Case No.

LORENZO T. TANGGA-AN,* Petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., UNIVERSE TANKSHIP DELAWARE LLC, and
CARLOS C. SALINAS, Respondents.

Facts:

- Tangga-an alleged that he entered into an overseas employment contract with Philippine
Transmarine Carriers, Inc. (PTC) for and in behalf of its foreign employer, Universe Tankship
Delaware, LLC. Under the employment contract, he was to be employed for a period of six
months as chief engineer of the vessel.

- He was to be paid a basic salary of US$5,000.00; vacation leave pay equivalent to 15 days a
month or US$2,500.00 per month and tonnage bonus in the amount of US$700.00 a month.

- Tangga-an was deployed. While performing his assigned task, he noticed that some officials of
the vessel are carrying out acts which under the maritime standard were prohibited. To avoid any
conflict, he chose to ignore the unbecoming conduct of the senior officers of the vessel.

- From Japan while sailing U.S.A., the master of the vessel required Tangga-an and the rest of the
Filipino Engineer Officers to report to his office where they were informed that they would be
repatriated on account of the delay in the cargo discharging in Japan, which was principally a
duty belonging to the deck officers. He imputed the delay to the non-readiness of the turbo
generator and the in operation of the boom.

Issue:

Whether or not the indemnity awarded by the CA in petitioner’s favor consisting only of 3 months’
basic salaries conform with the proper interpretation of Section 10 R. A. 8042 and or petitioner
entitled to at least 4 months salaries being the unexpired portion of his contract.

Case Flow:

Labor Arbiter:

- finding petitioner to have been illegally dismissed

- found petitioner entitled not to 4 months which is equivalent to the unexpired portion of his
contract, but only to three months, inclusive of vacation leave pay and tonnage bonus (pursuant
to Section 10 of RA 8042 or The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 2005).

National Labor Relations Commission:

- affirmed Labor Arbiter

Court of Appeals:

- herein respondents assailed NLRC’s decision

Partially Granted but Modified : Tangga-an is entitled to three (3) months salary representing the
unexpired portion of his contract; placement to reimburse with 12% interest per annum; and the
award of attorney’s fees is deleted.

Ruling:

- No. As held in Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. vs. NLRC, involving Section 10 of Republic Act
No. 8042, that an illegally dismissed overseas employee is not entitled to three (3) months salary
only. A plain reading of Sec. 10 clearly reveals that the choice of which amount to award an
illegally dismissed overseas contract worker, i.e., whether his salaries for the unexpired portion of
his employment contract or three (3) months salary for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less, comes into play only when the employment contract concerned has a term of
at least one (1) year or more. This is evident from the wording “for every year of the unexpired
term” which follows the wording “salaries x x x for three months.” To follow the thinking that
private respondent is entitled to three (3) months salary only simply because it is the lesser
amount is to completely disregard and overlook some words used in the statute while giving
effect to some.

- Petitioner must be awarded his salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his six-month
employment contract, or equivalent to four months. This includes all his corresponding monthly
vacation leave pay and tonnage bonuses which are expressly provided and guaranteed in his
employment contract as part of his monthly salary and benefit package. Thus, petitioner is
entitled to back salaries of US$32,800 (or US$5,000 + US$2,500 + US$700 = US$8,200 x 4
months). “Article 279 of the Labor Code mandates that an employee’s full backwages shall be
inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent.” As we have time and
again held, “it is the obligation of the employer to pay an illegally dismissed employee or worker
the whole amount of the salaries or wages, plus all other benefits and bonuses and general
increases, to which he would have been normally entitled had he not been dismissed and had not
stopped working.”
Case No. 7

CENTRO PROJECT MANPOWER SERVICES CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
AGUINALDO NALUIS and THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner Centro Project Manpower Services Corporation (Centro Project), a local recruitment agency,
engaged Naluis to work abroad as a plumber under Pacific Micronesia Corporation (Pacific Micronesia) in
Garapan, Saipan, in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (Northern Marianas). The work
was covered by the primary Employment Contract dated March 11, 1997, whereby his employment would
last for 12 months, and would commence upon his arrival in Northern Marianas.

Naluis left for Northern Mariana on September 13, 1997, the date of his actual deployment, and his
employment continued until his repatriation to the Philippines on June 3, 1998 allegedly due to the
expiration of the employment contract. Not having completed 12 months of work, he filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal against Centro Project.

