Baudrillard and Deleuze On Simulacra and

Baudrillard and
Deleuze on simulacra
and the soul:
searching for
singularity in order to
prevent the loss of the
soul through cloning
and commoditisation

Andrew McDonald

Dissertation Submitted for the

degree of M.Litt Continental
Philosophy
[31 July 2009]

i
Student No. 040015312
Abstract
This dissertation will focus upon on the relation of simulacra and the soul in
the philosophies of Jean Baudrillard and Gilles Deleuze. It will be argued that
the simulacrum plays an important role as it undermines the role of the One
and enables an emphasis on multiplicity and plurality in its place. Firstly,
Baudrillard’s interpretation of simulacra will be analysed in ‘The three orders
of simulacra’ in Symbolic, Exchange and Death and ‘the Hyperreal and the
Imaginary’ in Simulacra and Simulation. Secondly, his conception of simulacra
and its relation to the soul is examined in ‘Clone Story’ in Simulacra and
Simulation, ‘The Final Solution: Cloning Beyond the Human and Inhuman’ in
The Vital Illusion, and ‘The Hell of the Same’ in The Transparency of Evil.
Thirdly, Deleuze’s interpretation of simulacra will be analysed focusing on
Difference and Repetition. Fourthly, its relation to the soul will be examined
through his readings of Plato in ‘Plato and the simulacrum’ in The Logic of
Sense and the sections on Plato in Difference and Repetition. In conclusion
there will be a comparison of their views to ascertain how similar and different
their conceptions of the simulacrum are and in relation to the soul. The
argument analyses works by Baudrillard and Deleuze in order to suggest
further openness and the need for singularities to ensure that any one
definition of the soul is not burdened with a particular universality.
ii
Table of Contents
Abstract .................................................................................................................. ii
List of Figures ..................................................................................................... iv
Introduction ........................................................................................................... 1
1. Baudrillard and simulacra ......................................................................... 5

The history of the simulacrum ........................................................................... 5
The hyperreal ...................................................................................................... 8
The hyperreality of Disneyland / America ..................................................... 12
2. Simulacra and Cloning ............................................................................. 15

Immortality.......................................................................................................... 18
The loss of the soul .......................................................................................... 21
3. Deleuze and simulacra ............................................................................ 26

The Reversal of Platonism .............................................................................. 26
Difference always precedes the same .......................................................... 29
The Actual and the Virtual ............................................................................... 31
Overcoming the Hegelian dialectic ................................................................ 33
Simulacra and Simulation with Guattari ........................................................ 35
4. Deleuze and the soul ................................................................................ 41

The reversal of a Platonic conception of the soul ........................................ 41
The soul as simulacrum ................................................................................... 45
The actual body and the virtual soul .............................................................. 47
The Deleuzian ethics of the soul .................................................................... 49
Overcoming the simulation of the soul .......................................................... 54
Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 60
Baudrillard and Deleuze: Similarities and Differences on Simulacra and
the Soul. ............................................................................................................. 60
Bibliography ....................................................................................................... 69
iii
List of Figures
Figure 1: The creation of concepts for Deleuze and Guattari .........................58
iv
Introduction
The concept of simulacra, a copy of a copy without an original in the
philosophies of Baudrillard and Deleuze, following a Nietzschean influence,
allows for a new conception of the soul to take place after the loss of the
transcendental influence. The concept of simulacra is central to their
philosophies, for Baudrillard it creates a hyperreal and simulation of reality.
For Deleuze, through repetition, it allows for the virtual (becoming) to
constantly interact with the actual (Being) and in his work with Guattari, the
simulacrum also creates a simulation of reality. Therefore central to their
philosophies are the ways in which difference in itself (becoming) is used by
commoditisation in order to create an illusion of the same; the way in which
this same can be combated with a singularity allows for difference in itself to
return. A full analysis of this will be discussed further in the proceeding
chapters.
There has been recently renewed interest in the topic of the simulacrum that
can be seen within current literature. (Although the concept itself is not
modern as Ecclesiastes states “the simulacrum is never what hides the truth -
it is truth that hides the fact there is none. The simulacrum is true”1) For
instance, one aspect of Joanne Benford’s book, Sing the City of Electric: An
Exploration of Postmodern theories of Architecture and Identity studies
Baudrillard’s use of the simulacra through a discussion of the body and
psyche which are created through popular culture. M.W. Smith’s Reading
1
Ecclesiastes in Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. by Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan, 1994) p.1
1
Simulacra: Fatal Theories for Postmodernity analyses in depth the
postmodern experience which he describes as a “simulated experience.”2 Out
with academia, in fiction, the simulacra has also been discussed such as
Philip K. Dick’s The Simulacra, which rotates around the illusions of belief and
the questions of reality. Also in contemporary rock music the concept of
simulacra has been used as can be seen in the song Wax simulacra by The
Mars Volta3, in which the lyrics are obscure and leaves them open to
interpretation.
In contrast to simulacra, the soul has always had a strong philosophical
interest, from Ancient Greek philosophies of Aristotle, Anaxagoras,
Democritus, Lucretius and Plato to contemporary philosophies of Baudrillard,
Derrida and Deleuze. Despite Anthony Quinton’s remark in 1962 that
“philosophers in recent times have had very little to say about the soul.”4 The
soul has remained a debated topic within contemporary philosophy. In the
September 11th 2001 attack on the Twin Towers in New York, where Muslim
fundamentalists were argued to be dying for their promise of seventy two
virgins. As Nicholas Kristof argues “Christoph Luxenberg [a scholar’s
pseudonym suggests that] the ‘houri’ promised to martyrs when they reach
Heaven doesn’t mean ‘virgin’ after all. He suggests that instead it could mean
‘grapes’ … but suicide bombers presumably would be in for disappointment if
they reached the pearly gates and were presented 72 grapes.”5 The promise
of providence and a future state to martyrs demonstrates issues concerning
2
M.W. Smith, Reading Simulacra: Fatal Theories for Postmodernity (Albany: Suny Press, 2001) p.vii
3
Omar Rodriguez-Lopez, Wax Simulacra, The Mars Volta (Universal Records, 2007), B001131K04
4
Anthony Quinton, ‘The Soul’, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 59, No. 15 (Jul. 19 1962) p.393
5
Nicholas D. Kristof, ‘Islam, Virgins and Grapes’
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/23/opinion/23kristof.html April 22 2009 [accessed 13th July 2009]
2
the soul of an individual which have been debated upon for millenniums.
Issues that are conditioned and developed concern ethics, morality, religion,
God, transcendence, immanence, immortality and personal identity.
There has also been recent academic work on the similarities and differences
between Baudrillard and Deleuze. This can be seen in Benjamin D. Carson’s
‘Towards a Postmodern Political Art: Deleuze, Guattari, and the Anti-Culture
Book’6, Jacque Donzelot‘s ‘An antisociology’7, Brian Massumi’s ‘Realer than
Real: The simulacra according to Deleuze and Guattari’8, Steven Mara’s
‘Baudrillard and Deleuze: Re-viewing the postmodern scene’9 and Gary
Genosko’s Baudrillard and Signs: signification ablaze.10 Despite this interest
in the soul and the simulacrum, there has not been much discussion on
Baudrillard and Deleuze with reference to simulacra and the soul. This
dissertation will therefore contribute to furthering interest in this area and
hopefully will provide a reference for any further work in these subject areas.
The dissertation proceeds as follows. In Chapter One there is an exposition of
Baudrillard’s simulacra. This will analyse his books Symbolic, Exchange and
Death which outlines the history of the simulacrum and the hyperreal. The
concepts of simulacra and the hyperreal are further discussed with reference
6
Benjamin D. Carson, ‘Towards a Postmodern Political Art: Deleuze, Guattari, and the Anti-Culture
book’, in Rhizomes, Issue No. 7, Fall 2003 http://www.rhizomes.net/issue7/carson.htm [accessed 13th
July 2009]
7
Jacque Donzelot, ‘An antisociology’ in Gary Genosko (ed.) Deleuze and Guattari: critical
assessments of leading philosophers (London: Routledge, 2001) See pp.626-643 in particular pp.632-7
8
Brian Massumi, ‘Realer than Real: the simulacrum according to Deleuze and Guattari’ original
published in Copyright, no.1, 1987, http://www.anu.edu.au/HRC/first_and_last/works/realer.htm
[accessed 13th July 2009]
9
Steven Maras, ‘Baudrillard and Deleuze: Re-viewing the postmodern scene’, Continuum: Journal of
Media and Cultural Studies, Vol.2, Issue 2, 1989 pp.163-191
10
Gary Genosko, Baudrillard and signs: signification ablaze (London: Routledge, 1994) pp.57-71
3
to Simulacra and Simulation and ‘the Hyperreal and the Imaginary’ which
explains how the hyperreal occurs within Disneyland and America. Chapter
Two will build on the previous explanation of Baudrillard’s simulacra and
explain how it relates to the soul with cloning. This will attempt to combine his
arguments on the soul from ‘Clone Story’ in Simulacra and Simulation, ‘The
Final Solution: Cloning Beyond the Human and Inhuman’ in The Vital Illusion,
and ‘The Hell of the Same’ in The Transparency of Evil. In Chapter Three
there will be an exposition of Deleuze’s conception of the simulacra; this will
discuss the use of simulacra in Difference and Repetition. In Chapter Four
there will be an analysis of Deleuze and the soul. For this the sections on
Plato in Difference and Repetition and ‘Plato and the simulacrum’ The Logic
of Sense will be used in order to show how a Deleuzian conception of the
soul can emerge from his reversal of Platonism. In conclusion, there is a
review of Baudrillard and Deleuze’s positions on simulacra and its relation to
the soul so as to ascertain how similar and different their positions are. By the
end of this dissertation it is hoped that scholar’s will continue to search for
even more singularities based on difference in itself rather than burden those
already proposed by Baudrillard and Deleuze. This way, the concept of the
soul will always remain singular, a simulacra itself, and open for discussion.
