Human Behavioural Biology (BIO 150 - Standford)

By Robert Sapolsky

Lecture 1
Man average -> one day punch face co-worker -> strange -> 3 months later he discovers wife affairs -> 3
months after he stole money from work and disappear.
3 possibilities:
1) He is a creep.
2) He has a weird mid-life crisis.
3) He has a mutation in one gene.
This happened to someone with a genetic disease that explains the weird behaviour.

What commonality?
-having your period
-having a brain tumour (in certain areas)
-eating junk food (high changes in sugar level variance)
-taking steroids
They all have in common hormones, and they all have been used successfully in court to defend a murderer.
Taking this together, you can see the two main point of this course:
1) The stuff that goes inside your body can dramatically influence what goes on in your brain.
2) Sometimes what is going on in your head will affect every single outpost of you body (you know
you die, think about you slowly dying and at that point your heartbeat rate will increase)

This course is about the intertwining between your physiology, your behaviours, emotions, thoughts,
memories and the capacity of each to deeply influence the other in all sorts of circumstances
It is a complicated problem. Strategy to make things easier -> labelling and categories in various settings to
help understand human social behaviour problem.

Problems with categorical thinking:

- Languages, not a clear boundary in sounds to pronounce words (Finland b / p, bear pear)
- Not clear cut in categories -> leads to difficulty in interpretations
- Putting boundaries make it difficult to see how in reality things are similar (es. Marks in school 17 vs
18 -> pass-fail)
- When you pay too much attention to boundaries you just see categories and you are blinded to the
bigger picture
Why the chicken run to the male rooster when he is making the mating dance? Genes of chicken that run
replicated more compared to the ones that did not (natural selectlion) -> this behavior is explained by genes
(explanation is led to categorization bucket in which you live inside -> you explain everything with genes
but is not necessarly that -> lack of seeing bigger pictures es. Maybe is not a gene that code the behaviour
but when young chicken see old learn and replicate things)

For each beha category we will start off by looking at what the be looks like, it needs a lot objectivity. Then
we will say what went on in this organism a half second before that behaviour occurred to cause to occure
( whats going on in neurons, in this part of the brain, where is the explanation but just after we push back a
bit and then we ask what smells what sensory stimul factors in the environment activated those neurons that
caused that behaviour, then push all one step further behind and look at what do hormones levels in the blood
of that animal in the past few hours and see how sensitive you are to those sounds, smells etc to produce that
behaviour

If you talk about hormones (endocrinology) you talk about a gene that codes that hormone (Genetics) and
youre talking about the selection (evolution) and if you talking about the triggers smells sounds etc. (youre
talking also about fetal development and how sensible are you to those stimulus). Those are all buckets that
influences our findings and reasoning but we have to be aware that there is no bucket, they all are temporary
platforms and each platform is the simplest , most convenient way to explain an outcome of everything that
started millenia back in evolution.

Errors of category thinking:

- Any kid -> total control of environment -> can turn him into anything lawyer, doc, criminal
(Watson, father of behaviourism philosophical movement and psychology)
- Normal psyches depend of good functioning of synapses, and mental diseases depend in mental
damages and adjustments in brain delete mental sickness (Egas Moniz, neurologist inventor of
lobotomy)
- The selection of social utility must be accomplished by some social institution if mankind is not to
be ruined by domestication induced degeneracy, racial idea (Lorenz, Nazi scientist and founder of
ethologist)
These are not crappy scientists; these are people that had influenced modern times.

You cannot explain in one bucket how the world works. There is no bucket.

Three intellectual challenges:

1) First. To recognize circumstances where there is nothing fancy about us whatsoever, we are just like
every other animal out there. The challenge is to accept that. (es. Female hamster ovulation in 5
days, another female is put inside the same cage, they sync menstruations as in humans through
sensory stimuli like smell and pheromones -> put male and you break the cycle; pig hormone spray)
2) Second. Circumstances where we appear to be just like everybody else, all the organisms but do
something different (es. 2 humans going through a ritual, silent, no eye contact, chess
championships, these people have blood pressure like a marathoner without even moving a finger;
these two are physiologically similar to a baboon that is ripping off his worst rival in the jungle). We
 are similar to other animals, but we use physiology in way other animals can’t (mental thinking in
chess, stressing on the inevitability of death)
3) Third. When we do something that no other animal have anything remotely similar (es. Couple, live
together, they talk etc. the next day they do the same for 30 days; hippos would hate that and any
other animal that has non-reproductive sex)
Course structure:
First half -> intro in the different buckets (evolution, molecules, neurons, behaviour…)
Second half -> we go in each behaviour and analyse with every bucket and nuances.

Books:
1) Chaos, by James Gleick (radical way of thinking about biology taking apart a world of reductionism)
2) Why Zebras do not have ulcers?, by Robert Sapolsky

Lecture 2

If you're some osteologist, or whatever these folks are called. If you are presented those two skulls and told
this one's a female, this one's a male, you can begin to figure out stuff like how heavy, how large the body
was of that individual, what diseases they had, had they undergone malnutrition, had they given birth, a lot of
times, a few times, were they bipedal. All sorts of stuff you could figure out from just looking at these skulls.
What today's lecture, and Friday's, is about is the fact that with the right tools under your belt, you could look
at these two skulls and know that information. You are a field biologist, and you've discovered this brand
new species. And you see that this one nurses an infant shortly before leaping out of the tree, leaving only
the skull. And this one has a penis, shortly before leaping out of the tree and leaving a skull. So all you know
is this is an adult female and an adult male. And if you've got the right tools there, you can figure out who's
more likely to cheat on the other. Is the female more likely to mess around, or is the male? How high are the
levels of aggression? Does the female tend to have twins, or one kid at a time? Do females choose males
because they have good parenting skills, or because they're big, hunky guys? What levels of differences in
life expectancy? Do they live the same length of time? You would be able to tell
whether they have the same life
expectancy or if there's a big
discrepancy between the two.
All sorts of stuff
like that, merely
by applying a certain
piece of logic
that dominates all of this.

OK, so you're back reading

those Time Life nature
books back when, and there
was always a style of thing
you would go through.
Which is they'd
describe some species

doing something absolutely

amazing and unlikely,
and it goes like this.
The giraffe, the
giraffe has a long neck,
and it obviously has
to have a big heart
to pump all that blood up there.
And you lock up a whole
bunch of biomechanics people
with slide rules, and out they
come out with this prediction
as to how big the
giraffe heart should be
and how thick the walls.
And you go and you
measure a giraffe heart,
and it's exactly what
the equations predicted.
And you say, isn't
nature amazing?
Or you read about some desert
rodents that drink once
every three months, and
another bunch of folks
have done math and figured
out how many miles long
the renal tubules have to be.
And somebody goes
and studies it,
and it's exactly
as you expect it.
Isn't nature wonderful?
No, nature isn't wonderful.
You couldn't have
giraffes unless they
had hearts that were that big.
You couldn't have rodents
living in the desert
unless they had kidneys that
worked in a certain way.
There is an inevitable logic
about how organisms function,
how organisms are
built, how organisms
have evolved solving this
problem of optimizing
the solution.
And what the next two
lectures are about is,
you can take the
same exact principles
and apply them to thinking
about the evolution of behavior.
The same sort of
logic where, just
as you could sit there and,
with logical principles,
come to the point of
saying, a giraffe's heart
is going to be this big.
You can go through a
different realm of logic built

around evolutionary principles

and figure out all sorts
of aspects of social behavior.
And we already know what's
involved in, say, optimizing.
What's the optimal number
of whatevers in your kidney.
What's the optimal behavior
strategy or something.
All of us, as soon as
we got some kid sibling,
learned how to do the optimal
strategy in tic-tac-toe. So that you could never lose, and it's totally boring. But that's a case of figuring out
the optimal solution
to behavior, reaching what is
called the Nash equilibrium.
And actually, I have no
idea what I just said.
But I like making
reference to Nash,
because it makes me feel
quantitative or something.
So that is called
the Nash equilibrium.
The Nash equilibrium, and
what the entire point here is,
the same sort of
process of figuring out
what are the rules of
optimizing tic-tac-toe behavior
can be built upon the
principles of evolution
to figure out all
sorts of realms
of optimized social behavior.
And broadly, this is a field
that's known as sociobiology,
emerging in the late
1970s-- mid 1970s or so.
And by the late
1980s, giving birth
to another discipline known
as evolutionary psychology.
The notion that you cannot
understand behavior,
and you cannot understand
internal psychological states,
outside the context of evolution
had something to do with
sculpting those behaviors
and those psyches.
So to start off with that, basic
song and dance about Darwin.
Just to make sure we're
up to speed on this.
Darwin, just to get some
things out of the way.
Darwin did not
discover evolution.
People knew about
evolution long before that.
Darwin came up with the
notion of a mechanism

for evolution,
natural selection.
And in fact, Darwin is
the inventor of that.
There was another guy,
Alfred Russel Wallace,
the two of them.
And, for some reason, Wallace
has gotten screwed historically
and Darwin gets
much more attention.
But starting off with a
Darwinian view of how evolution
works.
First thing being that
there is evolution.
Traits in populations
change over time.
Traits can change enough
that, in fact, you
will get speciation.
New species will form.
And the logic of
Darwinian evolution
is built on just a few couple
of very reasonable steps.
First one is that there are
traits that are heritable.
Traits that could be passed
on one generation to the next.
Traits that we
now can translate,
in our modern parlance, into
traits that are genetic.
And we will see, soon, how
that's totally not correct
to have said that.
But traits that are heritable.
The next thing is that there is
variability among those traits.
There's different ways in
which this trait can occur,
and they're all heritable.
The next critical thing.
Some versions of those traits
are more adaptive than others.
Some versions work
better for you.
For example, giraffe
who wind up with hearts
the size of, like, a tomato,
that's not an optimal version.
Amid the range of
variability, some
will carry with them more
fitness, more adaptiveness,
than others.
And that translates
into another sound bite
that's got to be gotten rid of.
All of this is not about
survival of the most adapted.
It's about reproduction,
something we will
come to over and over again.
It's about the number
of copies of genes you
leave in the next generation.
So you've got to have
traits that are heritable.
There's got to be
variability in them.
Some of those traits are
more adaptive than others.
Some of those
traits make it more
likely that that organism
passes on copies of its genes
into the next generation.
And throw those three pieces
together, and what you will get
is evolution in populations.
Changing frequencies of traits.
And when you throw in one
additional piece, which
is every now and
then the possibility
to have a random introduction
of a new type of trait
in there-- modern parlance,
a mutation-- from that,
you can begin to get actual
large changes in what
a population looks like.
OK, so these are the basic
building blocks of Darwin.
And it is easy to apply
it to giraffes' hearts
and kidneys of desert rats,
and everything we think about
in the world of
physiology, anatomy,
in the context of evolution.
So how do you apply
it to behavior?
And the basic notion,
for folks who've
come from this
Darwinian tradition
into thinking about behavior,
is you do the exact same thing.
There are behaviors that are
heritable, types, traits,
classes of behaviors.
They come with a certain degree
of variation among individuals.
Some versions of them are
more adaptive than others.
Over time, the more
adaptive versions
will become more commonplace.
And every now and then,
you can have mutations
that introduce new variability.
Totally logical,
absolutely unassailable.
And what we're going to spend
an insane amount of time
in this class on is
one simple assumption
in there, which is that certain
behaviors are heritable.
That certain behaviors
have genetic components.
And as you'll see,
this one is just
going to run through
every lecture wrestling
with that issue there.
This is a big incendiary issue
there as to how genetic--
and that's not the
same thing as saying
how genetically determined--
how genetic behavior is.
So that's going to be an
issue we come back to again
and again.
So now, transitioning
into how you would apply
these Darwinian principles.
First thing before
starting, a caveat.
You're going to wind up,
in order to think about all
of this most efficiently,
hopefully do some personifying.
Personifying as in, you'll
sit around saying, well,
what would a female
chimpanzee want
to do at this point to
optimize the number of copies
of her genes in the
next generation?
What would this
brine shrimp want
to do to deal with this
environmental stressor?
What would this cherry tree do?
They're not planning.
They're not conscious.
They're not taking classes
in evolutionary biology.
What would this
organism want to do
is just a shorthand
for something sculpted
by the sort of
exigencies of evolution,
and reducing the optimal.
They want to do this.
This is just going to be
a short hand throughout.
Once you get past
the apes, nobody
is wanting to do any of
these optimization things.
So just getting that sort of
terminology out of the way.
OK, so we start off with
what's the first building
block of applying Darwinian
principles to behavior.
Something that is absolutely
critical to emphasize,
because the first
thing we all need to do
is unlearn something we all
learned back when on all those
National Geographic specials
and that would consistently
teach us something about
this aspect of evolution,
and would always
teach it to us wrong.
Here's the scenario.
So you're watching, and there's
this wildlife documentary.
It's dawn on the savanna.
And you see, there's
a whole bunch lions
on top of some big
old dead thing.
Some buffalo, or something.
And they're chewing away
and having a fine time.
So something happens
at that point,
which is, they have to deal
with how they divvy up the food.
Or let me give you
another example.
Another standard, sort
of endless vignette
that comes up in these films.
Once again, now, you're
back on the savanna.
It's not dawn this
time, but you are
looking at one of the
magnificent things
of the natural world, which
is the migration of zebras
throughout East Africa.
A herd of 2 million of them
migrate around, following
a cyclical pattern of rains.
So they're always going
where the grass is greener.
So you've got this wonderful
herd of 2 million wildebeest,
and there's a problem.
Which is, there's some great
field right in front of them
full of grass, and
bummer, there's
a river in between them
and the next field.
And especially a bummer, a
river teeming with crocodiles
just ready to grab them.
So what are the
wildebeest going to do?
And according to the
National Geographic type
specials we would get,
out would come a solution.
There's all the wildebeest
hemming and hawing
in this agitated state
by the edge of the river.
And suddenly, from
the back of the crowd,
comes this elderly wildebeest
who pushes his way up
to the front, stands on
the edge of the river
and says, I sacrifice
myself for you,
meine kinder, and throws
himself into the river--
--where immediately, the
crocs get busy eating him up.
And the other two
million wildebeest
could tiptoe around the
other way across the river,
and everybody is fine.
And you're then saying,
why'd this guy do this?
Why did this guy fling
himself into the river?
And we would get the
answer at that point.
The answer that is permeated
as, like, the worst urban myth
of evolution.
Whatever.
Why did he do that?
Because animals behave for
the good of the species.
This is the notion that has
to be completely trashed right now.
Animals behaving for
the good of the species
really came to the forefront,
a guy in the early 60s named
Wynne-Edwards.
Hyphenated, Wynne-Edwards.
Some hyphenated Brit zoologist,
who pushed most strongly
this notion of that animals behave
for the good of the species.
He is reviled throughout
every textbook, Wynne-Edwards
and group selection.
That would be the
term, selection
for the good of groups,
for the selection
for the good of the species.
Wynne-Edwards and
group selection.
I'm sure the guy did all
sorts of other useful things.
And anyone who really has any
depth to them would find out.
But all I know is that
the guy is the one who
came up with group selection.
Animals behave for the
good of the species.
This isn't the case at all.
Animals behave for passing on
as many copies of their genes
as possible.
And what we'll see
is, when you start
looking at the nuances
of that, sometimes it
may look like behaving for
the good of the species.
But it really isn't the case.
So animals behave in order to maximize the number of copies of genes they leave in the next generation.
Remember, not survival of the fittest,
reproduction of the fittest.
So first thing you need to do
is go back to that vignette
and saying, so what's up
with the wildebeest there?
And what's up with the elderly
guy who jumps in the river?
And finally, when you
look at them long enough
instead of the camera crew
showing up for three minutes,
when you studied
this closely enough,
you see something that
wasn't apparent at first.
Which is, this
elderly wildebeest
is not fighting his
way through the crowd.
This guy is being
pushed from behind.
This guy is being
pushed from behind,
because all the other
ones are saying,
yeah, get the old
guy on the river.
Sacrificing himself, my ass.
This guy is getting pushed
in by everybody else.
He is not sacrificing himself
for the good of the species.
He does not like the
idea of this whatsoever.
So he gets pushed in
because the old, weak guy.
None of this group
selection stuff.
What came in by the
'70s as a replacement,
a way to think about this,
is this notion of animals,
including us, behaving not
for the good of the species
or of the group, but to maximize
the number of copies of genes
left in the next generation.
And what you see is three ways
in which this could occur.
Three building blocks.
The first one being known
as individual selection.
The first one, built
around the notion
that sometimes the
behavior of an animal
is meant to optimize the
number of copies of its genes
that it leaves in
the next generation
by itself reproducing.
The drive to
reproduce, the drive
to leave more copies
of one's genes.
This was once summarized
really sort of tersely as,
sometimes a chicken is an egg's
way of making another chicken.
No, that's backwards.
Sometimes a chicken is an egg's
way of making another egg.
OK, ignore that.
What the guy said is, sometimes
a chicken is an egg's way
of making another egg.
All this behavior stuff,
and all this animate social
interaction, is just
an epiphenomenon
to get more copies of the
genes into the next generation.
Individual selection, a subset
of way of thinking about this
is selfish genes.
What behavior is
about is maximizing
the number of copies of
genes in the next generation.
And sometimes the best
way to do it, sometimes
the way that animals maximize,
is to get as many copies
by way of reproducing
themselves.
It's not quite equivalent
to The Selfish Gene,
but for our purposes,
individual selection.
And this can play out
in a number of realms.
And bringing in sort
of a big dichotomy
in thinking about
evolutionary pressures, Darwin
and the theory of
natural selection.
What natural
selection is about is
processes bringing about an
organism who is more adaptive,
what we just went through.
Darwin soon recognized there
was a second realm of selection,
which he called
sexual selection.
And what that one's
about is, this
is selecting for
traits that have
no value whatsoever in terms of
survival or anything like that.
Traits that carry
no adaptive value,
but for some random, bizarre
reason, the opposite sex
likes folks who look this way.
So they get to leave more
copies of their genes.
And suddenly, you could have
natural selection bringing
about big, sharp
antlers in male moose,
and they use that for fighting
off predators or fighting
with a male.
That would be natural selection.
Sexual selection might
account for the fact
that the antlers are
green, paisley patterns all
over for that.
And for some reason,
that looks cool.
The female moose is,
and what you wind up
getting as a mechanism
for sexual selection
is, as long as individuals
prefer to mate with individuals
with some completely
arbitrary traits,
those traits will also
become more common.
So this dichotomy
of natural selection
for traits driven by
traits that really do
aid leaving copies of genes
outside the realm of just
sheer sexual preference,
sexual selection.
And sometimes they can go in
absolutely opposite directions.
You can get some species
where the female fish
prefer male fish that have
very bright coloration.
And that's advantageous, then,
to have the bright coloration
by means of sexual selection.
But the bright
coloration makes you
more likely to get predated
by some other fish.
Natural selection pushing
against bright coloration
in males.
Very often, you've got the
two going against each other,
having to balance.
So how would that be
applied in this realm
of individual selection?
This first building block.
Sometimes an egg-- damn.
Sometimes a chicken is an egg's
way of making another egg.
Sometimes what behavior is
about is one individual trying
to maximize the number
of copies of their genes
in the next generation.
A natural selection
manifestation of it
being, you're good at
running away from predators.
Selection for speed, for certain
types of muscle metabolism,
for certain sets of sensory
systems that will tell you
there's somebody scary around.
That would be the realm of that.
Individual selection, selecting
the realm of sexual selection
to have more of whatever those
traits that are attractive.
So this first building block,
it's not group selection.
It's not behaving for
the good of the species.
It's behaving to maximize the
number of copies of one's genes
in the next generation.
And the most
straightforward way is
to behave in a way to
maximize the number of times
you reproduce yourself.
Second building
block, which is, there
is another way of accomplishing
the same thing that you just
did with individual
selection, as follows.
One of the things that
can be relied upon in life
is that you are related
to your relatives.
And what you get is, the
more closely related you are,
the more genes you share
in common with them.
On a statistical
level, identical twins
share 100% of their genes.
Full siblings, 50%.
Half siblings, 25%.
This is exactly
something that's going
to be covered in the catch
up section this week.
If you're not comfortable with
this stuff, this sort of thing
will be reviewed in more detail.
OK, so the closer a
relative is to you,
the more genes they
share in common with you.
So suddenly, you've
got this issue.
You're an identical twin
and your identical sibling
has the same genes that you do.
Individual selection, you
will be just as successful
as passing on copies of your
genes into the next generation
if you forgo
reproducing to make it
possible for your
identical twin to do so.
Because on the level
of just sheer numbers
of copies of genes in
the next generation,
they are equivalent.
And sometimes, you will thus get
behavior which really decreases
the reproductive
success of an individual
in order to enhance the
success of a relative.
But you've got a
constraint there,
which is, all of
your relatives don't
share all your genes with you.
They have differing
degrees of relatedness.
And what that winds up
producing is another factor,
another observation.
One of the great, witty
geneticists of all time, a guy
named Haldane who,
apparently, once in a bar
was trying to explain
this principle to somebody
and came up and
said, I will gladly
lay down my life for two
brothers or eight cousins.
And that's the math
of the relatedness.
You passing on one
copy of your genes
to the next generation is, from
the sheer mathematics of just
how evolution is going to
play out over the generations,
is exactly equivalent as giving
up your life for eight cousins
to be able to each pass
on a copy of their genes.
Because you share 1/8
with each of them,
and it winds up being
a whole [INAUDIBLE].
And it's that math.
And out of that, you
get something that
makes perfect sense instantly.
Which is, evolution selects
for organisms cooperating
with their relatives.
Something along those lines.
And thus we have this
second building block
known as kin selection.
Inclusive fitness.
Kin selection.

