-wing voters in these countries to cherish values that promote self-
interest, personal freedom, and individualism. Furthermore, as stated by
Jost, Basevich, Dickson, and Noorbaloochi (2015), one cannot exclude that the
2004 2008 2012

0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
–0.05
–0.1
–0.15
–0.2
–0.25
–0.3
SEC CON TRA BEN UNI SDI STI HED ACH POW
Figure 4.3 Correlations between basic values and ideological self-placement of

Italian respondents at three time points that span a period of eight years.

“elective affinities” model of political ideology applies better to Western-style

democracies, in which citizens have been relatively free to choose parties that
match their psychological needs.
Commonality among Rival Voters

Analyzing the significant differences in importance reported by left-liberal
and right-conservative voters to various values should not mean that com-
monalities in priorities are unimportant. A study by Caprara and Vecchione
(2015) reports the pair of values with the highest scores of importance among
left-liberal and right-conservative voters of a number of countries. Results are
reported in Table 4.5.
In most countries, self-direction is among the two values that scored
highest in importance for both left-liberal and right-conservative voters. In
Australia, Brazil, Germany (East and West), Israel, Ukraine, and the United
Kingdom, it is the most important, regardless of voters’ political orientation.
Left-wing voters in Poland and the United States and right-wing voters in
Greece and Italy also rated self-direction as most important. It is plausible
to assume that autonomy of thought and action, among basic needs, is the
most congenial to democracy and as such is valued highly across the political
ideological divide.
Universalism and benevolence are values more frequently distinctive of
the left, but are also found among those rated as most important for the right
in several countries. Specifically, universalism was the value type rated most
important among both left-and right-wing voters in Finland, and among left-
wing voters in Chile, Greece, Italy, and Spain. Benevolence was the value type
rated most important among both left-and right-wing voters in Slovakia, and
among right-wing voters in Chile, Poland, Spain, and the United States.
Security was found to be a distinctive value of the right, but with varia-
tion in ranking across countries. It was ranked first among voters of the right
in Turkey, and second among right-wing voters in Australia, Greece, and Italy.
In Turkey it was rated second among the left-wing voters. Conformity, tra-
dition, achievement, and power were moderately correlated with ideological
self-placement in several countries, but none of them can be viewed among
the most important values.
From these findings, one may argue that the value priorities of right-
and left-wing voters are different, but not extremely so, since commonalities
allow for convergences on shared priorities. For example, both left-liberal
and right-conservative voters in most countries rank self-direction as most
important among the agentic and person-focused values, and universalism

TAB L E 4 . 5 . VALUE PRIORITIES AMONG LEFT (OR LIBERAL) AND RIGHT

(OR CONSERVATIVE) VOTERS
Left (or Liberal) Voters Right (or Conservative) Voters
Australia 1. Self-direction (M = 4.77) 1. Self-direction (M = 4.86)

2. Universalism (M = 4.53) 2. Security (M = 4.51)
Brazil 1. Self-direction (M = 5.12) 1. Self-direction (M = 4.99)
2. Universalism (M = 4.99) 2. Benevolence (M = 4.84)
Chile 1. Universalism (M = 5.17) 1. Benevolence (M = 5.08)
2. Benevolence (M = 5.04) 2. Universalism (M = 5.00)
Finland 1. Universalism (M = 5.06) 1. Universalism (M = 4.77)
2. Self-direction (M = 4.72) 2. Self-direction (M = 4.72)
Germany—East 1. Self-direction (M = 5.17) 1. Self-direction (M = 5.07)
2. Universalism (M = 5.12) 2. Security (M = 5.04)
Germany—West 1. Self-direction (M = 5.14) 1. Self-direction (M = 5.06)
Greece 1. Universalism (M = 4.97) 1. Self-direction (M = 4.78)
2. Self-direction (M = 4.76) 2. Security (M = 4.66)
Israel 1. Self-direction (M = 4.84) 1. Self-direction (M = 4.82)
2. Benevolence (M = 4.79) 2. Benevolence (M = 4.71)
Italy 1. Universalism (M = 4.94) 1. Self-direction (M = 4.64)
2. Self-direction (M = 4.78) 2. Security (M = 4.60)
Poland 1. Self-direction (M = 4.38) 1. Benevolence (M = 4.48)
2. Benevolence (M = 4.32) 2. Self-direction (M = 4.45)
Slovakia 1. Benevolence (M = 4.55) 1. Benevolence (M = 4.55)
2. Security (M = 4.50) 2. Universalism (M = 4.49)
Spain 1. Universalism (M = 5.08) 1. Benevolence (M = 4.81)
2. Self-direction (M = 4.92) 2. Universalism (M = 4.70)
Turkey 1. Universalism (M = 5.26) 1. Security (M = 5.20)
2. Security (M = 5.18) 2. Universalism (M = 5.18)
Ukraine 1. Self-direction (M = 4.13) 1. Self-direction (M = 4.26)
2. Universalism (M = 4.13) 2. Universalism (M = 4.23)
UK 1. Self-direction (M = 4.75) 1. Self-direction (M = 4.42)
US 1. Self-direction (M = 4.69) 1. Benevolence (M = 4.70)
2. Benevolence (M = 4.57) 2. Self-direction (M = 4.68)
Source: Caprara and Vecchione (2015). Used with permission from Československá psychologie.
and benevolence as the most important among the communion and socially
focused values. Nevertheless, left-liberal voters tend to prioritize universal-
ism, namely the value that is consistent with an open view of communion and
the pursuit of all mankind’s welfare, whereas right-conservative voters tend
to prioritize benevolence, namely the value that is consistent with an inclusive

view of communion and thereby to caring being focused primarily on the

good of the family and people one knows and likes.
Ultimately it can be the aim of further investigation to examine in depth
the degree of commitment and thus the extent to which common value priori-
ties correspond to equal endorsement with significant and equal behavioral
consequences among left-liberals and right-conservatives voters.
The Trait-Value-Ideology Pathway

Findings from the studies of Caprara and colleagues (2006, 2008) have shown
that basic values account for a greater portion of variance in voting than
traits, while demographic variables related to voters’ social locations, such as
income and education, had no additional impact once values and traits were
taken into account. We interpret this finding as being in accordance with our
idea of personality as a proactive, self-regulating, agentic system operating
in the pursuit of own goals (Bandura, 1997, 2000; Caprara & Cervone, 2000).
As people weigh alternative aspirations and goals in light of their own per-
sonal priorities and standards, values account for more variance than traits in
predicting choices, such as voting, the more the choices entail conscious and
laborious considerations among various options.
Longitudinal findings help to clarify the pathways through which traits
and values may contribute to political preference. Figure 4.4 presents the
parameter estimates of a model in which traits predict values at six years of
distance. In this model, traits measured during late adolescence, before the
Conscientiousness
1998 R2 = .10
.34
Security
.55 2004
5 .29
–.0 R2 = .09
.38 Openness
1998 .36 Ideology
.22 2012
5
.43 –.2
Universalism
2004
.20
Agreeableness
1998 R2 = .13
Figure 4.4 The mediational role of values in linking personality traits to political

orientation in a sample of Italian late adolescents.

age of voting, have been found to contribute indirectly to later political orien-
tation through the effect of basic values (see Caprara, Vecchione, & Schwartz,
2009). In particular, values related to security and universalism fully medi-
ated the relations of openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness traits to
voting choice and left-right ideology.
While universalism values mediated the path of agreeableness and open-
ness traits toward a preference for left-wing political views, security values
mediated the path of conscientiousness toward a preference for right-wing
political views.6
Findings from this longitudinal study support the hypothesis that assigns
causal primacy to basic traits over basic values in pathways associated with
political orientation and choice. Similar conclusions were drawn by Jost et al.
(2015), who found that basic values mediated most of the effect that the Big
Five exerted on political ideology of a sample of US students. This is in accor-
dance with Rokeach’s (1973) view of personality traits as antecedent to values,
and with the vast amount of literature attesting to both the significant genetic
component of basic traits (Jang, McCrae, Angleitner, Riemann, & Livesley,
1998; Loehlin, McCrae, Costa, & John, 1998) and the importance of socializa-
tion experiences in channeling individual dispositions toward values.
The findings also corroborate our view that traits and values related
to political preferences are different expressions of personality, and they
help clarify how traits and values operate in concert to meet Agency and
Communion needs. It is probable, however, that basic values operate more
as proxy determinants of political choice than traits, which can be thought of
as basic potentials for political orientation. It is probable that people differ in
their inherited dispositions, which may later contribute to endorse values that
make them inclined to endorse liberal or conservative ideologies.
Values, Socioeconomic Development, and Level

of Democratization
Moving from individual to collective level of analysis, a further analysis was
designed to investigate whether the importance assigned to basic values at
a national level was associated with structural characteristics of societies.
Specifically, we used data from the research on 15 countries noted earlier
(Caprara et al., 2017a) to examine relations of values with three indicators of
socioeconomic development and political functioning, namely gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita, level of socioeconomic development, and level of democ-
ratization.7 Table 4.6 presents Pearson’s correlations with the national impor-
tance of the 10 basic values, calculated as the mean ratings of the respective
scales in each of the 15 countries.8

TA B L E 4 . 6 . CORRELATIONS AT THE COUNTRY LEVEL BETWEEN

THE IMPORTANCE OF BASIC VALUES AND GDP, SOCIOECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, AND DEMOCRATIZATION
Socioeconomic Level of
GDP Development Democratization
Security –.27 –.28 –.33

Tradition –.60* –.58* –.71**
Conformity –.35 –.42 –.64*
Benevolence .36 .45 .59*
Universalism –.07 .07 .40
Self-direction .44 .59* .75**
Stimulation .18 .14 .17
Hedonism .57* .52* .69**
Achievement .23 .05 –.12
Power –.31 –.42 –.61*
Note: GDP = Gross domestic product per capita.
Data on values from Caprara et al. (2017a).
The three characteristics of societies examined were highly intercorre-

lated. Gross domestic product (GDP) correlated .89 (p < .001) with socioeco-
nomic development and .79 (p < .001) with level of democratization. The latter
two correlated .87 (p < .001). As shown in Table 4.6, the three societal char-
acteristics correlated positively with the importance of hedonism and nega-
tively with the importance of tradition.
Moreover, socioeconomic development and level of democratization
correlated positively with the importance of self-direction. Finally, level of
democratization correlated negatively with the importance of conformity and
power, and positively with the importance of benevolence.
These findings must be treated with caution due to the limited number of
countries and to the non-representativeness of samples. Nevertheless, their
congruency with previous findings reported by Schwartz and Sagie (2000)
should be noted. These authors also found that socioeconomic development
and level of democratization correlate positively with self- direction and
hedonism, namely with values that emphasize individual autonomy, self-
actualization, and self-indulgency, as well as with values that express con-
cern for the welfare of others, like universalism and benevolence. Likewise,
these authors found that socioeconomic development and level of democra-
tization correlate negatively with the importance assigned to values like con-
formity and power that have been too often associated with non-democratic
forms of government. Our findings are also consistent with the reasoning of

Inglehart, Foa, Peterson, and Welzel (2008) regarding the value assigned to
self-expression and freedom of choice in affecting citizens’ levels of happi-
ness and subjective well-being.
The positive relations between self-direction and level of democratization,
in particular, are in accordance with both the human development sequence
of Inglehart and Welzel and with our hypothesis pointing to the mutual rela-
tion between personality development and democracy functioning. Whereas
freedom of choice set the conditions under which citizens may exercise their
autonomy and thus fully express their individualities, self-direction sets the
conditions for making citizens fully responsible for the functioning and con-
tinuous betterment of the political institutions from which the realization of
their potentials are derived. Likewise, the negative correlation between the
importance assigned to power, conformity, tradition, and level of democra-
tization is in accordance with the same reasoning. Valuing power and con-
formity today seems to be particularly less and less compatible with the
development of both personality and of democracy.
That said, we are aware that correlations do not allow us to make causal
inferences, or to disentangle reciprocal influences. Although one can view
hedonism and self-direction as both outcomes of economic prosperity and
freedom, we are inclined to view hedonism primarily as an outcome of pros-
perity and self-direction mostly as a major determinant of democracy.
Indeed, we believe that valuing self-direction will have the greatest effect on
the development of democracy, as it already has had a major effect on the devel-
opment of economic prosperity. This, however, will require citizens to be con-
vinced that autonomy and freedom of choice should be extended and granted
to all, and that freedom of others is no less important than their own freedom.
RELIGIOSITY, IDEOLOGY, AND POLITICAL

PREFERENCES
It has been said that religion and politics have taken quite different routes
in the transition to modernity and democracy through the gradual freeing
of political authority from religious legitimation (Witte, 2006). This freeing
of politics from religion, however, did not happen to the same extent across
all countries. Religion continues to exert its influence directly and indirectly
through traditions and moral education in societies in which religion and
politics are still expressions of people’s common worldviews.
Although religious practice has diminished in most Western countries,
in particular among the youth, this does not necessarily imply that religion
is no longer relevant in people’s life and their political choices. Religious

institutions may still play an important role in established democracies,

either directly through their explicit or implicit support for certain parties, or
indirectly through emphasizing values that suggest priority and preference
should be given to particular political issues and platforms. This might be
particularly evident in countries in which the impact of religion is strength-
ened and mediated by socialization experiences within the family and the
school that support certain world and political views. For example, religion
is still a key determinant of political alignment in established democracies,
such as Israel and Italy (Barnea & Schwartz, 1998; Caciagli & Corbetta, 2002;
Maraffi, 2007), and religion is likely to have a significant effect on political
choice in countries like Poland, where religious institutions have played a
major role in constructing the national identity and in promoting the transi-
tion to liberal democracy.
Most studies identify a consistent pattern of correlations between religi-
osity and value priorities that places religion among the major allies of con-
servation. Religious people, in fact, tend to assign high priority to preserving
traditional values and practices and avoiding uncertainty and change, and
to assign low priority to independence in thought and action (Roccas, 2005;
Saroglou, Delpierre, & Dernelle, 2004; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995). Using
data from the American National Election Studies (ANES), Malka, Lelkes,
Srivastava, Cohen, and Miller (2012) also identified a systematic link between
religiosity and a conservative stance on a variety of issues (e.g., policy prefer-
ences on immigration and death penalty). In Europe, Van der Brug, Hobolt
and De Vreese (2009) found that the frequency of church attendance predicts
voting for Christian Democratic and Conservative parties across a number of
countries. Similarly, Piurko et al. (2011) found that religiosity was systemati-
cally associated with individuals’ self-placement on the right of the political
spectrum. However, this effect varied substantially across the 19 European
countries considered in the study. Specifically, religiosity predicted political
orientation more strongly in countries like Greece, Poland, Spain, and Israel,
where religious practice is still widespread, than in more secular countries
like Australia, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
The degree to which religiosity is linked to ideology in orienting vot-
ing choice has not been studied specifically, but it is plausible to assume
that religiosity is most likely to contribute alongside ideology in predicting
political preference in countries with an established religious majority, such
as in Italy, Spain, Greece, Israel, and Poland. In such countries, a particular
religion has received special recognition from political authorities, and reli-
gious institutions have historically exerted considerable influence in shaping
citizens’ views of society and politics. In addition, children in these societies

are often committed early in their lives to a religious choice, through family
and school. This means that in general all citizens are in some way predis-
posed to endorse the values and ideologies most congenial to that religion.
Not all citizens, however, are equally religious, regularly attend religious
practices, and accord their habits to the precepts of religious institutions. In
these countries, religiosity, other than religion, can be influential in leading
people to support policies that conform to religious institutions’ views of
civic life and social order, and to contrast policies that instead refuse those
views and endanger their authority. Italy and Spain well represent countries
in which religiosity, other than religion, is still influential on issues related
to sex, family, and life.
In comparison, the influence of religion on political matters and of reli-
giosity on political choices is marginal in countries where pluralism of faith
has been the norm and political institutions have long been independent of
religious authority.
Data from the cross-national study noted earlier allowed us to examine the
contribution of religiosity to political preference (Caprara & Vecchione 2017b).
Figure 4.5 presents correlations of religiosity with voting and left-right (or
liberal-conservative) ideological self-placement. In response to the question
“How religious, if at all, do you consider yourself to be?” participants rated
their religiosity using an 8-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all religious) to
Ideology Voting
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Sl nd
S.
lia
il
Fi e
el
ly
n
d
rm /E
ce
ia
ey
K.
az
il
ai
Ge lan
Ita
ra
ak
U.
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U.
rk
la
ra
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ee
Ge any
Sp
Br
Is
Po
n
ov
Tu
st
an
Gr
rm
Au
Figure 4.5 Correlations of religiosity with voting and left-

right (or liberal-
conservative) ideological self-placement.
Data from Caprara and Vecchione (2017b).

7 (very religious). Positive correlations signify that religiosity is related to a

preference for rightist (or conservative) parties and ideologies, and vice versa.
As can be observed in Figure 4.5, a similar pattern of correlations was
found in most countries. Specifically, religious individuals tended to locate
themselves more to the right of the political spectrum and to prefer rightist (or
conservative) ideologies more than non-religious individuals. These results
held even after differences in basic sociodemographic characteristics were
taken into account.
The highest correlations with both voting and ideology were found in
Israel, Greece, Italy, Spain, and Poland—all counties in which religion played
a pivotal role in constructing national identity and in promoting or hindering
the transition to democracy. The lowest correlations were observed in secu-
lar countries like Australia, Chile, West Germany, and the United Kingdom.
Meaningful correlations were found also between religiosity and basic values,
as shown in Table 4.7. In accordance with previous findings (e.g., Schwartz &
Huismans, 1995), individuals more committed to a religion attributed rela-
tively high importance to conservation values, which is linked to the moti-
vational goal of avoiding uncertainty and change. Tradition, in particular,
showed the highest positive correlation in all countries. Religiosity, by con-
trast, was associated with low importance attributed to openness to change
values (self-direction, stimulation, and hedonism).
Religiosity, therefore, is seen to be systematically related to voting choice,
ideology, and basic values across a variety of countries, each with a specific
history, culture, religious denomination, and political system. To examine the
unique contribution of religiosity to voting, partial correlations were calcu-
lated. As can be seen in in Table 4.8, results revealed that (a) ideology and
voting remained substantially correlated, even after differences in religiosity
and basic values were taken into account; (b) when ideology and religiosity
were taken into account, the contribution of values decreased substantially;
and (c) after ideology and basic values were taken into account, the contribu-
tion of religiosity was negligible in most countries. Only in Israel, Poland, East
Germany, and Slovakia did religiosity add significantly to voting choice.
Hierarchical linear regression was used to examine the unique contribu-
tion of religiosity and basic values to ideology. Table 4.9 reports the unique
proportion of variance accounted for by these variables. After the contribu-
tion of religiosity was taken into account, basic values made an incremental
contribution to the explanation of ideology in all countries. The contribution
was highest in Finland and Australia, followed by Italy, the United Kingdom,
East and West Germany, and Brazil. In all these countries, except Italy, basic
values closely related to ideology and religiosity added little. The effect of

TA B L E 4 . 7 . CORRELATIONS OF BASIC VALUES WITH RELIGIOSITY.
SE CO TR BE UN SD ST HE AC PO
Australia .03 .12 .41** –.03 –.07 –.17* –.19* –.17* –.05 .08
Brazil .11** .16** .44** .09* –.07 –.20** –.20** –.25** –.08 –.06
Chile .15** .22** .46** .12 –.05 –.31** –.20** –.29** –.10 –.14*
Finland .22** .17** .41** .03 .00 –.21** –.15** –.31** –.18** –.08
Germany—East –.06 .04 .43** .01 –.13 –.11 –.22** –.21** .05 .06
Germany—West .09* .13** .49** .10** –.03 –.25** –.21** –.24** –.11** –.08
Greece .44** .19** .56** –.12 –.23** –.34** –.28** –.26** –.12 –.06
Israel .09 .14** .60** .03 –.14** –.18** –.17** .21** 13** .14**
Italy .21** .22** .44** .03 –.08 –.27** –.23** –.24** –.09 –.09
Poland .15** .24** .44** .15** .13** –.15** –.19** –.29** –.29** –.28**
Slovakia .03 .27** .52** .18** .05 –.21** –.26** –.27** –.25** –.14**
Spain .19** .31** .46** –.02 –.23** –.31** –.15** –.24** –.09 .02
Turkey .21** .23** .42** .12* .03 –.31** –.19** –.19** –.15** –.17**
Ukraine .04 .01 .29** .12** .12** –.14** –.09 –.17** –.09 –.13**
UK .15** .19** .56** .07 –.10 –.25** –.21** –.34** –.10 –.07
US .17** .23** .34** .08 .10 –.17** –.19** –.25** –.20** –.19**
Notes: * p < .01; ** p < .001;
SE = Security; CO = Conformity; TR = Tradition; BE = Benevolence; UN = Universalism; SD = Self-direction; ST = Stimulation; HE = Hedonism;

AC = Achievement; PO = Power.

TA B L E 4 . 8 . PARTIAL CORRELATIONS OF VOTING WITH IDEOLOGY,

RELIGIOSITY, AND BASIC VALUES (CORRELATIONS WITHIN EACH
COLUMN WERE STATISTICALLY CONTROLLED FOR DIFFERENCES IN THE
OTHER SETS OF VARIABLES)
Basic Values
Ideology Religiosity OpChg Cons S-Tran S-Enhan
Australia .39** .06 –.02 .14* –.11 .10

Brazil .45** .07 –.01 .01 .01 .01
Chile .61** .00 .01 .05 –.07 .04
Finland .58** .01 –.02 .06 –.12* –.03
Germany—East .59** .26** .01 .03 –.02 .16*
Germany—West .40** .01 –.02 .14** –.10* .04
Greece .49** .11 –.06 .07 .04 .01
Israel .68** .29** .03 –.04 –.12 .11
Italy .71** .01 –.06 .00 –.03 .11*
Poland .42** .13** .04 –.02 .02 –.03
Slovakia .33** .17** –.11* –.01 –.04 –.07
Spain .63** .03 .09 .11 .03 .13*
Turkey .51** .06 –.14* .01 –.04 –.06
Ukraine –.02 .02 –.05 –.06 –.07 –.09*
UK .42** .03 –.03 –.05 –.03 –.04
US .48** .03 –.07 .01 –.06 .01
Note. * p < .05; ** p < .01.
TA B L E 4 . 9 . UNIQUE PROPORTION OF VARIANCE

IN POLITICAL IDEOLOGY ACCOUNTED FOR BY
RELIGIOSITY AND BASIC VALUES
Religiosity Basic Values
Australia .00 .23**

Brazil .01** .13**
Chile .02* .11**
Finland .03** .24**
Germany—East .02* .14**
Germany—West .01* .13**
Greece .08** .11**
Israel .04** .09**
Italy .08** .18**
Poland .11** .03**
Slovakia .07** .05**
Spain .11** .07**
Turkey .06** .04*
UK .01* .15**
US .03** .09**
Note. * p < .05; ** p < .01.
Data from Caprara and Veccchione (2017b).

including religiosity after basic values yielded the greatest incremental valid-
ity in Spain, Poland, Greece, Italy, Slovakia, and Turkey. With the exception of
Italy and Greece, religiosity added more than basic values to the explanation
of ideology in these countries.
It is noteworthy that values and religiosity predicted ideology in a con-
sistent manner across countries, regardless of the particular dominant reli-
gion. The association of conservation values and higher religiosity with a
right political orientation held predominantly across Roman Catholic (e.g.,
Italy, Poland, and Spain), Christian Orthodox (Greece), Protestant (UK and
Finland), and Jewish (Israel) countries. Moreover, the pattern of correlations
between values and religiosity was also consistent despite the distinctive
nature, history, and roles of different religions and their social contexts. Thus,
clarifying the extent to which religions influence people’s value priorities ver-
sus the extent to which people’s personal values influence their commitment
to the religion they profess is a topic worthy of in-depth study.
The consistency of our findings also attests to a substantial commonal-
ity across established democracies in the meaning of left-right and liberal-
conservative ideologies. Nonetheless, variation in the relative contributions
of basic values and religiosity to ideology points to important differences. In
Greece, Israel, Italy, and Spain, both basic values and religiosity contributed
substantially to ideology. These are traditional, religious countries in which
the major religion and its institutions have benefited from special treatment
by governmental authorities and have significantly influenced the national
identity and the socialization of its inhabitants. On the other hand, in most
secular countries (e.g., Australia, Brazil, Chile, Finland, West Germany, the
UK, and the US), basic values had substantial explanatory power, whereas
religiosity was relatively unimportant.
In two post-communist countries (Poland and Slovakia) and in Turkey,
religiosity exerted a significant effect on ideology, while the contribution
of basic values was marginal. It is possible that the experience of commu-
nism has erased memories of past democratic regimes and that the profound
changes following its collapse resulted in confusion about the definition of
left and right in Poland and Slovakia. The findings in Turkey may also reflect
its transitional status: although it is formally a young, secular democracy, it
is still in the midst of a transition to modernity and a struggle over the role of
religion in the political domain.
Focusing on the unique contribution of religiosity, after controlling for
basic values, does not mean we should underestimate the role of values in
making sense of political choices. Rather, it serves to corroborate our reasoning
further regarding the manifold functions of ideology. It is probable that values

account for much of ideology’s cognitive content, but they can hardly exhaust
its motivational components that instead can be accounted for by religiosity.
This should lead us to investigate the real impact of religiosity and ideol-
ogy on political choices, despite the difficulties of disentangling their rela-
tions. Whereas religiosity may lead to ideology through socialization in the
family, peer group, and school, ideology may ultimately subsume religiosity
when ideological self-placement reflects social identities and worldviews that
antedate and fully express themselves in political choices.
This has been the case in Italy where the Christian Democratic Party and
the Communist Party have operated as two political subcultures that polar-
ized the majority of the electorate from the end of World War II to the fall
of Berlin Wall (Bellucci & Petrarca, 2007). This, however, came to an end in
the early 1990s, when the Christian Democratic and the Communist par-
ties disappeared, together with all traditional parties. The void was filled
by several new parties and two major political blocks that reproduced the
traditional divide between a center-left coalition (including the majority of
ex-Communists and a minority of Christian Democrats) and a center-right
coalition (including the majority of ex–Christian Democrats and the major-
ity of the traditional right). Currently, the leadership of the new Democratic
Party, which attracts the majority of leftist voters, has been taken over by a
new generation of politicians that have little in common with the old par-
ties, despite the long-t ime majority and leadership of the descendants of the
Communist Party. The presence of numerous religious people in both coali-
tions may explain why religion has such a weak impact on voting in Italy as
compared with ideology, despite the great influence that the Catholic Church
exerted in monopolizing the votes of practicing Catholics and despite the
influence the Catholic Church still exerts on Italian politics (Maraffi, 2007).
Concerning relations between religiosity and values, it is interesting
to note that the values that affect voting and ideological self-placement are
substantially the same among religious and non-religious people of several
countries. This suggests that religiosity does not moderate the links between
values and political preferences. Looking at value priorities among religious
and non-religious people, we found that
1. in Germany (East and West), Israel, Poland, Slovakia, the United

Kingdom, and the United States, the value first in importance is benevo-
lence among religious people, and self-direction among non-religious
people;
2. in Italy, Ukraine, and Chile, the value first in importance is universalism
among religious people, and self-direction among non-religious people;

3. in Turkey, Finland, and Greece, the value first in importance in both

groups is universalism;
4. in Australia and Brazil, the value first in importance in both groups is
self-direction;
5. in Spain, the value first in importance is benevolence among religious
people, and universalism among non-religious people.
In sum, although tradition is the value that most distinguishes religious from
non-religious people (as discussed in Chapter 2), this is not the most important
value among religious people. Indeed, non-religious people tended to rate self-
direction as most important, whereas religious people tended to rate universal-
ism and benevolence as most important. Thus, findings show a tendency among
non-religious people to prioritize agentic person-focused values over communion
socially focused values, while the opposite tendency is found among religious
people. This is in accordance with the ethos of secular modernity emphasizing
individuals’ autonomy and actualization (Inglehart, 1997). Findings also show
a tendency among religious people of certain countries to assign higher impor-
tance to benevolence than to universalism. This is in accordance with findings
that suggest the communion view of religious people is mostly concerned with
their in-group rather than with society as a whole (Saroglou, 2006).
Taking all findings together, it can be concluded that an examination of
how ideology, religiosity, and basic personal values contribute to voter choice
can also help clarify the manner in which different beliefs and value com-
mitments affect worldviews, which enable people to navigate in the political
world. Mostly conservation values account for the links between right-wing
ideology and religiosity. Thus it is not surprising that the links between reli-
giosity and right-wing ideology are particularly strong in religious countries,
whereas the links between conservation values and right-wing ideology are
particularly strong in secular countries.
CONCLUSIONS
In introducing the chapter, we stated that three issues are still pending
regarding how people organize political knowledge. We were also concerned
about whether the distinctions between the political left and right, or between
liberal and conservative factions, are functional and adequate in providing a
map for people to orient themselves in the political domain, and for scholars
to address the personal determinants of citizens’ political choices.
In addressing these issues we are convinced that the historical anteced-
ents and vicissitudes that underpin the left-right and liberal-conservative

ideologies, mostly among the cultural heritage of Western civilization,

deserve much of our consideration. Left-right and liberal-conservative ideolo-
gies likely belong to the legacy of Western thought and should be viewed as a
major expression of the vicissitudes of democracy in the Western hemisphere.
In this regard, one should particularly appreciate the motivational functions
that left-liberal and right-conservative ideologies have exerted and still may
exert as ideal types, enabling citizens to bring to common ends heterogeneous
needs and meanings. Indeed, empirical findings attest to the traditional left-
right and liberal-conservative ideologies still representing effective devices
through which citizens orient themselves in politics. It is likely that most
people in established democracies have an intuitive understanding of what
each pole of traditional ideological cleavages represents, despite the differ-
ent trajectories to democracy in various countries and despite the different
meanings that can be assigned to the same poles across countries and within
countries.
The heterogeneity of meanings attests to the function of ideology as a
device with which to handle the complexities of believing and belonging in
the political world and that can be used as a compass for citizens and politi-
cians to navigate through politics. Here the function of sharing a common
political identity is not less important than the contents and the coherence of
the beliefs people hold.
Thus, we have reason to doubt that a bi-dimensional conceptualization
of ideology that distinguishes between an economic and a social dimen-
sion may do better than the traditional single dimension opposing left and
right, or liberal and conservative, since most of the symbolic components of
ideology would be lost. Furthermore, we doubt that two dimensions would
be sufficient for making sense of the manifold political attitudes as they are
expressed and change across polities and across times.
The findings discussed in this chapter show that traditional ideologies
are still the best predictor of voting across polities and established democra-
cies. Nevertheless, a large body of findings recommends going beyond the
left-right and liberal-conservative divide in order to capture the psychologi-
cal multiple determinants of political choices. This leads us to appreciate the
crucial role that individual differences in personality play in accounting for
the variety of political attitudes that stay at the core of left-liberal or right-
conservative self-placement. Findings in fact have shown that personality
traits can account significantly for ideological leanings, while values and reli-
giosity contribute even more to ideological orientation.
Although the contribution of basic traits to political choices is much less
than that of basic values, they may nevertheless exert a notable influence

in predisposing people toward certain values. When citizens are given the
opportunity to express a political choice, first their dispositions and then their
values dictate their political preferences. As people come equipped in nature
with the needed potentials, socialization and personal experiences channel
dispositions into proper motives, values, and capacities.
Ultimately the political offerings cannot do anything other than match
and calibrate individuals’ equipment for agency and communion with the
requirements and challenges of social life. Among agentic traits, openness
has repeatedly been found to predict a left-liberal orientation, whereas consci-
entiousness, among communion traits, has been found to predict a right-con-
servative orientation across polities. A stable set of connected values has also
been shown to correspond to left-liberal and to right-conservative ideology
across most countries examined. The same priorities across different politi-
cal contexts accounted for left- right and liberal-conservative distinctions.
Liberal and left-oriented individuals assigned more importance to self-tran-
scendence values, which emphasize accepting others as equals, and to open-
ness to change values, which assign priority to receptiveness to change and
to independence of thought and action. Conservative or right-oriented voters,
by contrast, assigned more importance to conservation values, which call for
submissive self-restriction, the preservation of traditional practices, and the
protection of stability, and to self-enhancement values, which emphasize pur-
suing one’s own success and dominance over others.
Among agentic-focused values, self-direction is given higher importance
among left-liberal voters, whereas power is given higher importance among
right-conservative voters. Among communion- focused values, universal-
ism is given higher importance among left-liberal voters, whereas security
is given higher importance among right-conservative voters. Yet differences
in value rankings should not obscure important commonalities among vot-
ers on both sides of the political ideological divide. If one looks at common
priorities rather than at differences, self-direction and universalism ranked
higher than power and achievement in most countries among both left-liberal
and right-conservative. This encourages certain optimism about the future
of democracy, since both self-direction and universalism stay at the top of
growth motivations.
Preliminary findings point to a positive relation between valuing self-
direction and level of democratization in accordance with our hypothesis
about the mutual dependence of personality development and democracy
well-functioning.
A vast secularization has accompanied economic development and the
diffusion of democracy across countries carrying significant changes in

habits, interpersonal relations, and values that assess public morality. Yet reli-
giosity still plays a significant role in attesting to the legacy of tradition and in
shaping voters’ choice and ideological self-placement. Religious individuals
in fact tend to vote for right-oriented parties and to locate themselves more on
the right of the political spectrum than less religious individuals.
Likely religiosity contributes to ideology and voting mostly in countries,
where the majority religion and its institutions have benefited from special
treatment by governmental authorities, and have significantly contributed to
the formation of national identity and to the socialization of its inhabitants. In
secular countries, instead, the influence of religiosity on ideology and voting
is negligible in comparison to that of values.
It has been assumed that that ideological preferences result from a combi-
nation of “top-down” exposure to the ideological menu provided by political
elites and “bottom-up” psychological predispositions, namely the needs and
motives affecting individual’s receptiveness to specific ideological positions
(Jost, 2009). It is likely that in democratic societies, where polities provide a
diversified range of possible options, bottom-up cognitive and motivational
processes, namely personality structures, take a decisive role in accounting
for individual’s ideological preference and beliefs. Thus, more than in the
past, the goal of politicians should be to interpret voters’ propensities, to turn
them into proper narratives and platforms, and to find solutions that are able
to match both the needs of citizens and the growth of democracy. Indeed,
as more citizens have a greater voice in creating the political agenda and a
greater ability to appropriate the political discourse and bring their individu-
ality, the traditional “top-down” path of influence from political elites to vot-
ers will be reversed.
In the next chapter we review further findings that corroborate our beliefs
about the close link between the functioning and development of personality
and the functioning and development of democracy.
NOTES
1. The study included the reunified Germany, but paid attention to the East/West
division that reflects different political histories within this nation.
2. The study examines groups of convenience showing similar sociodemographic
characteristics that allow comparisons, but warns against generalization to the
entire populations of examined countries.
3. For this personality factor, usually labeled as extraversion, we used the term
“energy/extraversion,” in accordance with the questionnaire used to assess it
(the BFQ), and the specific meanings that in the Italian context are associated
with this factor (see Caprara et al., 1993).

4. In fact, PASOK has been repeatedly accused by the communists of adopting a

rather center-right profile.
5. Due to previous considerations, Ukraine was excluded from this analysis as
well as from the other analyses that focus on ideological self-placement.
6. This model is an extension of the one presented by Caprara et al. (2009), which
measured ideology in 2004.
7. GDP was indexed by the value of all goods and services produced in a country
in 2013 (expressed in US dollars), divided by the midyear population (as esti-
mated by the International Monetary Fund). Democratization was measured by
using the 2011 Democracy Index, which includes 60 indicators grouped into
five categories: electoral process and pluralism (i.e., free and fair competitive
elections), functioning of government, political participation, political culture,
and civil liberties (i.e., protecting basic human rights). Socioeconomic develop-
ment was measured by using the Human Development Index (HDI), a compos-
ite statistic based on life expectancy at birth, access to knowledge (i.e., mean
years of schooling and expected years of schooling), and standards of living
(i.e., the Gross National Income pro capita) of the population.
8. Within each country, the mean score of each value was subtracted from the
average rating given to all values. This controls for cross-national differences
in the scale use (e.g., acquiescence).

CHAPTER 5
Diversities and Commonalities

in Political Attitudes
CORE POLITICAL VALUES
In previous chapters we have provided findings that point to political ideol-
ogy as the most powerful predictor of voting in several democratic countries.
Empirical findings show that traditional left- right or liberal-conservative
ideologies still represent effective devices through which citizens of Western
democracies can orient themselves politically. This holds particularly in coun-
tries where progress toward the establishment of democratic institutions took
similar pathways within a common political culture that traces its origins
largely to the ideals of the European Enlightenment.
Despite the diverse meanings of left-right and liberal-conservative ideolo-
gies, there is no evidence to claim the end of traditional ideological divides.
Rather, one should understand the role of political ideology as still meeting
the various needs associated with political choices in democratic systems.
We have argued that needs associated with belonging are as important
as congruence of beliefs in accounting for voting preferences, and we have
pointed to the crucial role of traits and values in steering citizens to make
political choices that accord with their personality. In particular, we found
that traits like openness and conscientiousness can account for general pro-
clivities toward ideological preferences that operate invariantly across poli-
ties. Surprisingly, individual differences in traits may account for ideological
preferences more than traditional sociodemographic factors.
Yet traits, by definition, operate as potentials whose expressions are
largely due to other sources of variation within the person and in the envi-
ronment. As we have seen, the effects of traits on voting behaviour were
largely mediated by basic values, which probably attest to the joint influence
of agentic and communal needs in decision-making in the domain of politics.
Thus we have documented the substantial role played by basic personal val-
ues in determining political orientation, and have pointed to a meaningful
171

association between individuals’ basic values and their political choices in

different cultural contexts and political systems. Although basic values relate
systematically to political preferences, a major portion of variability in voting
still remains unaccounted for.
Along the same line of reasoning, we examined how basic personal val-
ues translate into political attitudes concerning the best choice to make about
the governance of society at a given time and context. In fact, basic personal
values are abstract beliefs that transcend specific situations and that may turn
into different policies. Thus, opposite coalitions might purport to stand for
the same basic values that are particularly important for all voters, like self-
direction and universalism. This, however, does not prevent different politi-
cal programs on various matters related to the economy, internal security, or
public morality from being upheld.
Voters may, therefore, discern among competing political platforms to
the extent that they can recognize implications concerning basic values by
the positions taken and solutions proposed to address specific issues. To
this aim, specific political values may operate as mediators between basic
values and political choices, when beliefs and feelings for or against certain
political actions turn into attitudes that are held at the core of the political
discourse.
While it is plausible to assume that the values people endorse in poli-
tics rest upon the same stable basic values that underlie any other domain
of their existence, a research focus on political values preceded interest in
basic personal values. For example, Converse (1964) reported political values
to be “a sort of glue to bind together many more specific attitudes and beliefs”
(p. 211), while Feldman (1988) saw political values as the principles that under-
lie specific attitudes, preferences, and evaluations about the sphere of politics,
thereby giving them some degree of coherence and consistency. In a similar
vein, McCann (1997) has pointed to core political values as overarching nor-
mative principles and assumptions about government, citizenship, and soci-
ety that facilitate “position taking in more concrete domains by serving as
general focal points in an otherwise confusing political environment” (p. 565).
Political values are typically measured in terms of respondents’ agree-
ment or disagreement with statements about the distribution of wealth in
society, the obligations of citizens and government, the limits of public inter-
ference in private matters, and the range of individuals’ freedom on commu-
nal sensitive topics. However, there has been no clear consensus regarding the
number and content of core political values in modern democracies (Sturgis,
2003). In fact, a large part of recent debates about core political values entails
arguments that parallel philosophical disagreements about the priorities that

Diversities and Commonalities in Political Attitudes 173
government should assign to equality, freedom, individual well-being, and

social welfare in the pursuit of a just society.
Feldman (1988), for instance, identified three core political values: equal-
ity of opportunity, economic individualism, and free enterprise. Equality of
opportunity refers to the belief that equality is the right of all people, regard-
less of social status, race, and gender. Economic individualism refers to the
belief that people should get ahead on their own through hard work. Free
enterprise refers to the non-interference of government in the economic sys-
tem. McCann (1997), on the other hand, specified two core political values:
egalitarianism, the belief that all people should be treated equally; and moral
traditionalism, a preference for traditional lifestyles and moral standards.
Heath and colleagues identified two core dimensions, libertarian/author-
itarian and socialist/laissez-faire, in the United Kingdom (Heath, Jowell, &
Curtice, 1985; Heath, Evans & Martin, 1994), while Goren (2005) suggested
that three basic dimensions— individualism, egalitarianism, and limited
government— describe the political attitudes in American politics. Going
somewhat further, Jacoby (2006) claimed that all political issues can be traced
back to four political values: liberty (freedom of thought and action), equal-
ity (equal distribution of resources), economic security (guarantee of job and
income), and social order (orderly and peaceful society).
Differences in core political values have been extensively used to account
for variations in policy preferences, voting behavior, and ideological identifica-
tion. McCann (1997), for example, demonstrated that voters for George Bush in
the 1992 US elections scored higher on moral traditionalism and lower on egal-
itarianism than voters for Bill Clinton. Feldman (1988) showed that both equal-
ity of opportunity and economic individualism correlate significantly with
liberal-conservative ideological identification. Liberals attributed more impor-
tance to equality of opportunity, conservatives to economic individualism.
HOW BASIC VALUES TRANSLATE INTO POLITICS THROUGH

CORE POLITICAL VALUES
Empirical studies aimed at investigating how core political values relate
to basic value priorities have been lacking for a long time. This is most
likely due to the different disciplines and research traditions in which the
two constructs are embedded, namely political science and social psychol-
ogy. Indeed, core political values and basic personal values are distinct
conceptually and in the ways they are measured (see Schwartz, Caprara,
and Vecchione (2010), and Schwartz et al., 2014). As discussed in Chapter 2,
basic values express broad motivational goals that apply across domains

and situations (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992). They are measured on a

scale of importance as guiding principles in people’s lives, and form a
relatively stable hierarchical system of priorities. Core political values,
instead, do not apply outside the political domain and are typically mea-
sured in terms of agreement/d isagreement with the policies and practices
of governments and societies. Beyond that, although people have prefer-
ences among their core political attitudes, these preferences do not neces-
sarily form a hierarchy (see Schwartz et al., 2010).
The crucial role of core political values in linking basic values to politi-
cal choices has only recently been clarified; they function by anchoring
abstract principles to current concrete issues and by making the distinctive
element of contingent political offers relevant. Indeed, the first attempt to
trace core political values to basic personal values was made in an Italian
study by Schwartz et al. as recently as 2010. For this study, a self-report
instrument was developed to measure eight political values drawn from
major issues at the core of political debates and programs of the April 2006
Italian national election. The instrument drew upon items proposed in the
literature to measure the core political values of equality, free enterprise,
traditional morality, law and order, blind patriotism, and civil liberties
(Feldman, 1988; Gunther & Kuan, 2007; Jacoby, 2006; McCann, 1997; Schatz,
Staub, & Lavine, 1999).
The political value, equality, which stands for the equal distribution of
opportunities and resources, fits with the traditional and distinctive ethos of
programs of the left in Italy. Free enterprise demands minimal government
involvement in the economy and champions economic individualism. This
political value accords with the neoliberal pro-market economy of the center-
right coalition.
The third political value, traditional morality, stands for preserving and
protecting traditional religious and family values against newer, permissive
lifestyles. This political value, which typically represents a major concern, has
often been at the core of right-wing and conservative programs. Likewise, law
and order, which implies enforcement and obedience to the law, with the aim
of protecting society against threats to the social order, has been a traditional
concern at the core of right and conservative programs.
The fifth political value, “blind” patriotism, reflects unquestioning attach-
ment to and intolerance of criticism concerning one’s country. Although
this political value has been a traditional value of the right, it has also been
endorsed by the majority of left parties after recent military missions in the
former Yugoslavia and in Afghanistan under the aegis of NATO and the UN
to bring peace in those countries.

The sixth and final political value included in the research instrument,
civil liberties, embodies freedom for all people to act and think as they con-
sider most appropriate. This has become a highly relevant issue in Italy, as
in other countries, often connected to strongly debated topics like abortion,
gay marriage, single parent adoption, and artificial fecundation, and is found
prominently among the programs of traditional left as well as of new libertar-
ian movements.
The study by Schwartz et al. (2010) also included two political attitudes
that were particularly prominent in the context of the 2006 Italian election.
These were accepting ethnically different immigrants and foreign military
intervention. New items were developed to assess these constructs.
Accepting immigrants refers to a general disposition to receive and wel-
come people in need and in flight from other countries. This issue became the
center of debate and contention in the last decades due to the large number
of illegal immigrants, first from post-communist eastern European countries,
and then from North Africa and Asia, entering Italy. Whereas center-left coali-
tions have typically been lenient toward illegal immigration for humanitar-
ian reasons, center-right coalitions have voiced the concerns and fears of local
parochialism and of various movements that are rather resistant to accept-
ing immigrants. Recently this issue has become of paramount importance in
all Europe, in concomitance with the thousands of refugees that attempt to
cross the Mediterranean to escape the devastations of war and famine in the
Middle East and Africa.
Foreign military intervention refers to the use of military forces to protect
against external sources of danger, to restore democracy, or to prevent further
escalation of a conflict, and has been a traditional value of the right.
To simplify matters, we combine these two political attitudes with the six
core political values detailed earlier and thereby refer to eight core political
values. In the final questionnaire, therefore, there are 34 items, with three to
seven statements for each core political value. In an attempt to prevent acqui-
escence and other method effects, both positively and negatively worded
items were included. Respondents indicated their agreement with each of the
items on a scale marked “completely disagree (1),” “agree a little (2),” “agree
somewhat (3),” “agree a great deal (4),” and “agree completely (5).” Box 5.1
reports the items used to measure these eight core political values.
The psychometric properties of the questionnaire were analyzed within
the framework of structural equation modeling. Specifically, a confirmatory
factor analysis was performed to ascertain whether the 34 items yielded dis-
tinct factors for each of the eight political values. Results corroborated the
posited eight dimensions. All items loaded significantly and substantially on

B OX 5 .1 ITEMS FOR MEASURING EIGHT CORE

POLITICAL VALUES
Equality
Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an
equal opportunity to succeed.
If people were treated more equally in this country, we would have many fewer
problems.
The government should do more to guarantee an equal distribution of resources
between rich and poor.
The government should take responsibility to provide free health care to all
citizens.
Free enterprise
It would be a good idea to privatize all of the public enterprises.
The less government gets involved with business and the economy, the better off
this country will be.
There should be more incentives for individual initiative even if this reduces
equality in the distribution of wealth.
All high school and university education should be made private rather than
controlled and supported by the government.
Traditional morality
This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on
traditional family ties.
It is extremely important to defend our traditional religious and moral values.
Homosexual couples should have the same rights as married couples (reversed).
The right to life has to be guaranteed by law from the moment of conception.
Newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society.
Law and order
Political measures to increase security should be promoted at this time, even if it
could mean sacrificing the freedom of citizens.
The police should have more powers so they can protect us better against crime.
There should be limits on the freedom of speech of people who threaten society.
It’s right for the government to take restrictive measures on civil liberties to guar-
antee the security of citizens.
Order has to be preserved at any cost, even if this could reduce civil liberties.
It would be a good idea to limit the liberty of expression if this can guarantee
more order.
The most important thing for our country is to maintain law and order.
“Blind” patriotism
I would support my country right or wrong.
It is a duty of all citizens to honor the country.
It is unpatriotic to criticize this country.

Civil liberties
It is extremely important to respect the freedom of individuals to be and believe
whatever they want.
The most important thing for our country is to defend civil liberties.
The right to individual freedom is inviolable and has to be maintained at
all cost.
Accepting immigrants
People who come to live here from other countries generally make this country
a better place to live.
People who come to live here from other countries generally take jobs away from
Italian workers (reversed).
People who come to live here from other countries make Italy’s cultural life
richer.
Military intervention
Going to war is sometimes the only solution to international problems.
War is never justified (reversed).
Italy should contribute forces to international peace-keeping efforts.
Italy should join other democratic nations in sending troops to fight dangerous
regimes.
Any act is justified to fight terrorism.
Note: Items are taken from Schwartz et al. (2010). Used with permission from John Wiley and
Sons Publishing.
their intended latent factor, supporting the convergent validity of the scales.
Acceptable levels of reliability were found for each factor (see Schwartz et al.,
2010, for details). Table 5.1 presents the intercorrelations among the eight
scales.
About one month prior to the Italian national election of April 2006 (T1),
1,699 respondents completed the core political values questionnaire along
with the Portrait Values Questionnaire that measured Schwartz’s basic values
and a standard item to measure left-right ideology. About one month after
the election (T2), 1,030 of these respondents (61% of the sample) completed
the same questionnaire and reported on their actual vote. The study was
replicated two years later, using the same questionnaire, for the 2008 Italian
national election; before, n = 697, and following, n = 506 (Vecchione, Caprara,
Dentale, & Schwartz, 2013).
Results pointed to systematic relations between core political values and
the four higher-order values of self-enhancement, self-transcendence, conser-
vation, and openness to change. Basic values, which are abstract and context

TA B L E 5 . 1 . CORRELATIONS AMONG THE EIGHT CORE POLITICAL

VALUES IN ITALY
TM BP LO MI FE EQ CL AI
Traditional morality
“Blind” patriotism .65
Law and order .66 .70
Military intervention .43 .66 .69
Free enterprise .34 .46 .43 .63
Equality –.05 –.10 –.14 –.38 –.38
Civil liberties –.14 –.07 –.24 –.29 –.26 .58
Accepting immigrants –.48 –.47 –.49 –.48 –.25 .35 .33
Note: Correlations are from Schwartz et al. (2010). Used with permission from John Wiley and Sons
Publishing.
free, were posited as having a direct effect on individuals’ stances on con-

crete political values (Schwartz et al., 2010). Self-enhancement led to higher
levels of valuing law and order, military intervention, and free enterprise.
Self-transcendence led to higher levels of valuing equality, accepting immi-
grants, and civil liberties, and lower valuing of free enterprise and law and
order. Conservation values led to valuing blind patriotism, military interven-
tion, free enterprise, and traditional morality more highly and to accepting
immigrants less. Openness to change was related to lower levels of valuing
traditional morality. Taken together, basic personal values accounted for a
substantial portion of variance in every one of the core political values—from
22% (free enterprise) to 53% (traditional morality).
All eight political values were significantly related to voting for center-left
or center-right coalitions in 2006 and 2008 Italian elections. As can be seen
in Figure 5.1, valuing traditional morality, military intervention, free enter-
prise, blind patriotism, and law and order were associated with voting for
the center-right. This fits with center-right policies that emphasize traditional
family values, favor demonstrations of military strength, encourage a free
market economy with minimal government intervention, build on Italian
nationalism, and favor law and order over free expression and diversity of
ideas (Caciagli & Corbetta, 2002).
Valuing equality, accepting immigrants, and civil liberties, by contrast,
were associated with voting for center-left coalitions. These core political val-
ues are clearly promoted by the center-left coalition policies that emphasize
tolerance of diversity, equality, and social justice.
As shown in Figure 5.1, associations between core political values and
voting were substantially stable across the two elections. As core political

2006 2008
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
–0.1
–0.2
–0.3
–0.4
–0.5
TraMor Milnt FreEnt BlnPa LawOr CivLib AccIm Equ
Figure 5.1 Correlations of core political values with voting for center-left (coded as 1)
and center-right (0) Italian coalitions.
values are generally intercorrelated, it is important to assess the unique con-

tribution of each political value, taking into account the effect of the other
values. This analysis, which combines data from the 2006 and 2008 elections,
revealed that traditional morality and equality have the greatest impact on
voting. These political values seem to capture the ideological divide particu-
larly well, at least in Italy. Accepting immigrants and military intervention
were also found to be relevant, which is not surprising for, as stated earlier,
they refer to issues that have been widely debated in the recent history of
the Italian political context. Taken together, core political values predicted
political choice substantially more strongly than basic values, accounting for
the 54% and 41% of variance in voting in the 2006 and 2008 Italian elections.
When political values were taken into account, sociodemographic variables
that reflect people’s social locations (age, gender, education, and income) had
no additional impact on voting.
An important finding of the study is that the causal link between basic
values and voting is indirect and fully mediated by core political values.
Indeed, after the eight political values were taken into account, basic values
did not add to the prediction. Figure 5.2 shows a schematic representa-
tion of these relations, where core political were posited as mediators of
the effect that basic values exerted on voting in the 2006 Italian national
election.