The Labor Arbiter found that Centro Project had been justified in repatriating Naluis, and accordingly
dismissed the complaint. Naluis appealed to the NLRC, which found that Centro Project had no choice
but to terminate the employment contract because the AE issued by the Department of Labor and
Immigration of Northern Mariana Islands had limited his stay in Northern Marianas, and that his
employment had expired on May 13, 1998 as explicitly provided in the employment contract executed
between him and Centro Project and affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

Issue:

Whether or not the expiration date contained in the AE issued by the Department of Labor and
Immigration of Northern Mariana Islands validly cut short Naluis’ stay and thus justified the pre-
termination of his work.

Ruling:

No. There is no dispute that Naluis did not complete the 12-month period stipulated in the primary
Employment Contract. However, the NLRC concluded that Centro Project had been justified in
repatriating him because the AE had stipulated a limit of stay for him. The NLRC thereby relied on a loose
interpretation of the AE and the primary Employment Contract.

The Court submits that an authorization of entry is different from a limitation of stay in the country visited,
which is not indicated in any of the documents submitted by the respondent. The Court concurs with the
CA. The burden of proof to show that the employment contract had been validly terminated pertained to
the employer. To discharge its burden, the employer must rely on the strength of its own evidence.
However, Centro Project’s reliance on the AE limiting Naluis’ stay was unwarranted, and, worse, it did not
discharge its burden of proof as the employer to show that Naluis’ repatriation had been justified.

The AE thereby clearly indicated that the date of May 13, 1998 appearing thereon referred only to the
expiration of the document itself. Centro Project stretched its interpretation to bolster its contention that
May 13, 1998 was the limit of stay for Naluis in Northern Marianas. The interpretation is unacceptable, for
item number 3 of the AE even recognized any employment period if the AE was issued for the purpose of
employment. This meant that contrary to the position of Centro Project there was no clear and categorical
entry in the AE to the effect that the AE limited his stay in Northern Marianas.

It is fundamental that in the interpretation of contracts of employment, doubts are generally resolved in
favor of the worker. It is imperative to uphold this rule herein. Hence, any doubt or vagueness in the
provisions of the contract of employment should have been interpreted and resolved in favor of Naluis.
The petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Case No. 8

THE HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATION COMMISSION and EMMANUEL A. MENESES, Respondents.

Facts:
Complainant is a regular rank and file employee of HSBC in Makati City. It appears that on February 3,
1993, complainant called the bank to inform the latter that he had an upset stomach and would not be
able to report for work. His superior, however, requested him to report for work because the department
he was then in was undermanned but complainant insisted that it was impossible for him to report for
work, hence, he was allowed to go on sick leave on that day.
On February 4, 1993 the bank called up Dr. Logos to verify the truth of complainant’s statement but the
doctor denied that he examined or attended to complainant on February 3, 1993 and the last time
complainant consulted him was in December 1992. For this reason, the bank directed complainant to
explain his acts of dishonesty because allegedly he was not honest in telling the bank that he had an
upset stomach on February 3, 1993, and that he consulted Dr. Logos on that day.
Complainant, in his written statement, further admitted that his statement about his not staying at his
house for one week and his consulting a doctor was incorrect, but that the same was not given with
malicious intention or deceit or meant to commit fraud against the bank, its operations, customers and
employees.
However, on February 16, 1993, the bank came out with a memorandum terminating his services
effective March 16, 1993 pursuant to Article 13, Section VI of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
between the union of the rank and file employees of the bank and the company and the banks Code of
Conduct.
Petitioner insists that private respondent should be dismissed in accordance with rules contained in its
employees’ handbook stating that any form of dishonesty shall constitute serious offenses calling for
termination.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not private respondents act of making a false statement as to the real reason for his
absence on did not constitute such dishonesty as would warrant his termination from service.
(2) Whether or not NLRC arbitrarily imposed its value judgment and standard on petitioners disciplinary
rules, thereby unilaterally restricting the Banks power and prerogative to discipline its employees
according to reasonable rules and regulations
Held:
(1) YES. It is unarguable that private respondents false information concerning his whereabouts on
February 3, 1993 is not a fraud, nor a false entry in the books of the bank; neither is it a failure to turn
over clients funds, or theft or use of company assets, or anything analogous as to constitute a serious
offense meriting the extreme penalty of dismissal.
Under Art. 282 of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate an employment for any of the following
causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
None of the above apply in the instant case. To be lawful, the cause for termination must be a serious and
grave malfeasance to justify the deprivation of a means of livelihood.
(2) NO. It is the NLRC's right and duty to review employer’s exercise of their prerogative to dismiss so as
to prevent abuse and arbitrariness as granted under Arts. 217 and 218 of the Labor Code. The
employer’s prerogative and power to discipline and terminate an employees services may not be
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner as to erode or render meaningless the constitutional
guarantees of security of tenure and due process. Our labor laws, both substantive and procedural,
require strict compliance before an employee may be dismissed.
Petition DISMISSED.

