G.R. No.

174269 May 8, 2009 CASE DIGEST

POLO S. PANTALEON, Petitioner, Doctrine: “Entitlement to damages is not

vs. simply because the delay incurred, but
AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, because the delay, for which culpability lies
INC., Respondent. under Article 1170, led to the particular
injuries under Article 2217 of the Civil Code
DECISION for which moral damages are remunerative.
Moral damages avail in cases of breach of
TINGA, J.: contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith, and the court
The petitioner, lawyer Polo Pantaleon, his should find that under the circumstances,
wife Julialinda, daughter Anna Regina and such damages are due.”
son Adrian Roberto, joined an escorted tour
of Western Europe organized by Trafalgar Case Title: POLO S. PANTALEON vs.
Tours of Europe, Ltd., in October of 1991. AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL,
The tour group arrived in Amsterdam in the INC., G.R. No. 174269, May 8, 2009
afternoon of 25 October 1991, the second (TINGA, J.:)
to the last day of the tour. As the group had
arrived late in the city, they failed to engage Facts:
in any sight-seeing. Instead, it was agreed
upon that they would start early the next Petitioner Polo Pantaleon together with his
day to see the entire city before ending the family joined an escorted tour of Western
tour. Europe. On the last day of the tour, the
group arrived at the Coster Diamond House
The following day, the last day of the tour, in Amsterdam around 10 minutes before
the group arrived at the Coster Diamond 9:00 a.m. The group had agreed that the visit
House in Amsterdam around 10 minutes to Coster should end by 9:30 a.m. to allow
before 9:00 a.m. The group had agreed that enough time to take in a guided city tour of
the visit to Coster should end by 9:30 a.m. Amsterdam. To pay for the diamond
to allow enough time to take in a guided purchases amounting to U.S. $13,826.00,
city tour of Amsterdam. The group was Pantaleon presented his American Express
ushered into Coster shortly before 9:00 credit card. The store clerk informed
a.m., and listened to a lecture on the art of Pantaleon that his AmexCard had not yet
diamond polishing that lasted for around been approved. As it was already 9:40 a.m.,
ten minutes. Afterwards, the group was led and he was already worried about further
1