Law and
Order
+
–
Blind
Patriotism
+ Right
Self- + Military
Enhancement Intervention Right
+
+ Right
+ Free
Conservation Enterprise Right
– Voting
+ Right
Traditional
Self- Morality
Transcendence Left
–
+ Civic Left
Openness Liberties
– Left
to Change +
Accepting
+ Immigrants
Equality
Figure 5.2 The mediational role of core political values in linking basic values to
voting.
Being broader and more fundamental than core political values, basic
values can encompass the various contingent goals that matter in politics.
However, the pursuit of the same basic values may lead individuals to favor
different political values and attitudes depending on the political contexts.
For example, people who attribute high priority to security are likely to favor
military intervention in contexts in which this appears to promise greater
security. Thus, basic values may serve as anchors for specific values that lie
at the core of the political discourse and, through them, indirectly influence
voting behavior.
The findings reported in the preceding, however, were derived from just
one political context (Italy), so if we wish to know about the generalizability
of associations among basic personal values, core political values, and politi-
cal preference, we need to look elsewhere. Here, a follow-up, cross-national
study by Schwartz et al. (2014), which involved 15 countries (Australia, Brazil,
Chile, Finland, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey,
Ukraine, United Kingdom, and United States), is useful. In each country,

authors selected from six to eight constructs that encompass the political val-
ues used in the Italian study. The value, accepting immigrants, was excluded
from consideration in Brazil, Poland, and Ukraine because the items about
immigrations were felt not to be meaningful in these countries, where a nega-
tive net migration occurred during the years preceding the study. This value
was also excluded in Israel, where items concerning immigration may have a
different meaning due to the public discourse that promotes Jewish immigra-
tion from around the world. Military intervention was also excluded in Israel,
where the constant state of military threat may have affected the meaning of
the items used to measure attitudes toward war (see Schwartz et al., 2014).
Political values in this cross-national study were measured by adopting or
modifying items used in Italy by Schwartz et al. (2010).1 Relations of core polit-
ical values with ideology were calculated separately for the post-communist
countries, as the political history of these countries may have affected the
meaning of basic or core political values (Schwartz et al., 2014).2
Findings confirm that basic values accounted for a significant propor-
tion of variance in every core political value. The variance explained ranged
from 17% (military intervention) to 39% (traditional morality) in the non-
communist countries and from 6% (free enterprise) to 30% (traditional moral-
ity) in the post-communist countries.
Table 5.2 presents the correlation coefficients of core political values with
ideological self-placement in each country. Positive correlations indicate that
a political value predicted a rightist (or conservative) ideology; negative cor-
relations that it predicted a leftist (or liberal) ideology. Equality was the politi-
cal value most strongly and consistently related to a preference for a left-wing
(or liberal) ideological position, and correlations with this political value were
significant in each country, except for post-communist countries (average r
across countries was –.22). This is in accord with Bobbio’s (1996) ideas point-
ing to equality as the major cleavage between left and right in Western estab-
lished democracies.
The political value most strongly and consistently related to a preference
for a right-wing (or conservative) ideological position was traditional moral-
ity (average r = .34, significant in all countries). This was followed by law and
order (average r = .26, significant in 11 countries), and by free enterprise (aver-
age r = .24, significant in 13 countries). Correlations between core political
values and ideological self-placement on the left or right of the political spec-
trum largely paralleled correlations with conservative and liberal ideological
self-placement.
Figure 5.3 shows the pattern of relationships between ideological self-
placement and the six political values included in all countries, averaged

TA B L E 5 . 2 . CORRELATIONS OF IDEOLOGY WITH CORE POLITICAL VALUES
TrdMor FreEn MilInt BlnPa LawOr CivLib Equ AccIm
Australia .38** .32** .35** .34** .42** –.26** –.27** –.28**

Brazil .34** .43** .26** .11** .25** –.10** –.32** —
Finland .37** .33** .25** .28** .44** –.12* –.46** –.22**
Chile .27** .16** .14** .19** .46** –.07 –.17** –.21**
E/Germanya .22** .18** –.29** .03 .08 — –.24** .21**
W/Germanya .36** .24** –.28** .00 .30** — –.18** .18**
Greece .31** .19** .31** .28** .46** –.31** –.28** –.34**
Israel .54** .26** — .33** .30** –.25** –.19** —
Italy .37** .35** .43** .39** .49** –.32** –.30** –.46**
Poland .36** .01 .02 .15** .02 –.08* –.07 —
Slovakia .09* .17** .10* –.27** –.15** .04 .00 .02
Spain .53** .34** .32** .28** .38** –.21** –.26** –.30**
Turkey .27** .17** .22** .28** .31** –.12* –.15** .04
Ukraine .11* –.04 .06 .13** –.05 .01 .02 —
UK .51** .40** .12* .42** .47** –.23** –.38** –.41**
US .37** .30** .26** .17** .12** –.07 –.20** –.14**
Notes: ** p < .01; * p < .05.
In the UK and the US we used the liberal-conservative scale.
TrdMor = Traditional Morality; LawOr = Law and Order; FreEn = Free Enterprise; Equ = Equality; BlnPa = “Blind” Patriotism; CivLib = Civil Liberties;
MilInt = Military Intervention; AccIm = Accepting Immigrants.
a
One of the civil liberties item was inadvertently omitted in the German study. This political value was therefore excluded in the German analyses.

Non-Communist Post-Communist
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
–0.1
–0.2
–0.3
TraMor FreEnt BlnPa LawOr CivLib Equ
Figure 5.3 Average correlations of core political values with left-liberal and right-
conservative ideology within non-communist and post-communist countries.
within non- communist and post- communist societies. In non- communist

countries, correlations were most negative for civil liberties and equality, and
most positive for traditional morality. In post-communist countries, correla-
tions were substantially weaker and near zero for most political values, and
only traditional morality exhibited a non-negligible correlation with ideologi-
cal self-placement. These results parallel findings reported in Chapter 4 for
basic personal values, which have shown little explanatory power in post-
communist societies.
The proportion of variance in ideological self-placement accounted for
by all core political values taken together varied widely across countries.
Taking into account only the six political values common to all countries,
the accounted variance was .28 in Australia, .30 in Brazil, .22 in Chile, .39 in
Finland, .16 in East Germany, .24 in West Germany, .30 in Greece, .36 in Israel,
.36 in Italy, .16 in Poland, .13 in Slovakia, .34 in Spain, .16 in Turkey, .03 in
Ukraine, .43 in the United Kingdom, and .21 in the United States.
A statistical test was performed to examine whether core political values
mediated the relation between basic values and ideological self-placement.
As in the Italian study (Schwartz et al., 2010), of which this research is an
extension, a full mediation was found to occur in most countries. Only in
three countries (Brazil, Finland, and Poland) was the effect of basic values not

completely mediated, suggesting that there might be other specific mediators

that were not examined. However, even in these countries, most of the effect
seen to be exerted on ideology by basic values was due to their influence on
political values.
The Role of Personality Traits as Distal Predictors of Basic Values

and Political Values
To further investigate the psychological underpinning of politically rele-
vant values and attitudes, data collected in Italy, Spain, and Chile revealed
significant correlations between core political values and the Big Five per-
sonality traits. The openness trait correlated positively with accepting
immigrants and civil liberties, and negatively with military intervention,
blind patriotism, and law and order. The agreeableness trait was positively
correlated with civil liberties and accepting immigrants, and negatively
correlated with military intervention and blind patriotism. The other traits
were much more weakly correlated or were unrelated with core political
values (Table 5.3).
Once basic values are controlled for, the correlations between the Big Five
traits and core political values approached zero. This result corroborates the
causal chain represented in Figure 5.4, where personality traits operate as dis-
tant determinants of political attitudes and preferences. Also, as reasoned in
Chapter 4, basic dispositions in the sphere of personality can be thought of
as basic potentials for ideological orientation. Basic values, instead, might be
conceptualized as intervening factors that mediate the influence of traits on
preferences and beliefs about specific political issues. However, there is a pau-
city of studies that have examined the combined effect that traits and values
may exert on core political values.
To the best of our knowledge, only one study has directly assessed the
mediational role of basic values in linking the Big Five to specific political
values (Vecchione, Caprara, Schoen, Gonzàlez Castro, & Schwartz, 2012). The
study, conducted in three European countries (Germany, Italy, and Spain)
focused on attitudes toward immigrants, one of the constructs included in the
Schwartz et al. studies described earlier, associated to one of the most hotly
debated topics in Europe and much of the world (Smith & Edmonston, 1997).
In this study, Vecchione et al. (2012) investigated whether the mediational
model shown in Figure 5.4 held concerning individuals’ perception of the
consequences of immigration as positive or negative. Findings revealed sig-
nificant covariation between perceptions of immigration and individual dif-
ferences in values and traits, even after controlling for such individual-level
variables as gender, age, education, and income. Traits and basic values jointly

TA B L E 5 . 3 . CORRELATIONS OF CORE POLITICAL VALUES WITH THE BIG FIVE PERSONALITY TRAITS IN THREE
COUNTRIES (ITALY, SPAIN, CHILE)
ENERGY
Italy –.02 .07 .03 .02 –.06 .01 –.07 .07
Spain –.02 .02 .00 .02 .03 .07 .05 .03
Chile –.02 –.03 .09 .02 -.07 .03 .03 .03
AGREEABLENESS
Italy –.05 –.21** –.29** –.09* –.23** .21** .26** .38**
Spain –.06 –.01 –.12* –.12* –.06 .17** .15** .15**
Chile –.10* –.29** –.10* –.22** –.26** .06 .16** .16**
CONSCIENTIOUSNESS
Italy .08 .05 .00 .03 .06 .01 .04 .02
Spain .00 .03 –.11* –.08 –.02 .08 .10* .04
Chile .08 –.18** –.13** –.14** –.03 –.04 .10* –.03
EMOTIONAL STABILITY
Italy –.03 –.02 –.03 .09* –.04 .09* .04 .15**
Spain –.07 .00 –.02 –.08 –.09 .03 .00 .11*
Chile –.01 –.08 –.01 –.04 –.06 –.03 .01 .04
OPENNESS
Italy –.18** –.18** –.25** –.17** –.26** .17** .24** .38**
Spain –.16** –.03 –.13* –.20** –.20** .14* .09 .14*
Chile –.08 –.27** –.15** –.22** –.22** .20** .26** .26**
Notes: ** p < .01; * p < .05.
TrdMor = Traditional Morality; LawOr = Law and Order; FreEn = Free Enterprise; Equ = Equality; BlnPa = “Blind” Patriotism; CivLib = Civil Liberties;
MilInt = Military Intervention; AccIm = Accepting Immigrants.

Core
Personality
Basic Values Political
Traits
Values
Figure 5.4 Paths of influence among personality traits, basic values, and core polit-
ical values.
explained from 44% (Italy) to 71% (Spain) of the variance in people’s percep-
tions of the consequences of immigration.
Concerning the role of basic values, universalism correlated most strongly
with positive perceptions of immigration, while security correlated most
strongly with negative perceptions. As they express conflicting motivations,
universalism and security are located on opposite sides of the motivational
circle of values. In particular, universalism and security differ with regard
to the extent that they reflect anxiety- free or anxiety-
based motivations
(Schwartz, 2009). Whereas universalism values express anxiety-free motiva-
tions, values that prioritize security are linked to coping with anxiety due to
uncertainty in the social and physical world. As argued by Schwartz (2009),
the trade-off between these two values provides a psychological basis for per-
ceiving the consequences of immigration as positive or negative. In particu-
lar, people who attributed more importance to security were more likely to
perceive immigrants as a threat and were more concerned about the negative
consequences of immigration, such as higher crime rates or increased compe-
tition in the labor market (Schwartz, 2009; Vecchione et al., 2012).
This finding is in accord with findings of an earlier study by Davidov,
Meuleman, Billiet, and Schmidt (2008), who analyzed data from 19 countries
included in the European Social Survey (2002–2003). The authors investi-
gated the effects of self-transcendence and conservation values on attitudes
toward immigrants. In the vast majority of countries, the greater the priority
respondents gave to self-transcendence values, and the less their priority for
conservation values, the more willing they were to accept immigrants, and
the less stringent the qualifications (e.g., language, education, skills) they con-
sidered important to let them into the country (for similar results, see also
Schwartz, 2007).
As implied by the circular motivational structure of the 10 values (cfr.
Schwartz, 2009), self-direction and benevolence, the values adjacent to univer-
salism, were also correlated with positive perceptions of immigration. Self-
direction and universalism are both related to comfort with and acceptance
of diversity, and benevolence shares anxiety-free concern for the welfare of
others with universalism. Conformity, tradition, and power values, which

are adjacent to security, were instead correlated with negative perceptions of

immigration. Based on anxiety regarding change, conformity and tradition
share the goal of maintaining the status quo with security; power, like secu-
rity, is concerned with avoiding uncertainty, though for power this is sought
through imposing control.
Regarding the Big Five, the basic dispositional tendencies captured by the
openness trait were found to be related to positive perceptions of immigration.
This accords with previous findings showing positive relations of openness
with tolerance for diversity and non-conformity (John & Srivastava, 1999) and
negative relations with right-wing authoritarianism (Akrami & Ekehammar,
2006; McCrae & Costa, 1997), generalized prejudice (Ekehammar & Akrami,
2003), and social dominance orientation (Ekehammar, Akrami, Gylje, &
Zakrisson, 2004). As expected, however, the effect of these traits on percep-
tions of immigration was indirect and was fully mediated by basic values.
Indeed, when controlling for basic values, traits did not add to the prediction
of attitude toward immigration. This result was quite stable across the three
countries.
Openness affected attitudes toward immigration through its influence on
values related to security and universalism, whereas the effect of agreeable-
ness was mediated by universalism. As discussed in Chapter 4, open-minded
and agreeable individuals tend to attribute more importance to universal-
ism values and less importance to security values. These traits operate as
potentials that predispose individuals toward specific preferences and value
priorities like universalism or security. Ultimately, it is the combination of
predispositions of individuals’ traits with experiences and social circum-
stances that leads to the endorsement of values and preferences conducive
to the acceptance or rejection of others from different ethnic backgrounds.
No relations were found with energy/extraversion, conscientiousness, and
emotional stability, three traits that have exhibited inconsistent or negligible
associations with prejudice in past studies (e.g., Sibley & Duckitt, 2008).
Findings from the study by Vecchione et al. (2012) may have direct impli-
cations for public policies. As tolerance for immigration seems rooted in stable
personality characteristics, one should expect that governments will face con-
siderable difficulties in enacting acceptance policies due to the widespread
skepticism of public opinion toward immigrants (Vecchione et al., 2012). Yet
public opinion is not immutable, and political elites might be more successful
in shaping public opinion by communication strategies that address citizen’s
altruistic values and mitigate their fears. Reducing the perception that immi-
gration threatens personal and societal security should, in fact, result in lower
levels of anxiety and opposition toward immigration.

BASIC VALUES PROVIDE STRUCTURE AND GIVE

COHERENCE TO CORE POLITICAL VALUES
A number of researchers have shown that the political values of the general
public are not independent, but are related to one another in a systematic way
(e.g., Gunther & Kuan, 2007; Knutsen, 1995a). Likewise, data from the cross-
cultural study of Schwartz and colleagues (2014) showed a high degree of
comparability across countries in the correlation matrices among core politi-
cal values. In other words, the way in which political values are interrelated
tends to be consistent across countries with different histories and political
traditions.
Table 5.4 reports the Tucker’s congruence coefficient, which was used
to assess the similarity in the configuration of correlations between the
core political values.3 The table compares correlations found in the United
Kingdom, which one may consider the more senior of the established democ-
racies, with those observed in the other countries. Coefficients higher than .90
indicate that results clearly generalize across countries.
As can also be seen in Table 5.4, the pattern of correlations found in
the United Kingdom was virtually identical to that found in other secular
countries, like the United States, Australia, and Finland, and in traditionally
religious countries, like Spain, Italy, and Greece. Only in post-communist
countries was a different pattern observed. The same results were replicated
across voters of different political preferences (i.e., across left-and right-wing
voters, and across liberals and conservatives).
These findings further confirm that political values are constrained to
one another in a stable and consistent way. However, few systematic studies
have attempted to identify the principles that underlie political values and
which may be responsible for their correlations. To address this issue, the
study by Schwartz et al. (2010) investigated the extent to which basic values
provide structure and give coherence to political values. As noted earlier,
this study was conducted in Italy and examined how the political values of
law and order, traditional morality, equality, free enterprise, civil liberties,
“blind” patriotism, military intervention, and accepting immigrants relate
to the whole system of basic values in a comprehensive manner. A multi-
dimensional scaling analysis (MDS) was performed in order to depict the
complex pattern of relations that is formed by correlations between basic
values and core political values (see Table 5.5). In this analysis, the loca-
tions of core political values reveal their relations to one another and to the
basic values (see Schwartz et al., 2010, for a more technical description of the
procedure).

TAB L E 5 . 4 . CONGRUENCE ACROSS COUNTRIES IN THE CORRELATION

MATRICES AMONG CORE POLITICAL VALUES
TrdMor LawOr FreEn Equ BlnPa CivLib Average
Australia .94 .96 .97 .97 .98 .94 .96

Brazil .96 .97 .89 .94 .93 .92 .93
Chile .96 .99 .97 .97 .99 .99 .98
Finland .91 .94 .88 .95 .93 .90 .92
E/Germany .94 .93 .97 .97 .91 .91 .94
W/Germany .95 .97 .99 .94 .96 .92 .96
Greece .94 .97 .90 .96 .96 .97 .95
Israel .95 .99 .98 .96 .99 .93 .97
Italy .97 .98 .93 .98 .98 .98 .97
Poland .54 .73 .15 .70 .68 .90 .62
Slovakia .53 .69 .31 .56 .69 .83 .60
Spain .98 .98 .97 .98 .98 .96 .98
Turkey .96 .96 .89 .82 .96 .88 .91
Ukraine .34 .75 .73 .59 .82 .65 .65
United States .93 .86 .96 .72 .91 .94 .89
Note: Coefficients < .90 (in italics) reflect non-negligible differences between countries. Average
coefficients across political values are in bold.
TrdMor = Traditional Morality; LawOr = Law and Order; FreEn = Free Enterprise; Equ = Equality;

BlnPa = “Blind” Patriotism; CivLib = Civil Liberties; MilInt = Military Intervention; AccIm = Accepting
Immigrants.
As can be seen in Figure 5.5, each political value related positively to a set
of basic values on one side of the circle, and negatively to a set of basic values
on the opposite side, depending on the degree to which it promotes the attain-
ment of the defining goals of each basic value, or whether it conflicts with the
expression and preservation of these goals.
Specifically, traditional morality, law and order, and blind patriotism,
which Table 5.1 shows to be substantially correlated, are clustered on the left
of Figure 5.5, together with conservation values (tradition, conformity and
security). They formed a region opposed to openness to change values (self-
direction, stimulation, hedonism), which are clustered together at the upper
left of Figure 5.5. This suggests that preserving traditional norms and modes
of behavior, emphasizing law and order, and promoting uncritical attachment
to one’s country are compatible with conservation values, protecting against
anxiety-provoking change and the threat of social disruption. In contrast,
they conflict with the goals expressed by openness to change values. Finally,
the negative association of these political values with universalism values

TA B L E 5 . 5 . CORRELATIONS OF CORE POLITICAL VALUES WITH BASIC

VALUES IN ITALY
Core Political Values
Basic Values TrdMor BlnPa LawOr MilInt FreEn Equ CivLib AccIm
Security .48** .43** .39** .30** .15** –.02 –.08* –.37**

Conformity .45** .35** .30** .21** .12** –.03 –.08* –.27**
Tradition .53** .37** .32** .20** .14** –.05 –.21** –.26**
Benevolence –.04 –.12** –.20** –.24** –.20** .23** .18** .20**
Universalism –.19** –.27** –.33** –.40** –.39** .43** .32** .36**
Self-direction –.38** –.34** –.30** –.21** –.17** .06 .19** .25**
Stimulation –.40** –.28** –.23** –.14** –.03 –.07* .03 .23**
Hedonism –.36** –.25** –.21** –.11** –.06 –.08* .03 .09**
Achievement –.15** -.04 .02 .11** .14** –.19** –.11** –.06
Power –.07* .04 .12** .23** .27** –.33** –.26** –.08*
Note: * p < .01; ** p < .001.

Immigrants.
Modified from Schwartz et al. (2010). Used with permission from John Wiley and Sons Publishing.
Self-Enhancement Openness
FreeEntrp
Immgrnt
MltryIntrv
LawOrder CivlLibrty
Patriotism
TrdtnMrlty
Equality
Conservation Self-Transcendence
Figure 5.5 Multidimensional analysis (MDS) of eight core political values and ten
basic personal values in Italy (Schwartz et al., 2010).

implies less concern for the welfare of those who are different and who do not
belong to one’s own groups.
The location of the value accepting immigrants on the right in Figure 5.5
reveals that its motivational underpinnings conflict with those of traditional
morality, law and order, and blind patriotism. It correlates most positively
with universalism, self-direction, and stimulation, and most negatively with
the three conservation values. This implies that, as reasoned earlier, accept-
ing immigrants entails concern for the welfare of others, even those quite
different from oneself (Schwartz, 2006) and reflects seeing change and diver-
sity as potential sources of gain, growth, and self-expansion (see Schwartz
et al., 2010).
The locations of the core political values of equality, civil liberties, and—
in reverse direction— free enterprise indicate that the main motivational
opposition that guides these political values is self-interest versus interest for
others. As argued by Schwartz et al. (2010), whereas equality and civil liber-
ties express concern for others’ welfare, free enterprise suggests the pursuit
of one’s own wealth and success, and the removal of governmental regulation
that can protect the weak. This is confirmed by the high correlations showed
by these political values with universalism (negative) and power (positive).
The value of civil liberties, however, correlates more positively with self-
direction values and more negatively with tradition values than equality.
This suggests that autonomy and freedom from conventions represent added
motivational bases of civil liberties.
The location of military intervention in Figure 5.5 suggests that this politi-
cal value is grounded in the three conservation values and, as such, conflicts
with self-direction and universalism values in the same way that law and
order, blind patriotism, and traditional morality do. Like free enterprise,
however, it also correlates positively with power. As Schwartz et al. (2010)
explain, valuing military intervention is linked to seeking protection against
external sources of danger through dominating power, rather than favoring
nonaggressive ways to handle problems and opposing actions that may harm
others.
In sum, findings reported in the preceding show that associations among
the core political values reflect their relations to basic values and the motiva-
tional polarities and compatibilities among these values. In other words, the
structure of compatible and contrasting motivational goals, which organizes
basic personal values into a circular continuum, appears also to provide a
psychological grounding that constrains and organizes core political values
in an integrated manner.

Returning to the cross-cultural study by Schwartz et al. (2014), correla-

tions between core political values and basic values were also calculated sep-
arately for non-communist and post-communist countries. Remarkably, the
pattern of correlations was virtually identical across 10 of 11 non-communist
countries (Brazil, Finland, Chile, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Spain, UK,
and US). Only in Turkey were moderate deviations from the overall pattern
observed, and then mostly as a consequence of the correlations between
accepting immigrants and basic values. Such differences have been linked
to the distinctive situation of immigration in Turkey, where the complexities
of diverse, illegal, and irregular immigration might make it difficult to form
consistent, value-based attitudes toward immigration (Schwartz et al., 2014).4
An MDS analysis on the data from the non-communist countries showed
that the pattern of relations between basic values and core political val-
ues largely confirmed the structure found in the Italian study (Schwartz
et al., 2010).
A systematic association between basic values and core political values
also emerged in the post-communist countries (Poland, Slovakia, and Ukraine),
although showing a different pattern with respect to that seen for the non-
communist countries.
One of the largest differences between non- communist and post-
communist countries was found concerning law and order and universalism.
These were negatively correlated in the non-communist countries but unre-
lated in the post-communist countries. As Schwartz et al. (2014) noted, one
possible explanation for this finding is that universalism values carry a less
liberal meaning in post-communist societies. In these countries, universal-
ism values are not opposed to that of security, like in the prototypical struc-
ture. This suggests that the motivational goals expressed by universalism and
security values are not incompatible in post-communist societies (see Bardi &
Schwartz, 1996).
Correlations of military intervention with conservation values were posi-
tive in non-communist societies but near zero in post-communist countries.
Here the threat of military intervention by Russia in the post-communist
countries may still operate as a source of anxiety and fear. The recent seces-
sion of Crimea and the persisting crisis in Ukraine has exacerbated this con-
cern among neighboring countries. Yet, it is difficult to establish the extent to
which pro-military intervention beliefs, which in non-communist societies
are prevalent among the right, have the same meaning in post-communist
countries that still perceive the threat of foreign occupation.
Equality and conservation values correlated negatively in the non-
communist countries, but were positively related in the post- communist

countries. One may argue that, in the latter, equality has been traditionally
linked to security to the extent that communist regimes have claimed the
pursuit of economic and social security through equality. Thus, faced with
the increased insecurity and socioeconomic inequality in the aftermath of the
fall of communist regimes in eastern Europe, individuals high in conserva-
tion values may regret the lack of past equality while desiring to restore what
they see as lost security.
Free enterprise and conservation values were positively correlated in the
non-communist countries, possibly due to the conservative rhetoric about
limiting the influence of government, but were negatively related in the post-
communist countries. As stated by Schwartz et al. (2014), “this supports the
reasoning that those who cherish conservation values experience the inse-
curity caused by the rampant free enterprise in those countries as especially
threatening and upsetting” (p. 25).
Overall, the observed pattern of relations between basic values and core
political values corroborates the idea that the most prominent core values in
the political science literature are grounded in an overarching motivational
structure that organizes and provides coherence concerning citizens’ beliefs
and preferences on a variety of contingent political issues. To investigate the
structure of core political values further, we used factor analysis to exam-
ine the extent to which they could be traced to one or more common dimen-
sions. In particular, we acknowledged the criticism of other scholars who
have claimed that a unidimensional model of ideology is not sufficient to
capture the variety of political attitudes, a conceptualization that assumes at
least two dimensions: economic and social, being preferable to one dimension
(e.g., Feldman, 2013).
Therefore, in order to make the economic component of ideology more
prominent, we included new items to cover economic security in addition to
previous core political values (Jacoby, 2006). This value concerns the importance
assigned to job and income guarantees by all citizens. Examples of items are:
“economic security is our country’s major problem” and “the biggest threat to our coun-
try is the collapse of our economy.”
In most countries, this political value correlated positively with conser-
vation values (security, tradition, and conformity), and negatively with self-
transcendence values (universalism and benevolence), self- direction, and
stimulation. This suggests that the opposition between the values of conser-
vation and openness to change structures this political value.
Figure 5.6 represents the correlations of economic security with left-
right (or liberal-conservative) ideological self-placement. This political value
was moderately related to a preference for a right-wing (or conservative)

0.3
0.2
0.1
0.1
lia
el
Uk y
d
n
nd
y
il
Ge ile
ly
ia
UK
e
an
az
in
an
ai
ec
US
Ita
ra
ak
rk
ra
Ch
la
ra
Sp
Br
rm
nl
Is
Po
ov
Tu
st
Gr
Fi
Au
Sl
Figure 5.6 Correlations of economic security with left-liberal and right-conservative
ideology. Correlations are ordered from highest to lowest.
ideological position. However, there was certain variability in these relation-

ships across countries, most likely due to citizens’ sensitivity concerning
economic security and current political situations. Positive and significant
correlations were observed in 10 countries, ranging from .10 (Germany) to .28
(Finland). In Turkey, Ukraine, Israel, Italy, and Slovakia, by contrast, correla-
tions were approaching zero.
When the other political values were controlled for, the impact of eco-
nomic security was no longer significant in each country. This suggests that
concerns about economic security cannot distinguish between voters of
opposite ideological views in a unique way.
As anticipated, the use of factor analysis allowed us to investigate the
number and type of underlying latent dimensions that may explain why
core political values are related to each other. Although slightly different
factor compositions were found across countries, a two-factor solution was
the most recurrent. The two dimensions, however, cannot be traced unam-
biguously to the distinction between economic, sociocultural, and ethi-
cal issues. Figure 5.7a presents the factor loadings observed in the United
Kingdom, which appeared to be one of the most prototypical solutions. One
factor was loaded by law and order, blind patriotism, traditional morality,
free enterprise, and, to a lesser degree, by economic security and military
intervention. The second factor was loaded by equality, accepting immi-
grants, and civil liberties.

(a)
0.8 Equ
Acclm
0.6
CivLib
0.4
EcSec
0.2
TraMor
0
FreEnt
Milnt BlnPa
LawOr
–0.2
–0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Figure 5.7a Rotated factor loadings of nine core political values in the United
Kingdom (principal axis factoring was used as method of estimation).
The same analysis was repeated by considering liberal and conservative

voters as separate groups. This permitted us to test the argument raised by
Cochrane (2010), who argued that ideology can act as a kind of worldview that
dictates the organization and content of people’s opinions. According to this
author, there might be differences between voters with different ideological
orientation in the ways they group political issues together into ideologically
coherent bundles of ideas about the political world. As shown in Figures 5.7b
and 5.7c, however, the pattern obtained in the United Kingdom for the overall
sample was clearly replicated among both liberal and conservative individu-
als. This suggests that the organization of political values does not change as
a function of voter’s ideological position.
Figures 5.7d–5.7g present the factorial compositions found in other coun-
tries. The two-factor solution obtained in the United Kingdom was substan-
tially replicated in other established democracies, like the US (Figure 5.7d),
Italy (Figure 5.7e), and Spain (Figure 5.7f), as well as in post-communist coun-
tries like Poland (Figure 5.7g). The two-factor solution observed in these coun-
tries accords with what has been found by Schwartz and colleagues (2010,
2014). Political values that share similar patterns of correlation with basic val-
ues, indeed, tend to cluster together. One dimension includes political values
(i.e., traditional morality, law and order, blind patriotism, military inter-
vention, free enterprise) mostly grounded in the three conservation values

(b)
1
0.8
Equ
0.6
Acclm
CivLib
0.4
0.2 EcSec
0
TraMor
Milnt
FreEnt LawOr
BlnPa
–0.2
–0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Figure 5.7b Factor loadings of core political values among liberal voters of

the United Kingdom.
and/or power. The other dimension comprises political values (equality, civil
liberties, and accepting immigrants) that are grounded mostly in universal-
ism values. Also, in these countries, as in the United Kingdom, no substantial
differences were found between voters with different political preferences
(i.e., among left-wing or liberal individuals, and right-wing or conservative
individuals). Only in Finland (Figure 5.7h) and Australia (Figure 5.7i) did
economic security and free enterprise load on the same factor that could be
remotely identified with economic ideology. Overall, the empirical evidences
about the distinction between social and economic dimensions of political
ideology was found to be weak and limited to few countries.
Overall, these findings further attest to core political values tending to
relate to each other and to their clustering together in similar manner across
different polities. Thus one may conclude that a common understanding of
politics is taking place even among citizens of quite different polities.
Nevertheless, by focusing on similarities we should not forget that the
same political values may carry different valences and meanings at different
times in response to contingent priorities, or that the conceptual constraints
accounting for the clustering of issues and priorities may significantly change
across political contexts.

(c)
0.8
Equ
AccIm
0.6
CivLib
0.4
0.2 EcSec
TraMor
0
FreEnt
BlnPa
–0.2
LawOr
Milnt
–0.4
–0.4 –0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Figure 5.7c Rotated factor loadings of nine core political values among conserva-
tive voters of the United Kingdom.
(d)
1
0.8 Equ
0.6
0.4
CivLib
AccIm
0.2
EcSec BlnPa
LawOr
0
TraMor FreEnt
–0.2
Milnt
–0.4
–0.2 –0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
Figure 5.7d Factor loadings in the United States.

(e)
0.8
Equ
0.6
CivLib
0.4 EcSec
AccIm
TraMor
0.2
BlnPa
0
Milnt
FreEnt LawOr
–0.2
–0.4
–0.4 –0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Figure 5.7e Factor loadings in Italy.
(f)
0.8 LawOr
0.6 TraMor
BlnPa
0.4
EcSec FreEnt
Equ
0.2 Milnt
CivLib
–0.2
AccIm
–0.4
–1.2 –1 –0.8 –0.6 –0.4 –0.2 0 0.2 0.4
Figure 5.7f Factor loadings in Spain.

(g)
0.8
0.6 CivLib Equ
0.4
EcSec
AccIm
0.2
TraMor
FreEnt BlnPa
0
LawOr
Milnt
–0.2
–0.4 –0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Figure 5.7g Factor loadings in Poland.
(h)
0.6
FreEnt
EcSec
0.4
Milnt
0.2
BlnPa
0
LawOr
CivLib
–0.2 Equ
TraMor
AccIm
–0.4
–0.4 –0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Figure 5.7h Factor loadings in Finland.

(i)
0.8
BlnPa
0.6
EcSec
FreEnt LawOr
0.4
TraMor
CivLib
0.2
Milnt
0
Equ
AccIm
–0.2
–0.9 –0.7 –0.5 –0.3 –0.1 0.1 0.3 0.5
Figure 5.7i Factor loadings in Australia.
Whereas citizens continue to rely on the traditional left-right or liberal-

conservative continuum to understand politics and to locate themselves in the
political space with various degrees of stability and consistency, they do so also
because their ideological self-placement allows a high degree of flexibility. In
this regard, both the unidimensional and bi-dimensional views of ideology
cannot account for the manifold combinations of issues and priorities that are
associated under the heading of left and right or under liberal and conservative
self-placement across different political contexts and across different times.
As stated in previous chapter, in order to account for ideological self-
placement, the function of political ideology needs to be understood in addition
to and beyond its content. Indeed, due to the heterogeneity of meanings that
citizens impose on the left-right continuum, people may continue to identify
with the right or the left of political ideology, despite the same policies being
endorsed by the right in certain countries at certain times, and by the left in other
countries at other times. Whereas people’s predispositions form the premises
for prioritizing certain values that lead to placing themselves on one or other
side of political ideology, people also have a large variety of self-serving strate-
gies with which to justify and protect the consistency of their political prefer-
ences. Indeed, the more ideological self-placement is an important component

of a person’s identity, and the more believing is at the service of belonging, the
more likely it is that consistency is crucial to account for ideological stability.
THE POLITICAL VALUES OF THE LEFT AND OF THE RIGHT

Figures 5.8a–5.8d and Figures 5.9a–5.9h present the frequency distribution of
various political values in several countries. Each figure portrays how indi-
viduals’ scores on a given political value are distributed among left-wing (or
liberal) and right-wing (or conservative) voters in two different countries. At
first glance, the figures reveal that all political values approximately follow a
normal (or Gaussian) distribution, which is bell-shaped and symmetrical. For
each political value, the majority of participants are located in the middle of
the distribution, around the sample mean. Relatively few cases, by contrast,
obtained extreme scores, with approximately the same frequency for high
and low scores.
Comparing the curves of two countries allows us to assess how left-
wing (or liberal) and right-wing (or conservative) individuals of the respec-
tive countries are similar concerning their agreement with specific policies
or political issues. The more the curves of two countries overlap, the more
similar the countries are with respect to the average agreement toward a
given political value. For example, Figures 5.8a–5.8d show how scores on the
(a)
0.5
0.4
0.3
– lib
US –
UK
onsc
0.2
– lib
0.1
on
US
–c
UK
0.0
0 2 4 6
Figure 5.8a Traditional morality in the United Kingdom and the United States.

(b)
0.6
0.5
s
con
UK –
US –
0.4
lib
0.3 – lib
UK
US –
cons
0.2
0.1
0.0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Figure 5.8b Free enterprise in the United Kingdom and the United States.
(c)
0.5
UK –
0.4
cons cons
US
b
UK – li
0.3
lib
US –
0.2
0.1
0.0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Figure 5.8c Law and order in the United Kingdom and the United States.

(d)
0.5
0.4
UK – lib
0.3
lib
US –
0.2
ns
– co
0.1
s
on
–c
UK
US
0.0
0 2 4 6
Figure 5.8d Equality in the United Kingdom and the United States.
(a)
0.5
0.4
ft
IS – le
IS – rig
lib
0.3
UK –
UK –
ht
cons
0.2
0.1
0.0
0 2 4 6
Figure 5.9a Traditional morality in the United Kingdom and Israel.

(b)
0.5
b
US – li
0.4
ft
le
SP –
0.3
US –
cons
0.2
SP –
right
0.1
0.0
0 2 4 6
Figure 5.9b Law and order in the United States and Spain.
(c)
0.5
0.4
cons
SP –
US –
right
0.3
b
US – li
0.2
SP
– le
0.1
ft
0.0
0 2 4 6
Figure 5.9c Equality in United States and Spain.

(d)
0.5
UK – lib
0.4
ons
UK – c
0.3
GR –
0.2
left
GR
–r
0.1
igh
t
0.0
0 2 4 6
Figure 5.9d Free enterprise in the United Kingdom and Greece.
(e)
0.6
0.5
0.4
IT – le
0.3
ft
ht
– rig
0.2
AU
ft
IT –
– le
0.1
righ
AU
0.0
1 2 3 4 5 6
Figure 5.9e Civil liberties in Australia and Italy.

(f)
0.6
0.5
FI – left
0.4
ht
FI – rig
0.3
US –
0.2
lib
US
–c
0.1
on
s
0.0
0 2 4 6
Figure 5.9f Blind patriotism in Finland and the United States.
(g)
0.4
US
– lib
ft
0.3
IT – le
US –
0.2
cons
right
IT –
0.1
0.0
0 2 4 6
Figure 5.9g Military intervention in Italy and the United States.

(h)
0.5
0.4
right
AU –
0.3
SP –
left
ht
– rig
0.2
AU
ft
– le
SP
0.1
0.0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Figure 5.9h Accepting immigrants in Spain and Australia.
four political values with the highest predictive value regarding ideological
self-placement (i.e., traditional morality, equality, free enterprise, and law and
order) were distributed across liberal and conservative voters of the United
Kingdom and the United States. As can be seen, there is a high degree of over-
lapping across the countries and thus a high degree of comparability in the
way in which the political values are distributed. As is also apparent, liberals
of both countries exhibited a higher degree of agreement with equality items
than conservatives, who in turn agreed more strongly with statements related
to traditional morality, law and order, and free enterprise. At the same time,
there were some differences between the United Kingdom and the United
States. On average, for example, UK liberals scored higher on equality than
US liberals, whereas US conservatives scored higher on free enterprise than
UK conservatives.
Figures 5.9a–5.9h represent other frequency distributions, comparing dif-
ferent pairs of countries on several political values. Interestingly, in some of
these comparisons there is a substantial overlapping in the frequency dis-
tributions of respondents with contrasting political preferences. This is the
case, for example, with US liberal and Spanish right-wing voters, who rated
the value of equality similarly (Figure 5.9c). This is also the case with Italian
left-wing voters and Australian right-wing voters, who obtained very similar
scores on civil liberties (Figure 5.9e).

In other cases, left-wing (or liberal) individuals in a country scored higher

than right-wing (or conservative) individuals from a different country on
political values that are conceptually related to a preference for right-wing or
conservative ideologies (and vice versa). Take, for example, the cases of “blind”
patriotism and accepting immigrants. Within each country, blind patriotism
was consistently rated higher by right-wing (or conservative) individuals,
whereas accepting immigrants, by contrast, scored consistently higher among
left-wing (or liberal) individuals. When the frequency distributions obtained in
different countries are compared, however, a different result can be observed.
On average, for example, US liberals rated blind patriotism higher than Finnish
right-wing individuals. In a similar vein, Australian right-wing individuals
scored higher than Spanish left-wing individuals on accepting immigrants.
Commonalities in Core Political Values Between Ideologies

and across Countries
The findings discussed in the previous section pointed to core political values
that are associated with a preference for left-or right-wing ideologies and par-
ties. The pattern of relations we observed between core political values and
voting is particularly informative concerning the extent to which each value
leads to a preference, and thereby to voting, for left-or right-wing parties.
With regard to the priority assigned, on average, to core political values by
left-and right-wing voters across societies, we saw that, despite their different
political orientation, the two groups may share similar priorities, reflecting
a certain degree of agreement on the relative importance attributed to the
examined values.
As we did in Chapter 4 for basic values, in this chapter we investigated
the extent to which participants with different political orientations assigned
priority to the same or different values, this time, political values (see Caprara
and Vecchione, 2016). The two political values to which left-wing (or liberal)
and right-wing (or conservative) individuals assigned the highest score in each
country can be seen in Table 5.6. As is evident, the two groups of participants
exhibited a remarkably degree of similarity in their political value ratings. In
seven countries, although in a different order, equality and civil liberties form
the pair of political values with the highest scores, among both left-liberal
and right-conservative voters. If one considers the most important political
value, equality was found to obtain the highest score in both groups of voters
of Brazil, Chile, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, and
Turkey. Civil liberties, instead, is the most important value in Finland and
Ukraine for all voters. Thus, voters in countries that are quite diverse in his-
tory, polities, and ideological background agreed in their high prioritization

TAB L E 5 . 6 . THE TWO POLITICAL VALUES WITH HIGHEST MEAN

SCORES IN EACH COUNTRY BY LEFTIST/LIBERALS AND RIGHTIST/
CONSERVATIVES VOTERS
Leftist/Liberals Participants Rightist/Conservative Participants
Australia 1. Accept immigrants (M = 3.93) 1. Accept immigrants (M = 3.85)

2. Equality (M = 3.83) 2. Equality (M = 3.47)
Brazil 1. Equality (M = 4.26) 1. Equality (M = 3.79)
2. Civil Liberties (M = 3.89) 2. Civil liberties (M = 3.74)
Chile 1. Equality (M = 4.33) 1. Equality (M = 3.97)
2. Civil liberties (M = 3.57) 2. Traditional morality (M = 3.78)
Finland 1. Civil liberties (M = 4.07) 1. Civil liberties (M = 3.98)
E/Germany 1. Equality (M = 4.16) 1. Equality (M = 3.84)
2. Accept immigrants (M = 3.88) 2. Traditional Morality (M = 3.54)
W/Germany 1. Equality (M = 3.98) 1. Equality (M = 3.60)
2. Accept immigrants (M = 3.94) 2. Traditional Morality (M = 3.51)
Greece 1. Equality (M = 4.36) 1. Equality (M = 4.07)
2. Civil liberties (M = 3.90) 2. Traditional Morality (M = 3.71)
Israel 1. Equality (M = 3.83) 1. Equality (M = 4.02)
2. Civil liberties (M = 3.38) 2. Civil liberties (M = 3.74)
Italy 1. Equality (M = 4.18) 1. Equality (M = 3.88)
Poland 1. Equality (M = 3.71) 1. Equality (M = 3.64)
Slovakia 1. Equality (M = 3.69) 1. Equality (M = 3.66)
Spain 1. Equality (M = 4.06) 1. Equality (M = 3.63)
2. Civil Liberties (M = 3.50) 2. Traditional Morality (M = 3.55)
Turkey 1. Equality (M = 4.33) 1. Equality (M = 4.20)
2. Civil Liberties (M = 4.10) 2. Traditional morality (M = 4.10)
Ukraine 1. Civil liberties (M = 3.83) 1. Civil liberties (M = 3.85)
UK 1. Equality (M = 3.91) 1. Traditional morality (M = 3.71)
2. Accept immigration (M = 3.72) 2. Civil liberties (M = 3.41)
US 1. Civil liberties (M = 3.77) 1. Traditional morality (M = 3.79)
2. Equality (M = 3.66) 2. Civil liberties (M = 3.62)
Source: Caprara and Vecchione (2015). Used with permission from Československá psychologie.
of values related to the egalitarian distribution of resources and opportunities

(equality), and freedom to think and act (civil liberties).
In Australia, accepting immigrants and equality are the most important
values for all voters. In the United Kingdom and the United States, equal-
ity and civil liberties obtained the highest score only among liberal voters.

Specifically, equality was rated as most important by UK liberal voters,

whereas civil liberties was rated as most important by US liberal voters.
Conservative voters of both countries, by contrast, scored highest in tradi-
tional morality.
Religiosity and Core Political Values

Table 5.7 presents the correlations of political values with religiosity in the
15 countries involved in the cross-national study by Schwartz et al. (2014).
In Italy, a primarily Catholic country where religion plays a pivotal role in
political discourse and public life, traditional morality exhibited the highest
positive correlation with religiosity (r = .53). This result is compatible with the
role of religious institutions, mostly Catholic, in conveying traditional values,
beliefs, and habits with regard to family life, sex, and relations among genders
and generations. Blind patriotism (r = .36) and law and order (r = .31) were
TA B L E 5 . 7 . CORRELATIONS OF CORE POLITICAL VALUES

WITH RELIGIOSITY
Australia .29* –.02 .04 .04 .08 –.02 –.05 .04

Brazil .50* .09** .04 .18** .16** –.09** –.02 —
Chile .46* .05 .14** .17** .14** –.16** .02 –.02
Finland .52* –.02 .11* .29** .36** –.20** –.12* .01
E/Germanya .28** .16* .09 .17* .19** — –.06 –.15**
W/Germanya .32** .09** .00 .17** .19** — .01 –.11**
Greece .57* .12* .19** .48** .48** –.16** –.09 –.30**
Israel .64* .08 — .20** .15** –.32** –.01 —
Italy .53* .09* .18** .36** .31** –.16** –.05 –.18**
Poland .54* –.17** –.08* .19** .07 –.06 .08* —
Slovakia .52* –.04 .01 .04 .12** –.01 .12* –.09*
Spain .60* .29** .10* .25** .38** –.20** –.18** –.14**
Turkey .33* .14** .25** .26** .30** .00 –.05 .07
Ukraine .24* .00 .01 .07 .14** .09* .10** —
UK .53* .13** .01 .26** .28** –.09 –.08 –.12*
US .48* .09* .07 .20** .10* .02 –.04 .09*
Notes: ** p < .01; * p < .05.

Immigrants.
a
One of the civil liberties item was inadvertently left out in the German study. This political value was
therefore excluded in the German analyses.

also positively related to religiosity. The comparable pattern of correlations

with religiosity exhibited by traditional morality, law and order, and blind
patriotism is probably due to their common motivational underpinning. As
previously noted, these political values are grounded in the three conserva-
tion values. As noted by Jost and colleagues, these values frequently accord
with a view of life in which the status quo tends to be justified as given and as
a part of a superior design (Jost, Hawkins, Nosek, Hennes, Stern, Gosling, &
Graham, 2014).
The findings concerning Italy and religiosity were clearly replicated in
different countries, and for different religions (see Table 5.7 for the complete
picture). In all countries, the highest positive correlation was found for tradi-
tional morality (correlation coefficient r was .46 on average), although religios-
ity also correlated positively with law and order (average r = .22, significant in
13 countries) and blind patriotism (average r = .21, significant in 12 countries).
In light of their intercorrelations with religiosity, we re-examined the role
of core political values in predicting political preferences after controlling for
religiosity. Even in this case, the political values most strongly related to ideo-
logical self-placement are equality, traditional morality, and free enterprise.
When religiosity was taken into account, the contribution of core political val-
ues to ideology did not change substantially. The proportion of accounted
variance ranged from .17 (Greece) to .35 (UK) in non-communist countries, and
from .03 (Ukraine) to .15 (Slovakia) in post-communist countries. Moreover, as
for basic values, the political values that affected ideological self-placement
remained substantially the same among religious and non-religious people
of different countries.
Taken together, these findings suggest that religiosity neither mediates
nor moderates the links between core political values and political prefer-
ences. Similarly, the structure of political values was found to be substantially
equivalent among religious and non-religious individuals. Results from the
Italian case can be seen in Figure 5.10 and Figure 5.11.
Looking at the political values to which religious and non-religious peo-
ple assign priority, it has been observed that in the vast majority of coun-
tries, non-religious individuals rated equality and civil liberties as the most
important political values. Equality ranked first in importance in 10 countries
(Brazil, Chile, Greece, Israel, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, UK); civil
liberties ranked first in four countries (Finland, Germany, Ukraine, and US);
accepting immigrants ranked first in Australia.
Equality and civil liberties were rated as the most important politi-
cal values also by religious individuals of most countries. Equality
ranked first in importance in eight countries (Brazil, Chile, Greece, Israel,

0.8
0.6 Equ
CivLib
0.4 AccIm
EcSec
0.2 BlnPa
TraMor
0
FreEnt
LawOr
–0.2
Milnt
–0.4
–0.4 –0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Figure 5.10 Factor loadings of political values among religious individuals in Italy.
0.8 Equ
0.6
CivLib
0.4 EcSec
AccIm
0.2 BlnPa
TraMor
0
LawOr
–0.2
FreEnt
Milnt
–0.4
–0.4 –0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Figure 5.11 Factor loadings of political values among non-religious individuals

in Italy.

Italy, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine), civil liberties in two countries (Finland and
Germany) and accepting immigration in one country (Australia). The most
striking difference with respect to non-religious individuals is that reli-
gious people of four countries (Poland, Slovakia, UK, US) rated traditional
morality as the most important political value; this political value, by con-
trast, was never rated as most important by non-religious people. As we
have noted in Chapter 4, moral issues associated to abortion, gay mar-
riages, and premarital sex accounted for much of the divisions between
liberals and conservatives in the United States, at least in the past (Putnam
& Campbell, 2010). It is a matter of investigation the extent to which the
same issues account for the same divisiveness in Poland, Slovakia, or the
United Kingdom.
CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, we have provided an overview of studies that, after traits
and basic values, have addressed values specifically relevant in the political
domain. Previous chapters have reported findings that attest to the persis-
tent relevance of left-right and liberal-conservative ideologies in established
democracies, and to the notable influence that individual differences in
personality, like traits and basic values, exert on ideological self-placement.
Here, therefore, we have examined the extent to which attitudes related to
issues and priorities that remain at the core of the political discourse and
programs may further clarify how traits and basic values operate on politi-
cal preferences. We also wanted to ascertain to which extent right-left and
conservative-liberal ideologies find correspondence in a congruent network
of beliefs about government and societal organization. Congruency among
shared beliefs, in fact, may sustain collective action at national level, and set
the premises for common aims and deliberations at a supernational level, as
in the case of European Parliament. It is unlikely that effective integration
among different polities will be achievable unless their representatives share
the same political lexicon and criteria to organize political knowledge, to form
coalitions, and to endorse different policies.
Findings presented in this chapter further attest to the importance of basic
values as coherent overarching principles that guide and organize political
values. It would seem likely that basic values operate as determinants of polit-
ical choice that turn personality traits into preferences and which orient citi-
zens toward ideologies they perceive as instrumental to the pursuit of their
own existential priorities. However, even basic values do not operate directly
over political preferences because specific values associated with the political

domain operate as proxy determinants of political choice. Empirical studies

conducted in several countries revealed that core political values account for
a substantial portion of variance in voting and ideological self-placement,
largely mediating the contribution of basic values.
Just as basic values were seen to mediate the influence of traits on political
preferences, so core political values were found largely to mediate the links of
basic values to political preferences. Core political values were located in the
multidimensional space of basic values similarly across countries.
The coherence and robustness of differences and of relations among polit-
ical values that can be traced to right-left or to conservative-liberal ideolo-
gies across the democracies of four continents also attested to these political
ideologies as systems of interconnected beliefs that constrain opinions into
coherent bundles of political viewpoints.
Left-wing and liberal voters exhibited a higher degree of agreement with
policies emphasizing the equal distribution of resources and opportunities
(equality) and freedom to act and think (civil liberties) than right-wing and
conservative voters. Right-wing and conservative voters, instead, showed a
higher degree of agreement with policies caring for traditional religious and
family values (traditional morality), enforcing the respect of law (law and
order), and limiting governmental intervention in economics (free enterprise).
Among all political values, equality and traditional morality were the ones
with the strongest discriminative power. They appear to be at the core of the
ideological cleavage between left-liberal and right-conservative ideologies in
most countries. This pattern of relations, attesting to ideology as a coherent
system of beliefs, holds in established democracies and in post-communist
countries, although only marginally in the latter case.
One particularly important finding has been that the political values just
discussed could not be traced to one unique latent dimension, since two dis-
tinct dimensions proved to fit better with the data. Although these dimen-
sions are not the same across all countries, in most cases they can be traced
to the two bipolar oppositions underlying Schwartz’s taxonomy of values,
namely openness to change versus conservation, and self enhancement ver-
sus self-transcendence.
Also, as previously undertaken with basic values, we found that looking
at similarities across ideologies regarding core political values was as infor-
mative as focusing on divergences. Equality and civil liberties are the values
that scored highest at the absolute level in terms of citizens’ agreement, which
held across most countries and regardless of political orientation. Thus one
may conclude that right-conservative and left-liberal voters are not so distant
from each other on values that proclaim the equality of respect each person

deserves as human being, and whose actualization rests upon the full expres-
sion of an individual’s personality. Whereas equality is the value at the core
of the democratic debate over the last two centuries, civil liberties extend the
legacy and scope of liberty in accordance with the change in habits and cus-
toms carried by modernity in the domain of ethics and individuals’ rights.
This told, we recall what we have already acknowledged at the begin-
ning of this chapter. All our findings are derived from polities whose prog-
ress toward democracy took similar pathways under the political ideals and
within the realm of Western civilization. It cannot be excluded, therefore, that
a quite different picture may result from the careful examination of other
political cultures. Nor do we underestimate the evidence that even in estab-
lished democracies there are fractions of people and social movements that
still resist the appeal of democracy.
NOTES
1. As in the Italian study, a confirmatory factor analysis was performed for

each country to assess whether the items yielded distinct factors for each
of the eight political values. In this case, however, the model obtained an
unsatisfactory fit. This was due mostly to the use of reverse-worded items,
with many of the negatively worded items showing problematic psycho-
metric properties. The reverse-worded items represent a problem that has
been reported in numerous studies (e.g., Barnette, 2000), and especially in
cross-national studies (Wong, Rindfleish, & Burroughs, 2003). Thus, all neg-
atively worded items were dropped. This resulted in a model with accept-
able fit. Analyses were therefore performed using only the 18 positively
worded items.
2. The regions of East and West Germany were analyzed separately to keep the
prolonged effect of their different political identities before reunification under
control.
3. Although this index is usually used to compare the pattern of loadings
obtained from exploratory factor analysis, it can also be used to compare cor-
relation coefficients (factor loadings, indeed, may be regarded as correlations
between the observed variables and the latent factors).
4. It should be remembered that accepting immigrants was not examined in
Brazil, Poland, Ukraine, and Israel.

CHAPTER 6
The Private and Public Personality of Politicians
ARE POLITICIANS WHAT THEY CLAIM TO BE?