Case No. 9

G & M PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,

vs.

ROMIL V. CUAMBOT, Respondent.

Facts:

On a two-year employment contract with the Al Waha Workshop, respondent Romil V. Cuambot was
deployed to Saudi Arabia as a car body builder with petitioner G & M Philippines, Inc., a duly licensed
placement and recruitment agency. Nevertheless, Cumabot returned to the Philippines just six months
later and so the contract was hanged unfinished. Upon returning, he immediately filed before the NLRC a
complaint for unpaid wages, withheld salaries, refund of plane ticket and repatriation bond, which was
later amended to include illegal dismissal, claim for the unexpired portion of his employment contract,
actual, exemplary and moral damages, and attorney’s fees.

Cuambot alleged that at the Al Waha Workshop, he was subjected to inhumane and unbearable working
conditions. Except for a meal allowance of 100 Riyals a month, he was not paid his monthly salary of
1,200 Riyals. And he was required to render six (6) hours of overtime work daily, except Friday, without
overtime pay; he was also seriously insulted by his employer every time he demanded for his salary, and
some of the letters sent to him by his family were withheld by his employer.

He thus filed a petition for payment of the unpaid salaries including interests, until the same will be fully
paid.

Petitioner G & M insisted that respondent was religiously paid his salaries as they fell due. After working
for almost seven months, respondent pleaded with his employer to be allowed to return home since there
were family problems he had to settle personally. Respondent even submitted a resignation letter. To
support such claim, petitioner submitted in evidence copies of seven payslips duly authenticated by the
Philippine Labor Attaché in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

Cuambot countered that his signatures in the purported payslips were forged. He also stated that he was
never given a copy of the contract of employment. To counter the allegation of forgery, petitioner claimed
that there was a great possibility that respondent had changed his signature while abroad so that he could
file a complaint for illegal dismissal upon his return. The argument that the stroke and handwriting on the
payslips was written by one and the same person is mere assumption, as respondent could have
requested someone, to prepare the resignation letter for him. Petitioner further pointed out that
respondent has different signatures, not only in the pleadings submitted before the Labor Arbiter, but also
in respondents’ personal documents.

The Labor Arbiter, then, ruled in favor of Cuambot, finding unreliable the G & M's evidence of Cuambot's
alleged signature in the payslips which was similar to the handwritings in the payslips and the
handwritings in the purported resignation letter of the Cuambot. In an appeal to the NLRC, the latter
remanded the case to its origin for referral to a government agency that can conduct calligraphy
examination on the questioned documents.

The case was then re-raffled to another Labor Arbiter, and this time, the complaint was dismissed for lack
of merit. The new Labor Arbiter said the respondent failed to substantiate his claim of poor working
conditions and long hours of employment. The fact that he executed a handwritten resignation letter was
enough evidence of the fact that he voluntarily resigned from work. Respondent also failed to submit any
evidence to refute the payslips duly signed and authenticated by the labor attaché in Saudi Arabia,
inasmuch as their probative value cannot be impugned by mere self-serving allegations. The Labor
Arbiter concluded that as between the oral allegations of workers that they were not paid monetary
benefits and the documentary evidence presented by employer, the latter should prevail.

