The Chernobyl Disaster

On April 26th, 1986, a nuclear power plant in Chernobyl, Ukraine failed violently during a
scheduled test of the turbine system. The power of the reactor increased out of control from a
low-power state, rapidly boiling water and causing a steam explosion that blew the roof off
the the reactor. A graphite fire was ignited, spewing toxic radioactive substances into the
atmosphere. 31 people were killed during the accident, and it has been estimated that the
released radiation has caused an additional 4,000 cancer deaths.

Here, you can find out what caused the Chernobyl accident and why we are convinced that
nothing like this could happen again. Check the links to the right for our collection of
information on Chernobyl.

 Sort-of short story of Chernobyl

 Short story of Chernobyl

 Can Chernobyl happen again?

 More Info

The Sort-of Short Story

The Soviet government ordered the operators of Chernobyl to perform a test on their reactor.
The test was supposed to measure how long the spinning generator would continue producing
electricity after the reactor was shut down before it slowed and stopped. The test was to
happen with the reactor at low power. As the operators were about to start slowly and
carefully bringing the reactor to low power, the utility company called and said that a nearby
coal plant just shut down unexpectedly and asked Chernobyl to stay at full power for a while
longer to keep the nearby homes lit. After peak hours, the operators brought the plant to low
power rapidly. Nuclear engineers can explain to you that this kind of shut-down would result
in an unusually large amount of Xenon build-up in the reactor fuel. Xenon eats up neutrons,
thus making the chain reaction more difficult to maintain. Because of this, the operators were
surprised when the reactor went to a lower power than they had expected.

To get the power of the reactor to its expected value, the operators pulled the control rods out
further than they would ever do in any normal situation. Finally, the reactor went up to the
power level needed for the test. Unfortunately, the Chernobyl reactor was designed in a
dangerous manner, allowing the reactor to get hotter if bubbles formed in the water coolant
flowing past the fuel. As water boiled in certain locations of the reactor, this power instability
started rearing its head. Apparently, one of the operators noticed this highly unstable situation
and pressed the button to insert the control rods and shut down the reactor. But, an even more
serious design flaw was in the control rods. The neutron poison in most of each rod had a
small graphite tip on the bottom. This graphite not a neutron poison (and is usually beneficial
to chain reactions). So with the control rods all the way out, inserting them for the first few
inches displaced some water without introducing any neutron poinson, and this actually
increased the power of the reactor. This led to more boiling of the water, which resulted in
even more power and then positive feedback took the reactor power sky-high, immediately
boiling all the water to steam. The steam pressure was so great that it blew the lid right off the
reactor and through the roof of the reactor building (which was not one of those steel
containments, by the way. It was just a concrete building).

With no more coolant, the fuel heated up and became molten. Standing graphite rods in the
reactor ignited into a very hot graphite fire that began spewing bits of the radioactive fuel into
the open air. The fire took over a week to extinguish, costing the lives of about 30 emergency
responders due to acute radiation poisoning.

The really short version

Because Xenon built up due to a rapid shut-down mainly caused by nearby coal plant
problem, operators at Chernobyl retracted the control rods all the way out of the core only to
notice power instabilities due to the inherent positive coolant void coefficient of the RBMK
reactor and reinsert them. But the tips of the rods were graphite, which displaced water
without introducing neutron poison, thus increasing the power rather than decreasing it and
the positive void coefficient allowed the reactor to undergo a runaway power excursion,
resulting in a catastrophic steam explosion and graphite fire that killed 30 workers and
released radiation in levels that were soon detected in Finland.

Can this happen again?

Modern reactors have reinforced steel-concrete containments domes that would not be so
easily penetrated by a steam explosion. Control rods are designed such that all parts of them
are neutron poisons, including the bottom. Reactors are designed to have NEGATIVE void
coefficients, meaning boiling water would result in power decreasing automatically rather
than increasing. Also, graphite is not typically put in reactor cores. Short answer: no.