Empirical findings reported in Chapter 4 show that there are significant
covariations of ideological self-placement and meaningful individual differ-
ences that point to the role of personality in individuals’ political preferences.
However, most findings have been based on direct methods of personality
assessment, such as self-reports, and have been based primarily on voters.
Studies of politicians’ personalities have relied primarily on indirect meth-
ods, such as content analysis of archived material or expert evaluations of
leaders’ personalities (Feldman & Valenty, 2001; George & George, 1998;
Simonton, 1986; Winter, 1987).
Collecting personality data directly from politicians is crucial when seek-
ing to uncover new insights into the relationship between personality and
political orientation, and in order to address a number of pending issues
related to political elites’ motivations and cognitions, particularly concern-
ing their ideological commitment and the interconnectedness and the stabil-
ity of their political beliefs. Unfortunately, there are exceptional difficulties
in obtaining direct access to politicians in order to have them respond to
objective and reliable personality assessment instruments. The habitual con-
cern of people about the ways in which their personal information might be
used, or misused, makes public officials particularly resistant to complying
with the standard assessment procedures required for nomothetic research.
Nevertheless, if we wish to uncover new insights into the various dynamic
relationships between the personalities of politicians, political party agendas,
and voter appraisals of politicians’ characters, obtaining such data is crucial.
One of the first attempts in this direction was made by Costantini and
Craik (1980), as reported in Chapter 1. This study, however, remained unchal-
lenged for a number of years, and it was only at the start of the 1990s, when
a growing consensus on the need for general systems to describe personal-
ity traits and basic values gave renewed impulse to nomothetic studies, such
as those related to the Big Five (Digman, 1990) and Schwartz’s (1992) values
217

model, and opened new avenues toward understanding the links between
personality and politics.
Although the same resistances have continued, making it a daunting task
to get politicians to complete questionnaires, recent findings have provided
some grounds for optimism regarding the possibility of gathering reliable per-
sonality data on large samples of elected officials. In fact, a growing amount of
data has been accumulated in the last decade with the aim of shedding light
on particular characteristics of politicians’ personality (Best, 2011; Caprara,
Barbaranelli, Consiglio, Picconi, & Zimbardo, 2003; Caprara, Francescato,
Mebane, Sorace, & Vecchione, 2010; Caprara, Vecchione, D’Ercole, & Zuffianò,
2014; Dietrich, Lasley, Mondak, Remmel, & Turner, 2012).
In the following, we provide an overview of recent studies that have pur-
sued a comprehensive assessment of personality characteristics to enable
inter-and intra-group comparisons among politicians, voters, political par-
ties, and coalitions. We start by reviewing data that compared personality
characteristics of legislators with those of voters, regardless of their political
orientation. Following this, we focus on personality differences between poli-
ticians of rival parties and coalitions.
Distinctive Characteristics of Politician’s Personalities

as Compared with Those of Voters
In 2001, Caprara and colleagues (2003) conducted a study with the aim of com-
paring Italian legislators’ personality traits with those of ordinary citizens.
The BFQ used in prior studies on voters’ personalities was sent to a large
sample of politicians holding major political offices. This included members
of the Italian Parliament of the 13th and 14th legislatures, the Italian members
of the European Parliament, and members of councils of three main regions
(Lazio, Sicily, and Piedmont) and three provinces and municipalities (Rome,
Catania, and Turin).
The questionnaire, which was accompanied by a letter presenting the
aims of the scientific research and guaranteeing anonymity, was followed up
by phone calls and other forms of reminders and encouragement. Over the
subsequent three months, 118 questionnaires were returned 103 from men
and 15 from women). This composition was fairly representative of the gen-
der and partisan composition of the population. Given the limited number
of females, Caprara and colleagues (2003) analyzed only questionnaires from
male politicians.
Findings attested to the reliability of the data, which replicated the fac-
tor structure previously found in the general population. When politicians’
scores on the Big Five Questionnaire (BFQ) were compared with the norms

The Private and Public Personality of Politicians 219
for the Italian population, politicians showed significantly higher scores in

social desirability. This may suggest that politicians tend to be more con-
cerned with conveying appealing images of themselves than average citizens.
Furthermore, as can be seen in Figure 6.1, the male politicians were, on aver-
age, significantly higher in energy/extraversion and agreeableness than male
citizens. Whereas the former is related to dominance and power, the latter
is crucial to conveying a friendly image and to attracting voters’ preference.
This was the first study to use a standard measure of the Big Five to achieve
a direct and comprehensive description of politicians’ personality traits. After
this study, similar procedures have been followed to collect a larger amount
of data among Italian legislators. In the 2009, a questionnaire battery includ-
ing an instrument to assess personality traits (BFQ) was sent to all members
of the Parliament of the 16th Italian legislature, in the Camera and Senate.
The questionnaire was completed by 230 politicians (106 females, 124 males).1
Figure 6.2 shows the average personality profile of the 230 Italian politi-
cians compared with that of a large sample of Italian voters taken from the
general population (N = 3,249). Differences in the personality profile of the
two groups were tested for significance, after controlling for the effects of age,
gender, education, and political orientation. As can be observed, the politi-
cians scored significantly higher than voters on the traits of agreeableness and
energy/extraversion, paralleling previous findings reported by Caprara et al.
(2003) for only male politicians. Moreover, the politicians scored significantly
Male Italian Politicians General Norms

4.5
*
3.5 *
2.5
Ener Agre Consc Emst Open
Figure 6.1 Mean personality dimension scores (Big Five Questionnaire) of 103

male Italian politicians compared with general public norms.
Asterisks mark significant difference between groups.
Data from Caprara et al. (2003).

Italian Politicians Italian Voters

4.5
4
*
*
3.5 *
2.5
Ener Agre Consc EmSt Open

Italian politicians compared with a sample of 3,249 Italian voters.
Asterisk marks significant difference between groups.
higher than voters on the traits of emotional stability and openness. In the
earlier study by Caprara et al. (2003), Italian male politicians displayed a ten-
dency, though not significant, in the same direction for both traits.
The high scores of politicians on agreeableness accord with their need to
please and to be accepted, especially when they have reason to believe that
voters’ choices are largely based on feelings and personal likings. Indeed, pol-
iticians are unlikely to be successful in politics unless they are able to convey
a fully trustworthy image of themselves to their voters. In order to perform
the difficult tasks of governance successfully, politicians must be perceived
not only as competent but also as accountable and trustworthy.
Nevertheless, one may wonder at the extent to which the self-reported
agreeableness reflects a real personality disposition and at the extent to which
politicians are really more sensitive to others’ personal and social needs. For
this reason, it may be that the more agreeableness is seen by politicians as a
desirable trait and the more it becomes imperative for politicians to craft an
image of themselves as caring, agreeable, and empathic, the more voters have
reason to doubt their sincerity.
The higher scores among politicians in energy/extraversion accord with
the vast literature pointing to power as a crucial determinant of motivation
and success (Browning & Jacob, 1964; Simonton, 1990; Winter, 1973), further

corroborating the idea that this personality dimension provides a competitive

advantage for people who strive to enter the political arena.
Being a politician, in fact, requires the capability to persuade, influence,
to take the initiative, and to lead, as well as the capacity to handle multiple
activities, relations, and pursuits concurrently. Regardless of their political
orientation, to be successful, politicians have to be proactive, persuasive, and
influential with their electorate, no less than with their party members.
The higher scores in the openness trait accord with literature that points
to intellectual brilliance and intelligence in sustaining political leadership
(Simonton, 2006). This difference, along with the one reported earlier for
energy/extraversion, fits with results from a study based on an assessment
center concerned with selecting prospective parliamentary candidates for a
main UK political party (Silvester & Dykes, 2007). Although this study did
not focus on the Big Five personality traits, it provides empirical evidence of
the role of individual differences in predicting electoral success among a large
sample of political candidates. It has been found that communication skills
(such as the capacity to communicate clearly and persuasively) and critical
thinking (such as the ability to interpret and evaluate arguments, and to make
inferences and deductions) were significantly associated with candidates’
political performance, as assessed through the percentage of votes achieved
in the 2005 UK general election.
As argued by Silvester (2008), politicians must be able to communicate
effectively across different audiences and communication media, and to
persuade potential voters of their intentions. On the other hand, they must
be “able to shift through large amounts of information quickly, identify key
arguments, balance conflicting demands and formulate responses” (Silvester,
2008, p. 128). Probably, many of the skills needed to convince and persuade
people, and to analyze, organize, and integrate information, can be traced to
basic traits such as energy/extraversion and openness, although not necessar-
ily exclusively or directly.
Finally, politicians’ higher scores on emotional stability are not surprising
due to the pressures and challenges they need to cope with when dealing with
their electorate and their adversaries. Undoubtedly, holding political office is
a highly demanding and stressful task that requires emotionally stability and
a lower susceptibility to negative feelings as a prerequisite.
A similar study to that described in the preceding was performed in
Germany by Best (2011). The author administered a standard personality test
(a reduced 10-item version of the Big Five index; Rammstedt, 2007) to a large
sample of politicians through computer-assisted telephone interviews. This
allowed the personality traits of 1,223 German members of the Federal, State,

and European parliaments to be compared with those of a large, representa-

tive sample taken from the general population (N = 17,300). Results showed
that parliamentary elites differed significantly from the general population in
all Big Five dimensions, with some differences from what was found in Italy.
Specifically, German politicians displayed higher levels of extraversion,
openness, and emotional stability than members of the general population,
in accordance with findings from Italian members of parliament. Contrary
to what has been found in Italy, German politicians showed lower scores
on agreeableness and conscientiousness than the general population. In
this regard, one may only guess about the multiple sources of these differ-
ences, including the different social desirability of various traits in Germany
and Italy.
While the comparisons described here were limited to personality traits,
Caprara and colleagues have extended the analysis to include basic personal
values. Indeed, the questionnaire administered to the 230 Italian politicians,
and to which we referred earlier, also included a short, 21-item version of the
PVQ, which is aimed at assessing Schwartz’s 10 personal values (see Chapter 4
of this volume). A few years later, in 2013, during the 17th legislature, the
same instrument was sent to members of the Italian Parliament. One hundred
politicians (68 males, 32 females) chose to participate.2 In total, data on basic
values were available for 330 members of Parliament (224 males, 106 females).
Basic values of Italian politicians and ordinary voters are shown in
Figure 6.3. As for traits, mean scores were calculated after controlling for basic
socio-demographic variables. As can be observed, Italian politicians scored
significantly lower than voters on security and hedonism values. One may
speculate that holding a political office places individuals in a social posi-
tion where they feel less concerned with security, and that many of the pub-
lic duties they are obliged to undertake are not always compatible with the
attainment of personal pleasure. Moreover, politicians scored significantly
higher than voters on universalism and benevolence, two values that focus on
the welfare and interest of others. The observed differences on these values,
however, were relatively small. The importance attributed by politicians and
voters to the other basic values were fully comparable.
When the order of importance of the 10 value types is examined, the data
show that the value hierarchy of politicians was remarkably similar to the one
observed in the general population: Universalism obtained the highest score
(M = 4.94), followed by benevolence (M = 4.90) and self-direction (M = 4.28),
with power (M = 2.68) at the bottom of the hierarchy. A similar order of
importance has been found in a wide range of cultures around the world
(Schwartz & Bardi, 2001).

Italian Politicians Italian Voters
5.5
5 * *
4.5 *
4
*
3.5
2.5
Sec Con Tra Ben Uni Sdi Sti Hed Ach Pow
Figure 6.3 Mean value scores (Portrait Values Questionnaire) of 330 Italian politi-
cians compared with a sample of 3,249 Italian voters.
Asterisks mark significant differences between groups.
Personality Differences Between Left-and Right-Wing Politicians

Findings from the studies discussed thus far enabled an investigation into
individual differences in the Big Five personality traits between politicians
of rival coalitions. We were also able to study the extent to which personality
differences among politicians parallel personality differences among voters
(see Chapter 4 of this volume for a review of these studies).
In the earlier study, Caprara et al. (2003) found that center-right Italian
politicians scored higher than their center-left colleagues on two dimensions
of the Big Five, namely, on energy and conscientiousness. The same differ-
ences were also found repeatedly between Italian voters of the two coalitions
(e.g., Caprara et al., 2006), which accords with the rhetoric of the Italian right
on the merits of individuals’ entrepreneurship and discipline. By contrast,
no differences between politicians of opposite coalitions have been found for
agreeableness, emotional stability, and openness.
Further comparisons based on a large sample of Italian legislators are
shown in Figure 6.4, which shows the Big Five mean scores of center-left and
center-right politicians. As can be seen, center-left politicians scored signifi-
cantly higher than center-right politicians on agreeableness and openness,
whereas center-right politicians scored significantly higher on energy/extra-
version and conscientiousness.

Center-Left Italian Politicians Center-Right Italian Politicians
65
60
* * *
55
50
45
40
35
Ener Agre Consc EmSt Open

Italian politicians of rival coalitions.
A score of 50 corresponds to the mean of the general population.
Best (2011) found that members of parties located at the right of the politi-
cal spectrum in Germany (i.e., the Christian Democratic Union, and the Free
Democratic Party) scored higher in conscientiousness and emotional stabil-
ity than members of leftist parties (i.e., the Social Democrat Party, and the
post-communist Party of Democratic Socialism). These results substantially
replicated what has been found previously for German voters (Schoen &
Schumann, 2007; Vecchione et al., 2011a).
As regards basic values, Figure 6.5 shows that center-left Italian politicians
attributed more importance to universalism values than Italian politicians of
the center-right. The latter attributed more importance to the conservation
values of tradition, security, and conformity, and to the self-enhancement val-
ues of achievement and power. These findings further corroborate the pattern
observed in previous studies on Italian voters.
Left-and right-wing Italian politicians, by contrast, did not differ with
regard to the priority they assigned to basic values. Both groups, in fact,
assigned a high priority to universalism and benevolence values, although in
a different order. Right-wing politicians rated benevolence (M = 4.91) as more
important than universalism (M = 4.67), while left-wing politicians displayed
the opposite pattern (universalism = 5.07; benevolence = 4.88). Whereas the

Center-Left Italian Politicians Center-Right Italian Politicians
65
60
* *
55 *
*
*
*
50
45
40
35
Sec Con Tra Ben Uni Sdi Sti Hed Ach Pow
Figure 6.5 Mean value scores (Portrait Values Questionnaire) of 330 Italian politi-
cians of rival coalitions.
A score of 50 corresponds to the mean of the general population.
former is concerned with the welfare of one’s own in group, the latter is con-
cerned with the welfare of all humanity.
The Personality Foundations of Ideological Divide

The findings presented thus far suggest mean-level differences in traits and
values between politicians of rival coalitions. A different issue concerns the
degree of covariation between individual differences in traits and values and
political choice. Bivariate correlations, calculated after controlling for the
effect of age and education, are reported in Table 6.1 (traits) and Table 6.2
(values). Data on politicians (N = 230) and voters (N = 3,249), from which mea-
sures of both traits and values were available, were used for the analyses. As
can be observed, results from the sample of politicians corroborated the pat-
tern of differences between the left and right found in the general population.
This suggests that the partisanship of politicians and the voting preferences
of ordinary citizens are related to the same traits and values.
To further examine the relations between self-reported traits and values,
as well as to understand more about their joint effect on the political choices of
both politicians and voters, we ran a structural equation model on the same set

TA B L E 6 . 1 . CORRELATIONS BETWEEN TRAITS AND POLITICAL

ORIENTATION
Energy/ Agreeableness Conscientiousness Emotional Openness

Extraversion stability
Politicians –.21** .15* –.08 –.02 .13*

(N = 230)
Voters –.07** .15** –.05** .00 .10**
(N = 3,249)
Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01; 0 = center-left; 1 = center-right.
of data. The model, shown in Figure 6.6, supported the hypothesized paths of
influence among the variables of interest. Italian politicians high in the agree-
ableness trait attributed more importance to self-transcendence values and less
importance to self-enhancement values. Italian politicians high in the conscien-
tiousness trait attributed more importance to conservation values, while those
high in energy/extraversion attributed more importance to self-enhancement
values. Self-transcendence values predicted affiliation to the center-left coali-
tion, whereas conservation values predicted affiliation to the center-right coali-
tion. In other words, the higher a politician’s score on universalism values, the
higher the probability that he or she was affiliated with left-wing parties. In
contrast, the higher a politician’s score on tradition, security, and power values,
the higher the probability that he or she was affiliated with right-wing par-
ties. Thus, elected officials with high levels of education, expertise, and political
sophistication showed distinctive traits and values that were congruent with
their ideologies. The same pattern was replicated among Italian voters.
The structural model presented in Figure 6.6 further revealed that, for
both politicians and voters, openness and conscientiousness contributed only
indirectly to political choice through the mediation of basic values. These are
also the traits that have shown robust and stable effects on political orienta-
tion across countries and political contexts.
Together, traits and values of Italian politicians accounted for 46% of the
variance in political choice (when values are considered alone, they accounted
for 44% of the variance; traits alone accounted for 18% of the variance). This is
much higher than the 15% found among Italian voters (with values and traits
accounting, respectively, for 13% and 7% of the variance when considered
separately). Thus self-reported traits and values contributed to the political
affiliation of politicians much more than to the political orientation of voters.
This suggests that the congruency among personality and political choice fits
better with politicians than with voters.

TAB L E 6 . 2 . CORRELATIONS BETWEEN BASIC VALUES AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION
Security Conformity Tradition Benevolence Universalism Self-direction Stimulation Hedonism Achievement Power
Politicians –.48** –.37** –.31** –.02 .24** –.08 –.13 –.05 –.16* –.30**
(N = 230)
Voters –.15** –.10** –.08** .09** .20** .02 –.01 –.05* –.08** –.16**
(N = 3,249)
Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01; 0 = center-left; 1 = center-right.

Agreeableness
.37 (.40)
Self-
Transcendence
.13 (.14)
.25 (.28)
Openness –.32 (–.24) R2 = .46 (.15)
Self- Political
Ehnancement –.18 (–.19)
Choice
Conscientiuosness
.48 (.47) –.61 (–.28)
–.30 (–.30)
.29 (.23)
Conservation
Energy/
Extraversion
Figure 6.6 The path linking personality traits to political choice through basic
values.
Coefficients outside parenthesis are from politicians (N = 230). Coefficients in parenthesis are
from voters (N = 3,249).
The difference between politicians and voters in the observed variance

was primarily due to conservation values, which distinguishes left-and
right-wing politicians much more than left-and right-wing voters. As argued
by Jost et al. (2003), attitudes supporting tradition and order (versus social
change) represents one of the most meaningful and enduring differences
between liberal and conservative ideologies.
How can the high polarization in self- presentation between political
elites of opposite ideological orientations be explained? Although the corre-
lational nature of this study does not permit causal inferences, it is reason-
able to assume a mutual reinforcement between political appointments and
self-reported personality. Whereas certain values and traits may predispose
people to favor specific ideologies, it is likely that the more politicians voice
the virtues and merits of the ideology they advocate, the more their behav-
ior and values should be congruent with the principles and programs they
endorse in public.
This is consistent with the seminal work of Converse (1964) on the nature
of belief systems held by elite political actors and the general public. Using
correlational data from a sample of congressional candidates and a national
sample of the general public, Converse (1964) showed that politicians have
higher levels of intercorrelations among ideas and attitudes on various

political issues than the vast majority of US citizens, due to their higher levels
of political involvement and sophistication.
Most important, the elite sample showed a markedly higher relationship
between attitudes on political issues and party preference than did the gen-
eral electorate. In particular, political attitudes in the elite population were
revealed to be more constrained not only by each other, but also by politi-
cal preference. Although Converse did not consider traits and basic values,
his reasoning regarding the connectedness among attitudes may apply to
the psychological forces or constraints linking traits and values to political
preferences.
As people in general try to keep a certain degree of coherence among
the way they think, desire, behave, and report about themselves, it is likely
that the higher the level of connectedness between thought, aspirations, and
actions required by the office, the greater desire for coherence and the stron-
ger the need for congruency.3
Thus, politicians should be more constrained than voters to present a per-
sonal view of themselves connected to and congruent with the ideals and the
programs they advocate. It is also likely that, the more that social pressures
require politicians to present themselves in accordance with the ideological
principles they preach, the more the match between ideological placement
and self-reported traits and values among politicians gets reinforced, primar-
ily through various mechanisms aimed at avoiding the discomfort of disso-
nance (Fiske, 2004). All this means that politicians need to practice what they
preach more than voters. Yet, as argued by Caprara et al. (2010), the extent
to which congruency among traits, values, and political preferences reflects
their personality or their social roles, as well as the extent to which their pub-
lic image contributes to the shaping of their personal identities, remains to
be clarified. The influence that personality and partisanship may exert upon
one another, in fact, may change significantly across cultural and political
contexts.
DISPOSITIONAL HEURISTICS: SIMPLIFYING
POLITICIANS’ PERSONALITY
The media saturates the symbolic environment of the electorate with images
designed to reflect, portray, invent, construe, and sometimes denigrate the
major political actors. Given the enormous amount of information that people
receive about issues, parties, and candidates through appeals and campaigns,
the task of making judgments about politicians’ personalities is likely to be
a rather challenging one. It is obvious, therefore, that citizens must navigate

the complexity of their political environments by using a variety of cognitive

strategies that help organize information and simplify their choices (Popkin,
1991; Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock, 1991).
Indeed, a number of studies have shown that voters process information
about candidates in a schematic fashion (Conover & Feldman, 1986), and that
traits play an important role in organizing political preferences (Funk, 1999).
Among cognitive strategies, Caprara and Zimbardo (2004) have pointed to a
kind of dispositional heuristic that leads voters to anchor their impressions
and inferences about politicians to traits that are habitually used to describe
themselves and others in daily transactions.
It has also been shown that dispositional inferences about politicians may
be spontaneously activated, as for any other person (Uleman, Newman, &
Moskowitz, 1996), and used to summarize a variety of feelings, perceptions,
and attributions about politicians’ motives and intentions. We also know
that people make judgments about a politician’s competence after only a
brief exposure to his or her visual image (Todorov, Mandisodza, Goren &
Hall, 2005).
Thus, we believe that dispositional constructs provide a parsimonious
way to organize knowledge and to extend voters’ control over politicians’
future performance on the common assumption that personality disposi-
tions are relatively stable. Likewise. we believe that judgments about politi-
cal candidates are generally structured around traits, such as competence,
leadership, integrity, and accountability, which are particularly relevant for
any political office and can be easily traced to various combinations of traits
related to agency and communion.
As stated in previous chapters, numerous studies conducted in diverse
linguistic and cultural contexts have shown that people’s descriptions and
evaluations of themselves, as well as of others, can be traced to five basic
dimensions (the Big Five) that provide a common language and a useful
tool for the mapping of individual differences in personality. The same five
dimensions emerged across variations in methods of subjects’ evaluation
(self-report vs. ratings by others), sample characteristics (such as gender and
age), and native languages, as well as across a host of independent research-
ers. However, when politicians’ personalities were assessed by voters, using a
list of adjectives commonly taken to be markers of the Big Five, a factor analy-
sis of the results led to a reduced number of broader factors being extracted.
In a study by Caprara, Barbaranelli, and Zimbardo (1997), voters of
diverse ages and political orientation in the United States (N = 195) and Italy
(N = 958) used a list of 25 adjectives4 to evaluate their own personalities and
those of various politicians in ongoing election campaigns. In the United

States, the target politicians were Bob Dole and Bill Clinton (who, at the time
of the study, were the Republican presidential candidate and the Democratic
serving president, respectively). In Italy, the politicians evaluated were Silvio
Berlusconi and Romano Prodi, the leaders of the two main Italian political
coalitions at that time.5
While respondents’ ratings of themselves resulted in the usual five-factor
solution, their ratings of the political candidates’ personality were traceable
to two major factors, one blending energy/extraversion with openness, the
other combining agreeableness, conscientiousness, and emotional stability.
These two factors largely corresponded to the two superordinate factors that
other researchers had previously posited as the basis of the Big Five (Digman,
1997; Wiggins & Trapnell, 1996; see Chapter 2 of this volume) and related to
Agency and Communion, as two modalities of human existence that also ori-
ent people’s social perception and judgment (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Judd,
James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005).
A subsequent study conducted in Italy five years later replicated earlier
findings (Caprara, Barbaranelli, & Zimbardo, 2002). In this study, more than
3,000 Italian voters were asked to evaluate the personality of Berlusconi, when
he was the leader of the opposition, and the personality of Prodi, when he
was prime minister, using the same 25 adjectives as in the previous study.
Voters also evaluated the personalities of two well-k nown Italian politicians,
Massimo D’Alema and Gianfranco Fini, who at the time of the study were sec-
retary of the Left Democrats and the secretary of the Right National Alliance,
respectively. Replicating earlier findings, two primary factors were observed
for each target, representing a blend of energy/extraversion and openness,
and of agreeableness, conscientiousness, and emotional stability. Table 6.3
shows how the 25 adjectives, markers of the Big Five, were distributed
across the two factors for the evaluations of Prodi and Berlusconi. As can be
observed, energy/extraversion and agreeableness served as primary anchors
or attractors for personality appraisals of politicians, as they subsumed the
other dimensions of the Big Five.
In a further study, 1,675 Italian voters were asked to evaluate the personal-
ity of Prodi when he was the president of the European Commission, and that
of Berlusconi when he was the Italian prime minister (Caprara, Barbaranelli,
Fraley, & Vecchione 2007), this time using a larger list of adjectives. The new
list comprised the original 25 adjectives used in the earlier studies and 10
additional adjectives. Findings again produced two personality factors,
which were virtually the same as those found in 1997, even though the politi-
cians were serving in different roles. This further attests to previous findings
showing that perceptions of political personalities tend to remain remarkably

TA B L E 6 . 3 . FACTORS COMPOSITION: PERSONALITY TRAITS

ATTRIBUTED TO ITALIAN POLITICIANS
Prodi Berlusconi
Factor Label I Competence II Integrity II Competence I Integrity
Blend of Energy, Agreeableness, Energy, Agreeableness,

openness conscientiousness, openness conscientiousness,
emotional stability emotional stability
Happy .19 .42 .15 .59

Determined .89 –.12 .87 –.17
Dynamic .90 –.14 .90 –.09
Energetic .82 –.01 .81 .03
Enterprising .79 –.04 .86 –.12
Authentic .06 .77 –.10 .89
Cordial .03 .75 .38 .42
Generous .10 .85 –.06 .84
Loyal .05 .85 .00 .86
Sincere .01 .83 –.05 .88
Reliable .35 .55 .03 .79
Constant .15 .64 .47 .25
Efficient .79 .07 .80 .03
Scrupulous .45 .44 .54 .32
Responsible .26 .64 .38 .52
Level-headed .16 .66 .50 .37
Optimistic .15 .43 .43 .31
Serene .14 .62 .08 .64
Self-confident .46 .21 .62 .20
Solid .76 .13 .53 .27
Sharp .58 .04 .77 –.10
Creative .71 .06 .69 .07
Innovative .61 .26 .57 .33
Modern .66 .18 .45 .45
Original .62 .18 .46 .38
From Caprara et al. (2002). Used with permission from John Wiley and Sons Publishing.
stable, even through several years of evaluations by the general public (Miller,
Wattenberg, & Malanchuk, 1986).
Similar findings emerged in another study that used data collected via
the Internet on 6,411 US voters during the 2004 presidential election (Caprara
et al., 2007). The data were collected in September 2004, before the Republican
president George W. Bush and the Democratic candidate John Kerry faced

each other in their first televised debate on September 31. Whereas, for Kerry,
the two personality factors were nearly identical to those previously found in
Italian and US politicians, a different factor composition was found for Bush.
His perceived personality was just as restricted as of the other politicians,
but the two factors represented a different combination of the Big Five traits.
Adjectives prototypical of openness (e.g., informed and imaginative) loaded
mainly onto the first factor; furthermore, this personality factor showed high
loadings on most descriptors of conscientiousness and some descriptors of
agreeableness. Adjectives prototypical of energy/extraversion (e.g., happy and
determined) and stability (e.g., self-confident and optimistic) loaded mainly
onto the second factor.
This study suggests that evaluations of politicians’ personality are usu-
ally restricted by voters to a few dimensions that are not necessarily the same.
The meaning behind this finding is probably that political personality dimen-
sions vary across time, office, and even possibly according to the amount of
media coverage of each candidate, as well as to the kinds of qualities receiving
attention in the media.
This effect has also been found in Greece (unpublished data, 2008), and
Spain (Vecchione, González Castro, & Caprara, 2011a). Greek politicians were
Kostas Karamanlis (leader of the New Democracy) and George Papandreou
(PASOK). Personalities of the two party leaders were assessed a few weeks
after the 2007 Greek parliamentary elections. Spanish politicians were José
Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, prime minister from 2004 to 2011 and leader of the
Spanish Socialist Workers (PSOE), and Mariano Rajoy, at that time leader of
the Popular Party (PP), who served later as prime minister. The two politi-
cians were assessed one month before the 2008 Spanish general election.
Findings from both countries replicated the reduced factor structure found
in most previous research, with energy/extraversion and agreeableness traits
serving as anchors for personality appraisals of politicians.
In sum, findings from diverse studies have demonstrated that voters orga-
nize their judgments of politicians along two, rather than five, dimensions.
Such a simplification effect has been corroborated across time (either in ongo-
ing election campaigns or long after an election campaign has concluded),
across cultures (US, Italy, Greece, and Spain), across political office (political
candidate, party leader, prime minister, etc.), across methods of assessment
(either face-to-face or through the Web), and across political preferences of the
participants (using the evaluations of voters for and against the candidate in
question, as well as the evaluations of non-voters).
This finding has also been reinforced by others showing that, when
the same adjectives are used for self-ratings to evaluate other prominent

individuals, including famous athletes such as the basketball player Magic

Johnson and the champion skier Alberto Tomba, and prominent Italian tele-
vision personalities like Pippo Baudo, factor analysis provided the common
five-factor solution. These findings have led us to exclude the fact that the
reduction of factors found for the politicians under evaluation was due to a
mere celebrity effect or to the fact that people’s acquaintance of the target was
limited and indirect. As originally stated by Caprara and Zimbardo (2004),
the simplified perceptions of leaders’ personalities may correspond to a cog-
nitively efficient strategy that voters adopt to cope with the massive amount
of daily information to which they are exposed and to guide their preferences
and decisions. Such simplification may be especially functional in the case of
political choice, where citizens feel constrained in expressing their choices on
matters they find difficult to understand, and where they feel under pressure
from contrasting views, advertisements, and political appeals.
It is also worth noting that, in general, energy and agreeableness domi-
nated other dimensions and served as major attractors in voters’ perceptions,
independently of their political orientations. This further contributed to relate
the two politicians’ factors either to Agency and Communion or to those per-
sonal characteristics that have frequently been reported to count most impor-
tantly among electorates of Western democracies, namely competence (and
leadership) and integrity (Popkin, 1991). From this, one may argue that the
need to express one’s choice, despite limited knowledge, leads the electorate
to focus on the personal qualities that are most important in politics. To this
end, traits allow citizens to anchor their impressions of political candidates
to relatively stable judgments that carry inferences and predictions and that
ultimately make sense of their preferences.
In other words, a kind of dispositional heuristics allows citizen to orga-
nize existing and incoming information by (a) focusing on personal qualities
that most account for Agency and Communion in the political domain, such
as energy/extraversion and agreeableness; (b) aggregating the other traits
around energy and agreeableness; and (c) tracing from such a aggregation
a simplified description of politicians that match those two qualities that
most voters expect from politicians. This means that, as voters process infor-
mation about candidates in a schematic fashion, these dispositions serve to
organize and summarize diverse bodies of information into relatively simple
terms (Conover & Feldman, 1986). Furthermore, they serve to justify citizens’
attributions and expectations that account for their likes and dislikes of
politicians.
Having established the robustness of the two-factor structure in the evalu-
ation of politicians, a critical issue that warrants investigation is the degree to

which the two politicians’ factors can attract voters’ preference. Indeed, recent
research has showed that voters are often influenced in their voting decisions
more by the personality traits of candidates than by the political issues in
their electoral programs (Pierce, 1993). Here, it is probably that the agentic and
communal traits of competence and integrity serve as evaluative filters for the
sorting of all incoming political information and its categorization as relevant
or irrelevant to individuals’ final voting decision.
Social psychologists have argued that agency and communion are differ-
ently related to the interests of self and others, and that they have, therefore, a
different relevance for describing and evaluating the self and the others (Abele
& Wojciszke, 2007). In particular, it has been argued that agentic traits are more
relevant and desirable for the self, as they help to attain one’s goals. Communal
traits, by contrast, suggest the integration of the self in a larger social unit through
caring for others and are therefore more relevant in the evaluation of other per-
sons. This would suggest a stronger effect of integrity than competence on the
evaluation of political candidates. Findings in this regard, however, have not
always been consistent. A study by Funk (1997), for example, showed that com-
petence appears to be a stronger determinant of voting behaviors than integrity,
especially in the case of people with high political expertise (Funk, 1997).
LIKABILITY HEURISTICS: WHEN LIKENESS GOES

WITH LIKING
The findings reported in the previous section point to a kind of dispositional
heuristic that is helpful in anchoring voters’ impressions and inferences about
politicians’ intentions to the traits for which they as voters care the most, and
in relation to what they expect from politicians at a given time in a given con-
text. In so doing, however, voters sacrifice a more detailed, informative, fine-
grained evaluation of the candidates’ personalities, ending with a functional
trade-off between distinctiveness and comprehensiveness in which latent fac-
tors are restricted in number but broadened in latitude.
Another form of judgmental heuristic at work in the political domain is a
kind of similarity heuristic that leads voters to like and prefer politicians they
perceive as similar to themselves. The hypothesis that similarity is conducive
to liking draws upon a broad literature using either experimental or correla-
tional approaches and focusing on both actual and perceived (or assumed)
similarity (e.g., Byrne, 1961, 1971; Bond, Byrne, & Diamond, 1968; Greenwald,
1980; Newcomb, 1961, 1978; Zajonc, 1980). It is probable that familiarity and
a kind of egocentric favoritism lead to liking and preferring those who are
perceived as similar to oneself.

The similarity-attraction effect has gained support across different cul-

tures (Bond & Smith, 1996) and in many domains of functioning, including
romantic and physical attraction (Albright, Kenny, & Malloy, 1988), friendship
and acquaintanceship (Watson, 1989; Watson, Hubbard, & Wiese, 2000), qual-
ity and duration of relationships (Carli, Ganley, & Pierce-Otay, 1991; Keller,
Thiessen, & Young, 1996), and supervisors’ ratings of performance (Liden,
Wayne, & Stilwell, 1993). However, recent studies have highlighted the role of
the similarity-attraction relationship also in the domain of politics (Bailenson,
Garland, Iyengar, & Yee, 2006; Crano, 1997; Lehman & Crano, 2002; Leitner,
1983; Piliavin, 1987). Here, studies have shown that voters prefer candidates
with personal attitudes akin to their own on several policy issues (Lehman &
Crano, 2002; Leitner, 1983; Piliavin, 1987; Quist & Crano, 2003). Crano (1997),
for example, showed that voters’ preferences for president in the US election
of 1972 were associated with perceived similarity between the candidates’
position on several policy issues—such as government-guaranteed jobs or
the legalization of marijuana—and their own personal attitude on the same
issues.
Recent studies, such as those by Caprara et al. (2007) and Vecchione et al.
(2011b) have extended the similarity-attraction relationship to the more basic
level of traits, revealing that voters perceive politicians for whom they vote as
being most like themselves with respect to a variety of personality character-
istics. It would seem that traits represent important elements through which
the similarity-attraction principle may operate in politics because they allow
voters to organize their impressions of politicians, to link politicians’ per-
ceived personalities to their own, and ultimately to justify their preferences
on the assumption that similarity in traits carries similarity in worldviews
and values. Traits also allow people to use information about themselves that
is uniquely accessible to them, to form judgments and beliefs about others
and about what they can expect from them.
Whereas people have direct access to the principles and values that guide
their own life, and conform accordingly in their behavior, they are likely to
have access to others’ values, motives, and purposes only indirectly, particu-
larly through inference from how others behave. Therefore, the more voters
acknowledge their own pattern of behavior in a political leader, the more they
may assume that the leader in question also shares their own principles.
Based on these premises, Caprara and colleagues (2007) investigated the
perceived similarity between voters’ self-reported personalities and voters’
appraisal of political leaders. Results from two studies conducted in the United
States and Italy attested to a greater similarity between voters’ self-reported
personality and their appraisals of personality of politicians belonging to

their preferred coalition than with their appraisals of politicians of the oppo-
site coalition (Caprara et al., 2007). The US study was conducted at the peak
of the 2004 presidential political campaign, when the media coverage of the
two main candidates, Republican president George W. Bush and Democratic
presidential candidate John F. Kerry, was very high. The Italian study was
also conducted in 2004, when Berlusconi was the Italian prime minister and
leader of the incumbent center-right coalition, and Prodi was the leader of the
opposition. In each country, participants first rated their own personality and
then provided their perceptions of the personalities of competing politicians,
using the same list of 25 adjectives employed in the studies reported earlier
concerning the perceived personalities of politicians.
A first result from the study showed an acceptable level of correspondence
across respondents with different political preferences in the way in which
the two candidates were evaluated. The observed level of agreement was also
found to be rather similar to those obtained in different studies across dif-
ferent judges, as for example between self-reports and spouse ratings of per-
sonality traits (McCrae et al., 1998). Specifically, in the United States, Bush
was perceived as generally more energetic, emotionally stable, loyal, sincere,
and cordial than Kerry. On the other hand, Kerry was perceived as more
open-minded, conscientious, generous, and unselfish. In Italy, respondents
perceived the two politicians in accordance with their stereotypical images
as conveyed by the media. Berlusconi’s personality was rated as more ener-
getic than Prodi, whose personality was rated as more agreeable than that of
Berlusconi.
As expected, voters were found to perceive politicians for whom they
vote as being most similar to themselves, while those they did not vote for
were judged to be most different.6 For example, in the United States, people
who intended to vote for Bush perceived themselves as more similar to Bush
with respect to a variety of personality traits. On the other hand, people who
planned to vote for Kerry perceived themselves as more similar to Kerry than
Bush. People who had yet to decide how they would vote in election were not
necessarily more likely to see themselves as similar to either candidate (upper
panel of Figure 6.7).
In Italy, center-right voters were more likely to see themselves as more
similar to Berlusconi than to Prodi, while the opposite pattern was found for
center-left voters (middle panel of Figure 6.7). These results were replicated in
the study conducted in Italy four years later, before the 2008 national parlia-
mentary election, by Vecchione et al., (2011b) when the personalities of Silvio
Berlusconi and Walter Veltroni, the leader of the Democratic Party (PD), were
evaluated.

(a) Bush-Self Similarity Kerry-Self Similarity

1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
Preference for Bush Neither Preference for Kerry
(b) Berlusconi-Self Similarity Prodi-Self Similarity
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
Preference for Neither Preference for Prodi
Berlusconi
(c) Rajoy-Self Similarity Zapatero-Self Similarity
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
Preference for Rajoy Neither Preference for Zapatero
Figure 6.7 Differences between the perceived personalities of the self and the poli-
ticians as a function of candidate preference.
Greater values indicate greater perceived similarity.

The similarity effect was further corroborated in Vecchione et al.’s study
(2011b) of the two major Spanish political leaders: Zapatero and Rajoy. As
shown in the lower panel of Figure 6.7, voters for the PSOE were more likely
to see themselves as more similar to Zapatero than to Rajoy; voters of the PP,
by contrast, saw themselves as more similar to Rajoy than to Zapatero.
Findings from the studies just discussed also revealed that the similarity
effect was higher in studies where openness had been found to be the most
distinctive trait of voters and of leaders of opposite coalitions, as well as the
most congruent with their political programs. In the United States, for example,
John Kerry was unanimously appraised to be more open-minded than George
W. Bush, and Kerry’s supporters showed significantly higher levels of open-
ness than supporters of Bush. Similarity between Kerry and his voters was
also particularly high concerning markers of openness (e.g., sharp, informed).
Results for George W. Bush were less clear, as similarity between Bush and
his voters was particularly high in markers of agreeableness (above all, sin-
cere and loyal), followed by markers of conscientiousness. It is reasonable to
guess that Bush benefited most from a kind of positivity bias (Fiske, 2004; Sears,
1983) that led people to accord the incumbent president a special trust concern-
ing his honesty and loyalty. Certainly, these attributes were higher in voters
for President Bush than in voters for Kerry. One can also argue that holding
presidential office makes communion traits most associated with super partes
and collective interests, like agreeableness and conscientiousness, more rel-
evant than agentic traits like openness and energy/extraversion.
In Italy, Silvio Berlusconi was unanimously appraised as more active, ener-
getic, and dynamic than Romano Prodi, and similarity between Berlusconi
and his voters was particularly high for markers of energy/extraversion (e.g.,
active and dynamic). Likewise, there was a certain agreement in apprais-
ing Romano Prodi as more agreeable than Silvio Berlusconi, agreeableness
being the trait in which the similarity between Prodi and his voters was
particularly high.
Thinking back to Chapter 4 and remembering that center- left voters
scored higher in agreeableness than center-right voters, who scored higher
in energy/extraversion than center-left voters, it is not surprising that energy/
extraversion and agreeableness, namely two traits that significantly distin-
guished Italian voters of opposite coalitions, were also the traits that mostly
accounted for the perceived similarity between Italian political leaders and
their followers (Caprara & Barbaranelli, 1996). As to why the same effect was
not found for conscientiousness, we can only say that further research is
needed, starting by clarifying the extent to which conscientiousness is espe-
cially desirable in politics and equally desirable for voters and for leaders.

In Spain, the similarity between Zapatero and his voters was particularly
high in markers of openness, which proved to be the most distinctive trait of
Zapatero’s personality, according to voters’ appraisals and to his supporters’
self-reports. Rajoy scored higher on some markers of conscientiousness (scru-
pulous and conscientious), although, contrary to what was expected, scores on
these markers were not significantly different between PP and PSOE voters.
Whereas similarity is clearly associated with political preference, findings
from the studies just discussed do not allow us to clarify fully the mecha-
nisms by which similarity operates and the extent of its impact on voting.
One may assume that voters are either attracted by candidates whom they
perceive as similar to themselves, or that voters project onto their preferred
candidates the personality characteristics that are most distinctive of them-
selves and that likely they value most.
In principle, both paths of influence are plausible. However, we need to
be aware that the similarity effect cannot be considered only in the light of
pre-or post-voting projection, since other findings, such as those derived
directly from politicians (Caprara et al., 2003), have shown that politicians’
self-reported personalities are more similar to the personalities of their vot-
ers than to the personalities of their opponents’ voters. It is also important to
note that the similarity-attraction relationship has recently gained support
in the domain of politics for features other than personality traits. Physical
similarity, for instance, proved influential in increasing candidate support
in an experiment where the degree of candidate-voter facial similarity was
manipulated. In such studies, participants showed higher preference for
facially similar candidates, even though they were not aware of the similarity
manipulation (Bailenson, Iyengar, Yee, & Collins, 2008).
Although scholars do not fully agree on the mechanisms that lead indi-
viduals to be attracted to similar others, most explanations draw upon ideas
from social, cognitive, and evolutionary psychology. One classic social psy-
chological explanation is that being attracted to others because of actual or
perceived similarities may meet a variety of needs, such as personal coher-
ence, belonging, and control over the environment. People also may like
others who share their same preferences, proclivities, and aversions to be
consistent and to maintain a balanced state among feelings and cognitions
(Heider, 1958). Moreover, people may like others with similar habits, attitudes,
interests, and beliefs because the shared attributes reaffirm and validate their
own (Fiske, 2004). Some scholars have even proposed the involvement of
genetic mechanisms that lead people to affiliate with others who are similar
to themselves, not only at the phenotypic level, but at the genotypic level as
well (Dawkins, 1976; Hamilton, 1971; Rushton, 1989).

Whatever the source of perceived similarity, one cannot doubt the function
that it exerts in building and keeping consensus. The more voters acknowl-
edge the same personal qualities in their leaders that they use to characterize
themselves, the easier it will be for voters to assume that their elected repre-
sentatives will behave in accordance with their own worldviews and that they
will therefore act to protect their common interests.
It is also probable that perceived similarity operates in concert with the
likability heuristic proposed by Sniderman and colleagues (1991) to high-
light the role that likes and dislikes may play in voters’ appraisals of poli-
ticians. According to these authors, citizens assess politicians’ statements
and behaviors on the basis of their feelings toward them. As people usually
harbor positive feelings toward themselves, similarity predisposes voters to
trust politicians whom they perceive as similar to themselves. Likability then
strengthens similarity further, so that voters feel proud and get a positive
and enhanced sense of self from the success of the politicians they have sup-
ported. Ultimately, likability and similarity nurture each other and supply
the emotional glue conducive to cement preferences into consent formation.
The more positive affect is associated with voters’ appraisal of their own per-
sonality and of their leaders, the more similarity might serve as a catalyst that
further strengthens consent and attraction.
As politicians invite agreement from across a spectrum of positions,
likability heuristics foster either assimilation processes or contrast processes
(Sherif & Hovland, 1961). Voters may in fact activate different schema when
evaluating the personalities of their own leaders versus those of their oppo-
nents, and these schema operate in enhancing the similarity between one’s
own individual self-presentation and the perception of one’s preferred
candidate. Such schemas may serve as personal anchors that assimilate or
pull some candidates into the latitude of acceptance, while pushing or con-
trasting other candidates into voters’ latitude of rejection, as suggested by
research on social perception and social identity (Capozza & Brown, 1999;
Sherif & Hovland, 1961). These cognitive processes may lead to similarities
between partisans and their leaders being exaggerated and to an accen-
tuation of differences between voters and politicians of opposite parties or
coalitions.
WHEN TRAITS MAY ACCOUNT FOR VALUES

The findings presented in the previous section attest to the use people make
of dispositional heuristics by selecting traits that pertain to political office,
like competence and integrity, and by subsuming other characteristics of

candidates’ personality under those traits, in order to organize existing and

incoming information. Indeed, people not only anchor their judgments of
others to dispositions they may infer from recurring observed behaviors, but
also go on to make inferences about others’ values.
Thus, further questions to be addressed in the domain of politics concern
the extent to which similar cognitive heuristics account for values as they
have proved to account for traits, the extent to which value inferences account
for voters preferences, and whether voters’ preferences rest more upon traits
or value inferences. In other words, do voters tend to anchor their perceptions
of political leaders’ basic values to a simplified taxonomy of values, as they
have proved to do in their perceptions of traits?
As we have stated in previous chapters, people usually distinguish 10
motivationally distinct values that form a coherent two-dimensional struc-
ture (Schwartz, 1992, 2006). Nevertheless, the question is still open as to
whether the same structure holds concerning voters’ inferences about poli-
ticians’ values. One may guess that the same principles of economy and
simplicity that account for the restriction of traits may be equally or even
more relevant for values. Whereas politicians’ traits are anchored to habitual
behaviors that voters may observe across time and situations, values can
only be inferred from such things as public statements and past deliberations
about policy priorities, and then only with a great degree of uncertainty. In
addition, deliberations concerning policy may be dictated by different val-
ues, as same values may end in different policy decisions under different
circumstances. Lower taxation may result either in values concerned with
the need to grant all a decent occupation or in values mostly concerned with
rewarding individuals’ achievements and gains. Security values may lead
to justify higher taxes either to improve free health services or for higher
vigilance over crime.
This can lead to politicians’ values appearing inconsistent and contradic-
tory as they address different audiences. Some values may also have little
relevance for politics, while others are just difficult to convey in public.
Given this situation, one could expect a limit in the number of values that
can be extracted from perceptions of politicians in comparison to the num-
ber of values found when politicians self-report on their value priorities. To
address these issues, Caprara, Schwartz, Barbaranelli, and Vecchione (2008)
conducted a study in which the structure of the value ratings was assessed
by employing a multidimensional scaling analysis (MDS), the approach used
to validate the distinctiveness of the 10 value types in past research. Separate
MDS analyses were performed on the self-reported values of voters and on
the values they attributed to the political leaders.

The MDS analysis of voters’ values is shown in Figure 6.8. As can be

observed, the 40 items of the PVQ yielded the prototypical spatial projection
consisting of 10 distinct regions. With only few exceptions, the items intended
to measure the same value type were grouped together and were located in
the expected order, replicating the circular structure postulated by the theory.
The MDS analysis of the values attributed to the politicians is shown
in Figure 6.9. In this case, the observed pattern cannot be partitioned into
regions for each of the 10 basic values. All the items that index benevolence
and universalism values formed a tight region to the right of the space, and
all the items that index power and achievement formed a tight region to
S1 T3
C2 C1
P2 S3
Security
T2
P1 Power S2
Tradition
S4 Conformity
P3
A1 C3
S5
A4
A2 A3 T1
Achievement
C4
T4
H3
H2 Hedonism
H1
ST2 ST3 U6
U4
ST1 U5
Stimulation U3
SD4 B2 B1
SD1 B3
SD3 Benevolence
B4
SD2
Universalism
Self-Direction
U1
U2
Figure 6.8 Graphical representations of the relationships among the PVQ items for
self-reported values.
A = achievement, P = power, H = hedonism, ST = stimulation, B = benevolence, U = univer-
salism, C = conformity, SE = security, T = tradition, SD = self-direction.
From Caprara et al. (2009), figure 1. Used by permission from European Psychologist, 2008;
Vol. 13(3):157–172 © 2008 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers. DOI: 10.1027/1016-9040.13.3.157

T1
ST3 ST2
H1 ST1 SD1
H3 Excitement Concern for

Others
SD3 B1 T4
H2
B2B3 B4 U2
U1
U6U3U5
P1 U4
A2 SD2
P2 A1 SD4 C3 T2
A3
P3 A4 SE5 C4
Concern for SE2

SE4
Self SE3
Caution
SE1 C2
C1 T3
Figure 6.9. Graphical representation of the relationships among the PVQ items for
values attributed to politicians.
A = achievement, P = power, H = hedonism, ST = stimulation, B = benevolence, U = univer-
salism, C = conformity, SE = security, T = tradition, SD = self-direction.
From Caprara et al. (2008). Used by permission from European Psychologist, 2008;
Vol. 13(3):157–172 © 2008 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers. DOI: 10.1027/1016-9040.13.3.157
the left of the space. This corresponds to the self-transcendence versus self-
enhancement dimension usually found for self-reported values. Here, how-
ever, the four values that constitute this dimension are reduced to a bipolar
dimension that opposes concern for the welfare of others with concern for self.
The stimulation and hedonism items clustered to the upper left of the
space, each forming a distinct region, and three conformity items, three
security items, and one tradition item formed a region to the lower right of
the space. These opposing sets of value items are a subset of those constitut-
ing the basic openness versus conservation polar dimension. We refer to the
bipolar dimension they form as excitement versus caution. The remaining value
items did not form distinct regions.

These results suggest that attributions of values to politicians are struc-

tured in a somewhat less complex way than perceptions of own values. As
argued by Caprara et al. (2008), although voters favored the usual 10 values
in describing themselves, when they were asked to evaluate the values of the
politicians involved, namely, Prodi and Berlusconi, they collapsed their eval-
uations into two broad dimensions. Thus, parsimony seems to help manage
complexity in estimating politicians’ value structures, just as they do when
judging politicians’ personality traits.
After establishing the constructs that voters use to attribute values to can-
didates, Caprara and colleagues (2008) examined how the two politicians were
perceived on the two value dimensions, and how attributed values related to
voting intention. In particular, authors assessed the relative importance of
the traits versus the values that voters attributed to candidates as predictors
of political choice. With this aim in mind, scores for perceived politicians’
values on the two dimensions were identified by subtracting mean ratings on
items that represent concern for self from mean ratings on items that represent
concern for others, and mean ratings on caution items from the excitement items.
As shown in Figure 6.10, voters perceived Berlusconi as possessing a stronger
competence trait, while scoring lower than Prodi on integrity. Moreover, vot-
ers perceived Berlusconi as endorsing excitement values more than Prodi, and
Prodi as endorsing concern for others more than Berlusconi. These perceptions
largely correspond to the media stereotypes of the two politicians.
Berlusconi Prodi
4
–1
–2
–3
Competence Trait Integrity Trait Concern for Others Excitement Values
Values
Figure 6.10 Traits and values attributed to Italian politicians.