Respondent appealed the decision to the NLRC, alleging that the Labor Arbiter failed to consider the
genuineness of the signature which appears in the purported resignation as well as those that appeared
in the seven payslips. He insisted that these documents should have been endorsed to the National
Bureau of Investigation Questioned Documents Division or the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory for calligraphy examination.
The NLRC dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. It held that the questioned documents could not be
endorsed to the agency concerned since mere photocopies had been submitted in evidence. It also
stressed that the parties had earlier agreed to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings
and the evidence on record; that if respondent had wanted to have the documents endorsed to the NBI or
the PNP, he should have insisted that the documents be examined by a handwriting expert of the
government. Thus, respondent was estopped from assailing the Labor Arbiter’s ruling.

On a petition for certiorari before the CA, the latter reversed the ruling of the NLRC. According to the
appellate court, among others, a visual examination of the questioned signatures would instantly reveal
significant differences in the handwriting.

Issue:

Whether or not the employee voluntarily resigned from employment or was illegally dismissed?

Ruling:

The Court finds in respondent’s favor. That the petitioner failed to submit the original copies of the
payslips and the resignation letter raises doubts as to the veracity of its claim that they were actually
signed by the respondent.

As correctly noted by the CA, the opinions of handwriting experts, although helpful in the examination of
forged documents because of the technical procedure involved in the analysis, are not binding upon the
courts. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts, because
the judge must conduct an independent examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a
reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. No less than Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting “with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered or proved to be genuine
to the satisfaction of the judge.”

Even a cursory perusal of the resignation letter and the handwritten pay slips will readily show that they
were written by only one person.

Indeed, the rule is that all doubts in the implementation and the interpretation of the Labor Code shall be
resolved in favor of labor, in order to give effect to the policy of the State to “afford protection to labor,
promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate
the relations between workers and employers,” and to “assure the rights of workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.”

The Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Case No. 10.

HUNTINGTON STEEL PRODUCTS, INC. & SERAFIN NG, petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, JAIME ORBASE, REGINO JARDIN, PAULINO
JAVIERTO, EDGAR JARDIN, RAMON N. BANA, ANTONIO MAGNO, RICO JARDIN, CELESTINO
JARDIN, JR., PEDRO JARDIN, JR., AGUSTIN GASTON, NAZARIO JAVIERTO, JR., and MARCIANO
GLINOGO, respondents.

Facts:

This case stemmed from the illegal dismissal complaint with claim for damages initiated by respondent
Jaime Orbase and eleven others against petitioners Huntington Steel Products, Inc. and its President,
Serafin Ng. Private respondents filed an amended complaint to include Everson Metal Works as a party,
being the original employer of private respondents before it changed its business name to Huntington
Steel Products, Inc. Thereafter, private respondents filed their position paper. Petitioner in their position
paper seeks the dismissal of the complaint file private respondents since the complaint they filed in the
NLRC Arbitration does not have a certification of Non-Forum Shopping. Under a Supreme Court circular,
all initiatory pleadings filed in courts and other quasi-judicial agencies must contain a Certificate of Non-
forum Shopping. In this case the complaint was filed in the NLRC, a quasi-judicial body hemust comply
with directives of the circular. Thus, the LA dismissed the complaint on the ground that there was no Cof
Non-forum Shopping. The NLRC reversed the decision of LA. It rationed that rules of procedure must be
liberally applied in labor cases pursuant 221 of the Labor Code, which provides that- decisions in labor
cases must be supported by substantial evidence, and disregarding technical rules of prwill not sacrifice
the fundamental requisites of due process. The Ca affirm decision of NLRC.

Issue: whether the case should be dismissed for failure to comply with Court Administrative Circular No.
04-94 on certification of non-forum shopping

Held:

No. As a rule, the certificate of non-forum shopping as provided by this Cour04-94 is mandatory and
should accompany pleadings filed before the NL Court Circular No. 04-94 is clear and needs no further
interpretation. However, in the case of Melo v. Court of Appeals, the court said that in cases where it
excused non-compliance with the requirements of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94,
there were special circumstances or reasons that made the strict application of said Circular clearly
unjustified. The rule is crystal clear and plainly unambiguous that the certification is a part of an initiatory
pleading, i.e., the complaint, and its omission may only be upon manifest equitable grounds proving
substantial compliance to the Rules.

In the present case, the respondents reasoned that they failed to comply to the Circular because the
complaint form supplied by the Labor Arbiter did not do the required undertaking. They simply filled up the
blanks therein. Hence we agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that respondents should not faulted
for not having the certification of non-forum shopping in their complaint