First building block, individual

selection, passing on copies
of your own genes as a way
to maximize future success.
Second version,
helping out relatives.
Helping out relatives
in terms of increasing
their reproductive success
with this vicious mathematical
logic, which is
one identical twin
to have two full siblings,
eight cousins, and so on,
as a function of
degree of relatedness.
And what this begins to
explain is a whole world
in animal behavior of animals
being obsessed with kinship.
Animals being fully aware of
who is related to who in what
sorts of ways.
Animals being
utterly aware of you
cooperate with relatives,
but as a function of how
closely related they are.
Animals put us in Social
Anthropology, in kinship terms,
and could you marry the daughter
of your uncle's third wife
or whatever, to
shame in terms of how
much a lot of social animals
deal with relatedness.
So inclusive fitness,
kin selection.
Here would be evidence for it.
Here's one example.
Very cool study done some years
back by a couple, Seyfarth
and Cheney, University
of Pennsylvania,
looking at vervet monkeys.
And these were vervet monkeys
out in Tanzania, I believe.
What they did was, a whole
bunch of these vervet monkeys
were sitting around.
And they, the researchers,
had made really high quality
recording recordings of
various vocalizations
from the monkeys over time.
So they had the sound of each
animal giving an alarm call,
giving a friendly gesture
call, giving a whatever.
And what they would then
do is hide a microphone
inside some bushes and play
the sound of one of the infants
from the group
giving an alarm call.
So what does the mother
of that infant do?
She instantly gets agitated
and looks over at the bush.
That's her child, all of that.
How to know that everyone
else in that vervet group
understands kin selection,
what does everybody else do?
They all look at the mother.
That's whoever's mother,
what is she going to do next?
They understand the
relatedness, and they understand
what the response will be.
All the other vervets look
at the mother at that point.
Whoa, I'm sure glad that's
not my kid giving an alarm
call from the bushes.
They understand kinship.
Another version of that
came out in these studies.
So you've got two females, each
of whom has a kid, a daughter,
whatever.
And female A and female
B. And one day, female A
does something absolutely
rotten to female B.
And later that day,
the child of female B
is more likely than chance
to do something rotten
to the child of
female A. They're
keeping track of
not only revenge,
but not revenge on
the individual who
did something miserable to
you, but displaced by one
degree of reproduction.
Keeping track of kinship.
Animals can do this.
All sorts of primate
species can do this.
And as we'll see, all sorts of
other species can do this also.
There is that caveat again.
All sorts of other
species want to figure out
who their cousins-- they
don't want to figure out.
Evolution has
sculpted an ability
to optimize behavior
along lines of relatedness
in all sorts of species.
So how would natural
selection play out
in this realm of kin
selection, I will lay down
my life for eight cousins.
And that's just sort of
obvious there by now.
How would sexual selection
play out in this realm.
I am willing to expend
great amounts of energy
to convince people that my
sibling is incredibly hot.
And with any
chance, then passing
on more copies of genes.
That would be inclusive fitness,
kin selection in both cases.
Decreasing your own
reproductive potential
by way of being killed by a
predator to save the 8 cousins,
or having to spend so much time
haranguing about your sibling.
Doings that, in
order to increase
the reproductive
success of relatives,
where you were willing
to give up more energy
and potential on your part,
the more closely related
the individual is.
So you throw those
two pieces together,
and you're suddenly
off and running
with explaining a lot
of animal behavior.
Individual selection,
none of this
for the good of the species.
Maximizing the number of
copies of your own genes.
And the easiest way, the
most straightforward,
is you yourself
maximizing reproduction.
Foundation number two the
whole thing, kin selection.
Sometimes the best way of
leaving more copies of genes
in the next
generation is using up
your own reproductive
potential foregoing
to help relatives as a function
of degree of relatedness.
OK, that's great.
So now the third piece, the
third final building block
of making sense of social
behavior in the context
of real contemporary
evolutionary theory,
the third block here.

Which is, you look at animals

and they're not all just
competing with non-relatives.
Animals forego competition
at certain points.
Animals would have
the potential to be
aggressive to other animals,
and they will forego doing so.
And there's one circumstance
in which that can happen,
where you get what is called a
rock-paper-scissors scenario.
You've got animals A, B, and
C. A has a means of damaging B,
but it costs A. B has
a means of damaging C,
but it costs B. C
can damage A, but it
costs A. You get the right
distribution of individuals
with one of those
traits in a population,
and you will reach a
rock-scissors-paper equilibrium
where nobody's doing anything
rotten to each other.
Great example, totally
cool example that got
published some years ago by a
guy named Brendan Bohannan, who

was assistant professor in the

department here at the time.
He was studying something
or other about bacteria
showing a rock-paper-scissors
circumstance.
You had three different types,
three different versions,
of this bacteria in
this colony he had made.
The first one could generate
a poison, but it cost.
It had to put the effort
into making that poison
and protecting itself from
that poison, all of that.
The second type was
vulnerable to the poison.
It happened to have some
transporter on its membrane
that took up the poison,
and that was bad news.
But it had an advantage,
which is the rest of the time,
that transporter
took up more food.
The third one, the
good thing going
for it is that it didn't
have-- the bad thing
was, it didn't have poison.
A good thing going
for it was it didn't
have to spend
energy on a poison,
and it didn't have
that transporter.
So each one of those has a
strength, each one of those
has a vulnerability.
They're like, I don't
know, Pokemon or something.
And you put them
all together there,
and you get a
rock-paper-scissors scenario
where you get equilibrium,
where they are not
attacking each other.
Because note, if I
am A and I destroy B,
B's no longer
wiping out C, who's
the one who could damage me.
It's got to come to
an equilibrium state.
So you can get the evolution
of stalemates like that,
and that's quite
frequently seen.
And note here, this
was the evolution
of stalemates not in chimps, not
in cetaceans, but in bacteria.
What we're going to see
is bacterial behavior,
to the extent that this is sort
of a metaphor for behavior.
Behavior of all sorts
of unlikely species
are subject to these
same rules of passing
on copies of your genes.
These three different
strains of bacteria
are competing with each other.
None of them are behaving for
the good of the species there
of the three of them.
So rock-paper-scissors
is very cool,
and you get versions
of that in humans.

757
00:34:12,320 --> 00:34:15,090
That's been sort of studied
quantitatively, all of that.

758
00:34:15,090 --> 00:34:16,989
But that's not real cooperation.

759
00:34:16,989 --> 00:34:19,000
That's merely
everybody realizing

760
00:34:19,000 --> 00:34:21,469
we have to cut back
on the competition.

761
00:34:21,469 --> 00:34:23,560
We have to cut back
on the aggression.

762
00:34:23,560 --> 00:34:25,949
Because every time
I damage whoever,

763
00:34:25,949 --> 00:34:27,929
I am more vulnerable
in another realm.

764
00:34:27,929 --> 00:34:29,080
That's a stalemate.

765
00:34:29,080 --> 00:34:30,810
That's a truce.

766
00:34:30,810 --> 00:34:33,480
But you look at animals,
and in all sorts of realms,

767
00:34:33,480 --> 00:34:35,870
it's not just
rock-paper-scissors stalemates

768
00:34:35,870 --> 00:34:36,600
they're reaching.

769
00:34:36,600 --> 00:34:39,000
They actually cooperate
with each other.

770
00:34:39,000 --> 00:34:43,170
And you look close enough, and
you see they're not relatives.

771
00:34:43,170 --> 00:34:45,409
They're not
relatives, yet you get

772
00:34:45,409 --> 00:34:47,719
all sorts of
altruistic behavior,

773
00:34:47,719 --> 00:34:51,090
and you've got it under
a whole bunch of domains.

774
00:34:51,090 --> 00:34:52,690
Because this brings
up the question,
775
00:34:52,690 --> 00:34:55,170
why should you
ever be cooperative

776
00:34:55,170 --> 00:34:57,520
with another individual if
you are a social animal.

777
00:34:57,520 --> 00:35:01,240
At every possibility, you
should stab them in the back

778
00:35:01,240 --> 00:35:02,390
and be selfish.

779
00:35:02,390 --> 00:35:04,100
And the reason why
that isn't a good idea

780
00:35:04,100 --> 00:35:06,660
is, there's all sorts
of circumstances where

781
00:35:06,660 --> 00:35:09,100
many hands make the task light.
782
00:35:09,100 --> 00:35:14,120
Or whatever that is, cooperation
can have synergistic benefits.

783
00:35:14,120 --> 00:35:16,190
And you see that
with species that

784
00:35:16,190 --> 00:35:19,360
are cooperative hunters,
where they are not necessarily

785
00:35:19,360 --> 00:35:20,110
relatives.

786
00:35:20,110 --> 00:35:22,310
They will chase one,
chasing an animal

787
00:35:22,310 --> 00:35:25,100
while the other is getting
ready to cut a corner on it.

788
00:35:25,100 --> 00:35:28,750
Cooperative behavior, and
they increase the likelihood
789
00:35:28,750 --> 00:35:30,570
of them getting a kill.

790
00:35:30,570 --> 00:35:32,130
Another example of this.

791
00:35:32,130 --> 00:35:33,960
Research by a guy
named Mark Hauser

792
00:35:33,960 --> 00:35:36,550
at Harvard looking
at rhesus monkeys.

793
00:35:36,550 --> 00:35:38,940
And what he showed was,
he would put these monkeys

794
00:35:38,940 --> 00:35:42,530
in a situation where
they had access to food.

795
00:35:42,530 --> 00:35:45,360
They had access to food
under one circumstance,
796
00:35:45,360 --> 00:35:50,200
where they could reach for it
and take it in and share it

797
00:35:50,200 --> 00:35:52,100
with another monkey.

798
00:35:52,100 --> 00:35:56,040
Under the other circumstance,
it required two monkeys

799
00:35:56,040 --> 00:35:57,730
to get the food in there.

800
00:35:57,730 --> 00:36:01,070
And what he showed was
clear cut reciprocity.

801
00:36:01,070 --> 00:36:03,780
Monkeys who were
sharing with this guy

802
00:36:03,780 --> 00:36:05,720
were more likely to
get shared back with
803
00:36:05,720 --> 00:36:09,169
and got more cooperation when
it was a task where two of them

804
00:36:09,170 --> 00:36:11,230
had to work together
to get the food.

805
00:36:11,230 --> 00:36:12,780
One alone wasn't enough.

806
00:36:12,780 --> 00:36:15,860
Many hands make the task
lighter under all sorts

807
00:36:15,860 --> 00:36:17,100
of circumstances.

808
00:36:17,100 --> 00:36:21,069
Cooperation has a strong
evolutionary payoff,

809
00:36:21,070 --> 00:36:25,680
even among non-relatives,
with a condition.
810
00:36:25,680 --> 00:36:28,049
Which is, you're not
putting more into it

811
00:36:28,050 --> 00:36:29,560
than you are getting.

812
00:36:29,560 --> 00:36:31,500
That is reciprocal.

813
00:36:31,500 --> 00:36:35,100
And ' opens up the third
building block of all of this,

814
00:36:35,100 --> 00:36:38,650
which is reciprocal altruism.

815
00:36:38,650 --> 00:36:42,610
Cooperation, altruistic
behavior among non-relatives,

816
00:36:42,610 --> 00:36:46,040
but undergoing very
strict constraints of,
817
00:36:46,040 --> 00:36:50,750
it's gotta be reciprocated with
all sorts of rules like that.

818
00:36:50,750 --> 00:36:53,630
So what does that look like.

819
00:36:53,630 --> 00:36:55,560
You're going to see
reciprocal altruism,

820
00:36:55,560 --> 00:36:56,799
when would you see that.

821
00:36:56,800 --> 00:36:59,160
What's the immediate
thing, what sort of species

822
00:36:59,160 --> 00:37:02,399
would show systems of
reciprocal cooperation

823
00:37:02,400 --> 00:37:03,940
among non-relatives.

824
00:37:03,940 --> 00:37:05,500
They've got to be smart animals.

825
00:37:05,500 --> 00:37:06,700
They've got to be social.

826
00:37:06,700 --> 00:37:07,700
They've got to be smart.

827
00:37:07,700 --> 00:37:08,908
Why do they have to be smart?

828
00:37:08,908 --> 00:37:10,610
Because they have
to remember, this

829
00:37:10,610 --> 00:37:13,880
is the guy who owes me a
favor from last Thursday.

830
00:37:13,880 --> 00:37:16,680
They need to be able to
recognize individuals.

831
00:37:16,680 --> 00:37:19,339
They have to be long lived
enough so that there's

832
00:37:19,340 --> 00:37:21,670
a chance of interacting
with that individual

833
00:37:21,670 --> 00:37:24,520
again and establishing
this reciprocity.

834
00:37:24,520 --> 00:37:26,640
You would thus
predict you would see

835
00:37:26,640 --> 00:37:30,350
systems of reciprocal
altruism only in long

836
00:37:30,350 --> 00:37:33,529
lived social vertebrates.

837
00:37:33,530 --> 00:37:37,780
But you see the exact sorts
of things in bacteria.

838
00:37:37,780 --> 00:37:40,520
You see the exact sort
of things in fungi.

839
00:37:40,520 --> 00:37:42,670
You see that in all
sorts of other realms.

840
00:37:42,670 --> 00:37:45,820
You get social bacteria,
colonizing bacteria.

841
00:37:45,820 --> 00:37:49,040
And where what you might
get are two clonal lines

842
00:37:49,040 --> 00:37:50,380
that are together.

843
00:37:50,380 --> 00:37:54,460
In other words, two
genetically-- two lines,

844
00:37:54,460 --> 00:37:56,540
each of which is,
all the bacteria

845
00:37:56,540 --> 00:37:57,870
have the same genetic makeup.

846
00:37:57,870 --> 00:38:00,900
So think of it as one individual
who's just kind of dispersed.

847
00:38:00,900 --> 00:38:02,850
Another one who's just
kind of dispersed.

848
00:38:02,850 --> 00:38:05,299
And they've come
together in something

849
00:38:05,300 --> 00:38:09,260
called a fruiting body, which
is how bacteria reproduce

850
00:38:09,260 --> 00:38:10,080
or whatever.

851
00:38:10,080 --> 00:38:13,730
And there's two parts
to a fruiting body.

852
00:38:13,730 --> 00:38:15,730
There's one which
is the stalk, which

853
00:38:15,730 --> 00:38:17,680
attaches to something or other.

854
00:38:17,680 --> 00:38:20,879
And then there is the
part that actually fruits.

855
00:38:20,880 --> 00:38:23,589
So you want to be in
the fruiting part,

856
00:38:23,589 --> 00:38:25,630
because that's the part
that actually reproduces,

857
00:38:25,630 --> 00:38:28,470
and the stalk is doing
all the work there.

858
00:38:28,470 --> 00:38:32,470
And what you see is
attempts at cheating.
859
00:38:32,470 --> 00:38:34,509
Attempts at one of
these strains trying

860
00:38:34,510 --> 00:38:37,440
to disproportionately wind
up in the fruiting part,

861
00:38:37,440 --> 00:38:39,860
and what you also
see is, the next time

862
00:38:39,860 --> 00:38:43,340
around, this other strain
will not cooperate with it.

863
00:38:43,340 --> 00:38:45,960
Will not form a social colony.

864
00:38:45,960 --> 00:38:48,810
So that's getting played off
at the level of single cell

865
00:38:48,810 --> 00:38:51,480
organisms forming
big social colonies.
866
00:38:51,480 --> 00:38:52,910
Getting played at that level.

867
00:38:52,910 --> 00:38:56,149
Yes, as we will see,
reciprocal altruism

868
00:38:56,150 --> 00:38:58,600
works most readily
in big, smart, long

869
00:38:58,600 --> 00:38:59,819
lived social beasts.

870
00:38:59,820 --> 00:39:03,830
But it can occur in
all sorts of systems.

871
00:39:03,830 --> 00:39:08,790
What it's built around is
reciprocal cooperation.

872
00:39:08,790 --> 00:39:11,770
And intrinsic in that it
is another motivation going
873
00:39:11,770 --> 00:39:12,270
on there.

874
00:39:12,270 --> 00:39:14,670
Not just to involve the
reciprocal relationship

875
00:39:14,670 --> 00:39:17,420
with a non-relative, and
many hands, and light tasks,

876
00:39:17,420 --> 00:39:18,090
and all of that.

877
00:39:18,090 --> 00:39:21,630
But also, whenever
possible, to cheat.

878
00:39:21,630 --> 00:39:24,570
To take advantage of
the other individual.

879
00:39:24,570 --> 00:39:26,920
And thus, another
key facet of it
880
00:39:26,920 --> 00:39:29,700
is to be very good at
detecting when somebody

881
00:39:29,700 --> 00:39:31,629
is cheating against you.

882
00:39:31,630 --> 00:39:34,760
To be vigilant about
cheating in what

883
00:39:34,760 --> 00:39:38,850
would otherwise be a stable,
reciprocal relationship.