When the predictive value of attributed values was investigated, it was

found that perceiving a candidate as valuing concern for others more, and
excitement less, related positively to the intention to vote for the candidate in
question. This is consistent with frequent findings in the literature, as people in
the vast majority of cultures consider the values of concern for others (universal-
ism and benevolence) more desirable than those of concern for self (power and
achievement), as well as prioritizing the values of caution (security and confor-
mity) over those of excitement (stimulation and hedonism) (Schwartz and Bardi,
2001). In the case of Prodi and Berlusconi, it is probable that Prodi’s higher con-
cern for others is why Prodi prevailed over Berlusconi any time they confronted
each other directly, although this cannot account for the long-lasting attraction
of Berlusconi’s excitement for large components of the Italian electorate.
Data from the Castelli et al. study (2009) suggest that the effect of com-
petence and integrity may depend upon the characteristics of the target. For
example, it has been found that voters prefer politicians to whom they can
attribute both competence and integrity traits, because both are seen to be
desirable. Perceived integrity, however, was more important in the case of
Berlusconi, and perceived competence was more important in the case of Prodi.
Indeed, lack of integrity was often conveyed by the media as a major
weakness of Berlusconi, while Prodi’s dubious leadership was a matter of con-
cern among his supporters. Thus one may guess that the effect of competence
and integrity depend either upon the characteristics that mostly fit with the
target and that are made more salient by the media, although it may be dif-
ficult to distinguish one from the others.
Findings also suggest that perceived traits explain substantially more
variance in voting intention than attributed values, though both contribute
significantly. It would seem plausible to assume that voters’ primary concern
is to choose the candidate whose future behavior will best promote or protect
their own interests and beliefs. Both the traits and the values that voters attri-
bute to candidates can serve as bases for anticipating their future behavior.
Attributed traits are inferences about candidates’ abilities and habits from
past and current behavior. Attributed values are inferences about candidates’
motives and goals from their past and current declarations and behavior.
Candidates’ abilities and habits, as well as their motives and goals, are useful
grounds for predicting their future decisions and behavior.
It is also probable that voters trust in perceived traits more than in attrib-
uted values, as they can directly assess candidates’ traits by observing their
speeches, actions, emotional expression, and other behaviors, whereas they
can only assess candidates’ values indirectly, through inference from the con-
tent of their communications. Thus, while voters’ self-reported values have

primacy over self-reported traits, because they have direct access to their own
values, voters’ perceptions of politicians’ traits have primacy over attributed
values, because these traits may serve as the anchors from which voters can
infer politicians’ values, motives, and intentions.
Results from this study also suggest that both perceived traits and attrib-
uted values provide a unique contribution to political preferences. Based on
a single study in Italy, however, we cannot exclude that their relative impor-
tance depends on the particular candidates and their relative media expo-
sure, on the specific traits or values that characterize them, or on the values of
voters to which they appeal. Further research with other candidates in other
contexts should seek to specify the conditions in which these or other factors
increase or decrease the relative importance of candidates’ personalities in
political choice. Moreover, whereas the competence and integrity super traits
have been replicable in different cultural contexts, we do not know whether
the concern for others and excitement value dimensions would emerge in other
countries. Future studies should clarify whether the same or other dimen-
sions of attributed values emerge in alternative political contexts and for alter-
native political figures. Nevertheless, one cannot doubt that it is concern for
others that politicians mostly claim to pursue and that voters mostly expect
from politicians.
CONCLUSIONS
Politicians and voters who hold the same ideological principles have been
found to resemble each other in personality traits and in values, and to differ
from their opponents in a similar fashion. In Italy, politicians scored higher
than voters in different dimensions of the Big Five, above all concerning
energy/ extraversion, openness, and agreeableness, thereby corroborating
the critical importance of basic personality traits in predisposing to politi-
cal performance and success. Similar patterns were found in Germany, but
also some differences, which warn against premature generalizations across
countries. Traits proved to be more important than values in distinguishing
elected representatives from ordinary citizens. This may be because traits
reflect basic and inherited dispositions, which may predispose people to dif-
fer in their engagement and achievement of success in politics.
Pattern of differences in traits and values between left-and right-
wing politicians mirrored those of voters, in accordance with the tradi-
tional cleavages between left and right ideologies. In Italy, traits and values
accounted for ideological differences in politicians more than in voters.
Although one cannot say whether politicians are better exemplars than

voters of how dispositions and values position people regarding political

preferences, one can speculate that politicians, more than voters, must con-
form to the habits and values that they advocate. It is in fact a property
of our self-system and a necessity of our social life to preserve a certain
level of consistency between what we say, what we do, and how we present
ourselves.
It has been found that voters tend to organize their impressions and
evaluations of politicians by focusing on summary features that they view
as most relevant to them. In the domain of traits, parsimony leads voters to
focus on competence and integrity that result from a blend of extraversion
and openness, and from a blend of agreeableness, conscientiousness, and
emotional stability, respectively. In the domain of values, parsimony leads
voters to focus on welfare of others versus concern for self and on caution versus
excitement when assessing political candidates.
Findings also suggest that similarity, in combination with a form of
likability heuristic, exerts a notable impact in orienting voters’ preference
to prefer candidates that are similar to themselves on a number of person-
ality traits. Likewise, findings show that politicians’ perceived traits affect
voters’ political preferences more than politicians’ attributed values, the
former being directly accessible through observations of what politician
do, whereas the latter can only be inferred from what politicians say and
promise.
Overall, findings discussed in this chapter attest to a general congru-
ency principle that is shown through a variety of correspondences related to
(a) how politicians present themselves in accordance with the programs they
propound, as voters do in accordance with the values they cherish; (b) how
voters appraise politicians’ personalities, selecting those attributes that they
believe to be most relevant to the political office and that they personally
value most; (c) how voters perceive politicians as similar to themselves, either
because politicians and voters of the same coalitions are expected to share
similar values and habits, or because politicians tend to convey images that
highlight those personality characteristics most congruent with the political
views that they advocate; and (d) how voters infer what politicians value from
what politicians do.
NOTES
1. We are grateful to Donata Francescato for making the data collected
available to us.
2. Data have been collected in collaboration with Martina D’Ercole.

3. As will be argued in Chapter 8, congruency among traits, values, and politi-

cal choices plays a critical role also in orienting political choices of ordinary
citizens.
4. The adjectives were drawn from a list that had previously been identified in
the Italian lexicon as being among the most representative of each of the Big
Five (Caprara & Perugini, 1994).The list included five markers each of: Energy/
Extraversion (happy, determined, dynamic, energetic, active); Agreeableness
(cordial, generous, loyal, sincere, unselfish); Conscientiousness (efficient,
scrupulous, precise, conscientious, diligent); Emotional stability (optimistic,
self-confident, solid, relaxed, calm), and Intellect/O penness to experience
(sharp, creative, innovative, modern, informed). Each adjective was rated for
how characteristic it was of each target on a 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much
so) scale.
5. Berlusconi and Prodi have been the politicians who dominated the Italian
political scene in the two decades at the turn of the millennium. Berlusconi
has been a successful entrepreneur, leader of the center-right coalition, and
three times prime minister of Italy. He stood for the virtues of a free market
economy and conveyed the image of an energetic and charismatic leader. Prodi
has been professor of economics at the University of Bologna and top man-
ager of a major company in the public sector, leader of the center-left coalition
for several years, prime minister in Italy twice, and president of the European
Commission. He stood for the merits of the welfare state and conveyed the
image of a wise and thoughtful leader.
6. Perceived similarity was assessed by calculating a difference score between
the personality ratings of the self and the politician across the entire set of
adjectives. Distance (or dissimilarity) scores were then converted into simi-
larity scores, ranging from 0 (not similar at all) to 1 (completely similar).
Similarity was calculated both at an overall level, averaging scores across all
25 adjectives, and for each single adjective. Then similarity scores were used to
examine whether voting for a candidate was associated with greater similarity
to that candidate’s personality.

CHAPTER 7
Political Participation and Efficacy
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
Political participation is crucial for democracy, and most would agree that
it should go beyond a mere expression of preference through voting. This
raises three questions: Who are the citizens that, to various extents, are active
in influencing politics in modern democracies? Which pathways are condu-
cive to active involvement in matters of governance? What factors may pre-
clude citizens’ political participation and thus jeopardize the functioning of
democracy?
As responses to these questions are likely to vary significantly across
polities and times, it is important to guard against premature generalizations
based on findings that in most cases are derived from research carried out
in Western countries, or from studies conceived within the ambit of Western
theoretical paradigms and/or using constructs that cannot be traced easily to
common meanings across cultures, thereby resulting in data that cannot be
interpreted unambiguously. Also, as acknowledged in the previous chapters,
significant discrepancy in the meanings of ideologies and political values are
likely to be found even within the same country, and especially among coun-
tries whose paths to modern democratic ideals and institutions have been
different. In other words, attempts to answer the questions posed earlier need
to proceed with caution.
Other factors also play a role when seeking answers across national
boundaries. For example, although modern communications, especially tele-
vision and the web, have expanded the symbolic environment so that it is now
shared by people throughout the globe, it is difficult to assess the extent to
which politics has been affected by these same homogenizing processes seen
in other domains of social life. Significant cultural differences also require
caution when comparing Western democracies with democracies in Asia,
in countries like India and Japan. Even more care is needed when examin-
ing political preferences and participation in recent democracies like South
Korea, Indonesia, or the Philippines (Inoguchi & Blondel, 2012).
251

Overall, when setting out to compare political behavior in different poli-

ties, beyond claims for their being democracies as such, two basic conditions
are needed:
1. To have a voice in political matters, citizens should have access to politi-

cal knowledge and be able to turn this knowledge into beliefs and goals
conducive to collective endeavors;
2. To actively contribute to politics, people should believe that their pref-
erences are valued, that their choices are held in due consideration by
those in government, and that their actions and efforts are crucial for
the governance they desire to be realized.
Whereas democratic participation rests upon citizens’ knowledge, choice,

and voice, mutual respect and tolerance are further conditions attesting to the
functioning and growth of democracy.
The concepts of left and right, or of liberal and conservative, are not likely
to make sense where no history or legacy concerning these notions exist, and
where the choices people are offered concern just one leader and no real pro-
gram regarding future developments and priorities, or where choices have to
be made under the vigilance of religious or military authorities.
As we have stated in the Introduction to this volume, the achievement
of a real and effective democracy is a demanding task that takes time and
requires a context in which people are free and in a position to voice their
opinions and where those in power are kept under the surveillance of the
citizenry. Active political participation can also be difficult for people in
countries where politics has been traditionally monopolized by certain
families or tribes, or by groups with vested interests, as well as in countries
where access to political office is largely conditional on the support of for-
eign power.
Having said this, we shall continue reasoning mostly within the limits of
Western political heritage, while shifting our focus from political preference
to political participation. By political participation, we refer to the form of
public commitment that concerns the governance of society and to the influ-
ence that citizens may exert in order to sustain different views and interests
and to affect public policies. The type, quality, and degree of political par-
ticipation rest upon and are attested to by the attention given by citizens to
political matters. In particular, it depends on knowledge that allows them
to understand and organize political information, on the level of interest for
political events, and on the amount of time and other personal resources
they are willing to invest in political discussions and activities. Further, as
we know from previous chapters that personality is crucial in accounting for

Political Participation and Efficacy 253
political preferences, we will also now turn to personality and its role in polit-
ical participation. In particular, we will address how citizens are introduced
to politics, how their various social environments may affect their personal
political inclinations, and how personality is relevant when accounting for
their political commitment.
In response to the questions raised at the beginning of this chapter, earlier
research has mostly pointed to factors such as resources, networks, and elite
mobilization. In general, findings show that, since the establishment of early
forms of democratic governments, three major factors can be distinguished
that have contributed to the gradual extension of political participation from
restricted groups of elite citizens—such as the nobility, and relatively affluent,
landowning and educated people—to all citizens.
A major change resulted from the extension of suffrage, although it was
limited to males in several countries for a long time. A concomitant change
was caused by political organizations emerging around parties to advocate
the interests of various social groups, such as proprietors, workers, peasants,
merchants, and civil servants. These parties took care of citizen mobilization,
as well as of the choice and formation of political personnel entitled to repre-
sent the interests of their constituencies. Finally, rises in levels of education
and income contributed to higher levels of citizens’ political knowledge and
interest, but not necessarily in their level of active participation. For example,
in the 1950s, socioeconomic status (SES), assessed according to people’s levels
of education, income, and occupation, was still one of the most reliable indica-
tors and predictors of political commitment in a democracy.
US findings provide a reliable picture of what occurred in most Western
democracies (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960; Milbrath, 1965;
Verba & Nie, 1972). Generally speaking, the poor and uneducated were the
majority among non-voters, while people holding political offices were typi-
cally well educated, relatively affluent, and supported the interests of specific
social strata. However, the importance of SES, as far as political commitment
is concerned, has declined significantly over the last few decades in most
countries.
Recent findings implicate the same factors, although in different combi-
nations across polities, but claims for adding new factors have also emerged.
Poverty and lack of education continue to represent major obstacles to active
commitment in politics. Yet, one may expect that they account for progres-
sively less in countries where the establishment of democracy has been accom-
panied by the extension of access to education, the elimination of extreme
poverty, and the diffusion among citizens of a sense of entitlement to civil
and political rights.

In reality, political participation in most countries is minimal and voter

turnout has significantly declined in the last few decades in many democra-
cies (Dalton, 2014; Inoguchi & Blondel, 2012). As to new factors, it has been
noted that psychological resources and motivation, rather than material
resources and social status, play a greater role than in the past in urging peo-
ple to become involved in politics.
With regard to degrees of political commitment, one may distinguish
between voters, activists, politicians, and non-voters. Voters are citizens who
regularly express their political preference in regional, national, and even
supranational elections, as in the case of election for the European Parliament.
Activists are citizens whose social and personal identities are strongly influ-
enced by membership in a party or political movement to which they devote
their energies and time. Among activists, one may distinguish between par-
tisans, whose action takes place within forms of conventional political com-
petition, and protesters, who do not hesitate to challenge traditional political
etiquette. Politicians’ social and personal identities are even more marked by
their political affiliations and positions insofar as they feel committed to iden-
tifying with the values and interests of their political constituencies.
Non-voters are citizens who do not vote or who systematically abstain
from doing so. Reasons for non-voting have been traditionally associated
with poor living conditions, a sense of uselessness and of being marginalized
from society, and where there is no knowledge or any form of investment in
politics. However, whereas in the past the poor and uneducated represented
the majority of non-voters across countries, today the number of people who
abstain from voting and show no interest whatsoever in politics, especially
among the young, the well-off, and the well-educated, has been growing in
several established democracies, such as Italy and the United States (Bontempi
& Pocaterra, 2007; Norris, 1999; Tuorto, 2006).
The percentage of citizens who may be assigned to one or the other of the
preceding categories varies across polities and times, depending on the abil-
ity of political parties and movements to mobilize citizens, on the relevance of
the political issues under discussion, the electoral procedures involved, and
the attractiveness and credibility of the political leaders in question.
Political activity has been traditionally viewed as a male stamping ground
and there is documentary evidence showing that most political offices in most
countries are held by males. However, the female presence in politics has been
growing quickly over the last few decades, with women reaching the high-
est positions in the government of several countries across the world. Thus,
one would expect this increase in the number of women returned to parlia-
mentary assemblies to result in significant changes, not only concerning the

priority attributed to issues where women are traditionally more sensitive

than men (like the family, child care, and gender), but also in political dis-
course as a whole (Campus, 2013).
As stated earlier, education continues to be a major discriminant between
those who show some form of political commitment and those with a rather
marginal attitude toward politics. Education levels are still linked to income,
though conditions of extreme poverty that bar people from education are far
less frequent today than in the past in most countries. Thus, one might expect
the extension of access to education to enable citizens to deal with political
matters more than previously.
As access to political knowledge is deemed crucial for people in order to
become acquainted with politics, one would expect the pervasiveness of the
media that provide political information all over the world, at all hours of the
day and night, to urge citizens to pay greater attention to politics. In reality,
voter turnout is on the decline, a datum that may seem to be at odds with
higher levels of education, information, and interest. However, the increase in
the number of citizens engaged in various forms of community service sug-
gests that estrangement from politics is not necessarily tantamount to a lack
of public commitment. Citizens who are dissatisfied with the way democracy
works and who stay away from politics may, in fact, invest their time, intel-
ligence, energies, and enthusiasm in other social causes they perceive as more
deserving. Thus, worry about the risk of widespread democratic disenchant-
ment should not lead one to confound political disaffection with civic disen-
gagement. It should lead, rather, to a better understanding of the reasons that
discourage people from active participation in politics. Democracy, of course,
will not survive without the participation of its citizens.
Education and information are the ingredients that enable citizen to
engage in politics, but they are not sufficient to convince citizens that their
involvement is worthy of psychological investment. The mental resources
needed to engage in politics should meet conditions and incentives such as
to turn potential into capacity, purpose, and action. This implies that citizens
should assign value to politics in order to become engaged in it and that valu-
able political goals should be perceived as within their reach. This means that
we need to understand the motivations underlying political participation and
thereby the extent to which it may be justified and driven by agentic and com-
munal needs and obligations.
Ideally, people should be motivated to participate actively in the gover-
nance of their communities through genuine interest and a sense of civic duty.
In practice, however, we need to clarify how agentic and communal disposi-
tions may turn into values, motivations, and habits that are essential to civic

life, and posit the conditions for making political commitment an important
component of the sense of identity of citizens and the realization of their per-
sonalities. This leads us to view knowledge and preference as the premises
of political interest and investment, to consider voting as the minimum form
of participation, and active political participation as the next step leading to
personal involvement aimed at bestowing meaning on given social contexts.
Political Socialization
Political socialization concerns the social mechanisms and the individual
experiences that introduce children to politics. To a large extent, it reflects
the historical and social context and the political cultures of communities in
which children grow up.
One may distinguish three major components of political socializa-
tion: the first conducive to the acquisition of knowledge, the second to the for-
mation of political attitudes and preferences, and the third to the acquisition
of skills needed to take an active role in the political realm, such as debating,
persuading, and negotiating. To varying degrees, all three components draw
largely upon the resources and opportunities made available so that children
may know, choose, and voice their own opinions within the domain of values,
norms, and habits of the social context in which they grow up.
To become political agents, children need to learn and exercise abilities
most congenial to recruiting, selecting, and organizing political information
and to communicating, defending, and spreading their own ideas about how
a society should function and be governed. Modern views of development
have accorded children a far greater influence on their families and social
environments than was imagined previously (Bell & Harper, 1977; Caprara
& Cervone, 2000; Parke & Buriel, 2006; Rubin, Bukowski, & Parker, 2006).
However, this does not imply underestimating the influence that parents, sib-
lings, peers, and significant others exert on the way children view themselves
and the world.
Earlier investigators, under the aegis of the social learning theory of per-
sonality development (Campbell, Converse, Miller & Stokes, 1960; Niemi, 1973;
Sears, 1975), indicated the family and the social milieu where people grow
as places and principal determiners of political socialization. Nevertheless, a
word of caution is needed here. These findings have been based primarily on
work carried out in the United States, one of the world’s oldest democracies,
renowned as a model of efficacious democracy. Yet its social, governmental,
and judicial institutions were and remain, in many ways, unique, as is the
case of the composition of its electorate and the profile of its political parties.

Therefore, one might be inclined to question the general validity of similar

findings in reference to the politics of a social milieu where children only
partially share similar features while growing up.
Social classes used to be stable entities from which people derived their
social status and a sense of belonging that was constitutive of their personal
and social identities. The places and neighborhoods where people lived, the
positions they held at work, their incomes, the schools they attended as chil-
dren, and the level of education they might attain all contributed to estab-
lishing a network of relations and experiences largely associated with their
political preferences and opportunities.
When people’s political preferences crystallized into joining a party or
a political movement, partisanship became an important constituent of per-
sonal and social identity. In these cases, the strength of party identification
became the most substantial predictor of voting, of stability of vote, and of
transmission of party affiliation from one generation to another.
This was most probably the case with political systems similar to those
of the United States, for example, the United Kingdom, characterized by an
alternating swing between the two major parties, Conservative and Labour.
Children used to be introduced to politics by their parents, through practice
and imitation, by debating and viewing how one should behave so as to be
congruent with the aspirations and obligations of one’s class, community, and
family.
Countries with strong workers’ unions, like the United Kingdom and
France, are eloquent examples of political systems where a significant ide-
ological gap has always mirrored, to a certain degree, the countries’ social
stratification and the positions held by people on the basis of the division
of labor.
The case of Italy may be viewed as a compromise, rather than as an
exception to the common distinction between a conservative right, lean-
ing to defend the interests of the well-off, and a decided leaning toward the
left, with a view to extending welfare to all. In reality, the existence of two
main churches, the Catholic and the Communist, led to solutions capable of
according the constraints of social class to those of parties and religion. The
right represented, primarily, the interests of the upper middle class. The
lower class, including blue-collar workers, peasants, and the petty bour-
geois, from small business people to public employees, has been divided
instead between observant Catholics, who formed their own unions and
supported the Christian-Democrat left, and the many others who supported
the Socialist and Communist parties, and joined the leftist unions. This per-
mitted the Christian Democrats to remain in power for over four decades,

making coalitions—first with the moderate right, then with the moderate
left—necessary.
In the United States, as in Italy and many other Western democracies,
political choice has often been a matter of belonging more than of believ-
ing, and the mediatory role of the family has been crucial for the transmis-
sion of political values and the fortune of political parties. Once, families
were mostly solid two-parent units, and the strength of parental transmis-
sion of political preference was greater where parents were more politicized.
Religiosity also contributed to parental transmission of political preference,
thus providing further proof of the influential role played by religion in shap-
ing people’s worldviews and preserving a sort of congruency between the
various domains of people’s lives (Jennings et al., 2009).
Political preferences and voting tended to remain stable as habits that,
once they had been acquired, were destined to last forever, despite changes
in programs and political priorities. Most people had no interest in reviewing
their choices, dictated mostly by needs of affiliation, while issues that were a
matter of contention between opposite parties were difficult to grasp for most
voters. Long-term stability and the impact of early party identification were
further reinforced by the inheritance and stability of parties viewed, most
likely, as models and vehicles of attachment and loyalty to one’s own class
and country.
The last three decades have brought about significant changes in the strat-
ification of societies, in family life, and in relations between the generations,
in many Western democracies in conjunction with the fall of the Berlin Wall,
the end of authoritarian regimes in Europe, and a broader and more wide-
spread democratization of South America.
In several countries, like Italy, social class is no longer a constituent aspect
of people’s social identity, trade unions are not so closely identified or so
closely associated with political parties, nor does income, trade, or profession
favor ideological choices, as in the past (Corbetta, 2006; Maraffi, 2007; Sylos
Labini, 1986).
The expansion of the middle class and the increased potential of upward
and downward social mobility of people during their lifetimes have blurred
previous gaps between the various strata of society. Neither is the social
milieu where children grow up as stable as it used to be, due to the higher
rate of domestic geographical mobility experienced by families today and to
the higher permeability rate of communities, caused by flows of people from
outside.
Party identification is weak or nonexistent in polities where the turnover
of parties is continuous. To this regard, Italy provides a typical example of a

country where the current political situation reveals considerable instability

after having been relatively stable for decades. Concomitant with the events
that marked the end of Cold War, both the Communist and the Christian
Democrat parties declined rapidly after having dominated the political scene
for over 40 years. These parties were replaced by political movements that
merge and splinter continuously.
Social class, income, and education are no longer the reliable predictors of
political preference or of partisanship, as they were in the past. Families con-
tinue to play an important role in the transmission to their children of politi-
cal attitudes, but this phenomenon is likely to be influenced by the extent to
which parents are themselves politicized, by the stability of their marriage,
and the extent to which their messages are congruent with the influence of
other socializing agencies, like peers, teachers, and religious or civic asso-
ciations. Parents can be particularly successful in passing on their political
orientation to their children if it comes as part of a congruent package of val-
ues and behavior. More than before, “family politicization and parental con-
sistency are complementary, with each usually elevating the likelihood that
children will adopt the political orientations of the parents” (Jennings et al.,
2009, p. 790).
One may, therefore, infer that political socialization within the family has
weakened over the past decades due to notable changes in family structures.
The rise in divorce rates, mixed, extended families, and single-parent house-
holds have inevitably reduced the frequency, duration, and effectiveness of
the traditional authority and molding power of parents. Furthermore, the
transmission by parents of political values cannot count upon the interaction
between political and religious values, as in earlier times, since religiosity has
generally declined among the youth in the United States, as in other Western
democracies (Inglehart, 1997; Putnam & Campbell, 2010). Taken together,
these changes mean that previous assumptions about the influence exerted
by social class, family, and party identification on the political socialization of
children and its long-term effects have to be re-examined.
One should take into account, in particular, other socializing agencies like
social media, the impact of which is difficult to evaluate and that were non-
existent in earlier times. One may guess that the socializing effect of peers
has increased due to the prolonged time children spend together and due to
the pervasiveness of their reciprocal influence. As regards this issue, the dif-
fusion of communication technology has greatly increased the influence that
children may exert upon each other, even at a distance.
Likewise, one may assume that the further extension of access to edu-
cation exposes children more to the socializing influence of schools and of

teachers. Student participation in the governance of schools and the teaching

of disciplines like history, humanities, and social sciences may have a sig-
nificant impact on young people’s sense of citizenship during the sensitive,
formative years of late adolescence and young adulthood.
Regarding this point, various findings attest to the long-term effects of pro-
grams aimed at promoting civic commitment in the young, as well as prompt-
ing them to join religious and voluntary associations committed in various
ways to fostering citizenship and civic virtues regarding political participa-
tion (Campbell, 2006;Gimpel, Lay, & Schuknecht, 2003; Nucci, Krettenauer, &
Narvaez, 2014; Sherrod, Flanagan, & Youniss, 2002). Ultimately, socialization
does occur in social contexts where traditional class influences and the fam-
ily concur with those of other agencies, the effects of which are achieved by
means of mechanisms other than those operating in the past.
To establish the principal determinants of present-day effective political
socialization across countries and to understand how they operate are ardu-
ous tasks, indeed.
The hypothesis that middle and late adolescence are critical periods
during which young people are particularly impressionable and, therefore,
permeable to social and political attitudes destined to crystallize in early
adulthood and remain stable during the course of one’s lifetime deserves spe-
cial attention (Sears & Brown, 2013).
Likewise, due attention needs to be paid to the way various sources of
influence operate in different contexts and at different times. Special consider-
ation should also be paid to the pervasive and lasting impact of extraordinary
events over the collective memories and the behavior patterns of generations.
The impact of extraordinary events, which was limited in the past by distance
and lack of information, can today be amplified enormously by the media.
Examples of events that have significantly marked the political experience
of the latest generations, and of young people in particular, are the youth move-
ments of the late 1960s, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the anti-globalization
movements of the turn of the present century, the attack on the World Trade
Center of New York on the September 11, 2001, and the insurrections of the
Arab Spring in 2011. While it is not possible for us to assess the pervasiveness
and lasting impression of these events locally and globally, it is unlikely that
they had no impact on the attitudes of most citizens toward politics.
The extension of the symbolic environment, made possible by the dif-
fusion of television and the web, has been, in fact, a major determinant of
change. It has produced ideas, desires, habits, and models capable of broaden-
ing the scope of people’ s imaginations, fears, and aspirations, making them
more accessible to everyone and much more vivid than in the past.

Current research addressing the effects of gene-environment interplay

in the transmission of political attitudes provides new and better tools with
which to address the influence of shared environments, namely family and
social milieu. As stated by Hatemi and colleagues (2009), “parental influ-
ence through social transmission on attitude orientations are strong during
childhood and adolescence, but as young adults move away from the direct
influences of the parental environment, the influence of parents appears to be
indirect through genetic inheritance” (p. 1151). Thus, it is probable that chil-
dren start out with attitudes acquired from their parents, but as they move
into adulthood, their own experiences and individual genetic disposition
interact to modify or to stabilize those attitudes.
Viewing human beings as agents that contribute actively to shape their
own environments and to select their experiences means that social envi-
ronments must be seen as sources of challenge and affordance, crucial to
turning potential into capacity and achievement. This has led to a focus
on the opportunities provided by social milieus that allow individuals to
navigate through their lives and to make the most of their potentials. This is
crucial in a multicultural world where mobility requires people to interpret
their social environments and to manage them productively, rather than
just conforming to the actions of others or to what they think others expect
from them.
This brings us again to personality as the system of individual proper-
ties whose development and functioning ultimately account for the choices
people make and for their behavior, also in the domain of politics. Ultimately,
how children learn and are able to manage themselves is what mostly counts
in politics, too. In this regard, the study of social context and influences can
tell us much, but it cannot be disassociated from the study of the psychologi-
cal structures that enable individuals to self-regulate and interact proactively
with their environments.
Civic Commitment and Social Capital

Civic commitment is related to various extents to political participation inso-
far as both may be viewed as expressions of citizens’ public involvement
(Borgida, Federico, & Sullivan, 2009). Nevertheless, we agree in principle
with those scholars who still find it convenient to distinguish between civic
commitment and political commitment (Campbell, 2006). While civic com-
mitment should lead to a focus on the contribution citizens can make to the
proper functioning of society, political commitment should lead to a focus on
the influence people may exert on the governance of a society.

Civic commitment usually implies the fulfillment of duties, such as

respect for the law, public institutions, and one’s fellow citizens, as well as the
exercise of public-spirited virtues, such as those that reduce conflict, reconcile
differences, and help alleviate the hardships that nature and fate can bring.
In sum, civically engaged citizens should demonstrate personal qualities that
promote solidarity in pursuit of the common good.
Political commitment usually implies choosing among alternative views,
debating, competing, and even fighting to affirm one’s values and ideas and
those of one’s party. Both civic commitment and political commitment can
be viewed as a manifestation of the duality that lies at basis of human exis-
tence: Agency and Communion. Depending on whether one conceives these
two fundamental modalities of human existence as complementary or alter-
natives, one may view civic commitment and political commitment as serving
selfish or communal goals.
Based on the assumption that the common good can be better served by
ideas that confront each other in the pursuit of the best solution, we can say
that democracy rests on both civic and political commitment. Democracy, in
fact, requires discussion and can benefit from competition no less than from
collaboration. Under the rule of law and fairness, competition among pro-
grams, alternation of governments, and rotation of parties and representa-
tives ought to act as the sources of innovation, growth, and wealth, rather
than of conflict. All this should be much easier when people’s political com-
mitment fosters the virtues that are usually claimed by civic commitment,
such as altruism, loyalty, honesty, integrity, truthfulness, fairness, and social
responsibility. Although most would doubt that this condition fits with what
occurs in many polities, various findings attest to the long-term effects on
political commitment of programs aimed at promoting civic commitment
through the development of public virtues.
It is highly probably that civic commitment is an important component, as
well as an important antecedent, of political commitment. Yet there is plenty
of evidence that much of civic commitment is quite removed from forms of
political commitment that go beyond the mere vote.
In reality, civic commitment does not necessarily foreshadow active polit-
ical commitment, since a good deal of adults’ community service today is
often a substitute for a commitment to politics, rather than a complement to
it. Ideally, politics should be at the service of the common good and, as such,
devoted to the realization of values at the core of civic society. In practice, how-
ever, the pursuit of the common good is often uncertain in politics, especially
when views and interests are in fierce conflict with each other. Indeed, view-
ing civic and political commitment as both being important manifestations

of public commitment should not lead to their specificity and distinctiveness

being overlooked.
While being effective in civics and in politics may require similar skills,
they do not necessarily rest upon the same motivations. The virtues of a good
citizen are easily acknowledged and, in principle, are demanded from all citi-
zens. Politicians, instead, are only rarely perceived as exemplars of the sense
of duty, altruism, and citizenship that they preach. Thus, as stated earlier,
we maintain that it is helpful to restrict political commitment to activities
specifically related to the governance of society and, in democratic politics, to
the functioning of institutions entitled to use power on behalf of and for the
common good of citizens.
Accordingly, we have differentiated among voters, partisans, politi-
cians, and non-voters as corresponding to different levels of political com-
mitment, under the assumption that the degree of personal involvement,
both private and public, is the proper criterion with which to establish the
degree to which politics is important in people’s lives. Likewise, we distin-
guish various levels of civic commitment, taking as a criterion the central-
ity of a sense of citizenship in peoples’ identity, under the assumption that
the more citizens’ commitment in pro-community and pro-social activities
is compelling and self-rewarding, the higher will be the level of their civic
commitment.
Basically, the awareness of duties and rights associated with being a citi-
zen should carry feelings and beliefs about being part of a larger and stable
community, ruled by norms and mutual obligations. Thus, in an ideal democ-
racy, where citizenship rests upon the sense that each individual deserves
respect and people may count on others for the fulfillment of their needs,
being a citizen should imply a duty for all to contribute actively to the pursuit
of the common good. Holding the law to be fair, respecting it, and knowing
that the government has concern for those it governs should be the condi-
tions for and the results of civic societies, namely of societies that prize public
virtues.
In reality, these ideal conditions are never fully achieved, and many have
complained that much of the malaise of contemporary democracies is due to a
deficit of citizenship and of public virtues. One can find not only the anteced-
ents of these complaints throughout the history of Western political thought,
but also, perhaps surprisingly, its remedies. Several authors have posited the
moral psychology of citizens as the basis of good society, and civic educa-
tion as the main road for this being realized (Almond & Verba, 1963; Galston,
2001; Putnam, 1993; Sullivan & Transue, 1999). Indeed, as repeatedly stated in
this volume, democracy cannot function properly or develop unless its roots

are solidly grounded in the moral psychology of its citizens, namely in their
views of themselves and of their fellow citizens.
The sense of individual duty and mutual obligations that are at the core
of democratic citizenship and which account for citizens’ public behavior
cannot be disjoined from the values and habits of the communities in which
people grow and live. This is the reason that exporting democracy to polities
where citizenship has different roots from those of liberal democracies may
result a hard task.
Following this reasoning, one may view civic commitment as an expression
of public morality and thus distinguish two forms of civic-mindedness: inhib-
itive and proactive. The inhibitive form is manifested when citizens refrain
from behaving in ways contrary to the demands of society. The proactive
form is when people proactively engage in the betterment of civic life.
Remaining informed concerning matters of governance, voting, and
vigilance over the accountability of one’s representatives are components
of citizenships’ duties and of basic civic commitment, no less than paying
taxes, obeying the law, avoiding damage to others in the pursuit of one’s own
interests, respecting the physical environment, and meeting one’s obligations
at work, within the family, and within society at large. However, engaging
in manifold activities in support of those in need, devoting a large portion
of one’s time to maintaining the community’s heritage and to promoting
improvements in the functioning of a community, being an active defender of
the law, justice, and peace, and affording personal cost and risk for the sake of
society’s welfare go beyond the basic duties of citizenship and further expand
the sphere of civic commitment. Thus one may envision different levels of
civic commitment, depending on the degree to which people are voluntarily
pursuing the betterment of society, without any tangible compensation, at
their own cost and through the exercise of public virtues like altruism, cour-
age, and fairness. As partisanship in politics attests to a higher level of politi-
cal commitment than mere voting, so volunteering in support of the poor,
of the environment, and of children’s civic education attests to a higher level
of civic commitment beyond merely adhering to the law, as all good citizens
should.
At this point it should be clear why we maintain that it is convenient
to view civic commitment and political commitment as distinctive expres-
sions of people’s public life, despite the fact that both are vital to the effec-
tive functioning of democracy. Indeed, we strongly believe, although it may
sound reiterative, that democracy functions to the extent that political com-
mitment is solidly grounded in civic commitment, and this occurs when the
sense of civic duty is central to the self-identity of citizens. Thus, both civic

commitment and political commitment should be properly nurtured toward

the betterment of social life. To this aim, it is crucial to know which psycho-
logical structures are most accountable for the motivations that lead citizens
to be proactive in society and in politics, and to understand how they operate
and how they can be properly developed.
We also believe that the more citizens are committed to promote civic
values throughout their life, the more political commitment can rest upon
pro-social values, rather than upon mere self-interest. This should have a sig-
nificant impact on the level of social capital that democracy ultimately has at
its disposal.
Social capital is, in fact, closely related to both civic commitment and to
political commitment. Literature dealing with social capital has grown in
recent decades within the ambits of all the social sciences (Bourdieu, 1980;
Coleman, 1990; Portes, 1998; Putnam, 2000). From reviewing this literature,
one may draw two major conceptualizations of social capital, one related to
the assets of the individual and one as an asset of society. With regard to the
former, social capital is seen as the net sum of interpersonal relations and
bonds that add to economic wealth by enabling individuals to be successful in
negotiating and dealing with a complex society and its hazards. With regard
to the latter, it is seen as the net sum of mutual obligations that empower com-
munities, promote their cohesion, and foster their development, from which
members draw feelings of attachment, trust, confidence, and pride.
Both conceptualizations have important implications for the realization of
democracy to the extent that supportive relationships between citizens may
benefit both their well-being and the functioning of democratic institutions.
From the point of view of citizens, social capital may add bonds and links at
their disposal for the achievement of their goals in any walk of life. From the
perspective of polities, social capital may carry feelings of mutual trust and
confidence, leading citizens to invest in their public obligations.
One should not underestimate that social capital, as any other form of
capital, may derive from sources and be focused on outcomes that may even
contrast with the ideals of good citizenry and of democracy. Criminal organi-
zations are examples of how social capital may differently serve individuals
and communities, no less than parties, unions, or humanitarian associations.
Corruption, nepotism, illegal solidarity, and the exclusion of minorities are
exemplars of social capital working against the interest of civic societies.
Acknowledging the different means by which social capital can influence
the realization of individuals’ and communities’ goals should lead to a care-
ful investigation of when and how social capital may contribute to civic com-
mitment, to political commitment, and to the well-functioning of democracy.

To this end, it is important to understand the reciprocal relations between

civic commitment, political commitment, and social capital, and how they
may operate in a synergistic way to contribute to the welfare of society and
ultimately of democracy.
Indeed, the three might go together and reinforce each other in the pur-
suit of common good. Early participation in school government and commu-
nity services has proved to be associated with a larger net of supportive peer
relations and often to major civic and political commitments in adulthood.
Children who engage in civic services in youth are later more concerned with
the exercise of their political duties and in general have broader nets of social
relations at their disposal.
While the position held in society by one’s own family and the material
and human resources at one’s disposal undoubtedly represent important
assets or limitations, we nevertheless believe that most people today can
select and change the social environments in which they live, and can choose
how to allocate their time, invest their psychological assets, and cultivate their
social capital. In this regard, individual differences in personality, namely in
dispositions, motivations, values, and capabilities, are much more important
now than in the past, to the extent that people’s choices rest upon discretion,
rather than on the constraints of ascribed roles and the material conditions
of life.
Nevertheless, while we know that the very individuals who engage in
community services are often more active in politics, and that they dispose,
on average, of higher amounts of social capital, much remains to be under-
stood regarding how to connect active participation to the functioning of
social institutions and governments. Here, research on personality should
help, especially when it comes to identifying and specifying the features of
individuality potentially relevant to the various forms of social commitment.
TRAITS, MOTIVES, AND VALUES

Income and education have been the major assets for being active in politics
and for access to political offices, especially in the early stages of democracy.
Today, they still may account for political commitment, but to a more a lim-
ited extent than in the past and differently across polities. In particular, while
superior levels of education have reduced its discriminatory power, most of
the people belonging to the higher-income bracket do not show any greater
interest in politics than those of the lower-income level.
The SES model that served in the past to predict political participation,
however, (Milbrath & Goel, 1977) did not fully clarify the mechanisms by

which the advantage of social position can be turned into higher political par-
ticipation. This led Brady, Verba, and Schlozman (1995) to advocate the need
to go beyond SES and to include civic skills and time as crucial resources that
are conducive to political participation. By civic skills, the authors referred
to those communications and organizational capacities that are essential to
political activity, which children start to learn at home and at school, and
which people cultivate throughout life.
Focusing on skills and learning, this new resource model represented a
significant change compared to previous approaches based on social strati-
fication theories (Bendix & Lipset, 1966) and mere self-i nterest. In particular,
it bears documentary witness to the renewed attention of political scientists
to either psychological factors, like intelligence and motivation, or to unique
experiences that permit people to acquire, exercise, and improve skills
that are prized during political activity and, thus, enhance their interest in
politics.
Based on these premises, the study of personality has gained momentum
as the psychological system that may account for how opportunities and con-
straints of the environment can turn into aspirations, capacities, and activities
that are relevant for politics. To this end, in fact, the study of individual dif-
ferences within the domains of traits, motives, values, beliefs, and attitudes
has come to the forefront as a tool for the identification of the psychological
characteristics underpinning political preference and participation.
In the previous chapters, we reviewed the progress made concerning how
personality traits, basic values, and political attitudes are related to political
ideologies and preferences. Now, we will address advances made in under-
standing political participation by distinguishing two stages of development
and a third that is still in its infancy.
During the initial stage, scholars examined the relationships between
socioeconomic status, some psychological variables, like self- esteem and
locus of control, and various expressions of personal involvement with
politics, like political knowledge, political interest, voting, party identifica-
tion, and political efficacy (Cohen, Vigoda, & Samorly, 2001; Krampen, 2000;
Sniderman, 1975). Self-esteem and locus of control were part of the traditional
repertoire of personality research, whereas party identification and political
efficacy were part of the traditional repertoire of political science.1
This leads to a primary distinction among the variables mentioned, and
between distal and proximal determinants of political participation. Whereas
SES, self-esteem, and locus of control were viewed as distal determinants,
political knowledge, political interest, party identification, and political effi-
cacy were viewed as proxy determinants of political activity. The notion of

Political
Knowledge
Self-
Esteem
Political
Interest
Political
SES
Participation
Partisanship
Locus of
Control
Political
Efficacy
Figure 7.1 Distal and proximal determinants of political participation.
mediation was used to account for conceptual models in which self-esteem

and locus of control mediated the influence of SES, the influence of which
on political activity was prevalently indirect and operated through political
knowledge, interest, partisanship, and efficacy. Figure 7.1 depicts the path-
ways from SES to political participation through psychological variables.
A second stage in the understanding of political participation was marked
by the discovery and establishment of personality traits as reliable predic-
tors of political preference and participation. The Big Five also represented an
important turning point in providing a consensual and economical method
to aggregate and assess major individual differences in behavioral tendencies
and to examine and compare their relations with various degrees of political
commitment across time and across polities.
Indeed, studies putting the Big Five among the determinants of political
participation have multiplied over the last decade. These studies also place
political knowledge at an intermediate level and consider political efficacy as
the most important and proximal determinant of conventional and uncon-
ventional forms of political participation (Gallego & Oberski, 2011; Levy, 2013;
Mondak et al., 2010). Figure 7.2 depicts the pathways from basic traits to politi-
cal participation, through political knowledge and efficacy.
A third stage, which placed values, together with traits, among the major
determinants not only of political preferences but also of political participa-
tion was initiated by Caprara, Schwartz, and Vecchione. This was accom-
panied by the elaboration of conceptual models aimed at determining how
traits, values, and self-beliefs operate at the different stages of political choice

Political
Knowledge
Personality
Traits Political
(Big Five) Participation
Political
Efficacy
Figure 7.2 The role of Big Five personality traits as distal predictors of political
participation.
and commitment. This also led to the inclusion of self-esteem among the basic
traits accounting for political participation, even though self-esteem has not
shown any relevance for political preferences. Sniderman (1975) had already
noticed the important role that self-esteem may play in political participation
and leadership.
Viewing self-esteem as a major expression of positivity, as discussed in
Chapter 3, led us to incorporate positivity in our analysis of political activ-
ity. We include positivity among the psychological structures that are most
strongly linked to valuation and motivation, and believe that these structures
operate in parallel with those underlying the Big Five, which mostly exert an
executive-behavioral function. All these represent sources of potential, the
actualization of which, during one’s development, and in interaction with the
environment, leads to the emergence of a self-system that enables individuals
to unify their experiences and achieve a sense of identity. Ultimately, it is this
system that we put at the core of personality, and that accounts for how traits,
motives, values, and self-beliefs gradually crystallize over time and come to
operate in concert to regulate and orient humans’ behavior.
Over the last two decades, the discovery of personality has carried nota-
ble advantages for a better understanding of the choices and investments peo-
ple make in politics. In the following section we will present major findings
regarding the role of basic traits, motives, values, and self-efficacy beliefs with
regard to political participation.

Personality Traits
Studies conducted within the framework of the Big Five have found mean-
ingful relations between individuals’ personality traits and various forms of
political participation. For example, several scholars investigated the role of
the Big Five in the civic and political commitment of citizens from different
countries, including the United States (Gerber, Huber, Doherty, & Dowling,
2011; Mondak & Halperin, 2008; Mondak, Hibbing, Canache, Seligson, &
Anderson, 2010), Italy (Vecchione & Caprara, 2009), Germany (Schoen &
Steinbrecher, 2013), Uruguay, Venezuela (Mondak, Canache, Seligson, &
Hibbing, 2011), South Korea (Ha, Kim & Jo, 2013), Spain, and Chile (unpub-
lished data).2
The largest effects in most of the studies were found for openness and
energy/extraversion, although the results were not always consistent across
samples. This was most likely due to the specificity of the instruments used
to assess the Big Five, the moderating role of contextual variables (such as the
cultural or political scenario), and the specific forms of activism considered
as outcome.
The openness trait was found to be related to several indicators of political
commitment, including contacting members of Congress, working for cam-
paigns, displaying yard signs, contributing money to candidates and political
organizations, and protesting. Energy/extraversion was also related to several
forms of participation, especially for those involving a certain degree of social
interaction, such as joining voluntary associations, attending political meet-
ings, engaging in political discussions, and attempting to persuade others on
how to vote. One should remember that openness and energy/extraversion
were also among the traits on which Italian politicians outscored ordinary
citizens (see Chapter 6).
The effect of the other traits was smaller and less consistent across behav-
ioral patterns and situations. Conscientiousness, for instance, was sometimes
found to be negatively and other times positively related to participation. As
reported by Mondak et al. (2010), high levels of this trait may encourage civic
commitment only when the latter is perceived as an important duty.
A further study conducted in the United States by Hibbing, Ritchie, and
Anderson (2011) addressed the role of personality traits in shaping patterns
of political discussion. Replicating previous studies, extraversion and open-
ness were related to a general tendency to discuss politics (see Mondak &
Halperin, 2008). High levels of emotional stability were found to encourage
people to discuss politics with individuals who have contrasting political
views. High levels of openness, which refers to intellectual flexibility and

broad-mindedness, were found to increase the likelihood of being influenced

by these discussions.
Taken together, findings from the studies under discussion suggest that
energy/extraversion and openness may account for individual differences in
behavior, communication, and relational styles that are crucial for being suc-
cessful in the political arena. Important ingredients of political activity, such
as keeping up to date with main political events, being receptive to a large
variety of ideas and points of view, and interacting within a wide network
of people with different backgrounds, may benefit from a genuine open-
ness toward others and to the world in general. In addition, several facets of
energy/extraversion, such as assertiveness, persuasiveness, and dominance,
are crucial to participating and being successful in politics. Moreover, results
from most studies indicate that the effects of the Big Five in predicting politi-
cal participation are comparable to that of classic predictors of civic commit-
ment, like income, education, and partisanship, and tend to persist even after
these other variables are taken into account (Gerber et al., 2011; Ha, Kim, & Jo,
2012; Vecchione & Caprara, 2009).
As anticipated, an issue that has been debated in recent literature is
whether the Big Five affect political commitment directly or indirectly though
intervening variables. Mondak et al. (2010), for instance, present data suggest-
ing that the effect of openness is mediated by political knowledge. As indi-
viduals with high levels of openness, also referred to as intellect (McCrae &
Costa, 1997), are interested in different ideas and are curious about the world,
it is likely that their greater exposure to a variety of information also enhances
greater political involvement and active participation. Other scholars (e.g.,
Gallego & Oberski, 2012; Schoen & Steinbrecher, 2013) have shown that other
variables, like party identification, civic duty, political interest, and political
efficacy, serve as intervening variables that mediate the impact of personality
traits on electoral and non-electoral participation.
Data from a longitudinal study carried out on a sample of 80 Italian ado-
lescents also attest to the role of the Big Five as predictors of political activism.
The model shown in Figure 7.3 depicts the relations over time among the Big
Five (i.e., energy/extraversion, openness, agreeableness), civic commitment
(i.e., participation in voluntary, non- political organizations), and political
activism. Personality traits were measured in 1996, when participants were
aged 14–18 (thus before the age of voting); volunteerism and political partici-
pation were measured in 2004 and 2008, respectively.
Results showed that higher levels of agreeableness promoted active
citizenship and voluntary social commitment. This confirms results from

Energy/
Extraversion
1996
Agreeableness Political
Volunteering
1996 .27* 2004 .27** Participation
2008
.36**
Openness
1996
Figure 7.3 Big Five and political participation: The mediational role of volunteerism.
previous studies (e.g., Penner & Finkelstein, 1998), which showed that indi-
viduals with high levels of agreeableness and empathic concern were more
likely to volunteer, and that this, in turn, helped promote active political com-
mitment later in life. Thus, agreeableness has an indirect effect on political
participation, mediated by the experience of volunteerism. This is in line with
the role of civic commitment as an incubator of democratic participation, able
to foster mobilization in politics at later stages of life (Pasek, Feldman, Romer,
& Jamieson, 2008). The model also shows the long-term effect of openness,
which directly affects political participation 12 years later. The direct effect of
energy/extraversion, by contrast, was not significant.
Table 7.1 reports data from an ongoing longitudinal study carried out in
Genzano, a small town a few miles south of Rome, showed that ideological
self-placement was substantially stable when monitored over a period of eight
years (Caprara & Vecchione, unpublished data). The table contains concurrent
and longitudinal correlations of the Big Five with interest in politics, voting
turnout, and trust in the institutions. As can be observed, openness is the
most valid predictor of interest in politics and voting turnout. Energy/extra-
version and conscientiousness are other significant predictors of interest in
politics and voting turnout. These relations hold among left-and right-wing
voters. Trust in institutions is only faintly related to the Big Five (Table 7.1).

TA B L E 7 . 1 . CORRELATIONS BETWEEN TRAITS OF PERSONALITY AND INTEREST IN POLITICS, VOTING TURNOUT,
AND TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS
Interest in Interest in Voting Voting Trust in Trust in

Politics 2004 Politics 2008 Turnout 2004 Turnout 2008 Institutions 2004 Institutions 2008
(N = 534) (N = 347) (N = 534) (N = 347) (N = 534) (N = 347)
Energy/Extraversion .14** .09 .17** .01 .15** .11*

Agreeableness .02 –.01 .13** .15** .16** .15**
Conscientiousness .16** .12* .25** .14** .15** .14**
Emotional Stability .07 .03 .09* .07 .13** .13*
Openness .29** .24** .24** .17** .09* .03
Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01.
These data were provided by Caprara and Vecchione (unpublished report).

Positivity
4.05
3.95
3.85
3.75
3.65
3.55
General Population Politicians
Figure 7.4 Mean scores on the positivity scale reported by a group of Italian politi-
cians (N = 100) and a large sample of Italian individuals (N = 2,136) taken from the
general population.
Note: Items of the scale have been scored on a five-point Likert scales, ranging from 1
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
With regard to positivity, studies performed in the general population

showed no relations with political activism. However, data available from
Italian politicians (to which we referred in Chapter 6) suggest that elected offi-
cials outscore ordinary citizens on the positivity scale, an eight-item instru-
ment designed to assess the tendency to view life and experiences with a
positive outlook. Items of the scale refer to individuals’ regard for themselves
(e.g., “On the whole, I am satisfied with myself”), individuals’ confidence in the
future (e.g., “I have great faith in the future”), individuals’ confidence in others
(e.g., “Others are generally here for me when I need them”), and individuals’ satis-
faction with their lives (“I am satisfied with my life”).3
These data corroborate earlier findings and reveal a positive association
between self-esteem and political activism. While self-esteem remains at the
core of positivity, it is unlikely to foster political commitment unless one is
convinced of one’s own value. Self-esteem is, in fact, generally associated
with interpersonal competence, which is crucial to successful negotiation and
achievement of consensus (Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003).
As shown in Figure 7.4, politicians scored significantly higher than ordi-
nary citizens on the overall score. Table 7.2 reports the mean scores of both
groups for each of the eight items. Significant differences emerged with
respect to two items: politicians reported higher life satisfaction, as well as
higher confidence in themselves, than voters.