4
1. Baudrillard and simulacra

The history of the simulacrum
Baudrillard first introduces the term simulacra in Symbolic, Exchange and
Death where simulacra are identified with modern society. This is the third
order of the simulacra with the two previous orders being counterfeit and
production schemas11. As he remarks, “the counterfeit is the dominant
schema in the ‘classical’ period, from the Renaissance to the Industrial
Revolution. [Whilst] production is the dominant schema in the industrial era.”12
Counterfeiting does not mean to resemble a copy of the original, rather,
completely altering and changing a material which is reliant upon a limitation.
Stucco is used as an example; during this period stucco was made from lime,
water and sand. This material is applied wet and then gradually hardens like
cement. This may seem like a limitation but stucco can imitate various
materials such as “velvet curtains, wooden cornices and fleshy curves of the
body. Stucco transfigures all this incredible material disorder into a new
substance …”13 In this way, stucco would be a counterfeit as it resembles an
appearance of an object like velvet curtains but in itself is a new object as it is
not made from the same material. As Leonardo Benevolo argues “the use of
plaster and stucco in place of natural materials [at the church of SS. Luca e
Martina in Rome by Pietro da Cortona, 1635-50] helped further to equalize
this diversity and to bring out the excellence of the approach, in relation to the
11
See Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic exchange and Death, trans. by Iain Hamilton Grant (London: Sage
Publications, (1993A) pp.50-86
12
Baudrillard, (1993A) p.50
13
Ibid, p.52
5
psychical quality of the structures.”14 Baudrillard uses another example of an
old cook in Ardennes, inspired by the construction of tiered cakes and
patisserie-sculpture he attempted to construct everything in its natural state as
God had intended. To do this he created everything out of concrete, furniture,
musical instruments, animals, trees, with the added realism of a boar’s skull
on the concrete boar and leaves on the tree. The cook’s project is similar to
the stucco artists as the aim is to reshape and reform material into something
which resembles an object but is completely new and a counterfeit of the
material used.
The counterfeit schema changes to production schema in the Industrial
Revolution. This schema was lost due to products being produced on a large
scale where the same object could be produced several thousands of times.
As Stewart Ross remarks, “from about 1750, some industries (led by textiles
and iron) began to switch from small scale production to large scale factory
(or mill) production. This involved making large quantities of goods in a single
place …”15 For Baudrillard, with objects being produced on a mass scale the
original object is extinguished as an original object ensures there to be only
one, however, in the industrial era there was a surplus amount of the same
object being made. Production “reabsorbs every original being and introduces
a series of identical beings…”16 meaning that artisans in the industrial era
could create the same piece of work ad infinitum as long as the machines
worked. This shows a change from the stucco artists and the cook that
14
Leonardo Benevolo, The Architecture of the Renaissance, Volume Two, trans. Judith Landry
(London: Routledge, 2002) p.628
15
Stewart Ross, The Industrial Revolution (London: Evans Brothers, 2008) p.22
16
Baudrillard (1993A) p.55
6
attempted to reshape and reform a material into the object itself turned into its
same equivalence and indifference. This is where in the industrial era, each
object had to be of equal quality and look the same as the next item being
produced and each item would be priced the same. An item would be thrown
away or the machine repaired if any differences were spotted. Thus, the
industrial second order simulacrum aims at an indefinite reproduction creating
a series of the same object making all their identities identical.
This second stage is overcome by the third stage of simulacra that is
identified with modernity when a generation of models takes precedence over
serial reproduction. In place of, simply reproducing an item an indefinite
amount of times the item will be labelled as a model such as the first line, 1.0,
or first generation. This will be eventually upgraded and replaced by a newer
more efficient model, the second line, 2.0 or second generation of models.
This procession of models will have modulated differences, in computer
operating systems this may be a better human computer interface, improved
security, upgraded media players, and so forth. All the models therefore do
not have an end but an indefinite modulation that will be constantly improved
upon where simulacra are based on the structural law of value. In this law, an
object is deemed with a value and given certain worth in comparison with
another object. For instance, when value is added to a car, value is no longer
based on an original but strictly in terms of components where an updated
component in a model is given more worth than previous components which
are classified as outdated. The structural law of value itself is a simulacrum as
each component is a model without an original. This can be seen in the
7
surplus amount of parts made for cars in order to replace any parts which are
faulty. This shows the influence of models taking precedence over a continual
reproduction of the same object to the reproduction of objects of a certain
generation of models which are constantly upgraded, for instance, this can be
seen in Nintendo’s handheld consoles, Game Boy (1989), Game Boy play it
loud (1995), Game Boy pocket (1996), Game Boy light (1997), Game Boy
colour (1998), Game Boy advance (2001), Game Boy advance SP (2003) and
Game Boy micro (2005). The game boy was then surpassed by the DS (2004)
which has upgraded versions of DS Lite (2006), DSi (2008)
The hyperreal
In the opening of Simulacra and Simulation, reality is described like a map in
which everything in this map like reality was so detailed that it covered every
European country and territory17. An individual in this map can be sure of what
their sense perception tells them and have a common sense approach to
reality. For instance, they can be sure that they are sitting on a chair, eating
food and talking to another individual. However, with simulacra, this sense
certainty and common sense approach cannot apply any more to reality. For
Baudrillard, reality has collapsed into hyperreality through a surplus
reproduction of reality. As he states “Simulation is no longer of a territory, a
17
Baudrillard here alludes to Jorge Luis Borges’ ‘On Exactitude in Science’ which states “ ... In that
Empire, the Art of Cartography attained such Perfection that the map of a single Province occupied the
entirety of a City, and the map of the Empire, the entirety of a Province. In time, those Unconscionable
Maps no longer satisfied, and the Cartographers Guilds struck a Map of the Empire whose size was that
of the Empire, and which coincided point for point with it. The following Generations, who were not so
fond of the Study of Cartography as their Forebears had been, saw that that vast Map was Useless, and
not without some Pitilessness was it, that they delivered it up to the Inclemencies of Sun and Winters.
In the Deserts of the West, still today, there are Tattered Ruins of that Map, inhabited by Animals and
Beggars; in all the Land there is no other Relic of the Disciplines of Geography.” Jorge Luis Borges,
Collected Fictions, trans. by Andrew Hurley (London: Penguin, 1999) p.325
8
referential being or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real
without origin or reality: a hyperreal.”18
With the generation of models in the third modern order of the simulacra this
creates a simulation or a hyperreal of reality. This does not mean that reality
is a computerised virtual reality where everything would be turned into a
virtual simulation of objects. This is apparent in the film The Matrix19 which
has misinterpreted Baudrillard’s concepts of simulacra and simulation. This
flaw is also apparent in Richard Hanley’s interpretation of Baudrillard on The
Matrix where “The Matrix rejects the pessimistic notion that the real has no
chance. Just as escape from the Matrix is possible, so we could escape from
the post-modernist condition of simulation, even were it our present lot. And
that’s nice to know.”20 What has been misunderstood in the film is the notion
that there is a reality or the Real behind the hyperreality which is not the case
for Baudrillard as he argues, “The most embarrassing part of the film is that
the new problem posed by simulation is confused with its classical, Platonic
treatment. This is a serious flaw.”21 Baudrillard is not arguing for the
reinstallation of an original but that simulation means there is no original
version of anything, even reality. This is because different mediums produce
their own versions of reality which means reality itself becomes a simulation.
In television programs, literature, films, photographs, paintings, music lyrics,
radio broadcasts, all individually give a representation of a particular version
18
Jean Baudrillard (1994), p.1
19
The Matrix, dir. Andy and Larry Wachowski (Warner Bros. 1999)
20
Richard Hanley, ‘Simulacra and Simulation: Baudrillard and The Matrix’ November 20th 2002,
http://whatisthematrix.warnerbros.com/rl_cmp/new_phil_fr_hanley2.html [accessed 5th July 2009]
21
Jean Baudrillard, ‘The Matrix Decoded: Le Nouvel Observatuer Interview with Jean Baudrillard’,
trans. by Gary Genosko and Adam Bynx, International Journal of Baudrillard Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2
(July 2004) http://www.ubishops.ca/BaudrillardStudies/vol1_2/genosko.htm [accessed 5th July 2009]
9
of reality. As Jonathon and Margarete Epstein argue “the (mass) media, for
Baudrillard, have become the dominant cultural form.”22 In film, there have
been numerous amounts of realities created, such as Terminator23, a post-
nuclear apocalyptic futuristic nightmare and Edward Scissorhands24, a perfect
quaint American street being a model for all constructed communities. All
versions of a reality would thus have modulated differences with each
character being played differently, each person a different model for a
character such as Batman; Adam West, Michael Keaton, Val Kilmer, George
Clooney and Christian Bale. With modulated differences in the line of films,
upgraded technology, different Batman suit, added side kick of Robin (Batman
Forever25) and Bat girl (Batman and Robin26), improvements to the batcave,
different bad guys and different batmobiles. Each genre of film also has
modulated differences; the “superhero” films have different hero figures,
superpowers, back histories, villain figures, protagonist’s love interest, and
gadgets.
All these versions of reality created are different reality models in which all
have a claim to be the true version of reality. However, there is no true or
original reality in itself as the surplus models of reality debase a claim for any
original reality due to the surplus amount of claims to be a true reality.