884
00:39:38,850 --> 00:39:42,020
And an awful lot
of social behavior

885
00:39:42,020 --> 00:39:44,710
is built around
animals either trying

886
00:39:44,710 --> 00:39:47,600
to get away with something
or spotting somebody else

887
00:39:47,600 --> 00:39:48,700
doing the same.

888
00:39:48,700 --> 00:39:49,850
An example of it.

889
00:39:49,850 --> 00:39:52,920
There is a test that's used
in evolutionary psychology

890
00:39:52,920 --> 00:39:55,730
where you are given this
very complicated story,

891
00:39:55,730 --> 00:39:58,280
or another version of a
complicated story, where

892
00:39:58,280 --> 00:40:01,217
somebody promises if you do
this, you'll get this reward.

893
00:40:01,217 --> 00:40:03,550
But if you do that, you're
going to get this punishment.

894
00:40:03,550 --> 00:40:05,250
And really complex.

895
00:40:05,250 --> 00:40:07,830
And one outcome,
the outcome of it

896
00:40:07,830 --> 00:40:10,569
is, the person isn't
supposed to get rewarded.

897
00:40:10,570 --> 00:40:13,740
But the individual
decides to reward them.

898
00:40:13,740 --> 00:40:15,720
Spontaneous act of kindness.

899
00:40:15,720 --> 00:40:17,370
In another
circumstance, the person

900
00:40:17,370 --> 00:40:19,720
is the individual who is
supposed to get rewarded,

901
00:40:19,720 --> 00:40:21,930
and instead, they get punished.

902
00:40:21,930 --> 00:40:23,500
A cheater in that case.

903
00:40:23,500 --> 00:40:25,970
And amid these
convoluted stories,

904
00:40:25,970 --> 00:40:29,859
people are much
better-- 75% to 25%--

905
00:40:29,860 --> 00:40:32,940
are much better at detecting
when cheating has gone

906
00:40:32,940 --> 00:40:36,660
on in the story than when a
random act of kindness has gone

907
00:40:36,660 --> 00:40:37,350
on.
908
00:40:37,350 --> 00:40:39,779
We are more attuned to
picking up cheating.

909
00:40:39,780 --> 00:40:42,940
And remarkably, some
very subtle studies

910
00:40:42,940 --> 00:40:44,690
have been done
with chimps showing

911
00:40:44,690 --> 00:40:46,750
that chimps have the same bias.

912
00:40:46,750 --> 00:40:48,550
They are much
better at picking up

913
00:40:48,550 --> 00:40:52,160
social interactions involving
cheating than ones that

914
00:40:52,160 --> 00:40:55,390
involve spontaneous altruism.
915
00:40:55,390 --> 00:40:59,430
So you see here, this
balance between cooperation,

916
00:40:59,430 --> 00:41:01,480
reciprocal, even
among non-relatives.

917
00:41:01,480 --> 00:41:03,100
And that's great,
but you should cheat

918
00:41:03,100 --> 00:41:04,350
when you can get away with it.

919
00:41:04,350 --> 00:41:06,200
But you should be
vigilant against cheaters.

920
00:41:06,200 --> 00:41:08,210
And what, of course,
it comes down to then

921
00:41:08,210 --> 00:41:12,210
is tic-tac-toe and giraffe
hearts and all of that.

922
00:41:12,210 --> 00:41:16,560
What is the optimal strategy
in a particular social species

923
00:41:16,560 --> 00:41:18,020
for a particular individual.

924
00:41:18,020 --> 00:41:19,930
What is the optimal strategy.

925
00:41:19,930 --> 00:41:23,779
When do you cooperate
and when do you cheat.

926
00:41:23,780 --> 00:41:27,360
When do you defect on the
cooperative relationship

927
00:41:27,360 --> 00:41:28,390
you've had.

928
00:41:28,390 --> 00:41:31,230
And this introduces
us to a whole world
929
00:41:31,230 --> 00:41:35,510
of mathematics built around
what is called game theory.

930
00:41:35,510 --> 00:41:39,170
The notion that there are
games, formal games, that

931
00:41:39,170 --> 00:41:43,180
have mathematically
optimal strategies,

932
00:41:43,180 --> 00:41:46,169
or multiple strategies,
multi-equilibrium.

933
00:41:46,170 --> 00:41:48,110
And a whole world
of research has

934
00:41:48,110 --> 00:41:52,160
been built around them in
terms of when to cooperate

935
00:41:52,160 --> 00:41:54,220
and when to defect.

936
00:41:54,220 --> 00:41:55,990
So game theory stuff.

937
00:41:55,990 --> 00:41:59,580
This was starting off
in a world of people

938
00:41:59,580 --> 00:42:02,910
studying economics, and
negotiation, and diplomacy,

939
00:42:02,910 --> 00:42:03,819
and all of that.

940
00:42:03,820 --> 00:42:06,540
And that was a whole world
built around this logic

941
00:42:06,540 --> 00:42:09,080
of when do you cooperate,
when do you cheat.

942
00:42:09,080 --> 00:42:11,370
And what came out of
there were all sorts

943
00:42:11,370 --> 00:42:15,420
of models of how to optimize
behavior in terms of that.

944
00:42:15,420 --> 00:42:19,160
And the building block, sort of
the fruit fly of game theory,

945
00:42:19,160 --> 00:42:23,049
is a game called the
prisoner's dilemma.

946
00:42:23,050 --> 00:42:26,950
Prisoner's dilemma, sort of
cutting to-- sort of getting

947
00:42:26,950 --> 00:42:27,879
rid of the details.

948
00:42:27,880 --> 00:42:31,740
Two individuals are
prisoners, and they escape,

949
00:42:31,740 --> 00:42:33,439
and they're both captured.

950
00:42:33,440 --> 00:42:35,970
And they're
interrogated separately.

951
00:42:35,970 --> 00:42:39,259
And both of them refuse to
talk, that's great for them.

952
00:42:39,260 --> 00:42:41,520
If they both squeal,
they both get punished.

953
00:42:41,520 --> 00:42:43,731
If one of them is able to
squeal on the other one,

954
00:42:43,731 --> 00:42:44,730
they get a great reward.

955
00:42:44,730 --> 00:42:46,730
If the other one--
what you get formally

956
00:42:46,730 --> 00:42:49,560
are four possible outcomes.

957
00:42:49,560 --> 00:42:54,360
Both individuals
cooperate, both individuals

958
00:42:54,360 --> 00:42:59,360
cheat against each other,
individual A cooperates and B

959
00:42:59,360 --> 00:43:03,710
cheats, individual B
cooperates and A cheats.

960
00:43:03,710 --> 00:43:05,330
And what you get in
prisoner's dilemma

961
00:43:05,330 --> 00:43:07,400
is a formal payoff for each.

962
00:43:07,400 --> 00:43:10,670
What gives you the
greatest payoff, stabbing

963
00:43:10,670 --> 00:43:12,210
the other guy in the back.

964
00:43:12,210 --> 00:43:14,360
You cheat and they cooperate.

965
00:43:14,360 --> 00:43:17,610
You have exploited them, you
have taken advantage of them,

966
00:43:17,610 --> 00:43:18,920
isn't that wonderful.

967
00:43:18,920 --> 00:43:22,290
That's the highest payoff
in prisoner dilemma games.

968
00:43:22,290 --> 00:43:26,800
Second highest payoff,
you both cooperate.

969
00:43:26,800 --> 00:43:29,074
Third highest payoff--
which is beginning

970
00:43:29,074 --> 00:43:31,740
to not count as a payoff, but in
a lot of the games, this set up

971
00:43:31,740 --> 00:43:34,029
is the start of
punishment-- both of you

972
00:43:34,030 --> 00:43:36,640
cheat on each other.

973
00:43:36,640 --> 00:43:40,819
Fourth worst possible
payoff is you're the sucker.

974
00:43:40,820 --> 00:43:42,740
You cooperate, and
the other individual

975
00:43:42,740 --> 00:43:44,569
stabs you in the back.

976
00:43:44,570 --> 00:43:46,290
So what the prisoner's
dilemma game

977
00:43:46,290 --> 00:43:50,670
is set up these circumstances
where individuals will play

978
00:43:50,670 --> 00:43:54,430
versions of this against each
other with varying rewards

979
00:43:54,430 --> 00:43:56,779
and that sort of thing,
and parameters that we will

980
00:43:56,780 --> 00:43:58,340
look at in a lot of detail.

981
00:43:58,340 --> 00:44:01,510
And seeing when is it
optimal to cooperate,

982
00:44:01,510 --> 00:44:03,910
when is it optimal to cheat.

983
00:44:03,910 --> 00:44:05,589
When would you do this.

984
00:44:05,590 --> 00:44:07,740
So you've got examples
of this, and this
985
00:44:07,740 --> 00:44:09,390
was the building block.

986
00:44:09,390 --> 00:44:12,009
And what anyone would
say looking at this is,

987
00:44:12,010 --> 00:44:13,230
it's obvious.

988
00:44:13,230 --> 00:44:15,680
What you want to
do is, in some way,

989
00:44:15,680 --> 00:44:18,879
rationally maximize your payoff.

990
00:44:18,880 --> 00:44:22,490
This whole world
of Homo economists,

991
00:44:22,490 --> 00:44:25,549
the notion of humans as being
purely rational decision
992
00:44:25,550 --> 00:44:26,190
makers.

993
00:44:26,190 --> 00:44:29,520
And what you begin to see in
this world of game theory is,

994
00:44:29,520 --> 00:44:31,846
there is anything
but that going on.

995
00:44:31,846 --> 00:44:33,470
Later in the course,
we're going to see

996
00:44:33,470 --> 00:44:35,169
something very interesting.

997
00:44:35,170 --> 00:44:38,320
People playing prisoner's
dilemma games inside a brain

998
00:44:38,320 --> 00:44:40,760
scanner, looking at a
part of the brain that
999
00:44:40,760 --> 00:44:42,990
has a lot to do with pleasure.

1000
00:44:42,990 --> 00:44:45,709
And what you see
is, some individuals

1001
00:44:45,710 --> 00:44:48,580
activate that part of the brain
when they have successfully

1002
00:44:48,580 --> 00:44:50,470
stabbed the other
guy in the back.

1003
00:44:50,470 --> 00:44:54,080
Some individuals activate it
when they have both cooperated.

1004
00:44:54,080 --> 00:44:56,520
And there's a big
gender difference

1005
00:44:56,520 --> 00:44:57,630
as to which circumstance.
1006
00:44:57,630 --> 00:44:58,470
[LAUGHTER]

1007
00:44:58,470 --> 00:45:01,107
So you just guess which
one is going on there.

1008
00:45:01,107 --> 00:45:02,690
We're going to see
a number of studies

1009
00:45:02,690 --> 00:45:05,070
like that coming down the line.

1010
00:45:05,070 --> 00:45:06,870
So the question
becomes, how do you

1011
00:45:06,870 --> 00:45:10,009
optimize prisoner dilemma play?

1012
00:45:10,010 --> 00:45:11,970
And what emerged
at that time was

1013
00:45:11,970 --> 00:45:15,209
the notion of all sorts of
theoretical models and stuff.

1014
00:45:15,210 --> 00:45:18,240
And then in the 1970s,
there was an economist

1015
00:45:18,240 --> 00:45:21,240
at University of Michigan
named Robert Axelrod who

1016
00:45:21,240 --> 00:45:23,759
revolutionized the entire field.

1017
00:45:23,760 --> 00:45:27,600
What he did was he took
some paleolithic computer

1018
00:45:27,600 --> 00:45:29,980
and programmed in how the
prisoner's dilemma would

1019
00:45:29,980 --> 00:45:31,010
be played.

1020
00:45:31,010 --> 00:45:34,760
And he could program in as
if there were two players.

1021
00:45:34,760 --> 00:45:39,130
And he could program in what
each one's strategy would be.

1022
00:45:39,130 --> 00:45:42,900
And what he then did was, he
wrote to all of his buddies

1023
00:45:42,900 --> 00:45:46,580
and all of his mathematician
friends and prize fighters

1024
00:45:46,580 --> 00:45:50,910
and theologians and serial
murderers and Nobel Peace Prize

1025
00:45:50,910 --> 00:45:52,490
winners, and in
each case, explained

1026
00:45:52,490 --> 00:45:55,970
what was up and saying,
what strategy would you use
1027
00:45:55,970 --> 00:45:58,020
in a prisoner's dilemma game?

1028
00:45:58,020 --> 00:46:00,009
And he gets them all
back, and he programs

1029
00:46:00,010 --> 00:46:01,380
all these different versions.

1030
00:46:01,380 --> 00:46:04,200
And he runs a round
robin tournament.

1031
00:46:04,200 --> 00:46:07,319
Every strategy is paired
against every other strategy

1032
00:46:07,320 --> 00:46:08,430
at one point or other.

1033
00:46:08,430 --> 00:46:10,470
And you look at
what the payoff is.
1034
00:46:10,470 --> 00:46:14,399
You ask, which is the
most optimal strategy.

1035
00:46:14,400 --> 00:46:18,000
And out of it,
shockingly to everyone--

1036
00:46:18,000 --> 00:46:21,590
because this was a computer
teaching us optimizing

1037
00:46:21,590 --> 00:46:25,540
human behavior-- out of it
came one simple strategy that

1038
00:46:25,540 --> 00:46:27,320
always out-competed the others.

1039
00:46:27,320 --> 00:46:29,720
This is people sitting
there, probabilistic ones

1040
00:46:29,720 --> 00:46:33,879
as to when to cooperate, and
lunar cycles as to what to do.
1041
00:46:33,880 --> 00:46:38,980
The one that always won
is now called tit for tat.

1042
00:46:38,980 --> 00:46:42,120
You start off cooperating
in the very first round

1043
00:46:42,120 --> 00:46:43,299
with the individual.

1044
00:46:43,300 --> 00:46:45,670
You cooperate.

1045
00:46:45,670 --> 00:46:49,170
If the individual has cooperated
with you in that round,

1046
00:46:49,170 --> 00:46:51,300
you cooperate in the next round.

1047
00:46:51,300 --> 00:46:53,410
And you cooperate,
cooperate, as long
1048
00:46:53,410 --> 00:46:55,120
as the other
individual cooperates.

1049
00:46:55,120 --> 00:46:58,000
But as soon as there is a round
where the individual cheats

1050
00:46:58,000 --> 00:47:02,160
against you, you cheat
against them the next time.

1051
00:47:02,160 --> 00:47:04,600
If they cheated at
you that time also,

1052
00:47:04,600 --> 00:47:06,240
you cheat against
them the next time.

1053
00:47:06,240 --> 00:47:08,589
If they go back to
cooperating, you

1054
00:47:08,590 --> 00:47:11,530
go back to cooperating
the next time.

1055
00:47:11,530 --> 00:47:13,540
You have this tit
for tat strategy.

1056
00:47:13,540 --> 00:47:16,210
In the absence of somebody
stabbing you in the back,

1057
00:47:16,210 --> 00:47:18,020
you will always cooperate.

1058
00:47:18,020 --> 00:47:20,650
And what they found
was, run these hundreds

1059
00:47:20,650 --> 00:47:24,040
of thousands of versions of
these round robin tournaments,

1060
00:47:24,040 --> 00:47:27,240
and tit for tat was the
one that was most optimal,

1061
00:47:27,240 --> 00:47:29,879
to begin to use a
word that is not just

1062
00:47:29,880 --> 00:47:31,320
going to be a metaphor.

1063
00:47:31,320 --> 00:47:34,330
Tit for tat always drove
the other strategies

1064
00:47:34,330 --> 00:47:36,779
into extinction.

1065
00:47:36,780 --> 00:47:40,770
And what you wound up seeing
is this optimized strategy.

1066
00:47:40,770 --> 00:47:44,160
And it was very clear why
tit for tat worked so well.

1067
00:47:44,160 --> 00:47:46,319
Number one, it was nice.

1068
00:47:46,320 --> 00:47:48,170
You start off cooperating.
1069
00:47:48,170 --> 00:47:52,590
Number two, it retaliates if
you do something crummy to it.

1070
00:47:52,590 --> 00:47:55,440
Number three, it is forgiving.

1071
00:47:55,440 --> 00:47:57,370
If you go back to cooperating.

1072
00:47:57,370 --> 00:48:00,310
Number four, it's
clear cut in its play.

1073
00:48:00,310 --> 00:48:02,570
It's not some
probabilistic thing.

1074
00:48:02,570 --> 00:48:05,400
What you get, then,
with tit for tat is,

1075
00:48:05,400 --> 00:48:08,270
suppose you're playing three
rounds with another individual.
1076
00:48:08,270 --> 00:48:09,930
You both cooperate
the first one,

1077
00:48:09,930 --> 00:48:11,430
you both cooperate the next one.

1078
00:48:11,430 --> 00:48:13,029
You're playing tit
for tat strategy,

1079
00:48:13,030 --> 00:48:14,250
so you cooperate on this one.

1080
00:48:14,250 --> 00:48:17,100
And they stab you in the back,
and you can't get back at them,

1081
00:48:17,100 --> 00:48:18,870
because this is the last round.

1082
00:48:18,870 --> 00:48:21,609
What you'll see is, under
lots of circumstances,
1083
00:48:21,610 --> 00:48:24,470
tit for tat is disadvantageous.

1084
00:48:24,470 --> 00:48:27,660
But what the soundbite is
about it is, tit for tat

1085
00:48:27,660 --> 00:48:30,799
may lose the battles,
but it wins all the wars.

1086
00:48:30,800 --> 00:48:34,520
This pattern of being nice,
but being retaliatory, being

1087
00:48:34,520 --> 00:48:37,070
forgiving, and being
clear in the rules,

1088
00:48:37,070 --> 00:48:41,890
drives all the other
strategies into extinction.

1089
00:48:41,890 --> 00:48:44,400
OK, at this point my
alarm just went off,
1090
00:48:44,400 --> 00:48:46,370
which was to remind
me to ask somebody

1091
00:48:46,370 --> 00:48:51,799
who is wearing a life vest-- is
somebody wearing a life vest?

1092
00:48:51,800 --> 00:48:53,420
[INAUDIBLE]

1093
00:48:53,420 --> 00:48:54,760
Over there.

1094
00:48:54,760 --> 00:48:56,468
Where are you?

1095
00:48:56,468 --> 00:48:57,779
She just left.

1096
00:48:57,780 --> 00:48:58,822
She left.

1097
00:48:58,822 --> 00:48:59,780
Isn't that interesting?

1098
00:48:59,780 --> 00:49:02,340
Somebody put me up to
having to ask this person,

1099
00:49:02,340 --> 00:49:03,940
why are you wearing a life vest?

1100
00:49:03,940 --> 00:49:05,830
And apparently the
answer she would give

1101
00:49:05,830 --> 00:49:09,509
was going to free all sorts of
captives in some rebel group

1102
00:49:09,510 --> 00:49:11,051
in Colombia.

1103
00:49:11,051 --> 00:49:12,310
And she fled.

1104
00:49:12,310 --> 00:49:14,014
OK, what that does is--
1105
00:49:14,014 --> 00:49:16,070
[LAUGHTER]

1106
00:49:16,070 --> 00:49:18,340
I don't know what that says
about reciprocal altruism.

1107
00:49:18,340 --> 00:49:21,760
But what that says also
is, after I do a summary,

1108
00:49:21,760 --> 00:49:22,546
don't make a move.