TAB L E 7 . 2 . MEAN SCORES FOR ITALIAN CITIZENS AND POLITICIANS

ON THE EIGHT ITEMS OF THE POSITIVITY SCALE
Item General Elected Officials

Population (N = 100)
(N = 2,136)
1. I have great faith in the future. 3.43 (1.02) 3.63 (1.11)

2. I am satisfied with my life. 3.70* (1.42) 4.16* (.79)
3. Others are generally here for me when 4.24 (.86) 4.38 (.68)
I need them.
4. I look forward to the future with hope 3.72 (.96) 3.89 (1.03)
and enthusiasm.
5. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself. 3.69 (.84) 4.06 (.74)
6. At times, the future seems unclear to 3.19 (1.20) 3.35 (1.11)
me (reversed).
7. I feel I have many things to be proud of. 4.12 (1.01) 3.94 (1.39)
8. I generally feel confident in myself. 3.58* (1.01) 4.08* (.85)
Note: *p < .05. Standard deviations are provided within parentheses.
Source: Caprara, Vecchione, D’Ercole, and Zuffianò (2014).
Motives
Studies aimed at examining relations between motives and civic and political
participation are few and unambiguous. (e.g., Omoto, Snyder, & Hackett, 2010).
The studies by Winter (1995, 2002) and Hermann (1980a, 1980b, 1987), to which we
referred in Chapter 1, focused on motive profiles of worldwide political leaders,
using a scoring system devised to assess personality at a distance. Among the
main results, Winter (2013) highlighted the following: (a) power-related motives
are higher among charismatic and aggressive leaders; (b) motives concerning
affiliation promote cooperative leadership styles; and (c) motives related to
achievement, which in past studies have been found to predict entrepreneurial
success, were indicated as not particularly relevant for politicians’ performance.
These studies, however, neither examined the role of motives of people who
engage in more basic forms of political expression (e.g., voting, signing a peti-
tion), nor compared the motives of politicians with those of ordinary citizens.
Data from the longitudinal study in Genzano have been used to exam-
ine relations between motivation and political participation with the
Test of Motivational Orientation (TOM; Borgogni, Petitta, & Barbaranelli,
2004), a standardized questionnaire inspired by McClelland’s (1985) work.
The research instrument identifies four general orientations toward goal

attainment, relationships, innovation, and leadership. Relations of the four

subscales with political activism and interest, however, were weak and mostly
non-significant.
Personal Basic Values
Whereas personality traits set the potentials that predispose people to engage
in political action, basic values provide the reasons that sustain the motiva-
tion to become politically engaged. Values determine, first, whether politics is
perceived as worthy of personal investment; second, the course of action; and
third, the efforts to be undertaken.
A number of studies have examined the contribution of basic values in
promoting various forms of political activity, such as participation in pub-
lic demonstrations and protests, contacting politicians, working in political
groups or organizations, and signing petitions. A study by Schwartz (1994)
examined the effects of basic values on political participation using the ESS
data from 1,244 French citizens and a short, 21-item version of the PVQ.
Findings showed that self-transcendence values had the strongest positive
impact on political participation, whereas conservation values negatively pre-
dicted political participation. Similar results were reported by Vyrost, Kentos,
and Fedakova (2007), who combined data from the 24 countries participat-
ing in the second round of the ESS (2004–2005). Finally, Augemberg (2008)
reported that commitment in US electoral activities was positively influenced
by self-direction and universalism, and negatively influenced by power and
achievement.
Along similar lines, Vecchione et al. (2014) conducted two studies with the
aim of clarifying consistencies and variability across countries concerning
the influence that basic values exert on political activism, measured as the
number of politically relevant acts performed during the previous 12 months.
The first study was conducted on 35,116 individuals from 20 countries par-
ticipating in the first round (2002–2003) of the ESS (Austria, Belgium, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland,
Israel, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, UK). The four higher-order values were measured with the
PVQ-21.
Self-transcendence values, which motivate people to care for the welfare
of others, were linked to high levels of political activism, which often aims at
promoting goals like social justice and environmental preservation. In terms
of cost-benefit calculations, political activism might be construed as irrational,
because each individual citizen makes only a negligible contribution to the

attainment of political goals (Whiteley & Seyd, 1996). Yet citizens with self-
transcendence values seem to pay less attention to such calculations, probably
because they regard political action as a kind of moral obligation associated
with civic duties (Finkel, Muller, & Opp, 1989).
Openness to change values were also positively related to political activ-
ism. As Schwartz (2006) argued, the pursuit of excitement may play a role in
orienting the decision to engage in risky unconventional forms of political
action, such as participation in protest marches, and so on. At the same time,
commitment to civic and political activities may be promoted by values that
emphasize personal autonomy and freedom of expression for all people, even
for those who hold minority views and pursue unconventional habits and
lifestyles.
Conservation values, by way of contrast, tend to inhibit political activ-
ism. These values emphasize risk avoidance, personal security, acceptance
of traditional practices, adherence to established norms, and a commitment
to preserving the status quo. As political activism is aimed at changing the
status quo, it is reasonable to assume that challenging existing arrangements,
which could lead to unexpected and uncontrolled outcomes, might therefore
be perceived as threatening to one’s security.
While self-transcendence, openness to change, and conservation related
systematically to political activism, correlations with self-enhancement were
weak or not significant. A somewhat different picture emerged when the
activism index was split into conventional (e.g., contacting political offices,
donating money to parties) and unconventional (e.g., protests, demonstra-
tions) subtypes. It was found that power values correlated negatively with
unconventional and positively with conventional activism.
It is likely that the negative correlation with unconventional activism
reflects the fact that such activism is usually intended to serve collective inter-
ests (e.g., environmental and consumer activism) or the interests of minority
and disadvantaged groups (e.g., women, immigrants), rather than self-interest.
Engaging in such activities, in fact, may entail sacrificing personal resources
and interests for the sake of others, and outcomes that contrast with self-
focused power values. The positive correlation with conventional activism,
instead, may reflect the fact that this type of activism often takes place within
organizations aimed at producing and distributing resources, such as politi-
cal parties, trade unions, and business organizations, where activism may
serve as a means to obtain power.
Overall, the strength of relations between basic values and political activism
varied considerably across countries. In an attempt to explain the observed het-
erogeneity, the authors focused on level of democratization—conceptualized

in terms of civil liberties, freedom of expression, pluralism, and politi-

cal culture. It has been found that rates of political activism were higher in
more rather than less democratic countries, where values had weak or non-
significant effect. Specifically, values explained most variance in Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (9% or more of accounted
variance), and least variance in Greece, Hungary, Portugal, and Slovenia
(4% or less).
Indeed, democratization might contribute to political activism by increas-
ing individuals’ opportunities to express their values through acting on their
preferences. Less democratic political systems, instead, tend to restrict citi-
zens’ freedom to express their views, thereby limiting the influence of per-
sonal values on political commitment.
In an attempt to replicate the results of their first study, Vecchione et al.
(2014) examined relations between basic values and political activism in
14 countries, including the 6 ESS countries examined in the first study
(i.e., Germany, Greece, Finland, Israel, Poland, and the UK), and an addi-
tional 8 countries (Australia, Brazil, Chile, Italy, Slovakia, Turkey, Ukraine,
and the US). Focusing on the 10 basic values (measured with the extended
version of the PVQ), this study investigated how the whole motivational
system captured by the values circle (see Chapter 3) relates to political
activism.
The strongest associations with political activism were exhibited by self-
direction and universalism values. These values are linked, respectively, to
freedom and equality (Schwartz, Caprara, & Vecchione, 2010), the two key
building blocks of democracy (Rokeach, 1973, 1979). Autonomy of thought, a
subtype of self-direction, was found to be particularly relevant to the deci-
sion to engage in politics. It emphasizes generating and expressing one’s
own ideas independently and, as such, may encourage people to form and
express their own political opinions and preferences. Universalism, which
is adjacent to self-direction in the motivational circle of values, promotes
social justice and preservation of the environment, common goals of politi-
cal activism.
Associations with the other values were progressively less positive
as one moves in either direction around the circular structure of values.
Conformity and security, the values that are opposed to self-direction and
universalism, showed the most negative correlations with political activism.
Conformity values may inhibit activism because they emphasize restraint of
one’s impulses and compliance with social expectations. Likewise, security
values may discourage people from engaging actively in politics because they

emphasize maintaining a safe personal and societal environment, one free of

disturbances and actions that might upset or threaten the existing order.
This was the most common pattern of correlations observed across coun-
tries. However, some findings did deviate from this pattern, suggesting that
the link between personal values and political activism may depend upon
cultural or contextual factors. In the United States, for example, political activ-
ism is related positively to security, which is in contrast to the negative corre-
lation found in most countries. This may reflect the recent social and political
atmosphere in the United States that has placed national and personal secu-
rity at the center of political discourse in response to fear of terrorist attacks.
Furthermore, one cannot exclude the fact that patterns of correlations may
change at the extreme limits of ideological self-placement. Indeed, extreme
right-wing activists often prize stimulation and refuse conformity, even more
than left-wing activists do.
As expected, values proved to have a unique effect on activism, above and
beyond the contributions of gender, age, education, and income. Overall, how-
ever, the explanatory power of values was not particularly high, especially in
some countries. The variance accounted for by the whole set of values ranged
from 1% to 25% across the two studies, which is at least as much as accounted
for by sociodemographic variables. This is also similar to the predictive value
of personality traits, as discussed in previous paragraphs.
As argued by Vecchione et al. (2014), the results of the two studies have
implications for the processes leading to policy preferences and political deci-
sions. They demonstrated that political activism attracts people who give high
priority to certain values (universalism and self-direction), and low priority to
others (conformity and security). Studies described in Chapter 4 have demon-
strated that the same values also shape policy preferences, so they are likely
to affect which policies receive the most attention. Universalism values, for
example, incline citizens to political activism and to subscribe to specific, left-
wing, policy preferences. As a consequence, these preferences are more likely
to be voiced. While a similar reasoning applies to self-direction values, the
opposite pattern emerges for conservation values. Because security, confor-
mity, and tradition deter people from political activism, the right-wing policy
preferences fostered by these values have a smaller probability of being voiced.
The relation between basic values and political activism was further cor-
roborated by data collected in Italy comparing the importance attributed to
the four higher-order values by three groups of respondents that differ in
levels of political involvement and expertise: (a) national politicians holding
offices (N = 333), (b) local politicians (N = 425), and (c) voters who are not
members of any political organization (N = 3,249).4

Voters Local Politicians National Politicians
5 a
a
b
4.5
a
4 a
b
b b
b
3.5
a
a
a
3
2.5
Cons S-Enh OpChg S-Tran
Figure 7.5 Scores on the four higher-order values of voters and national and local
politicians.
Note: Groups with different letters (a, b, c) differ significantly (p < .05).
Cons = Conservation; S-Enh = Self-Enhancement; OpChg = Openness to Change; S-Tran =
Self-Transcendence.
The data reported in Figure 7.5 showed that basic values vary across the
three groups. Specifically, voters attributed higher importance to conserva-
tion values than the groups of politicians. This confirms the negative relations
found in the two studies by Vecchione et al. (2014) between political activism
and values that emphasize resistance to change, order, and self-restriction.
This also confirms data reported in Chapter 6, showing that Italian politicians
tend to be less concerned with security than ordinary voters.
As can also be seen from Figure 7.5, self-transcendence values were higher
among national and local politicians than among voters. This is in line with
the positive relations of activism with self-transcendence values found in the
two studies by Vecchione et al. (2014), as well as with the higher importance
that politicians attributed to universalism and benevolence with respect to
voters (see Chapter 6). Openness to change values were highest among local
politicians than among voters and national politicians. Self-enhancement val-
ues were not significantly different among groups.
With regard to core political values, data from the cross-cultural study by
Schwartz and colleagues (2013), to which we refer in Chapter 5, were used to
examine relations with political activism. The results are reported in Table 7.3.

TA B L E 7 . 3 . CORRELATIONS BETWEEN CORE POLITICAL VALUES AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN 15 COUNTRIES
Traditional Free Enterprise Military Blind Law and Civil Liberties Equality Acceptance of Economic
Morality Intervention Patriotism Order Immigrants Security
Australia –.15* –.24** –.16** –.25** –.31** .06 .22** .23** –.19**
(N = 285)
Brazil –.09** –.18** –.02 –.02 –.18** .07* .12** .07* –.13**
(N = 999)
Chile –.17** –.23** –.13** –.19** –.34** .10* .14** .22** –.10*
(N = 414)
Finland –.26** –.21** –.07 –.19** –.34** .12* .23** .17** –.16**
(N = 449)
Germany –.16** –.08** .00 –.16** –.20** — –.04 .22** –.14*
(N = 1,056)
Greece –.17** –.12* –.01 –.13* –.19** .09 .03 .14** –.12*
(N = 375)
Israel –.03 –.18** — –.08 –.16** –.09 .05 — –.02
(N = 478)
Italy –.23** –.19** –.22** –.17** –.34** .20** .18** .35** –.05
(N = 564)
Poland –.11** –.07 .04 –.03 –.12** .01 .02 .11** .00
(N = 709)
(continued)

TA B L E 7 . 3 . CONTINUED
Traditional Free Enterprise Military Blind Law and Civil Liberties Equality Acceptance of Economic
Morality Intervention Patriotism Order Immigrants Security
Slovakia .06 .02 .00 –.05 –.03 –.01 .00 .09 –.09*
(N = 487)
Spain –.19** –.12* –.06 –.16** –.22** .14** .03 .14** –.09
(N = 420)
Turkey –.20** –.10* –.15** –.28** –.24** .02 .09* –.03 –.10*
(N = 514)
Ukraine .00 –.04 .08* .04 –.05 –.01 .01 –.04 –.06
(N = 740)
UK –.25** –.32** –.02 –.26** –.31** .10* .19** .16** –.15**
(N = 471)
US .05 –.04 .04 –.12** –.19** .06 –.07 .21** .01
(N = 544)
Note: *p < .05; **p < .01.

Traditional morality, law and order, blind patriotism, and military interven-
tion tended to inhibit political activism, although with some variations across
countries. As discussed in Chapter 5, these political values are grounded in
Schwartz’s conservation values and, as such, conflict with openness to change
values. Free enterprise, which conflicts with universalism values, also inhib-
ited political activism. Equality, civil liberties, and accepting immigrants,
which are grounded in self-transcendence values, tend to facilitate political
activism. Thus, relations between basic personal values and political activism
seem to reflect their relations to basic values and the motivational compat-
ibilities among them.
Other studies have examined the relations of basic personal values with
trust in institutions, namely the confidence that people hold toward various
institutions, such as the educational, judicial, political, health care, media,
and economic systems, the army, the police, and religious institutions (Devos,
Spini, & Schwartz, 2002; Vecchione, Fida, & Barbaranelli, 2008). These stud-
ies suggest that the trade-off between conservation and openness to change
values may provide the main motivational underpinnings for trust in a broad
set of institutions.
Specifically, the importance assigned to security, conformity, and tradi-
tion was found to be positively related to trust in institutions. Indeed, main-
taining order and stability in society and preserving traditions and customs
are among the most important functions of institutions. Yet the degree to
which trust in institutions attests to their effective performance or whether
it primarily reflects the tendency to conform and comply with established
authorities and to justify the status quo, as suggested by the system justifica-
tion theory (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004), needs to be further clarified.
The importance assigned to openness to change values, and in particu-
lar to self-direction, was negatively related to trust in institutions. That citi-
zens who cherish self-emancipative values do not fully trust in institutions
that should promote the functioning of democracy could be worrying. The
extent to which the moderate levels of lack of trust in institutions of people
who value self-direction is due to their intolerance toward any institutional
restrictions, or to their high expectations regarding the role of institutions
in upholding and promoting those values, should also be clarified further.
Indeed, critical citizens are needed to make democracy function and grow,
although their demands may carry challenges that are difficult to handle.
As for traits, we examined the relations of basic values with interest in
politics, voter turnout, and trust in institutions in a sample of young Italian
adults (Table 7.4). Similar to what was found for active participation, interest
in politics was positively related to self-transcendence and negatively related

TA B L E 7 . 4 . CORRELATIONS OF SCHWARTZ’S HIGHER-ORDER VALUES WITH INTEREST IN POLITICS,
VOTING TURNOUT, AND TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS
Interest in Interest in Voting Voting Trust in Trust in

Politics 2004 Politics 2008 Turnout 2004 Turnout 2008 Institutions 2004 Institutions 2008
(N = 534) (N = 347) (N = 534) (N = 347) (N = 534) (N = 347)
Self-enhancement .04 .04 –.11* –.16** .03 .01

Conservation –.14** –.15** .01 –.02 .15** .05
Self-t ranscendence .15** .11* .14** .18** –.09 –.01
Openness to change –.02 .03 .00 .07 –.14** –.08
Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01.
Data are available from Caprara and Vecchione (unpublished report).

to conservation values, both concurrently and over time. These are also the
values most often related to ideological preferences. Indeed, we found that
right-wing and conservative voters are less interested in politics than left-
wing and liberal voters.
Voter turnout was moderately related to the trade- off between self-
transcendence and self-enhancement values. Correlations with trust in insti-
tutions substantially replicated results by Devos et al. (2002) and Vecchione
et al. (2008). Conservation values were positively related with trust in institu-
tions, whereas they related negatively to openness and value shifts. Although
these associations are rather moderate and tend to disappear over time, they
agree substantially with the system-justification theory (Jost et al., 2004). In
reality, we need to investigate thoroughly whether trust in the institutions
always reflects conservative priorities, or if belief in the pursuit of change
and self-transcendence may prove compatible with trust in the institu-
tions and prove to be not mere pipedreams, but factors crucial to the func-
tioning and growth of democracy.
POLITICAL EFFICACY
Among the mechanisms of personal agency, people’s beliefs in their ability to
exert control over their level of functioning and environmental demands have
been the target of broad investigation by scholars, who placed similar beliefs
at the root of human agency (Bandura, 1997, 2001). Thus, it is surprising that
most scholars of politics have paid little attention to the literature regarding
perceived self-efficacy, due to the fact that political efficacy became a popular
notion in the field of political science beginning in the early 1950s.
Campbell, Gurin, and Miller (1954) discussed the possibility of political
and social change, noting the role that individual citizens may play in bring-
ing about this change. Then, in 1959, Lane pointed to a sense of political effec-
tiveness resulting from feelings of mastery and control over oneself and the
environment that lead people to be more active in the political process. He
distinguished two components of political self-confidence, or self-efficacy, as
being related to citizens’ perceptions of themselves as effective and of demo-
cratic government as answering their demands. Since then, the distinction
between internal and external political efficacy has largely dominated the
literature, pointing to two components of people’s beliefs regarding the con-
tribution they make to change in society (Balch, 1974; Converse, 1972; Craig,
1979; Gurin & Brim, 1984).
Internal political efficacy has been referred to as personal beliefs regard-
ing the ability to achieve desired results in the political domain through

personal commitment and an efficient use of one’s own capacities and

resources. External political efficacy has been referred to as people’s beliefs
that the political system is receptive of citizens’ demands and amenable to
change through individual and collective influence.
Thus, a number of authors undertook studies to distinguish between
internal and external political efficacy. Some findings showed that internal
political efficacy plays an important role in promoting both conventional and
non-conventional forms of political participation (Abramson & Aldrich, 1982;
Finkel, 1985; Madsen 1987; Milbrath & Goel, 1977; Morrell, 2003; Pollock, 1983),
while others showed that internal political efficacy is correlated with per-
ceived competence and several indicators of civic commitment (Pinkleton &
Austin, 2001; Zimmerman,1989), as well as interest in politics (Cohen, Vigoda,
& Samorly, 2001; Craig & Maggiotto, 1982; Morrell, 2003). External political effi-
cacy has, instead, been found to be associated with general trust in the func-
tioning of the political system and institutions (Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 1991).
Despite the vast literature on political efficacy, few studies have addressed
the influence of self- efficacy beliefs related to political participation and
choices within the frame of a comprehensive theory of personality function-
ing. In this regard, social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986, 1997) embeds the
understanding of political action within a broad theory of human agency. In
so doing, it focuses on political perceived efficacy, namely on judgments that
people hold about their own capacities, and those of the collective entities to
which they belong, to perform effectively in the political domain. Indeed, it
would seem that people feel efficacious in politics, as in any other domain of
functioning, when they believe they can, either as an individual or as a part
of a collective entity, produce desired results by their actions.
Social cognitive theory allows us to go beyond the mere assessment of
political efficacy, since it is solidly grounded on knowledge concerning the
way personality functions and develops, and ultimately may guide interven-
tions aimed at enhancing people’s will and ability to contribute to the func-
tioning of democracy.
Perceived Political Self-efficacy

As previously stated in Chapter 3, a vast literature documents the pervasive
influence of perceived self-efficacy on cognition, motivation, learning, and
performance, and diverse lines of research bear documentary witness to the
role that self-efficacy beliefs exert in sustaining intellectual development,
social adjustment, and well-being, while promoting academic achievement,
work performance, and healthy habits. It would also seem that the judg-
ments people express concerning the possibility of being effective within the

realm of politics are critical of the need to devote time and effort to active
participation.
Being informed is a necessary condition for people to master the manifold
tasks and challenges of politics related to the different offices, responsibili-
ties, and contexts, although knowledge alone is not sufficient. Having a “good
understanding of political issues” and “being well informed,” for example,
do not measure whether one has the sense of mastery that is required to navi-
gate through politics and to influence political processes. One can be fully
informed on domestic and foreign policies but lack the capacity to voice one’s
own opinions to counter adversaries or to persuade potential followers. One
can also fully comprehend the machinery of governmental and representa-
tive systems but lack the confidence that is needed to influence them.
A defective sense of personal efficacy may nurture both feelings of dis-
tance and alienation, leading to disenchantment and ultimately to withdrawal
from any political commitment. In democratic systems, where the degree
of political participation ranges from voting to holding important political
office, political efficacy expresses itself across a variety of activities, from
campaigning, petitioning, fundraising, and mobilizing voters, to choosing
candidates, keeping in contact with one’s own representatives, lobbying, and
negotiating with other factions within one’s own party and with other par-
ties. Thus, political efficacy should be measured not only in terms of political
knowledge, but mostly in terms of belief that one can produce effects through
political action.
Following this reasoning, Caprara, Vecchione, Capanna, and Mebane
(2009) developed a way to measure perceived political self-efficacy (PPSE) in
accordance with Bandura’s guidelines (2006). We were aware that the political
domain is rather complex and that different sub-skills are required to address
successfully the diverse tasks, obligations, and challenges found at different
levels of involvement and responsibility. Thus, in conceiving this new scale,
we focused on one’s ability to voice opinions and preferences with a view
to contributing actively to the success of the parties that meet one’s ideals,
and exerting control over one’s representatives. The items of the PPSE scale
are reported in Table 7.5 (third panel from the top). For each item, partici-
pants were asked to evaluate how capable they felt in carrying out the action
or behavior on a Likert scale, from 1 (not at all) to 5 (completely). The table
includes also items developed by Campbell et al. (1954) and by Niemi et al.
(1991), which have been commonly used in the literature to assess internal
political efficacy (first two panels from the top).
An initial set of studies bore witness to the psychometric properties
of the PPSE scale, which revealed a one-dimensional structure. This also

TA B L E 7 . 5 . ITEMS AND INSTRUMENTS USED TO ASSESS BELIEFS

IN POLITICAL EFFICACY AND PERCEIVED POLITICAL EFFICACY
Political self-e fficacy: Campbell, Gurin, and Miller (1954)
1. People like me don’t have any say about what the government does.
2. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really
understand what’s going on.
3. I don’t think public officials care much what people like me think.
4. Voting is the only way that people like me can have any say about how the government
runs things.
Political self-e fficacy: Niemi, Craig, and Mattei (1991)
I consider myself well qualified to participate in politics.
I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our
country.
I feel I could do as good a job in public office as most other people.
I think that I am better informed about politics and government than most people.
Perceived political self-e fficacy: Caprara, Vecchione, Capanna, and Mebane (2009)
1. State your own political opinion openly, even in clearly hostile settings.
2. M ake certain that the political representatives you voted for honor their commitments to
the electorate.
3. Promote public initiatives to support political programs that you believe are just.
4. Maintain personal relationships with representatives of national government authorities.
5. Play a decisive role in the choice of the leaders of political movements to which you
belong, or to which you are near.
6. C arry out an effective information campaign for the political movement or party with
which you concur regarding beliefs and programs.
7. Actively promote the election of political candidates in whom you trust.
8. Promote effective activities of information and mobilization in your own community (of
work, friends, and family), to sustain political programs in which you believe.
9. Collect a substantial amount of money to sustain the activities of your party.
10. Use the means you have as a citizen to critically monitor the actions of your political
representatives.
Perceived political self-e fficacy of politicians: Caprara, Vecchione, D’Ercole and Zuffianò
(2014)
1. Fully master relevant issues, such as “security.”
2. R
ely on a well-established staff and a network of professional consultants, who are able to
offer qualified support on specific political issues.
3. Be up to date regarding the leanings of public opinion and voter trends.
4. Obtain information necessary for decision-making in parliament, even on matters that are
foreign to you.
5. Liaise with local authorities and/or various institutions to obtain extra-parliamentary
support.
6. Be aware of the economic and financial situation of your country within the framework of
the European Union.
7. Be an authoritative point of reference for your party regarding specific issues related to
your scientific and professional expertise.
8. Be fully respected by your opponents, despite differences of opinion.
Note: The scales by Campbell et al. (1960) and Niemi et al. (1991) ask respondents to agree or disagree with
each statement. The scales by Caprara et al. (2009, 2014) ask respondents to rate how confident they are in
their ability to execute the specific action or behavior described in each statement.

corroborated the hypothesis that self-efficacy beliefs about basic political

capacities can be traced to a common dimension rather similar to the internal
political efficacy of previous studies (Caprara et al., 2009). The measure met
the standard psychometric criteria of validity and reliability, and proved to
be a better predictor of political commitment than established measures of
internal political efficacy (Campbell et al., 1954; Niemi et al., 1991).
Italian politicians reported higher perceived political efficacy than politi-
cal activists who, in turn, reported higher political self-efficacy than voters
who were not political activists. This held regardless of the political orienta-
tion or ideology of the people involved. Political self-efficacy beliefs, indeed,
were uncorrelated with political choices and ideological orientation. Finally,
sociodemographic variables, such as gender, age, and education were found
to be associated with political activism in accordance with what was expected
on the basis of prior research (Milbrath & Goel, 1977; Verba & Nye, 1995; Verba,
Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). Males, higher educated, and middle-aged voters
all showed higher perceived political efficacy than females, less educated, and
young and older voters. Subsequent studies have examined the contribution
of perceived political self-efficacy to political participation while examining
the contribution of traits and values in order to clarify how these different
structures may operate in concert. For instance, we conducted two stud-
ies with the aim of investigating how traits and self-efficacy beliefs jointly
account for the commitment found in a number of behavior patterns related
to political involvement, such as taking part in political demonstrations, dis-
tributing leaflets, contacting one’s elected representatives, donating money to
a political association, or working for a political party. Results revealed that
energy/extraversion and openness correlated positively with political self-
efficacy (Vecchione & Caprara, 2009).
A structural equation model was tested to examine whether efficacy
beliefs mediated the relation between traits and political participation. Data
for this study were collected in Genzano, Italy, at two measurement points.
Traits were measured through mothers’ ratings in 1998, when participants
were aged 13–16 years. Political self-efficacy beliefs and political participation
were assessed six years later in 2004. Results corroborated a pattern of influ-
ences in which political self-efficacy beliefs directly contribute to political
participation, fully mediating the effect of traits. After the effects of sociode-
mographic variables were controlled for, however, only energy/extraversion
remained a significant distal predictor of adult political participation (see
Vecchione & Caprara, 2009).
The findings just reported suggest that personality traits may provide the
potential for political activity. Traits, however, do not necessarily turn into

political action. Personality dispositions are not sufficient to ensure that peo-
ple will invest their talents and virtues in politics, unless properly equipped
for the political arena. In other words, people can be extremely energetic and
open-minded, but it is unlikely that they will become actively involved in
politics unless they feel capable of doing what politics requires.
Data from an unpublished study conducted in Italy also showed that
political self-efficacy beliefs are correlated with basic personal values. The
pattern of correlations was similar to the one between values and political
participation. Specifically, correlations were positive with openness toward
change and power values, and negative toward conservation. However, most
correlations were weak and tended to disappear once the Big Five were taken
in account.
This lead us to conclude that (a) basic traits represent distal predictors,
which may predispose people to actively engage in politics; (b) basic val-
ues not only contribute to political preference, but also to political activism;
(c) political self-efficacy beliefs mostly affect political activism; and (d) basic
values and self-efficacy beliefs mediate the influence that basic dispositions
exert on political preferences and activism, respectively. This pattern of rela-
tions is represented in Figure 7.6.
Dispositions tell us much about inherited potentials, as values tell us
much about socialization processes and personal appropriation of values.
However, neither behavioral dispositions nor value priorities can turn into
attainments unless assisted by the capabilities and mastery beliefs that are
required to sustain motivation and to realize people’s efforts.
Self-efficacy beliefs, in particular, are instrumental in channeling dispo-
sitions and in sustaining values through mastery experiences. Social cogni-
tive theory has shown how mastery experiences lead to the generation and
Core Political
Basic
Political Preference
Values
Values
Personality
Traits
Self-efficacy Political
Beliefs Activism
Figure 7.6 The paths from personality dispositions to political preference and

activism.

strengthening of self-efficacy beliefs, through imitation, practice, and the

exercise of self-regulation, thanks to humans’ capacity to reflect and capi-
talize upon one’s own and others’ experience. This has been documented
across domains of functioning where the development of mastery beliefs has
enabled people to deal with demands, opportunities, and challenges that pre-
viously were precluded (Bandura, 1997).
Similarly, social cognitive theory provides directions on how to make the
best use of personality potential and on which values one can achieve desir-
able outcomes in politics. We are not aware of any intervention aimed at pro-
moting political self-efficacy, but we have no reason to doubt that the same
procedures that proved successful for school attainments, work performance,
sport achievement, and health promotion would also promote political, civic,
and political efficacy.
Recently, we focused on the activities that legislators should be able to
handle, and this led us to reassess political efficacy. It is probable that the
qualities that make attractive and successful politicians are quite stable and
do not significantly change across polities. In previous chapters we have
referred to competence and accountability, which in turn require intelligence
and openness, no less than sympathy and agreeableness.
The activities that politicians have to be able to master, however, may
change significantly across political offices and time. Thus, we developed a
new measure by which to assess self-efficacy beliefs in politicians returned to
the Italian Parliament after the 2013 general elections.5 This measure showed
a one-dimensional structure, like the PPSE scale, and adequate levels of inter-
nal consistency. Moreover, it correlated significantly with Niemi et al.’s (1991)
measure of internal efficacy (r = .32, p < .01), and with the PPSE scale (r = .45,
p < .01).
The scale correlated positively with three of the Big Five, namely energy/
extraversion (r = .39, p < .01), conscientiousness (r = .34, p < .01), and openness
(r = .44, p < .01). However, only energy/extraversion and openness made a
unique contribution in predicting politician’s self-efficacy beliefs.
The items of the scale are reported in Table 7.5 (lower panel). Here, the
diversities of perceived self-efficacy scales with regard to previous scales are
quite clear, as is the higher specificity of the politicians’ version compared to
the previous version of the perceived self-efficacy scale, which was designed
to assess citizens’ political commitment. To manage a dedicated team of sup-
porters able to create links and bonds with the electorate and with other poli-
ticians and to supply knowledge on the most diverse fields of political action
require leadership capacities that are crucial for the success of legislators.
These capacities go far beyond the political capacities needed by voters and

partisans. Ultimately, one may easily appreciate the discriminatory power of

measures designed to tap specific and contextualized political activities. This
is particularly relevant in view of interventions aimed to develop the abili-
ties that are particularly needed to meet successfully the demands of political
offices.
Perceived Collective Efficacy and Trust

Political efficacy not only rests on judgments that people hold about their
unique capacities to make things happen, but also on judgments that people
hold about other citizens’ capacities to operate in concert in the pursuit of
common goals, and on the effectiveness of government. A comprehensive
assessment of political efficacy, therefore, should address both citizens’ per-
ceived self-efficacy and their beliefs about the efficacy of the entire political
system (Bandura, 1997; Lee, 2005; Yeich & Levin, 1994). Understanding the role
that such beliefs have in the political process also requires a broad perspec-
tive that is able to bridge individual and collective level of analyses.
When people participate in politics, they are aware, to varying degrees,
that they are contributing to a collaborative enterprise in which individual
choices are turned into collective outcomes. Yet it is unlikely that differ-
ent views and interests turn into effective collective action unless they are
sustained by individually perceived efficacy and by shared beliefs in their
conjoint capabilities to organize and execute the course of actions required
to produce given levels of attainment. In reality, common goals and confi-
dence in one’s own and others’ capacities are needed to turn individuals’
self-efficacy into a shared sense of collective efficacy. In this regard, social
cognitive theory extends the conception of agentic causality to collective
agency and provides a framework for the study of both personal and col-
lective efficacy (Bandura, 1997).
Unlike individual efficacy, collective efficacy involves interactive, coor-
dinative, and synergetic social dynamics. Individuals pool their knowledge,
competencies, and resources, provide mutual support, form alliances, and
work together to solve problems and improve the quality of their lives. While
political self-efficacy is derived from individuals’ unique experiences, per-
ceived collective efficacy is an emergent property of groups and social system
that goes beyond the mere aggregation of perceived individual efficacies.
Mutual interdependencies between individuals’ and collective efficacy
beliefs are obvious, although the direction of influence may vary across situ-
ations. On one hand, social or collective agency can be an important deter-
minant of individuals’ sense of political efficacy to the extent that personal

efficacy beliefs are rooted in specific group-based social identities and ideolo-
gies. Membership in certain groups and social categories, in fact, may imply
different experiences and life conditions, which may affect individual political
self-efficacy. People of disadvantaged minorities, for example, are less likely
to feel politically efficacious, given their distance and detachment from the
major sources of social influence. In contrast, people with high educational
and occupational status are better informed and integrated in the community
(Cohen et al., 2001), and have more social, financial, and cognitive resources
to meet the challenges of politics (Harder & Krosnick, 2008; Rosenstone &
Hansen, 1993). On the other hand, people’s beliefs that they can reach collec-
tive attainments is, to a large extent, grounded in the perceived self-efficacy
of each individual member contributing to the collective endeavor. Although
perceived collective efficacy is an emergent group-level attribute, one cannot
easily create a strong collective force from members who are overwhelmed by
a profound feeling of personal inefficacy.
In any case, one should not expect that individuals’ perceived political
self-efficacy will automatically turn into a shared sense of collective efficacy
among members of the parties or movements to which they belong. Likewise,
one should not expect that perceived collective efficacy of parties will auto-
matically turn into a general sense of efficacy through the entire political
system.
Rather, one should warn against the undesirable effects of perceived
self-efficacy disjointed from perceived collective efficacy, as well as against
the perceived collective efficacy of competing groups that pursue opposite
aims. According to a number of different combinations of high and low lev-
els of perceived individual self-efficacy and perceived collective efficacy of
the political system, four types of responses to politics may be identified (see
Figure 7.7). A poor sense of political self-efficacy may lead to passive com-
pliance or withdrawal from politics, conditional to one’s sense of collective
efficacy. Strong trust in one’s own political self-efficacy may lead to engaging
in political action, either to strengthen or to overthrow the entire political
system, depending on the level of confidence in one’s group collective efficacy
and trust in the functioning of the entire system.
Among issues that still need to be addressed, the relations between indi-
vidual and collective perceived efficacy, as well as between perceived self-
efficacy beliefs and trust, deserve special attention. Unfortunately, empirical
findings to this regard are meager, but we are able to refer to findings drawn
from two unpublished studies. The first was undertaken by Cristina Capanna
as part of her doctoral dissertation, the second from the previously mentioned
longitudinal study carried out in Genzano.

Low Political High Political

Self-Efficacy Self-Efficacy
Low Collective
Efficacy
Indifference/ Unconventional
Apathy Activism/
Protest
High Collective
Efficacy
Subordination/ Conventional
Compliance Activism
Figure 7.7 Four types of responses to politics, based on high or low levels of per-
ceived individual and collective political efficacy.
Adapted from Bandura (1997).
The study by Capanna examined the relations between individual per-

ceived self-efficacy and collective perceived efficacy. The author posited a
conceptual model in which individuals’ perceived self-efficacy contributes to
a perception of efficacy of the collective system to which they belong, both
directly and through their perceptions of how its major constituencies are
perceived as fulfilling their roles correctly.6
Capanna hypothesized, in particular, that the perceived efficacy of both
government and opposition parties would act as mediating variables between
citizens’ perceived political self-efficacy and collective efficacy beliefs. The
model fit the data better than alternative models, although the amount of vari-
ance accounted for was moderate. Socioeconomic status affected perceived
political self-efficacy positively. It also affected belief in collective political
efficacy, but only moderately. Mostly, the perception of efficacy of govern-
ments affected the perception citizens had of the efficacy of the political sys-
tem as a whole, thus mediating the impact of individual self-efficacy beliefs.
A second, longitudinal study was conducted on 560 Italian young adults
in order to investigate the contribution of political self-efficacy and collec-
tive efficacy beliefs (both measured in 2004) to trust in politics and political

Trust in
.11 Politics
2008
.15
Perceived Collective
Political Political .28
Self-Efficacy .29 Self-Efficacy
2004 2004
Political
.21 Participation
2008
Figure 7.8 Paths of influence from individual and collective efficacy beliefs to trust
in politics and political participation.
activism (measured in 2008). As shown in Figure 7.8, individual’s efficacy

beliefs affected perceived collective efficacy, in accordance with findings
reported earlier. Moreover, individuals’ efficacy beliefs affected later politi-
cal participation and, although to a lesser extent, trust in politics. Collective
efficacy, by contrast, exerted a direct effect on trust in politics, but the effect
on political participation was not significant.
GENDER EQUALIZATION
Political activity has traditionally been seen as a male preserve. Among
established democracies, France and Italy recognized women’s right to vote
only after World War II, in 1945 and 1946, respectively, while Swiss women
achieved the franchise in 1971. Even in democracies like the United States
and the United Kingdom, where females were granted the right to vote much
earlier, women voted less than men and were largely reluctant and unwilling
to play an active role in politics.
The status of women in politics, however, underwent profound changes in
the last decades, first in northern Europe and then across all Western democ-
racies to the extent that most would agree that no other social attitude has
undergone such a rapid transformation toward equalization as that regard-
ing gender. This occurred despite strong obstacles against equal treatment of
males and females within the family, at school, and at work, and despite the
many resistances that still persist.
Likewise, few would now disagree that women can perform as well as
men in politics and may thus aspire to top leadership positions, despite the
underrepresentation of women in most parliamentary assemblies and in top

political positions (Tremblay, 2012). On the other hand, it is difficult to assess

with any certainty the impact of the growing presence of women in posi-
tions of power across all domains of society—politics, business, education,
and science—since this transformation is ongoing. We can, however, provide
the example of Italy, where, in less than 20 years, the percentage of women in
the National Parliament has tripled, rising from less than 10% at the turn of
the twentieth century to over 30% today. Likewise, the percentage of females
occupying positions of political leadership at regional and municipal levels
has also been increasing.
Such variations in the percentages of women in relevant political offices
may have strong implications with regard to the depth of changes and to the
kind of effects one may expect from a more extended female representation. In
particular, one may expect significant changes if one believes that a higher pres-
ence of women will inevitably bring different sensitivities, priorities, and styles
to politics. This, however, rests upon one assumption (namely, that females are
different from males) and upon one condition (namely, that the presence of
females should reach a certain critical mass in order to balance the major influ-
ence males have exerted thus far by dictating the rules in the game of politics).
The assumption that males and females are different may be difficult to
reject, but what seems to be a matter of everybody’s intuition becomes con-
tentious when one has to say exactly how males and females differ, and par-
ticularly whether there are any substantial differences in their psychological
makeup and functioning.
Psychological research has not yet produced any conclusive knowledge
regarding sex differences, despite the manifold number of studies on a great
variety of populations addressing the most relevant features of affect, cog-
nition, motivation, and personality. Among the differences that have been
reported, we are unable to determine how much is due to nature, how much
to nurture, and how much to their interrelationship. As regards the features
of personality that have been related to political preference and participation,
namely traits, values, and self-confidence, at present we have data that allow
some inconclusive conjectures, at best.
Regarding the Big Five, Costa, Terracciano, and McCrae (2001) have
reported data from 26 cultures (N = 23,031) where females scored signifi-
cantly higher than males in agreeableness and neuroticism (the opposite pole
of emotional stability). Concerning basic values, Schwartz and Rubel (2005)
have reported data from 127 samples in 70 countries (N = 77,528) showing that
males attribute more importance than females to power, stimulation, hedo-
nism, achievement, and self-direction values, while females attributed more
importance to benevolence and universalism than males.

For both traits and values, variations within sexes were larger than
between sexes. Furthermore, the magnitude of gender differences was mod-
erated by culture and was largely consistent with gender stereotypes. Most
females are found to be inclined to be sensitive and caring, while assign-
ing more importance to basic values focused on the welfare of others. Most
males are found to be inclined to be dominant and competitive, assigning
more importance to self-centered values. One should note, however, that the
studies discussed here were carried out over 10 years ago, and that changes
in gender attitudes and stereotypes occur constantly, especially among the
youth.
Regarding self-esteem, a meta-analytic review on 216 samples (N = 97,121)
provides evidences that males tend to score slightly higher than females
on standard measures of general self-esteem, especially in late adolescence
(Kling, Hyde, Showers, & Buswell, 1999). When gender differences were exam-
ined with respect to specific domains (Gentile et al., 2009), males were found
to have higher levels of self-esteem, especially concerning themselves as a
person, their personality, physical appearance, and athletic ability. Females,
by contrast, exhibited higher scores on behavioral conduct and moral-ethical
self-esteem. No significant differences were found in other domains of self-
esteem, such as affect, academic performance, social acceptance, and familial
relationships.
Regarding positivity, meta-analytic data are not yet available. A review
of existing studies, however, gave inconsistent results: Caprara, Caprara,
and Steca (2003) found a slightly higher score on positivity for men than for
women, while Alessandri et al. (2012b) and Caprara et al. (2012) found no gen-
der differences.
Findings from our studies in Italy and in other countries corroborate these
differences only in part. The extent to which gender differences hold in per-
sonality traits among Italian voters and politicians of opposite coalitions can
be seen in Table 7.6. Among both left-and right-wing Italian voters, women
tend to score higher than men on agreeableness and lower in emotional stabil-
ity. Similar gender differences were found among left-and right-wing Italian
politicians, although most differences were not significant, likely due to the
reduced size of the sample.
Table 7.7 shows the extent to which gender differences hold in basic
values among Italian voters and politicians of opposite coalitions. Among
voters, females assign more importance to benevolence and universalism val-
ues than do males, while males assign more importance to power than do
females. However, the observed differences are small and do not alter the
hierarchical order of values, which remains substantially the same across

TA B L E 7 . 6 . GENDER DIFFERENCES IN THE BIG FIVE TRAITS BETWEEN LEFT-AND RIGHT-WING ITALIAN VOTERS
AND POLITICIANS
Italian Voters Italian Politicians
Left-Wing Right-Wing Left-Wing Right-Wing
M F M F M F M F
n = 760 n = 952 n = 683 n = 641 n = 71 n = 71 n = 55 n = 36
Energy/Extraversion 3.19 (.53) 3.15 (.50) 3.26 (.52) 3.23 (.53) 3.38 (.48) 3.37 (.51) 3.61 (.43) 3.54 (.46)
Agreeableness 3.33** (.48) 3.49** (.48) 3.20** (.49) 3.33** (.51) 3.60* (.45) 3.84* (.36) 3.62 (.46) 3.55 (.35)
Conscientiousness 3.53 (.54) 3.52 (.54) 3.58 (.55) 3.59 (.56) 3.63 (.58) 3.64 (.61) 3.77 (.55) 3.68 (.61)
Emotional stability 3.03** (.71) 2.79** (.68) 3.04** (.70) 2.75** (.73) 3.31 (.71) 3.15 (.70) 3.30 (.78) 3.19 (.54)
Openness 3.57 (.59) 3.53 (.61) 3.45 (.58) 3.40 (.60) 3.79 (.54) 3.99 (.45) 3.81 (.48) 3.64 (.67)
Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01. Standard deviations are provided within parentheses.

TA B L E 7 . 7 . GENDER DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LEFT-AND RIGHT-WING ITALIAN VOTERS AND POLITICIANS
ACCORDING TO SCHWARTZ’S BASIC VALUES SYSTEM
Voters Politicians
Left-Wing Right-Wing Left-Wing Right-Wing
M F M F M F M F
n = 759 n = 951 n = 682 n = 639 n = 107 n = 87 n = 63 n = 40
Security 4.20** (1.11) 4.37** (1.00) 4.57 (.94) 4.66 (.96) 3.56** (1.11) 2.99** (1.12) 4.37 (.91) 4.43 (1.17)
Tradition 3.43** (1.07) 3.62** (1.18) 3.63** (1.08) 3.83** (.11) 3.86** (.96) 3.17** (1.17) 4.08 (1.11) 4.03 (.82)
Conformity 3.66 (1.12) 3.67 (1.07) 3.90 (1.04) 3.87 (1.10) 3.72 (1.07) 3.44 (1.22) 4.34 (1.00) 4.06 (1.08)
Benevolence 4.62** (.86) 4.86** (.88) 4.48** (.94) 4.71** (.88) 4.74 (.88) 5.06 (.77) 4.74 (.99) 5.18 (.85)
Universalism 4.77* (.79) 4.86* (.77) 4.43** (.87) 4.56** (.81) 5.02 (.62) 5.14 (.60) 4.63 (.79) 4.76 (.81)
Self-direction 4.22 (.96) 4.26 (.98) 4.17 (.95) 4.24 (.93) 4.04 (.89) 4.39 (1.01) 4.15 (1.02) 4.71 (.98)
Stimulation 3.49** (1.11) 3.30** (1.12) 3.52** (1.14) 3.29** (1.13) 3.51 (1.06) 3.41 (1.16) 3.70 (1.16) 3.69 (1.28)
Hedonism 3.55 (1.21) 3.48 (1.25) 3.74** (1.18) 3.50** (1.22) 2.79 (1.17) 2.61 (1.21) 2.98 (1.27) 2.75 (1.13)
Achievement 3.53 (1.18) 3.43 (1.27) 3.72 (1.20) 3.61 (1.22) 3.49 (1.14) 3.31 (1.13) 3.79 (1.16) 3.90 (1.42)
Power 2.82** (1.10) 2.56** (1.04) 3.18** (1.16) 2.89** (1.09) 2.54 (.95) 2.39 (.83) 2.92 (1.16) 3.15 (1.11)
Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01. Standard deviations are provided within parentheses.

genders. Benevolence and universalism have high importance for both males
and females, while power is the least important value for both genders.
Gender differences in benevolence and universalism found among voters
replicate what has been found among politicians, although differences were
not statistically significant due to the small size of the samples. While left-
wing politicians assign less importance to tradition and security than right-
wing politicians, the importance assigned to these values is higher among
male than female politicians of the left. Voters and politicians of both genders
and ideologies assign the highest importance to self-direction.
Table 7.8 extends this analysis to left (or liberal) and right (or conservative)
voters from 14 countries around the world. As can be seen, females assign
more importance to benevolence and less importance to power than males in
most countries.
TA B L E 7 . 8 . GENDER DIFFERENCES IN BASIC VALUES BETWEEN LEFT-

AND RIGHT-WING VOTERS OF 14 COUNTRIES
Left-Wing Right-Wing
Australia • Benevolence: F = 4.65; M = 4.34; —

Brazil • Benevolence: F =4.96; M =4.68; • Benevolence: F = 5.02; M = 4.60;
• Universalism: F = 4.89; M = 4.39;
Chile • Benevolence: F = 4.92; M = 5.16; • Benevolence: F =5.21; M = 4.93;
• Power: F =3.00; M = 3.72;
Finland • Benevolence: F =4.76; M = 4.51; • Benevolence: F =4.78; M = 4.38;
Germany — • Benevolence: F = 5.22; M = 4.89;
• Power: F = 3.39; M = 3.00;
Greece • Security: F = 4.00; M = 4.45; • Benevolence: F = 4.93; M = 4.40;
Israel • Power: F = 3.06; M = 3.52; • Tradition: F = 2.92; M = 2.33;
Poland — —
Slovakia • Security: F = 4.67; M = 4.31; —
• Power: F = 2.88; M = 3.67;
Spain • Benevolence: F =5.04; M = 4.75; • Achievement: F =3.30; M = 4.16;
• Power: F =2.97; M = 3.60;
Turkey • Benevolence: F = 5.17; M = 4.99; —
• Power: F =3.58; M = 4.06;
Ukraine • Benevolence: F = 4.26; M = 3.96; • Benevolence: F =4.35; M = 3.96;
• Power: F = 3.30; M = 3.58; • Conformity: F = 4.20; M = 3.89;
• Universalism: F = 4.25; M = 4.00;
U.K. • Universalism: F = 4.79; M = 4.49; —
U.S. • Benevolence: F =4.72; M =4.36; • Power F =3.28; M = 3.71;
Notes: **p < .01; *p < .05. Only significant differences were reported. These data were provided by
Caprara and Vecchione (unpublished report).

TAB L E 7 . 9 . GENDER DIFFERENCES IN CORE POLITICAL VALUES

BETWEEN LEFT-AND RIGHT-WING VOTERS OF 14 COUNTRIES
Left-Wing Right-Wing
M F M F
n = 2,671 n = 2,671 n = 1,200 n = 1,336
Traditional Morality 3.09 (.96) 3.09 (.96) 3.56 (.85) 3.47 (.91)
Free Enterprise 2.55 (.94) 2.52 (.88) 2.97 (.94) 2.86 (.86)
Military Intervention 2.30** (.97) 2.18** (.92) 2.72** (.98) 2.43** (.96)
Blind Patriotism 2.33 (1.02) 2.33 (.98) 2.72 (1.04) 2.62 (.99)
Law and Order 2.67 (.94) 2.68 (.92) 3.05 (.83) 3.00 (.84)
Civic Liberties 3.90 (.78) 3.87 (.76) 3.72 (.76) 3.74 (.76)
Equality 3.98 (.80) 4.03 (.77) 3.67 (.86) 3.76 (.81)
Accepting Immigrants 3.44 (.92) 3.48 (.87) 3.14 (.90) 3.16 (.84)
Economic Security 3.30 (1.06) 3.20 (1.04) 3.43 (.95) 3.32 (.95)
Note: **p < .01. Standard deviations are provided within parentheses.
Table 7.9 shows the extent to which gender differences hold in core politi-
cal values of left (or liberal) and right (or conservative) voters of 14 countries.
Data, combined across countries, showed that males tend to score higher on
military intervention, which is also the core political value with which people
tend to exhibit the lowest degree of agreement on average.
Figures 7.9a and 7.9b report findings from an Italian study (Caprara
et al., 2009) that demonstrated significant gender differences in political
self-efficacy among left-and right-wing politicians, partisans and voters. As
can be observed, males tend to outperform females on political self-efficacy
beliefs, although differences were not always significant.
Gender differences were also examined with regard to the positivity
of Italian politicians. Unfortunately, the limited size of the sample did not
allow us to examine these differences separately for left-and right-wing par-
ticipants. No gender differences were found in the overall score, nor in single
items of the positivity scale, which represent specific indicators of satisfaction
with life, optimism, and self-regard.
It is probable that most of these differences concern gender and status
rather than sex, and one might be tempted to add that these differences
are due to social and cultural expectations and stereotypes rather than to
nature. In reality, current epigenetic studies warn us against rigid distinction
between nature and nurture since genetic expression is largely conditioned
by the environment from the very beginning of life, while sex still matters in

(a) Males Females

4.5
3.5
2.5
1.5
Politicians Holding Office Partisans Voters
Left-Wing Participants
Males Females
4.5
3.5
2.5
1.5
Politicians Holding Office Partisans Voters
Right-Wing Participants
Figure 7.9 Gender differences in political self-efficacy among left-wing and right-

wing Italian politicians, partisans, and voters. Data from Caprara et al. (2009).
predisposing men and women differently to hold a variety of activities and

social functions due to their different physiology.
Whatever the ultimate sources of differences in traits and values might
be, it is accepted that they can have significant implications for the predis-
position of males and females to take different roles within the family, at
work, and in politics. Traits and values, in fact, largely account for behavioral
tendencies, attitudes, and motivations, and ultimately for how people relate
to each other. Politics has been an arena where masculine traits and values,

like dominance and power, have been traditionally rewarded. This is corrob-
orated from findings, as discussed earlier, showing the higher importance
given to power and military intervention by men than by women. The lower
perceived political efficacy of women when compared with men (among vot-
ers, activists, and politicians) may further corroborate the belief that politics
is predominantly a male activity. Thus one may wonder about the extent to
which the higher agreeableness, benevolence, and universalism of women
would be welcome. Some would argue that more empathy and sympathy
would help to humanize politics and to promote democracy. Others would
contend that their higher emotional sensitivity makes women less suited to
the fights and stressful negotiations of politics. Following this line of think-
ing, it is not surprising to find that in polities where female legislators have
been given special political mandates, they are usually confined to dealing
with issues that typically require compassion and caring, such as education,
health, and social services.
The exemplars of female successful leadership in top positions have not
been lacking, from Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom and Angela
Merkel in Germany to Indira and Sonia Gandhi in India. Yet women continue
to be significantly underrepresented in parliamentary assemblies and even
more so in leadership positions, including the oldest democracies, like the
United Kingdom and the United States. Indeed, there has always been a kind
of disjuncture between women and the notion of power. This disjuncture in
the context of politics has been seen to mirror that found within the family
and at work, and which has continued to be reiterated through the socializa-
tion of children, despite laudable and manifold attempts to reduce the tradi-
tional gender gap (Bandura & Bussey, 2004).
With the rise of women in politics, the media have often contributed to
amplifying stereotypes and to producing new patterns of gender inequal-
ity (Norris, 1997; Srebeny & van Zoonen, 2000). While female leadership has
often been the target of criticism by colleagues, either for being too lenient
and feminine or for being too assertive and masculine, the media have ampli-
fied the difficult compatibility between qualities traditionally associated with
women and those traditionally associated with leadership. Nevertheless, the
increasing presence of women in parliamentary assemblies and in leadership
positions can be taken as a sign that new styles of making politics and prac-
ticing democracy that are more consonant with the demand of contemporary
societies are starting to happen (Campus, 2013; Eagly & Carli, 2007; Inglehart
& Norris, 2003, Kellerman & Rhode, 2007).
Indeed, as we have seen in Chapter 5, agreeableness, which is a trait on
which females habitually score higher than males, is among the personality

characteristics that citizens appreciate most in a politician. Likewise, benevo-

lence and universalism are among the values to which citizens of most coun-
tries assign more importance, as well as the values to which females assign
more importance than males. Our studies have registered only marginal
gender differences in self-direction, also among the values that people value
most and which are associated with economic progress and a functioning
democracy.
All the preceding leads us to conclude that similarities between males
and females are far more prevalent than differences. There are differences,
but it is unlikely that they are fixed since they vary across people and cultures
and can change, although males and females seem to be differently inclined
toward being caring and nurturing, namely to being sensitive and taking care
of others. Whatever might be the source of gender differences in agreeable-
ness, emotionality, and benevolence, all aspects of personality that one may
trace to Communion, women have proved to be as well-equipped as males
in openness and self-direction, which one may trace to Agency. This is sup-
ported by the extraordinary achievements of women throughout history, and
in particular by the prominent role played by women in education, science,
and professions that were the monopoly of males until very recently. Females
of a traditional country, like Italy, outperform males in academic achievement
and gradually outnumber males in leading positions of vital sectors of society
like health, education, and justice.
In politics, women have been often given an ancillary role, being appointed
by males and being confined to secondary roles. Hopefully, as more women
enter politics, there will be sufficient numbers to affirm their own person-
alities and styles, rather than having to accommodate those of their male
colleagues.
We believe that gender equalization might lead to changes in political
styles from which all politics, and thus democracy, can benefit. We therefore
agree with Campus’s claim (2013) that de-gendering the debate on leadership
would help to delineate a model of political leadership that may take the best
from both men and women. However, numbers still matter: being a minority
does not help a different voice to be heard. In addition, individual qualities
are not likely to overcome powerful barriers. Such barriers are only broken
down through profound institutional reforms enabled by law to dismantle
the stereotypes and prejudices operating against treating males and females
as equally adept at and necessary for politics. Indeed, to grant equal quotas
of representative political positions to males and females may help to balance
gender presence and influence in political assemblies, and set the conditions

for the recruitment and development of the best people from society to make
democracy function, regardless of gender (Norris, 2007).
CONCLUSIONS
Democracy requires the active participation of its citizens, and to this end
citizens should be enabled to know about politics, to voice their opinions, and
to properly choose their representatives. Democratic functioning, in fact, rests
upon citizens’ active commitment no less than upon competent and account-
able politicians.
Citizens should be properly initiated into politics as part of their civic edu-
cation to acquire the knowledge that is needed to understand and to appropri-
ate the values at the core of civic life and of democratic institutions. Schools,
peers, and the media join families as powerful agents of political socializa-
tion, more than before. Early experiences of volunteering that children have at
school and within their communities can be viewed as important precursors
of political involvement, while developing the level of children’s social capital
may further contribute to sustaining their motivations.
As both civic and political commitment should be properly nurtured in
the pursuit of the betterment of social life, it is crucial to know which psycho-
logical structures most account for the motivations conducive to individuals
being proactive in society and in politics, and then to understand how they
operate and how they can be properly developed.
In this regard, individual differences in personality have been shown
to play an important role in predisposing citizens for active commitment
in social activities and in moderating the influence of social environments.
Traits and motives are the forerunners of both preference and action, values
turn inclinations and motives into political preferences and belief into self-
efficacy, attesting to the skills required to sustain the desire to take an active
role in politics.
Findings have shown the crucial role of traits, like energy/extraversion
and openness, in fostering political participation, as well as demonstrating
the influence of self-direction and universalism among basic values. However,
neither dispositions nor basic values are sufficient to motivate citizens to
take an active role in politics unless accompanied by a sense of mastery with
regard to the skills required for success in politics. As these skills derive from
experience and may change in relation to the different levels and the different
offices of a political career, instruments and interventions should be devised
and implemented for their assessment and development, respectively.

