Martin Weinberg-Terrorism in An Era of Unconventional Warfare

Terrorism and Political Violence
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Terrorism in an Era of Unconventional Warfare
Susanne Martin & Leonard B. Weinberg
To cite this article: Susanne Martin & Leonard B. Weinberg (2016) Terrorism in an
Era of Unconventional Warfare, Terrorism and Political Violence, 28:2, 236-253, DOI:
10.1080/09546553.2014.895330
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Terrorism and Political Violence, 28:236–253, 2016
Copyright # Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 0954-6553 print=1556-1836 online
DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2014.895330
Terrorism in an Era of Unconventional Warfare
SUSANNE MARTIN AND LEONARD B. WEINBERG

Department of Political Science, University of Nevada, Reno,
Nevada, USA
Academic studies of terrorism and mass political violence have developed largely
independently of one another. Insurgents, in contrast, have tended to incorporate
terrorism tactics along with other types of unconventional warfare in their repertoire
Downloaded by [Uniwersytet Jagiellonski] at 13:42 16 July 2016
of action. This tendency has become more apparent among insurgents engaging in
armed confrontations in the twenty-first century. In order to take account of this
development, scholars and others interested in contemporary warfare need to incor-
porate terrorism studies within the broader subject of insurgencies and ‘‘small
wars’’—political violence, in other words.
Keywords counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, guerrilla warfare, insurgency,

terrorism
It may seem that warfare in the twenty-first century has taken an ‘‘unconventional’’
turn. Rather than confrontations between the uniformed and professional armed
forces of warring states, we find many recent conflicts being waged between states
and comparatively weak non-state actors, who tend to be neither professional nor
uniformed. Because these weaker actors cannot expect to defeat state militaries on
a battlefield, they engage in other forms of warfare, oftentimes using a combination
of guerrilla tactics and terrorism.1
Such combinations of tactics are not uncommon. American revolutionaries,
Vietnamese communists, Afghan warriors, and Iraqi insurgents combined guerrilla
and terrorism tactics in their respective campaigns.2 In addition to guerrilla attacks
on British targets, American revolutionaries threatened local Loyalists, even some
moderates, with tar-and-feathering, lashings, loss or destruction of property, and,
later, ‘‘quasi-judicial’’ executions.3 While engaging in guerrilla wars against a
succession of foreign occupation, Vietnam’s communist–nationalist terrorists also
embarked upon a campaign of terrorism, executing local leaders, perpetuating fear,
and creating conditions for compliance, or at the very least acquiescence, among
local populations. Afghan insurgents reportedly terrorized Afghan civilians while
engaging in guerrilla warfare against Soviet occupation.4 Insurgents in Iraq have
used terrorism against local populations in the context of intra-group rivalries.5
Susanne Martin is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science,

University of Nevada. Leonard B. Weinberg is the Foundation Professor of Political Science
Emeritus at the University of Nevada.
Address correspondence to Leonard B. Weinberg, Department of Political Science (0302),
University of Nevada, 1664 N. Virginia Street, Reno, NV 89557, USA. E-mail: leonardw@
unr.edu
236
Terrorism in an Era of Unconventional Warfare 237
Among insurgents, it is typically the weakest groups that rely on terrorism

tactics.6 In contrast, more capable insurgents may use a combination of terrorist
and guerrilla attacks in attempts to show a state’s weakness and perpetuate fear.7
Using tactics such as assassinations, bombings, and suicide attacks, modern-day insur-
gents in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere may have taken a page from the book of,
among others, their Vietnamese counterparts operating a generation earlier.8 As we
will point out, however, modern-day insurgents have also added pages to this book.
The article that follows offers insights into the development of twenty-first
century warfare and the challenges that this new type of warfare poses for the scholars
who theorize the causes of these conflicts and the ways in which they can be brought
to an end, as well as the practitioners tasked with formulating effective responses to
these new threats. In this article, we engage practical and theoretical issues by address-
ing a series of related questions: What role does terrorism play in twenty-first century
warfare? Have the older ways of responding to terrorism been overtaken by recent
events? What are the implications of these findings for the academic study of terror-
ism and insurgency, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency? Answers to these ques-
tions have obvious consequences for states facing the challenges posed by warfare in
the twenty-first century.
The article proceeds as follows. We begin by offering a discussion of ‘‘conven-
tional’’ and ‘‘unconventional’’ forms of warfare along with definitions of ‘‘terrorism,’’
‘‘insurgency,’’ and ‘‘guerrilla warfare.’’ We continue by placing terrorism, insurgency,
and unconventional warfare in an historical context. In order to accomplish this, we
offer an overview of the development of terrorism as an area of research and the
evolving role played by terrorism tactics in twentieth- and twenty-first century war-
fare. We discuss the ways in which the scholarship on the otherwise similar subjects
of terrorism and insurgency has been separated into different fields of study with little
cross-disciplinary interaction. We highlight implications of these developments and
make a few modest suggestions concerning the academic study of terrorism. Our hope
is that this discussion will stimulate some rethinking of the subject.
Tactics and Types of Warfare

Warfare takes many forms and involves a variety of actors. To the extent that
‘‘unconventional’’ refers to a practice that is not standard or customary, unconven-
tional warfare represents what may be considered by some to be an ‘‘abnormal’’ or
‘‘uncommon’’ form of warfare.9 Andrew C. Janos has suggested that if conventional
warfare refers to confrontations between roughly equal state militaries, then uncon-
ventional warfare may be designated as warfare between unmatched adversaries or
between a state and at least one non-state actor.10 In fact, this understanding of ‘‘con-
ventional’’ war may be ‘‘ahistorical.’’11 Max Boot describes conventional, rather than
unconventional, warfare as a ‘‘relatively recent invention.’’12 Armed confrontations
have often involved actors of unequal strength, including cases in which states have
faced non-state actors. Unable to defeat their opponents on the battlefield, the weaker
parties have long combined guerrilla and terrorism tactics in contests against stronger
parties.13 In the process, the weaker parties have tended to engage in a type of psycho-
logical warfare, using ambushes, ‘‘hit-and-run’’ attacks, and sabotage in order to con-
vince stronger parties to abandon the fight.14 These are the weapons the weak use to
win in war. With these tactics, the weaker actor acts as the metaphorical flea, capable
of annoying the lion even if not killing him.15
238 S. Martin and L. B. Weinberg
Even though it may be the tool of the weakest insurgents,16 efforts to define
‘‘terrorism’’ and distinguish it from other forms of violence and intimidation have
become interminable.17 Bruce Hoffman employs a widely used definition of ‘‘terror-
ism’’ as ‘‘the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the
threat of violence in the pursuit of political change . . . [which] is specifically designed
to have far-reaching political consequences beyond the immediate victim(s) or object
of the terrorist attack.’’18 This definition is consistent with that offered nearly two
decades earlier by Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman in their search for a consensus
definition of terrorism.19 Groups engaging in political terrorism use terrorism tactics
to achieve political ends.20
The terms ‘‘guerrilla’’ and ‘‘guerrilla war’’ also require some specification. In
popular discourse, at least, ‘‘terrorism’’ and ‘‘guerrilla warfare’’ are often used
interchangeably.21 This confusion is perfectly understandable given that the same
groups may employ terrorist and guerrilla tactics. Max Boot provides a helpful defi-
nition: ‘‘Guerrilla literally means ‘small war’; the name derives from the struggles of
Spanish irregulars against Napoleon from 1808 to 1814, but the practice is as ancient
as mankind. Here it will be used to describe hit and run tactics by an armed group
directed primarily against a government and its security forces for political or religious
reasons.’’22 Perhaps more importantly, greater capacity in terms of organization,
resources, and support is generally required of groups engaging in guerrilla warfare.23
Even though it is sometimes conflated with guerrilla warfare,24 insurgency is a
term that tends to arouse less conflict over its meaning. The U.S. Army Counterinsur-
gency Field Manual refers to ’’ . . . an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a
constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.’’25 The
scholar Bard O’Neill puts it somewhat differently: ‘‘Insurgency may be defined as a
struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the non-ruling
group uses political resources . . . and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the
basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics.’’26 These definitions require
some qualification. Among other things, they put things in the singular, as if the
government involved were being challenged by a single group or movement. In reality,
a single insurgency may consist of multiple challengers, often with their own conflict-
ing agendas and modes of operation. In addition, the definition of insurgency does not
presuppose a range of tactics; rather, insurgents may use a variety of tactics. Given
their relative weakness in comparison to state militaries, some insurgents use
terrorism and guerrilla warfare.27 Moreover, as James Khalil points out, a group
may be simultaneously an insurgent group and a terrorist group, using terrorist
‘‘tactics’’ as part of an insurgent ‘‘strategy.’’28
Political Terrorism in the Twentieth Century