Chernobyl Timeline
Back to main Chernobyl section

Date Time Event

Normal operation: reactor was at full power. Steam power was directed to both
April
turbines of the power generators. The purpose of the test was to determine if one of
25, 1:06 am
the turbines could supply power to feedwater pumps until standby diesel generators
1986
came on line in the case of a local power failure.
In preparation for the test prior to routine shutdown, reactor power was powered
down to 1600 MWt for a test sequence. Now only one turbine was needed to take
1:00 pm
in the decreased amount of steam from the reduced power and one of the turbines
was switched off.
The test was designed to be conducted at 22%-32% full power. However the
demand in electricity was still high at the time, and authorities asked to keep the
reactor at at 50% power for additional 9 hours.
April 12:28 Permission was received to resume the reactor power reduction. One of the
 operators failed to reprogram computer to maintain the power at 30%, which
26, caused the power to fall down to 1% and reactor was filled with solid water (no
am
1986 boiling) - an extremely unstable situation because of the positive void coefficient.
This amount of power was too low to conduct the test.
To try to bring the power back to the desired level operator pulled number of
control rods out of the core (less than 26 control rods remaining in the core), but
the power only increased to 7%, still well below the test design value. The reason
the power could not be brought back up was the "xenon poisoning" effect. Xenon
12:32
is a decay product of I-135 and is a strong neutron absorber which "poisons" the
am
fission reaction. It reaches an equilibrium at normal operating power levels by
being "burned away" by neutron absorption and further decay. When the power
level was decreased from the 1600 MW level, there were lots of I-135 to decay into
xenon, but a small neutron flux with which to burn it away, so it built up rapidly.
In order to keep reactor from automatically shutting down under these conditions,
emergency core cooling system (ECCS) and several of the automatic scram circuits
1:15 am were disconnected. More control rods were pulled out to overcome "xenon
poisoning". 6 control rods were still remaining on the core. At this point reactor
could not be shut down rapidly if needed.
All eight cooling water pumps were running at the low power, compared to a
normal six even at full power, so there was nearly solid water with almost no void
1:20 am
fraction, which increased the vulnerability to any power excursion which produced
boiling.
The turbine was tripped to initiate the test, which caused the switching off of four
1:22 am of the eight recirculation pumps. This would have scrammed the reactor if the
automatic scram circuit had not been disconnected.
Reduced coolant flow caused voids to form rapidly in the pressure tubes,
1:23.35 increasing reactivity because of the positive void coefficient. The higher reactivity
am produced more steam. As the system fed itself, heat production soared, casing
uncontrollable steam generation.
1:23.40 Operator, recognizing an emergency, hit the button that was to lower all control
am rods into the core and shut down the reactor.
Ironically, this last attempt was the final straw. The reactor system had a design
problem that no one had foreseen. The control rods had six-inch graphite tips at
their lead ends. These tips enter the core before the boron carbide section. As they
enter the core, they displace water, which is essentially displacing absorber with
1:23.44
moderator. Being inserted all at once they caused power to increase for a few
am
seconds. Under normal operating conditions, this small temporary increase has
little effect. But Chernobyl Reactor Number Four was not operating under normal
conditions. As control rod tips entered the core, power surged to 100 times normal
in four seconds.
Under intense heat, the core began to break down. Fuel assemblies fragmented,
control rod channels warped, steam built up furiously and, finally, steam tubes
burst. Tons of steam and water shot into the reactor, causing a tremendous steam
1:24 am
explosion. Steam pressure blew the 1000-ton steel- and cement-filled biologic
shield off the top of the reactor, destroying the roof of the reactor building along
the way and exposing the hot core to the atmosphere.
1:28 am 14 firemen arrived on the scene of the accident.
The largest fires on the roof of the reactor hall were brought under control by a
2:00 am
group of 100 fire fighters called in from the Pripyat.
 Most of the fires were put out, but graphite fire had started. Graphite fire caused
5:00 am
the dispersion of radionuclides high into the atmosphere.

Table 1 Timeline of the Chernobyl accident compiled by Natallia Pinchuk.