to the store’s showroom to allow them to
select items for purchase. Mrs. Pantaleon
had already planned to purchase even
before the tour began a 2.5 karat diamond
brilliant cut, and she found a diamond
close enough in approximation that she
decided to buy.2 Mrs. Pantaleon also
selected for purchase a pendant and a
chain,3 all of which totaled U.S.
$13,826.00.
To pay for these purchases, Pantaleon
presented his American Express credit card to the bus. It is alleged that their offers of
together with his passport to the Coster
sales clerk. This occurred at around 9:15
inconveniencing the tour group, Pantaleon
asked the store clerk to cancel the sale. The
store manager though asked plaintiff to wait
a few more minutes.
At around 10:00 a.m, or around 45 minutes
after Pantaleon had presented his
AmexCard, and 30 minutes after the tour
group was supposed to have left the store,
Coster decided to release the items even
without respondent’s approval of the
purchase. The spouses Pantaleon returned
apology were met by their tourmates with
stony silence. The tour group’s visible
a.m., or 15 minutes before the tour group irritation was aggravated when the tour
was slated to depart from the store. The guide announced that the city tour of
sales clerk took the card’s imprint, and Amsterdam was to be canceled due to lack
asked Pantaleon to sign the charge slip. of remaining time. Mrs. Pantaleon ended up
The charge purchase was then referred weeping, while her husband had to take a
electronically to respondent’s Amsterdam tranquilizer to calm his nerves.
office at 9:20 a.m.
After coming back to Manila, Pantaleon sent
Ten minutes later, the store clerk informed a letter through counsel to the respondent,
Pantaleon that his AmexCard had not yet demanding an apology for the
been approved. His son, who had already "inconvenience, humiliation and
boarded the tour bus, soon returned to embarrassment he and his family thereby
Coster and informed the other members of suffered" for respondent’s refusal to provide
the Pantaleon family that the entire tour credit authorization for the aforementioned
group was waiting for them. As it was purchases. Respondent, in its response,
already 9:40 a.m., and he was already stated among others that the delay in
worried about further inconveniencing the authorizing the purchase from Coster was
tour group, Pantaleon asked the store clerk attributable to the circumstance that the
to cancel the sale. The store manager charged purchase of US $13,826.00 "was
though asked plaintiff to wait a few more out of the usual charge purchase pattern
minutes. After 15 minutes, the store established." Since respondent refused to
manager informed Pantaleon that accede to Pantaleon’s demand for an
respondent had demanded bank references. apology, the aggrieved cardholder instituted
Pantaleon supplied the names of his an action for damages. Pantaleon prayed
depositary banks, then instructed his that he be awarded ₱2,000,000.00, as moral
daughter to return to the bus and apologize damages; ₱500,000.00, as exemplary
to the tour group for the delay. damages; ₱100,000.00, as attorney’s fees;
and ₱50,000.00 as litigation expenses.
At around 10:00 a.m, or around 45
minutes after Pantaleon had presented his The Makati City RTC awarded him
AmexCard, and 30 minutes after the tour ₱500,000.00 as moral damages,
group was supposed to have left the store, ₱300,000.00 as exemplary damages,
Coster decided to release the items even ₱100,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and
without respondent’s approval of the ₱85,233.01 as expenses of litigation.
purchase. The spouses Pantaleon returned
to the bus. It is alleged that their offers of The RTC had concluded, based on the
apology were met by their tourmates with testimonial representations of Pantaleon and
stony silence. The tour group’s visible
4 respondent’s credit authorizer, Edgardo
irritation was aggravated when the tour Jaurigue, that the normal approval time for
guide announced that the city tour of purchases was "a matter of seconds." Based on
that standard, respondent had been in clear
Amsterdam was to be canceled due to lack
delay with respect to the three subject
of remaining time, as they had to catch a transactions.
3:00 p.m. ferry at Calais, Belgium to
London.5 Mrs. Pantaleon ended up weeping, On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a
while her husband had to take a decision reversing the award of damages in
tranquilizer to calm his nerves. favor of Pantaleon, holding that respondent
had not breached its obligations to
It later emerged that Pantaleon’s purchase petitioner.
was first transmitted for approval to
respondent’s Amsterdam office at 9:20
a.m., Amsterdam time, then referred to
respondent’s Manila office at 9:33 a.m, then
finally approved at 10:19 a.m., Amsterdam
time.6 The Approval Code was transmitted
to respondent’s Amsterdam office at 10:38
a.m., several minutes after petitioner had
already left Coster, and 78 minutes from
the time the purchases were electronically
transmitted by the jewelry store to
respondent’s Amsterdam office.
After the star-crossed tour had ended, the
Pantaleon family proceeded to the United
States before returning to Manila on 12
November 1992. While in the United States,
Pantaleon continued to use his AmEx card,
several times without hassle or delay, but
with two other incidents similar to the
Amsterdam brouhaha. On 30 October
1991, Pantaleon purchased golf equipment
amounting to US $1,475.00 using his
AmEx card, but he cancelled his credit card
purchase and borrowed money instead
from a friend, after more than 30 minutes
had transpired without the purchase
having been approved. On 3 November
1991, Pantaleon used the card to purchase
children’s shoes worth $87.00 at a store in
Boston, and it took 20 minutes before this
transaction was approved by respondent.
On 4 March 1992, after coming back to
Manila, Pantaleon sent a letter7 through
counsel to the respondent, demanding an
apology for the "inconvenience, humiliation
and embarrassment he and his family
thereby suffered" for respondent’s refusal to
provide credit authorization for the
aforementioned purchases.8 In response,
respondent sent a letter dated 24 March
1992,9 stating among others that the delay
in authorizing the purchase from Coster
was attributable to the circumstance that