Therefore these surplus reality claims turns reality into a simulation or a
hyperreal where there is an indefinite multiplicity of reality. Baudrillard argues
22
Jonathon S. Epstein and Margarete J. Epstein, ‘Fatal Forms: Toward a (Neo) Formal Sociological
Theory of Media Culture’ in Douglas Kellner (ed.), Baudrillard: A Critical Reader (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1994) p.141
23
The Terminator, dir. James Cameron, (Hemdale Films, 1984)
24
Edward Scissorhands, dir. Tim Burton (Twentieth Century Fox, 1990)
25
Batman Forever, dir. Joel Schumacher (Warner Bros., 1995)
26
Batman and Robin, dir. Joel Schumacher (Warner Bros., 1997)
10
“the hyperreal is beyond representation only because it is entirely within
simulation …”27 Returning to the map, this cannot serve as a basis as
simulacra claim to be the true version of representation through the surplus of
truth claims. If an individual tries to claim that what they perceive is a chair,
this will be true that it is indeed a chair however it does not serve as a
universal truth of chair. Modulated differences debase a universal basis for a
truth claim as each model would only represent a certain type of chairness.
The material used to make a chair, textile for cushioning (if there is any), how
the legs are constructed and so forth. With no universal to base any claims to
the truth makes each model their own claim to truth, the 1.0 models would
have right to an identity as 1.1 models. This creates a generation of models
without an original. Each of the models have an equal claim to the truth given
this lack of the original therefore each generation of models creates its own
version of reality which makes reality itself become hyperreal. As Steven Best
states “The hyperreal is the end result of historical simulation process where
the natural world and all its referents are gradually replaced with technology
and self-referential signs.”28 For instance with washing machines, all claim to
clean clothes with several different models available such as Hotpoint,
Whirlpool and Bosch. There is no original model to clean clothes in but
different models within companies competing against one another in the
hyperreal of generations of models with modulated differences.
27
28
Steven Best ‘The Commodification of Reality and The Reality of Commodification: Baudrillard,
Debord and Postmodern theory’ in Kellner (1994), p.53
11
The hyperreality of Disneyland / America
Baudrillard states “Disneyland is a perfect model of all the entangled orders of
the simulacra.”29 That is to say, in Disneyland’s case, it brings together the
counterfeiting, industrial and the modern model simulacra schemas together
in one place. Splash Mountain is an example of this; the ride is based on the
1946 film Song of the South with Br’er Fox and Br’er Bear attempting to
capture Br’er Rabbit. The first order, counterfeiting can be seen easily
identified as the animals inside are animatronic robotic imitations based on
the caricature versions presented in the film. This is also the case with the
constructed flume and seated passenger logs. The second industrial order is
identifiable with the numerous robotic replacements and passenger “logs”
available. The final order modern model schema can be identified as there
exists more than one model of Splash Mountain with the others being in Walt
Disney World and Tokyo Disneyland.
He continues to argue, “Disneyland is presented as imaginary in order to
make us believe that the rest [of America] is real, whereas all of Los Angeles
and the America that surrounds it are no longer real, but belong to the
hyperreal order and to the order of simulation.”30 This shows that he is not
concerned with the hyperreality of Disney itself but how Disney itself reflects
the hyperreality of America. For Baudrillard, “... [America] is a hyperreality
because it is a Utopia which has behaved from the very beginning as though it
29
Baudrillard (1994) p.12
30
Ibid
12
were already achieved.”31 That is to say, America has become a hyperreal
through the Utopian ideal. This Utopian ideal was presented to Europeans in
the early 17th century of a better life in a new world where all their dreams
could come true. As Catherine Armstrong states, “whether an author had
visited America or not, the literary purpose of his work was to create an
identity for an individual or group of settlers or a geographical identity for the
colony itself.”32 Such was the case of one anonymous author’s text about
Virginia in 1641, “the author was so explicit about his intended readers that he
named them in the title of his work: A Direction for Adventurers with small
stock to get Two for One and good land Freely: and for Gentlemen and all
Servants, Labourers and Artificers to live plentifully.”33 For Baudrillard, this
Utopian ideal has already been achieved as it is mechanically reproduced
within American society. Some of the models which reflect this are; The
Declaration of Independence, The Statue of Liberty, The Washington
Monument, The White House, The Lincoln Memorial, Mount Rushmore, The
Liberty Bell, McDonalds, KFC, Burger King, Coca Cola, Pepsi, Chrysler, Ford
and Chevrolet.
All these models created all have a claim to be the true version of America.
This turns America itself into a hyperreal as it is no true or original America in
itself as the surplus models of American values debases a claim for any
original reality due to the surplus amount of claims to be the true
representation of America. America thereby becomes hyperreal as there is no
31
Jean Baudrillard, America, trans. by Chris Turner (London: Verso, 1988) p.27
32
Catherine Armstrong, Writing North America in the seventeenth century: English representations in
print and manuscript (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2007) p.24
33
Ibid, p.34
13
true or original America since it is constructed through a series of models
based around Utopian ideals which themselves are surplus. Any claim to an
original reality is debased therefore even claims of structure, would be based
on the structural law of value. Each component making up the idea of America
would itself be given a different value of worth depending on how it represents
the idea of America as a whole. For instance, The Lincoln Memorial would be
given greater worth than McDonalds because of the values which Lincoln
represented are greater than that of McDonalds. Nevertheless, each value
which is represented and given worth more than another is still a simulacrum.
This value is represented many times in other things such as Lincoln’s stance
against slavery reproduced in the Civil Rights Movement (1955-68), Martin
Luther King Junior’s speech from the steps of the Lincoln Memorial (1963),
and the election of the first black President Barack Obama (2008).
14
2. Simulacra and Cloning
Unlike reality, an individual’s bodily identity is not hyperreal but is in danger of
becoming hyperreal if cloning was permitted. Each individual has their own
unique personal attributes such as their shade of eyes, hair colour, skin colour
and so forth. Previously, it would have been impossible to make an exact
duplicate of the same individual; however, there has been a fascination with
man and his double. This double as Baudrillard states “is an imaginary figure,
which, just like the soul, the shadow, the mirror image … haunts the subject
like a subtle and always averted death.”34 That is to say, with the impossibility
to replicate every detail of an individual into their exact duplicate there would
be no danger of simulacra occurring as the individual would be their own
original model without any possibility of other models of their self. This
fascination with the double could only be based on a dream like reality where
an individual’s double could always remain in their imagination but never can
be actualised in reality. Using Baudrillard’s example of the mirror image, an
individual stares into a mirror and there is a representation of the individual’s
other staring back at them, however, their mirror other cannot leap out of the
mirror into reality. Another example of this is portrait paintings where an artist
can paint a double of themselves but this painted double can never be
brought to life itself. As William Pawlett remarks “our image in the mirror is
laterally inverted so we are protected from the nightmare of encountering
ourselves as others see us, or coming ‘face to face’ with ourselves.”35
34
35
William Pawlett, Jean Baudrillard: Against Banality (London:Taylor & Francis, 2007) p.155
15
With the modern invention of cloning36 individuals are made into a simulation,
a hyperreality of their own individuality. The hyperreality of individuals occurs
with the removal of the need for sexual reproduction as clones can be made
solely from one individual’s DNA. This removes the need for the father and
mother as the genetic code can infinitely ‘give birth’ to itself without any need
for another individual’s genetic code. Baudrillard quotes geneticist Albert
Jacquard who remarks “my genetic patrimony was fixed once and for all when
a certain spermatozoa encountered a certain ovum … a copy of this recipe is
inscribed in each of the dozens of millions of cells that constitute me today.”37
To put this simply, an individual is made by the combination of their father’s
and mother’s DNA code in the sperm and egg. This combination then forms a
unique individual with their own unique genetic code which differs from their
parents. In contrast, with cloning, the genetic code of one individual “[it is]
theoretically possible to manufacture an individual identical to me starting with
one of these cells.”38 Thus the genetic code is like a unique serial number into
which every individual can be made into their own serial reproduction. As
Paul Hegarty argues “With cloning, the child is now a product, a prosthesis,
fully modelled in advance, a hyperchild …”39
All three eras of the simulacra can also be seen in cloning. Counterfeiting
would involve the manipulation of the genetic code from the reproduction of
two members of the same species to the same individual being able to
36
The first clone from an embryo was in 1958 as John B. Gurdon and James Byrne state “[In] 1958
Fischberg, Elsdale and Gurdon clone sexually mature Xenopus frogs using late embryonic nuclei.”
John B. Gurdon and James Byrne ‘The history of cloning’ in Anne McLaren (ed.), Ethical Eye -
Cloning, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2002) p.49
37
Albert Jacquard in Baudrillard (1994) p.99
38
Ibid
39
Paul Hegarty, Baudrillard: live theory (London: Continuum, 2004) p.122
16
reproduce themselves. This would mean that the genetic code would be
counterfeit as it is a material which has been manipulated and used for other
than it was intended. The industrial era would involve the mass production of
the same individual by cloning and lastly the simulacra would occur as each
generation or model of the clone would have modulated differences such as
the removal of genetic defects, different hair colours, eye colours and so forth.
Thus the individual themselves can be manufactured and mass produced like
consumer products. As Baudrillard argues, “This is our clone ideal today: a
subject purged of the other, deprived of its divided character and doomed to
metastasis, to pure repetition. No longer the hell of other people, but the hell
of the Same.”40 The original identity of the individual is lost as they do not
have an original identity with their duplication. Just like there is no original
Nintendo DS with the mass production of the individual there would be no
original Mr X. Each clone would have an equal claim to the individual’s identity
and of being the truest model of them. The 1.0 model would claim to be Mr X
just like the 1.1 model.
This makes the individual lose its uniqueness as each model of the individual
would be exactly the same. This reproduction of the same is compared with
cancer,
“ordinarily a cell is destined to divide a certain number of times and
then to die. If in the course of its division, something happens to
perturb this process … then a cell becomes cancerous. It forgets to die.