1109
00:49:22,546 --> 00:49:23,919
We will have a
five minute break.

1110
00:49:23,920 --> 00:49:25,570
So what do we have
at this point,

1111
00:49:25,570 --> 00:49:29,180
we have the first building
block of optimizing
1112
00:49:29,180 --> 00:49:32,370
the evolution of behavior,
like optimizing giraffe hearts.

1113
00:49:32,370 --> 00:49:35,710
First piece, you don't behave
for the good of the species.

1114
00:49:35,710 --> 00:49:38,100
Individual selection,
passing on as many copies

1115
00:49:38,100 --> 00:49:39,790
of your own genes as possible.

1116
00:49:39,790 --> 00:49:43,090
Sometimes a chicken is an egg's
way of making another egg,

1117
00:49:43,090 --> 00:49:44,510
he says triumphantly.

1118
00:49:44,510 --> 00:49:47,180
Building block number
two, kin selection.
1119
00:49:47,180 --> 00:49:50,379
Some of the time, the best way
to pass on copies of your genes

1120
00:49:50,380 --> 00:49:52,780
is by way of helping relatives.

1121
00:49:52,780 --> 00:49:55,610
Kin selection, with the
mathematical fierceness

1122
00:49:55,610 --> 00:49:57,940
of degree of
relatedness driving it.

1123
00:49:57,940 --> 00:50:01,050
Piece three, sometimes
what's most advantageous

1124
00:50:01,050 --> 00:50:03,650
is to cooperate, even
with non-relatives,

1125
00:50:03,650 --> 00:50:06,580
but with the rules of
it has to be reciprocal
1126
00:50:06,580 --> 00:50:08,470
and you have to
cheat when possible.

1127
00:50:08,470 --> 00:50:10,399
You have to be on
guard against cheaters.

1128
00:50:10,400 --> 00:50:13,640
And as we've just seen, game
theory, prisoner's dilemma,

1129
00:50:13,640 --> 00:50:17,589
beginning to formalize
optimal strategies for that.

1130
00:50:17,590 --> 00:50:20,280
OK, let's take a
five minute break.

1131
00:50:20,280 --> 00:50:23,110
But promise you will
come back if you go out,

1132
00:50:23,110 --> 00:50:25,630
and everyone won't wander off.

1133
00:50:25,630 --> 00:50:31,085
Altruism [INAUDIBLE] game
theory as being a form or way

1134
00:50:31,085 --> 00:50:34,690
to maximize that behavior
in a very artificial realm,

1135
00:50:34,690 --> 00:50:35,910
but stay tuned.

1136
00:50:35,910 --> 00:50:38,299
Prisoner's dilemma
as the building block

1137
00:50:38,300 --> 00:50:40,570
of how to do this amid
lots of other types

1138
00:50:40,570 --> 00:50:41,760
of games that are used.

1139
00:50:41,760 --> 00:50:44,200
But prisoner's dilemma
is the most basic one.

1140
00:50:44,200 --> 00:50:47,850
And that round robin tournament,
that computer simulation,

1141
00:50:47,850 --> 00:50:50,799
Axelrod asking all his
buddies to tell him

1142
00:50:50,800 --> 00:50:53,760
what strategy would you use,
run them against each other,

1143
00:50:53,760 --> 00:50:55,450
and out comes tit for tat.

1144
00:50:55,450 --> 00:51:00,230
Tit for tat drives all the
others into extinction.

1145
00:51:00,230 --> 00:51:02,260
However, there is
a vulnerability

1146
00:51:02,260 --> 00:51:19,720
in tit for tat,
which is-- OK, so.

1147
00:51:19,720 --> 00:51:23,109
We have the technical way of
showing prisoner's dilemma

1148
00:51:23,110 --> 00:51:23,830
play.

1149
00:51:23,830 --> 00:51:27,340
And first round, both
individuals are cooperating.

1150
00:51:27,340 --> 00:51:30,150
Second round, both
individuals are cooperating.

1151
00:51:30,150 --> 00:51:33,290
Third round, this one
cheats-- those are fangs.

1152
00:51:33,290 --> 00:51:35,410
This one cheats and
this one cooperates.

1153
00:51:35,410 --> 00:51:40,200
So the next round, this
one now cheats and this one

1154
00:51:40,200 --> 00:51:42,580
goes back to cooperating,
and we've just

1155
00:51:42,580 --> 00:51:46,069
gotten through a scary thing
that tit for tat solves,

1156
00:51:46,070 --> 00:51:47,510
and it's great.

1157
00:51:47,510 --> 00:51:48,610
Wonderful.

1158
00:51:48,610 --> 00:51:52,660
What if, though, your
system is not 100% perfect.

1159
00:51:52,660 --> 00:51:54,569
What if there's
a the possibility

1160
00:51:54,570 --> 00:51:59,430
of a mistake being made, of
sending the wrong signal.

1161
00:51:59,430 --> 00:52:03,410
What if there's the possibility
of noise in the communication

1162
00:52:03,410 --> 00:52:04,060
system.

1163
00:52:04,060 --> 00:52:06,310
And at some point,
an individual who

1164
00:52:06,310 --> 00:52:09,259
does a cooperative
behavior, thanks to a glitch

1165
00:52:09,260 --> 00:52:14,500
in the system, it is read
as having been defection.

1166
00:52:14,500 --> 00:52:16,950
So what happens as a result?

1167
00:52:16,950 --> 00:52:21,069
This individual-- forget it.

1168
00:52:21,070 --> 00:52:26,060
OK, what happens as a result.
The individual who cooperated,

1169
00:52:26,060 --> 00:52:28,820
but somehow the message
got through as cheating,

1170
00:52:28,820 --> 00:52:30,030
they don't know.

1171
00:52:30,030 --> 00:52:33,150
Something got lost in the wires
between them in translation.

1172
00:52:33,150 --> 00:52:35,550
The other individual
was saying whoa,

1173
00:52:35,550 --> 00:52:37,590
that individual
cheated against me.

1174
00:52:37,590 --> 00:52:39,460
I'm going to cheat
in the next round.

1175
00:52:39,460 --> 00:52:41,920
So along comes the next
round, and that individual

1176
00:52:41,920 --> 00:52:43,179
cheats against them.

1177
00:52:43,179 --> 00:52:44,970
This one who's cooperating,
because they've

1178
00:52:44,970 --> 00:52:46,145
been cooperating all along.

1179
00:52:46,146 --> 00:52:47,520
They don't know
about this error.

1180
00:52:47,520 --> 00:52:50,920
And they say whoa, that person
just cheated against me.

1181
00:52:50,920 --> 00:52:52,697
I'm going to cheat
in the next round.

1182
00:52:52,697 --> 00:52:54,030
So they cheat in the next round.

1183
00:52:54,030 --> 00:52:56,870
This one says whoa, they
just cheated another time,

1184
00:52:56,870 --> 00:52:58,220
again and again and again.

1185
00:52:58,220 --> 00:53:02,520
And what you get is a seesaw
pattern for the rest of time.

1186
00:53:02,520 --> 00:53:05,870
You've just wiped out
50% of the cooperation.

1187
00:53:05,870 --> 00:53:08,990
And what you've got is
tit for tat strategies

1188
00:53:08,990 --> 00:53:11,799
are vulnerable to signal error.

1189
00:53:11,800 --> 00:53:14,080
That's something that soon
came out in these studies

1190
00:53:14,080 --> 00:53:15,680
of Axelrod's.

1191
00:53:15,680 --> 00:53:18,940
When I was a kid, there was
like one of these thriller

1192
00:53:18,940 --> 00:53:22,930
books I remember reading where
there's a glitch in the system.

1193
00:53:22,930 --> 00:53:25,870
And at the time, the
mean scary Soviet Union

1194
00:53:25,870 --> 00:53:29,620
launched a missile that--
no, it was the United States.

1195
00:53:29,620 --> 00:53:31,420
The United States,
by accident, launched

1196
00:53:31,420 --> 00:53:34,850
a missile, a nuclear weapon,
where they didn't mean to.

1197
00:53:34,850 --> 00:53:39,049
Some cockroach chewed through
a wire some place or other.

1198
00:53:39,050 --> 00:53:43,630
And the missile went off, and
wound up destroying Moscow.

1199
00:53:43,630 --> 00:53:45,810
And oh my god, we had
a cooperative system

1200
00:53:45,810 --> 00:53:49,430
of mutually restraint of
aggression, all of that.

1201
00:53:49,430 --> 00:53:52,669
And thanks to a signal
error, a cheating signal
1202
00:53:52,670 --> 00:53:54,250
was accidentally sent off.

1203
00:53:54,250 --> 00:53:55,820
And how did the book end?

1204
00:53:55,820 --> 00:53:57,290
A tit for tat response.

1205
00:53:57,290 --> 00:54:00,960
In order to avoid
thermonuclear wasteland,

1206
00:54:00,960 --> 00:54:04,990
the Soviet Union was
allowed to destroy New York.

1207
00:54:04,990 --> 00:54:07,790
All right, so that
shows exactly how

1208
00:54:07,790 --> 00:54:10,630
you could then get into
a see-sawing thing,
1209
00:54:10,630 --> 00:54:14,370
simply by way of if the
system has any vulnerability

1210
00:54:14,370 --> 00:54:15,609
to signal error.

1211
00:54:15,610 --> 00:54:18,270
So it soon became clear,
as soon as Axelrod

1212
00:54:18,270 --> 00:54:21,400
began to introduce the
possibility of signal errors,

1213
00:54:21,400 --> 00:54:25,680
that tit for tat didn't work as
well as another strategy, one

1214
00:54:25,680 --> 00:54:27,950
that quickly came
to the forefront.

1215
00:54:27,950 --> 00:54:33,580
And that one-- for
some strange reason,
1216
00:54:33,580 --> 00:54:35,940
that's the way it's shown.

1217
00:54:35,940 --> 00:54:40,320
That one was called
forgiving tit for tat.

1218
00:54:40,320 --> 00:54:42,570
What happens with
forgiving tit for tat?

1219
00:54:42,570 --> 00:54:45,244
The usual rule, like tit
for tat, if you cooperate,

1220
00:54:45,244 --> 00:54:46,910
if they cooperate,
you always cooperate.

1221
00:54:46,910 --> 00:54:50,129
If they cheat against you, you
punish them in the next round.

1222
00:54:50,130 --> 00:54:52,020
Exactly the same
thing as tit for tat,

1223
00:54:52,020 --> 00:54:55,450
but oh no, what if there's
a signal error in the system

1224
00:54:55,450 --> 00:54:58,589
and you've gotten caught in
one of these horrible seesawing

1225
00:54:58,590 --> 00:54:59,170
things.

1226
00:54:59,170 --> 00:55:02,100
What forgiving tit
for tat does is,

1227
00:55:02,100 --> 00:55:04,350
we'll have a rule, for
example, that if we

1228
00:55:04,350 --> 00:55:07,779
see saw like this
five times in a row,

1229
00:55:07,780 --> 00:55:10,330
I will forego cheating
the next time.

1230
00:55:10,330 --> 00:55:12,009
And instead, I'll cooperate.

1231
00:55:12,010 --> 00:55:14,610
And that will get
things back on track.

1232
00:55:14,610 --> 00:55:18,780
I am willing to be
forgiving in one round

1233
00:55:18,780 --> 00:55:21,600
in order to
re-establish cooperation

1234
00:55:21,600 --> 00:55:23,940
after the signal error came in.

1235
00:55:23,940 --> 00:55:26,080
And that one-- as
soon as you introduce

1236
00:55:26,080 --> 00:55:29,060
the possibility of signal
error, that one out-competes

1237
00:55:29,060 --> 00:55:30,529
tit for tat.

1238
00:55:30,530 --> 00:55:32,650
Because it makes perfect sense.

1239
00:55:32,650 --> 00:55:36,050
It's a great way of
solving that problem.

1240
00:55:36,050 --> 00:55:38,280
So that was terrific.

1241
00:55:38,280 --> 00:55:40,220
Tit for tat with the
ability to forgive,

1242
00:55:40,220 --> 00:55:44,096
and what you would then see is
variability, how many of these

1243
00:55:44,096 --> 00:55:46,540
do you need to go through
before you forgive,

1244
00:55:46,540 --> 00:55:49,450
what's the optimal number
of see-sawings, all of that.

1245
00:55:49,450 --> 00:55:53,200
So a whole world of optimizing
how soon you're forgiving.

1246
00:55:53,200 --> 00:55:56,270
Nonetheless, the general
theme being forgiving tit

1247
00:55:56,270 --> 00:55:59,890
for tat out-competes tit for tat
when you can have signal error.

1248
00:55:59,890 --> 00:56:02,170
But there is a vulnerability.

1249
00:56:02,170 --> 00:56:04,960
There is a vulnerability
here to this one, which

1250
00:56:04,960 --> 00:56:07,270
is, you could be exploited.

1251
00:56:07,270 --> 00:56:09,970
If you're playing against,
for example, a tit for tatter,

1252
00:56:09,970 --> 00:56:12,359
or all sorts of other
strategies, where

1253
00:56:12,360 --> 00:56:16,570
they don't have forgiving
strings of defection

1254
00:56:16,570 --> 00:56:18,517
and you do, what's
going to happen

1255
00:56:18,517 --> 00:56:20,600
is you're going to keep
going back to cooperating,

1256
00:56:20,600 --> 00:56:23,020
they're going to keep
stabbing you in your back.

1257
00:56:23,020 --> 00:56:27,500
Forgiving tit for tat is
vulnerable to exploitation

1258
00:56:27,500 --> 00:56:30,070
playing against
individual players that

1259
00:56:30,070 --> 00:56:32,790
don't have forgiveness in them.

1260
00:56:32,790 --> 00:56:38,259
So what soon became apparent was
an even better strategy, which

1261
00:56:38,260 --> 00:56:48,880
is you start off with
a tit for tat strategy.

1262
00:56:48,880 --> 00:56:51,520
Which is, you are
punitive, you are

1263
00:56:51,520 --> 00:56:55,100
retaliatory amid being
forgiving, clear and nice
1264
00:56:55,100 --> 00:56:55,819
initially.

1265
00:56:55,820 --> 00:56:59,020
You are willing to punish, and
you cannot be exploited in this

1266
00:56:59,020 --> 00:57:00,290
way.

1267
00:57:00,290 --> 00:57:04,170
If and only if you have gone
whatever number of rounds

1268
00:57:04,170 --> 00:57:07,470
without the other individual
ever cheating on you, if you've

1269
00:57:07,470 --> 00:57:09,759
gone long enough
without that happening,

1270
00:57:09,760 --> 00:57:12,380
you switch over to
forgiving tit for tat.
1271
00:57:12,380 --> 00:57:13,760
What is that?

1272
00:57:13,760 --> 00:57:16,050
That's deciding
you trust somebody.

1273
00:57:16,050 --> 00:57:18,140
You've had enough
interactions with them

1274
00:57:18,140 --> 00:57:20,060
that you are willing
to trust them.

1275
00:57:20,060 --> 00:57:24,890
This is the transition from
pure rational optimizing

1276
00:57:24,890 --> 00:57:28,990
to switching over, forgiveness
coming in there protects you

1277
00:57:28,990 --> 00:57:30,279
from signal error.
1278
00:57:30,280 --> 00:57:34,190
And of course, now, a whole
world of how many rounds do you

1279
00:57:34,190 --> 00:57:36,700
need to do this before
you switch that as to what

1280
00:57:36,700 --> 00:57:38,350
the optimal deal with that is.

1281
00:57:38,350 --> 00:57:41,380
But again, this is a
way of transitioning

1282
00:57:41,380 --> 00:57:44,280
to solve the problem
of signal error,

1283
00:57:44,280 --> 00:57:48,590
but forgiving too readily
and being taken advantage of.

1284
00:57:48,590 --> 00:57:53,390
Soon, another strategy appeared,
which was called Pavlov.
1285
00:57:53,390 --> 00:57:56,390
And those of you who
know Pavlovian psychology

1286
00:57:56,390 --> 00:57:59,339
will see that this, in fact,
has nothing whatsoever to do

1287
00:57:59,340 --> 00:58:02,500
with Pavlovian psychology, and
I don't know why they did that.

1288
00:58:02,500 --> 00:58:04,050
But they thought it
was kind of cool.

1289
00:58:04,050 --> 00:58:07,870
But the rule was
remember, if you

1290
00:58:07,870 --> 00:58:10,790
stab the other guy in the back,
you get a bunch of points.

1291
00:58:10,790 --> 00:58:13,870
If you both cooperate, you
get points, not as many.

1292
00:58:13,870 --> 00:58:16,870
If you both cheat,
you lose some points.

1293
00:58:16,870 --> 00:58:20,130
If you're taken advantage
of, you lose a lot of points.

1294
00:58:20,130 --> 00:58:23,260
So two outcomes you gain,
two outcomes you lose.

1295
00:58:23,260 --> 00:58:27,130
In Pavlov, the simple rule
is when I do something,

1296
00:58:27,130 --> 00:58:30,660
if I get points, if I get
some degree of reward,

1297
00:58:30,660 --> 00:58:33,009
I do it again the next time.

1298
00:58:33,010 --> 00:58:36,350
If I get rewarded in either of
the first two types of payoffs,

1299
00:58:36,350 --> 00:58:39,390
I do the same thing again.

1300
00:58:39,390 --> 00:58:44,080
And the other part, of course,
is, if I play my strategy

1301
00:58:44,080 --> 00:58:48,100
and I lose one of the
two bottom outcomes,

1302
00:58:48,100 --> 00:58:51,310
I switch to the other
strategy the next time.

1303
00:58:51,310 --> 00:58:55,000
And what you see is that
can establish very good tit

1304
00:58:55,000 --> 00:58:55,780
for tat stuff.

1305
00:58:55,780 --> 00:58:58,290
But if you sit and
spend hours tonight

1306
00:58:58,290 --> 00:59:01,000
with a long roll of
toilet paper and playing

1307
00:59:01,000 --> 00:59:02,590
out all the rounds
of it, you will

1308
00:59:02,590 --> 00:59:06,200
see what Pavlov allows
you to do is exploit

1309
00:59:06,200 --> 00:59:08,250
somebody else who is forgiving.

1310
00:59:08,250 --> 00:59:10,930
So Pavlov goes along
just fine with this.

1311
00:59:10,930 --> 00:59:14,580
And as long as Pavlov continues,
whenever they switch over
1312
00:59:14,580 --> 00:59:16,940
to a forgiving tit
for tat, Pavlov

1313
00:59:16,940 --> 00:59:19,770
will out-compete them,
because Pavlov exploits.

1314
00:59:19,770 --> 00:59:22,340

1315
00:59:22,340 --> 00:59:26,330
What then emerged was just
zillions of people studying

1316
00:59:26,330 --> 00:59:28,220
all sorts of games like this.

1317
00:59:28,220 --> 00:59:32,049
There's other ones, ultimatum
game, there's a trust game.

1318
00:59:32,050 --> 00:59:34,520
It's the same notion
of business there,
1319
00:59:34,520 --> 00:59:37,460
which is you choose to
cooperate, you choose to cheat,

1320
00:59:37,460 --> 00:59:39,240
what's the optimal outcome.