Political terrorism, as defined above, became a serious problem and a separate subject
for academic inquiry during the late 1960s and early 1970s.29 This period of time cor-
responds with what David Rapoport has labeled the ‘‘Third Wave’’ of modern terror-
ism and what Walter Laqueur characterized as the ‘‘age of terrorism.’’30 Even though
terrorism was not a new phenomenon at this time,31 there were noticeable changes in
the groups, their objectives, and their tactics.32 It was at this time that homegrown
terrorist groups emerged in Italy, Japan, West Germany, Turkey, the Netherlands,
and elsewhere; secessionist bands appeared in Spain; and republican and loyalist
movements in Northern Ireland became reinvigorated. In the Middle East, a number
of groups engaging in armed struggle under the Palestinian Liberation Organization

(PLO), most conspicuously the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP),
turned to terrorism in order to bring international attention to their cause.33
It was also during this time that such observers as Alex Schmid and Janny de
Graaf depicted terrorism as a form of communication, a type of theatre.34 To quote
Brian Jenkins, this was when ‘‘terrorists wanted a lot of people watching, not a lot of
people dead.’’35 Terrorist attacks tended to be spectacular displays aimed at winning
widespread attention. ‘‘Urban guerrilla’’ bands in Latin America, including those
in Uruguay, Brazil, and Argentina, staged bank robberies, kidnappings, and assassi-
nations in the hope of igniting revolutions.36 Other major events (e.g., airline skyjack-
ings, kidnappings of prominent individuals, hostage-taking events) drew the attention
of government officials, journalists, and academic investigators, not to mention an
apprehensive public.37
Terrorism during the ‘‘Third Wave’’ was a type of violence carried out mostly by
small groups lacking popular support and unable to mount more substantial attacks
against their enemies. Even though there was some form of international cooperation
among terrorist groups, the groups that emerged during this time were largely
stand-alone organizations.38 While the leaders of these bands hoped to attract a mass
following, they rarely succeeded beyond winning a handful of admirers, helpers, and
well-wishers. Analysts began referring to terrorism as a ‘‘weapon of the weak.’’39
Yet, there was another type of terrorist active even at this time. Some groups
were using terrorism in the context of wider-scale warfare. Groups in El Salvador
and Guatemala, for instance, engaged in guerrilla warfare, attacking military and
government targets in the context of civil war. These same groups were simul-
taneously identified as terrorist groups, presumably because their targets included
civilians.40 Communist militants in Vietnam, whom Rapoport credits with ‘‘precipi-
tat[ing] the Third Wave [of terror],’’41 also used terrorism tactics, including some
acts designated as suicide missions, in the context of war.42 Although Rapoport
associates ‘‘terror’’ in Vietnam with the beginning of the ‘‘Third Wave of inter-
national terrorism,’’ his references to ‘‘terror against the American Goliath’’ seem
to refer primarily to attacks directed against the American military.43 In other words,
Rapoport credits the Vietnamese communists with demonstrating the ability of the
weak to impair the strong in large part through guerrilla warfare, not solely
terrorism. Hence, it was the capacity of the weak to challenge the strong that spread
to the leftist terrorists of the ‘‘Third Wave of international terrorism.’’44
Though guerilla warfare was a key feature of the conflicts in Vietnam,
Vietnamese militants also used terrorism tactics. There are many possible explana-
tions for why terrorism in the context of the Vietnam War has received less attention
than terrorism elsewhere. The war took place during a time in which the American
government was working to contain communism, not terrorism; moreover, counter-
ing terrorism resided in the domain of criminal justice, not that of the military.45 The
United States military was directly and publicly involved in the war in Vietnam,
perhaps contributing to different interpretations of the tactics used by Vietnamese
militants as compared to those used by militants operating elsewhere, such as in
Central America. In addition, in Vietnam much of the terrorism was perpetrated
against locals, not Americans. Furthermore, the end of the Vietnam conflict, the sub-
sequent avoidance of direct participation in war, and the ongoing view of terrorism
as a domestic issue and a domestic threat likely provided little or no support for a
focus on terrorism as a tactic of warfare.
Many of the groups using terrorism following Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979
became part of Rapoport’s ‘‘Fourth Wave’’ of religious terrorism.46 These groups
tended to be far weaker than their adversaries, though there were prominent exam-
ples of weaker actors successfully challenging stronger states. These ‘‘successes’’
included the departure of Americans from Lebanon following the 1983 suicide attack
on the U.S. marine barracks and the departure of the Soviets from Afghanistan in
1989 following a decade-long war. The ‘‘guerrilla,’’ rather than ‘‘terrorist,’’ nature
of these events seems inconsequential. The weak had influenced, even defeated,
the greatest powers of the time.
Separately Studying Terrorism and War

Even though studies of war and terrorism have progressed independently of each
other, the eventual implications of the separation between the new scholarship on ter-
rorism and the more established scholarship on the theories and practice of war and
domestic political violence may not have been evident early on. Terrorism was studied
as a tactic used by violent non-state actors. The focus was not on terrorism as a tactic
of warfare, nor was the focus on terrorism as one among many tactics employed by a
variety of political groups.47 Instead, while terrorism studies were emerging as a new
field of academic inquiry and policy discussion, another set of concerns attracted the
attention of American military officers and academics typically specializing in secur-
ity studies. These concerns were focused on what went wrong in Vietnam. Why had
the United States, with its superior military capacity, failed to defeat the Viet Cong
and their North Vietnamese patrons?48 The answer offered by a younger generation
of army officers was the military’s over-reliance on conventional war-fighting tactics,
which had proved so successful during World War II.49 Lieutenant Colonel John
Nagl has argued that the problem is one of organizational learning and innovation
in response to the changing tactics used by America’s adversaries.50 Nagl, General
David Petraeus, and other experts in the practice of war assumed positions in the
Department of Social Sciences at West Point.51
It was against this background that terrorism emerged as a special field of study,
one which drew academics from various disciplines, especially political science and
criminal justice. Also at this time, government agencies in the United States and in
other democracies with special responsibilities for responding to the terrorist problem
became willing to devote resources to terrorism studies. Some analysts came to the
view that terrorists had distinctive character traits; while others thought that the
terrorists were perfectly normal, often coming from nurturing family backgrounds.52
The absence of a consensus on the causes of terrorism and the nature of terrorists
has coincided with a lack of consensus on how the problem should be addressed.
Some advocated negotiating with terrorist hostage-takers; others, notably the Nixon
administration and Israeli decision-makers, adopted a position of not negotiating
with terrorists on the grounds that it simply encouraged others to seize hostages.53
Moreover, one could ask whether terrorism was fundamentally a criminal justice
problem or one that required a military or paramilitary reaction. Was it necessary
for new anti-terrorism legislation to be enacted or were existing criminal laws suf-
ficient? Since terrorist groups used the mass media to disseminate their messages,
should steps be taken to deny or limit their access to television and the other means
of mass communication?54 Discussions of these questions would benefit from
considering how terrorism has changed over time, the uses of terrorism as a tool in
wider-scale armed conflict, and the implications this may have for countering
terrorism.
‘‘Unconventional’’ Warfare in the Twenty-First Century