40
Jean Baudrillard, The Transparency of Evil: essays on extreme phenomena, trans. by James Benedict
(London: Verso, 1993B) p.122
17
It forgets how to die. It goes on to clone itself again and again, making
thousands of identical copies of itself thus forming a tumor.”41
His main point of this example is that ordinarily a reproduction of the same
within an individual’s body is dangerous for them. The same cluster of cells
need to be medically treated and removed from the body as this could lead to
the death of the individual. In contrast, when an individual is cloned, they are
not treated like a cancerous lump or tumour; instead, the scientists are
congratulated in their successful clone. As to why they are not cancerous,
Baudrillard focuses on man’s attempt for an individual to be immortal by trying
to preserve their identity through cloning themselves.
Immortality
For Baudrillard, immortality had been an emblem of power and social
transcendence where every individual did not have the right to immortality.
Only those who were in positions of power were granted immortality such as
kings and pharaohs. In contrast, in primitive societies there was no personal
immortality or structure of political power which guaranteed an individual’s
immortality. He argues “… with the Grand Empires, despotic societies of total
transcendence of power, immortality is generalised and becomes eternal.”42
Kings and pharaohs are then the first to benefit from achieving immortal
status. For instance, the pharaoh’s pyramids are designed in order to achieve
immortality in the afterlife but also a reminder of the greatness of their power
41
Jean Baudrillard, The Vital Illusion, ed. by Julia Witwer (New York: Columbia University Press,
2001) p.4-5
42
18
with their enormous size. Kings similarly achieve immortality through their
lineage, their great acts, and the benefits given to the people during their
reign. The king’s tomb or coffin is not as grand as the pharaoh’s pyramid but
nevertheless is usually eloquently made which represents their wealth and
power even in death. Immortality is later made democratic through the
commands from God himself, and Baudrillard argues this stage coincides with
the great Universalist religions, in particular Christianity.
The divine God works through the minister or priest who guarantees
immortality for all individuals (this being similar to Apollo talking through the
priestess at Delphi). A king or pharaohs actions despite how horrific they may
have been always were always granted immortality. With Christianity, man
needed to be recompensed for his actions if they were good or evil43. This
was done through the act of confession where an individual had to confess
their actions to their priest in order for him to judge them. As the priests were
said to have God’s judgement, the people were judged as if God judged them
personally. The individual would then be granted immortality only if they had
accounted for all their actions in their lifetime. Even though the Christian form
of immortality is meant to be granted for all Baudrillard argues “[immortality] is
sparingly granted, remaining the privilege of a cult, and within this culture, the
privilege of a specific social and political caste.”44 That is, an individual has to
be a Christian in order to achieve immortality. If they do not believe in
anything at all then they will be doomed to death without the prospects of an
afterlife. They also cannot believe in any other religion as the Christian
43
Baudrillard references Daniel in the Old Testament but not the exact section which is Daniel 12. 2
44
19
religion would have the truest God and all others would be false therefore the
individual would believe in false God’s and prophets. In belonging to the
Christian religion only white European rational males would have been given
immortality leaving the question open if women, children, animals, the insane,
criminals, and individual’s of different races were granted immortality.
Cloning attempts to achieve a ‘truer’ democratic form of immortality as an
individual regardless of caste, race, and gender can be cloned. Animals can
also be cloned with the most famous example of this being Dolly the sheep
who was ‘born’ in 1996. As argued previously, the genetic code enables an
individual to be cloned and thus is turned into hyperreal through simulacra of
their selves. This removes the need for sexual reproduction and enables
asexual reproduction of the same individual’s genetic code45. With the
possibility of mass production of the same individual then the individual need
not worry about death as they can simply have themselves cloned again at a
younger and healthier period in their lives. With death abolished through
cloning, Baudrillard argues, “[clones] could function … as a death wish. Kill
your clone; destroy yourself with no risk of actually dying: vicarious suicide.”46
This is a complete reversal of the mirror other where there was a mystery and
fascination. In contrast, with the clone, the mystery itself is lost and may turn
violent in order to destroy themselves. This would not be in order to be the
original version of their self but since the individual could not die the fear of
death would be removed and replaced with the pleasure of killing their self.
45
As a dictionary definition states that a clone is “a group of organisms descended from a single
individual through a sexual reproduction.” The Concise Columbia Encyclopaedia in Daniel Cohen,
Cloning , 2nd edition (Brookfield: Twentieth First Century Books, 2002) p.10
46
20
The loss of the soul
The soul for kings, pharaohs and priests has a relation to a bodily identity. In
Christianity, there is an emphasis placed on the importance of an individual’s
soul as it is the part of the individual which is eternal. When an individual
confesses they are not only cleansing their sins but also their soul. With the
purer soul, the better chance at reaching heaven and achieving immortality47.
Therefore there is a direct relation to the individual in their Earthly body to the
same individual in a heavenly body48. Immortality itself was a gift given by
God49, but with a priest being the ‘voice’ of God, this allowed the
commoditisation of one’s soul with the attachment of the price and worth to
their soul. An example of this was when atonement and indulgences were
combined together with an individual being able to purchase God’s
forgiveness in the Renaissance period. Martin Luther argued against this in
his Ninety Five Theses arguing “if it is at all possible to grant to any one the
remission of all penalties whatsoever, it is certain that this remission can be
granted only to the most perfect, that is, to the very fewest.”50
In cloning, DNA replaces the need for a soul as an individual does not have to
die. The soul is made irrelevant as the individual does not worry about an
47
This is similar to Plato’s conception of the soul as a charioteer who can be in communion with the
metaphysical forms themselves in Phaedrus 246a-248e. A full discussion of this will take place in
chapter 4.
48
Corinthians 1: 15. 53-4
49
John 17. 3
50
Martin Luther, Ninety Five Theses, No. 23, in The Works of Martin Luther Vol. 1, ed. and trans. by
Adolph Spaeth, L.D. Reed, Henry Eyster Jacobs, et al. (Philadelphia: A. J. Holman Company, 1915)
http://www.ctsfw.edu/etext/luther/theses/theses_e.asc [accessed 5th July 2009]
21
afterlife or need to believe in a God in order to become immortal. An individual
does not need to be cleansed of their sins by a priest nor worry about their
actions. A problem with ethics therefore occurs; why should an individual
behave in a morally good way if they need not worry about the effects of their
behaviour to what their afterlife will be like? Baudrillard himself does not
address this problem but he argues “… once the human is no longer defined
in terms of transcendence and liberty, but in terms of functions and of
biological equilibrium, the definition of the human itself begins to fade, along
with that of humanism.”51 With the loss of ideal definitions “there could be no
interdiction that could be founded on a division between good and evil.”52 A
Baudrillardian answer to that problem can be formulated as Baudrillard is here
warning of the destruction of morality, laws, and symbolic codes with a
scientific immortality existing beyond good and evil.
Baudrillard is not arguing conservatively for the benefits of existing laws,
instead, he is arguing for thought itself. As Brian Massumi has argued in
favour of this conservative view “Baudrillard’s framework can only be the
result of a nostalgia for the old reality so intense that it has difformed his
vision of everything outside of it … He cannot see that the simulacrum
envelops a proliferating play of differences and galactic distances.”53
Massumi’s view is that simulacra play a negative role in Baudrillard’s
philosophy which stops the possibility of singular differences from occurring.
In doing this, Baudrillard is left with only nostalgia for old forms of resistance
51
Baudrillard (2001), p.22
52
Ibid, p.28
53
Brian Massumi, ‘Realer than Real: the simulacrum according to Deleuze and Guattari’ original
published in Copyright, no.1, 1987, http://www.anu.edu.au/HRC/first_and_last/works/realer.htm
22
without using those forms of resistance which occur from the simulacrum
itself54. In contrast to Massumi, one instance where singularity occurs for
Baudrillard is thought, as thought would allow singularity and difference to
occur. As he states “thought is singular, and in its singularity thought may be
able to protect us … for thought … cannot be exchanged, either for some
objective truth (as in science) or for an artificial double, such as artificial
intelligence.”55 That is, there is no structural law of value for thought. Each
individual’s thoughts cannot be bought or commoditised simply because no
one can tell an individual what to think, how to think or think for them. There
are no discs like in The Matrix56 where each individual could learn from discs
such as learning Kung Fu or multiple languages. Since thought cannot itself
be a commodity then the simulacra cannot occur as there cannot be
modulated differences of the same thought. In The Matrix, this could have
been a possibility with Kung Fu version 1.0 then 1.1 on discs. In contrast, an
individual can have their thoughts changed, such as an individual loving a
particular brand of soda then suddenly they change their opinion about it
which is not a modulated difference of thought.
Modulated differences work on difference with a reference to the same, the
Nintendo Dsi having differences compared with the Nintendo Ds, for example
two cameras, a bigger screen, access to the Nintendo store and so forth.
54
Massumi’s argument is based on his interpretation of how the simulacrum works within Deleuze and
Guattari’s philosophy this will be explained later in chapters 3 and 4.
55
Baudrillard (2001), p.29
56
The discs used in The Matrix contained full knowledge of a subject on a disc which was plugged into
a computer then downloaded into an individual. This was possible as the individual had previously
been connected to a large machine through wires which kept the individual in an embryonic state. All
what was required was to reconnect the individual using similar wires to a different computer once they
had escaped the virtual reality.