1321
00:59:39,240 --> 00:59:42,450
There are mathematically optimal
outcomes that you can use,

1322
00:59:42,450 --> 00:59:44,669
and you run all of it
against the computer,

1323
00:59:44,670 --> 00:59:48,120
and you get the optimization
popping out the other end.

1324
00:59:48,120 --> 00:59:49,130
Wonderful.

1325
00:59:49,130 --> 00:59:52,210
So there's Axelrod and
his buddies using terms
1326
00:59:52,210 --> 00:59:54,360
like oh, this
strategy will drive

1327
00:59:54,360 --> 00:59:56,400
the other one into extinction.

1328
00:59:56,400 --> 01:00:00,020
Or this strategy works,
but if you program in

1329
01:00:00,020 --> 01:00:02,430
that every now and then
there could be a glitch,

1330
01:00:02,430 --> 01:00:04,770
there can be a mutation,
this will be-- they're

1331
01:00:04,770 --> 01:00:09,130
using all this biology jargon,
obviously metaphorically.

1332
01:00:09,130 --> 01:00:11,630
But right around this
point, the biologists
1333
01:00:11,630 --> 01:00:14,000
look at this, who are
just beginning to think

1334
01:00:14,000 --> 01:00:15,990
about the social biology stuff.

1335
01:00:15,990 --> 01:00:19,529
Formal patterns of
optimizing behavior.

1336
01:00:19,530 --> 01:00:23,290
And they say whoa, does
this apply to the behavior

1337
01:00:23,290 --> 01:00:25,060
of real organisms?

1338
01:00:25,060 --> 01:00:28,810
Because at this point, it's just
economists and computer types

1339
01:00:28,810 --> 01:00:31,410
and diplomats learning
when to optimize,
1340
01:00:31,410 --> 01:00:32,560
all that sort of thing.

1341
01:00:32,560 --> 01:00:36,120
Around the time there
was a paper published,

1342
01:00:36,120 --> 01:00:37,380
somewhat before that.

1343
01:00:37,380 --> 01:00:39,836
This is a name nobody
is going to know,

1344
01:00:39,836 --> 01:00:42,720
lost in history, a guy
named Daniel Ellsberg.

1345
01:00:42,720 --> 01:00:46,799
Daniel Ellsberg became
very famous around 1970,

1346
01:00:46,800 --> 01:00:48,840
by he was working
in the Pentagon
1347
01:00:48,840 --> 01:00:52,210
and he stole thousands
of pages of secret files

1348
01:00:52,210 --> 01:00:54,370
there, and gave it
to the New York Times

1349
01:00:54,370 --> 01:00:57,680
showing how utterly
corrupt everything that

1350
01:00:57,680 --> 01:01:00,730
went on behind the scenes was
in getting us into Vietnam.

1351
01:01:00,730 --> 01:01:02,880
Major blowout, all of that.

1352
01:01:02,880 --> 01:01:06,430
He had spent the early part of
his career perfectly happily

1353
01:01:06,430 --> 01:01:10,930
working in the Pentagon for the
military as a game theorist.

1354
01:01:10,930 --> 01:01:13,779
As a game theorist coming
up with optimal patterns.

1355
01:01:13,780 --> 01:01:17,230
And he wrote one paper
called "The Optimal

1356
01:01:17,230 --> 01:01:20,270
Benefits of Perceived Madness".

1357
01:01:20,270 --> 01:01:22,750
What times do you
want your opponent

1358
01:01:22,750 --> 01:01:25,640
to think you are
absolutely out of your mind

1359
01:01:25,640 --> 01:01:27,960
and going to do all
sorts of crazy stuff,

1360
01:01:27,960 --> 01:01:29,610
and where they
wind up cooperating

1361
01:01:29,610 --> 01:01:31,300
to keep you from doing that.

1362
01:01:31,300 --> 01:01:33,730
The advantages of
madness, what's that.

1363
01:01:33,730 --> 01:01:37,320
That's systems where things like
mutually assured destruction

1364
01:01:37,320 --> 01:01:40,630
doesn't work, because you
are willing to set it off.

1365
01:01:40,630 --> 01:01:42,310
The advantages of madness.

1366
01:01:42,310 --> 01:01:45,990
This whole world of people
working on it, mathematicians

1367
01:01:45,990 --> 01:01:47,609
and war strategists.

1368
01:01:47,610 --> 01:01:52,050
And there's the zoologists now
looking at this saying whoa,

1369
01:01:52,050 --> 01:01:53,360
this is cool.

1370
01:01:53,360 --> 01:01:56,280
I wonder if animals
behave that way.

1371
01:01:56,280 --> 01:01:59,220
And that's when people, now
armed with their insights

1372
01:01:59,220 --> 01:02:01,490
into prisoner's dilemma
and tit for tat,

1373
01:02:01,490 --> 01:02:04,649
all this stuff, started to
go and study animals out

1374
01:02:04,650 --> 01:02:08,010
in the wild and see, were
there any examples where

1375
01:02:08,010 --> 01:02:09,480
this happened.

1376
01:02:09,480 --> 01:02:10,440
Yes.

1377
01:02:10,440 --> 01:02:12,860
In all sorts of
interesting realms.

1378
01:02:12,860 --> 01:02:16,090
First example, vampire bats.

1379
01:02:16,090 --> 01:02:18,970
Vampire bats, we are all
set up to be creeped out

1380
01:02:18,970 --> 01:02:20,149
by vampire bats.

1381
01:02:20,150 --> 01:02:23,230
But in actuality, when you
see a vampire bat drinking
1382
01:02:23,230 --> 01:02:25,410
the blood of some
cow or something,

1383
01:02:25,410 --> 01:02:29,740
you are watching a mommy
getting food for her babies.

1384
01:02:29,740 --> 01:02:32,370
Because vampire bat
mothers are not actually

1385
01:02:32,370 --> 01:02:33,890
drinking the blood.

1386
01:02:33,890 --> 01:02:36,009
They're filling up
this throat sack thing,

1387
01:02:36,010 --> 01:02:38,030
and they go back to the
nest and they disgorge

1388
01:02:38,030 --> 01:02:39,780
the blood to feed their babies.
1389
01:02:39,780 --> 01:02:42,570
She's just watching
out for her kids.

1390
01:02:42,570 --> 01:02:45,950
It happens that vampire bats
have an interesting system

1391
01:02:45,950 --> 01:02:49,230
of reciprocal altruism, which
is a whole bunch of females

1392
01:02:49,230 --> 01:02:51,140
will share the same nest.

1393
01:02:51,140 --> 01:02:53,660
Will have all their
kids in there mixed in.

1394
01:02:53,660 --> 01:02:55,710
And these are not
necessarily related,

1395
01:02:55,710 --> 01:02:58,290
so we've just left the
world of kin selection.

1396
01:02:58,290 --> 01:03:00,259
They're not necessarily
related, but they have

1397
01:03:00,260 --> 01:03:02,070
reciprocal altruists system.

1398
01:03:02,070 --> 01:03:05,830
Each female comes in,
disgorges the blood,

1399
01:03:05,830 --> 01:03:07,799
and feeds everybody's babies.

1400
01:03:07,800 --> 01:03:09,450
And they all feed
each other's babies,

1401
01:03:09,450 --> 01:03:10,640
and everything is terrific.

1402
01:03:10,640 --> 01:03:13,810
And they have this blood
vampire commune going there.
1403
01:03:13,810 --> 01:03:17,740
And they've reached a nice
state of stable cooperation.

1404
01:03:17,740 --> 01:03:21,279
Now, make the bats think
that one of the females

1405
01:03:21,280 --> 01:03:23,600
is cheating on them.

1406
01:03:23,600 --> 01:03:26,890
Out comes that female flying off
to find some blood, and instead

1407
01:03:26,890 --> 01:03:29,230
you net her and
get a hold of her,

1408
01:03:29,230 --> 01:03:31,700
and take some
syringe full of air

1409
01:03:31,700 --> 01:03:33,870
and pump up the throat
sack so the throat

1410
01:03:33,870 --> 01:03:36,051
sack is really
full and distended,

1411
01:03:36,051 --> 01:03:37,299
but there's no blood in there.

1412
01:03:37,300 --> 01:03:38,880
You've just pumped
air into there.

1413
01:03:38,880 --> 01:03:40,549
And stick her back
into the nest there.

1414
01:03:40,549 --> 01:03:42,090
And she's just
sitting there happily,

1415
01:03:42,090 --> 01:03:43,464
and the other
females are sitting

1416
01:03:43,464 --> 01:03:46,799
saying look at her, look at
how much blood she's got there.

1417
01:03:46,800 --> 01:03:49,890
I can't believe it, because
she's not feeding our kids.

1418
01:03:49,890 --> 01:03:51,279
She's cheating on us.

1419
01:03:51,280 --> 01:03:53,450
And the next time
they go out to feed,

1420
01:03:53,450 --> 01:03:56,600
the other females
don't feed her kids.

1421
01:03:56,600 --> 01:03:58,310
A tit for tat.

1422
01:03:58,310 --> 01:04:01,150
What you saw here
is an exact example

1423
01:04:01,150 --> 01:04:02,840
of introducing signal error.

1424
01:04:02,840 --> 01:04:05,640
Signal error, in this case,
being some grad student

1425
01:04:05,640 --> 01:04:08,450
pumping up the throat
of some vampire bat

1426
01:04:08,450 --> 01:04:12,379
and showing that they're using
a version of a tit for tat

1427
01:04:12,380 --> 01:04:13,490
strategy.

1428
01:04:13,490 --> 01:04:14,990
Totally amazing.

1429
01:04:14,990 --> 01:04:17,109
People were blown away by this.

1430
01:04:17,110 --> 01:04:19,930
Another example, fish.
1431
01:04:19,930 --> 01:04:23,620
Stickleback fish who, in the
world of animals-- you know,

1432
01:04:23,620 --> 01:04:26,060
bats are probably not some of
the brightest folks around.

1433
01:04:26,060 --> 01:04:29,490
But I don't think sticklebacks
are within light years of them.

1434
01:04:29,490 --> 01:04:32,649
But stickleback fish can
do a tit for tat strategy.

1435
01:04:32,650 --> 01:04:33,550
Here's what you do.

1436
01:04:33,550 --> 01:04:38,440
You have a stickleback
fish in your fish tank,

1437
01:04:38,440 --> 01:04:41,650
and you make the fish
believe that he's
1438
01:04:41,650 --> 01:04:44,240
being attacked by another fish.

1439
01:04:44,240 --> 01:04:44,899
What do you do?

1440
01:04:44,900 --> 01:04:47,900
You put a mirror up against
the edge of the tank there.

1441
01:04:47,900 --> 01:04:49,819
So within a very short
time-- I told you

1442
01:04:49,819 --> 01:04:50,860
they were not that smart.

1443
01:04:50,860 --> 01:04:52,700
So within a very
short time, he's

1444
01:04:52,700 --> 01:04:55,480
lunging forward at
this mirrored thing
1445
01:04:55,480 --> 01:04:58,110
and maintaining his
territory against this guy

1446
01:04:58,110 --> 01:04:59,410
and barely holding on.

1447
01:04:59,410 --> 01:05:02,529
And that other guy is
just-- he doesn't get tired.

1448
01:05:02,530 --> 01:05:04,230
Thank god I don't get tired.

1449
01:05:04,230 --> 01:05:05,810
And they're just going at it.

1450
01:05:05,810 --> 01:05:10,299
And now make him think he
has a cooperative partner.

1451
01:05:10,300 --> 01:05:14,150
Put in a second mirror
that's perpendicular here.

1452
01:05:14,150 --> 01:05:17,460
In other words, he sees
his reflection there.

1453
01:05:17,460 --> 01:05:19,710
And every time he
moves forward, the

1454
01:05:19,710 --> 01:05:22,990
sees that one moving
forward, which is fortunate

1455
01:05:22,990 --> 01:05:25,759
because he's also seeing another
fish coming from that way.

1456
01:05:25,760 --> 01:05:27,635
And he's sitting there
saying, this is great.

1457
01:05:27,635 --> 01:05:30,150
I don't know who this guy is,
but wow, what a team we are.

1458
01:05:30,150 --> 01:05:30,892
[LAUGHTER]
1459
01:05:30,892 --> 01:05:31,850
Doubles, this is great.

1460
01:05:31,850 --> 01:05:33,880
He's in there and the thing
is, it's funny how those two

1461
01:05:33,880 --> 01:05:35,060
guys are so synchronized.

1462
01:05:35,060 --> 01:05:37,590
But whoa, we're holding
them off and we're doing it.

1463
01:05:37,590 --> 01:05:41,180
Now make him think his
cooperating partner is,

1464
01:05:41,180 --> 01:05:43,120
in fact, cheating on him.

1465
01:05:43,120 --> 01:05:45,569
Take the mirror and
angle it back a little

1466
01:05:45,570 --> 01:05:49,120
bit so the reflection
is set back some.

1467
01:05:49,120 --> 01:05:52,430
And what he now sees is
the fish moving forward,

1468
01:05:52,430 --> 01:05:54,560
but not all the way
up to the wall there.

1469
01:05:54,560 --> 01:05:56,200
The fish is hanging back there.

1470
01:05:56,200 --> 01:05:57,609
The fish is cheating.

1471
01:05:57,610 --> 01:06:00,330
And this stickleback is sitting
there saying, in effect,

1472
01:06:00,330 --> 01:06:02,067
that son of a bitch.

1473
01:06:02,067 --> 01:06:03,650
I can't believe he's
doing that to me.

1474
01:06:03,650 --> 01:06:04,983
We've worked together for years.

1475
01:06:04,983 --> 01:06:07,710
I can't believe he's-- oh
he's pretending to go forward.

1476
01:06:07,710 --> 01:06:09,750
But I see he's not
really doing that.

1477
01:06:09,750 --> 01:06:12,540
Fortunately, that guy isn't
coming forward anymore, either.

1478
01:06:12,540 --> 01:06:13,170
Phew.

1479
01:06:13,170 --> 01:06:14,900
But I can't believe
the guy is cheating.

1480
01:06:14,900 --> 01:06:18,420
And the next time you set up
this scenario, the next time

1481
01:06:18,420 --> 01:06:21,320
there's a chance the
stickleback doesn't attack

1482
01:06:21,320 --> 01:06:22,910
its own reflection there.

1483
01:06:22,910 --> 01:06:26,299
It is tit for tatting
against this guy.

1484
01:06:26,300 --> 01:06:29,110
So here we've managed to
set up one of these deals

1485
01:06:29,110 --> 01:06:31,800
within one fish and
carrying it out forever.

1486
01:06:31,800 --> 01:06:34,800
One fish, ultimately with
some very blistered lips.

1487
01:06:34,800 --> 01:06:36,980
Tit for tat, once again.

1488
01:06:36,980 --> 01:06:38,150
Another example.

1489
01:06:38,150 --> 01:06:41,546
This is the most bizarre
one I can imagine, and leads

1490
01:06:41,546 --> 01:06:43,169
to all sorts of
subjects that are going

1491
01:06:43,170 --> 01:06:44,760
to come many lectures from now.

1492
01:06:44,760 --> 01:06:48,440
But there are fish species
that will change sex.

1493
01:06:48,440 --> 01:06:52,220
And they do it under all sorts
of strategic circumstances

1494
01:06:52,220 --> 01:06:54,870
that suddenly begin to fit
into this realm of what

1495
01:06:54,870 --> 01:06:56,210
we've been learning about.

1496
01:06:56,210 --> 01:06:59,390
And you've got one of these
things called black hamlet

1497
01:06:59,390 --> 01:06:59,940
fish.

1498
01:06:59,940 --> 01:07:02,350
And they can change gender.

1499
01:07:02,350 --> 01:07:04,279
So you'll have a
pair of them who

1500
01:07:04,280 --> 01:07:06,520
hang out with each other
of opposite genders,

1501
01:07:06,520 --> 01:07:07,799
and they take turns.
1502
01:07:07,799 --> 01:07:08,840
They flip back and forth.

1503
01:07:08,840 --> 01:07:11,110
For a while, this one's
female, and for a while,

1504
01:07:11,110 --> 01:07:11,860
this one's female.

1505
01:07:11,860 --> 01:07:13,750
And they go back and
forth, and that's great.

1506
01:07:13,750 --> 01:07:15,770
But there's an
inequity there, which

1507
01:07:15,770 --> 01:07:17,530
is that the price
of reproduction

1508
01:07:17,530 --> 01:07:21,240
is greater for the
female than for the male.
1509
01:07:21,240 --> 01:07:22,970
As is the case in
so many species,

1510
01:07:22,970 --> 01:07:25,919
the female doing all
that egg and ovaduct

1511
01:07:25,920 --> 01:07:28,570
and progesterone stuff,
or whatever it is.

1512
01:07:28,570 --> 01:07:31,160
And the male's just got to
come up with some sperm there.

1513
01:07:31,160 --> 01:07:34,250
Doing to reproduction
as a cooperating pair,

1514
01:07:34,250 --> 01:07:35,660
they're not relatives.

1515
01:07:35,660 --> 01:07:39,759
Reciprocal altruism, maximizing
each of their reproductions.

1516
01:07:39,760 --> 01:07:42,200
Whoever's the female
in any given round

1517
01:07:42,200 --> 01:07:44,509
is the one who's paying more.

1518
01:07:44,510 --> 01:07:48,110
What you see are reciprocal
relationships there

1519
01:07:48,110 --> 01:07:50,740
of the fish using tit for tat.

1520
01:07:50,740 --> 01:07:54,299
If you get one fish that
begins to cheat and winds up

1521
01:07:54,300 --> 01:07:56,350
being a male too
much of the time,

1522
01:07:56,350 --> 01:07:58,950
the other fish stops
cooperating with them.

1523
01:07:58,950 --> 01:08:00,779
Again, tit for tat stuff.

1524
01:08:00,780 --> 01:08:04,180
So people were just blown out
of the water at this point,

1525
01:08:04,180 --> 01:08:08,770
seeing whoa, forget rational
human economic thinking,

1526
01:08:08,770 --> 01:08:09,370
all of that.

1527
01:08:09,370 --> 01:08:13,180
You go out into the wild,
and bats and stickleback fish

1528
01:08:13,180 --> 01:08:15,509
and gender switching
fish and all of that,

1529
01:08:15,510 --> 01:08:18,270
they're following some of
the exact same strategies.

1530
01:08:18,270 --> 01:08:20,279
Isn't nature amazing.

1531
01:08:20,279 --> 01:08:21,729
No, nature isn't amazing.

1532
01:08:21,729 --> 01:08:23,840
It's the exact same
logic as saying

1533
01:08:23,840 --> 01:08:26,300
a giraffe has to
have a heart that's

1534
01:08:26,300 --> 01:08:28,130
strong enough to
pump blood to the top

1535
01:08:28,130 --> 01:08:29,540
of the head of a giraffe.

1536
01:08:29,540 --> 01:08:31,250
Or else there
wouldn't be a giraffe.
1537
01:08:31,250 --> 01:08:34,939
And when you look at this realm,
it's applying the same notion.

1538
01:08:34,939 --> 01:08:39,319
This same sort of wind tunnel
of selective optimization

1539
01:08:39,319 --> 01:08:42,050
for behavior-- in this
case, when to cheat,

1540
01:08:42,050 --> 01:08:44,390
when to cooperate--
sculpts something

1541
01:08:44,390 --> 01:08:47,330
that is as optimized
as a giraffe's heart

1542
01:08:47,330 --> 01:08:48,809
being the right size.