The ‘‘new’’ wars of the twenty-first century differ in important ways from those
fought in the past.55 These differences are particularly evident in the prevalence of
asymmetrical wars between state and non-state actors and in the tactics that dominate
this warfare.
One of the key distinctions between the wars fought in the twenty-first century
and those fought earlier has a lot to do with the parties engaging in warfare. Whereas
earlier periods of history were dominated by, with some exceptions, ‘‘conventional’’
interstate or civil wars, a state’s adversaries in the twenty-first century are almost
exclusively non-state actors. This is not to say that asymmetrical warfare between state
and non-state adversaries is new to the twenty-first century, nor is it to suggest that the
use of terrorism in wider-scale warfare is unique to modern conflict.56 Despite the use
of terrorism in the twentieth-century campaigns of anti-colonial and nationalist-
separatist groups, the resulting conflicts were not the only wars, or even the most
significant wars, of their time. Rather, the most significant wars of the twentieth
century, including the two World Wars; the wars fought between Arab states and
Israel, including the 1948–1949 War of Israeli Independence, the 1956 Suez War with
Egypt, the June 1967 Six Day War, and the 1973 war between Israel and Egypt=Syria;
and the Korean War, were ‘‘conventional’’ wars between states.
The pervasiveness of confrontations between states and non-state actors has
resulted in an increase in ‘‘unconventional’’ warfare and the tactics associated with
it. Although non-state actors are far weaker than states in terms of military strength,
they tend to have an advantage in warfare carried out on their home soil.57 Local
militants are better able to hide within local communities, while carrying out attacks
against non-native actors.58 Locals know their environment, including terrains,
cultures, and languages, better than foreigners, and they can take advantage of this
familiarity in recruiting supporters and carrying out attacks. In some cases, insur-
gents enjoy a type of legitimacy because they are local actors who may be pursuing
local interests. When the adversary is a foreign military, local militants can frame a
war in terms of ‘‘us versus them’’ or ‘‘our interests vs. theirs.’’59 In other cases, insur-
gents propagate fear amongst members of a local population, interfering with local
efforts to support counterinsurgents in routing them. Insurgents are difficult for
foreign militaries to identify, making it even more difficult to counter their activities
without punishing innocent civilians.
The tactics used in warfare have also changed in recent years. By most accounts,
insurgents employ a variety of tactics. In Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Mali, and else-
where insurgents typically rely on a combination of guerrilla-style ‘‘hit-and-run’’ tac-
tics in the countryside and urban guerrilla operations directed against outposts of
government authority in the cities, combined with terrorist violence directed against
the civilian population. According to Ivan Arreguin-Toft, the likelihood of insurgent
success improves substantially when those challenging the incumbents use unconven-
tional means, including ‘‘barbarism.’’60 By ‘‘barbarism’’ he means indiscriminate
attacks on civilian populations, in other words attacks we would label as ‘‘terrorism.’’
He also includes ‘‘torture’’ in this category of tactics typically not condoned in the
context of conventional warfare.61 Some viewed ‘‘barbarism’’ as part of ‘‘modern
warfare’’ and as a necessary technique for counterinsurgents seeking ‘‘to shatter social
support for insurgents’’;62 however, these tactics proved to be ineffective where
applied, as the examples of successful insurgencies in Indochina and Algeria
suggest.63 Although terrorist and guerrilla tactics tend to be less sophisticated and
less expensive than organized military operations, such tactics seem only to benefit
insurgents; similar tactics turn out to be largely counter-productive when used by
governments.64
Insurgents’ objectives have also changed over time. The old distinction accord-
ing to which guerrillas want to capture territory while terrorists want to instill fear
no longer applies. Contemporary insurgents typically want to do both.65
It is possible that the apparent successes of ‘‘unconventional’’ tactics in twentieth-
century warfare inspired similar practices by twenty-first century insurgents.66 Some
tactics, such as bombings and targeted assassinations, resemble terrorism, except that
the targets of these attacks could be described as ‘‘combatants,’’ especially in the con-
text of war. Attacks on military and government targets serve at least two purposes.
Such attacks disrupt military activities, damage morale, and weaken governments.
They also act as psychological warfare. Terrorist-type attacks on ‘‘combatant’’ tar-
gets may create fear amongst civilian populations in much the same way that terrorist
attacks perpetrated against civilians would. Whereas civilians are understood to be
weak and unarmed, attacks on the state emphasize the weakness of the state and,
especially in cases in which insurgents gain some level of legitimacy, challenge the
state’s presumed monopoly on the legitimate use of force.
The rules of warfare have also changed with the introduction of non-state actors in
contemporary warfare. Non-state actors are not bound by the conventions governing
warfare between states. Andrea J. Dew describes non-state armed groups as oftentimes
uninhibited by norms regarding the conduct of war, leading to an ‘‘erosion of the con-
straints on warfare.’’67 Moreover, while imposing costs for noncompliance is difficult
when the actor is a non-state entity, states must presumably continue to abide by these
norms. As a result, as terrorism and guerrilla warfare have become more common,
wars have become ‘‘increasingly bloody and protracted’’ and the likelihood that coun-
terinsurgents will achieve their objectives has diminished.68
Another type of issue arises when considering how insurgents, as terrorists, are
targeted in the context of war. With the new form of warfare has come a new type
of combatant; however, conventions governing conduct in war may not apply to
those whose legitimacy as fighters is not recognized.69 When captured, insurgent–
terrorists may or may not be recognized or treated as would prisoners of war. This
has been the case in the past with Irish republican terrorists who were treated as
criminals; this has also been the case more recently with the incarceration of presumed
terrorists in places like Guantanamo Bay. Although both represent non-state actors,
the latter differ from the former in important ways. Perhaps the most important
distinction is the foreign status of many of the presumed terrorists who have been
imprisoned, a status which has been recognized by the prisoners and their captors.
A second distinction is the presumed nature of the war in which the prisoners have
purportedly engaged.
The adoption of suicide tactics as a weapon of warfare marks yet another change
between wars conducted in previous eras and twenty-first century warfare. Even
though suicidal missions were used as a tool of warfare during the decades-long con-
flict in Vietnam,70 it is a thirteen-year-old Iranian soldier who has been recognized by
many as the first modern-day military martyr. The young soldier became a national
symbol of dedication and sacrifice when he detonated the bombs he was carrying in
an attempt to hinder an Iraqi military advance. His act was the presumed impetus for
many subsequent suicide attacks and suicidal actions during the Iran–Iraq War.71
Because these attacks were carried out in the context of military confrontation, a ter-
rorism label would be inappropriate. Within a couple of years, however, suicide
attacks were adapted for uses in times and places of presumed peace. Moreover,
the appearance of attacks as terroristic has sometimes influenced the recognition of
these tactics as ‘‘acts of terror,’’ if not acts of ‘‘terrorism.’’72 Even when acts qualify
as terrorism according to the definitions offered above, they appear to have assumed
an increased prevalence and importance and taken different forms in modern-day
warfare.
Terrorism in Twenty-First Century Warfare