the charged purchase of US $13,826.00
"was out of the usual charge purchase
pattern established."10 Since respondent
refused to accede to Pantaleon’s demand for
an apology, the aggrieved cardholder
instituted an action for damages with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 145.11 Pantaleon prayed that he be
awarded ₱2,000,000.00, as moral damages;
The Court of Appeals conceded that there
had been delay on the part of respondent in
approving the purchases. However, it made
two critical conclusions in favor of
respondent. First, the appellate court ruled
that the delay was not attended by bad
faith, malice, or gross negligence. Second, it
ruled that respondent "had exercised
diligent efforts to effect the approval" of the
purchases, which were "not in accordance
with the charge pattern" petitioner had
established for himself, as exemplified by
the fact that at Coster, he was "making his
very first single charge purchase of
US$13,826," and "the record of [petitioner]’s
past spending with [respondent] at the time
does not favorably support his ability to pay
for such purchase."17
On the premise that there was an obligation
on the part of respondent "to approve or
disapprove with dispatch the charge
purchase," petitioner argues that the failure
to timely approve or disapprove the
purchase constituted mora solvendi on the
part of respondent in the performance of its
obligation. For its part, respondent
characterizes the depiction by petitioner of
its obligation to him as "to approve
purchases instantaneously or in a matter of
seconds."
Before the Supreme Court, petitioner
asserts that the Court of Appeals had
wrongly applied the principle of mora
accipiendi, which relates to delay on the
part of the obligee in accepting the
performance of the obligation by the
obligor. The requisites of mora accipiendi
are: an offer of performance by the debtor
who has the required capacity; the offer
must be to comply with the prestation as it
should be performed; and the creditor
refuses the performance without just
cause.19 The error of the appellate court,
argues petitioner, is in relying on the
invocation by respondent of "just cause" for
the delay, since while just cause is
₱500,000.00, as exemplary damages; determinative of mora accipiendi, it is not
₱100,000.00, as attorney’s fees; and so with the case of mora solvendi.
₱50,000.00 as litigation expenses.12
Issue:
On 5 August 1996, the Makati City RTC
rendered a decision13 in favor of Pantaleon, 1. Whether or not American Express
awarding him ₱500,000.00 as moral International Inc. had committed a
damages, ₱300,000.00 as exemplary breach of its obligations to Pantaleon.
damages, ₱100,000.00 as attorney’s fees,
and ₱85,233.01 as expenses of litigation. 2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals had
Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal, while wrongly applied the principle of mora
Pantaleon moved for partial accipiendi, which relates to delay on the
reconsideration, praying that the trial court part of the obligee in accepting the
award the increased amount of moral and performance of the obligation by the
exemplary damages he had prayed obligor.
for.14 The RTC denied Pantaleon’s motion
for partial reconsideration, and thereafter Ruling:
gave due course to respondent’s Notice of
Appeal.15 1. Yes, the Court is convinced that
defendants delay constituted breach of its
On 18 August 2006, the Court of Appeals contractual obligation to act on his use of
rendered a decision16 reversing the award of the card abroad "with special handling." The
damages in favor of Pantaleon, holding that culpable failure of respondent herein is not
respondent had not breached its obligations the failure to timely approve petitioner’s
to petitioner. Hence, this petition. purchase, but the more elemental failure to
timely act on the same, whether favorably or
The key question is whether respondent, in unfavorably.
connection with the aforementioned
transactions, had committed a breach of its Moral damages avail in cases of breach of
obligations to Pantaleon. In addition, contract where the defendant acted
Pantaleon submits that even assuming that fraudulently or in bad faith, and the court
respondent had not been in breach of its should find that under the circumstances,
obligations, it still remained liable for such damages are due. The delay committed
damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code. by defendant was clearly attended by
unjustified neglect and bad faith, since it
The RTC had concluded, based on the alleges to have consumed more than one
testimonial representations of Pantaleon hour to simply go over plaintiff’s past credit
and respondent’s credit authorizer, history with defendant, his payment record
Edgardo Jaurigue, that the normal and his credit and bank references, when all
approval time for purchases was "a matter such data are already stored and readily
of seconds." Based on that standard, available from its computer. This Court also
respondent had been in clear delay with takes note of the fact that there is nothing in
respect to the three subject transactions. plaintiff’s billing history that would warrant
As it appears, the Court of Appeals the imprudent suspension of action by
conceded that there had been delay on the defendant in processing the purchase.
part of respondent in approving the
purchases. However, it made two critical It should be emphasized that the reason why
conclusions in favor of respondent. First, petitioner is entitled to damages is not
the appellate court ruled that the delay was simply because respondent incurred delay,
not attended by bad faith, malice, or gross but because the delay, for which culpability
negligence. Second, it ruled that lies under Article 1170, led to the particular
respondent "had exercised diligent efforts to injuries under Article 2217 of the Civil Code
effect the approval" of the purchases, which for which moral damages are remunerative.
were "not in accordance with the charge Moral damages do not avail to soothe the
pattern" petitioner had established for plaints of the simply impatient, so this
himself, as exemplified by the fact that at decision should not be cause for relief for
Coster, he was "making his very first single those who time the length of their credit card
charge purchase of US$13,826," and "the transactions with a stopwatch. The