Much remains to be learned regarding how to connect active participa-

tion to the functioning of social institutions and government when this rests
upon the concerted actions of citizens. In this regard, democratic collective
efficacy requires diffused political skills, common values and purpose, as
well as the confidence of people that their fellow citizens and politicians are
politically competent and accountable.
Psychological research may help to identify and develop the qualities
of personality needed to uphold various forms of political commitment.
Likewise, it may help to identify and implement the actions needed to over-
come traditional barriers in attitudes and habits that have precluded large
segments of society from taking an active role in politics.
As there is no reason to view politics as a gendered activity, to balance
the presence of males and females in major parliamentary assemblies and
governing councils may represent an opportunity to enable politics to take
advantage of the psychological capital of all members of society.
NOTES
1. Locus of control (Rotter, 1966) refers to an inclination on the part of indi-

viduals to attribute internal causes (e.g., personal effort, ability) or exter-
nal factors (e.g., luck, fate) to personal life events or to external factors (e.g.,
luck, fate).
2. The data for Spain and Chile were provided by two unpublished studies. We
are grateful to Jose Luis Gonzalez Castro and Jorge Manzi for making these
data available to us.
3. Findings from cross-cultural, twin studies corroborated the one-dimensionality
of the scale and the high heritability of the tendency. As already stated in
Chapter 3, the felicitous impact of positivity has been found across different
functional domains, like health, job performance, psychological well-being,
and social adjustment. Little residual variance was due to its principal expres-
sions, namely self-esteem, satisfaction with life, and optimism, once their com-
mon component was placed under control. This, however, does not exclude
that self-
esteem, optimism, and satisfaction with one’s life are worthy of
consideration, since they may play a uniquely important role within various
domains.
4. The data on voters and national politicians are those included in Chapter 5.
Data concerning local politicians were kindly made available by Donata
Francescato.
5. To this end, preliminary interviews were carried out with several Italian poli-
ticians in accordance with the critical-incidents technique in order to identify
the most demanding and challenging tasks politicians should be able to handle

in order to be successful in politics. These tasks were described in a vast set

of items that were phrased according to the instructions given by Bandura in
his “Guide to the Construction of Self-Efficacy Scales” (Bandura, 2006). After a
preliminary screening, the 8 items with the best psychometric properties were
selected and included in the final version of the scale.
6. This model was originally implemented in schools and other organizations
to assess how perceived self-efficacy and perceived efficacy of major organi-
zational components contribute to the construction of beliefs regarding per-
ceived collective efficacy (Caprara, 2013).

CHAPTER 8
A Congruency Model of Political Behavior
THE PARADOX OF VOTING

In modern democracies, voting is the habitual procedure by means of which
citizens voice their opinions and influence politics through their choices.
Voting permits citizens to express their ideological preferences regard-
ing how society should be governed and to legitimize the power of their
representatives.
Although voting is a minimal form of political commitment, voter turn-
out, under conditions of free and competitive elections, has been tradition-
ally viewed as a critical indicator of the healthy functioning of a democratic
system. For example, more than half a century ago, Allport (1945) referred to
low turnout rates as a blemish on democracy. Nevertheless, as democracy has
aged, it has not led to an increase of voter participation in most countries. On
the contrary, decreasing voter turnout has become a feature commonly found
in democracies during the last few decades. Even in the United States, with
its long-established democratic institutions and the enormous progress it has
made in the direction of greater equality of civil rights, until the most recent
presidential elections, turnout rates have remained as low as when Allport
bemoaned them. And the United States is not alone. In other long-standing
democracies, such as France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom, turnout rates have dropped by an average of 15% between the
1960s and the present (Delwit, 2013; Franklin, 2004; Institute for Democracy
and Electoral Assistance, 2002).
This trend may be a cause for concern, but it should not necessarily be
viewed as a blemish on democracy. Indeed, the meaning of varying rates of
voter turnout across time and the extent to which lower turnout may repre-
sent a risk for democracy are not invariant across polities. There is no doubt
that when significant numbers of citizens are denied the right to vote, the gov-
ernment becomes less democratic, but when significant numbers of citizens
choose to abstain from voting in established democracies, is the result the
same? To choose to abstain from voting is not necessarily tantamount to a lack
309

of interest or a deficit of civic pride. Political commitment is not demonstrated

by voting alone, and withholding one’s vote does not preclude people from
engaging in political actions that they may perceive as more effective means
to affect public policy.
High turnout is desirable to the extent that it is associated with civic
virtues, trust, and citizen control over their representatives. High rates of
absenteeism may attest to forms of disaffection or indignation that prompt
significant changes that ultimately can be beneficial for democracies. One
may view the higher propensity of voters to abstain or to shift from one
party to another as pressures on political elites to attend to the needs of
people.
Although one cannot assess the long-term effects of the profound disaf-
fection of Italian voters with traditional political elites, the recent elections
have shown an increase in absenteeism, as well as a substantial change in the
gender, age, and previous experience of candidates. The members of Italy’s
most recent parliamentary assemblies are much younger than in the past,
and greater numbers of females and first-time parliamentarians have been
returned than ever before.
Certainly one should not underestimate the risk associated with the wan-
ing of political participation and therefore the importance of understanding
the motives behind decreasing turnout, as well as its possible consequences.
Indeed, it is the failings of democracy that are ultimately responsible for the
political estrangement of citizens.
In this regard, one should start by acknowledging that all politics has sig-
nificantly changed in the last decades due to significant changes in the quali-
ties of electorates, in the means that make political knowledge accessible, and
in the reasons that make political involvement desirable. Voter turnout may
still represent an important indicator of democracy’s functioning, but this is
neither constant across polities, nor independent of other modes of political
activism.
Traditional models of electoral participation that have pointed to voters’
resources, party mobilization, electoral procedures, and the civil virtues of
citizens may account for levels of voting only in part. Early political scientists
endorsed a resource model to explain turnout in established democracies and
identified low income and lack of education as the major determinants of voter
disenfranchisement (Milbrath, 1965). Indeed, unequal access to resources and
opportunities may still represent major obstacles for a number of minorities
and disadvantaged citizens to voice their own interests. Nonetheless, the
resource model cannot explain the continuing decline of voter turnout in
democracies where education levels have increased and where many barriers

A Congruency Model of Political Behavior 311
that previously impeded voting have been demolished. As noted earlier,

sophisticated and affluent citizens may also abstain from voting in order to
express their criticism of the way that democratic institutions are functioning
(Bontempi & Pocaterra, 2007; Dalton, 2014; Norris, 2011; Rosanvallon, 2006;
Tuorto, 2006).
The mobilization model asserts that people are mobilized to vote by the
efforts of parties, interest groups, and candidates (Rosenstone & Hansen,
1993). As parties may help people to reduce the initial cost of addressing poli-
tics and to make decisions on new matters, persistence in voting can become
self-reinforcing insofar as voters regularly targeted by parties and campaigns
may benefit from feeling they belong to the political environment. This may
have occurred in the past when political parties served as unique organiza-
tions that combined the crucial functions of representing social interests,
selecting political leaders, shaping citizens’ political attitudes, and inducing
them to vote.
Yet the extent to which political parties still exert any of these functions
today is debatable. Partisan loyalty and party identification have drastically
declined in the United States and the United Kingdom, despite the prestige
and longevity of two major parties operating in these countries (Groendyk,
2013; Lavine, Johnston, & Steenbergen, 2012). This is even more so in multi-
party political systems, like Italy, where the decline has coincided with the
disappearance of traditional parties, the ambiguity of political coalitions, the
continuous proliferation of new political entities, and the weakening of long-
term bonds between trade unions, political parties, and voters (Maraffi, 2007;
Revelli, 2013).
Greater political sophistication requires new forms of mobilization. Issue-
centered activism tends to bypass traditional parties, taking advantage of
new communication technologies to rouse public opinion and to reach mul-
tiple constituencies of the electoral body.
The electoral competition model attributes change in turnout rates to the
long-term, cumulative effects of demographic shifts in the electorate, to fea-
tures of electoral systems, and to changes in laws and procedures related to
voting (Franklin, 2004). For example, lowering the age of eligibility to vote
may have different consequences on voting in different polities depending
on the capacities of political system to attract young voters. Likewise, aging
of the population may have led to declining turnouts whereby older cohorts,
habituated and committed to vote in accordance with the traditional cleav-
ages of social class, have been replaced by younger cohorts that do not bear
the same social imprinting. Extended aging in itself, on the other hand, may
contribute to declining turnouts when the disabilities that accompany aging

reduce people’s interest in political issues and make the physical act of voting
more difficult.
Changes in electoral systems may also affect voter turnout. Citizens may
feel that their preferences have limited influence because incumbents have
advantages that make them hard to replace. Electoral systems that reward
minimal majorities with an exaggerated prize in the form of number of rep-
resentatives encourage coalitions with a degree of ideological heterogeneity
that may be both confusing and somewhat unattractive. Voters may doubt the
fairness of a representative system in which majority bonuses lead to different
weights being assigned to the votes of winners and losers. Citizens in coun-
tries like Italy, where the final list of candidates depends on choices made by
party leaders, also have good reason to feel deprived regarding their choice
of representatives.
The civil-virtue model views voter turnout as an important indicator
of the civic-mindedness and social capital of a community (Putnam, 1993,
2000) that goes hand in hand with trust in institutions. The more people feel
part of a political community and feel responsible for its effective function-
ing, the more they feel committed to vote. Yet even civic-minded people may
abstain from voting when disillusionment with politics leads them to prefer
alternative forms of social activism and to volunteer in favor of causes that
they perceive as more consonant with their values and thereby worthy of
their efforts.
All the models of electoral participation we have discussed capture
important determinants that may work to increase or decrease voter turn-
out across time and political systems. However, they do not cover all the
variety of factors that uphold citizens’ commitments to representative
democracy and to voting regularly. To gain a more comprehensive picture,
we need to integrate the potential determinants with other factors that per-
tain to the subjective meaning of voting and to the reasons that lead people
to assign value to the act of voting. More than in the past, in fact, citizen
participation is linked to perceptions of the influence they may exert in
the political arena and to the degree to which voting may attest to this
influence. In this regard, higher educational level and a greater awareness
of one’s own political rights and duties as a citizen should lead to greater
importance being paid to voters’ worldviews, self-beliefs, value priorities,
and aspirations.
As voting carries an intrinsic tension between its symbolic and its prac-
tical value, this may even appear paradoxical if one does not consider its
psychological underpinnings. In reality, the high symbolic value of voting
as an expression of citizens’ rights to voice their views may stand in stark

contrast to the miniscule weight of a single vote in elections comprising

millions of voters. However, it has been shown, on the basis of documentary
evidence, that while a single vote may be seen as objectively irrelevant with
respect to the outcome of an election, the subjective value of voting is dem-
onstrated by the number of people who have, even recently, put their lives at
risk to claim their right to vote. Despite the fact that many voters fear they
are endorsing an optimal choice, most citizens would feel deeply offended
if they were suddenly deprived of their right to vote.
Voting may be driven by economics, as people’s preferences generally
accord with the pursuit of their own interests. Yet people’s investment in vot-
ing cannot be reduced to mere utilitarian calculations dictated by their mate-
rial interests. Other substantial benefits are associated with self-worth and
with the regard one expects from others.
Actually, voting has a function that is both symbolic and expressive and
which goes beyond material and contingent interests, although such a func-
tion is far from being irrational and devoid of instrumental value. When peo-
ple vote, despite being aware that their single vote is unlikely to influence
the results of an election or to affect their life conditions significantly, they
express their individual autonomy, assert the equal dignity of their views,
affirm their sense of belonging and inclusion, and project their aspirations
onto others (Gonzalez & Tyler, 2008; Quattrone & Tversky, 1988).
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine another action that celebrates both agency
and communion as much as voting does. Similarly, it is difficult to imagine
another private act with similar public salience, or another secret decision
with the property to turn into a collective act. By voting, people send a double
message that attests to their dignity as autonomous individuals, worthy of
respect, and as citizens belonging to a community of bonds and values. First,
every citizen’s vote, regardless of her or his social position in society, counts
to the same extent. Second, each vote is influential only when aggregated with
other votes in the pursuit of common goals.
Through voting, people express their personal and social identities, their
trust in concerted action, their worldviews and personalities. As voting out-
comes depend on aggregation, voting is a cooperative enterprise that turns
personal efficacy into collective efficacy. Paying the cost of voting may be
viewed as a paradox only under the veil of an individualistic bias that leads
us to lose sight of the collective nature of gains. In reality, perceived aggre-
gation is what leads to voting and what makes voting rational. Individuals
are aware that, as there is no collective outcome without individual contri-
butions of like-m inded others who share a common worldview, their con-
tribution only makes sense and acquires value when aggregated with the

contributions of others (Krueger & Acevedo, 2008). Thereby, the more vot-
ers believe they are contributing to a collaborative enterprise, the more they
are confident that their individual choices will turn into collective outcomes.
The more voting attests to a shared view of principles about liberty, equality,
and fairness, the more democracy may count on the emotional and relational
conditions that are needed for its effective functioning.
Following these arguments, we can say that personality, in its broadest
sense, and including variables like genes, cognitive abilities, traits, and val-
ues, may account for voting (Denny & Doyle, 2008; Fowler, Baker, & Dawes,
2008). For example, altruism at the intersection of traits (agreeableness) and
values (universalism and benevolence) may significantly affect voting behav-
ior, depending on how people who care about the well-being of others believe
that their political choices are likely to make others better off (Fowler, 2006).
Indeed, altruism can be seen as compatible with rational choice when it carries
evident benefits in term of self-regard and the respect of others (Jankowski,
2007). Indeed the immaterial and subjective benefits that one derives from
voting can explain why people often risk voting under adverse circum-
stances. Similar arguments, however, may apply also to non-voting when it
is the result of a deliberate political choice rather than just a residual behavior
traceable to poverty, ignorance, civic indifference, or apathy.
Non-voting, in fact, may also satisfy important psychological needs when
concerted absenteeism serves to uphold the personal and social identities of
disillusioned minorities and represents a powerful incentive to change the
style of politics. This, in particular, is what may occur when non-voting of
relevant constituencies of the electorate (like the youth) is the forerunner to
the rise of social movements whose contribution is decisive in making a coun-
try governable. In this regard, Podemos in Spain is a telling example of social
movements that have succeeding in voicing the discontent of many voters
who are no longer aligned with traditional parties, and in turning people’s
indignation into a vote that challenges the power of established political
majorities (Seguin & Fabers, 2015).
Thus, we believe that caution should be recommended before assum-
ing a straight correlation between turnout and democracy. Although vot-
ing traditionally has been associated with citizens’ commitment, more than
a caveat is needed when inferring causes from correlations between voting
and trust in democratic institutions, and when comparing data across times
and across countries. In reality, voter turnout is not a special indicator of the
extension and functioning of democracy, and one cannot fully appreciate its
relevance unless one acknowledges that turnout percentages may have dif-
ferent meanings and may rest upon different causes, at different times, in

different political constituencies, and in different countries. To abstain from

voting when citizens have no reason to fear losing democracy has a different
meaning than abstaining in countries where the non-vote may appear as an
explicit and risky sign of dissent. In established democracies, where people
have several opportunities to vote at local and regional levels, low turnout
in general elections may also be due to a mixture of lack of confidence and a
feeling of distance from central government. Citizens who do not doubt the
stability of democracy in their country may refrain from voting at general
elections but may engage in voting at the local level, where they feel they may
have some kind of influence on political matters that affect their lives.
Thus, when examining voting behavior, the historical and social context
in which individuals are embedded should be taken into account. In particu-
lar, more empirical research is needed to ascertain the constituencies that are
at risk of disenfranchisement in different contexts and to identify effective
measures that enable the largest majority of people to exercise their politi-
cal rights. The components of the electorate that are most inclined to abstain
may also vary across political contexts and political orientations, just as the
reasons for not voting may vary.
Higher mobility in the global economy may raise as yet unexpected
issues for membership in some categories, like gender, generation, religion,
and occupation, and consequently, for citizenship participation and political
identity. One pending issue in established democracies is whether and when
to grant the right to vote to immigrants and refugees from countries where
citizens have never been accorded political rights, to people whose civil rights
continue to be severely limited in their homelands and whose freedom to
voice their opinions may be severely limited within their families.
Above all, more empirical research is needed to understand the reasons of
informed citizens to vote or not to vote, and thus to know what value to assign
to voter turnout in modern societies. In this regard, the literature is consis-
tent with the general claim that citizens’ decisions about whether to vote are
mostly a function of their motivation, namely of their expectations about the
achievement of desirable outcomes (Krosnick, Visser, & Harder, 2010). Thus
one should abandon the traditional views of voters as recipients or mere spec-
tators of politics.
Citizens’ political attitudes toward government, in fact, have drastically
changed from being deferential and supportive of political elites, to hold-
ing higher expectations of them than in the past, especially about how they
should perform. More and more voters are informed citizens who not only
require that they be heard, but also are assertive in their claim to dictate the
political agenda.

Informed citizens vote when political programs accord with their priori-
ties and when voting is seen to satisfy their needs of agency and communion.
Conversely, they have no reason to vote when the political offering bears no
relationship to their values and interests, when their vote is perceived as inad-
equate in exerting any influence, and when the functioning of a political sys-
tem is perceived as being incongruent with their view of a good democracy.
In this regard two factors appear crucial: (1) the correspondence between
voters’ expectations and politicians’ responses, and (2) the congruence
between voters’ and politicians’ beliefs and values. The latter makes the
attainment of the former possible.
Politicians should speak the same language, use the same frames of refer-
ence, and share the same priorities as voters if they want to gain their consen-
sus and support. Indeed, politicians cannot do otherwise than to increasingly
adapt their offerings to voters’ priorities. To this end, left-right and liberal-
conservative ideologies are still decisive, in most Western democracies, in
providing the overarching scheme under which voters and politicians’ beliefs
and values may come together. Indeed, the findings from research into sev-
eral democracies attest to the high correspondence between ideological self-
placement of voters and politicians. In particular, results from the Italian
studies reported in Chapters 5 and 6 show how politicians’ value priorities
parallel voters’ value priorities and suggest a congruence of their values as
providing the basis for political consensus. Indeed, politicians can meet vot-
ers’ expectations and thus count on their continuing support insofar as they
understand and pursue the same value priorities.
MENU DEPENDENCE, ELECTIVE AFFINITIES

AND PROACTIVE CONGRUENCY
People are spontaneously motivated to achieve and maintain a certain degree
of stability and coherence concerning their response to events and thus how
their emotions, cognitions, and actions relate to each other and operate in con-
cert. Patterns of correspondence between thought, feelings, and behavior are
transmitted through generations and are further reinforced through personal
experiences that allow people to count on common understandings of events,
of themselves, and of others. Congruency is a further property that adds to
stability and coherence, that operates at service of the self, and which in some
way unifies stability and coherence in accordance with the general principles
that inform individuals’ lives. Individuals feel uneasy when behavior does
not fall in line with feeling and reasoning, and when emotions, thoughts, and
actions are unstable and not in accordance with one another. Indeed, it is a

property of our self-system and a necessity of our social life to preserve a

certain level of congruency between what we declare and what we do, and
between how we feel and how we present ourselves in the various circum-
stances of our life.
Patterns of congruency between thoughts, emotions, and actions are at the
core of our identity as they become associated with the experience of unity
and continuity. Similar patterns of congruency allow us to make sense of the
behavioral styles, feelings, and thoughts of others on the assumption that
what accounts for those of oneself also accounts for those of others. Likewise,
patterns of congruency between self-perception, values, and attitudes make
sense of political preferences. For this reason, a number of authors have taken
congruency as the basic principle that primarily accounts for the constraints
that bind together feelings, thoughts, and actions in the political domain and
which accounts for the stability and predictability of political choices.
Sniderman and Bullock (2004) referred to consistency, construed as con-
gruence, to index “the predictability of positions citizen take on specific
issues given their general political orientation” (p. 337). Moreover, they have
pointed to established cognitive mechanisms in impression formation and
judgmental heuristics and have emphasized the role of political offer in orga-
nizing citizens’ political knowledge. Political parties and candidates provide
the frames, anchors, connections, and shortcuts that dictate how information
is processed, feelings are mobilized, opinions are shaped, and choices are
justified.
Sniderman and Bullock admit that their theory has two causal legs, as
consistency, understood as congruence, is jointly conditional on the charac-
teristics of citizens as choosers and on the menu of options they face. Yet they
accord a kind of priority to the characteristics of choices over the characteris-
tics of choosers. As citizens’ choices are dependent on the organization of the
menus they are offered, the consistency of citizens’ choices cannot be other
than contingent on the organization of options made accessible to them. Thus,
it is the task of political parties and their candidates to provide the salient
views, frames, anchors, and connections that make political platforms appeal-
ing and that account, ultimately, for stable and congruent political positions
and preferences.
This view agrees with a picture of representative democracies where polit-
ical parties govern the game of politics, and the autonomous deliberations of
politicians fully satisfy citizen representation. However, to paraphrase Dalton
(2014), this picture seems to pertain more to the old party politics rather than
to the new style of citizens’ politics. The statement that, in representative
democracies, citizens do not directly chose alternatives, but mostly select

ones on the menu presented to them by political parties, is true only in part.
Indeed, the statement holds less and less despite the efforts of political parties
to preserve their monopoly over politics through electoral procedures that
hamper the emergence of new parties, claim to assimilate social movements
to traditional political parties, and in various ways limit the freedom of citi-
zens to choose their representatives.
In reality, the other causal leg upon which congruency rests, namely the
characteristics of choosers, has become more and more important insofar as
it has become evident that the menu largely depends on citizens’ needs and
tastes. In Italy, for example, the Five Stars Movement (M5S), which participated
in the national elections of 2013 for the first time, gained the consensus of over
25% of the electorate, but refused to become a political party and significantly
influenced the course of the subsequent legislature by constantly reaping con-
sensus from the web (Lanzone, 2015). It is, however, too soon to establish the
extent to which the Internet activism of M5S met the desirable standard of
new forms of direct democracy. Likewise, it is still difficult to establish the
extent to which M5S may have served to reduce the large absenteeism among
the youth and to provide an outlet for the high level of resentment toward
traditional political elites. Yet one cannot dispute the fact that the genera-
tional and gendered changes which followed in the subsequent parliamen-
tary assembly contributed to significant changes in the political agenda of all
political actors. This agenda change probably happened because of changes
in the needs and perceptions of the voters, more than because of the imagina-
tion of traditional political parties and their candidates. Therefore, we believe
that political elites will continue to exert a crucial function insofar as they will
be able to meet the expectations of voters, as the attractiveness and success of
the political offerings depend increasingly on the values and competence of
citizens (Goren, 2012).
Competition among parties has also led to a continuous adaptation of
political menus to voters’ tastes, certainly more so than in the past. As citi-
zens are more able than before to assess a current political offering, they are
better able to choose on the basis of how it fits with their views and aspi-
rations. Linked to this, developments in communication technologies have
also enabled citizens to contribute more easily and directly to the deliberative
process; the more the contributions are made from the bottom up, the greater
the chances that directions coming from the top down may be overthrown,
and the greater the likelihood that the traditional role of political elites will
be turned from that of inspirer to that of interpreter. Obviously this holds
primarily in polities where there is freedom to voice one’s opinions, recurrent

elections are held, and there is fair competition among political platforms,
thereby allowing citizens to choose among alternative menu items.
We do not believe that the current crisis of traditional parties in estab-
lished democracies like Italy or Spain corresponds to a failure of democracy.
Rather, it is a crisis that has revealed the unfitness of political structures, pro-
cedures, and arguments that belong to earlier stages of democracy and that
no longer suit citizens’ demands. One may view as a paradox of democracy
the fact that the more people internalize its values, the more they voice their
dissatisfaction with the way it functions. In actual fact, the progress of democ-
racy can be nurtured, in part at least, by the criticism of citizens.
Across all democracies, however, as already noted in Chapter 1, few regret
the old pre-democratic regimes, and most have no doubt that democracy is the
best political system. Even in countries like China, where most citizens have
benefited from increasing economic prosperity under forms of government
quite distant from the liberal democracy of the West, citizens view democracy
as a desirable political system (Bell & Li, 2013).
Availing themselves of similar arguments to attest to the influence of
voters’ psychological motives in structuring ideological preferences, Jost,
Federico, and Napier (2009), as mentioned in Chapter 4, have used the image
of elective affinities to account for citizens’ tendency to gravitate toward those
ideas and opinions that match and resonate with their own needs, interests,
and desires. Whereas most traditional political thought sees ideology as the
result of top-down processes in which political elites determine how citizens
navigate political issues, Jost and colleagues point to a bottom-up process
in which citizens’ epistemic, existential, and relational motives balance the
power of pressures and constraints of conventional political offerings. To this
end, ideology may serve as a bridge between citizens’ requests and expecta-
tions and what the political elites offer. We agree with this line of reasoning.
Indeed, citizens do not come to politics as blank slates, but as individu-
als predisposed to choose, albeit within the limits of the available options. In
the past, citizens could not choose, and in authoritarian regimes their choices
are still severely limited. Uneducated and thereby uninformed citizens who
experienced earlier stages of democracy largely depended on choices that
were made accessible to them by political elites and parties. Informed citizens
of currently established democracies are instead able to choose from among
several and competing alternatives the ones that most fit with their needs and
aspirations. This turns the focus of attention and the locus of causality con-
cerning citizens’ political preferences and participation from allegiance and
co-option to their aspirations and freedom of choice.

As we have seen in previous chapters, a large body of findings shows

that the choices people make in politics reflect basic predispositions that are
rooted in human biology and which equip people to face the fundamental
quest of human existence, including those pertaining to the organization and
the government of societies. Another body of findings shows that basic values
exert a crucial influence in putting predispositions at the service of political
choices.
One should remember that values are motivational representations that
stay at the intersection of the individual and society and which attest to both
the influence exerted by society on an individual’s development and the
degree to which individuals generate the values that mark their life. Whereas
predispositions concern the distal behavioral and evaluative determinants of
political behavior, values are the proxy determinants of political attitudes that
uphold their preferences and their commitment in politics.
Thus, values appear as the pivotal elements around which political atti-
tudes are congruently organized and to which political offers should con-
form. In a seminal paper, Caprara and Zimbardo (2004) set the premises for a
radical change of view that overturns the traditional focus from politicians’
offerings to citizens’ demands. The traditional view of the political offering
as a package of attitudes conveyed to citizens by political elites in a top-down
manner has mostly focused on the mechanisms of transmission and assimi-
lation. The new view focuses instead on citizens as political actors equipped
with psychological structures and processes that enable them to orient them-
selves in politics according to the moral principles that guide their choices.
In terms of psychological structures, traits, values, and self-beliefs account
for the architecture and stability of the personality system. Among psycho-
logical processes, selective perception, attribution of causality, affect regula-
tion, and moral reasoning account for the dynamics of the system and for its
relations with the environment. Whereas values set the goals to be pursued,
moral reasoning and moral emotions constrain behavior in accordance with
the values that stay at the core of one’s self-identity.
As already anticipated in Chapter 6, a powerful congruency principle
operating at different stages of political transactions brings order, stability, and
continuity to citizens’ choices, with personality evaluations playing a crucial
role in making sense of both voters’ preferences and politicians’ appeals. The
mechanism of congruency largely accounts for the dynamics and function-
ing of the system as a unified entity, with self-evaluations playing a pivotal
role in making sense of individuals’ preferences and choices. Self-perception
and self-k nowledge, in fact, provide the anchors and the frames that allow
citizens to consolidate their political knowledge and to make sense of their

political choices in accordance with their views of themselves and with the
values they cherish. The congruency mechanism mostly operates in accor-
dance with people’s needs for self-worth and through various kinds of heuris-
tics that preserve a sense of coherence and stability in support of adaptation
and well-being.
Self-worth is dependent on self-awareness. People could not accept their
vulnerability and dependency on others unless they see themselves as wor-
thy of value. As the self is highly accessible and generally positively valenced,
positive attitudes toward themselves may easily generalize to anyone who is
perceived as similar to oneself.
Self-respect is contingent on self-worth, and both draw confirmation and
reinforcement from the recognition and respect of others. Indeed, self-respect
and self-worth are strictly related to the recognition that others see one as
worthy of regard. Furthermore, individuals cannot maintain self-respect and
self-worth unless they live up to the personal standards and values they have
assimilated in the course of their lives, as well as to the standards of the com-
munities to which they belong.
The more that basic needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness
are fulfilled, the more important the voicing of one’s own views about how
society should function becomes for the achievement of one’s full self-
realization. When being oneself becomes synonymous with being coherent
with one’s own ideals, then congruency mechanisms become the powerful
organizers of the affective, cognitive, and behavioral features surrounding
moral standards that bestow order and continuity to one’s opinions and
prompt the citizens of democracies to exert a proactive role in claiming and
striving to achieve the actualization of the political order they value. Thus
the congruency that holds political beliefs, political preferences, and vot-
ers’ impressions of politicians’ personalities together is no longer imposed
but is drawn from people’s personalities—namely their inclinations, their
values, and their self-beliefs.
Ideology rests upon mechanisms of congruency in binding together
beliefs and obligations that ultimately rest upon the personal propensities
and values of individuals. Congruency mechanisms also operate in the extent
to which voters appraise a politician’s personality as similar to their own, par-
ticularly concerning attributes that they personally value most. As we have
argued in Chapter 6, dispositional heuristics allow citizens to anchor their
impressions of politicians to qualities that they use to describe themselves,
whereas similarity heuristics allows individuals to use information about
themselves to form beliefs about what they may expect from the politician in
question.

As perceived similarity adds to objective commonalities in traits and val-

ues of voters and politicians who share the same ideologies, it is probable that
likability heuristics further contributes in supplying the emotional glue that
bonds them together. In fact, the more citizens recognize the same personal
characteristics in their representatives that they use to characterize them-
selves, and which they like, the more they will have a sense of confidence in
their representatives and the easier it will be for them to make sense of their
choices. Further, the closer citizens feel to their representatives, the more they
have reason to believe that their own opinions count, and the more they have
reason to pay the cost of political commitment.
All this helps to nurture a sense of cohesion and inclusiveness among
leaders and partisans as it strengthens their commonality of feelings,
thoughts, habits, and ideals. Similar mechanisms of congruency that account
for individuals’ political preference also account for their political commit-
ment and their sense of collective political efficacy. The more citizens meet
political offerings that are congruent with the values that count most for
their personal and social identity, the more they feel committed to engage in
politics and the greater the sense of self-actualization stemming from their
commitment. Taken further, the more citizens acknowledge in other citizens
the same qualities that they use to characterize themselves, and the more
they expect that others will behave as they do themselves, the more they
derive a sense of accomplishment from contributing to a collective endeavor.
Conversely, incongruence between leaders’ behavior, political programs,
and citizens’ priorities can become a source of feelings of distance, alienation,
and powerlessness that can lead to withdrawal or protest, in various forms.
This may occur when voters face a world of politics whose functioning is
incomprehensible or beyond their control, when issues seem irrelevant, or
when people’s commitment does not matter because the political leaders
operate as members of a caste apart from other citizens.
Ultimately, congruency accounts for the direction of influence and for
the strength of the constraints between traits, values, political attitudes, and
behavior. In Chapters 4, 5, and 6, we reported findings that attest to a model
of political choice where values mediate the influence of traits to become
political preferences. In Chapter 7, an alternative model has been extended to
account for political participation, positing self-efficacy beliefs as mediating
variables between traits and political commitment.
The model represented in Chapter 7, Figure 7.6, represents a first step in
understanding the sequence that leads from personality traits to ideology and
to political action. This model does not account for all political choices, nor
can it be retained as invariantly valid across polities. However, the findings

that point to basic values as the crucial organizers of political behavior are
quite robust and concur with the theory that posits basic values at being the
core of individuals’ political choice.
As we noted in Chapter 3, the more the values one holds are perceived
to be part of oneself, the more one is constrained to behave in accordance
with what one cherishes and propounds. For this reason, we believe that what
binds beliefs and actions together is derived from within an individual’s per-
sonality—namely, from the strength of the links between predispositions,
values, and self-belief. In this regard, findings regarding the priority given to
values related to self -direction across democracies, and independent of ideo-
logical orientation, are particularly interesting. We believe that these findings
are promising and encouraging, as they corroborate our initial hypothesis
that there is a mutual relationship between personality development and
democracy.
We are, of course, aware that our arguments in this direction are not com-
pletely novel, as they develop along a line of reasoning that is quite similar to
Inglehart and Welzel’s (2005) sequence of human development, which points
to the development of strong links between self-expressive values and democ-
racy, as greater economic development allows people to free themselves from
survival needs to growth needs. The difference and novelty of our approach
is the focus on the potentials and determinants of personality and the firm
belief that we can come closer to understanding in detail how they operate,
how individuals’ development can be sustained, and how democracy can
benefit from citizen psychological growth.
In support of this aim, the following paragraphs provide models of the
kind of research that is needed to better understand how values affect partici-
pation in politics or abstention from voting and how voting may affect values.
Next we will present alternative models that can be viewed as complemen-
tary examples of research that is needed to further understand how traits,
basic values, and social and political attitudes may affect political commit-
ment or withdrawal from democratic politics.
Why People Abstain from Voting: The Role of Personal Basic Values

Given the concern about falling levels of electoral participation in established
democracies, the lack of systematic research on the personal characteristics of
people who abstain, beyond the usual sociodemographic characteristics like
income, education, and age, is surprising. In fact, the decline in voter turnout
has been diffused across age, income, and education, although it varies across
countries and between one election and another. Whereas one may understand
why the poor and the uneducated may not participate, the reasons behind the

abstention of large numbers of educated youth from voting are not well under-
stood, which makes it a major source of concern for the future of democracy.
As knowing more about the habits, self-beliefs, and values of non-voters
may help to clarify why they abstain, we conducted preliminary studies on
the Big Five personality traits, self-esteem and political self-efficacy of sub-
jects aged 25–45, while controlling for income, age, and education.1
Findings showed higher openness, conscientiousness, self-esteem, and
political self-efficacy beliefs in voters than in non-voters, but findings overall
were so ambiguous as to prohibit any generalization. For example, we found
non-voters scoring lower than average on self- esteem, conscientiousness,
openness, and political self-efficacy, which may lead one to consider non-
voters as apathetic citizens on the basis of a stereotypical view of the matter.
But we also found non-voters among the disillusioned and protesters who
nevertheless scored above average on all these variables.
As it was not easy to identify non-voters willing to complete a question-
naire on personal and private matters in a country like Italy with a long
tradition of high turnout, we found it more feasible to focus on basic values
and to address a relatively large population that would include a reason-
able number of non-voters. This line of research has been followed in two
recent studies that focused on the basic personal values of voters and non-
voters in the Italian general elections of 2001 and 2008 (Caprara, Vecchione, &
Schwartz, 2012). In both studies, the composition of subjects roughly reflected
the percentage of voters of two major political coalitions and the percentage
of non-voters.
Caprara and colleagues (2012) have argued that non- voting can be a
rational and congruent choice insofar as people find no reason to vote when
the political offering is perceived as too far removed from their own ideals.
The more people perceive voting as ineffectual in affirming their identities
and promoting their personal priorities, the less they are committed to vote.
Believing that available political programs are irrelevant to one’s own values
can nurture feelings of distance and extraneousness that may ultimately lead
to abstention from voting. Thus, people may decide to abstain when the politi-
cal choices available offer less opportunity to affirm, protect, or attain the
values they cherish.
In the first study, Caprara et al. (2012) examined the extent to which voting
versus abstention in the Italian elections of 2001 can be traced to a fit between
people’s value priorities and the opportunities that voting provided to affirm
and promote these priorities. Figure 8.1 shows the mean differences among
non-voters, center-left voters, and center-right voters in the importance of the
10 basic values as measured with the PVQ.

Center-Right Center-Left Non-Voter

55
54
53
52
51
Mean
50
49
48
47
46
45
n
er
n
sm
t
n
m
y
ity
en
rit
io
io
tio
nc
lis
w
m
ni
ct
at
em
cu
Po
le
di
sa
or
do
re
ul
vo
a
Se
ev
nf
er
im
Tr
Di
He
ne
Co
iv
hi
lf-
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Ac
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Figure 8.1 Standardized mean group differences on the 10 values.

Note: a score of 50 represents the mean of the general population.
Caprara et al. (2012, study 1). Used by permission from European Psychologist, 2012;
Vol. 17(4):266–278 © 2011 Hogrefe Publishing. DOI: 10.1027/1016-9040/a000099
Those who voted in the 2001 Italian elections assigned relatively high pri-
ority either to universalism values or to security values. These values refer
to equality, justice, and tolerance (universalism) and to social order, national
security, and control of crime (security). As already noted, the policies of the
center-left coalition placed particular emphasis on the promotion of univer-
salism values, while those of the center-right promised to promote security
values. Thus, individuals holding either of these values could hope to pro-
mote them by voting for their preferred party.
Those who did not vote attributed higher importance to stimulation and
hedonism than did the voters of either coalition. As neither of the coalition
policies was distinctively associated with promoting the pursuit of excitement
or of pleasure, voting offered little reward in terms of the goals that motivated
non-voters. More generally, the value priorities of the non-voters were more
ego-centered than those of the voters. In valuing hedonism and stimulation,
they focused on their personal interests and did not give high priority to such
values as universalism, benevolence, security, tradition, or conformity, values
that are more socially focused and that concern the wider society. However,
it is helpful to remember that hedonism correlated positively with level of

democratization in both the research of Schwartz and Sagie (2000) and in our
multinational research discussed in Chapter 4. Hedonism and stimulation
can also be associated with the self-emancipative values of Inglehart and
Welzel (2005), and this leads one to question the extent to which non-voting
should always be viewed as being underpinned by needs that are at odds
with democratization.
A limitation of this study was the absence of a direct measure of the
degree to which respondents perceived the available voting options as pro-
viding an opportunity to affirm or promote their cherished values. It has been
assumed that those who attributed relatively high importance to the values
prominent in the platforms of the political coalitions would view voting as a
vehicle to foster their values, but no direct evidence to support this assump-
tion was presented.
Thus a second study was conceived to assess citizens’ subjective percep-
tion of the congruence between their own values and the values they attrib-
uted to the political coalitions of the 2008 Italian national elections (Caprara
et al., 2012). In this study, subjective value congruence was conceptualized as
the perception that the values that the program of a given political coalition
promoted matched one’s own personal value priorities.
Drawing on the Caprara and Zimbardo (2004) congruency model, it has
been suggested that people are more likely to vote if they perceive a match
between their values and those endorsed by the political parties on offer. In
this regard, voting can provide a sense of self-actualization and inclusion to
the extent that available political choice is perceived as congruent with the
values central to a citizen’s personal and social identity. Conversely, people
would have no reason to engage in politics or even to pay the cost of voting,
however limited the cost may be, if they feel that their vote does not count
toward the values they cherish.
A set of items based on the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS; Schwartz, 1992,
2006) was used to measure respondents’ own value priorities, as well as the
value priorities they perceived as being endorsed by the left and right political
coalitions. To measure their own priorities from a list of given values, partici-
pants were asked, “How important is this value to you?” To measure perceived
coalition values, they were asked, “How important do you think this value is
to the center-left party coalition/center-right party coalition?” Subjective value
congruence was assessed by computing two indexes: one measured congru-
ence of a participant’s own values with the values attributed to the left coali-
tion, and the other congruence with the values attributed to the right coalition.
The study examined the joint contribution of individual’s values and
perceived value congruence on the likelihood of voting, after controlling

for the effects of sociodemographic characteristics (gender, age, education,

and income). In accordance with previous research findings (e.g., Milbrath &
Goel, 1977; Milligan, Moretti, & Oreopoulos, 2004; Rindermann, 2008), failure
to vote was found to be more common among the poor and less educated,
while middle-aged adults were more likely to vote than either younger or
older people.
Respondents’ own values and subjective value congruence both showed
unique, additive effects on voting, over and above the effects of demographic
variables. Respondents’ own values accounted for significant variance in
electoral participation, thereby replicating the results of study 1. Subjective
congruence between respondents’ own values and the values they perceived
as endorsed by the policies of the two coalitions further improved predic-
tion. As expected, the higher the perceived incongruence between political
offerings and citizen’s ideals, the higher the probability of citizens’ abstention
from voting. This effect was found mostly for self-transcendence and conser-
vation values, which have proved to be the most distinctive values related to
the policies of the opposing left and right political positions.
Thus, perceptions of congruence with one’s own values exerted a signifi-
cant effect in mobilizing citizens to participate in the political process, and
thereby in producing high rates of voter turnout. Conversely, the likelihood
of voting was minimized when personal values were perceived as incongru-
ent with all the available political offerings. This condition was particularly
evident in the 2008 Italian national elections, where it is likely that many for-
mer left voters refused to participate in the election because the left coalition
failed to demonstrate that it would clearly serve the traditional left priorities
of equality and welfare (ITANES, 2008).
These findings point to a unique contribution of psychological individual
differences over and above the well-k nown effects of sociodemographic vari-
ables. They also fit both the views of the voter as rational agent and of per-
sonality as a self-regulatory system in that they confirm the idea of people
engaging in activities they perceive as relevant for expressing, promoting,
and protecting their important values. Probably, both basic personal values
and value congruence have a greater effect on voting, as well as on abstention
from voting, today than in the past. This is in accordance with the significant
changes that have occurred in mass education and public sensitivity to the
themes of individual freedom and dignity.
As we have said repeatedly, shifts in focus from group affiliation to indi-
vidual choices are among the most salient novelties of modern democracies.
This is in accordance with the ethos of modernity that places the self-referent
agent at the center of societal functioning. As political choice becomes

more individualized, it makes sense for people to decide whether or not to

vote based on whether the potential outcomes of voting for one or another
party match their own value priorities. As democratization carries a rise in
level of aspirations in all domains associated with self-actualization, self-
determination may lead to higher commitment to the pursuit of duty, or of
pleasure, or of both.
The value priorities of the non-voters in our sample show that they were
more concerned with their own excitement and pleasurable experiences than
with the fate of the wider society in which they live, thereby being relatively
distant from the offerings of contingent political platforms. Counterintuitively,
ideological self-placement was slightly more polarized in non-voters than in
voters. This may be because, among the non-voters, one could find many indi-
viduals who are unhappy about recent political happenings leading to the
redesign of the political offerings on both sides of the political spectrum and
who see themselves as orphans of the traditional left and right. Thus, one may
argue that most people abstain not because of a lack of ideology, but because
of a lack of correspondence between current political platforms and programs
and their own ideals.
As democratization extends the latitude for the free choice of citizens, so
citizens become more critical with respect to the degree to which the various
political offerings meet their ideals. Although the ambition to conquer the
large electorate that gravitates close to the center of the ideological spectrum
may lead parties to dilute their ideological contents, critical citizens may dis-
trust parties that do not make their ideological position clear before elections
and that allow too much leeway in the transformation of politicians and their
policies after the elections.
We are quite aware of the limitations of the preceding studies. The sample
of convenience warns against premature conclusions. The Italian historical
political context warns against the generalization of findings to other poli-
ties. Yet they provide a model of what psychology may offer in order to better
understand what citizens expect from politics, and what politicians should
do to maintain their offices and to meet citizens’ aspirations concerning
democracy.
When Values Affect Voting and Voting Affects Values

As discussed in Chapter 4, there is substantial evidence for a systematic,
meaningful association between individuals’ traits and values and their
political preference in different cultural contexts and political systems
(e.g., Barnea & Schwartz, 1998; Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna, Vecchione, &

Barbaranelli, 2006; Jost et al., 2015; Schwartz, Caprara, & Vecchione, 2010).
These results have often been interpreted as suggesting that the way peo-
ple vote depends on their habitual tendencies and the values they hold
to be important—t hat is, that traits and values influence voting behavior.
However, the issue of causal order in these associations, such as the links
between traits and values and the links between values and behavior,
remains an issue for discussion.
We also are aware that traits may change, but it is unlikely that the choices
people make in politics affect major habitual tendencies, unless they involve
substantial life changes. As the contribution of traits to political choices is
largely mediated by values, the key issue concerns the extent to which values
can be influenced by political choices.
As people may not only practice what they preach but are also likely to
preach what they practice, the question to address concerns the extent to which
values and political choices influence each other. Sturgis (2003) has argued
that causality in the relation between values and political behavior is not uni-
directional but reciprocal, with individuals’ values both shaping and being
shaped by their political choices. The longitudinal study of the 1992 American
presidential election by McCann (1997) supported this view by showing that
individuals who voted for a candidate during an election campaign changed
their core political values to make them more consistent with those of the
chosen party and/or candidate. This study showed a stronger effect of voting
for a particular candidate on subsequent values than the effect of values on
subsequent political choice.
However, McCann’s study, which confirmed the effects of political choice
on values, focused on core political values like egalitarianism, civil liberties,
ethnocentrism, and limited government. As noted in Chapter 6, such values
represent overarching normative principles that facilitate position taking in
political domains and that form a bridge between basic values and political
choices. These values act as proxies for political choices but do not exhaust
the domain of values and can therefore account for only part of the influence
basic values may exert on voting.
McCann (1997) suggested three processes that may contribute to value
change following voting. First, voting for a candidate or party may entail
acknowledging or increasing one’s identification with the group(s) that sup-
ports that candidate or party. This, in turn, creates implicit social pressures to
be aware of and to accept the group’s values and expectations.
Second, in line with the assumption that people strive for cognitive con-
sistency among their attitudes, values, and behavior, people may shift their
political values in order to align them more closely with the implications of

their voting behavior. Dissonance leading to value change may be especially

strong among voters who switch parties because the discrepancies between
the political values of their former and new parties are likely to be salient for
them. A study by Sturgis (2003) in the United Kingdom, for example, showed
that changing party preference between one election and another (i.e., from
the Conservative to the Labour party and vice versa) led to a concomitant shift
in core political values (i.e., economic individualism, free enterprise, equality).
Third, having made a political choice, voters may attend more to the
arguments of their chosen party during the electoral campaign, become more
receptive to them, and confirm or revise their values accordingly.
Although political choices seem to influence core political values, whether
political choices also affect more abstract and fundamental basic values is less
clear (Schwartz, 2006). Individuals have a relatively stable hierarchal system
of value priorities and use their own basic values as standards for judging all
kinds of behavior, events, and people. Contrary to basic values, however, core
political values do not apply outside the political domain. Although people
have preferences among their core political values, these preferences do not
necessarily form a hierarchy. Rather, they reflect a polyarchy of values that
may change across people, times, and contexts.
To address this issue, two studies examined the possible reciprocal influ-
ences of political choice and values, including Schwartz’s 10 basic values dis-
cussed earlier at length and a set of more specific political values that have
been discussed in Chapter 5 (Vecchione, Caprara, Dentale, & Schwartz, 2013).
In the first study, value questionnaires were administered to 1,030 voters two
weeks before and one month after the 2006 Italian general elections. The use
of structural equation modeling in a longitudinal design allowed the recip-
rocal effects of values and voting to be examined while controlling for the
stability of values. Findings confirmed previous results regarding the contri-
bution of basic and political values to political preference.
The greater the importance attributed by voters to the basic values of
security, tradition, conformity, and power, the more likely they were to vote
for the center-right coalition. The greater the importance voters attributed
to universalism values, the more likely they were to vote for the center-left.
Likewise, the more importance attributed to free enterprise, law and order,
traditional morality, blind patriotism, and military intervention, the more
likely voters were to vote for the center-right. The more importance voters
attributed to equality of opportunity, civil liberties, and acceptance of immi-
grants, the more likely they were to vote for the center-left.
The political choices of individuals had no significant effects on basic
values. All 10 of Schwartz’s values exhibited substantial stability over the

two-month period, from before to after the election, regardless of how indi-
viduals voted. As reasoned by Vecchione et al. (2013), changing a basic value
to be more compatible with a single political choice may make it less com-
patible with the many other cognitions and affects in a person’s other life
domains. Hence, for most people, where politics is not the most important
life domain, value inconsistency with political choice is more tolerable than
value inconsistency across life domains. In other words, people are likely to
change their basic values following events that significantly change their life
and worldviews, rather than because of a single event, such as voting.
By way of contrast, voting affected, in a significant manner, scores regard-
ing six out of the eight core political values examined, namely free enterprise,
equality, law and order, military intervention, civil liberties, and acceptance
of immigrants. After voting, the individual’s belief in these political values
changed to become more compatible with the policies and ideology of the
coalition chosen. Although this is not a full test of causality, these findings
support the idea that core political values and voting may have reciprocal
influences.
Once the reciprocal effects of voting and core political values had been
established, a second study by Vecchione et al. (2013) was performed, this
time focusing on factors that may mediate and moderate these effects. The
study’s main research question concerned the mechanisms by which voting
could change voters’ core political values. Taking ideology as a major deter-
minant of political choice, value change was expected to be the consequence
of an alteration in people’s perception of their position on the ideological con-
tinuum. Specifically, the authors argued that voting for the center-left or the
center-right coalition would predict a shift in the individuals’ perception of
their position along the left-right continuum. Such a shift may, in turn, lead
people to adjust the importance that they attribute to their political values, to
make them more consistent with their ideological self-placement, which might
explain why voting affects political values. The hypothesized path of relations
(from voting to values through left-right ideology) is depicted in the lower part
of Figure 8.3.
Ideology was also expected to mediate the effect of values on voting. That
is, each political value was expected to predict self-placement on the left-right
scale in the direction compatible with that value. Considerable evidence in
this regard indicates that people’s political values predict their self-place-
ment on the left or right of the political spectrum. Furthermore, left-right self-
placement was expected to predict the direction of voting. As discussed in
Chapter 4, ideology accounts for most of the variance found in voting in Italy,
as in other established democracies. The hypothesized path of relations (from

values to voting through left-right ideology) is depicted in the upper part of

Figure 8.2.
To test the model portrayed in Figure 8.2, 506 voters completed a set
of questionnaires that included core political values and left-r ight ideol-
ogy three weeks before and one month after the 2008 Italian general elec-
tions. Moreover, they reported both their voting intentions (at T1) and their
actual votes (at T2). Expectations were largely confirmed by the empirical
data. The reciprocal relation between voting and core political values was
fully mediated, in both directions, by ideological self-placement. Each of
the eight core political values was a significant determinant of left-r ight
political orientation, which, in turn, strongly predicted voting behavior.
Furthermore, after the elections, the voters’ ideological self- placement
shifted in order to become more compatible with their vote (i.e., voting for
the center-left coalition predicted a more leftist ideology; voting for the
center-r ight coalition predicted a more rightist ideology). This change in
ideological self-placement, in turn, predicted a change on six of the eight
core political values, which became more consistent with the policies of the
coalition chosen. Specifically, an increase in rightist ideology led to valuing
free enterprise, law and order, and “blind” patriotism more, and equality,
civil liberties, and acceptance of immigrants less. An increase in leftist ide-
ology led to the opposite result.
The pathway from values to voting, mediated by left-right ideology, is
likely to reflect a rational choice stemming from voters’ perceptions of a
match between their own preferences and the interests and positions of the
parties or candidates.
Value Left-Right
t1 ideology t1
Vote
2008
Value Left-Right
t2 ideology t2
Figure 8.2 A model positing reciprocal relations between values, ideological self-
placement, and voting.
Adapted from Vecchione et al. (2013, study 2). Used with permission from John Wiley and
Sons Publishing.