The popular understanding of terrorism has been transformed in the twenty-first cen-
tury from an act that took place primarily outside of war to an act of war and an act in
war. The recognition of terrorist attacks as acts of war was reinforced in the aftermath
of the attacks on September 11, 2001, with the assertion of these attacks as an ‘‘act of
war’’ and the subsequent declaration of a ‘‘war on terrorism.’’73 Previous suicide
attacks on the barracks of American and French peacekeepers in Beirut in 1983,
American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and the USS Cole in peaceful
Yemeni waters in 2000 were different. These attacks were aimed at symbols of the
American government and military in foreign lands. In contrast, the attacks on
September 11 were carried out over American soil and were aimed at civilian and
non-civilian targets in a time and place of presumed peace and prosperity. The perpe-
trators were part of a non-state—in fact, stateless—entity with associates operating
freely within the borders of the United States and its allies. In fact, the same entity,
al Qaeda, was associated with previous attacks on American interests and infrastruc-
ture, including the attacks in Kenya, Tanzania, and Yemen.74
This was a time when the changing nature of challenges to powerful states was
becoming more apparent. Rather than facing each other, states were increasingly
being challenged by non-state actors, including well-funded, though militarily weak,
transnational terrorist groups and their local associates. Rather than attacking from
afar, the terrorists trained and hid amongst their future victims. Rather than drawing
on military might or military technologies, the terrorists required very little in terms of
technological sophistication to carry out their attacks on civilian and military targets.
The twenty-first century is also a period in which terrorism has become more
apparent as a tactic used in war. It has been one of the most important tactics used
by insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan,75 and it has become more prevalent in the
recent insurgency in Pakistan, where militants attack local populations, in some
cases purportedly doing so in response to American drone attacks on the militants’
interests within Pakistan’s borders.76
Terrorism in the twenty-first century has evolved into a new type of threat. This is
a phenomenon that has been most obvious since 2001, when terrorism shifted from a
domestic and international phenomenon to a transnational phenomenon, and from
being a tool of small, relatively isolated groups to one used by members of a larger
global network. Whereas the operations of international terrorists may have crossed
state borders, transnational terrorists operate around the world. They share objec-
tives and ideology, though they often operate independently within a loose network.77
The apparent dominance of a network structure may be a byproduct of the

transnational nature of terrorists as well as a response to counterterrorism efforts
and the loss of some safe havens for operation. Their objectives and ideology also dif-
fer from those of most of the earlier modern terrorists. Religious ideology is dominant
in the twenty-first century, and it provides a type of glue to organizations unmatched
by socialism or nationalism. These ‘‘new’’ terrorists view themselves as being
members of a larger community that cross state boundaries, much as religious beliefs
do. Religious groups pursue political objectives that are inherently religious. More-
over, they view themselves as being involved in a global war, or jihad, with those
who threaten their existence. Their presumed supporters and targets reside within
and outside of their communities. As terrorism has become transnational and
religious, it may be that insurgency has, as well.78
Transnational terrorists threaten and use particularly destructive tactics, and they
do so increasingly in the context of warfare. As noted above, whether it is their widely
recognized celebration of martyrdom during the Iran-Iraq war or the less well-
documented, though earlier, suicide missions in Vietnam, the modern use of suicide tac-
tics first occurred in the context of war.79 Ariel Merari observes similarities in the use of
suicide tactics in Lebanon in the context of sectarian fighting and civil war against
government and military targets, often representing foreign governments, and their
use twenty years later in Afghanistan.80 Many of the groups that have adopted suicide
tactics have been labeled as terrorists, though these same groups have used suicide tac-
tics against military as well as civilian targets as demonstrated in these contexts, as well
as in the nationalist–separatist struggles in Sri Lanka and in the Palestinian–Israeli
conflict.81 Merari also observes differences between the uses of suicide tactics, along
with other terrorism tactics, found in Afghanistan and Iraq, where local civilians have
increasingly become the main targets of attacks perpetrated by militants.82 In these
contexts, these attacks represent a tactic of warfare, as well as a tactic of terrorism.
Suicide attacks became a frequent tactic in ground warfare in the new millen-
nium. The threat of transnational terrorism offered an incentive for foreign inter-
vention in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. Not long after the 2003 invasion of
Iraq, the number of terrorist attacks in the region skyrocketed, exceeding the number
of suicide attacks executed by the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka.83 Insurgent groups have
directed suicide attacks against military and nonmilitary targets, perpetuating insta-
bility, creating fear among local populations, causing tremendous structural damage,
and leaving the impression that the insurgents cannot be deterred. With terrorism in
twenty-first century warfare, noncombatants are treated like combatants.
Developments in technology also support new forms of terrorism in modern-day
warfare. The use of new combinations of tactics has been accompanied by a vastly
expanded repertoire of messages directed via the new social media and the somewhat
older means of mass communication. In addition, social media provide another way
for people to get connected and spread ideas and ideologies, as well as a means for mili-
tants to communicate with the public, and with their adversaries, without engaging in
direct communication.84 The Internet also provides a means for terrorists to reach out
to would-be terrorists and a means by which would-be terrorists can participate in
jihad from afar. Terrorists may spread propaganda via the Internet, which may attract
new supporters to join the jihad, inspire the creation of new terror cells, or encourage
interested parties to join in the fighting.85 In addition to this threat of ‘‘cyber-
mobilisation,’’86 there is a developing threat of cyber-warfare, or cyber-terrorism.87
Those engaging in such tactics may use computer viruses as weapons with the
capability of imposing high costs and causing immense damage. In short, in the
modern interconnected world terrorism can be carried out remotely.
With the seemingly abrupt change in the terrorist threat came an impetus to
understand this ‘‘new’’ terrorism, along with many who have argued that there has
been little ‘‘new’’ with regard to terrorism in the twenty-first century.88 Regardless
of how ‘‘new’’ the ‘‘new’’ terrorism is, older ways of responding to terrorism have
been overtaken by recent events. Responses have been aided by some changes in mili-
tary technology and approach. Advances in military technologies allow states to carry
out warfare remotely, as well. Drones, smart weapons, and satellite imagery provide
sophisticated militaries with ways to identify and target adversaries. While these tech-
nologies provide tools that can be used against adversaries engaging in unconven-
tional warfare, their ability to target only combatants is limited, especially when
combatants disappear within a community of noncombatants.
At the same time, new ideas have surfaced regarding the ways that terrorism
should be countered. This is demonstrated by the recognition that a different

military approach is needed in response to the unconventional tactics preferred by
insurgents. One result has been a new doctrine for countering insurgency in the
twenty-first century: The U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual.89
Terrorism as a Tool of Insurgents

Calling attention to an important matter, the impact of the insurgents’ use of terror-
ism in influencing the outcomes of insurgencies, Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki
point out that insurgents tend to perform better when using selective terrorism, which
seems to work more in insurgents’ favor than indiscriminate attacks.90 Whether or
not insurgents use terrorism tactics, though, is simply one of a number of factors that
should be considered in evaluating the role of terrorism in contemporary insurgen-
cies. We think two other variables require consideration.
First, there is the matter of timing. At what point in such conflicts do insurgents
employ terrorism tactics? Is it used in the initial stage of the struggle, during the
‘‘agitation-propaganda’’ phase of the fighting?91 Or, do insurgents find it useful to
use terrorism tactics throughout the struggle, as was the case with the Viet Cong
in the struggle over Vietnam? A third possibility is that insurgents employ terrorism
tactics when they are in the course of being defeated by the authorities. They use
terrorism against elements in the local population out of desperation because
nothing else seems to have worked.
Second, how significant or how salient is terrorism among the tactics insurgents
choose to employ? Does it play a minor role? For instance, most observers regard the
Castro revolution in Cuba in 1959 as the result of guerrilla warfare plus the adroit
use of publicity.92 This is not entirely the case however. Castro’s followers set off
bombs all over Havana and kidnapped a world-renowned race car driver from his
hotel room and demanded ransom for his release. Clearly terrorism played a minor
role in Castro’s success. On the other hand, there are instances in which the use of
terrorism is an important tactic for insurgents. Its use by the Taliban in Afghanistan,
for example, is central to the way the organization seeks to win power.
Learning From the Present