record of [petitioner]’s past spending with somewhat unusual attending circumstances
[respondent] at the time does not favorably to the purchase at Coster – that there was a
support his ability to pay for such deadline for the completion of that purchase
purchase."17 by petitioner before any delay would
redound to the injury of his several traveling
On the premise that there was an obligation companions – gave rise to the moral shock,
on the part of respondent "to approve or mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded
disapprove with dispatch the charge feelings and social humiliation sustained by
purchase," petitioner argues that the failure the petitioner, as concluded by the RTC.
to timely approve or disapprove the Those circumstances are fairly unusual, and
purchase constituted mora solvendi on the should not give rise to a general entitlement
part of respondent in the performance of its for damages under a more mundane set of
obligation. For its part, respondent facts.
characterizes the depiction by petitioner of
its obligation to him as "to approve 2. None. Generally, the relationship
purchases instantaneously or in a matter of between a credit card provider and its
seconds." card holders is that of creditor-debtor,
with the card company as the creditor
Petitioner correctly cites that under mora extending loans and credit to the card
solvendi, the three requisites for a finding of holder, who as debtor is obliged to repay the
default are that the obligation is creditor. This relationship already takes
demandable and liquidated; the debtor exception to the general rule that as between
delays performance; and the creditor a bank and its depositors, the bank is
judicially or extrajudicially requires the deemed as the debtor while the depositor is
debtor’s performance. Petitioner asserts
18 considered as the creditor.21 Petitioner is
that the Court of Appeals had wrongly asking us, not baselessly, to again shift
applied the principle of mora accipiendi, perspectives and again see the credit card
which relates to delay on the part of the company as the debtor/obligor, insofar as it
obligee in accepting the performance of the has the obligation to the customer as
obligation by the obligor. The requisites of creditor/obligee to act promptly on its
mora accipiendi are: an offer of purchases on credit.
performance by the debtor who has the
required capacity; the offer must be to Ultimately, petitioner’s perspective appears
comply with the prestation as it should be more sensible than if we were to still regard
performed; and the creditor refuses the respondent as the creditor in the context of
performance without just cause.19 The error this cause of action. If there was delay on the
of the appellate court, argues petitioner, is part of respondent in its normal role as
in relying on the invocation by respondent creditor to the cardholder, such delay would
of "just cause" for the delay, since while not have been in the acceptance of the
just cause is determinative of mora performance of the debtor’s obligation (i.e.,
accipiendi, it is not so with the case of mora the repayment of the debt), but it would be
solvendi. delay in the extension of the credit in the
first place.
We can see the possible source of confusion
as to which type of mora to appreciate.
Generally, the relationship between a credit
card provider and its card holders is that of
creditor-debtor,20 with the card company as
the creditor extending loans and credit to
the card holder, who as debtor is obliged to
repay the creditor. This relationship already
takes exception to the general rule that as
between a bank and its depositors, the
bank is deemed as the debtor while the
depositor is considered as the
creditor.21 Petitioner is asking us, not
baselessly, to again shift perspectives and
again see the credit card company as the
debtor/obligor, insofar as it has the
obligation to the customer as
creditor/obligee to act promptly on its
purchases on credit.
Ultimately, petitioner’s perspective appears
more sensible than if we were to still regard
respondent as the creditor in the context of
this cause of action. If there was delay on
the part of respondent in its normal role as
creditor to the cardholder, such delay
would not have been in the acceptance of
the performance of the debtor’s obligation
(i.e., the repayment of the debt), but it
would be delay in the extension of the
credit in the first place. Such delay would
not fall under mora accipiendi, which
contemplates that the obligation of the
debtor, such as the actual purchases on
credit, has already been constituted.
Herein, the establishment of the debt itself
(purchases on credit of the jewelry) had not
yet been perfected, as it remained pending
the approval or consent of the respondent
credit card company.
Still, in order for us to appreciate that
respondent was in mora solvendi, we will
have to first recognize that there was
indeed an obligation on the part of
respondent to act on petitioner’s purchases
with "timely dispatch," or for the purposes
of this case, within a period significantly
less than the one hour it apparently took
Such delay would not fall under mora
accipiendi, which contemplates that the
obligation of the debtor, such as the actual
purchases on credit, has already been
constituted. Herein, the establishment of the
debt itself (purchases on credit of the
jewelry) had not yet been perfected, as it
remained pending the approval or consent of
the respondent credit card company.
Still, in order for us to appreciate that
respondent was in mora solvendi, we will
have to first recognize that there was indeed
an obligation on the part of respondent to act
on petitioner’s purchases with "timely
dispatch," or for the purposes of this case,
within a period significantly less than the
one hour it apparently took before the
purchase at Coster was finally approved.
The findings of the trial court, to our mind,
amply established that the tardiness on the
part of respondent in acting on petitioner’s
purchase at Coster did constitute culpable
delay on its part in complying with its
obligation to act promptly on its customer’s
purchase request, whether such action be
favorable or unfavorable.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati is
REINSTATED.
before the purchase at Coster was finally
approved.