23
Even though companies attempt to argue that their brand is number one, the
thought about loving a particular flavour cannot be mass produced as it is
unique to that individual. Not everyone is going to agree with them about that
particular flavour or brand is the best. For instance, Kettle foods argue about
their backyard barbeque crisps that “everyone loves the flavour of backyard
barbeque – smoky, spicy, tangy sweet. But it’s the sweet feeling of a summer
barbeque that we really love.”57 This shows that there is an assumed
universal about the enjoyment of the backyard barbeque flavour but also of
the enjoyment of a barbeque at summer. However, Kettle food’s created
universals cannot hold as universal for every individual as not every individual
will enjoy the crisp’s flavour or enjoy a barbeque at summer. Their taste buds
might not give them those flavours which Kettle crisps describe, they may
prefer a different flavour which makes them negate the taste of it, or when the
individual is about to enjoy a summer barbeque it may suddenly come on rain
which ruins their whole experience. These individualistic differences are what
that Baudrillard wants to encourage. Differences of liking, disliking, loving and
hating particular things, how we dress, decorate, interact, manipulate and
create are all things which makes each individual unique and different from
the next. If suddenly there were 10,000 individuals all the same then all those
unique differences would be lost, as all them would like, dislike, love and hate
all the same things. For Baudrillard, each individual has the possibility through
thought to influence and change existing laws that have been created which
would be a better alternative than the complete loss of them through cloning.
57
Unknown author, http://www.kettlefoods.com/our-all-natural-products/chips [accessed 4th July
2009]
24
This also has an effect on an individual’s soul as the soul may not be lost
through thought. This is not to prove or disprove the existence of the soul but
emphasise the multiple ways in which people can think about it. An example
of this would be the history of the soul itself in philosophy, in Plato’s
philosophy; the soul is trapped like a prisoner within the human body and
requires death to release it from this prison58. In contrast, Aristotle argued that
the soul was the first principle of life, the animation of the body, the soul was
then considered part of the human body itself and to cut the body was to cut
the soul, one was inseparable from the other59. Descartes argued that the
mind was immortal and that the immaterial soul and material body were joined
together in the pineal gland which he identified as a gland in the brain60.
Whilst Leibniz similarly maintained that everything is a monad, which is an
indivisible substance which cannot be perceived or represented in experience.
The monad is immortal and when an individual dies they simply lose the
organic part of the monad61. In each of these philosophers’ definitions of the
soul each slightly differs from one another. These differences from
Baudrillard’s view are caused by their own thoughts which are all different and
unique. Multiple perspectives on the soul enable it to be saved in order to be
discussed, criticised and reflected upon. Thus through the individuals
uniqueness in thought they can combat the effects of simulacra, stop the hell
of the same and save the soul from being lost as a concept.
58
See Plato. Phaedo 64d-67b
59
See Aristotle, De Anima 412a-413a
60
See Article 31 ‘That there is a little gland in the brain which the soul exercises its functions in a more
particular way than the other parts, Article 32 ‘How it is known that this gland is the principal seat of
the soul’ and Article 41 ‘What the power of the soul is with respect to the body’ in Rene Descartes The
Passions of the Soul, trans. Stephen H. Voss, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989) p36, pp.36-7 and p.41
61
See propositions 71-77 in Gottfried Leibniz, The Monadology, trans. Robert Latta,
http://philosophy.eserver.org/leibniz-monadology.txt [accessed 4th July 2009]
25
3. Deleuze and simulacra

The Reversal of Platonism
Deleuze states “the task of modern philosophy has been defined: to overturn
Platonism.”62 However, this overturning has to be understood as a reversal as
James Williams argues “if the line is read in terms of overthrowing or wiping
out Platonism ... then the … detail of Deleuze’s definition of difference will
have been missed.”63 In contrast to calling this an overturning “the sentence
must be understood as advocating an inversion of Platonism that remains
faithful to its key structure, as defined by Deleuze.”64 This task of reversal is to
make simulacra take the primary role in contrast to the metaphysical forms or
Platonic Ideas.
For Plato everything can be thought of in relation to an ideal form. This is the
idea that a colour such as blue participates in blueness, mud in muddiness,
chairs in chairness, and so forth. The form itself is metaphysical whilst
everything in the world is a mere copy of it such as a blue sky would be a
copy of the metaphysical form of blue and sky. The forms are a priori and the
use of recollection allows for an individual to recollect the forms themselves.
Recollection captures the eternal quality of the simulacrum. This eternal
attachment differentiates recollection from the process of memory or
remembering as things can be forgotten through those processes. For
instance, an elderly person’s memory is lost yet recollection consoles them for
62
Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. by Paul Patton (London: Continuum, 2004A), p.71
63
James Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition:: a critical Introduction and guide,
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003) p.79
64
Ibid
26
that loss of memory as it gives continuity to their life. All the little differences in
memory and remembering are lost but recollection gives a singular continuity
of having been born, educated, worked, and then retired. Similarly, in Plato, if
an individual recollects blue in the various shades of blue, in a blue sky, blue
river, blue paint, the simulacrum would be lost as the individual would only
recollect a single instance of blueness within all the various shades.
A famous example which is called by modern scholars ‘Plato’s cave’65,
explains Plato’s theory of forms. Put briefly, there are a group of people who
have grown up in a cave. They have chains on their legs and necks so they
cannot move and their heads remains stationary. Towards the entrance of the
cave a fire is burning and behind the people there is a wall. There are men
who carry dummies of humans and other living things behind the wall which
casts a shadow on the adjacent wall which the people can see. The people,
for Plato, would only know the shadows and they would associate any noises
they heard made by the men carrying the dummies to the shadows due to
their immobility. As he states, “[the people] … will think that the truth is
nothing other than the shadows of dummies.”66 If an individual was released
from their chains and was able to look upon the real objects themselves in the
world they would not longer reflect upon the copies of the objects but
conclude that it was the sun which was the source of the reflections in the
cave and other things in the world that were the dummies. If the same
individual then went back into the cave they would try in vain to explain this to
65
See Plato, Republic 514A-519A
66
Plato, Republic 514A-519A in T.D.J Chappell, The Plato Reader, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 1996) p.231
27
the other people as they had been convinced that the fire shadows they
perceived were the truth.
The people in the cave are representative of humans in the world where all
they perceive are the simulacrum of objects (the shadows) and never the real
object itself (the forms). They have convinced themselves that the simulacrum
is the true representation of objects whilst the real object itself is always
outside their reach. As such if an individual could glimpse upon the forms
themselves they would never convince everyone else that they were the true
reality of things and not simulacra. In The Timaeus67, Plato considers if the
simulacrum is a model capable of rivalling the forms themselves. He writes,
“to which pattern did [the world’s] constructor work, that which remains the
same and unchanging or that which has come to be?”68 The same and
unchanging pattern is described as “… apprehensible by intelligence with the
aid of reasoning”69, whilst simulacra are described as “…the object of opinion
and irrational sensation.”70 The simulacra are discarded by Plato because
they are secondary, for instance, in relation to a creator who had the eternal in
mind, the world would have been created as a copy of the form of beauty. As
beauty is an unchangeable metaphysical form, it is eternal, whereas the world
is merely a copy of this unchanging model. As A.K. Rogers argues “[the
creator’s eternal] pattern explicitly contains within itself the ideal complexity
that is reproduced in the actual universe.”71
67
See Plato, Timaeus 29E-32A
68
Plato, Timaeus and Critias, trans. by Henry Desmond Pritchard Lee (London: Penguin, 1971) p.41
69
Ibid, p.40
70
Ibid
71
A.K. Rogers, ‘Plato’s Theory of Forms’, The Philosophical Review, Vol.45, No.1 (Jan. 1936) p.62
28
Difference always precedes the same
For Deleuze, the simulacrum is no longer a degraded copy but a positive
power which denies the original, the copy, the model and the reproduction of
the same. This reverses the Platonic model of copies and forms where
everything would be transformed to simulacra or a world as a phantasm72.
The simulacrum and copy are separated by Deleuze where “the copy is an
image endowed with resemblance, the simulacrum is an image without
resemblance.”73 That is, the copy which resembles the forms is not a
simulacrum as the individual would have confused difference with
resemblance. For instance, if an individual through the use of recollection
assumed that the various shades of blue, in a blue sky, blue river, blue paint,
resembled the same shade of blue then that individual would be mistaken as
all the shades of blue are different at a molecular level. Deleuze’s argument is
metaphysical and does not depend upon a philosophy based at the molecular
level. Difference at a molecular level when compared to a molar level is an
expression of the point that each blue is already difference in itself74.
Therefore the colour blue itself is always in a constant state of becoming as
there is no original blue. Each blue that an individual perceives is slightly
different and through resemblance the individual joins all the variations of blue
into blueness. As such in categorising blue through the use of recollection the
individual would have mistaken resemblance for the simulacrum. In trying to
72
For Deleuze’s sections on Plato see Deleuze (2004A) pp.71-83 and Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of
Sense, ed. by Constantin V. Boundas, trans. by Mark Lester and Charles Stivale (London: Continuum,
2004B) pp.291-303
73
Deleuze (2004B) p.295
74
For Deleuze’s explanation of difference in itself see Deleuze (2004A), p.36-83
29
categorise the variations of blue into blueness, the simulacrum would always
assure a becoming of blue and never a categorisation or norm of blue. The
underlying differences have been missed in experience when reality or
experience is defined in terms of identifiable properties or a set of predicates
under a general term. When the object itself is singular and not related to any
general, for example, the particular brown of a hedgehog is unique and should
not be identified with brownness of hedgehogs in general.
The simulacrum is therefore preferred to recollection as recollection
predetermines what an individual thinks which will then have a predetermined
outcome. This outcome will determine the final influence upon the individual’s
thought and make it appear to the individual that simulacra do not have a
primary role as with Plato. For instance, an individual may have seen a play a
few years ago. They had enjoyed the performance of the play on the night
they saw it. The individual notices in the newspaper that the play is going to
be performed again. With the enjoyment felt by recollecting the performance
of the previous play the individual decides to see it again. After watching the
play again the individual decides that the recent performance of the play was
terrible as it did not meet their expectations. With the use of recollection there
is an attachment by the individual of enjoyment to that specific play which
predetermined what they were to expect for all future performances of it. This
makes the recollection of the previous performance the ideal performance
where all subsequent different performances do not compare thus making
recollection take precedence over simulacra.