1543
01:08:48,810 --> 01:08:50,740
So this made perfect sense.
1544
01:08:50,740 --> 01:08:52,130
Wonderful.

1545
01:08:52,130 --> 01:08:54,740
But then people began to
look a little bit closer,

1546
01:08:54,740 --> 01:08:58,330
and began to see the very
distressing real world

1547
01:08:58,330 --> 01:08:59,700
beginning to creep in there.

1548
01:08:59,700 --> 01:09:01,750
Which were exceptions.

1549
01:09:01,750 --> 01:09:03,080
First exception.

1550
01:09:03,080 --> 01:09:05,559
This was done by a guy named
Craig Packer, University

1551
01:09:05,560 --> 01:09:09,029
of Minnesota, looking
at lions in East Africa.

1552
01:09:09,029 --> 01:09:11,840
What you get is,
typically, prides

1553
01:09:11,840 --> 01:09:15,550
are a whole bunch of relatives,
usually female, sisters,

1554
01:09:15,550 --> 01:09:16,507
nieces, all of that.

1555
01:09:16,506 --> 01:09:18,089
But you will sometimes
get prides that

1556
01:09:18,090 --> 01:09:19,410
are not of close relatives.

1557
01:09:19,410 --> 01:09:23,250
Nonetheless, they will get
reciprocal altruistic things

1558
01:09:23,250 --> 01:09:24,290
going on.

1559
01:09:24,290 --> 01:09:27,090
Lions, in this case,
having the same trick as

1560
01:09:27,090 --> 01:09:28,840
was done on those
vervet monkeys.

1561
01:09:28,840 --> 01:09:32,979
Researcher putting inside
the bush there a speaker,

1562
01:09:32,979 --> 01:09:39,270
and playing the sound of like
400 menacing lions all at once.

1563
01:09:39,270 --> 01:09:42,050
What you're supposed to do
is freak out at that point.

1564
01:09:42,050 --> 01:09:44,569
And all of you need to very
carefully approach and see
1565
01:09:44,569 --> 01:09:46,899
what's going on in that bush.

1566
01:09:46,899 --> 01:09:49,399
So what would happen
in a reciprocal system,

1567
01:09:49,399 --> 01:09:51,680
and everybody does this.

1568
01:09:51,680 --> 01:09:53,700
Or if one time, one
of them cheats on you,

1569
01:09:53,700 --> 01:09:55,679
you push that one
forward the next time.

1570
01:09:55,680 --> 01:09:56,522
Or some such thing.

1571
01:09:56,522 --> 01:09:57,730
That's what you would expect.

1572
01:09:57,730 --> 01:09:59,509
But what he would
begin to notice

1573
01:09:59,510 --> 01:10:03,680
is, in a bunch of these groups,
there'd be one scaredy cat

1574
01:10:03,680 --> 01:10:07,770
lion, one who habitually
stayed behind the others

1575
01:10:07,770 --> 01:10:10,190
and who wasn't punished for it.

1576
01:10:10,190 --> 01:10:12,460
So this produced
this first puzzle

1577
01:10:12,460 --> 01:10:15,910
that oh, sometimes animals
aren't optimizing tit for tat.

1578
01:10:15,910 --> 01:10:19,670
Sometimes animals haven't read
Robert Axelrod's landmark 1972

1579
01:10:19,670 --> 01:10:21,230
paper, that sort of thing.

1580
01:10:21,230 --> 01:10:24,830
And what you suddenly
have is the real world.

1581
01:10:24,830 --> 01:10:27,320
What could be
possible explanations?

1582
01:10:27,320 --> 01:10:31,009
One thing being, maybe they're
not really paying attention.

1583
01:10:31,010 --> 01:10:32,740
Maybe they're not
quite that smart.

1584
01:10:32,740 --> 01:10:35,179
Wait, bacteria are doing
versions of tit for tat.

1585
01:10:35,180 --> 01:10:36,480
What else could be going on?

1586
01:10:36,480 --> 01:10:39,799
Oh, lions interact
in other realms.

1587
01:10:39,800 --> 01:10:44,150
Maybe this individual is
doing very reciprocal stuff,

1588
01:10:44,150 --> 01:10:47,980
forgiving overly altruistic
stuff in some other realm

1589
01:10:47,980 --> 01:10:48,990
of behavior.

1590
01:10:48,990 --> 01:10:52,300
Maybe this lion eats
less of the meat

1591
01:10:52,300 --> 01:10:55,160
and backs off earlier,
or something like that.

1592
01:10:55,160 --> 01:10:59,740
Maybe there's another game
going on simultaneously.
1593
01:10:59,740 --> 01:11:01,880
And this is introducing
the real world

1594
01:11:01,880 --> 01:11:04,670
in which it is not
just two individuals

1595
01:11:04,670 --> 01:11:08,270
sitting there playing prisoner's
dilemma and optimizing.

1596
01:11:08,270 --> 01:11:11,085
You suddenly begin to get
real world complexities coming

1597
01:11:11,085 --> 01:11:11,790
in there.

1598
01:11:11,790 --> 01:11:13,570
And by the time we
get to the lectures,

1599
01:11:13,570 --> 01:11:16,700
way down the line, on
aggression and cooperation,
1600
01:11:16,700 --> 01:11:19,870
what you'll see is things
get really complicated

1601
01:11:19,870 --> 01:11:23,170
when you have individuals
playing games simultaneously.

1602
01:11:23,170 --> 01:11:25,980
The rules that you apply
to one psychologically

1603
01:11:25,980 --> 01:11:28,269
begin to dribble
into the other one.

1604
01:11:28,270 --> 01:11:30,000
All sorts of things like that.

1605
01:11:30,000 --> 01:11:31,590
It will get very complicated.

1606
01:11:31,590 --> 01:11:34,590
So a first hint there
that, in fact, everything
1607
01:11:34,590 --> 01:11:36,620
doesn't work perfectly
along those lines.

1608
01:11:36,620 --> 01:11:38,460
Here's another version.

1609
01:11:38,460 --> 01:11:41,510
Here's one of the truly
weird species out there,

1610
01:11:41,510 --> 01:11:44,950
something called
the naked mole rat.

1611
01:11:44,950 --> 01:11:47,040
If you ever have
nothing to do and you've

1612
01:11:47,040 --> 01:11:51,190
got Google Image up there, go
spend the evening looking up

1613
01:11:51,190 --> 01:11:53,429
close up pictures
of naked mole rats.

1614
01:11:53,430 --> 01:11:56,140
These are the weirdest
things out there.

1615
01:11:56,140 --> 01:11:58,810
They are the closest
things among the mammals

1616
01:11:58,810 --> 01:12:02,630
to social insects, in terms
of how their colonies work.

1617
01:12:02,630 --> 01:12:04,700
They're totally
bizarre, all of that.

1618
01:12:04,700 --> 01:12:07,650
But they live in these
big, cooperative colonies

1619
01:12:07,650 --> 01:12:10,120
that are predominately
underground in Africa.

1620
01:12:10,120 --> 01:12:13,440
And they were discovered, I
think, only in the 1970s or so.

1621
01:12:13,440 --> 01:12:16,030
And for a while when
zoologists got together,

1622
01:12:16,030 --> 01:12:18,219
if you were a naked
mole rat person,

1623
01:12:18,220 --> 01:12:19,970
you were just the
coolest around.

1624
01:12:19,970 --> 01:12:22,050
And everybody else
would feel intimidated,

1625
01:12:22,050 --> 01:12:24,620
because you were working on
the best species out there.

1626
01:12:24,620 --> 01:12:27,269
And you would see these
big cooperative colonies,
1627
01:12:27,270 --> 01:12:30,490
soon shown to not
necessarily be of relatives.

1628
01:12:30,490 --> 01:12:33,620
And reciprocity and all
those sorts of rules.

1629
01:12:33,620 --> 01:12:35,830
But people soon
began to recognize

1630
01:12:35,830 --> 01:12:39,350
there would be one or two
animals in each colony that

1631
01:12:39,350 --> 01:12:41,070
weren't doing any work.

1632
01:12:41,070 --> 01:12:44,799
Work digging out
tunnels, bookkeeping,

1633
01:12:44,800 --> 01:12:47,070
I don't know what naked mole
rats do in terms of work.

1634
01:12:47,070 --> 01:12:49,080
But there would be a
few individuals who

1635
01:12:49,080 --> 01:12:50,550
would just be sitting around.

1636
01:12:50,550 --> 01:12:53,200
And they were these big
old naked mole rats.

1637
01:12:53,200 --> 01:12:54,950
They were much bigger
than the other ones,

1638
01:12:54,950 --> 01:12:57,280
and they were scarfing
up food left and right.

1639
01:12:57,280 --> 01:13:00,179
There goes Robert
Axelrod down the drain.

1640
01:13:00,180 --> 01:13:01,640
There goes all
that optimization,

1641
01:13:01,640 --> 01:13:03,860
because no one would be
punishing these guys.

1642
01:13:03,860 --> 01:13:05,330
What's the deal?

1643
01:13:05,330 --> 01:13:08,500
And it took enough watching
these animals long enough

1644
01:13:08,500 --> 01:13:11,170
to see this notion
of oh, there's

1645
01:13:11,170 --> 01:13:13,400
another game going
on in which they

1646
01:13:13,400 --> 01:13:15,480
play a more important role.

1647
01:13:15,480 --> 01:13:18,150
And it is sort of
dribbling across.

1648
01:13:18,150 --> 01:13:22,230
When the rainy season comes,
these big naked mole rats

1649
01:13:22,230 --> 01:13:25,780
go up and turn around and they
plug the entry to the tunnels

1650
01:13:25,780 --> 01:13:26,280
then.

1651
01:13:26,280 --> 01:13:27,599
[LAUGHTER]

1652
01:13:27,600 --> 01:13:29,040
That's what they do.

1653
01:13:29,040 --> 01:13:30,540
And suddenly,
these guys who have

1654
01:13:30,540 --> 01:13:33,150
been sitting around doing
no work whatsoever all year

1655
01:13:33,150 --> 01:13:36,610
and eating tons of stuff, they
suddenly have to now stick

1656
01:13:36,610 --> 01:13:39,170
their rear ends out for
the coyotes to be around

1657
01:13:39,170 --> 01:13:40,850
or whatever it is
that predates them.

1658
01:13:40,850 --> 01:13:44,120
What we have is role
diversification.

1659
01:13:44,120 --> 01:13:47,220
Real animals, real
organisms, are not just

1660
01:13:47,220 --> 01:13:51,030
playing one formal prisoner's
dilemma game against each other

1661
01:13:51,030 --> 01:13:52,870
at the same time.

1662
01:13:52,870 --> 01:13:55,559
And by the time we, again,
get to the later lectures

1663
01:13:55,560 --> 01:13:57,300
on aggression,
cooperation, all of that,

1664
01:13:57,300 --> 01:14:00,820
we will not only see that things
get much more complicated when

1665
01:14:00,820 --> 01:14:02,769
you're playing
simultaneous games,

1666
01:14:02,770 --> 01:14:04,932
when you're playing a game
against one individual

1667
01:14:04,932 --> 01:14:06,639
while you're playing
against another one,
1668
01:14:06,640 --> 01:14:09,240
and then against
triangular circumstances.

1669
01:14:09,240 --> 01:14:12,690
How play differs if you
know how many rounds

1670
01:14:12,690 --> 01:14:14,910
you are playing against
the individual versus

1671
01:14:14,910 --> 01:14:16,330
if you have no idea.

1672
01:14:16,330 --> 01:14:18,559
How play differs
if, when you are

1673
01:14:18,560 --> 01:14:20,530
about to play
against someone, you

1674
01:14:20,530 --> 01:14:22,830
get to find out what
their behavior has
1675
01:14:22,830 --> 01:14:25,660
been in the previous trials
with other individuals.

1676
01:14:25,660 --> 01:14:29,200
In other words, if somebody
shows up with a reputation,

1677
01:14:29,200 --> 01:14:31,940
we'll see this is a much
more complicated world

1678
01:14:31,940 --> 01:14:33,370
of playing out these games.

1679
01:14:33,370 --> 01:14:35,570
A much more realistic one.

1680
01:14:35,570 --> 01:14:39,179
So we begin to see a first pass
at all this optimization stuff,

1681
01:14:39,180 --> 01:14:40,710
and how great that all is.
1682
01:14:40,710 --> 01:14:44,770
One final interesting addition
to this game theory world

1683
01:14:44,770 --> 01:14:47,780
of thinking about behavior like
that, which came from a guy

1684
01:14:47,780 --> 01:14:51,099
named James Holland,
who apparently-- might

1685
01:14:51,100 --> 01:14:52,350
have a different first name.

1686
01:14:52,350 --> 01:14:55,570
But Holland, apparently, as an
interesting piece in history,

1687
01:14:55,570 --> 01:14:57,410
he's the person first
person to ever get

1688
01:14:57,410 --> 01:14:59,670
a PhD in Computer Sciences.
1689
01:14:59,670 --> 01:15:02,520
Which I think was in the late
50s, University of Michigan.

1690
01:15:02,520 --> 01:15:05,980
Apparently, there are realms
of computer programmers

1691
01:15:05,980 --> 01:15:07,400
who worship this guy.

1692
01:15:07,400 --> 01:15:09,900
And he, like a lot of other
folks in that business,

1693
01:15:09,900 --> 01:15:12,910
got interested in this
game theory evolution

1694
01:15:12,910 --> 01:15:14,300
of optimal strategies.

1695
01:15:14,300 --> 01:15:16,870
And he designed ways
of running all of this.
1696
01:15:16,870 --> 01:15:18,910
And he introduced
a new ripple, which

1697
01:15:18,910 --> 01:15:22,930
is the possibility of a
strategy suddenly changing.

1698
01:15:22,930 --> 01:15:26,080
The possibility of a mutation.

1699
01:15:26,080 --> 01:15:28,559
What he could then
study was mutations,

1700
01:15:28,560 --> 01:15:31,290
how often they were
adaptive, how often they

1701
01:15:31,290 --> 01:15:35,360
spread throughout the strategy
there, of individuals playing.

1702
01:15:35,360 --> 01:15:38,120
How often they drove
the other strategies
1703
01:15:38,120 --> 01:15:41,220
into extinction versus
ones that were quickly

1704
01:15:41,220 --> 01:15:42,830
driven to extinction themselves.

1705
01:15:42,830 --> 01:15:45,730
More cases where we are
getting these systems

1706
01:15:45,730 --> 01:15:48,400
where maybe they're not just
metaphorically using terms

1707
01:15:48,400 --> 01:15:49,580
from biology.

1708
01:15:49,580 --> 01:15:52,670
Maybe they are exactly
modeling the same thing.

1709
01:15:52,670 --> 01:15:55,690
And we will see more and
more evidence for that.
1710
01:15:55,690 --> 01:15:58,169
OK, so reciprocal altruism.

1711
01:15:58,170 --> 01:16:01,670
How would that play out in the
world of natural selection.

1712
01:16:01,670 --> 01:16:04,520
Natural selection,
cooperative hunting.

1713
01:16:04,520 --> 01:16:07,170
And there's lots of species
that have cooperative hunting.

1714
01:16:07,170 --> 01:16:11,234
Wild dogs, jackals, some
other species as well.

1715
01:16:11,234 --> 01:16:12,850
Clearly, that's
like the definition

1716
01:16:12,850 --> 01:16:16,050
of cooperative hunting,
of reciprocal altruism,

1717
01:16:16,050 --> 01:16:17,310
if they're not relatives.

1718
01:16:17,310 --> 01:16:19,660
How would sexual
selection play out

1719
01:16:19,660 --> 01:16:21,580
in the realm of
reciprocal altruism?

1720
01:16:21,580 --> 01:16:23,210
A little bit less obvious there.

1721
01:16:23,210 --> 01:16:25,660
That would be if you
and some non-relative

1722
01:16:25,660 --> 01:16:28,330
spent an insane amount
of energy and time

1723
01:16:28,330 --> 01:16:32,980
making sure you both look really
good before going to the prom.

1724
01:16:32,980 --> 01:16:35,736
That would be sexual selection
working on reciprocal altruism

1725
01:16:35,736 --> 01:16:36,650
system.

1726
01:16:36,650 --> 01:16:40,160
So what we have now are
three building blocks.

1727
01:16:40,160 --> 01:16:43,950
This whole trashing of it's
not survival of the fittest.

1728
01:16:43,950 --> 01:16:46,537
It's not behaving for
the good of the species.

1729
01:16:46,537 --> 01:16:48,370
It's not behaving for
the good of the group.

1730
01:16:48,370 --> 01:16:49,980
But instead, these
three building

1731
01:16:49,980 --> 01:16:54,429
blocks, the ways to optimize
as many copies of your genes

1732
01:16:54,430 --> 01:16:56,290
in the next generation
as possible.

1733
01:16:56,290 --> 01:16:59,620
Way number one,
individual selection,

1734
01:16:59,620 --> 01:17:01,250
a version of selfish genes.

1735
01:17:01,250 --> 01:17:04,500
Sometimes a chicken is an egg's
way of making another egg.

1736
01:17:04,500 --> 01:17:07,260
Behavior is just a way of
getting copies of genes

1737
01:17:07,260 --> 01:17:09,170
into the next generation.

1738
01:17:09,170 --> 01:17:12,587
Piece number two, inclusive
fitness kin selection.

1739
01:17:12,587 --> 01:17:14,420
That whole business,
that sometimes the best

1740
01:17:14,420 --> 01:17:17,160
way of passing on copies
is to help relatives do it.

1741
01:17:17,160 --> 01:17:19,269
And it's a function of
how related they are.

1742
01:17:19,270 --> 01:17:23,850
The whole world of cooperation
more among related organisms

1743
01:17:23,850 --> 01:17:25,330
than unrelated ones.

1744
01:17:25,330 --> 01:17:28,150
And as we will see way
down the line, what

1745
01:17:28,150 --> 01:17:30,480
is very challenging
in different species

1746
01:17:30,480 --> 01:17:33,469
is, how do you figure out
who you are related to?

1747
01:17:33,470 --> 01:17:36,970
And humans do it in a very
unique way that sets them up

1748
01:17:36,970 --> 01:17:40,560
for being exploited in all
sorts of circumstances that

1749
01:17:40,560 --> 01:17:44,470
begin to explain why culture
after culture, people

1750
01:17:44,470 --> 01:17:48,920
are really not nice to thems,
and it flows along those lines.
1751
01:17:48,920 --> 01:17:51,500
This is something we will
get to in a lot of detail.

1752
01:17:51,500 --> 01:17:54,140
So degree of relatedness,
a lecture coming.

1753
01:17:54,140 --> 01:17:56,020
How do you tell who
you're related to.

1754
01:17:56,020 --> 01:17:58,440
But that second
piece, kin selection.

1755
01:17:58,440 --> 01:18:00,799
Third piece,
reciprocal altruism.

1756
01:18:00,800 --> 01:18:03,700
You scratch my back and
I'll scratch your back.

1757
01:18:03,700 --> 01:18:06,775
And whenever possible, you want
to instead scratch your back,

1758
01:18:06,775 --> 01:18:08,150
and they want to
make sure you're

1759
01:18:08,150 --> 01:18:09,309
not scratching your back.