The findings of the trial court, to our mind,

amply established that the tardiness on the
part of respondent in acting on petitioner’s
purchase at Coster did constitute culpable
delay on its part in complying with its
obligation to act promptly on its customer’s
purchase request, whether such action be
favorable or unfavorable. We quote the trial
court, thus:

As to the first issue, both parties have

testified that normal approval time for
purchases was a matter of seconds.

Plaintiff testified that his personal

experience with the use of the card was
that except for the three charge purchases
subject of this case, approvals of his charge
purchases were always obtained in a matter
of seconds.

Defendant’s credit authorizer Edgardo

Jaurique likewise testified:

Q. – You also testified that on normal

occasions, the normal approval time
for charges would be 3 to 4 seconds?

A. – Yes, Ma’am.

Both parties likewise presented evidence

that the processing and approval of
plaintiff’s charge purchase at the Coster
Diamond House was way beyond the
normal approval time of a "matter of
seconds".

Plaintiff testified that he presented his

AmexCard to the sales clerk at Coster, at
9:15 a.m. and by the time he had to leave
the store at 10:05 a.m., no approval had yet
been received. In fact, the Credit
Authorization System (CAS) record of
defendant at Phoenix Amex shows that
defendant’s Amsterdam office received the
request to approve plaintiff’s charge
purchase at 9:20 a.m., Amsterdam time or
01:20, Phoenix time, and that the
defendant relayed its approval to Coster at
10:38 a.m., Amsterdam time, or 2:38,
Phoenix time, or a total time lapse of one
hour and [18] minutes. And even then, the
approval was conditional as it directed in
computerese [sic] "Positive Identification of
Card holder necessary further charges
require bank information due to high
exposure. By Jack Manila."

The delay in the processing is apparent to

be undue as shown from the frantic
successive queries of Amexco Amsterdam
which reads: "US$13,826. Cardmember
buying jewels. ID seen. Advise how long will
this take?" They were sent at 01:33, 01:37,
01:40, 01:45, 01:52 and 02:08, all times
Phoenix. Manila Amexco could be unaware
of the need for speed in resolving the charge
purchase referred to it, yet it sat on its
hand, unconcerned.

xxx

To repeat, the Credit Authorization System

(CAS) record on the Amsterdam transaction
shows how Amexco Netherlands viewed the
delay as unusually frustrating. In sequence
expressed in Phoenix time from 01:20 when
the charge purchased was referred for
authorization, defendants own record
shows:

01:22 – the authorization is referred

to Manila Amexco

01:32 – Netherlands gives

information that the identification of
the cardmember has been presented
and he is buying jewelries worth US
$13,826.

01:33 – Netherlands asks "How long

will this take?"

02:08 – Netherlands is still asking

"How long will this take?"

The Court is convinced that defendants

delay constitute[s] breach of its contractual
obligation to act on his use of the card
abroad "with special handling."22 (Citations
omitted)

xxx

Notwithstanding the popular notion that

credit card purchases are approved "within
seconds," there really is no strict, legally
determinative point of demarcation on how
long must it take for a credit card company
to approve or disapprove a customer’s
purchase, much less one specifically
contracted upon by the parties. Yet this is
one of those instances when "you’d know it
when you’d see it," and one hour appears to
be an awfully long, patently unreasonable
length of time to approve or disapprove a
credit card purchase. It is long enough time
for the customer to walk to a bank a
kilometer away, withdraw money over the
counter, and return to the store.

Notably, petitioner frames the obligation of

respondent as "to approve or disapprove"
the purchase "in timely dispatch," and not
"to approve the purchase instantaneously
or within seconds." Certainly, had
respondent disapproved petitioner’s
purchase "within seconds" or within a
timely manner, this particular action would
have never seen the light of day. Petitioner
and his family would have returned to the
bus without delay – internally humiliated
perhaps over the rejection of his card – yet
spared the shame of being held accountable
by newly-made friends for making them
miss the chance to tour the city of
Amsterdam.