The challenges associated with unconventional warfare have become more prevalent
in an era in which confrontations between unmatched state and non-state actors have
become more common.93 Such developments pose practical and theoretical issues in
need of further consideration. The prevalence of guerrilla and terrorism tactics in
modern-day warfare poses a practical problem for states engaging in contemporary
conflicts, as these types of adversaries and tactics may require a response that differs
from that for which most militaries are trained. There is also a theoretical issue. While
policymakers and scholars are giving increasing attention to insurgencies and
terrorism, with few exceptions these phenomena tend to be treated separately.94 This
separation is also evident in the literatures on counterterrorism (CT) and counterin-
surgency (COIN). Moreover, to the extent that CT and COIN enter the same
dialogue, the result has been, at times, one of ‘‘confusion’’ regarding whether a threat
is a terrorist threat, an insurgent threat, or both; on occasion, this has resulted in a
relabeling of terrorists and insurgents accordingly.95
Although countering terrorism was traditionally a criminal justice issue, the new
transnational nature of the terrorist threat and the use of terrorism in warfare add to
the need to consider whether efforts at countering terrorism belong with the federal
government and the military.96 Preparing the military to address the terrorism prob-
lem raises further issues regarding strategy and innovation, as well as the potential
need for new norms to address this new threat of non-state, non-military actors
engaging in insurgent warfare. Moreover, the potential transnational threat posed
by terrorists raises additional questions: should foreign intervention be deemed an
appropriate response to an attempt by terrorists to take over a state? Alternatively,
has a state lost its sovereignty when it is sufficiently challenged by terrorists or insur-
gents using terrorism?
As suggested by these questions, although today’s terrorists share similar tactics
and short-term objectives (i.e., provoking overreaction and gaining support) with
their predecessors, they have different organizational capabilities and long-term
objectives. To borrow from a more recent statement by Brian Jenkins, twenty-first
century terrorists tend to want many watching and many dead.97 Although terrorists
seeking large numbers of casualties may be at risk of alienating their base of
support,98 they also may be capable of provoking sufficient fear and using ideological
appeals to create a base of support or, at least, eliminate their opposition. Unlike the
small bands of clandestine, largely anonymous terrorists and independent terrorist
groups seeking revolutionary change during terrorism’s ‘‘Third Wave,’’ many of
the terrorist groups operating in the twenty-first century share an extensive support
network and ideology. Also unlike many of their comparatively weak predecessors,
modern terrorists are seeking to maximize attention and control over territory, and
they are doing so with religious rather than nationalistic, anti-colonial, or revolution-
ary appeals.99
Terrorism remains, by definition, a tactic used against civilians; though, it is also
a tactic used against civilians in the context of warfare. At the same time, it is likely
that insurgents do not view their attacks differently on the basis of whom they attack.
Certainly, there are similarities in the types of attacks perpetrated against combatants
and noncombatants. Perhaps insurgents recognize civilians as combatants, as al
Qaeda has.100 It is possible that the distinction between guerrilla warfare and terror-
ism, or between ‘‘combatant’’ and ‘‘noncombatant’’ or legitimate and illegitimate
targets, is held by the targets of these attacks rather than by their perpetrators. It also
may be that insurgents target ‘‘noncombatants’’ for the same reasons they target
‘‘combatants.’’ Even so, countering insurgency and countering terrorism would not
necessarily require the same set of responses, as the targets of these attacks remain
differently vulnerable and the effects of attacks may differ depending on the nature of
the target and the types of responses counterinsurgents carry out.
Implications for the Study of Terrorism

No doubt we would be troubling deaf heaven with our bootless cries if we attempted
to sort out the serious policy dilemmas outlined above. What we intend to do instead
is make a few modest suggestions concerning the academic study of terrorism in the
hope that it will stimulate some rethinking of the subject.
Students of terrorism, international relations, and security have much to learn
from each other. From our perspective, at least, we should stress that the ideas
inherent in contemporary COIN strategies evolved largely independently of the grow-
ing field of terrorism studies. To the extent that COIN became a source of academic
inquiry it tended to develop under the general heading of ‘‘political violence.’’ As an
area of inquiry ‘‘political violence’’ tended to focus on larger scale types of conflict,
e.g., civil wars, mass protests, and ethnic disputes, rather than the type of small group
violence, e.g., plane skyjackings, hostage seizures, politically motivated extortion,
with which the study of terrorism came to be linked. Michael Boyle calls attention
to what he depicts as the excessive specialization of these fields of study.101 He
believes that the relative isolation of terrorism studies from the wider subject of polit-
ical violence denies the former valuable insights, such as from the civil wars literature,
which might be gained from absorbing the work of such analysts as Stathis Kalyvas
and Jeremy Weinstein.102 A similar comment might be made about the growing body
of work in another sub-field, ‘‘contentious politics,’’ as developed inter alia by Charles
Tilly and Sidney Tarrow.103
The trend Boyle identifies involving the over-specialization and relative isolation
of terrorism studies from the study of political violence has coincided with the ways
contemporary insurgencies are fought. This applies as well to those conflicts in which
the United States and its allies may choose to become involved. The study of terror-
ism and the type of advice provided to American and other governments changed
substantially with the rise of al Qaeda and its affiliates during the first years of the
new millennium and the advent of the ‘‘War on Terrorism.’’ Following 9=11, the
American policy community redefined terrorism as an adversary that needed to be
fought much like other armed groups with which the United States has come into
conflict. What followed was the development of counterterrorism (CT) doctrine.
As Brigitte Nacos and other observers point out, CT as first adopted by the Bush
Administration involved the promotion of democracy (i.e., the use of ‘‘soft power’’),
pre-emption (i.e., staging counterterrorist strikes before the threat becomes immi-
nent), and unilateralism (i.e., the willingness of the United States to use force in the
absence of support from its friends and endorsement by the United Nations).104
CT stressed the use of special operations forces staging commando raids on suspected
‘‘nodes’’ of a terrorist organization. Later these ‘‘kinetic’’ aspects of CT came to
include the use of unmanned aerial vehicles or ‘‘drones’’ to locate these centers and
key leaders. And once located, some of the drones at least could be used to fire
missiles at these targets.
Michael Boyle identifies the major problem with these two approaches. COIN
and CT are not compatible with one another.105 COIN is a long-term strategy for
winning the trust of a local population by providing better government and minimiz-
ing the use of force, while being careful to avoid civilian casualties. CT on the other
hand, as it has been applied in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere, creates