30
In contrast to an individual regulating their thoughts and predetermining its
outcome through the use of recollection, they should be more open to the
differences occurring on a daily basis. As Deleuze states “it is a matter of
acting, of making repetition as such a novelty: that is a freedom and a task of
freedom.”75 In this way the individual’s experience of watching the play should
be more novel, that is, their experience should be more aware of the new or
uniqueness occurring in the performance of it. If an individual is open to
novelty they will be more accepting to those differences. In place of negating
those differences the individual should affirm those differences and not expect
the same to return in each performance of the play. The individual may try to
determine their thought through recollection and resemblance, difference still
occurs and precedes resemblance. This is due to the constantly differing
experience in reality, which for Deleuze, is connected to a constant becoming
of the experience. Therefore in allowing differences to occur in each
performance and by judging the performance in itself rather than allowing
other performances to determine their enjoyment of it. This means that the
simulacrum would reverse the role of recollection as the individual’s openness
in their allowance of difference to occur would allow for a freer experience of
watching the play rather than being determined by recollection.
The Actual and the Virtual
This condition for becoming as a side of reality is called the virtual, that is,
simulacra are always attached to reality itself76. For Deleuze, the virtual is not
to be understood in terms of a computerised virtual reality, based on copying
75
Deleuze (2004A), p.6
76
For Deleuze’s explanation of the virtual and the actual see ibid, pp.258-266
31
the real, as his virtual reality is not a simulation. He argues “the virtual is
opposed not to the real but the actual. The virtual is fully real in so far as it is
virtual … the virtual must be defined as strictly part of the real object.”77 That
is to say, reality is always in a state of becoming which an individual cannot
immediately perceive. The virtual is not opposed to reality but to the actual as
the actual attempts to define an object into sameness which restricts the
becoming of the object. In working with reality, the virtual makes the object
into a becoming where differentiation would always occur. This would make
only temporary form of the object appear as it would always be constantly
changing. The virtual would always be working underneath the actual
perception of the object which does not mean that the virtual is separate from
reality. This is argued by Peter Hallward “Deleuze’s work is guided by a single
question, the question of absolute creation, elaborated through the distinction
of actual creatures and virtual creatings.”78 For Hallward, Deleuze’s
philosophy of creation is split, where the virtual and actual are distinct,
separate and not conjoined. This makes his philosophy of creation ‘out of this
world’ as the virtual’s distinction from the actual means that the becoming of
objects is otherworldly. In contrast to Hallward, a Deleuzian answer can be
made where Deleuze’s virtual in working with reality changes the perception
of reality itself from the presumed sameness of an object into an object of
constant differentiation.
For instance, if an individual perceived a landscape painting, there does not
appear to the individual’s perception the fading of colours which is constantly

77
Ibid, p.260
78
Peter Hallward, Out of this world: Deleuze and the philosophy of creation (London: Verso, 2006)
p.159
32
occurring. If the painting was contained within an airtight container then the
fading would still occur just much slower compared it being on display where
ultraviolet light would hasten the fading of the painting’s colour. When the
colour has considerably faded on the painting then the colour would have to
be restored in order to try and recapture the brightness and vividness of the
colours before fading. The becoming faded, then only occurs to the individual
when something is perceivably different in the appearance of the painting
itself. Therefore the virtual is always constantly part of the actual where one is
inseparably part of the other as the simulacrum work at the molecular level
which changes perception and appearance.
Overcoming the Hegelian dialectic
Badiou, a contemporary of Deleuze, criticised the virtual and the actual
dialectics within Deleuze. As he states, “[Deleuze’s] philosophy is organised
around a metaphysics of the One … it is systematic and abstract.”79 For
Badiou, the virtual in Deleuze averts the individual from the actual in
discussing something real. If Badiou’s view was implemented so that the
virtual was not included with the actual so that only reality remains, Deleuze
would be stuck within the Hegelian dialectic where sense certainty is
mediated by language. For instance, an individual perceives a shape, it is
circular, red and bouncy, this is the immediate knowledge of the object, then
someone tells them this object they perceive is a ball, this is the mediate
knowledge of the object which categorises the immediate. The mediate
makes a generalised statement about the this, the here and the now, this is a
79
Alain Badiou, Deleuze: The Clamor of Being, trans. by Louise Burchill (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2000) p.16
33
ball, the individual perceives it here and now in their hands, this makes a
universal claim within that knowledge of the particular, since all balls are
meant to be circular, have colour and have bounce. As Peter Singer states “…
sense-certainty, in seeking to express its knowledge of the pure particular,
has got sucked into the necessity of the universal term.”80 Hegel had shown
that it is impossible to make a claim about the immediate or sense-certainty
without it being dialectically attached to the mediate81.
The Hegelian dialectic works solely within the actual, so all that remains in
reality are dialectically opposing things such as light and dark, black and
white, day and night which will eventually be synthesised and then
dialectically opposed in an ongoing process of synthesis and dialectical
opposition. Using the Hegelian model an individual can say there is a dialectic
of day and night, where at some point this dialectic will be synthesised from
day into night or night into day. In contrast, if the virtual and the actual are
dialectically attached, through the use of simulacra and the eternal return of
difference, Deleuze manages to overcome the Hegelian dialectic as difference
always returns in the repetition. The virtual and the actual are attached for
Deleuze as he remarks “the virtual becomes engaged in the process of
actualization as it follows the plane which gives it its proper reality.”82 The
eternal return of difference allows objects to return to the individual’s
perception but differently due to its relation with the simulacra.
80
Peter Singer, Hegel: A very short introduction, (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2001) p.71
81
For a full explanation see Georg Wilhelm Freidrich Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A. V.
Miller (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1977) pp.58-103
82
Gilles Deleuze, Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975 – 1995, ed. by David
Lapoujade, trans. by Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina (New York: Semiotext(e), 2006A) p.388
34
In contrast to the Hegelian model, simulacra destroy the notion of any original
form such as light, dark, day, night. For example, there is a constant
becoming of light to dark, where light can never be fully conceptualised as
light at any given point due to the constant diminution of the light. Likewise,
there is a constant becoming of dark to light, where darkness also can never
be fully conceptualised as dark due to the constant increasing of light.
Therefore when an individual repeatedly looks at the sky, light or darkness is
perceived to be different. The light may resemble what the individual had
perceived previously but it would be different as the sun will have moved
slightly in those last few seconds causing the light to be slightly different.
Deleuze manages to overcome the Hegelian dialectic through this constant
becoming which is present within actual things. This becoming cannot be
conceptualised into a dialectic, as there is an constant unfolding, such as light
into darkness and dark into light where there is never a point when a universal
can be used of day and night like the Hegelian model.
Simulacra and Simulation with Guattari
The virtual and the actual are only one level of simulacra. The second occurs
when there is a burden of a concept by the commoditisation of it. For Deleuze
and Guattari concepts are not simple, they are a multiplicity. For instance, a
fox is not simply just a mammal as the fox is an assemblage that relates to
other assemblages such as the scientific classification of a mammal, the
subcategory of mammal, carnivores, the subcategory of carnivores a Canidae
and so forth. A concept cannot be every single assemblage “since this would
35
be chaos pure and simple”83 This means the definition of fox itself cannot be
every single definition of fox, rather, there occurs a process of unfolding
assemblages within a concept which will connect other assemblages ad
infinitum which stops the concept itself from being chaotic.
A concept for Deleuze and Guattari “has three inseparable components:
possible world, existing face and real language or speech.”84 That is to say,
the possible world is the virtual with infinite possibilities on how the concept is
going to take shape. The existing face acts as mediation between the virtual
and the actual which begins to shape the possible world and real language or
speech is then given to the possible world making it exist in an actual
conception. For instance, Japan is a possible world as there is infinite
possibility of how Japan is going to take shape. The possible world exists as
the virtual because this infinite possibility cannot be represented in the actual.
How this possible world of Japan is going to take shape is determined by the
people (existing face) who act as the mediation device between the virtual
with infinite possibilities and the actual with only one conceptual possibility. As
the existing face, the collection of people in Japan use real language or
speech in order to express the possible world of Japan using Japanese then
begins to limit how Japan itself will take shape. The existing face as mediation
would be different from Hegelian mediation as previously described due to the
mediation between the virtual and the actual and not mediation of just the
actual like the Hegelian model.
83
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What is philosophy?, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and Graham
Burchill (London: Verso, 1994) p.15
84
Deleuze and Guattari (1994) p.17
36
There always remains a possible world within a concept despite its
conceptualisation as every individual can influence and change a concept.
This can be seen historically in Japan as each period or epoch of Japanese
history has a different conception of exactly what Japan is at a given period of
time. The Showa period (1926-1989) differs greatly from the contemporary
Heisei period (1989-present). The Showa period had a rise of ultra-
nationalism which led to xenophobia, emperor and Asian centrism; there was
hostility towards an encroaching westernisation of Japan. Despite this, as
Tessa Morris-Suzuki argues “…while attempting to turn its back on the
western (particularly British and the US) model of modernisation, was at the
same time becoming more and more in need of western technology to build
up its military strength.”85 The model chosen to be emulated was “…a German
path of technological development …”86 In contrast, contemporary Japan was
shaped by the westernisation of Japan after World War II which still managed
to retain its archaic roots and therefore did not completely become
westernised. Thus Japan itself changed as a concept from ultra-nationalistic
to toleration of the west and the incorporation of western traditions and
businesses87.