The reverse path from voting to values may originate from both rational
and rationalized forms of voting. Self-perception theory (Bem 1972) would
suggest that people simply conform their reasoning to their behavior, so that,
after voting for a particular party, they are likely to infer from this act that they
endorse political values consistent with those the party represents. Likewise,
mechanisms of rationalization, such as persuasion or projection, may account
for the influence of voting on political values. For example, Visser (1994) noted
that those who vote for a party for reasons other than its policies (e.g., a can-
didate’s personality) may subsequently adapt their own positions to fit those
of the party they chose. Voters may also mistakenly project their own posi-
tions on an attractive party, misperceiving its true policies. Upon discovering
their misperception after voting, they may try to justify their choice by chang-
ing their own political values to be more consistent with those of their vote’s
destination. In both cases, the change in an individual’s core political values
serves to reduce cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957; Fiske, 2004).
Finally, it could also be the case that people change the party or candi-
date they vote for simply because, for the time being, they find the alternative
offering more attractive, although this may imply a reordering of priorities.
This does not, however, necessarily imply a change in basic values, but rather
a revision of how they can be fulfilled. Voters are selectively flexible when it
comes to change and can adjust their attitudes as needed.
Another issue examined in a study by Vecchione et al. (2013) is whether
reciprocal relations between political values and voting depend on voters’
certainties regarding their electoral choices. To this end, the effects illustrated
in Figure 8.2 were tested separately for the two groups of participants: those
who voted at T2 as intended at T1 (i.e., the decided group), and those who at T1
said that they had not yet decided and then voted for either of the two coali-
tions at T2 (i.e., the undecided group).
In accordance with the hypothesis, systematic differences were found
between the two groups. Specifically, the effect of all eight political values on
voting was significantly stronger among decided than among undecided voters.
The effect of voting on political values measured one month after the elec-
tion was, on the contrary, stronger among the undecided. One may argue that
people who are uncertain how to vote may lack clear internal cues regard-
ing their political views. Accordingly, they are more likely to pay attention to
contradictory information, especially during election campaigns (Sweeney &
Gruber, 1984), which further exacerbates their uncertainty. As a result, unde-
cided voters may be inclined to infer their political views from their voting
styles, leading to shifts in values. This agrees with Bem’s (1972) theory of
self-perception, which asserts that behavior affects attitudes when internal

cues are ambiguous or weak. Conversely, decided voters may have a clearer
understanding of their innermost perceptions of their political views and
may be, therefore, more resistant to changing them due to a particular behav-
ior (Vecchione et al., 2013).
Taken together, findings from the two studies further corroborate our rea-
soning concerning voter congruency. Citizens vote in accordance with their
most important values, and there is stability and consistency among the basic
values that mark and direct their life. Political attitudes, on the other hand,
are more volatile, as coherence requires citizens to match their opinions to
their choices, particularly when they have no clear knowledge about the mat-
ters in contention.
As we saw in Chapter 5, a substantial congruency exists between the val-
ues of the right and those of the left across countries. Likewise, there is a
substantial congruency between the basic values and core political values of
the right and of the left across established democracies. Yet basic values do
not constrain political values, as these do not structure political knowledge
invariantly across times and polities.
It should be remembered that people translate their basic values in the
different domains of their life in accordance with the demands, challenges,
and opportunities of circumstances. Likewise, core political values turn
basic values into political purposes and actions, depending on available
resources and on the goals that are perceived to be accessible given contex-
tual constraints.
Certainly further research is needed, particularly cross- cultural and
across polities. Yet the data presented in this chapter and previous chapters
attest to the robustness of the basic values that underlie voters’ choices and
to the connectedness of their beliefs and preferences. Citizens know what
they expect from politics, despite the complexity of matters and the elusive-
ness of programs. People bring questions and aspirations to politics that are
deeply rooted in their own experiences and as such form important compo-
nents of their personal and social identities. Most important, perhaps, the
parties and politicians must be able to interpret and satisfy these questions
and aspirations, unless they want to run the risk of having to exit the politi-
cal market. They can no longer count on the blind partisanship of citizens to
ensure their votes (Groenendyk, 2013; Lavine, Johnston, & Steenbergen, 2012).
Indeed, citizens’ aspirations to higher levels of justice and efficacy represent
a tremendous challenge that requires parties and politicians to be continu-
ously interpretative and innovative with regard to their political offerings.
Whereas people may be predisposed toward left and right, and left and right
ideologies may continue to serve democracy, parties must be able to match

the continuing rising level of citizens’ aspirations with regard to fairness and
efficiency, if they want to survive and to contribute to the democratization of
society.
COMPLEMENTARY MODELS
The study of individual differences in traits, needs, values, and attitudes
is instrumental for a better understanding of personality in politics to the
degree that these features allow us to scrutinize the distinctive modes of how
people organize political knowledge, develop preferences, make choices, and
engage in a variety of activities that require the investment of psychological,
social, and material resources. Thus, individual differences can be viewed as
the accessible indicators of underlying structures and processes and as the
manageable predictors of possible outcomes. As such, they allow us to turn
surface associations into hypothetical relations of cause and effect, to assess
changes due to the passing of time and other changes within and external to
the person, to provide reasonable accounts for the behavior of people across
a variety of situations, and to predict all variety of events resulting from peo-
ple’s actions.
While left- right and liberal-conservative ideologies continue to serve
as important predictors of political choices, various attempts have also
been made to clarify their psychological underpinnings by drawing on the
vast repertoire of individual differences stemming from social psychology
research in general, and from studies on personality in particular. For exam-
ple, individual differences in traits, values, and attitudes may help to capture
and elucidate patterns of congruency and reciprocal influence in how people
organize knowledge, assign priorities, make choices, and actively engage in
politics.
In terms of studies aimed at understanding the psychological underpin-
nings of political preference, recent contributions by Jost et al. (2003, 2009),
Duckitt et al. (2002), and Caprara et al. (2006, 2008; Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004),
although based on different research traditions and referencing different con-
structs, pursue similar goals. Each provides a model of congruency and sta-
bility concerning how people think, assign value, and behave in the domain
of politics.
In Jost et al.’s (2003, 2009) model, portrayed in Figure 8.3, relational motives
(the drive to share with others the view of the world), existential motives (the
drive to manage the threat induced by the awareness of one’s own mortality),
and epistemic motives (the drive to reduce uncertainty, complexity, or ambi-
guity) are posited as being among the antecedents of system justification,

Relational Preference
Motivation for Equality
Existential System
Motivation Justification Left-Right
Epistemic Resistance
Motivation to Change
Figure 8.3 Jost et al.’s (2003) model.
namely the tendency to legitimize and justify the social system and to per-
ceive it as fair and legitimate (Jost et al., 2003, 2009). According to Jost and col-
leagues, people who are vulnerable to anxiety and unhappy with uncertainty,
who fear change, and who strive to achieve and maintain “shared reality”
with others are inclined to justify the political system as it functions currently
and to make a virtue of necessity. Moreover, individuals tend to endorse left
and liberal, rather than right and conservative ideologies, depending on the
extent to which they believe in and justify the status quo. This is very much in
keeping with traditional reasoning that opposes the pursuit of equality and
resistance to change.2
As anticipated in Chapter 4, the dual process model by Duckitt et al. (2002)
posits Social Dominance (SDO) and Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA)
as antecedents of left-right ideology. Social conformity, which is negatively
related to the openness trait and positively related to conscientiousness,
predisposes people to view the world as a dangerous place. Tough-versus
tender-mindedness, which is negatively related to the agreeableness trait,
predisposes people to view the world as a competitive place.3 This model is
illustrated in Figure 8.4.
The model by Caprara et al., which was described in detail in Chapters 4
and 6, posits basic personality traits as distal predictors of ideology that exert
a direct effect on basic personal values and which in turn affect core politi-
cal values, the most proximal predictors of ideology. This model supports
the views discussed here, which see personality as a self-regulating system
whereby predispositions turn into values that guide behavior through social
attitudes. This model is illustrated in Figure 8.5.
A recent study has compared the three models with regard to their ability
to account for political preference and participation in two well-established
democracies: Sweden and Italy (Caprara, Nilsson, Vecchione, Bäck & Bäck,

Social Dangerous
RWA
Conformity World Beliefs
Left-Right
Tough vs. Competitive

SDO
Tender World Beliefs
Figure 8.4 Duckitt et al.’s (2002) model.
2016). Despite the diversities, the three models attest to congruent patterns
of relations in both countries, accounting for significant portions of variance
in political ideology. In Jost’s model, system justification predicted left-right
ideology indirectly, through the effects of acceptance of inequality and resis-
tance to change. In both countries, left-right ideological self-placement was
negatively predicted by acceptance of inequality, and positively predicted by
resistance to change. System justification also had a direct effect on left-right
ideology, but only in Sweden. The amount of accounted variability in ideo-
logical self-placement was 20% in Italy (N = 284) and 49% in Sweden (N = 357).
Among the distal predictors, only relational motives in Italy impacted signifi-
cantly on system justification in Italy.
Equality
Agreeableness Self-
Transcendence
Accepting
Immigrants
Conscientiousness Left-Right
Free
Enterprise
Openness Conservation
Traditional
Morality
Figure 8.5 Caprara et al.’s model.

Note: The figure includes only the variables that are expected to show the largest effects.

It should be noted that, as reported in the left-hand side of Figure 8.6, the
mean scores of all the variables examined, with the exception of epistemic
motivations, are below the theoretical mean in both countries. This might
suggest that the constructs included in Jost and colleagues’ model, in par-
ticular system justification (in Italy only) and acceptance of inequality, are
relatively undesirable or are seen negatively by most participants.
In Duckitt’s model, both SDO and RWA contributed to left-right ideology,
accounting for 25% of variance in Italy (N = 277), and 32% of the variance
in Sweden (N = 394). In both countries, social conformity and tough-versus
tender-mindedness contributed to RWA and SDO through their effect on
the tendency to be exposed to particular social environments that lead one
to view the world as a dangerous and competitive place, respectively (see
Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). These findings are in accordance with a vast body of
literature pointing to authoritarianism and social dominance as distinctive
characters of most right-wing and conservative ideologies.
Sweden Italy
4.5
3.5
2.5
1.5
Social Conformity
Accepting Immigrants
Tender vs. Tough-Mindedness
Self-Enhancement Values
Self-Transcendence Values
Openness to Change Values
Conservation Values
Military Intervention
Equality
Free Enterprise
Blind Patriotism
Traditional Morality
Openness
Competitive-World Beliefs
Relational Motivation
Existential Motivation
Epistemic Motivation
System Justification
Acceptance of Inequality
Resistance to Change
Dangerous-World Beliefs
SDO
RWA
Energy
Agreeableness
Conscientiousness
Law and Order
Figure 8.6 Means of the variables included in the models by Jost, Duckitt, and
Caprara.
Note: The theoretical mean corresponds to a score of 3.5 for basic values, and 3 for the other
constructs.

The correlations of RWA with the tendency to view the world as a danger-
ous place, and of SDO with the tendency to view the world as a competitive
place, are quite consistent with the beliefs and reasoning of people who in
some way are predisposed to see life from a defensive and aggressive per-
spective. As can be seen in the middle panel of Figure 8.6, the mean values
observed also fall below the theoretical average, except for social conformity
in both countries and the tendency, in Italy, to consider the world as a danger-
ous place, which are slightly above average.
In Caprara’s model, left-right ideology was predicted by the political val-
ues of equality, accepting immigrants (in Italy only), traditional morality (in
Italy only), and free enterprise (in Sweden only). Political values accounted
for 36% of variance in ideological self-placement in Italy (N = 289), and 57%
in Sweden (N = 388). Conservation and self-transcendence values exhibited
a meaningful pattern of relations with core political values, replicating the
results reported in Chapter 5. Specifically, conservation values were positively
related to traditional morality and law and order, and negatively related to
equality; self-transcendence values were positively related to equality and
accepting immigrants, and negatively related to traditional morality and law
and order. The basic traits of agreeableness and conscientiousness were posi-
tively related to both self-transcendence and conservation values; openness
was positively related to self-transcendence values, and negatively related to
conservation values.
There is some variability in the means of the variables included in this
model, as reported in the right-hand side of Figure 8.6. In both countries, the
majority of the observed means lie above the theoretical mean. This is not the
case of conservation values (in Sweden only), self-enhancement values, tradi-
tional morality, law and order, free enterprise, blind patriotism, and military
intervention.
One may be tempted to test alternative paths of influence by combining
elements drawn from these models. However, we prefer to conceive them
as complementary routes illuminating different aspects of the ideological
underpinnings. Although they partially overlap, each model appears to con-
tribute to a comprehensive view of the personal determinants of political
preference.
The differences observed between the two countries call for further, in-
depth investigation. The diversities are particularly salient with regard to the
variance of ideological self-placement that is accounted for by the models.
Although one may only guess what the source of these differences may be,
we need to keep in mind that Sweden is larger in area and far less popu-
lated than Italy, that its economy is much healthier, that its democracy has

been securely in place for far longer, and that its ideological divisions are less
controversial.
Although the preceding models were originally developed to account for
ideological orientation, Caprara et al. (2016) also investigated whether, and
to what extent, they may enable the prediction of citizens’ political partici-
pation. To this end, the authors adopted an exploratory approach and per-
formed a multiple regression to assess the proportion of variance of political
participation jointly accounted for by each set of variables, after the effects of
sociodemographic factors and left-right self-placement had been controlled
for. Political participation was measured by means of seven items inviting
participants to state whether they had participated or not in various political
activities during the previous year (e.g., “worked in a political party or action
group,” “signed a petition”).
The variables included in the Jost et al. model accounted for a 1% vari-
ance in Italy, and 7% in Sweden. System justification, resistance to change, and
preference for equality predicted political participation negatively, but only
in Sweden. In Italy, none of the variables impacted significantly on participa-
tion, over and above the effect of sociodemographic factors and ideological
self-placement.
The variables included in the Duckitt et al. model accounted for 4% of the
variance in Italy, and 8% in Sweden. Political participation in Sweden was
negatively predicted by RWA and social conformity. In Italy, it was negatively
predicted by SDO and beliefs regarding the competitive world.
The variables included in the Caprara et al. model accounted for 4% of
variance in Italy, and 11% in Sweden. Consistent with the findings reported
in Chapter 7, the openness trait showed a significant unique contribution
in Sweden, and was close to significance in Italy. Political participation in
Sweden was also negatively predicted by the political value of patriotism, and
positively predicted by openness to change values.
Thus, it would seem that, as in the case of political preference, the models
by Jost and Duckitt point to the aspects of personality associated most with
withdrawal from, rather than with active participation in, democratic politics.
The psychological dimensions included in these models are in fact related to
threat sensitivity, fear, anxiety, and uncertainty, and as such, they are likely
to inhibit rather than promote citizens’ political involvement in democratic
polities.
The model by Caprara et al. instead points to personality dimensions that
may either facilitate or inhibit political commitment. Whereas openness and
universalism values sustain participation, conservation values make people
hesitant to actively engage in politics, particularly when democracy requires

an equal respect of worldviews and lifestyles that challenge traditional views

of social order and morality.
On the whole, the variance of political participation accounted for by
the models is far lower than that observed for ideology. In actual fact, the
three models were conceived originally to account for political preference. It
is likely that a thorough investigation of the psychological underpinnings of
political participation may require psychological variables other than those
included in any of the preceding models.
ASSESSMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICIANS

The progress of democracy depends upon a knowledgeable, vigilant citi-
zenry, so that critical citizens demand that politicians be competent and reli-
able. Seeing that today democratization requires greater responsiveness to
citizens’ expectations than in the past on the part of the political elites, politi-
cal leadership needs to be able to inspire and motivate people, in addition
to getting things done and making goals attainable. To this end, knowledge
from psychology about the personality characteristics that most account for
political preferences and participation should help to identify and promote
the personal characteristics and the experiences that, among citizen and
politicians, most contribute to the functioning and progress of democracy. In
particular, such knowledge should help in the pursuit of two goals that are
crucial for democracy: (1) the identification of qualities that are most desirable
in politicians, and (2) the extension of active citizens’ political commitment.
To achieve these goals, the assessment of required qualities is important to
the fairness of procedures that make political offices accessible.
Knowledge about the personal characteristics of candidates that are par-
ticularly valued in politics, such as competence and integrity, could be use-
ful for citizens in deciding for whom to vote (Popkin, 1991; see Chapter 6 of
this volume). Likewise, knowledge about the qualities one should have and/
or develop in order to meet the requirements, challenges, and responsibilities
of political representativeness could be useful for any citizen considering run-
ning as a candidate for political office. Ultimately, higher transparency and
validity concerning the selection procedures associated with access to political
offices should facilitate the identification of good politicians, thereby achieving
a closer match between citizens’ expectations and politicians’ performance.
Furthermore, the more citizens have the possibility of occupying relevant
representative political positions, the more political expertise will be distrib-
uted among the electorate, and the greater the chance that democracy will
be practiced correctly. With this in mind, the number of terms for which a

person may hold the same political office should be limited. This may seem in
contrast with those who argue that the complexity of modern politics requires
people with greater and greater expertise and bears witness to a contradic-
tory evolution of mass democracy and political professionalization (Best,
2007). In reality, the politics of today requires a wider distribution of political
expertise, which can be best achieved by engaging more citizens in the exer-
cise of government.
Thus, we contend that a major de-professionalization of politics should
result in a higher politicization of citizenry, with great benefits for the func-
tioning of democracy. By assuming this position, we do not underestimate
the value of expertise and experience. We intend, rather, to limit the risk of
creating self-referential political elites.
We believe that the less politicians are allowed to form a long-term attach-
ment to their office, the less politics will become a kind of reserve estranged
from the views and needs of the populace; the more citizens alternate in polit-
ical office, the more the political agenda can be updated in accordance with
the demands and priorities of civic society; the less politicians hold positions
of permanent power, the less they will be tempted to bestow favors, and the
easier it will be for them to resist corruption and nepotism. Moreover, we
believe that, the more political knowledge and practice are distributed among
the electorate, the higher should be the collective investment and vigilance in
making democracy function.
Introducing limited mandates would not preclude representatives from
holding other political appointments or prevent them from being re-elected
to the same office after an interval of time, nor would it exclude people from
making their living from politics, in parties or in other political organiza-
tions. Mostly, it would work toward enlarging the share of the populace with
a direct experience of government, and avoid the establishment of politi-
cal castes, thereby reducing the distance between the seat of power and the
people.
A similar increase in the number of people experienced in the practice of
government might well be achieved through procedures designed to secure
the highest levels of transparency and validity, namely procedures that appear
clear and effective to all. Thus far, in most democracies, the recruitment and
development of political elites have been primarily through co- optation
and mentoring by parties (Best, 2007). However, lack of trust in politicians
and diffused criticism of their want of leadership, competence, and integrity
warn against the sustainability and effectiveness of the old methods.
Among the new methods that have been suggested, Silvester’s assess-
ment of political candidates in the United Kingdom is a case that deserves

great attention. In a way that may appear prosaic and provocative, Silvester
addresses politicians as political workers and proposes a kind of assessment for
politicians that has been frequently implemented in other organizations, such
as the military, the civil service, and various corporations. However, the imple-
mentation of this approach in government cannot be considered as completely
new if one remembers that, for almost a thousand years, the ruling class of
China was selected by means of a system of exams that might be considered a
precursor of the present-day emphasis on merit as a major criterion of appoint-
ment and promotion at all levels in the organization of society (Bell & Li, 2013;
Ho & Tsou, 1968). Nevertheless, Silvester’s proposal is provocative and innova-
tive to the degree that it may contribute to demystifying the figure of the politi-
cian, viewed as political workers, and supporting the systematic analysis of the
personal qualities that politicians need to fulfill their public role adequately.
The work of Silvester and colleagues also provides models and tools with
which to establish and assess the competencies and skills a politician should
possess and for linking these competencies and skills to stable personal-
ity characteristics (Silvester, 2008, 2012; Silvester & Dykes, 2007; Silvester &
Menges, 2011; Silvester, Wyatt, & Randall, 2014). In this regard, Sylvester and
colleagues are particularly accurate in targeting the qualities that are par-
ticularly needed in the different activities and at different stages of a politi-
cal career, like campaigning and performing electorally at local and national
levels.
Such work is particularly valuable since it carries empirical evidence that
assessment methods are valid both for evaluating politicians’ performance
in office, and in evaluating their electoral performance. Assessment has been
conducted in the United Kingdom on candidates and politicians of major
political parties at local and national level. Given the characteristics of the UK
electoral system, however, the extent to which the same procedures would
prove equally applicable and valid in other political contexts and under dif-
ferent electoral procedures needs to be examined carefully.
There is no reason to doubt the importance of qualities that have been
found as most relevant for holding a political office, namely, cognitive ana-
lytical abilities, communication and relational abilities, and resilience. These
qualities are easily traceable with an acceptable degree of approximation to
openness, emotional stability, conscientiousness, and agreeableness in the
domain of the Big Five. In this regard, the findings of Silvester and colleagues
do not differ substantially from those we found when confronting the average
ratings in the Big Five of Italian politicians with those of voters. As most of
the preceding abilities can be developed, one can easily imagine the advan-
tages that may be derived from their assessment beyond the mere selection

of candidates. Political parties and candidates, in fact, may benefit from inter-
ventions aimed at valuing individuals’ strengths and at improving the most
necessary skills. Likewise, as already stated in Chapter 6, the same qualities
can be viewed as related to the two personality characteristics that citizens
value most in politicians, namely, competence and integrity, although only to
a certain extent.
Values and moral dimensions, however, are more difficult to address
and to capture, especially through self-reports and reports from others.
This is mainly because they deploy over time, and their behavioral out-
comes are often subtle and ambiguous. People also tend to convey images
of themselves that they think are more socially desirable, while concealing
their true feelings, beliefs, desires, and fears, which they feel may attract
blame or censure. Indeed, assessing competence is much easier than assess-
ing integrity.
Unfortunately, most of what concerns the dark side of political leadership,
which has often been labeled as Machiavellianism or politicking, is difficult
to assess, other than through its effects when in practice, which is usually
too late for any remedies. Powerful mechanisms of self-deception and moral
disengagement may in fact operate in support of narcissism and destruc-
tive egotism. While the exercise of power may change personality, the need
to maintain power may reveal unexpected proclivities. The less desirable
aspects of personality deserve special attention, particularly when the values
and habits of politicians convey the public image of a nation and affect its
morality.
Assessment may serve to limit the risk, while limited mandates may
serve to contain the damage of bad choices. Furthermore, assessment could
be turned into political development programs aimed at promoting the ana-
lytical and communicative skills at the core of political competence, and at
developing the ethical judgment and the moral willpower that are primarily
required to hold various political offices with the utmost integrity.
As noted before, healing the malaise of established democracies also
requires investment in the knowledge and attitudes of all citizenry concerning
politics. Institutional reforms should, therefore, set the conditions for expand-
ing all citizens’ understanding of politics, for strengthening their commitment
toward the promotion of democratic values, and for enlarging the number of
citizens that are directly exposed to the exercise of government. Here, limited
mandates could help by creating greater chances for ordinary citizens to expe-
rience the role of responsible politician. The more citizens have such an experi-
ence, the more ordinary citizens there will be who can exert control over the
correct use of power by their representatives. Nothing, however, can be more

important than citizens’ appropriation of democratic values and citizens’ com-

mitment toward democracy. To this end, starting from infancy, every citizen
should receive an education in civics. Furthermore, one might even conceive
compulsory forms of civil service in which the young engage temporarily in
activities to the benefit of their communities, aimed at fostering a sense of
responsibility regarding the common good. This would be consistent with
assuming that, in order to develop values like respect, tolerance, and fairness,
and in order that the ideals of democracy become embedded in the core of the
self-identity of individuals, “the sooner and broader this education the better.”
Undoubtedly, democracy is a moral enterprise that rests mostly upon the
way people relate to themselves, to each other, and to life in general, and as
such, it requires investment in knowledge throughout society and in concrete
experiences capable of promoting that sense of personal and collective effi-
cacy necessary to self-governance.
CONCLUSIONS
Emerging value priorities, which stress self-actualization and autonomy, and
the increasing political sophistication of citizens, have resulted in greater crit-
icism of political elites and governments that seem unable to gain consensus
and to meet the demands and aspirations of citizens.
While traditional political agencies entrusted with the creation of con-
sensus and the legitimization of government have weakened, citizens have
been increasingly looking for a means of active participation in the decisions
that affect their lives, often beyond the channels and modes of conventional
politics. Thus, the decline in voter turnout in the world’s most consolidated
democracies may appear paradoxical. In reality, the degree to which the
general decline of voter turnout in these democracies corresponds to a real
decline in political commitment and a withdrawal of citizens from politics is
hard to say.
In this regard, we need to acquire a better understanding of the signifi-
cance of voting and of the various probable messages conveyed by absten-
tion. While voting has traditionally carried a symbolic valence associated
with membership in a particular social class, religion, or party, it is likely that
it assumes a self-expressive valence today more than in the past. Through
voting, in fact, citizens may convey their aspirations as individuals and as
rational agents who are aware of their rights and who want to count directly.
Today’s citizens are, in fact, increasingly informed about politics, due to
their higher education and to the pervasive influence of social media. Yet
their interest in and commitment to politics are linked to the influence that

they can exert, more so than previously. The findings reported in this chapter
attest to the substantial influence that personal inclinations and views exert
in organizing political experience, and as such they add to those presented in
previous chapters.
Overall, the findings suggest that voters’ political attitudes and choices
depend on the menu offered to them by parties and politicians less so than
in the past. Today, citizens can be seen as proactive agents whose priorities
largely dictate the kind of menus that political parties and politicians should
make available to them. Indeed, the more citizens are aware of their rights,
especially of their freedom to voice their opinions, the more mental represen-
tations of self and personal worldviews dictate their individual choices.
Citizens’ political preferences accord with their values, while their com-
mitment rests upon the extent to which political achievements are within
reach of their actions. Findings show that there is a substantial congruency
between what citizens think, their choices, and their political commitment.
The congruency mechanism allows the image that people have of themselves
to serve as a compass with which to navigate the world of politics.
As this congruency largely reflects how citizens’ personal inclinations
and values converge into a stable pattern for the organization of political
knowledge and the maintenance of political commitment, a major task of pol-
iticians is to interpret and meet what citizens expect from politics, rather than
conveying some predetermined menus. To this end, it is crucial to understand
how people relate their attitudes and choices to their values, and then to rec-
ognize what determines their preferences, what various forms their activism
takes, and the meaning of their abstention and withdrawal from politics.
In order to identify which personality variables are in play and to exam-
ine how they operate, researchers today have different conceptual models
at their disposal that, to various degrees, can explain citizens’ consistency
and coherence in their preferences and investment in politics. Taken together,
these models can help gain a more comprehensive understanding of the dis-
positions, values, and attitudes that may sustain or counter democracy’s func-
tioning and development.
To make democracy function, conditions for the widest participation of
citizens have to be set. It is an irremediable loss for democracy when edu-
cated and critical citizens withdraw from the political game. Yet educated
and critical citizens do not invest in politics unless they are certain they
can count.
Limitation of terms of office might serve to increase the number of citi-
zens directly exposed to the practice of government and spread knowledge of
government and the skills required to exercise it among the general populace.

Implementing valid procedures to assess and develop the personal quali-

ties of candidates for political office may serve to recruit better politicians
according to the criteria of transparency, competence, and integrity, which
citizens value most and democracy requires in order to function well. An
early education in civics and experience in civil service might serve to foster
that sense of responsibility and commitment that the growth of democracy
requires of all citizens.
NOTES
1. These studies were carried out on appropriate samples and have remained
unpublished to date.
2. An example of an item for measuring epistemic motives (Roets & Van Hiel,
2011) is “I don’t like situations that are uncertain.” An example of an item for
measuring existential motives (Wong, Reker, & Gesser, 1994) is “It annoys
me to hear about death.” An example of a relational-motive item (Stern, West,
Jost, & Rule, 2012) is “I prefer to have my own unique understanding of the world”
(reverse-scored). An example of an item for measuring system justifica-
tion (Kay & Jost, 2003) is “Society is set up so that people usually get what they
deserve.” An example of an item for measuring resistance to change (Nilsson
& Jost, 2012) is “If you start changing things very much, you often end up making
them worse.” An example of an item for measuring acceptance of inequality
(Nilsson & Jost, 2012) is “The government should take more measures to elimi-
nate economic disparities between men and women who are doing the same work”
(reverse-scored).
3. An example of an item for measuring SDO (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001) is “Some
groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.” An example of an item for
measuring RWA (Zakrisson, 2005) is “There are many radical, immoral people
trying to ruin things; the society ought to stop them.” An example of an item for
measuring beliefs regarding a competitive world (Duckitt, 2001) is “Life is not
governed by the ‘survival of the fittest.’ We should let compassion and moral laws be
our guide.” An example of an item for measuring beliefs regarding a dangerous
world (Duckitt, 2001) is “There are many dangerous people in our society who will
attack someone out of pure meanness, for no reason at all.” Examples of adjectives
used to measure social conformity (Duckitt, 2001) are “conforming” and “obedi-
ent.” Examples of adjectives used to connote tough-versus tender-mindedness
(Duckitt, 2001) are “cynical” and “ruthless.”

Concluding Remarks
DEMOCRACY AND PERSONALITY

Democracy has been often viewed as an ideal system belonging to the sphere
of philosophical speculation. Yet this ideal may be traced back to hypotheses
concerning forms of government that one may assess by means of empirical
investigation. We believe that the hypothesis that views freedom of thought,
equal respect, and fair opportunities for all as the main forces sustaining
the development of individuals, the hypothesis that sees democracy as the
form of popular self-governance best suited to the achievement of these con-
ditions, and the hypothesis that sees the development of personality and of
democracy as mutually interdependent, as posited here, should be assessed
by means of the usual standards of scientific, scholarly inquiry. To this regard,
current findings are still lacking, though promising.
Whereas previous research reveals the existence of positive links between
education, cognitive ability, emancipative values, and democracy (Inglehart
& Welzel, 2005; Rindermann, 2008), the arguments and findings presented
in this volume help to clarify the extent to which democracy may represent
the political system best suited to human development. In particular, they
attest to the crucial role of psychological inquiry in elucidating the connec-
tions between psychological growth and democratization.
In our reasoning, we have endorsed an extended definition of democ-
racy as the political system that aims to grant all citizens free expression of
ideas and preferences about how to live one’s own life and about how society
should be governed, self-respect and respect of others, equal treatment before
the law, and equal concern of government for the welfare of all citizens. This
leads us to view democracy as the political system most congenial to human
development, as it pursues conditions of life that afford individuals freedom,
dignity, and responsibility. These, in fact, are the distinctive properties and
349

aims of human beings, the expression and attainment of which attest to their
development. The ideals of democracy, however, cannot be properly achieved
unless the full actualization of citizens’ potentials is realized, since the func-
tioning and progress of democratic government depend upon citizens’ abili-
ties and values. Although we have no doubt that this goal is still far from
being attained, we cannot but pursue it.
The rising complexity of economic and political life in a multicultural
world, in fact, entails a growing dependence on people’s capacities to man-
age new knowledge and technologies and to face new ethical and social
challenges. Ultimately, citizens’ psychological growth is the common
denominator when it comes to productivity, innovativeness, responsibility,
and trust. All these are human qualities that need to be cherished and cul-
tivated in order to achieve and guarantee respect for law and order, to sus-
tain socioeconomic development, and to promote the effective functioning
of democracy.
With this in mind, it is crucial for us to understand how human beings
become equipped to meet the challenges of existence, how they adapt and
contribute to the transformation of their social environments, and how politi-
cal and social institutions can contribute to promote the habits, values, and
interpersonal relations best suited to the well-being of individuals and the
prosperity of society. It is no less important to understand the intimate resis-
tances and fears that may hinder the development of individuals and impede
social change.
To address these issues, we have endorsed an extended definition of
personality as an agentic system that shows different features that one may
describe as behavioral tendencies or traits, motives, values, and self-beliefs,
and which possess the unique properties of self-awareness, self-reflection,
self-regulation, forethought, and intentionality. Whereas the former proper-
ties concern how persons present themselves and impact the outer world, the
latter concern what is unique about being a person, of having a stable sense
of identity, of being the owner of one’s own desires, thoughts, and purposes,
and of feeling responsible for the consequences of one’s own actions without
indulging in self-justification.
In positing personality at the core of our discourse, we have presented
personality psychology as the discipline best suited to bridge the gap between
biological and social sciences in order to gain a more comprehensive under-
standing of human action, including political behavior. We have indicated
personality psychology as the domain of inquiry where traditional traits and
social cognitive approaches converge with recent approaches that benefit
from genetics and the neurosciences to reach a better understanding of the

whole person. As such, it may play a special role both in understanding the
pathways most conducive to putting people’s assets at the service of effective
democracy, and in understanding how democracy can effectively contribute
to people’s personal development.
Agency and Communion

Under the assumption that good and evil are equally within the reach of
human beings, we have argued that the course of individuals’ lives and the
organization of societies largely reflect the solution given to two fundamental
quests of human existence: how to relate to one’s nature and to the environ-
ment as self-governing agents, and how to operate in concert with others as
social beings. This leads us to view Agency and Communion as the two fun-
damental modalities of human condition to which one may trace the major
expressions of personality.
Agency is about autonomy, competence, volition, and responsibility, and
manifests itself in needs and feelings of mastery and through the ability of
individuals to make things happen and to exert control over themselves and
the environment in the pursuit of their goals. Communion is about related-
ness, interdependence, and inclusiveness, and manifests itself in needs and
feelings of attachment and belonging, and in individuals’ abilities to engage
in cooperative actions and to transcend their own views and priorities in the
pursuit of common aims.
As people need to meet the requirements of both agency and communion
to manage their lives, nature equips people with potentials that culture and
nurture contribute to shaping and turning into traits, values, and attitudes.
Among these basic traits, the tendency to take a positive stance regarding
experience predisposes people to value their own lives and those of others,
despite the frailty of human existence, and equips them to strive for their own
realization through autonomy, competence, and relatedness. While traits like
energy/extraversion and openness may be viewed as part of executive equip-
ment best able to operate in the service of Agency, agreeableness, conscien-
tiousness, and emotional stability can be viewed as traits that stand primarily
at the service of Communion. Among the basic values, one may distinguish
those that regard, above all, the social dimension of experience, such as uni-
versalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, and security, and those that, on
the other hand, concern mostly the personal dimension of experience, such as
self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, and power.
Ultimately, Agency and Communion can provide general criteria to
describe and organize the distinctive features of individuals’ personalities
across domains of functioning and societies. Their duality, however, should

not lead us to lose sight of what accounts for the distinctiveness of person-
alities and societies, namely, the different combinations resulting from how
the priorities and modalities people avail themselves of to manage their lives
complement each other, favoring well-being and welfare.
HUMAN POTENTIAL
Some of the findings provided by the neurosciences and psychology inform
us that human beings are equipped by nature to develop capacities that
allow them to extend their control over their environment and their lives.
Individuals’ potentials for self-reflection, for learning, for forethought, and
for matching their actions to their aims place people in the role of agents that
contribute actively to their own development. The degree to which poten-
tials can turn into effective capacities, however, is conditional on opportuni-
ties to acknowledge the reach and the consequences of one’s actions, to learn
and to exercise one’s abilities, and to extend one’s own mastery over multiple
domains of functioning. The findings provided by the neurosciences attest
to the vast potential of genetic endowment, the plasticity of cerebral func-
tions and the malleability of conduct resulting from interplay between nature
and nurture. The findings from developmental and social psychology attest
to the importance of social context in providing the opportunities to appro-
priate and value one’s personal assets. Indeed, the mental structures and pro-
cesses that govern thought, motivation, and actions—that enable individuals
to interact purposively with the environment, and thus to actively chart the
course of their lives—have to be properly nurtured. The influence that people
may exert over their lives, in fact, depends upon the goals they set for them-
selves, which, in turn, depend upon the extent to which they acknowledge,
develop, and master mandatory capacities.
Thus, to grant all citizens equal opportunities to acknowledge and culti-
vate their talents is an indispensable condition for securing the mental capi-
tal that societies need to develop. This requires considerable investment in
people’s capacities no less than careful consideration of their aspirations. In
reality, as stated in Chapter 2, findings leave no doubts concerning the long-
lasting effects of early deprivation and the cost to individuals and societies
of the amount of potential that remains unexpressed due to lack of oppor-
tunity and motivation. Not all the poor are destined to a miserable life,
but poverty still accounts for a large portion of deficiencies in intelligence,
capabilities, and life attainments in all, including developed, countries. To
grant each individual equal opportunities to express his or her talents is
crucial to the nurture of self-worth and is decisive in sustaining individual’s

motivation to the make the best of him-or herself. Nothing can confirm
being valued more than being granted equal access to health care, educa-
tion, and a decent occupation. Yet widespread inequality and poverty still
prevent large segments of society from accessing the basic ingredients nec-
essary for self-regard, even within established democracies (Sen, 1992). In
reality, nothing can attest to the value attributed by society to the lives of
individuals better than the promotion of their personalities.
Resources, activities, and opportunities to learn and practice skills allow
people to turn their potentials into capacities and achievements, and thus, to
be free of the pressure to simply survive through the possibility of focusing
on developmental needs. This leads people to internalize values that tran-
scend one’s own material interests, and to pursue ideals that form a perma-
nent base for self-respect and for the respect they expect from others, and thus
for their well-being.
Intelligence and learning set the conditions for developing the abilities
that are needed to take the best advantage of natural resources and technolo-
gies to transform the environment and to create habitats most congenial to
human development. Moral development and reasoning set the conditions
for the appropriation of values indispensable for motivation and the exercise
of will power, which are needed to pursue the ideals of liberty, equality, and
fairness that democracy preaches.
Democracy as a Moral Enterprise

Democracy aims to grant citizens equal consideration of their needs, opin-
ions, and aspirations under the assumption that they are responsible agents
inclined to treat one another as socially equal and as individuals who
are willing to operate in concert in the pursuit of the common good. This
requires the ideals of equal dignity, mutual respect, and fairness to be at the
core of citizens’ aspirations and makes democracy dependent upon their
morality.
Indeed, democracy may function and develop to the extent that citizens
operate as moral agents who assign equal consideration to one’s own and oth-
ers’ self-regard, well-being, and realization. This requires us to assign special
importance to the moral reasoning and willpower of citizens necessary to
promote the effective functioning and development of democracy. Moral rea-
soning and willpower, in fact, set the conditions both for valuing freedom,
equality, and justice and for behaving in accordance with principles of mutual
respect and concern for the common good. Ultimately, it is the moral develop-
ment of its citizens that permits self-determination and self-actualization to
act as the effective motors of democracy as a collective endeavor, capable of

extending equal right to a decent life to each individual, thus enhancing the
freedom of all to the maximum.
Moral development, however, does not occur equally from all contexts
and experiences, but is conditional on the development of cognitive, emo-
tional, and self-regulatory structures that enable people to distinguish good
from evil, to take the perspective of others, to anticipate and feel respon-
sible for the consequences of their own actions, to pursue what is good,
and to refrain from what is bad for themselves and for others. Indeed, as
stated in Chapter 3, moral principles are effective to the extent that they are
fully internalized and operate as core components of personal identity; this
means that they cannot be ignored without undermining self-respect and
acceptance.
Also, moral development rests upon cognitive and affective potentials
that turn into judgments, feelings, values, purposes, choices, and actions that
continuously have to match needs and resources, means and ends, duties and
rights, obligations and preferences. All this largely depends on opportuni-
ties to reflect upon experience, to practice freedom of choice, to adopt values,
to appraise one’s needs and feelings and those of others, and to match one’s
behavior to moral standards. This requires proper experiences of exposure,
exercise, monitoring, and mastery.
As the development of democracy rests upon an ethic of the public good,
an education in civics and civil commitment are crucial to sustaining the
internalization of values that transcend mere self-interest. Trustworthy insti-
tutions, however, are vital for establishing these values, for placing equal
concern for one’s own well-being and that of others at the core of one’s self-
respect and self-actualization, and for the transmission of these values from
one generation to another.
The Commitment of Citizens

Citizens make choices about and engage in politics congruent with values
they cherish and with the aims they perceive as within their reach. Over the
last three centuries, the progress of democracy has been driven by growing
demands for social change and claims for more freedom, equality, and jus-
tice. Ultimately, liberty, equal dignity, and fairness have become the values
that form the core of established democracies, whereas ideological diversity
mostly reflects the degree to which these priorities inform contingent policies.
Few in fact, would dispute the inalienability of citizens’ rights to voice their
opinions, to equal treatment by government and the law, and to decent and
respectable life conditions.

We are aware that this occurs mostly in the West, but the advancement of
democracy throughout the world over the past few decades encourages our
optimism. The democratization progress has been prepared and accompa-
nied by economic changes that have increased the world population, length-
ened people’s life expectancy, and emancipated the majority of people from
the necessity to satisfy mere survival-level needs, thus fostering the growth of
their aspirations. Democratic progress has brought with it higher concomitant
demands on the part of people for self-determination and self-actualization,
as well as greater awareness of their civil and political rights.
We believe that individuals’ demands for self-expression attest to the
degree of their personality development. Likewise, we believe that citizens’
awareness and commitment to their civil and political rights attest to the
degree of a society’s democratization.
We have found that the most important priorities of both sides of the polit-
ical divide concerning basic values and core political values are self-direction
and universalism, and civil liberties and equality, respectively, across several
democratic countries. This confirms the interdependence of the development
of democracy and of personality. The more democracy establishes the condi-
tions for the emancipation of citizens from the satisfaction of bare necessities
to the pursuit of growth, the more citizens endorse values that agree with the
self-actualization of themselves and of others.
Likewise, we saw the least importance assigned to power among basic val-
ues, with authoritarianism and social dominance largely discredited by the
majority of citizens. This further demonstrates the mutual relations between
citizens’ higher concern for their self-actualization and citizens’ greater con-
fidence in collective self-governance, concomitant with the establishment of
democracy.
Citizens need to be guided and mentored by political elites less than in
the past, insofar as educated and self-reflective citizens find in their values the
coherence that binds their beliefs in accordance with the priorities that dictate
their choices in any realm of life, including politics. The roots of political pref-
erences, in fact, can be found in the nature of human personality, in its traits,
needs, and basic values.
The mechanism of congruency permits dispositions and values related
to Agency and Communion to turn into a system of beliefs and attitudes
capable of organizing political knowledge in ways that bestow order, stabil-
ity, and continuity on citizens’ choices. In this regard, it is hard to imagine
a simpler and more effective device with which to organize political knowl-
edge than the traditional left-right ideology, despite frequent announcements

of its disuse. Indeed, a similar device is the result of the fruitful debate that
accompanied the progress of democracy over the last two centuries. As such,
it continues to orient citizens of Western established democracies and to give
voice to their personal leanings and aspirations in the complex world of poli-
tics (Jost et al., 2006).
Furthermore, if there were no such thing as a distinction between left
and right, one would have to invent an equivalent to limit the transformism of
politicians by anchoring their promises in consensual value maps. One may
doubt that the same ideological cleavage can be used in polities that do not
share the same common historical and cultural legacy, which may be traced
to the ideals of the Enlightenment, the industrial revolution, the birth of the
nation-state, as well as the vicissitudes of constitutionalism and parliamen-
tarianism in Europe and North America. Yet, in most Western democracies,
left and right, in terms of liberals and conservatives, are social constructs that
exert a unique function in organizing political knowledge and in orienting
political choices by combining believing and belonging, and by helping to
define citizens’ social identity.
Whereas, in the past, belonging was mostly a matter of ascription that
largely subsumed the individuals’ will, today it is primarily a matter of free
choice that is largely driven by beliefs and by choice. Indeed, people feel that
they belong not just to a social class or to a religion, as in the past, but to ide-
als of humanity, of personhood, and of rights that they have chosen and have
made their own.
Informed citizens are their own persons and believe that they are entitled
to express their individuality and realize their potential fully under two con-
ditions: (a) when their conduct is congruent with the values that are at the core
of the self and from whose fulfillment they derive self-respect, and (b) when
the political system that they aim to realize is congruent with the ideals they
uphold.
Political ideologies represent a coherent pattern of interdependent beliefs
whose reciprocal constraints and stability are largely grounded in people’s dis-
positions, aspirations, and identities. Today, left-right and liberal-conservative
preferences largely reflect either how people are naturally inclined or how
they have been socially prepared to deal with Agency and Communion, and
thus to organize their beliefs about how they should behave with others and
about how society should be governed.
People’s values mediate basic traits, and core political values mediate the
influence that basic values exert on ideological preferences. Values and politi-
cal attitudes that underlie traditional ideological cleavages, however, appear
less distant than in the past. Thus, differences should not lead us to overlook

important commonalities among political opponents, because most past con-

tentions regarding the extension of liberty and equality appear to have been
largely attenuated, though to different extents across polities. Neither should
commonality of principles, on the other hand, induce us to overlook the
important discrepancies existing within the realm of facts. In reality, inequal-
ity of wealth between those at the top of the social pyramid and the majority
of the population has increased over the last few decades, even in consoli-
dated democracies (Piketty, 2013; Stiglitz, 2012). It is evident that discrepan-
cies between the rhetoric of equality and the practice of inequality represent
a challenge for democracy.
Whereas change is the main mover of democratic development, attitude
toward change has distinguished the political left and right since the French
Revolution. While the left has dictated the course of change, first toward more
freedom, then toward greater equality, and finally toward more fairness and
solidarity, the right has often been decisive in realizing its implementation
by moderating the pace of change in accordance with the contingencies of
history.
Over the past few decades, the alternation between left and right has
moved the pendulum of politics back and forth between the demand for
greater intervention of states on matters of health, education, and labor and
the claims of free market policies enabling societies to grow in a globalized
economy. Today, distinctions between left and right in programs and priori-
ties only remotely correspond to earlier divisions of how a democratic society
should function and be governed. Whereas traditional morality remains in
several countries the source of ideological polarization around issues like gay
marriage and abortion, one can be confident in the strong tolerance carried by
new generations, interreligious marriages, and multicultural societies.
Whereas equality has been a major source of differences between left and
right in the past, few would argue against the need to grant all citizens equal-
ity with regard to respect or against the need to grant all citizens equal oppor-
tunities to express their potential and adequate resources to make life worth
living. More and more voters are critical citizens who dictate the contents
and priorities of political offerings, while their engagement more and more
depends upon their trust in democratic institutions and their confidence in
their representatives.
Though the pressure of contingencies may force the left and the right, as
well as liberals and conservatives, to converge on pragmatic solutions, ide-
ology still plays an important role in the creation of consensus, in sustain-
ing collective action around the order of priorities, and in binding the action
of politicians to the achievement and implementation of their promises.

Ultimately, the alternation in government of competing political ideologies

may activate virtuous circles in which shared priorities in the sphere of basic
values benefit from diversity of views and policies that compete in the pursuit
of best solutions to achieve the common good.
As the progress of democracy brings in its wake an increase in the aspira-
tions of citizens regarding the way it works, their confidence in democratic
institutions and their commitment to democratic ideals may become more
important than their satisfaction when evaluating the state of health of demo-
cratic policies.
Political Efficacy
The effective functioning of democracy requires virtuous institutions,
informed citizens who are devoted to the principles and practices of democ-
racy, and leaders capable of granting government’s efficiency and transpar-
ency. Virtuous institutions should establish the conditions through which to
develop their citizens’ ability to understand politics and promote collective
self-governance among them.
High cognitive functioning is required to acquire and master larger
amounts of knowledge, while moral integrity is needed to guarantee that
habits and relations conform to the highest point of human dignity. Citizens
who are cognitively sophisticated and authentically committed to the pur-
suit of democratic ideals are likely to make informed choices when voting, to
exert critical vigilance over their representatives’ conduct, and to contribute
actively to the functioning of democratic institutions.
Democracy is not just a matter of constitutional engineering, but also of
psychological development and commitment. Indeed, the quality and the
practice of democracy rest upon citizens’ intelligence, values, and ability to
agree regarding goals and to regulate the way they pursue common ends.
Institutions should set and preserve conditions to value and nurture the
political efficacy and moral integrity that effective collective self-governance
requires.
It is most likely that no other form of government depends on the psychol-
ogy of citizens and benefits from the development of their personalities as
much as democracy does. Certainly other forms of government may benefit
from extended education, from universal health and security systems, from
full employment as they carry larger capacities to compete in world markets,
to produce goods, to increase productivity, to value natural resources, to be
efficient in administration, and to innovate in science. Yet one may wonder to
what extent all this can be achieved unless people’s aspirations for freedom,

equal respect, and voice in the government of society are acknowledged.

Likewise, one may wonder to what extent the best of cognitive and non-
cognitive capacities can find full expression in political systems that limit
people’s self-determination in the domain of public affairs and of government.
While governments cannot rely upon the talents and views of the elites
alone, the people cannot resist the attraction of democracy. This is particu-
larly so today, where new media have extended the extraordinary power of
comparison and imitation in raising the level of aspirations and in mobilizing
people to seek higher opportunities for self-determination, freedom of choice,
and political participation.
Findings leave no doubt about the role of social and economic develop-
ment in setting the conditions for higher demands of self-governance con-
ducive to democracy. Likewise, findings leave no doubt about the role of
psychological development in providing the capacities of self-governance that
set the conditions for effective collective self-governance.
Political thinkers have acknowledged that the functioning of democ-
racy has depended from the very beginning, and above all, on people’s
mindsets and attitudes. The reasoning we have expounded in this volume
rests upon the conviction that democracy is the form of government most
congenial to people’s self-determination and to the full actualization of
their potentials.
Yet, we are aware that the proper functioning of democracy remains an
arduous task that still meets with major resistance that underpin the beliefs
and habits of the people. To counteract this resistance, we fail to envisage solu-
tions other than investment in people’s moral and civic education. In actual
fact, societies should invest massively in the promotion of democratic princi-
ples, in the diffusion of rules and habits among citizens from early childhood,
in such a way as to enable people to appreciate and commit themselves to the
realization and safeguard of democracy.