antagonism between the U.S., the host government, and the local population. It offers
a bonanza in propaganda benefits to the insurgents. It may, as Boyle, Cronin, and
others maintain, create more insurgents than it eliminates.106 In short, CT policies
may work against the objectives they seek to achieve. The danger is that not planning
for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, as pointed out by Bruce Hoffman and
Jennifer Morrison Taw, could ‘‘prolong a conflict or even result in outright failure,’’
something they suggest happens often.107 At the same time, although they recognize
that there are different needs for different situations, Hoffman and Taw describe
the ‘‘elements’’ of a counterterrorism or counterinsurgency plan as including some
combination of the same components.108
The academic and professional barriers that interfere with responding to terror-
ism have yet to be broken. Studies of terrorism remain largely separated from studies
of war. This is particularly problematic in an era in which terrorism is a tactic used in
war. Moreover, there remains a divide between those producing theory regarding
terrorism and counterterrorism and those practicing countering terrorism. Presum-
ably theory could inform practice, and practice could test theory. Instead, these
activities take place largely in isolation of each other, not only in terms of the divide
between scholars and practitioners, but also in terms of the lack of experience each
has with the other’s areas of expertise. Recognizing the limitations of any one per-
son’s knowledge and expertise, bridging these divides is an area in need of further
attention.
Notes
1. Andrea J. Dew, ‘‘The Erosion of Constraints in Armed-Group Warfare: Bloody
Tactics and Vulnerable Targets,’’ in Jeffrey H. Norwitz, ed., Armed Groups: Studies in
National Security, Counterterrorism, and Counterinsurgency (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War
College, 2008), 255–268; see also Andrew C. Janos, ‘‘Unconventional Warfare: Framework
and Analysis,’’ World Politics 15, no. 4 (July 1963): 638–639.
2. See, for instance, Dew, ‘‘The Erosion of Constraints in Armed-Group Warfare’’ (see
note 1 above), 258.
3. William Polk, Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla
War, from the American Revolution to Iraq (New York: Harper Perennial, 2008), Chapter
One, especially 12–14; for a description of the Sons of Liberty, who operated in the context
of the American Revolution, see David C. Rapoport, ‘‘Before the Bombs There Were the
Mobs: American Experiences with Terror,’’ Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 2 (Apr.
2008): 167–194.
4. See, for instance, ‘‘ ‘We Must Fight to the Death’ Even without Unity, the Muslim
Insurgency Struggles On,’’ Time 115, no. 5 (February 4, 1980), 38–40; ‘‘Frightened City under
the Gun: An Eyewitness Account of Hatred and Terror in Kabul,’’ Time 115, no. 14 (April 7,
1980), 40–44.
5. By offering comparisons among these groups, we do not mean to imply that each of
the groups used the same combinations of terrorist and guerrilla tactics or that they sought the
same outcomes with these tactics; rather, we wish to draw attention to the combinations of
tactics used in diverse settings and during different periods of time. For instance, see
Rapoport’s description of the Sons of Liberty as engaging in a ‘‘mob terror campaign’’ and
acting as a unifying force, as ‘‘an essential ingredient in bringing the colonies together or in
helping to create a nation’’ prior to the formation of a national army in ‘‘Before the Bombs’’
(see note 3 above), 181.
6. Janos, ‘‘Unconventional Warfare’’ (see note 1 above), 642–645; see also Ben Connable
and Martin Libicki, How Insurgencies End (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 2010),
99–110. Connable and Libicki offer an overview of theoretical and practical insights regarding
the uses and timing of terrorism within insurgency, drawing in particular on the description of
stages of insurgency and weak actors offered in John J. McCuen, The Art of
Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy of Counter-insurgency (London: Faber, 1966).
7. See, for instance, Robert Taber, The War of the Flea: A Study of Guerrilla Warfare
Theory and Practice (New York: Lyle Stuart, 1965), 35; Connable and Libicki, How Insurgen-
cies End (see note 6 above), 99–110.
8. See, for instance, William R. Polk, Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terror-
ism and Guerrilla War, from the American Revolution to Iraq (New York: Harper Perennial,
2008), 173–174. On terrorism and suicide attacks in Vietnam, see Leonard Weinberg, ‘‘Suicide
Terrorism for Secular Causes,’’ in Ami Pedahzur, ed., Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The
Globalization of Martyrdom (New York: Routledge, 2006), 108–121; Hoa Minh Truong, The
Dark Journey, Inside the Reeducation Camps of Viet Cong (Durham, CT: Eloquent Books,
2010); Abdel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of Al Qaeda (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 2008), 92–93, 108.
9. Janos, for instance, describes the understanding of conventional wars as something
that is ‘‘subconscious.’’ See Janos, ‘‘Unconventional Warfare’’ (see note 1 above), 637.
10. Ibid. Interestingly, although he was referring to wars between unequal states, Janos,
‘‘Unconventional Warfare’’ (note 1 above) foresaw that increasing disparities in powers of
states would likely lead to an increase in unconventional warfare.
11. See, for instance, Max Boot, Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare
from Ancient Times to the Present (New York: Liveright, 2013).
12. Max Boot, ‘‘The Evolution of Irregular War: Insurgents and Guerrillas from
Akkadia to Afghanistan,’’ Foreign Affairs 92, no. 2 (March=April 2013): 100–114.
13. Bard O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism (Washington, DC: Brassey’s Inc., 1990), 24.
14. Dew, ‘‘The Erosion of Constraints in Armed-Group Warfare’’ (see note 1 above),
255–268; Janos, ‘‘Unconventional Warfare’’ (see note 1 above), 638, 639; James O. Whittaker,
‘‘Psychological Warfare in Vietnam,’’ Political Psychology 18, no. 1 (March 1997): 165–179.
15. This metaphor is used frequently in the context of unconventional types of warfare.
See, for instance, Taber, The War of the Flea (note 7 above).
16. Lawrence Freedman, ‘‘Terrorism as a Strategy,’’ Government and Opposition 42,
no. 3 (Summer 2007): 314–339; Janos, ‘‘Unconventional Warfare’’ (note 1 above), 642–645;
see also Connable and Libicki, How Insurgencies End (note 6 above), 99–110.
17. See, for instance, Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur, and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler,
‘‘The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism,’’ Terrorism and Political Violence 16, no. 4
(Winter 2004): 777–794.
18. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 40.
19. Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors,
Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction,
2005), 1–38.
20. See Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (note 18 above), 2–3.
21. See, for instance, Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (note 18 above), 35–36.
22. Boot, Invisible Armies (see note 11 above), xxii. Guerrilla warfare normally involves
an armed conflict between insurgents or non-state actors and an incumbent regime. This is not
always the case, however. In some instances competing guerrilla groups may fight it out with
each other before seeking to topple the state. This is particularly true in cases where the state is
weak (e.g., Somalia in recent decades). The Geneva Convention stipulates that guerrillas when
captured are entitled to be treated as prisoners-of-war so long as they openly display their
weapons.
23. Janos, ‘‘Unconventional Warfare’’ (see note 1 above), 642–645.
24. See, for instance, Andrew T. H. Tan, ‘‘Terrorism, Insurgency and Religious
Fundamentalism in Southeast Asia,’’ Defence Studies 8, no. 3 (Sept. 2008): 311–312.
25. U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2007), 2.
26. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism (see note 13 above), 13.
27. For instance, Connable and Libicki, How Insurgencies End (see note 6 above),
99–110; Boot, ‘‘Evolution of Irregular War’’ (see note 12 above), 100–114.
28. James Khalil, ‘‘Know Your Enemy: On the Futility of Distinguishing Between
Terrorists and Insurgents,’’ Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 36, no. 5 (2013): 419–430.
29. See Frederick Schulze, ‘‘Breaking the Cycle: Empirical Research and Postgraduate
Studies on Terrorism,’’ in Andrew Silke, ed., Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements
and Features (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2004), 163–164.
30. See David Rapoport, ‘‘The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,’’ in Audrey Cronin
and James Ludes, eds., Attacking Terrorism (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press,
2004), 46–73; see also, ‘‘The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism,’’ Current
History 100, no. 650 (Dec. 2001): 419–424, and ‘‘The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and
September 11,’’ Anthropoetics 8, no. 1 (Spring=Summer 2002), http://www.anthropoetics.
ucla.edu/ap0801/terror.htm; Walter Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism (Boston: Little Brown,
1987), 298–322. Terrorist violence played a significant role in the postwar struggles for
national independence in Algeria, Palestine=Israel, Cyprus, Yemen, and a few other places.
But it was only at the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s that ‘‘terrorism’’ became
a distinct field for study by academics. It was also a time when various government agencies
in the United States and elsewhere elevated the subject to a matter of serious concern, one
requiring distinct approaches, such as, for example, responding to airline skyjackings and
hostage-takings. See also Schulze, ‘‘Breaking the Cycle’’ (note 29 above), 163–164.
31. See, for instance, David C. Rapoport, ‘‘Fear and Trembling—Terrorism in Three
Religious Traditions,’’ American Political Science Review 78, no. 3 (Sept. 1984): 658–677.
32. Rapoport, ‘‘Four Waves of Modern Terrorism’’ (see note 30 above), 46–73; ‘‘Fourth
Wave,’’ (note 30 above), 419–424; and ‘‘Four Waves of Rebel Terror’’ (note 30 above).
33. For a useful resource on the relationship between the media and terrorism, see James
J. F. Forest, The Terrorism Lectures: A Comprehensive Collection for Students of Terrorism,
Counterterrorism, and National Security (Santa Ana, CA: Nortia Press, 2012), 97–114.
34. Alex Schmid and Janny de Graaf, Violence as Communication (Los Angeles, CA:
Sage, 1982).
35. Brian Jenkins, The New Age of Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation,
1992), 117–121; see also Brian Jenkins, ‘‘Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?’’ (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 1975), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2006/
P5541.pdf.
36. See, for instance, Bradley McAllister and Alex P. Schmid, ‘‘Theories of Terrorism,’’
in A. P. Schmid, ed., The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (New York: Routledge,
2011), 224.
37. See, for instance, Rapoport, ‘‘Four Waves of Modern Terrorism’’ (note 30 above),
46–73; see also Rapoport, ‘‘Fourth Wave’’ (note 30 above), 419–424, and ‘‘Four Waves of
Rebel Terror’’ (note 30 above).
38. Ibid.
39. See especially Martha Crenshaw, ‘‘The Logic of Terrorism,’’ in Walter Reich, ed.,
Origins of Terrorism (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), 7–24.
40. See, for instance, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses
to Terrorism, Terrorist Organization Profiles, 2008, http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_
collections/tops/
41. Rapoport, ‘‘Fourth Wave’’ (see note 30 above), 420–421.
42. Weinberg, ‘‘Suicide Terrorism for Secular Causes’’ (see note 7 above), 108–121; see
also Truong, The Dark Journey (note 8 above) and Atwan, The Secret History of Al Qaeda
(note 8 above), 92–93, 108.
43. Rapoport, ‘‘Fourth Wave’’ (see note 30 above), 420–421; see also Rapoport, ‘‘Four
Waves of Rebel Terror’’ (note 30 above).
44. Rapoport, ‘‘Fourth Wave’’ (see note 30 above), 423, 422. Rapoport also associates
the ability of the weak to impair the strong with the onset of the Fourth Wave of religiously
inspired terrorism. In this case, he draws on the retreat of the Soviets out of Afghanistan with
the help of internationally composed Sunni militias. The withdrawal of American peacekeep-
ing force from Lebanon following the suicide attack on the U.S. marine barracks in October
1983 also demonstrates the power of weaker parties to influence stronger states.
45. See, for instance, Ian Shapiro, Containment: Rebuilding a Strategy Against Global
Terror (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), Chapter Two.
46. See, for instance, Rapoport, ‘‘Four Waves of Modern Terrorism’’ (see note 30
above), 46–73; see also Rapoport, ‘‘Fourth Wave’’ (note 30 above), 419–424, and ‘‘Four
Waves of Rebel Terror’’ (note 30 above).
47. One exception within a growing body of literature on this topic is Leonard
Weinberg, ‘‘Turning to Terror: The Conditions under Which Political Parties Turn to
Terrorist Activities,’’ Comparative Politics 23, no. 4 (July 1991): 423–438.
48. We could, of course, frame the question differently: How did the weaker North
Vietnamese avoid defeat?
49. See, for instance, Dale Andrade and James H. Willbanks, ‘‘CORDS=Phoenix:
Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future,’’ in Stephen S. Evans, ed., U.S.
Marines and Irregular Warfare, 1898–2007: Anthology and Selected Bibliography (Quantico,
VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2008), 171.
50. John Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat
Soup with a Knife (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002).
51. For a discussion of the new war-fighting ideas see Fred Kaplan, The Insurgents (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 2013), 11–60.
52. Martha Crenshaw, ‘‘The Causes of Terrorism,’’ Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (July
1981): 379–399.
53. Peter C. Sederberg, ‘‘Conciliation as Counter-terrorist Strategy,’’ Journal of Peace
Research 32, no. 3 (Aug. 1995): 295–312; Abraham H. Miller, ‘‘Negotiations for Hostages:
Implications from Police Experience,’’ Terrorism 1, no. 2 (1978): 125–146.
54. Many of these concerns are discussed in Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy
(New York: Routledge, 2006), 1–19.
55. See not only Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), but also Keith Shimko, The Iraq Wars and
America’s Military Revolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), and Bruce
Berkowitz, The New Face of War: How War Will Be Fought in the Twenty-First Century
(New York: The Free Press, 2003).
56. See, for instance, Leonard Weinberg and Louise Richardson, ‘‘Conflict Theory and
the Trajectory of Terrorist Groups,’’ in Andrew Silke, ed., Research on Terrorism: Trends,
Achievements and Failures (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2004), 146.
57. The U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual ties this advantage to ‘‘local
knowledge’’ (see note 25 above), 1–125.
58. Ivan Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2005), 23–47.
59. See, for instance, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual (note 25 above).
60. Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars (see note 58 above), 23–47.
61. Arreguin-Toft, ‘‘Contemporary Asymmetric Conflict Theory in Historical
Perspective,’’ Terrorism and Political Violence 24, no. 4 (2012): 640.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. See also, Arreguin-Toft, for a discussion of the preference for political over
terroristic responses to insurgents; for instance, ‘‘Contemporary Asymmetric Conflict Theory’’
(note 61 above), 635–657.
65. A number of ‘‘Second Wave’’ terrorist groups also wanted to seize territory (e.g., the
Israeli IRGUN); however, they typically failed to do so in the course of their operations.
Instead, they hoped their activities would cause a popular uprising in which large numbers
of people would take up arms against the ruling colonial power.
66. Bruce Hoffman, ‘‘The ‘Cult of the Insurgent’: Its Tactical and Strategic
Implications,’’ Australian Journal of International Affairs 66, no. 3 (Sep. 2007): 312–329.
67. Dew, ‘‘The Erosion of Constraints in Armed-Group Warfare’’ (see note 1 above),
255–256, 263–264.
68. Ibid.
69. Boot, ‘‘Evolution of Irregular War’’ (note 12 above), 100–114.
70. Weinberg, ‘‘Suicide Terrorism for Secular Causes’’ (see note 8 above), 108–121; see
also Truong, The Dark Journey (note 8 above) and Atwan, The Secret History of Al Qaeda
(note 8 above), 92–93, 108.
71. Robert Baer discusses this in detail in The Cult of the Suicide Bomber, directed by
David Batty and Kevin Toolis, 2005 (New York: Disinformation Company).
72. There have been definitional debates following many attacks. See, for instance, The
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President on the Deaths of U.S.
Embassy Staff in Libya, September 12, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/