85
Tessa Morris-Suzuki, The technological transformation of Japan: from the Seventeenth to the
Twenty-first Century, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) p.144
86
Ibid
87
One example of this is acceptance of fast food restaurants as Pradyumna P. Karan remarks “Nearly
70 per cent of KFC Japan’s customers are women. With the customer base in mind, KFC offers
promotions such as tote bags … Japan is now its fastest growing market.” Pradyumna P. Karan, Japan
in the 21st Century: environment, economy, and society (Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press,
2005) p.331
37
However, the commoditisation and marketing of a concept, makes the
concept itself become a simulacrum of the same. As Deleuze and Guattari
state “the simulacrum, the simulation of a packet of noodles, has become the
true concept; and the one who packages the product, commodity, or work of
art has become the philosopher, conceptual persona88, or artist.”89 This
second simulacra would be a based around a model of the same for Deleuze
and Guattari as it rids the actual of the virtual that makes reality into a
simulation of the same. Similar to Baudrillard, the advertising and marketing of
an object such as the soft drink Coca-Cola allows for no difference in quality
for every drink produced. This makes each object have the same qualities as
the next model of production with the same features, qualities, accessories,
colours and so forth. Difference would therefore only occur at the level of the
same for each model. The Coca-Cola Company have marketed the concept
of Coca-Cola to such a degree that, “Coca-Cola is thought to be the second
most widely understood word in the world after ‘OK’!”90 However, this
burdening of a concept with the same, pre-exists the commoditisation of the
concept as the product must meet the company’s specifications and market
expectations. This burdens the concept of the product in order to make it a
viable commodity. Successful completion of this makes the product into a
marketable commodity where commoditisation of the product takes place
making it into a simulacrum of the same.
88
Conceptual persona are the concepts created by a philosopher who in turn begin to embody their own
concepts. These concepts are thus not in a state of fixity but mobility as they are interacted with not
only with the philosopher but with everyone that interacts with their concepts. For a full explanation
see ibid, pp.61-83
89
Ibid, p.10
90
Unknown author, http://www.coca-cola.co.uk/ourbrands/default.aspx?ID=9 [accessed 8th June 2009]
38
This simulacrum can be compared with Plato, where the simulacrum of
difference is not considered to be a rival to model of the same. Any virtual is
lost as it is deemed an error or mistake which then has to be corrected if any
perceivable difference occurs within a product such as pixelation problems on
an LCD screen, glitches on a game, or pick ups not working on an electric
guitar. Each company puts its product through quality testing in order to
eradicate any perceivable differences and maintain the same quality within all
its models. Employing quality assurance inspectors, examiners or game
testers in order to make sure those ‘mistakes’ are eliminated. If the customer
buys insurance on the product such as electronic goods from a company this
will enable any future ‘mistakes’ which might occur to be fixed by a qualified
technician.
Returning to the concept of Japan, the commoditisation of Japan itself would
limit other definitions from emerging such as the advertising of a specific
conception of Japan to tourists, through festivals, shrines, temples, gardens,
museums, and what to look for in each region like Odori Park in Sapporo,
Hokkaido. This conception of Japan would be based around the simulacrum
of the same as the simulacrum of difference itself would again not be
considered as a rival91. For instance, in advocating a specific image of the
cherry blossoms, as a travel guide states, “the cherry, as the Japanese see it,
as a felicitous symbol but also a poignant reminder of the evanescent beauty
91
In contrast, Murakami Haruki’s writings use the simulacrum as tool in order to criticise
contemporary Japan as Michael Seats argues “Murakami Haruki’s oeuvre utilize the structure of the
simulacrum in order to develop a complex critique of contemporary Japanese culture.” Michael Seats,
Murakami Haruki: The Simulacrum in contemporary Japanese culture (Lanham: Lexington Books,
2006) p.1
39
of the world.”92 The very conception of cherry blossom has been limited by its
description which then is the image not only for all cherry blossoms but also
the expected opinion of all the people who participate at the cherry blossom
festivals. The moment of their blossoming “is the subject of extensive media
coverage in Japan.”93 The media coverage would further reinforce the same
conception of the cherry blossoms. Every other opinion would therefore be not
as important as the current definition is enforced by government backing as
the cherry blossom is the national flower of Japan itself. Therefore it may
seem like there is little room for the simulacrum of difference in marketing and
commoditisation as the simulacrum of the same always negates it. However,
Deleuze and Guattari discuss pedagogy as a way of finding singularity again
in order to combat this simulacrum of the same. This will be discussed in the
next section with reference to saving the soul from commoditisation.
92
Rosalyn Thiro, Stephen Bere, Jane Simmons et al, Japan: DK eyewitness travel guides, (London:
Blue Island Publishing, 2003) p.17
93
Danielle Demetriou, Global warming hits Japan’s cherry blossom season,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/environment/globalwarming/5052867/Global-warming-hits-Japans-
cherry-blossom-season.html [accessed 9th June 2009]
40
4. Deleuze and the soul
The reversal of a Platonic conception of the soul
For Plato, the soul is a priori existing before its attachment to a body, “…our
souls existed before we came into the world, before we were in human form,
apart from our bodies …”94 The soul is then entrapped within the body when it
comes to be in a temporary a posteriori. This means that the soul is immortal,
for Plato, as there is an eternal self-changing of soul escaping from body after
death to a further entrapment within another body. Plato discusses this in The
Phaedrus95,
“…what has the power of changing itself never ceases from being
changed – for that power cannot be exhausted … thus the principle of
all change must be that which changes itself. It is not possible for this
to be destroyed or come to be, or the whole heaven and every sort of
coming to be would stop dead in confusion; they would never find a
way of restarting the processes of change.”96
That is to say, the alternative to this, an a posteriori experience would only
allow for a temporary form of the soul to exist. Appearances of objects would
only exist in a temporary state and then evaporate into non existence when
the state stops changing. For instance, the body for Plato would be that of
only a temporary state which would then cease to exist when the body
94
Plato, Phaedo 72E-77B in Chappell (1996), p.200
95
See Plato, Phaedrus 245C-248E
96
Plato, Phaedrus 245C-248E in Chappell (1996), p.165
41
stopped functioning. This would mean that the soul could be affected and
changed when it came into contact with other relations within the body.
Therefore the soul could be destructible as this temporary change would
eventually cease, meaning that like the body, the soul would cease to be. If
the soul did not exist a priori and was able of being affected externally then
the forms themselves and the whole of knowledge would collapse into chaos.
For Plato, this chaos does not ensue and there is a denial of the simulacrum
of the soul since knowledge is based on recollection which ensures the
existence of the soul and proof of the soul’s immortality. As the soul exists a
priori then it would not be destroyed upon an individual’s death but continue
its journey upwards to the forms or to be further entrapped within another
body. In using recollection, an individual would be recalling previous
knowledge already learned in a past life. This shows the existence of the
soul’s immortality as knowledge has always been known of objects in the
world. This prevents the world falling into chaos as knowledge based on
recollection guarantees the existence of objects in the world due to the soul’s
attachment to the body which gives knowledge of the world and of the forms
through recollection. As Eric J. Roberts remarks “the soul was regarded by
Plato as the subject of knowledge or cognitive activity in general and as the
principle of movement or of life.”97
Each time the soul is entrapped within a body it carries with it the eternal
knowledge of the forms. An individual’s knowledge at birth is wiped of their
previous knowledge but the individual then relearns through recollection.
97
Eric J. Roberts, ‘Plato’s view of the soul’, Mind, New Series, Vol. 14, No. 55 (Jul. 1905) p.372
42
For instance, if an individual was an accomplished pianist they would forget
how to play a piano when they were reborn. However, when they were going
to play piano they would learn it faster then someone else who had not played
piano in a past life because they would simply be recollecting the previous
musical structures they had learnt. Knowledge itself is proved to be a priori as
there has always been knowledge of objects in the world. As the soul is a
carrier of this a priori knowledge with each entrapment in a body, this also
proves that the soul is a priori and exists before its attachment to a body. The
soul therefore cannot be a simulacrum and dissoluble like the body but must
be immortal and divine like the forms themselves98. As Plato states, “it cannot
be destroyed … by any defect to itself or any defect specific to anything to
anything else.”99
The problem is that the soul is a prisoner of the body. Plato warns that when
pleasure and pain are at their most intense every soul imagines this object of
pain and pleasure to be the plainest and truest. In this state each pleasure
and pain is like a nail which rivets the soul to the body. This would mean that
the individual would have chosen the simulacrum of pain or pleasure over the
form. For Plato, a temporary pain is not the true form of pain, in order to gain
the true a priori the individual would have to experience several pains in order
to recollect the form itself. The soul thus becomes like the body so it is never
likely to be pure at departure from it as the individual would have chosen the
simulacrum rather than recollect the form itself. The soul in this state will never
98
This is similar to Spinoza’s notion of immortality where the more we have knowledge of the third
kind, that is to say, the more we understand and acknowledge God or nature the more we become
immortal and thus separate from our bodies which is our source of weakness, Benedict de Spinoza,
Ethics, trans. by Edwin Curley (London: Penguin, 1996), pp.171–81
99
Plato, Republic, trans. by Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p.366
43
be “… in the communion of the divine and pure and simple …”100 This means
that the soul must separate itself from a bodily identity otherwise there is a
possibility of the soul becoming a posteriori which would lead to the
destruction of the soul. In Phaedo101 , Socrates states “when I have drunk the
poison, I will no longer be with you … I shall disappear from here, and depart to
the delights of the blessed ones.”102 This shows the detachment of a bodily
identity from the soul, a denial of a temporary form of pain, and a denial of
death as the ultimate end as Socrates chooses the divine in preference of
worldly a posteriori. This would remove Earthly attachments from the soul as
any fear of death or the pain would rivet an Earthly attachment to the soul. In
detaching these from the soul then the soul can escape the body freely and
join the eternal forms.