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About the Authors
GIAN VITTORIO CAPRARA

Gian Vittorio Caprara holds a Laurea degree in Political Science and a
Specialization degree in Psychology, both from the Catholic University of
Milan. He is full professor of Personality Psychology at Sapienza University
of Rome, where he has also served as Chair of the Department of Psychology,
Dean of Faculty of Psychology, President of Federate Faculties of Arts, Law
and Economics, and Chair of the Inter-University Center for the Research
on the origin of prosocial and antisocial motivations. He is a member of the
Academia Europaea and of several international scientific associations. His
research has addressed several topics across personality psychology, social
psychology, and political psychology, with a special focus on the personal
determinants of successful development and well-being.
Caprara is author and co-author of over 500 scientific publications, includ-
ing several volumes, such as Personality: Determinants, Dynamics, and Potentials
in collaboration with Daniel Cervone, published by Cambridge University
Press, 2000.
MICHELE VECCHIONE
Michele Vecchione holds a Laurea degree in Psychology from Sapienza
University of Rome and a PhD in Personality and Social Psychology from
the University of Padua. At present, he is Professor of Psychometrics at the
Department of Psychology (Sapienza University of Rome) and Junior Research
Fellow at Sapienza School for Advanced Studies (SSAS).
Vecchione’s main research interests focus on the application of multivari-
ate statistics to diverse areas of psychology, with a special focus on personal-
ity assessment across multiple domains. Vecchione is author and co-author of
over 120 scientific publications, including several chapters and books.
399

Index
Abstention, 323 personality traits predisposing

Abu Ghraib prison, 96 to, 141
Achievement motivation, 26 political leaders, 231, 234–35
Affinities (elective), 130 in political participation, 261, 262,
agency and communion, 81 285–86, 292–93
gender differences, 296–97 religion, religiosity, 109, 111
gender differences in, 299t traits of personality, 54–55, 81
non-voters, 326f values, 81, 167
political leadership, 224, 225f, in voting, 313–14, 321, 327–29
227t, 246 Agreeableness, 24, 52
religiosity in voting behaviors, gender differences in, 298t
155–57, 156t, 170nn7–8 left/right distinction, properties,
Schwartz model, 58–60, 59t, 60f 138–39, 141
values, commonalities in, 152, 153t political leadership, 220, 220f, 224f,
values in structure/coherence, 190t 226, 226t, 228f, 232t, 233, 234, 303–4
Abilities, 246 in political participation, 271–72,
Activism, 254, 263, 264, 277–83, 280f, 272f, 273t
281–82t, 289, 293–95 religiosity and, 111
Activities, 252 religiosity in voting behaviors, 155
Adjective Check List (ACL), 23 Schwartz model of, 52, 53t, 61
Adorno, T., 19 Alessandri, G., 297
Affiliation, belonging Alford, J. R., 38
political participation, 257, 258 Allport, G., 309
traits of personality, 56–57, 81 Altemeyer, R., 21
Afghanistan, 174 American National Election Studies
Africa, 125 (ANES), 158
Agency, 262 Amodio, D. M., 37, 38
Agency beliefs (see also perceived Amygdala, 37, 69n1
self-efficacy) Anderson, M. R., 270
Agency versus Communion Androgens, 36
Big Five traits, 81, 155 Anterior cingulate cortex, 37, 69n1
concepts, definitions of, 351–52 Approach-avoidance responses,
liberal/conservative ideology, 81–82 36, 70n3
moral convictions, 106–8 Ashton, M. C., 128
in morality, 80–83, 86, 100–101, Asia, 125
109, 111 Aspelund, A., 146
401

402Index
Assessment of politicians, 341–45. Belonging, 349

see also political leadership Bem, D. J., 333
Assessments of leaders, 82 Benevolence
-at distance gender differences, 296–97, 299t, 300
-through self reports non-voters, 326f
Attachment, 174 political leadership, 224–25, 225f,
Athenian democracy, 1–2 227t, 246, 280
Attentional target selection, 36, religiosity in voting behaviors, 152–57,
69n1, 70n3 153t, 156t, 165, 170nn7–8
Attribution, 230 Schwartz model, 58–61, 59t, 60f
Augemberg, K., 276 values in structure/coherence,
Australia, 278 186, 190t
civil liberties in, 205f, 207 Berlusconi, S., 142, 231, 232t, 237, 238f,
economic security, 193–94, 194f 239, 245, 246, 249n5
immigrants, accepting, 207f, 208 Best, H., 221–22, 224
left/right distinction, 132–37, 133t, Big Five traits
147, 169nn1–2 agency and communion, 81, 155
left/right ideology, 124, 125 ideology and, 137–42, 155
left/right ideology, gender in morality, 111
differences, 300–301, 300–303, 302f political participation, 144–46
left/right political values, in political participation, 268, 269f,
208–10, 209t 270–75, 272f, 273t, 274f,
political attitudes factor analysis, 275t, 305n2
194–201, 200f politicians, BFQ testing, 218–22,
political attitudes in, 180–84, 182t, 219–20f, 223f
183f, 215nn1–2 politicians, left vs. right wing, 223–25,
religiosity in voting behaviors, 157–65, 224–25f
159f, 161–62t religion, religiosity, 111–12
religiosity/values correlations, 210–13, Schwartz model, 56–61, 59t, 60f
210t, 212f traits of personality, 28n3, 33, 52–54,
values, commonalities in, 53t, 56, 61
152–54, 153t values, effects on, 53t, 54, 155, 187
values in structure/coherence, Billiet, J., 186
188–201, 189–90t, 190f, 194–200f, Binding, 357
215nn3–4 Bonds, 80, 101
values/political activism in, 278, 280, Blasi, A., 89–93
280f, 281t Blind patriotism, 174
voting, values as predictive of, political attitudes, 174, 176b, 178t, 189,
150, 150f 190f, 191, 206f, 208
Austria, 146, 276 political participation, 281–82t,
Authoritarianism, 336 283, 301t
Authoritarian Personality, The, 19–20 Bobbio, N., 181
Bowlby, J., 79
Bad apple theories, 96, 98 Brady, D., 267
Bakan, D., 54, 80, 83 Brain-systems, 29, 35
Bandura, A., 86, 89–95, 97, 98, 287 structures
Barbaranelli, C., 138, 230–31, 242 process
Barber, J., 22 functions
Belgium, 138, 146, 276 Brazil

Index 403
economic security, 193–94, 194f left/right ideology, gender

left/right distinction, 132–37, 133t, differences, 300–301, 300–303, 302f
147, 147–49t, 169nn1–2 left/right political values,
left/right ideology, gender 208–10, 209t
differences, 300–301, needs, motives, values in political
300–303, 302f preference, 140–41, 147, 147–49t
left/right political values, personality traits as value
208–10, 209t predictors, 184–87, 185t, 186f
political attitudes in, 180–84, 182t, political attitudes in, 180–84, 182t,
183f, 215nn1–2 183f, 215nn1–2
religiosity in voting behaviors, political participation, Big Five traits
157–65, 159f, 161–62t in, 270
religiosity/values correlations, religiosity in voting behaviors, 157–65,
210–13, 210t, 212f 159f, 161–62t
values in structure/coherence, religiosity/values correlations, 210–13,
188–201, 189–90t, 190f, 194–200f, 210t, 212f
215nn3–4 values, commonalities in,
values/political activism in, 278, 280, 152–54, 153t
280f, 281t values in structure/coherence,
voting, values as predictive of, 188–201, 189–90t, 190f, 194–200f,
150, 150f 215nn3–4
Bullock, J., 317 values/political activism in, 278, 280,
Bush, G.W., 138 280f, 281t
Bush, G., 173 voting, values as predictive of,
150, 150f
Campbell, A., 285, 288t China, 13, 51, 100, 122, 319, 343
Campus, D., 304 Citizenship
Canada, 124, 128, 136 commitment in, 354–58
Capabilities, 266 elective affinities, 143, 319
Capanna, C., 287, 288t, 293, 294 in political participation, 260–65,
Caprara, G. V., 97, 132, 138–39, 139f, 146, 305, 315–16
149, 152, 154, 170n6, 173, 218–23, values/voting relationships,
229, 230–31, 234, 236, 242, 245, 268, 329–35, 332f
287, 288t, 297, 320, 325, 328, 336–41, voting symbolic value, 312–13
337–38f Citizens, 309
Caprara, M. G., 297 -likes and dislikes
Care, 288 - critical
Carney, D. R., 138 Civicness
Castelli, L., 246 Civic education, 1, 263
Catholicism, 110, 112–15, 163 Civic engagement. see also political
Caution vs. Excitement participation, 6, 57
Children commitment in, 261–66, 271, 305
moral development in, 84, 88 factors affecting, 3–7
positivity in, 78–79 moral disengagement, 91–99, 97t,
potentials of, 42–46, 50 108, 119
Chile Civil liberties, 125
economic security, 193–94, 194f political attitudes, 175, 177b, 178,
left/right distinction, 132–37, 133t, 178t, 190f, 191, 205f, 214–15
169nn1–2 political participation, 281–82t, 301t

404Index
Civil rights, 126 Conscientiousness

Clinton, B., 173 agency and communion, 81
Cochrane, C., 195 gender differences in, 298t
Cohen, A. B., 158 left/right distinction,
Communion. see agency and properties, 137–41
communion, 230 non-voters, 324
Concern for self vs. Concern for others political leadership, 220f, 224, 224f,
Conformity, 243f 226, 226t, 228f, 233
gender differences in, 299t in political participation, 270,
political leadership, 224, 225f, 227t 272, 273t
religiosity and, 112 religiosity and, 111
religiosity in voting behaviors, 155–57, religiosity in voting
156t, 170nn7–8 behaviors, 155
Schwartz model, 58–61, 59t, 60f Schwartz model of, 52, 53t, 61
values, commonalities in, 152, 153t Conservation values, 327
values in structure/coherence, 186–87, Consistency, 329
189, 190t Constraint, 334
values/political activism in, 278–79 Converse, P. E., 228
Coherence, 316 Convictions, 106
Congruency model, 326 Conway, L., 25
acceptance of inequality, 347n2 Coolidge, C., 22
agency and communion in, 313–14, Core political values, 171
321, 327–29 (see also political attitudes)
civil-virtue model, 312 Cortisol, 36
cohesion, inclusiveness, 322 Costa, P. T. Jr., 296
dual process model, 336, 337f, Costantini, E., 23, 217
341, 347n3 Craig, S. C., 288t
electoral competition model, 311–12 Craik, K., 23
electoral participation Craik, K. H., 217
models, 310–12 Crano, W. D., 236
left/right ideology in, 316, 321, 325–28, Critical citizen, 283
326f, 331–33, 332f, 337–39, 338f Croatia, 146
mobilization model, 311 Crystallized intelligence, 48
needs, motivations in voting Culture, 296
behaviors, 315–16, 336–37, Civilization, 75
336f, 347n2 Czech Republic, 145, 146, 276
non-voting, 314, 324–29, 326f
patterns of congruency, 316–17 Dalton, R. J., 317
political agenda changes, 318–20 Davidov, E., 186
political leadership, 316–19 Deci, E. L., 56
principles of, 317–24, 323f Democracy
resistance to change, 347n2 access to public office, 3
resource model, 310–11 accountability in, 3, 4, 6, 11–12
self-worth, self-respect, 321 benefits, merits of, 13, 349–51
system justification, 347n2 challenges in, 1–7
values/voting relationships, 329–35, citizens’ self-realization, 4–5
332f, 337–40, 338f, 346–47 common good, just society, 11–12
voter turnout, 309–15, 346 Democratic institutions, 83
voting symbolic value, 312–13, 345 education effects on, 50–51

Index 405
fairness, 4, 6–7, 11–13 Eisenhower, D., 22

ideologically based differences Elective affinities, 143, 319
in, 13–14 Electoral competition model, 311–12
institutions in, 2–7 Electoral participation models, 310–12
intuitions, intentionality, 11–12 Embodied moral cognitions, 102–4
media role in, 9 Emotions, 316
as moral enterprise, 353–54 Emotional stability, 343
personality development agency and communion, 81
personalizing politics, 7–14, 27 gender differences in, 298t
political participation, 3–7 left/right distinction,
politicians’ personalities, image, 9 properties, 141
principles of, 2, 3 political leadership, 220f, 221, 222,
public indifference, 224, 224f, 226t, 232t
dissatisfaction, 5–6 in political participation, 270, 273t
shifts in focus, 8–9 Schwartz model of, 52, 53t
symbolic interests, 11 Endogenous peptides, 36
terminology, 2, 28n1 Endorphins, 36
voters’ personalities, 9–10 Energy/extraversion
Democratization, 155 agency and communion, 81
Democrats. see also liberal/ gender differences in, 298t
conservative ideology; left/right distinction, properties,
United States 138–42, 169n3
brain pattern activity, 37 political leadership, 220–22, 220f,
personality profiles, 2004 224f, 226t, 228f, 232t, 234
election, 138 in political participation, 270–72,
personality traits, 23, 37 272f, 273t
political participation, religion Schwartz model of, 52, 53t, 61
and, 115–16 Emphaty
Denmark, 146, 276 Epigenesis, 29
D’Ercole, M., 288t Epistemic needs/motives, 56
Devos, T., 285 Equality
De Vreese, C., 158 political attitudes, 174, 176b, 178t, 181,
Digman, J., 54 190f, 191–93, 203–4f, 214–
Dignity, 313 preference for,
Di Renzo, G., 21 political participation, 281–82t, 301t
Dispositional heuristics, 229–35, 232t, Erikson, E., 22, 79
249nn4–5, 290–91, 290f, 321 Estonia, 146
Dole, B., 231 Estrogens, 36
Dopamine, 36 Etheredge, L., 22
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, 36, 69n1 European Social Survey (ESS), 145–46,
Dual process model, 336, 337f, 186, 276
341, 347n3 Eysenck, H. J., 20, 127
Duckitt, J., 21, 128, 336, 337f, 340 Existential needs/motives
Dworkin, R., 83
Economy Fairness, 83
Family, 17, 20, 43
Economic security Faschingbauer, T. R., 24
political attitudes, 193–94, 194f Fedakova, D., 276
political participation, 281–82t, 301t Federico, C. M., 319

406Index
Feldman, S., 129, 172, 173 Gandhi, M., 22

Ferguson, L. W., 127 GDP and basic values
Finland Gender equalization, 254–55, 295–305,
blind patriotism in, 206f, 208 298–301t, 302f
economic security, 193–94, 194f Genes, 49
left/right distinction, 132–37, 133t, Genetic determinants of political
146, 169nn1–2 preferences
left/right ideology, gender Genzano studies, 142–43, 150–51, 272,
differences, 300–301, 300–303, 302f 273t, 275–76, 289, 293–94.
left/right political values, see also Italy
208–10, 209t Gerber, A. S., 138
needs, motives, values in political Germany
preference, 147– 49t economic security, 193–94, 194f
political attitudes factor analysis, left/right distinction, 124, 132–40,
194–201, 199f 133t, 144, 169nn1–3
political attitudes in, 180–84, 182t, left/right ideology, gender
183f, 215nn1–2 differences, 300–301,
religiosity in voting behaviors, 300–303, 302f
157–65, 159f, 161–62t left/right political values,
religiosity/values correlations, 208–10, 209t
210–13, 210t, 212f needs, motives, values in
values, commonalities in, political preference, 146–48,
152–54, 153t 147–49t
values in political participation, political attitudes in, 180–84, 182t,
276–85, 280f, 281–82t, 284t, 306n4 183f, 215nn1–2
values in structure/coherence, political participation, Big Five traits
188–201, 189–90t, 190f, 194–200f, in, 270
215nn3–4 politicians, BFQ testing, 221–22
values/political activism in, 278, 280, politicians, left vs. right wing,
280f, 281t 224, 225f
voting, values as predictive of, religiosity in voting behaviors,
150, 150f 157–65, 159f, 161–62t
Five Stars Movement (M5S), 318 religiosity/values correlations,
Fluid intelligence, 48 210–13, 210t, 212f
Foa, R., 157 values in political participation,
Fraley, R. C., 138 276–85, 280f, 281–82t, 284t, 306n4
France, 113, 146, 257, 276 values in structure/coherence,
voter turnout in, 309 188–201, 189–90t, 190f, 194–200f,
Francescato, D., 306n4 215nn3–4
Freeden, M., 126 values/political activism in, 278, 280,
Free enterprise 280f, 281t
political attitudes, 176b, 178, 178t, voting, values as predictive of,
190f, 191, 193, 202f, 205f 150, 150f
political participation, 281–82t, Gilligan, C., 83
283, 301t Gonzalez Castro, J. L., 306n2
Freedom, 46 Government –democratic
Frenkel-Brunswik, E., 19 Gosling, S. D., 138
Frontoparietal attentional network, 70n3 Greece
Funk, C. L., 235 economic security, 193–94, 194f

Index 407
free enterprise in, 205f Heredity, 57

left/right distinction, 132–40, 133t, Heritability coefficients in variability
146, 169nn1–3 estimation, 32
left/right ideology, gender Heuristics
differences, 300–301, 300–303, 302f dispositional
left/right political values, likability
208–10, 209t similarity
needs, motives, values in political trait
preference, 147– 49t Hermann, M., 25, 275
political attitudes in, 180–84, 182t, Hibbing, J. R., 38
183f, 215nn1–2 Hibbing, M. V., 270
politicians, dispositional Hirsh, J. B., 141
heuristics, 233 Hobbes, T., 18, 73
religiosity in voting behaviors, 157–65, Hobolt, S., 158
159f, 161–62t Hormones, 36
religiosity/values correlations, 210–13, Horney, K., 79
210t, 212f Huddy, L., 7
values, commonalities in, Humanism, 101
152–54, 153t Human nature, 73–76, 118
values in political participation, Human potential, 352–59
276–85, 280f, 281–82t, 284t, 306n4 Hume, D., 73
values in structure/coherence, Hungary, 145, 146, 276
188–201, 189–90t, 190f, 194–200f,
215nn3–4 Identity, 241
values/political activism in, 278, 280, - personal
280f, 281t - social
voting, values as predictive of, - political
150, 150f Ideology. see also liberal/conservative
Greenstein, F., 19 ideology; religion, religiosity
Grubich, C., 138 authoritarianism, 125
Gurin, G., 285, 288t Big Five traits, 137–42, 155
capitalism, 125, 129
Haidt, J., 90, 102, 104–6 center left/right, 140
Halperin, K. D., 138 communism (Real Socialism), 125
Hanley, C., 127 concepts of, 121, 166
Harm, 49 conservatism/radicalism, 127
Hatemi, S., 261 dimensionality
Heckman, J. J., 41, 45 dual process model, 128
Hedonism economic dimensions, 129
gender differences, 296–97, 299t education’s influences
non-voters, 325–26, 326f on, 121–22
political leadership, 225f, 227t elective affinities, 143, 319
religiosity and, 112 heredity in, 143
religiosity in voting behaviors, 155–57, as heuristic device, 130
156t, 170nn7–8 identity, belonging, 131–32, 135,
Schwartz model, 58–60, 59t, 60f 142–43, 166
values in structure/coherence, left/right distinction, 122–26, 129–37,
189, 190t 133t, 165–66, 169nn1–2
Hempel, S., 138 libertarianism, 129

408Index
dimensionality (Cont.) political attitudes in, 180–84, 182t,

liberty/equality/social justice, 183f, 215nn1–2
126–29, 136, 145 religiosity in voting behaviors,
moral regulation/individual 157–65, 159f, 161–62t
freedom, 128 religiosity/values correlations,
motivational function, 130 210–13, 210t, 212f
nationalism/communism, 127 traditional morality in, 203f
needs, motives and, 143–52, 147–49t, values in political participation,
150–51f, 170n5 276–85, 280f, 281–82t, 284t, 306n4
personality traits and, 135, 137–43, values in structure/coherence,
139f, 166–67, 169n3, 170n4 188–201, 189–90t, 190f, 194–200f,
in political attitudes, 127–32, 195, 215nn3–4
200–201, 213 values/political activism in, 278, 280,
political preferences and, 135 280f, 281t
positivity in, 142 voting, values as predictive of,
religiosity/humanitarianism, 127 150, 150f
tough-mindedness/ Italy
tender-mindedness, 127 Big Five traits, gender differences in,
trait-value-ideology pathway, 154–55, 297–300, 298–300t
154f, 170n6 civil liberties in, 205f, 207
values and, 135, 143–52, 147–49t, economic security, 193–94, 194f
150–51f, 170n5 Five Stars Movement (M5S), 318
voting, predictors of, 130, 149–50, left/right distinction, 124, 132–37,
149t, 150f, 166–68 133t, 169nn1–3
Immigrants, accepting left/right political values, 208–10,
political attitudes, 175, 177b, 209t, 333
178–79, 178t, 181, 186, 187, 190f, 191, military intervention in, 206f
207f, 208 needs, motives, values in
political participation, 281–82t, 301t political preference, 143–4 4,
India, 100 147–49t, 275–76
Inglehart, R., 13, 71n4, 127, 157, 323, 326 non-voting in, 324–28, 326f
Insula, 37, 69n1 partisanship in, 257–58
Intelligence, 48–51 personality dispositions/ideological
Fluid and crystallized, 49 preferences, 141–43
IQ, 49 personality traits as value
Heritability of intelligence predictors, 184–87, 185t, 186f
Interactionism, 17 political attitudes factor analysis,
Ireland, 146, 276 194–201, 198f
Israel political attitudes in, 174–84, 176–
economic security, 193–94, 194f 77b, 178t, 179–80f, 182t, 183f
left/right distinction, 132–37, 133t, political participation, Big Five
169nn1–2 traits in, 270–75, 272f, 273t, 274f,
left/right ideology, gender 275t, 305n2
differences, 300–301, political self-efficacy beliefs
300–303, 302f in, 289–90
left/right political values, 145, 146, political structure unfitness in, 319
208–10, 209t political subcultures in, 164
needs, motives, values in political politicians, BFQ testing, 218–22,
preference, 147– 49t 219–20f, 223f

Index 409
politicians, dispositional heuristics, political attitudes, 176b, 178, 178t,

229–35, 232t, 249nn4–5 189, 190f, 191, 202f, 204f
politicians, left vs. right wing, political participation, 281–82t,
223–25, 224–25f 283, 301t
politicians, likability heuristics, Leadership, 221
235–41, 238f, 249n6 Left/right. see liberal/conservative
religiosity in, 113, 115 ideology
religiosity in voting behaviors, Lelkes, Y., 158
157–65, 159f, 161–62t Levinson, D., 19
religiosity/values correlations, Levy, J., 7
210–13, 210t, 212f Liberal/conservative ideology
values, commonalities in, agency and communion, 81–82
152–54, 153t Big Five trait effects on, 53t, 54
values/ideology cognitive complexity role, 25
relationships, 150–51 conflict monitoring, 37
values in structure/coherence, congruency model, 316,
188–201, 189–90t, 190f, 194–200f, 321, 326–29, 326f, 331–33, 332f,
215nn3–4 337–39, 338f
values/political activism in, 278, 280, embodied moral cognitions, 102–4
280f, 281t gaze following, 36, 70n3
voter turnout in, 310 genetic role in, 36, 70nn2–3
voting, traits as heredity in, 143
predictive of, 138–39 integrative policy
voting, values as predictive of, 150, management, 24–25
150f, 337–39, 338f moral intuitions, 104–6
normative orientation of, 21
Jost, J. T., 36, 37, 38, 138, 142, 143, 155, personality profiles, 2004
211, 228, 319, 336 election, 138
Judaism, 93, 111, 112, 163, 181 physiological, neurophysiological
Justice, 56 variation, 36–37
political attitudes, empirical studies
Kaplan, J., 69n1 of, 174–84, 176–77b, 178t, 179–80f,
Kennedy, J. F., 22, 25 182t, 183f, 215nn1–2
Kentos, M., 276 political participation, religion
Kerry, J., 138 and, 115–17
King, M. L., 22 in political participation, 252, 272,
Knutson, J. N., 19 273t, 279, 289
Knutson, O., 69n1 political values, empirical studies
Kohlberg, L., 83 of, 200–213, 201–7f, 209t, 211t,
Kohn, M., 41–43 212f, 301t
Kossowska, M., 138 religiosity in voting behaviors, 157–65,
Kruglanski, A. W., 108 159f, 161–62t
threat sensitivity, 36–38, 69n1
Lakoff, G., 102–4 values, commonalities in, 152–54,
Lane, R. E., 285 153t, 167
Lasswell, H., 19 values, gender differences in, 300–301,
Lateral prefrontal cortex, 36, 69n1 300–303, 302f
Latvia, 146 Life instinct, 76–79, 118
Law and order, 174 Life satisfaction ( see positivity)

410Index
Likability heuristics, 235–41, 238f, 248, Big Five traits in, 111

249n6, 322 commitment to moral ideals, 93–94
Liberty, 314 concepts of, 82–89
Lithuania, 146 content, praxis of, 88
convictions, 106–8
Machiavelli, N., 18 corporate transgression, 97, 98
Malka, A., 158 dehumanization, 95, 97t
Manzi, J., 306n2 displacement, diffusion of
Marx, 19 responsibility, 95–96, 97t
Marxism, 20, 124 distortion of consequences, 95, 97t
Maslow, A., 55–56, 71n4, 126–27 education and, 79
Master, S., 37 embodied moral
Mattei, F., 288t cognitions, 102–4
McCann, J. A., 172, 173, 329 emotions and feelings in, 84–87, 92,
McClelland, D. C., 56, 275 94–95, 118–19
McCrae, R. R., 137, 296 euphemistic labeling, 95, 97t
McGuire, W., 19 fate, 88–89
Mebane, M., 287, 288t human nature, 73–76, 118
Media ideo-affective postures, 101
Mediation, 36 intentionality, 88, 90, 91
Mental capital, 41 intuitions, 104–6
Menu dependence, 316 life instinct, 76–79, 118
Mergl, S., 138 moral development, 84, 88, 91,
Metaphor, 92 110, 118–19
Mervielde, I., 138 moral disengagement
Meuleman, B., 186 moral imperatives, 83–84
Milbrath, L., 21 moral justification, 95, 97t
Military intervention negativity bias, 38, 79
political attitudes, 175, 177b, 178–79, nurturing parent, 102–4
178t, 190f, 191, 206f ownership, 90–91
political participation, 281–82t, palliative/advantageous
283, 301t comparison, 95
Miller, D. T., 158 political institutions, rules and, 75,
Miller, W., 285, 288t 98–99, 119–20
Mitchell, G., 12 positivity in, 99
Modernization, 114 public, 92–99, 97t
Molecular genetics, 34 reasoning, rationality, 83,
Mondak, J. J., 138, 270, 271 86–87, 93–94
Moral disengagement, 91–99, 97t, religion, religiosity, 108–18
108, 119 religious institutions, 110
Morality. see also values reward and punishment, 85,
in accountability, 83, 88, 94–95
92–93, 119–20 self-reflection, judgment, 90
advantageous comparison, 95, 97t in self-regulation, 76, 86–88,
agency, 89–92, 94, 118–19 90–91, 118–19
agency and communion, 80–83, 86, self-sanctions, 95
100–101, 109, 111 social context in, 84, 88, 91
approach and avoidance, 86 strict father, 102–4
attribution of blame, 95, 97t values and, 76, 86–88, 90, 91, 93

Index 411
variability, 89 Opportunities
worldviews, beliefs, 100–102, 120 Optimism (see positivity)
Moral traditionalism Oxley, D. R., 70n2
non-voters, 326f
political attitudes, 173, 174, 176b, 178, Panhellenic Socialist Movement
178t, 181, 189, 190f, 191, 201f, 203f (PASOK), 140, 170n4
political participation, 281–82t, Party identification
283, 301t Perceived collective efficacy, 292–95,
Morgenthau, H., 73 293–94f
Perceived self-efficacy, 64–68, 269,
Napier, J. L., 319 286–92, 288t, 290f, 307n6
Needs, motivations Person-focused values
personality and, 55–57 Personality
in political preference, 143–52, automatic emotional responses,
147–49t, 150–51f 36, 69n1
in voting behaviors, 315–16, 336–37, avoidance motivations, 36, 38, 69n1
336f, 347n2 bio-psychological systems in, 47–48
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs brain systems/physiological
Negativity bias, 38, 79 responses, 35–39, 36, 69n1,
Netherlands, 146, 276, 309 70nn2–3
Neuropolitics, 35 capacities development, 41–50,
Neuroregulators, 36 62–63, 68–69
Neurotransmitters, 36 concepts, definitions of, 349–50
New Zealand, 124 early studies of, 18–27
Niederhoffer, K., 138 education effects on, 50–51
Niemi, R. G., 288t gene-environment interactions,
Nixon, R. M., 22 29–35, 33f
Non-voting, 254, 263, 314, intelligence in, 48–51
324–29, 326f of leaders ( see political leadership)
Norepinephrine, 36 Maslow’s theory, 41–42, 55–56, 71n4
Normativism, 101 needs, motives, 55–57
Norway, 146, 276 negative affect, 36, 69n1
Nussbaum, M. C., 41 personalization of politics, 7–14
physiological, neurophysiological
Ones, D. S., 24 variation, 36–37
Openness to experience in political participation, 252–53, 261,
agency and communion, 81 268, 269f, 289–90, 305
gender differences in, 298t potentials ( see potentials)
mediation of, 155 psychoanalysis, 19–20
non-voters, 324 response inhibition, 37, 69n1
in political attitude, 178 self-regulation in, 6, 17–18, 30–31,
political leadership, 220f, 221, 222, 35–40, 43, 53t, 62–69
224f, 226, 226t, 228f, 232t, 233 sensitive periods, 49
in political orientation, 137–41 social learning theory, 20–21, 256–57
in political participation, 270–72, traits ( see traits of personality)
272f, 273t views of, 14–18
religiosity and, 111, 112 of leaders
in Schwartz model, 52, 53t, 61 of politicians
Openness to change values of voters, 26–27

412Index
Personality traits equality, 174, 176b, 178t, 181, 190f,

in voting behaviors, 314 191–93, 203–4f, 214–15
Personalization factor analysis, 194–201, 195–200f
Personalizing free enterprise, 176b, 178, 178t, 190f,
Peterson, C., 157 191, 193, 202f, 205f
Piurko, Y., 146, 158 heredity in, 32–35, 33f, 70n2
Podemos, 314 ideology in, 127–32, 195,
Poland 200–201, 213
economic security, 193–94, 194f immigrants, accepting, 175, 177b,
left/right distinction, 132–40, 133t, 178–79, 178t, 181, 186, 187, 190f, 191,
169nn1–3 207f, 208
left/right ideology, gender law and order, 176b, 178, 178t, 189,
differences, 300–301, 300–303, 302f 190f, 191, 202f, 204f
left/right political values, 208–10, libertarian/authoritarian
209t, 214 dimension, 173
needs, motives, values in political media influences on, 130
preference, 144–48, 147–49t military intervention, 175, 177b,
political attitudes factor analysis, 178–79, 178t, 190f, 191, 206f
194–201, 199f moral traditionalism, 173, 174,
political attitudes in, 128, 180–84, 176b, 178, 178t, 181, 189, 190f, 191,
182t, 183f, 215nn1–2 201f, 203f
religiosity in, 113–15 non-communist countries, 183, 183f,
religiosity in voting behaviors, 192, 193
157–65, 159f, 161–62t personality traits as value
religiosity/values correlations, predictors, 184–87, 185t, 186f
210–13, 210t, 212f physiological, neurophysiological
values, commonalities in, variation, 36–37
152–54, 153t post-communist countries, 183, 183f,
values in political participation, 188, 189t, 192–93
276–85, 280f, 281–82t, 284t, 306n4 religiosity/values correlations, 210–
values in structure/coherence, 13, 210t, 212f
188–201, 189–90t, 190f, 194–200f, socialist/laissez-faire
215nn3–4 dimension, 173
values/political activism in, 278, 280, values in structure/coherence, 188–
280f, 281t 201, 189–90t, 190f, 194–200f, 213–14,
voting, values as predictive of, 215nn3–4
150, 150f Political efficacy
Political attitudes democracy’s dependence on, 358–59
Big Five trait effects perceived collective efficacy, 292–95,
on, 53t, 54, 184 293–94f
blind patriotism, 174, 176b, 178t, 189, perceived self-efficacy, 269, 286–92,
190f, 191, 206f, 208 288t, 290f, 307n6
civil liberties, 175, 177b, 178, 178t, in political leadership, 288t,
190f, 191, 205f, 214–15 291–92, 306n5
core values role in, 171–74 self-efficacy beliefs, 64–68, 324
economic security, 193–94, 194f Political elites
egalitarianism, 173 Political knowledge
empirical studies of, 174–84, 176–77b, Political leadership
178t, 179–80f, 182t, 183f, 215nn1–2 achievement, 224, 225f, 227t, 246

Index 413
agency and communion, 231, 234–35 self-enhancement values, 224, 226,

agreeableness, 220, 220f, 224f, 226, 226t, 228f
226t, 228f, 232t, 233, 234, 303–4 self-transcendence values, 226, 226t,
assessment of politicians, 341–45 228f, 280, 280f
assimilation processes, 241 stimulation, 225f, 227t
attributed values, 246–48 tradition, 224, 225f, 227t
benevolence, 224–25, 225f, 227t, traits of personality, 23–26,
246, 280 28nn2–3
competence, 246–48 traits-values relationships, 241–47,
conformity, 224, 225f, 227t 243–45f, 280f
congruency, 226, 229, 249n3 universalism, 224–25, 227t, 246, 280
congruency model, 316–19 Political neuroscience, 35
conscientiousness, 220f, 224, 224f, Political participation. see also civic
226, 226t, 228f, 233 engagement
conservation values, 228f activism, 254, 263, 264, 277–83, 280f,
contrast processes, 241 281–82t, 289, 293–95
data gathering challenges, 217–18 affiliation, belonging, 257, 258
dispositional heuristics, 229–35, agency and communion in, 261, 262,
232t, 249nn4–5, 321 285–86, 292–93
emotional stability, 220f, 221, 222, agreeableness in, 271–72, 272f, 273t
224, 224f, 226t, 232t Big Five traits in, 268, 269f, 270–75,
energy/extraversion, 220–22, 220f, 272f, 273t, 274f, 275t, 305n2
224f, 226t, 228f, 232t, 234 blind patriotism, 281–82t, 283, 301t
hedonism, 225f, 227t capacities development in, 46–47
ideology, individual covariation citizenship in, 260–65, 305, 315–16
in, 225–29, 226–27t, 228f, 239, civic commitment, 261–66, 271, 305
247–48, 249n3 political commitment
integrity, 246–48 civil liberties, 281–82t, 301t
left vs. right wing, 223–29, 224–25f, concepts, definitions, 252–54
226–27t, 228f, 249n3 conscientiousness in, 270, 272, 273t
likability heuristics, 235–41, 238f, conservation values, 277
248, 249n6, 322 democratization, level of, 277–78
openness, 220f, 221, 222, 224f, 226, determinants of, 251–54, 267–69,
226t, 228f, 232t, 233 268–69f, 271
perceived traits, 246–48 developmental stages, 267–69,
personality, archive data, 23–26, 268–69f
28nn2–3 disenchantment in, 255
personality of vs. voters, 21–23, dispositions, potentials in, 290–91,
218–22, 219–20f, 223f 290f, 321
political attitudes, 228–29, 249n3 economic security, 281–82t, 301t
political choice, 228f education levels in, 253,
political efficacy in, 288t, 255, 259–60
291–92, 306n5 emotional stability in, 270, 273t
political participation by, 254, 263 energy/extraversion in, 270–72,
positivity in, 274, 274f, 275t, 272f, 273t
301–2, 302f equality, 281–82t, 301t
power, 224, 225f, 227t, 246 extraordinary events in, 260
security, 224, 225f, 227t family role in, 258–60
self-direction, 225f, 227t free enterprise, 281–82t, 283, 301t

414Index
political commitment (Cont.) self-transcendence values, 276–77,

gender equalization, 254–55, 295–305, 280, 280f
298–301t, 302f SES model, 266–67
gene-environment interactions, 261 social capital, 261–66
heredity in, 32–35, 33f, 306n3 social media impacts, 259
identity, 257–59 trust in institutions, 283–85, 284t,
immigrants, acceptance of, 292–95, 293–94f
281–82t, 301t values, self-beliefs in, 268–69,
individual duty, mutual 276–85, 280f, 281–82t, 284t,
obligations, 263–64 306n4, 340–41
interest in politics, 283–85, 284t volunteerism, mediational role of,
law and order, 281–82t, 283, 301t 271, 272f
left/right ideology in, 252, 272, 273t, voters, 254, 263
279, 289 voter turnout, 283–85, 284t
locus of control, 267, 268, 268f, 306n1 Political preference
military intervention, 281–82t, congruency in, 322
283, 301t heredity in, 32–35, 33f, 143
models, 310–12 ideology and, 135
moral convictions, 106–8 multiparty systems, 135
moral disengagement, 91–99, 97t, needs, motives, values in, 143–52,
108, 119 147–49t, 150–51f
moral traditionalism, 281–82t, party identification, 136
283, 301t personality profiles, 2004
motivations in, 255–56, 275–76 election, 138
non-voters, 254, 263 personality traits in, 138–40
openness in, 270–72, 272f, 273t physiological, neurophysiological
openness to change, 277 variation, 36–37
partisanship in, 257–58 religiosity in, 159–60, 159f
perceived collective efficacy, 292–95, self-esteem and, 142
293–94f similarity effect, 235–41, 238f, 249n6
perceived self-efficacy, 269, 286–92, Portugal, 113, 146, 276
288t, 290f, 307n6 Positivity
personality in, 252–53, 261, 268, 269f, in children, 78–79
289–90, 305 in ideology, 142
political commitment, 261–66, life instinct, 76–79
289, 305 in morality, 99
political efficacy, 285–86 in political leadership, 274, 274f, 275t,
political socialization, 256–61 301–2, 302f
politicians, 254, 263 in political participation, 269, 274,
positivity, 269, 274, 274f, 275t, 297, 274f, 275t, 297, 301–2, 302f, 306n3
301–2, 302f, 306n3 Potentials
preliminary interviews, 306n5 activities, abilities, 39–47
religion, religiosity and, 115–17 anticipation, 63
religiosity in, 258 capacities development, 41–50,
resource model, 267–69, 268–69f 62–63, 68–69
Schwartz’s values, 144–46 childhood deprivation in, 44–45,
self-confidence, self-efficacy, 285–86 49–50, 64
self-efficacy beliefs, 286 of children, 42–46, 50
self-esteem in, 269, 274, 297 cognitive potential

Index 415
cognitive ability, 45 attendance at services, 114

gene-environment interaction in, belongingness, 114
29–35, 40, 49 benefits of, 110–11
heredity in, 143 Big Five traits, 111
of humans, 352–59 Catholicism, 110, 112–15, 163
imitation, 63 Christian Orthodox, 163
inequalities, transmission of, 42–45 communitarian forms of, 115
memory, 63 influence of, 109–10, 116–17, 120
occupation/social status Judaism, 93, 111, 112, 163, 181
relationships, 42–43 moral intuitions, 104–6
ownership, 46, 66 political attitudes/values
parental investment, 44, 45 correlations, 210–13, 210t, 212f
physiological sensitivities, 39 political participation and, 115–17
in political participation, politics and, 115–16
290–91, 290f prosociality, 112–13
self-efficacy beliefs, 64–68 Protestantism, 112–15, 117, 163
social adjustment, 45 Schwartz’s values, 111–12
symbolization, 62–63 secularization, 113–14, 168
Potter, J., 138 separation of church
Poverty (see also material and state, 115
deprivations) in voting behaviors, 157–65, 159f,
Power 161–62t
gender differences, 296–97 as worldview, 108–9, 116–17, 120
gender differences in, 299t Republicans. see also liberal/
non-voters, 326f conservative ideology;
political leadership, 224, 225f, United States
227t, 246 brain pattern activity, 37
religiosity in voting behaviors, 155– personality profiles, 2004
57, 156t, 168, 170nn7–8 election, 138
Schwartz model, 56–61, 59t, 60f, 81 personality traits, 23, 37
values, commonalities in, 152, 153t political participation, religion
values in structure/coherence, and, 115–16
186–87, 190t Resistance to change, 145, 168, 178,
Pratto, F., 21 186–87, 347n2
Presidential Character (Barber), 22 Resource model, 310–11
Preference for equality, Respect
Probabilism, 35 Richter, M., 138
Prodi, R., 231, 232t, 237, 238f, 239, 245, Recognition of merits
246, 249n5 Riemann, R., 138
Protestantism, 112–15, 117, 163 RIght-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA)
Psychodynamic theory Ritchie, M., 270
Psychoanalysis Rokeach, M., 20, 57, 111, 127, 144, 155
Psychopathology and Politics Romania, 146
(Lasswell), 19 Roosevelt, F. D., 124
Roosevelt, T., 22
Rajoy, M. Rousseau, J. J., 73
Relational needs/motives Rubenzer, S. J., 24
Religion, religiosity Russia, 146, 192
agency and communion, 109, 111 Ryan, R. M., 56

416Index
Sagie, G., 156, 326 Self-expression Self-perception theory,

Sahlins, M., 73 333, 334
Sanford, N., 19 Self-placement (ideological)
Schlozman, K. L., 267 Self-reflection, 63, 90
Schmidt, P., 186 Self-regulation. see also personality
Schmitt, C., 73 brain area associated with, 37
Schoen, H., 138 democracy as, 6–7
Schreiber, D., 37 morality in, 75–76, 86–88,
Schumann, S., 138 90–91, 118–19
Schwartz, S. H., 58–60, 60f, 81, 107, 112, in personality, 7, 17–18, 30–31, 35–40,
144, 156, 173, 174, 180, 186, 188, 43, 53t, 62–69
191–93, 195, 217–18, 242, 268, 276, as potential, 43
277, 280, 283, 326 Self system, 62–68
Sears, D., 7 Self-transcendence values
Security Sen, A., 3, 41
gender differences in, 299t Serotonin, 36
non-voters, 325, 326f SES model
political leadership, 224, 225f, 227t Sève, L., 41, 43
religiosity in voting behaviors, 155–57, Sidanius, J., 21
156t, 168, 170nn7–8 Silvester, J., 221, 343–44
Schwartz model, 58–61, 59t, 60f Similarity effect, 235–41, 238f, 249n6
values, commonalities in, 152, Simonton, D. K., 19, 24, 28n2
153t, 155 Skitka, L., 102
values in structure/coherence, Slovakia
189, 190t economic security, 193–94, 194f
values/political activism in, 278–79 left/right distinction, 132–37, 133t,
Self 169nn1–2
left/right ideology, gender
The self-system differences, 300–301, 300–303, 302f
Self-beliefs left/right political values,
in political efficacy, 64–68, 324 208–10, 209t
in political participation, 268–69, needs, motives, values in political
276–85, 280f, 281–82t, 284t, 306n4 preference, 146–48, 147–49t
Self-determination political attitudes in, 180–84, 182t,
Self-direction 183f, 215nn1–2
gender differences, 296–97, 299t, 304 religiosity in voting behaviors, 157–
left/right ideologies and, 147 65, 159f, 161–62t
non-voters, 326f religiosity/values correlations, 210–
religiosity and, 112 13, 210t, 212f
religiosity in voting behaviors, 186, values, commonalities in,
189, 190t 152–54, 153t
Schwartz model, 58–61, 59t, 60f values in structure/coherence,
values, commonalities in, 152, 153t 188–201, 189–90t, 190f, 194–200f,
values/political activism in, 278 215nn3–4
Self-enhancement values values/political activism in, 278, 280,
Self-efficacy beliefs, 64–68, 324 280f, 282t
Self-esteem, 64, 67 voting, values as predictive of,
Self-evaluation, 63 150, 150f
Self-exonerative maneuvers Slovenia, 145, 146, 276

Index 417
Smith, A., 73 values, commonalities in,

Smith, K. B., 38 152–54, 153t
Sniderman, P. M., 21, 241, 269, 317 values and ideology, 146
Social Capital values in political participation,
Social class 276–85, 280f, 281–82t, 284t, 306n4
Social cognitive theory, 291 values in structure/coherence,
Social Dominance (SDO) 188–201, 189–90t, 190f, 194–200f,
Social focused values 215nn3–4
Social learning theory, 256–57 values/political activism in, 280,
Socialization (political) 280f, 282t
Socio-demographic factors voter mobilization in, 314
Socioeconomic development voting, values as predictive of,
South America, 114 150, 150f
South Korea, 270 Srivastava, S., 158
Soviet Union, 124, 125 Steca, P., 297
Spain Stimulation
economic security, 193–94, 194f gender differences, 296–97
equality in, 204f, 207 gender differences in, 299t
immigrants, accepting, 207f, 208 non-voters, 325–26, 326f
law and order in, 204f political leadership, 225f, 227t
left/right distinction, 132–37, 133t, religiosity and, 112
169nn1–3 religiosity in voting behaviors, 155–57,
left/right ideology, gender 156t, 170nn7–8
differences, 300–301, Schwartz model, 58–60, 59t, 60f
300–303, 302f values in structure/coherence,
left/right ideology in, 124 189, 190t
left/right political values, Sturgis, P., 329–30
208–10, 209t Suedfeld, P., 24, 25
needs, motives, values in political Symbolic value of voting
preference, 147– 49t System Justification
personality traits as value Sweden, 146, 276, 337–41, 339f
predictors, 184–87, 185t, 186f Switzerland, 146, 276, 309
personality traits/ideology Term limit
relationships, 138– 40 Terracciano, A., 296
political attitudes factor analysis, Tetlock, P. E., 12, 24
194–201, 198f Thoemmes, T., 25
political attitudes in, 180–84, 182t, Thorisdottir, H., 145
183f, 215nn1–2 Tomkins, S., 21, 101
political participation, Big Five traits Tradition
in, 270 gender differences in, 299t
political structure unfitness in, 319 ideology/religiosity relationships,
politicians, dispositional 160, 165
heuristics, 233 in left-right ideology, 145
politicians, similarity effect, 239–40 political leadership, 224, 225f, 227t
religiosity in, 113, 115 religiosity and, 112
religiosity in voting behaviors, 157–65, Schwartz model, 58–61, 59t, 60f
159f, 161–62t values, commonalities in, 152, 153t
religiosity/values correlations, 210–13, values in structure/coherence, 186–87,
210t, 212f 189, 190t

418Index
Traditional morals. see moral religiosity/values correlations, 210–13,

traditionalism 210t, 212f
Traits of personality. see also values, commonalities in,
specific traits 152–54, 153t
achievement, 56–57, 61 values in structure/coherence,
affiliation, 56–57, 81 188–201, 189–90t, 190f, 194–200f,
agency and communion, 54–55, 81 215nn3–4
authoritarianism, 19–20 values/political activism in, 278
basic, 16, 51–56, 53t, 135 voting, values as predictive of,
Big Five traits, 28n3, 33, 52–54, 150, 150f
53t, 56, 61
extremism, 20–21 Ukraine
gene-environment interactions, economic security, 193–94, 194f
29–35, 33f left/right distinction, 132–37, 133t,
ideology and, 135, 137–43, 139f, 166–67, 146, 169nn1–2, 170n5
169n3, 170n4 left/right ideology, gender
individual differences in, 16–17 differences, 300–301, 300–303, 302f
interactionism, 16–17 left/right political values,
motivations of leaders, 25–26 208–10, 209t
political leaders ( see political political attitudes in, 180–84, 182t,
leadership) 183f, 215nn1–2
power ( see power) religiosity/values correlations, 210–13,
Schwartz model, 56–61, 59t, 60f 210t, 212f
similarity effect, 235–41, 238f, 249n6 values in structure/coherence,
social cognitive approaches, 17–18 188–201, 189–90t, 190f, 194–200f,
social learning theory, 17 215nn3–4
superordinate, 54 values/political activism in, 278
trait-value-ideology pathway, 154–55, United Kingdom
154f, 170n6 assessment of politicians, 343–44
as value predictors, 184–87, 185t, economic security, 193–94, 194f
186f, 337–38, 338f equality in, 203f
Trapnell, P. D., 54, 137 free enterprise in, 202f, 205f
Trust in institutions, 283–85, 284t, law and order in, 202f
292–95, 293–94f left/right classification, 123–24
Turiel, E., 83 left/right distinction, 132–37, 133t,
Turkey 169nn1–2
economic security, 193–94, 194f left/right ideology, gender
left/right distinction, 132–37, 133t, differences, 300–301,
169nn1–2 300–303, 302f
left/right ideology, gender left/right political values,
differences, 300–301, 300–303, 302f 208–10, 209t
left/right political values, needs, motivations in, 146, 147–49t
208–10, 209t partisan loyalty, party
needs, motives, values in political identification, 311
preference, 147, 147–49t, 148 partisanship in, 257
political attitudes in, 180–84, 182t, political attitudes factor analysis,
183f, 215nn1–2 194–201, 195–97f
religiosity in voting behaviors, 157–65, political attitudes in, 173, 180–84,
159f, 161–62t 182t, 183f, 215nn1–2

Index 419
religiosity in voting behaviors, 157–65, politicians, likability heuristics,

159f, 161–62t 235–41, 238f, 249n6
religiosity/values correlations, 210–13, religion, religiosity in, 110–13,
210t, 212f 115, 117
representative democracy in, 2 religiosity in voting behaviors, 157–65,
traditional morality in, 201f, 203f 159f, 161–62t
values, commonalities in, religiosity/values correlations, 210–13,
152–54, 153t 210t, 212f
values in political participation, representative democracy in, 2
276–85, 280f, 281–82t, 284t, 306n4 separation of church and state, 115
values in structure/coherence, traditional morality in, 201f
188–201, 189–90t, 190f, 194–200f, values, commonalities in,
215nn3–4 152–54, 153t
values/political activism in, 278 values in structure/coherence,
values/voting relationships, 330 188–201, 189–90t, 190f, 194–200f,
voter turnout in, 309 215nn3–4
voting, values as predictive of, values/political activism in,
150, 150f 278, 279
United States values/voting relationships, 330
blind patriotism in, 206f, 208 voter turnout in, 309
economic security, 193–94, 194f voting, values as predictive of,
equality in, 203f, 204f 150, 150f
free enterprise in, 202f Universalism
law and order in, 202f, 204f gender differences, 296–97, 299t, 300
left/right classification, 123–24 ideology/religiosity
left/right distinction, 132–37, 133t, relationships, 165
169nn1–2 needs, motives, 145–47
left/right ideology, gender non-voters, 325, 326f
differences, 300–301, policy preferences and, 279
300–303, 302f political leadership, 224–25, 227t,
left/right political values, 246, 280
208–10, 209t religiosity in voting behaviors, 152–57,
military intervention in, 206f 153t, 156t, 165, 168, 170nn7–8
needs, motives in, 144, 147, 147–49t Schwartz model, 58–61, 59t, 60f
partisan loyalty, party values in structure/coherence, 186,
identification, 311 189–91, 190f, 190t, 192
partisanship in, 258 values/political activism in, 278
personality profiles, 2004 Uruguay, 270
election, 138 Values. see also morality; core political
political attitudes factor analysis, values, specific values
194–201, 197f agency and communion, 81, 167
political attitudes in, 128, 180–84, basic, 57–62, 59t, 60f, 135, 171–73,
182t, 183f, 215nn1–2 186, 213–14
political commitment in, 276 Big Five trait effects on, 53t, 54,
political participation, Big Five traits 155, 187
in, 270 conservation, 146, 147, 160, 178, 186,
political participation in, 117 189, 224, 277
politicians, dispositional heuristics, emancipative, 57
229–35, 232t, 249nn4–5 excitement vs. caution, 244–46, 245f

420Index
Values (Cont.) Vecchione, M., 138, 152, 173, 184, 187,

gender differences, left/right 236, 237, 239, 242, 268, 276, 278–80,
ideology, 300–301, 300–303, 302f 285, 287, 288t, 331, 332, 334
ideology and, 135, 143–52, 147–49t, Veltroni, W.
150–51f, 170n5 Venezuela, 270
intelligence in, 51 Ventromedial prefrontal cortex,
left/right, commonalities in, 152–54, 36, 69n1
153t, 167 Verba S., 267
level of democratization and, 155–57, Visser, M., 333
156t, 170nn7–8 Volatility electoral
Maslow’s theory, 41–42, 55–56, 71n4 Voter turnout
MDS analyses, 241–47, 243–45f Voting
moral convictions, 106–8 agency and communion in, 313–14,
morality and, 76, 86–88, 90, 91, 93 321, 327–29
personal focus behaviors, gene-environment
political, left/right, empirical interactions in, 32
studies, 200–213, 201–7f, 209t, 211t, ideology as motivation, 130
212f, 301t personality traits in, 139–41, 314
political attitudes structure/ paradox of
coherence, 188–201, 189–90t, 190f, similarity effect, 235–41,
194–200f, 213–14, 215nn3–4 238f, 249n6
in political participation, 268–69, symbolic value of, 312–13, 345
276–85, 280f, 281–82t, 284t, 306n4 traits-values relationships, 241–47,
political preferences and, 34 243–45f
predictors, personality traits as, values as predictive of, 130, 149–50,
184–87, 185t, 186f, 337–38, 338f 149t, 150f, 166–68, 178–80, 179–80f
predictors, traits of personality as, Vyrost, J., 276
184–87, 185t, 186f, 320
PVQ testing, 58, 59t, 71n5, 174–84, Weiner, B., 88
176–77b, 178t, 179–80f, 182t, 183f Well-being
resistance to change, 145, 168, 178, Welzel, C., 13, 127, 157, 323, 326
186–87, 347n2 Westen, D., 69n1
self-enhancement, 146–48, 147–49t, Wiggins, J. S., 54
178, 224, 226, 226t Wilson, W., 22
self-transcendence, 146, 167, 178, 186, Winter, D., 25, 56, 275
226, 226t, 276–77 Worldviews
socioeconomic development and,
155–57, 156t, 167, 170nn7–8 Yee, C., 37
social focus Yugoslavia, 174
trait-value-ideology pathway, 154–
55, 154f, 170n6 Zamboni, G., 69n1
voting relationships, 329–35, 332f, Zapatero, L. R.
337– 40, 338f, 346–47 Zimbardo, P. G., 96, 230–31, 234,
320, 326
Van der Brug, W., 158 Zsolnai L., 97
Van Hiel, A., 138 Zuffianò, A., 288t

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Advance praise for Personalizing Politics

Caprara and Vecchione’s book is a magnificent contribution to political psychology.

This is an insightful contribution to the complex interplay between the various

This is an insightful examination of the moral foundations of political action! From

There is no need for politics to “become more personalized,” as the authors

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1 Personality and Politics in Contemporary Democracies 1

3 Moral Foundations of Political Action 73

4 Personal Determinants of Political Divisions 121

5 Diversities and Commonalities in Political Attitudes 171

6 The Private and Public Personality of Politicians 217

7 Political Participation and Efficacy 251

8 A Congruency Model of Political Behavior 309

Concluding Remarks 349

Personality and Politics

DEMOCRACY AND ITS CHALLENGES

2 Personalizing Politics and Realizing Democracy

Personality and Politics in Contemporary Democracies 3

a number of countries may claim the status of established democracies, but

4 Personalizing Politics and Realizing Democracy

Personality and Politics in Contemporary Democracies 5

6 Personalizing Politics and Realizing Democracy

forms of civic engagement, such as pro-​environment movements, support for

Personality and Politics in Contemporary Democracies 7

politicians may be further reduced, unless new forms of education, infor-

8 Personalizing Politics and Realizing Democracy

Personality and Politics in Contemporary Democracies 9

from issue-​centered politics to more person-​centered politics. While the

10 Personalizing Politics and Realizing Democracy

Thus focusing on voters’ personalities appears no less important than

Personality and Politics in Contemporary Democracies 11

To acknowledge that human beings are endowed with extraordinary

12 Personalizing Politics and Realizing Democracy

The lexicon of fairness includes many psychological concepts like needs,

Personality and Politics in Contemporary Democracies 13

Knowledge about personality should help to shed light on the needs

14 Personalizing Politics and Realizing Democracy

Personality and Politics in Contemporary Democracies 15

The current notion of personality addresses the functioning of the entire

16 Personalizing Politics and Realizing Democracy

evaluations stemming from how individuals present themselves and habitu-

Personality and Politics in Contemporary Democracies 17

18 Personalizing Politics and Realizing Democracy

Indeed, to achieve a comprehensive view of the major determinants and

1. Personality is a complex system of psychological structures—​cognitive,

EARLIER STUDIES ON PERSONALITY AND POLITICS

Personality and Politics in Contemporary Democracies 19

Psychodynamic and Social Learning Approaches

2 Personalizing Politics and Realizing Democracy

Personality and Politics in Contemporary Democracies 3

4 Personalizing Politics and Realizing Democracy

Personality and Politics in Contemporary Democracies 5

6 Personalizing Politics and Realizing Democracy

forms of civic engagement, such as pro-environment movements, support for

Personality and Politics in Contemporary Democracies 7

8 Personalizing Politics and Realizing Democracy

Personality and Politics in Contemporary Democracies 9

from issue-centered politics to more person-centered politics. While the

10 Personalizing Politics and Realizing Democracy

Personality and Politics in Contemporary Democracies 11

12 Personalizing Politics and Realizing Democracy

Personality and Politics in Contemporary Democracies 13

14 Personalizing Politics and Realizing Democracy

Personality and Politics in Contemporary Democracies 15

16 Personalizing Politics and Realizing Democracy

Personality and Politics in Contemporary Democracies 17

18 Personalizing Politics and Realizing Democracy

1. Personality is a complex system of psychological structures—cognitive,

Personality and Politics in Contemporary Democracies 19

20 Personalizing Politics and Realizing Democracy

Personality and Politics in Contemporary Democracies 21

22 Personalizing Politics and Realizing Democracy

Personality and Politics in Contemporary Democracies 23

Among the first to assess politicians’ personality through self-reports,

24 Personalizing Politics and Realizing Democracy

Personality and Politics in Contemporary Democracies 25

26 Personalizing Politics and Realizing Democracy

Personality and Politics in Contemporary Democracies 27

28 Personalizing Politics and Realizing Democracy

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32 Personalizing Politics and Realizing Democracy

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36 Personalizing Politics and Realizing Democracy

existential, and relational—to achieve existential security. Then he holds that,

38 Personalizing Politics and Realizing Democracy

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self-efficacy beliefs. All are features of individuality that, in different degrees,

50 Personalizing Politics and Realizing Democracy

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of self-regard and self-actualization needs (self-respect, justice, creativity)

58 Personalizing Politics and Realizing Democracy

60 Personalizing Politics and Realizing Democracy