2012/09/12/remarks-president-deaths-us-embassy-staff-libya; H. Cooper, ‘‘Libya Envoy’s
Killing Was a Terrorist Attack, the White House Says,’’ The New York Times, September
20, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/21/world/middleeast/assault-on-consulate-in-
libya-a-terrorist-attack-white-house-says.html?_r=0; S. Crabtree, ‘‘Pentagon Will Not Label
Fort Hood Shootings as Terrorist Attack,’’ The Washington Times, October 22, 2012, http://
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/oct/22/pentagon-will-not-label-fort-hood-shootings-
terror/?page=all.
73. See Sandra Silberstein, War of Words: Language, Politics and 9=11 (New York:
Routledge, 2002), xi–xiii.
74. For a timeline of al Qaeda operations, see ‘‘Al Qaida Timeline: Plots and Attacks,’’
NBC News and msnbc.com, www.nbcnews.com/id/4677978/ns/world_news-hunt_for_al_
qaida/t/al-qaida-timeline-plots-attacks/.
75. For a discussion of various types of terrorism tactics in Iraq, see Mohammed M.
Hafez, ‘‘Suicide Terrorism in Iraq: A Preliminary Assessment of the Quantitative Data and
Documentary Evidence,’’ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29, no. 6 (Sept. 2006): 591–619.
76. ‘‘Pakistan Blasts: Burials Amid Anger after Peshawar Church Attack,’’ BBC News
Asia, September 23, 2013, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-24201240.
77. There is a debate regarding the evolving structure of terrorist groups; although,
within this debate there may be more agreement than disagreement. See, for instance, Marc
Sageman and Bruce Hoffman, ‘‘The Reality of Grass-Roots Terrorism [with Reply],’’ Foreign
Affairs 87, no. 4 (July=Aug. 2008): 163–166.
78. See, for instance, Idean Salehyan, Rebels without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies
in World Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009).
79. There is a case of a suicide mission being undertaken by Palestinians in Lebanon;
however, the nature of the mission and the expectation that the attackers would not survive
differs in many ways from modern suicide missions. In this case, the recognition of the mission
as a suicide mission seems to have occurred after the mission rather than prior to it.
80. Ariel Merari, Driven to Death: Psychological and Social Aspects of Suicide Terrorism
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
81. Other, even earlier, terrorist attacks have been subsequently identified as suicide
missions. See, for instance, Luca Ricolfi, ‘‘Palestinians, 1981–2003,’’ in Diego Gambetta,
ed., Making Sense of Suicide Missions (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 80–81.
82. Merari, Driven to Death (see note 80 above) and Hafez, ‘‘Suicide Terrorism in Iraq’’
(note 75 above).
83. See, for instance, Hafez, ‘‘Suicide Terrorism in Iraq’’ (note 75 above), 591–619.
84. This has been most recently exemplified during the terrorist attack in Kenya,
September 21–22, 2013, during which al-Shabab militants from Somalia, which is affiliated
with al Qaeda, reportedly used Twitter to communicate with the public and the government.
See, for instance, ‘‘Somalia’s al-Shabab Claims Nairobi Westgate Kenya Attack,’’ BBC News
Africa, September 21, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24191606.
85. See, for instance, Seth Jones and Patrick B. Johnston, ‘‘The Future of Insurgency,’’
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 36, no. 1 (Jan. 2013): 1–25. For further discussion, see ‘‘A
World Wide Web of Terror,’’ The Economist, July 12, 2007, http://www.economist.com/
node/9472498.
86. Audrey Kurth Cronin, ‘‘Cyber-Mobilization: The New Levée en Masse,’’ Parameters
36, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 77–87.
87. See, for instance, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini,
‘‘Information-Age Terrorism,’’ Current History 99, no. 636 (April 2000): 179–185.
88. See, for instance, Martha Crenshaw, ‘‘ ‘New’ versus ‘Old’ Terrorism,’’ Palestine–
Israel Journal of Politics, Economics, and Culture 10, no. 1 (2003): 48.
89. U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual (see note 25 above).
90. Stathis Kalyvas goes further, arguing that what matters are perceptions regarding
whether or not violence is selective. Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 145. Jeremy Weinstein adds to this discussion
by identifying the group characteristics and contexts associated with the use of more or less
selective violence. Jeremy Weinstein, Inside Rebellion (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2007).
91. Thomas Thornton, ‘‘Terrorism as a Weapon of Political Agitation,’’ in Harry