We do not wish do dispute that respondent

has the right, if not the obligation, to verify
whether the credit it is extending upon on a
particular purchase was indeed contracted
by the cardholder, and that the cardholder
is within his means to make such
transaction. The culpable failure of
respondent herein is not the failure to
timely approve petitioner’s purchase, but
the more elemental failure to timely act on
the same, whether favorably or unfavorably.
Even assuming that respondent’s credit
authorizers did not have sufficient basis on
hand to make a judgment, we see no
reason why respondent could not have
promptly informed petitioner the reason for
the delay, and duly advised him that
resolving the same could take some time. In
that way, petitioner would have had
informed basis on whether or not to pursue
the transaction at Coster, given the
attending circumstances. Instead,
petitioner was left uncomfortably dangling
in the chilly autumn winds in a foreign land
and soon forced to confront the wrath of
foreign folk.

Moral damages avail in cases of breach of

contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith, and the court
should find that under the circumstances,
such damages are due. The findings of the
trial court are ample in establishing the bad
faith and unjustified neglect of respondent,
attributable in particular to the "dilly-
dallying" of respondent’s Manila credit
authorizer, Edgardo Jaurique.23 Wrote the
trial court:

While it is true that the Cardmembership

Agreement, which defendant prepared, is
silent as to the amount of time it should
take defendant to grant authorization for a
charge purchase, defendant acknowledged
that the normal time for approval should
only be three to four seconds. Specially so
with cards used abroad which requires
"special handling", meaning with priority.
Otherwise, the object of credit or charge
cards would be lost; it would be so
inconvenient to use that buyers and
consumers would be better off carrying
bundles of currency or traveller’s checks,
which can be delivered and accepted
quickly. Such right was not accorded to
plaintiff in the instances complained off for
reasons known only to defendant at that
time. This, to the Court’s mind, amounts to
a wanton and deliberate refusal to comply
with its contractual obligations, or at least
abuse of its rights, under the contract.24
 xxx

The delay committed by defendant was

clearly attended by unjustified neglect and
bad faith, since it alleges to have consumed
more than one hour to simply go over
plaintiff’s past credit history with
defendant, his payment record and his
credit and bank references, when all such
data are already stored and readily
available from its computer. This Court also
takes note of the fact that there is nothing
in plaintiff’s billing history that would
warrant the imprudent suspension of
action by defendant in processing the
purchase. Defendant’s witness Jaurique
admits:

Q. – But did you discover that he did

not have any outstanding account?

A. – Nothing in arrears at that time.

Q. – You were well aware of this fact

on this very date?

A. – Yes, sir.

Mr. Jaurique further testified that there

were no "delinquencies" in plaintiff’s
account.25

It should be emphasized that the reason

why petitioner is entitled to damages is not
simply because respondent incurred delay,
but because the delay, for which culpability
lies under Article 1170, led to the particular
injuries under Article 2217 of the Civil Code
for which moral damages are
remunerative.26 Moral damages do not avail
to soothe the plaints of the simply
impatient, so this decision should not be
cause for relief for those who time the
length of their credit card transactions with
a stopwatch. The somewhat unusual
attending circumstances to the purchase at
Coster – that there was a deadline for the
completion of that purchase by petitioner
before any delay would redound to the
injury of his several traveling companions –
gave rise to the moral shock, mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings
and social humiliation sustained by the
petitioner, as concluded by the
RTC.27 Those circumstances are fairly
unusual, and should not give rise to a
general entitlement for damages under a
more mundane set of facts.

We sustain the amount of moral damages

awarded to petitioner by the RTC. There is
no hard-and-fast rule in determining what
would be a fair and reasonable amount of
moral damages, since each case must be
governed by its own peculiar facts, however,
it must be commensurate to the loss or
injury suffered.28 Petitioner’s original prayer
for ₱5,000,000.00 for moral damages is
excessive under the circumstances, and the
amount awarded by the trial court of
₱500,000.00 in moral damages more
seemly.1avvphi1

Likewise, we deem exemplary damages

available under the circumstances, and the
amount of ₱300,000.00 appropriate. There
is similarly no cause though to disturb the
determined award of ₱100,000.00 as
attorney’s fees, and ₱85,233.01 as expenses
of litigation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 145 in Civil Case No. 92-
1665 is hereby REINSTATED. Costs against
respondent.

SO ORDERED.