1760
01:18:09,310 --> 01:18:11,020
Or whatever cheating counts as.

1761
01:18:11,020 --> 01:18:13,730
But trying to cheat,
being vigilant against it,

1762
01:18:13,730 --> 01:18:17,750
formal games where you can
optimize it, very complicated.

1763
01:18:17,750 --> 01:18:20,360
And can you believe it, you
go out into the real world,

1764
01:18:20,360 --> 01:18:23,139
and you find examples
of precisely that.

1765
01:18:23,140 --> 01:18:25,830
Optimization with tit for
tat, isn't nature wonderful.

1766
01:18:25,830 --> 01:18:27,470
It's gotta work that way.

1767
01:18:27,470 --> 01:18:30,800
Then you begin to see how the
real world is more complicated.

1768
01:18:30,800 --> 01:18:34,290
Multiple roles, naked mole
rats stuck in plumbing,

1769
01:18:34,290 --> 01:18:36,940
things of that sort.

1770
01:18:36,940 --> 01:18:38,349
These are the principles.

1771
01:18:38,350 --> 01:18:40,930
And what people of this
school of evolutionary thought

1772
01:18:40,930 --> 01:18:44,010
would say, armed with
these sorts of principles,

1773
01:18:44,010 --> 01:18:47,200
you could now look at all
sorts of interesting domains

1774
01:18:47,200 --> 01:18:49,980
of animal behavior
and understand

1775
01:18:49,980 --> 01:18:53,200
what the behavior is going
to be like by using these.

1776
01:18:53,200 --> 01:18:55,290
OK, we start with
the first example.

1777
01:18:55,290 --> 01:18:57,910
Here we return to these guys.

1778
01:18:57,910 --> 01:19:01,280
And we have one species
here, and knowing

1779
01:19:01,280 --> 01:19:03,550
this guy had a penis
and this one nursed,

1780
01:19:03,550 --> 01:19:05,790
we've got an adult male
and an adult female.

1781
01:19:05,790 --> 01:19:07,560
What is it that
you can conclude?

1782
01:19:07,560 --> 01:19:12,680
In this species, males are
a lot bigger than females.

1783
01:19:12,680 --> 01:19:16,740
Let's state it here as there's
a big ratio of males to females.

1784
01:19:16,740 --> 01:19:18,450
Meanwhile in the
next county, you've
1785
01:19:18,450 --> 01:19:21,070
discovered another species
where somebody's got a penis

1786
01:19:21,070 --> 01:19:22,380
and somebody else is nursing.

1787
01:19:22,380 --> 01:19:24,440
And their skulls are
the exact same size.

1788
01:19:24,440 --> 01:19:26,309
Oh, here's a species
where there's

1789
01:19:26,310 --> 01:19:31,130
no difference in body size
between males and females.

1790
01:19:31,130 --> 01:19:33,520
Let's begin to see, just
using the principles

1791
01:19:33,520 --> 01:19:38,140
we've got in hand already, what
sort of stuff we can predict.
1792
01:19:38,140 --> 01:19:41,960
Starting, which of those
species-- in one case,

1793
01:19:41,960 --> 01:19:45,660
you have males being a
lot bigger than females.

1794
01:19:45,660 --> 01:19:49,019
In one case, you've got males
being the same size as females.

1795
01:19:49,020 --> 01:19:51,840
In which of those species,
the first one like this,

1796
01:19:51,840 --> 01:19:53,700
or the same size
ones, which ones

1797
01:19:53,700 --> 01:19:56,360
would you expect to see
more male aggression?

1798
01:19:56,360 --> 01:19:58,280
First one.

1799
01:19:58,280 --> 01:19:58,900
First one.

1800
01:19:58,900 --> 01:20:00,777
OK, how come?

1801
01:20:00,778 --> 01:20:02,230
Their bodies are built for it.

1802
01:20:02,230 --> 01:20:03,759
Their bodies are built for it.

1803
01:20:03,760 --> 01:20:05,410
Which begins to
tell you something,

1804
01:20:05,410 --> 01:20:07,080
their bodies are
built for it, maybe

1805
01:20:07,080 --> 01:20:09,240
because females have
been selecting for that.
1806
01:20:09,240 --> 01:20:12,300
You will see higher
levels of aggression

1807
01:20:12,300 --> 01:20:16,140
in species like this, where
there's a big body size

1808
01:20:16,140 --> 01:20:19,840
difference, and much
less of it in these guys.

1809
01:20:19,840 --> 01:20:23,960
Next, you now ask how
much variability is there

1810
01:20:23,960 --> 01:20:26,320
in male reproductive success.

1811
01:20:26,320 --> 01:20:29,469
In one of these
species, all the males

1812
01:20:29,470 --> 01:20:32,180
have one or two kids
over their lifetime.
1813
01:20:32,180 --> 01:20:35,890
In another species,
95% of the reproducing

1814
01:20:35,890 --> 01:20:38,320
is carried out by
5% of the males.

1815
01:20:38,320 --> 01:20:42,820
A huge variability skew in
male reproductive success.

1816
01:20:42,820 --> 01:20:45,980
Which species do you
get the every male has

1817
01:20:45,980 --> 01:20:49,030
a couple of kids, and that's
about it, and all equally so?

1818
01:20:49,030 --> 01:20:50,009
Which one?

1819
01:20:50,010 --> 01:20:50,720
[INAUDIBLE]
1820
01:20:50,720 --> 01:20:51,530
Second one.

1821
01:20:51,530 --> 01:20:52,200
How come?

1822
01:20:52,200 --> 01:20:56,750

1823
01:20:56,750 --> 01:21:00,600
Because these guys are being
selected for aggression.

1824
01:21:00,600 --> 01:21:02,115
If they're fighting,
there's going

1825
01:21:02,115 --> 01:21:03,990
to have to be something
they're fighting for.

1826
01:21:03,990 --> 01:21:06,530
Deferential reproductive access.

1827
01:21:06,530 --> 01:21:13,599
OK, so you see more variability
in species that look like this.

1828
01:21:13,600 --> 01:21:16,090
Next, females come
into the equation.

1829
01:21:16,090 --> 01:21:17,890
What do females want?

1830
01:21:17,890 --> 01:21:20,460
What do females want in
the species on the left

1831
01:21:20,460 --> 01:21:21,840
versus the one on the right?

1832
01:21:21,840 --> 01:21:24,720
The one on the
right, again, skull's

1833
01:21:24,720 --> 01:21:26,260
the same size, same body size.

1834
01:21:26,260 --> 01:21:29,720
On the left, what
does the female want?

1835
01:21:29,720 --> 01:21:32,595
[INAUDIBLE]

1836
01:21:32,595 --> 01:21:35,153
What sort of male is the
female interested in?

1837
01:21:35,153 --> 01:21:36,000
[INAUDIBLE]

1838
01:21:36,000 --> 01:21:36,570
Big.

1839
01:21:36,570 --> 01:21:37,519
Exactly.

1840
01:21:37,520 --> 01:21:40,290
That's exactly the
driving force on this.

1841
01:21:40,290 --> 01:21:41,430
How come?
1842
01:21:41,430 --> 01:21:44,615
Because she's not going to get
anything else out of this guy.

1843
01:21:44,615 --> 01:21:46,490
This guy is just going
to, like-- the present

1844
01:21:46,490 --> 01:21:47,572
is going to be some sperm.

1845
01:21:47,573 --> 01:21:50,590
It might as well be some
good sperm, some genetically

1846
01:21:50,590 --> 01:21:53,910
well-endowed sperm that makes
her a big healthy offspring,

1847
01:21:53,910 --> 01:21:57,000
increasing the odds of her
passing on copies of her genes

1848
01:21:57,000 --> 01:21:58,550
in the next generation.
1849
01:21:58,550 --> 01:22:01,340
What about in this species?

1850
01:22:01,340 --> 01:22:02,820
What's females looking for?

1851
01:22:02,820 --> 01:22:05,808

1852
01:22:05,808 --> 01:22:06,810
[INAUDIBLE]

1853
01:22:06,810 --> 01:22:08,780
OK, good.

1854
01:22:08,780 --> 01:22:10,969
Hold on to that for
a second, and let's

1855
01:22:10,970 --> 01:22:13,470
jump ahead a few lines.

1856
01:22:13,470 --> 01:22:16,810
One of the species,
males have never
1857
01:22:16,810 --> 01:22:20,160
been known to do the slightest
affiliative thing with infants.

1858
01:22:20,160 --> 01:22:22,930
They just get irritated and
harass them and all of that.

1859
01:22:22,930 --> 01:22:25,960
In the other, you
have soccer dads

1860
01:22:25,960 --> 01:22:30,270
who are doing as much raising
of the kids as the females are.

1861
01:22:30,270 --> 01:22:33,990
In which species do you get
lots of male parental behavior?

1862
01:22:33,990 --> 01:22:35,190
Smaller.

1863
01:22:35,190 --> 01:22:36,250
The one on the right.
1864
01:22:36,250 --> 01:22:36,800
OK.

1865
01:22:36,800 --> 01:22:39,227
So lots of male
parental behavior here.

1866
01:22:39,227 --> 01:22:43,050

1867
01:22:43,050 --> 01:22:45,850
Somebody just gave the
answer here, female choice.

1868
01:22:45,850 --> 01:22:47,580
What would you see
in this species?

1869
01:22:47,580 --> 01:22:49,680
You want big, muscular guys.

1870
01:22:49,680 --> 01:22:52,520
You want whatever is
selling that season for what
1871
01:22:52,520 --> 01:22:55,890
counts as a hot male, because
you want your offspring

1872
01:22:55,890 --> 01:22:57,440
to have those traits.

1873
01:22:57,440 --> 01:22:59,099
And somebody else
called out here,

1874
01:22:59,100 --> 01:23:01,630
what do females want
in this category?

1875
01:23:01,630 --> 01:23:03,964
And what was it you said?

1876
01:23:03,964 --> 01:23:04,672
Good personality.

1877
01:23:04,672 --> 01:23:05,170
[LAUGHTER]

1878
01:23:05,171 --> 01:23:06,600
Good personality.

1879
01:23:06,600 --> 01:23:08,020
Yes.

1880
01:23:08,020 --> 01:23:09,950
Able to express emotions.

1881
01:23:09,950 --> 01:23:11,276
[LAUGHTER]

1882
01:23:11,276 --> 01:23:13,016
That, too.

1883
01:23:13,016 --> 01:23:14,639
OK, somebody else
shouted out something

1884
01:23:14,640 --> 01:23:18,780
that gets at the broader,
more globally Oprah version.

1885
01:23:18,780 --> 01:23:20,166
OK, somebody shouted out--

1886
01:23:20,166 --> 01:23:21,560
[INAUDIBLE]

1887
01:23:21,560 --> 01:23:23,610
--parental behavior.

1888
01:23:23,610 --> 01:23:26,830
You want a male who is going
to be competent at raising

1889
01:23:26,830 --> 01:23:27,740
your children.

1890
01:23:27,740 --> 01:23:31,110
What is it that you
want, really most deeply?

1891
01:23:31,110 --> 01:23:34,349
You want to get the male who
is the most like a female you

1892
01:23:34,350 --> 01:23:35,730
can get a hold of.

1893
01:23:35,730 --> 01:23:38,049
You don't want some
big old stupid guy

1894
01:23:38,050 --> 01:23:41,390
with a lot of muscle and canines
who's wasting energy on stuff

1895
01:23:41,390 --> 01:23:45,280
like that he could be using
instead on reading Goodnight

1896
01:23:45,280 --> 01:23:47,000
Moon or some such thing.

1897
01:23:47,000 --> 01:23:50,260
What you want
instead is somebody

1898
01:23:50,260 --> 01:23:53,140
who's as close to a female as
you can get to without getting

1899
01:23:53,140 --> 01:23:54,670
this lactation stuff.

1900
01:23:54,670 --> 01:23:59,770
Males are chosen who are
the same size as females.

1901
01:23:59,770 --> 01:24:04,670
So the term given here is
choosing for paternal behavior,

1902
01:24:04,670 --> 01:24:06,130
parental behavior.

1903
01:24:06,130 --> 01:24:08,250
Parental, let's just
put that in there.

1904
01:24:08,250 --> 01:24:11,130
And that begins to explain
the top line, species

1905
01:24:11,130 --> 01:24:14,480
in which there's a lot
of sexual dimorphism.

1906
01:24:14,480 --> 01:24:16,299
Morphism, shapes of things.

1907
01:24:16,300 --> 01:24:18,470
Sexual dimorphism,
big difference

1908
01:24:18,470 --> 01:24:21,540
in body size as a
function of gender.

1909
01:24:21,540 --> 01:24:23,680
And in these sorts
of species where

1910
01:24:23,680 --> 01:24:25,780
you get male parental
behavior, not

1911
01:24:25,780 --> 01:24:27,844
much variability in male
reproductive success,

1912
01:24:27,844 --> 01:24:29,260
low levels of
aggression, and what

1913
01:24:29,260 --> 01:24:31,450
females want is
a competent male.

1914
01:24:31,450 --> 01:24:35,650
These are ones where you see low
degrees of sexual dimorphism.

1915
01:24:35,650 --> 01:24:37,490
So how's a female
going to figure out

1916
01:24:37,490 --> 01:24:40,090
that this guy is going
to be a competent parent?

1917
01:24:40,090 --> 01:24:43,240
Once again, we just figured out,
if he looks kind of like you.

1918
01:24:43,240 --> 01:24:46,519
Because that suggests he hasn't
wasted health and metabolism

1919
01:24:46,520 --> 01:24:48,470
on stupid, pointless
muscles when there's

1920
01:24:48,470 --> 01:24:50,380
more important things
in life for making sure
1921
01:24:50,380 --> 01:24:51,820
your kids have good values.

1922
01:24:51,820 --> 01:24:54,269
What else would the female
want to know when she's first

1923
01:24:54,270 --> 01:24:55,895
considering mating with a male?

1924
01:24:55,895 --> 01:24:58,630

1925
01:24:58,630 --> 01:25:00,162
Is he a nice guy,
is he sensitive,

1926
01:25:00,162 --> 01:25:01,370
does he express his feelings.

1927
01:25:01,370 --> 01:25:04,630
Is he competent
at being a parent.

1928
01:25:04,630 --> 01:25:06,760
What do you want the
individual to do?

1929
01:25:06,760 --> 01:25:10,620
Prove to you that he can
provide for the kids.

1930
01:25:10,620 --> 01:25:15,370
And suddenly you have a world of
male birds courting the females

1931
01:25:15,370 --> 01:25:17,309
by bringing them worms.

1932
01:25:17,310 --> 01:25:19,220
Bringing them
evidence that they are

1933
01:25:19,220 --> 01:25:22,620
able to successfully forage,
they are able to get food.

1934
01:25:22,620 --> 01:25:25,500
Female choice is built
around appearance
1935
01:25:25,500 --> 01:25:27,990
and behavioral
competence at being

1936
01:25:27,990 --> 01:25:30,150
able to be a successful
parent in order

1937
01:25:30,150 --> 01:25:31,570
to pass on as many
copies of genes

1938
01:25:31,570 --> 01:25:33,150
to the next generation
as possible.

1939
01:25:33,150 --> 01:25:35,540
OK, how about life span.

1940
01:25:35,540 --> 01:25:39,160
In which species is there a big
difference in life expectancy

1941
01:25:39,160 --> 01:25:41,184
as a function of gender?
1942
01:25:41,184 --> 01:25:42,540
First one.

1943
01:25:42,540 --> 01:25:43,400
First one.

1944
01:25:43,400 --> 01:25:45,070
Here you're choosing
for males to be

1945
01:25:45,070 --> 01:25:47,880
as close to females as possible,
and thus the physiology.

1946
01:25:47,880 --> 01:25:50,390
Here you've got
these guys who are

1947
01:25:50,390 --> 01:25:52,910
using huge amounts
of energy to build up

1948
01:25:52,910 --> 01:25:55,559
all this muscle, which
takes a lot more work
1949
01:25:55,560 --> 01:25:57,200
to keep in calories.

1950
01:25:57,200 --> 01:25:59,190
And you're more
vulnerable in famines.

1951
01:25:59,190 --> 01:26:01,910
You've got these males
with high testosterone,

1952
01:26:01,910 --> 01:26:05,080
which does bad stuff to
your circulatory system.

1953
01:26:05,080 --> 01:26:07,890
You've got males who, thanks
to all this aggression,

1954
01:26:07,890 --> 01:26:10,250
are getting more
injuries, more likely.

1955
01:26:10,250 --> 01:26:13,690
In species in which you have
a lot of sexual dimorphism
1956
01:26:13,690 --> 01:26:19,049
in body size, you get a lot of
sexual dimorphism in life span.

1957
01:26:19,050 --> 01:26:21,790
Then you look at these
guys, and it's basically

1958
01:26:21,790 --> 01:26:23,540
no difference by gender.

1959
01:26:23,540 --> 01:26:25,110
Moving on.

1960
01:26:25,110 --> 01:26:27,030
Considering primates
that are one

1961
01:26:27,030 --> 01:26:30,280
of these two patterns, in
which one do you always

1962
01:26:30,280 --> 01:26:32,929
want to give birth to twins,
in which one do you never
1963
01:26:32,930 --> 01:26:34,130
want to give birth to twins?

1964
01:26:34,130 --> 01:26:35,983
Who gives birth to twins?

1965
01:26:35,983 --> 01:26:36,690
[INAUDIBLE]

1966
01:26:36,690 --> 01:26:38,160
The one of the right, of course.

1967
01:26:38,160 --> 01:26:38,889
How come?

1968
01:26:38,890 --> 01:26:41,010
Because you've got two
parents on the scene.

1969
01:26:41,010 --> 01:26:42,560
You are not a single mother.

1970
01:26:42,560 --> 01:26:45,300
And you are a single mother
rhesus monkey or something,

1971
01:26:45,300 --> 01:26:47,820
and you give birth to
twins, and you do not

1972
01:26:47,820 --> 01:26:50,230
have the remotest
chance of enough energy,

1973
01:26:50,230 --> 01:26:53,709
enough calories on board, to
get both of them to survive.

1974
01:26:53,710 --> 01:26:57,770
A twin that is born
in a species like this

1975
01:26:57,770 --> 01:27:01,000
has the same rate that it occurs
in humans, about a 1% rate.

1976
01:27:01,000 --> 01:27:04,390
And it is almost inevitable that
one of them does not survive.

1977
01:27:04,390 --> 01:27:07,520
Meanwhile, there's a whole
world of primate species

1978
01:27:07,520 --> 01:27:10,520
with this profile where
the females always twin.

1979
01:27:10,520 --> 01:27:13,460

1980
01:27:13,460 --> 01:27:16,210
Finally, you are
the female and you

1981
01:27:16,210 --> 01:27:19,590
are contemplating
bailing out on your kids

1982
01:27:19,590 --> 01:27:21,020
and disappearing,
because there's

1983
01:27:21,020 --> 01:27:24,540
some really hot guy over there
who you want to mate with.
1984
01:27:24,540 --> 01:27:27,420
And you are trying to
figure out this strategy.

1985
01:27:27,420 --> 01:27:30,760
So you are going to leave
and abandon your kids.

1986
01:27:30,760 --> 01:27:34,080
In which species do
you see that behavior?

1987
01:27:34,080 --> 01:27:35,070
The one on the right.