Eckstein, ed., Internal War (New York: The Free Press, 1964), 77–78.
92. Walter Laqueur, Guerilla (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), 299–303.
93. See, for instance, Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, ‘‘Armed Conflict and Its
International Dimensions, 1946–2004,’’ Journal of Peace Research 42, no. 5 (Sep. 2005):
623–635; Frank G. Hoffman, ‘‘Small Wars Revisited: The United States and Nontraditional
Wars,’’ Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 6 (Dec. 2005): 913–940.
94. Arreguin-Toft, ‘‘Contemporary Asymmetric Conflict Theory’’ (see note 61 above),
635–657.
95. For a discussion of the ways that policymakers have viewed counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency, see Michael J. Boyle, ‘‘Do Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Go
Together?,’’ International Affairs 86, no. 2 (March 2010): 335.
96. Arreguin-Toft, ‘‘Contemporary Asymmetric Conflict Theory’’ (see note 61 above),
635–657.
97. Brian Michael Jenkins, ‘‘The New Age of Terrorism,’’ in McGraw-Hill Homeland
Security Handbook (New York: McGraw Hill Companies, 2006), 118–119, www.rand.org/
pubs/reprints/RP1215.html.
98. For a discussion of the relevance of selective versus indiscriminate attacks on the
population, see Connable and Libicki, How Insurgencies End (note 6 above).
99. In his discussions of ‘‘waves of terrorism,’’ Rapoport introduces some of the most
important distinctions between ‘‘Fourth Wave’’ terrorists and their predecessors; however,
his discussion is limited with regard to considering the implications of terrorism as a tactic
of warfare.
100. See, for instance, Quintan Wiktorowicz and John Kaltner, ‘‘Killing in the Name of
Islam: Al-Qaeda’s Justification for September 11,’’ Middle East Policy 10, no. 2 (Summer
2003): 76–92.
101. Michael Boyle, ‘‘Progress and Pitfalls in the Study of Political Violence,’’ Terrorism
and Political Violence 24, no. 4 (2012): 527–543.
102. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (see note 90 above) and Weinstein,
Inside Rebellion (note 90 above).
103. For example see Charles Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2003), especially 55–80; Sidney Tarrow, The New Transnational
Activism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 15–34.
104. Brigitte Nacos, Terrorism and Counterterrorism (New York: Penguin, 2008),
169–204.
105. Boyle, ‘‘Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency’’ (see note 95 above), 333–353; the
debate between Daniel Byman (‘‘Why Drones Work’’) and Audrey Cronin (‘‘Why Drones
Fail’’) over the use of drones is also of considerable relevance: ‘‘Death from Above: Are
Drones Worth It?’’ Foreign Affairs 92, no. 4 (July=August 2013): 32–54.
106. Boyle, ‘‘Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency’’ (see note 95 above) and Cronin,
‘‘Why Drones Fail’’ (note 105 above), 44–54.
107. Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison Taw, A Strategic Framework for Countering
Terrorism and Insurgency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1992), v.
108. Ibid., 3.

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Terrorism and Political Violence

ISSN: 0954-6553 (Print) 1556-1836 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ftpv20

Terrorism in an Era of Unconventional Warfare

Susanne Martin & Leonard B. Weinberg

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