1988
01:27:35,070 --> 01:27:37,980
The one on the right, because
you bail out and the male

1989
01:27:37,980 --> 01:27:39,200
is there taking care of them.

1990
01:27:39,200 --> 01:27:42,670
You bail out in here, and you've
lost your investment and copies
1991
01:27:42,670 --> 01:27:44,350
your genes for the
next generation.

1992
01:27:44,350 --> 01:27:48,050
You see female cuckoldry,
this great Victorian term.

1993
01:27:48,050 --> 01:27:51,770
You see females cheating on
the fathers in this species,

1994
01:27:51,770 --> 01:27:53,580
but not in species like this.

1995
01:27:53,580 --> 01:27:58,059
Because the father is long gone
and three other counties there,

1996
01:27:58,060 --> 01:27:59,430
courting somebody else.

1997
01:27:59,430 --> 01:28:00,920
And it doesn't
matter, you're not
1998
01:28:00,920 --> 01:28:02,370
going to get any help from him.

1999
01:28:02,370 --> 01:28:04,650
In primate species
of this profile,

2000
01:28:04,650 --> 01:28:06,650
you always see twinning.

2001
01:28:06,650 --> 01:28:08,440
And they both survive.

2002
01:28:08,440 --> 01:28:10,660
And what studies have
shown in these species,

2003
01:28:10,660 --> 01:28:12,420
and we'll get to
them shortly, is

2004
01:28:12,420 --> 01:28:16,434
after birth, in fact, the males
are expending more calories

2005
01:28:16,434 --> 01:28:17,850
taking care of the
offspring, then

2006
01:28:17,850 --> 01:28:22,570
the females go bail out on him
and go find some other hot guy.

2007
01:28:22,570 --> 01:28:24,320
Which, in your species,
counts as some guy

2008
01:28:24,320 --> 01:28:27,400
who looks even more like you
than he does in terms of what

2009
01:28:27,400 --> 01:28:29,190
you want out of the individual.

2010
01:28:29,190 --> 01:28:29,967
So that.

2011
01:28:29,967 --> 01:28:31,049
So what have we done here?

2012
01:28:31,050 --> 01:28:33,700
We've just gone through
applying these principles

2013
01:28:33,700 --> 01:28:35,590
in this logical
way, and everybody

2014
01:28:35,590 --> 01:28:38,550
from the very first step was
getting the right outcome.

2015
01:28:38,550 --> 01:28:41,800
And go, and these are
exactly the profiles

2016
01:28:41,800 --> 01:28:43,600
you find in certain species.

2017
01:28:43,600 --> 01:28:46,420
Among social mammals,
these would be referred to

2018
01:28:46,420 --> 01:28:48,770
as a tournament species.

2019
01:28:48,770 --> 01:28:51,470
A tournament species,
whereas the one on the right

2020
01:28:51,470 --> 01:28:55,730
is referred to as a pair
bonding, a monogamous species.

2021
01:28:55,730 --> 01:28:58,419
Because in this one,
males and females

2022
01:28:58,420 --> 01:29:01,840
stay together, because they
both have equivalent investment

2023
01:29:01,840 --> 01:29:03,120
in taking care of the kids.

2024
01:29:03,120 --> 01:29:04,000
All of that.

2025
01:29:04,000 --> 01:29:05,830
What you have here
is this contrast

2026
01:29:05,830 --> 01:29:10,010
between tournament species
and pair bonding species.

2027
01:29:10,010 --> 01:29:13,020
Tournament species,
these are all the species

2028
01:29:13,020 --> 01:29:16,690
where you get males with
big, bright plumage.

2029
01:29:16,690 --> 01:29:19,660
These are peacocks,
these are all those birds

2030
01:29:19,660 --> 01:29:22,639
and fish species where the
males are all brightly colored.

2031
01:29:22,640 --> 01:29:25,000
What are the females
choosing for?

2032
01:29:25,000 --> 01:29:28,580
Peacock feathers does not make
for a good peacock mother.
2033
01:29:28,580 --> 01:29:31,860
Peacock feathers are signs
of being healthy enough

2034
01:29:31,860 --> 01:29:33,639
that you can waste
lots of energy

2035
01:29:33,640 --> 01:29:35,740
on these big stupid
pointless feathers.

2036
01:29:35,740 --> 01:29:37,469
That's a sign of health.

2037
01:29:37,470 --> 01:29:41,030
That's a sign of all I'm getting
from this peacock is genes,

2038
01:29:41,030 --> 01:29:42,750
I might as well
go for good ones.

2039
01:29:42,750 --> 01:29:44,250
That's the world
of peacocks, that's
2040
01:29:44,250 --> 01:29:46,930
the world of chickens
with pecking orders,

2041
01:29:46,930 --> 01:29:49,210
dominating like that,
lots of aggression.

2042
01:29:49,210 --> 01:29:53,210
That's the world of primates
where, as in savanna baboons,

2043
01:29:53,210 --> 01:29:55,560
the male is twice as
big as the female.

2044
01:29:55,560 --> 01:30:00,010
Tournament species, where a
lot of passing on of genes

2045
01:30:00,010 --> 01:30:03,570
is decided by male-male
aggression in the context

2046
01:30:03,570 --> 01:30:07,950
of tournaments producing
massive amounts of variability

2047
01:30:07,950 --> 01:30:09,440
in reproductive success.

2048
01:30:09,440 --> 01:30:12,299
Where males are being selected
for being good at this,

2049
01:30:12,300 --> 01:30:15,260
so they sure are being selected
for having big bodies, which

2050
01:30:15,260 --> 01:30:16,814
winds up meaning
a shortened life

2051
01:30:16,814 --> 01:30:17,980
span for a bunch of reasons.

2052
01:30:17,980 --> 01:30:19,599
Females are choosing for that.

2053
01:30:19,600 --> 01:30:21,620
These are guys who are
not using their energy

2054
01:30:21,620 --> 01:30:23,840
on parental behavior,
thus you do not

2055
01:30:23,840 --> 01:30:26,160
want to have twins if
you are a female baboon,

2056
01:30:26,160 --> 01:30:28,030
and you do not want to
bail out on the kids

2057
01:30:28,030 --> 01:30:30,170
because nobody else is
going to take care of them.

2058
01:30:30,170 --> 01:30:33,020
Go and look at a
new primate species,

2059
01:30:33,020 --> 01:30:36,100
and see this much of a
difference in skull size,

2060
01:30:36,100 --> 01:30:38,260
and you'd just be able
to derive everything

2061
01:30:38,260 --> 01:30:40,420
else about its social behavior.

2062
01:30:40,420 --> 01:30:44,140
Meanwhile, these guys on the
right, pair bonding species.

2063
01:30:44,140 --> 01:30:47,300
These are found among South
American monkeys, marmosets,

2064
01:30:47,300 --> 01:30:48,180
tamarins.

2065
01:30:48,180 --> 01:30:50,010
You put up a picture
of them, which

2066
01:30:50,010 --> 01:30:51,866
I will do if I ever
master PowerPoint

2067
01:30:51,866 --> 01:30:53,490
in some subsequent
lecture-- you put up

2068
01:30:53,490 --> 01:30:56,590
a picture of a marmoset
pair, and you can't tell

2069
01:30:56,590 --> 01:30:58,340
who's the male and the female.

2070
01:30:58,340 --> 01:31:00,570
This is not the world
of the mandrill baboons,

2071
01:31:00,570 --> 01:31:04,309
with males with big, bright,
bizarre coloration on the face,

2072
01:31:04,310 --> 01:31:06,700
and with antlers when
the females don't,

2073
01:31:06,700 --> 01:31:09,681
and that whole world
of sexual dimorphism.
2074
01:31:09,681 --> 01:31:11,179
You can't tell which
one is the male

2075
01:31:11,180 --> 01:31:13,920
and which one is the female
marmoset by looking at them.

2076
01:31:13,920 --> 01:31:16,180
You can't tell by seeing
how long they live.

2077
01:31:16,180 --> 01:31:17,630
You can't tell by
how much they're

2078
01:31:17,630 --> 01:31:19,180
taking care of the kids.

2079
01:31:19,180 --> 01:31:22,180
You can't tell in terms of
their reproductive variability.

2080
01:31:22,180 --> 01:31:24,560
That's a whole different
world of selection.
2081
01:31:24,560 --> 01:31:27,950
All of the South American
tamarins and marmosets,

2082
01:31:27,950 --> 01:31:30,010
the females always twin.

2083
01:31:30,010 --> 01:31:31,710
They have a higher
rate of cuckoldry,

2084
01:31:31,710 --> 01:31:33,400
of abandoning the kids.

2085
01:31:33,400 --> 01:31:35,519
The males take as much
care, if not more,

2086
01:31:35,520 --> 01:31:37,100
of the kids than
the female does.

2087
01:31:37,100 --> 01:31:38,470
Very low levels of aggression.
2088
01:31:38,470 --> 01:31:40,320
Same body size, same lifespan.

2089
01:31:40,320 --> 01:31:43,019
All the males have low
degree of variability.

2090
01:31:43,020 --> 01:31:43,880
How come?

2091
01:31:43,880 --> 01:31:45,910
Because if you're
some marmoset male,

2092
01:31:45,910 --> 01:31:49,150
you don't want to get 47
marmoset females pregnant.

2093
01:31:49,150 --> 01:31:51,969
Because you are going to have
to take care of all the kids.

2094
01:31:51,970 --> 01:31:55,010
Because as we will see way
down the line in lectures
2095
01:31:55,010 --> 01:31:57,900
on parental behavior,
the wiring there is such

2096
01:31:57,900 --> 01:32:01,309
is bonding with the offspring
and taking care of them.

2097
01:32:01,310 --> 01:32:03,870
No wonder among
species like these,

2098
01:32:03,870 --> 01:32:05,809
you have very low variability.

2099
01:32:05,810 --> 01:32:08,100
All the males reproduce
once or twice.

2100
01:32:08,100 --> 01:32:10,780
This is the world of 5%
of the guys accounting

2101
01:32:10,780 --> 01:32:12,889
for 95% of the matings.
2102
01:32:12,890 --> 01:32:16,160
This is totally
remarkable because again,

2103
01:32:16,160 --> 01:32:17,320
that starting point.

2104
01:32:17,320 --> 01:32:19,320
You start off here,
and you look at these,

2105
01:32:19,320 --> 01:32:21,530
and oh, you can tell if
they were bipedal and were

2106
01:32:21,530 --> 01:32:24,650
they diseased or malnourished,
simply by applying

2107
01:32:24,650 --> 01:32:28,200
these principles of individual
selection, reciprocity,

2108
01:32:28,200 --> 01:32:29,050
all of that.
2109
01:32:29,050 --> 01:32:32,230
One factoid, you see
a new primate species,

2110
01:32:32,230 --> 01:32:34,759
and you see one nursing
and one with a penis,

2111
01:32:34,760 --> 01:32:37,820
and they're the same size or
there's difference in the size,

2112
01:32:37,820 --> 01:32:40,849
and you already know all
about their social system.

2113
01:32:40,850 --> 01:32:46,620
Very consistent across birds,
across fish, across primates.

2114
01:32:46,620 --> 01:32:48,730
Of course, all of
those, this dichotomy

2115
01:32:48,730 --> 01:32:52,209
between tournament species
and pair bonding species.

2116
01:32:52,210 --> 01:32:54,570
As we will see
way down the line,

2117
01:32:54,570 --> 01:32:57,540
among some species,
types of voles, rodents,

2118
01:32:57,540 --> 01:33:01,060
that are famous in Hallmark
cards for their pair bonding,

2119
01:33:01,060 --> 01:33:02,310
for their monogamy.

2120
01:33:02,310 --> 01:33:04,560
As we'll see, they're
not quite as monogamous

2121
01:33:04,560 --> 01:33:05,390
as you would think.

2122
01:33:05,390 --> 01:33:09,190
But nonetheless, a general
structure like this.

2123
01:33:09,190 --> 01:33:14,860
So, one asks expectedly, where
do humans fit in on this one?

2124
01:33:14,860 --> 01:33:16,530
Where do humans fit?

2125
01:33:16,530 --> 01:33:19,320
And the answer
is, complicatedly.

2126
01:33:19,320 --> 01:33:22,820
Are we a tournament species,
are we a pair bonding species.

2127
01:33:22,820 --> 01:33:24,240
What's up with that?

2128
01:33:24,240 --> 01:33:28,519
What we will see is
we're kind of in between.

2129
01:33:28,520 --> 01:33:31,310
When you look at the degree
of sexual dimorphism,

2130
01:33:31,310 --> 01:33:34,440
we are not like baboons, but
we're sure not like marmosets.

2131
01:33:34,440 --> 01:33:36,080
We're somewhere in the middle.

2132
01:33:36,080 --> 01:33:39,530
Variability is somewhere
in the middle there.

2133
01:33:39,530 --> 01:33:41,250
I'm not going near that one.

2134
01:33:41,250 --> 01:33:44,200
Life span, the
dimorphism in lifespan

2135
01:33:44,200 --> 01:33:46,880
tends to be in between.

2136
01:33:46,880 --> 01:33:49,290
Parental behavior and
likelihood-- all of those,
2137
01:33:49,290 --> 01:33:50,800
you look at a
number of measures.

2138
01:33:50,800 --> 01:33:53,370
And by next lecture,
we'll be looking

2139
01:33:53,370 --> 01:33:56,570
at some genetics of what
a monogamous species

2140
01:33:56,570 --> 01:33:58,559
and tournament
species look like.

2141
01:33:58,560 --> 01:34:00,780
And we're right in the middle.

2142
01:34:00,780 --> 01:34:04,980
In other words, that explains
like 90% of literature.

2143
01:34:04,980 --> 01:34:08,009
Because we're not a classic
tournament species and we're

2144
01:34:08,010 --> 01:34:09,760
not a classic pair bonding one.

2145
01:34:09,760 --> 01:34:12,790
We are terribly confused
in the middle there.

2146
01:34:12,790 --> 01:34:17,250
And everything about
anthropology supports that.

2147
01:34:17,250 --> 01:34:19,980
Most people on the
planet right now

2148
01:34:19,980 --> 01:34:23,219
are in a form of
monogamous relationships

2149
01:34:23,220 --> 01:34:28,000
in a culture that
demands monogamy.

2150
01:34:28,000 --> 01:34:30,700
An awful lot of people who are
in monogamous relationships

2151
01:34:30,700 --> 01:34:33,910
in such cultures aren't really
in monogamous relationships.

2152
01:34:33,910 --> 01:34:38,849
Traditionally, most cultures on
this planet allowed polygamy.

2153
01:34:38,850 --> 01:34:41,960
Nonetheless, in most of
those polygamous cultures,

2154
01:34:41,960 --> 01:34:45,760
the majority of individuals
were pair bonded and monogamous.

2155
01:34:45,760 --> 01:34:47,690
You get two different
versions of polygamy

2156
01:34:47,690 --> 01:34:49,650
in different social
systems of humans.
2157
01:34:49,650 --> 01:34:53,620
One is economic polygamy,
which is you're basically

2158
01:34:53,620 --> 01:34:57,200
sitting around, and the
wealthiest guy in the village

2159
01:34:57,200 --> 01:35:00,679
is the one who can have the
largest number of wives.

2160
01:35:00,680 --> 01:35:02,910
An enormous skew in
reproductive success

2161
01:35:02,910 --> 01:35:04,800
that's driven by economics.

2162
01:35:04,800 --> 01:35:06,970
The other type is demographic.

2163
01:35:06,970 --> 01:35:09,380
You have a culture
where, for example, you
2164
01:35:09,380 --> 01:35:11,050
have a warrior class.

2165
01:35:11,050 --> 01:35:14,570
Guys spend 10 years as
warriors-- worriers, warriors,

2166
01:35:14,570 --> 01:35:15,920
New York City accent.

2167
01:35:15,920 --> 01:35:17,870
As warriors, they don't worry.

2168
01:35:17,870 --> 01:35:18,730
There's no anxiety.

2169
01:35:18,730 --> 01:35:20,349
But they eventually worry
about getting a wife,

2170
01:35:20,350 --> 01:35:22,450
because by the time they're
done being a warrior,

2171
01:35:22,450 --> 01:35:24,059
they're like 25.

2172
01:35:24,060 --> 01:35:26,330
And they marry someone
who's 13, which

2173
01:35:26,330 --> 01:35:28,519
is what you see in a lot
of traditional cultures

2174
01:35:28,520 --> 01:35:29,970
that follow that pattern.

2175
01:35:29,970 --> 01:35:32,460
And at that point,
you've got a problem,

2176
01:35:32,460 --> 01:35:35,260
which is an awful lot of
those guys have been killed

2177
01:35:35,260 --> 01:35:38,220
over the course of 10
years of being involved

2178
01:35:38,220 --> 01:35:41,030
in high levels of aggression
and 10 more years of life

2179
01:35:41,030 --> 01:35:42,610
expectancy to catch up with you.

2180
01:35:42,610 --> 01:35:44,639
There's is a shortage of males.

2181
01:35:44,640 --> 01:35:48,000
So you see polygamy there
driven by demographics,

2182
01:35:48,000 --> 01:35:50,660
and you see polygamy
driven by economics

2183
01:35:50,660 --> 01:35:52,269
in other types of society.

2184
01:35:52,270 --> 01:35:56,070
So most cultures on this
planet allow-- traditionally,

2185
01:35:56,070 --> 01:35:57,690
before the
missionaries got them--

2186
01:35:57,690 --> 01:36:00,530
most cultures on this
planet allow polygamy.

2187
01:36:00,530 --> 01:36:03,519
Nonetheless, within most
polygamous cultures,

2188
01:36:03,520 --> 01:36:06,270
the majority of people
are not polygamous.

2189
01:36:06,270 --> 01:36:10,580
We have one really confused,
screwed up species here.

2190
01:36:10,580 --> 01:36:14,160
Because we are halfway in
between in all sorts of these

2191
01:36:14,160 --> 01:36:15,190
measures.

2192
01:36:15,190 --> 01:36:17,769
OK, so what do we
have next, which

2193
01:36:17,770 --> 01:36:19,240
we will pick up on Friday.

2194
01:36:19,240 --> 01:36:20,940
What we've just
started with here

2195
01:36:20,940 --> 01:36:23,809
is the first case of using
all these principles,

2196
01:36:23,810 --> 01:36:26,590
individual selection, kin
selection, reciprocal altruism,

2197
01:36:26,590 --> 01:36:29,390
to understand all sorts
of aspects of behavior.

2198
01:36:29,390 --> 01:36:31,770
We will then move
on to seeing how

2199
01:36:31,770 --> 01:36:35,040
they explain other aspects
of animal behavior, some ones

2200
01:36:35,040 --> 01:36:38,290
which, if you are behaving for
the good of the species circa

2201
01:36:38,290 --> 01:36:42,070
1960, there's no explanation
at all, because you're

2202
01:36:42,070 --> 01:36:45,519
doing things like killing
other members of your species.

2203
01:36:45,520 --> 01:36:47,620
And then finally,
we will see how

2204
01:36:47,620 --> 01:36:51,090
this applies to humans and
some of the witheringly

2205
01:36:51,090 --> 01:36:52,930
appropriate--
2206
01:36:52,930 --> 01:36:56,190
For more, please visit
us at stanford.edu.

2207
01:36:56,190 --> 01:36:57,014