In The Phaedrus, the soul upon leaving the body is compared to a charioteer
with winged horses. These winged horses guide the soul upwards into the
heavens. An ethical element is attached to these horses as they will fly best
when “…nourished and increased by these qualities [the Beautiful, the Wise,
the Good] and most wasted and corrupted by their opposite qualities, the
Shameful and the Bad.”103 Depending on how virtuous an individual has been
and not committing acts which were bad or shameful dictates how well the
horses will fly. The highest level they can fly is to the forms themselves where
the soul can join them and look upon each form itself. In reaching this highest
level the soul will be free from any worldly harm or suffering and thus attaining
100
R. W. Livingston, Portrait of Socrates being The apology, Crito, and Phaedo of Plato, (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1946), p.134
101
See Plato, Phaedo 115A-118A
102
Plato, Phaedo 115A-118A in Chappell (1996), p. 11
103
Plato, Phaedrus 245C-248E in ibid, p.167
44
divine bliss104. The other levels only have varying degrees of glimpses of the
forms with the worst having no glimpse only to be dragged straight back into
another body. In each reincarnation an individual will be incarnated with a
different job where they will be able to live their most virtuous life and join the
forms or continue this circular cycle of incarnations within different bodies.
Therefore the individual should lead a virtuous life in order to reach the forms
and free themselves from all worldly suffering and evils.
The soul as simulacrum
For Deleuze, the simulacrum takes on a positive role again reversing the
Platonic role of the forms. As he argues, “… souls do not belong to the domain
of resemblance or equivalence; and it is no more possible to exchange one’s
soul than it is to substitute real twins for one another.”105 That is, the Platonic
model has confused resemblance with the soul which would make the
simulacrum connected to an identity. In contrast to Plato, the soul must not be
confused with an identity as this makes all identities into a resemblance of the
same. Using twins as an example, both twins would have their own unique
differences each with their own shade of hair colour, eye colour and so forth.
For Plato, all these similarities would be merged into a resemblance of the
same form that creates a generalisation of one identity regardless of their
104
Neo Platonists such as Aquinas shared the same view and linked it to happiness in the afterlife “the
soul cannot reach the height of perfection unless it is separated from the body … the participation of
which makes it happy” Thomas Aquinas, The Resurrection of Man, in Paul Edwards (ed.), Immortality,
(New York: Prometheus Books, 1997), p.96. Aquinas fixes two problems that he observed; the way in
which the soul is to be reunited with the body and the reunion with the same body. This changes
Plato’s view where souls could be resurrected in animals. Aquinas answer to Aristotle who stated
“whatsoever things are changed in their corruptible substance are not repeated identically ... the change
wrought by death the selfsame man cannot be repeated” ibid, p.98 is that man would have been in vain
because he would have been unable to obtain the end for which he was made since it would be without
a purpose.
105
Deleuze (2004A), p.1
45
individual differences. This proves to be problematic as each twin has different
shades of hair with one perhaps having chestnut brown with the other having
golden brown hair. Uniqueness made into the same rids each twin of their own
identity making the twins into one generalised individual. When this is applied
to the soul, in generalising each difference in variances of identities makes the
soul have a resemblance of the same if the soul was compared to a bodily
identity. Every individual’s soul would be made into the resemblance of the
same soul which makes the simulacrum of the soul lost to an identity.
However the soul for Deleuze is a simulacrum as it remains in a state of
becoming with the eternal return of difference allowing for the soul’s constant
interaction with the body itself.
The eternal return of difference allows for the soul to remain independent of
an identity as difference always returns and never the same. This means that
the soul would be in a state of becoming with the body itself yet not allowing
for recollection to make the becoming of the soul into a generalised form of
the soul. Difference always returns in this generalised form of the soul
because the individual would have confused difference (the simulacrum) with
resemblance. In recollecting, as in the Platonic model, they would have
predetermined the soul in joining it with a bodily identity thus mistaking
resemblance for the simulacrum. The criticism of Plato, from a Deleuzian
view, is that Plato should have been more open to the differences in each
individual instead of choosing recollection over the simulacrum as recollection
fixes an attached identity of sameness to each individual which limits the role
of the simulacrum
46
The actual body and the virtual soul
If an individual was not open to differences and identified the soul with the
body, this could lead to them arguing that the body is like the soul. As Zizek
stated “… the body is not the body in reality, but the virtual body in Deleuze’s
sense of the term: the incorporeal/immaterial body of pure intensities”106 For
Zizek, the Deleuzian body is completely virtual without any attachment to
actuality thus the dialectic between virtual and actual would disappear. Zizek
is mistaken as the body is not virtual but actual. The body is in the realm of the
actual as it can be experienced and remains at the level of perception and
senses. An individual can quite rightly state this is an arm, leg, or torso that
they perceive.
However, the soul is virtual as it does not exist within the actual. The individual
cannot perceive the soul in experience and state this or that perception is the
soul. The soul is incorporeal and immaterial, which is full of intensities and of
becoming. These intensities are explained like amplitude within the body at
varying degrees such as the different intensive waves that move through the
body. This virtual side of the body is called the body without organs107. As
Deleuze states, “the body without organs … is an intense and intensive body. It
is traversed by a wave that traces levels or thresholds in the body according to
106
Slavoj Zizek, Deleuze’s Platonism: Ideas as Real, http://www.lacan.com/zizplato.htm, (Lacan.com,
1997) [accessed 5th July 2009]
107
Deleuze borrows this term from Antonin Artaud who states “when you will have made him a body
without organs, then you will have delivered him from his automatic reactions and restored him to his
true freedom.” Antonin Artaud, ‘To Have Done with the Judgment of God’ in Antonin Artaud,
Selected Writings, ed. by Susan Sontag, trans. by Helen Weaver (Berkley: University of California
Press, 1976) p.571 For Artaud, the body without organs is a reaction to individual’s belief in the idea of
Man with the death of God. The body without organs is therefore a way to debase the notions of organs
and scientific concepts attached to the body in order to regain a notion of the body which cannot be
conceptualised.
47
the variations of its amplitude. Thus the body does not have organs, but
thresholds or levels.”108 Put simply, at a molecular level within the body there
are various becomings, the circulation of blood cells, various cells being
created and dying, the circulation of air molecules and so forth. These various
molecular occurrences within the body have a different intensity. For instance,
when an individual breathes, each breath itself would vary in intensity as there
would be a different amount of air molecules being inhaled each time. In
contrast to Plato’s denial of temporary pain and pleasure, for Deleuze, each
pain or pleasure would be of a varying intensity as it interacts with the body.
This shows the different degrees or thresholds of pain or pleasure which
differs in each individual such as an individual falling down and hitting their
knee would vary in degree of pain due to each individual’s different thresholds.
The soul is therefore determined by its expression or actualisation in an actual
body. This means there is a reciprocal determination of virtual soul (becoming)
and actual body (Being). Like the Platonic model, the soul may be seen as a
prisoner of the body. However, with the soul working through the body the
combinations of virtual and actual are never singular individual entities as both
are indistinguishable from each other. In this sense Deleuze is closer to
Aristotle than Plato “… that the soul is not separable from the body”109 . For
Aristotle, if one cuts the body they would be cutting the soul. Deleuze also
similarly argues “…the body and the soul have no point in being inseparable,
for they are not in the least really distinct …”110
108
Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans. Daniel W. Smith (London:
Continuum, 2003) p.32
109
Aristotle, De Anima (On the Soul), trans. by Hugh Lawson-Tancred (London: Penguin, 1986) p.158
110
Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. by Tom Conley (London: Continuum,
2006B) p.13
48
The Deleuzian ethics of the soul
As shown in the Platonic model, there is an overcoming of the bodily wants in
order to reach the forms. In terms of ethics this is problematic for Deleuze due
to the loss of the forms which grounded Plato’s ethics as this would have led
to a chaotic morality. Deleuze’s moral situation therefore can be deemed to
resemble a Stoic model, where individual situations, desires and ambitions
give rise to moral restrictions and goals. This leads to Badiou’s criticism of
Deleuze stating that “[Deleuze] presupposes an ethics of thought that requires
dispossession and asceticism.”111 A Deleuzian answer to this criticism is
through Deleuze’s use of eternal return and counter-actualisation where he
tries to explain the processes that return and what allows us to become. This
leads to an invitation to move beyond moral judgements to go ‘beyond good
and evil’ but not to end in dispossession; on the contrary, this move ‘beyond
good and evil’ is active. A full discussion of counter-actualisation is beyond the
scope of this dissertation so a brief outline in relation to a Deleuzian notion of
the soul will be made instead.
The eternal return rests not on memory or recollection of the forms but on
active forgetting112 and waste. In contrast to Plato, the individual must not use
recollection as this attributes a singular sensation which does not allow for
new experiences to occur such as the individual attributing pleasure towards a
111
Badiou (2000) p.16, using this statement in relation to the soul for Badiou, it becomes a negation of
our everyday engagements in favour of the dispossession of our actual body and an asceticism in
relation to ethical acts that becomes primarily nurtured towards the soul. A Badiouian reading of the
eternal return can also be made where the eternal return for Badiou would be parallel to Plato which
would lead to a subversion of the Deleuzian eternal return.
112
Deleuze is here appropriating his own usage of active forgetting from Nietzsche. As Nietzsche
stated “... there could be no cheerfulness, hope, pride, immediacy, without forgetfulness.” Friedrich
Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, ed. by Keith Ansell-Pearson (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994) p.38
49
particular performance of a play in the previous example113 which stopped
them from enjoying subsequent performances. The attribution of a singular
feeling to a particular object, person or place is negative as this could lead to
resentment. For instance, an individual resenting mathematics as they find it
difficult. Each time the individual has to think about mathematics they would
resent it. This resentment stops them from experiencing mathematics itself in
order to learn how to overcome the logical problems by using the correct
mathematical equations. For Deleuze, this resentment114 leads to individuals
acting like tyrants who become enslaved through their own resentment. In
order to stop them from being enslaved an individual has to actively forget
each time they come to a think about that particular object, person or place
thereby they actively affirm it instead of negating it. The individual would have
to actively forget their resentment of maths in order to positively learn the
mathematical equations.
Active forgetting is therefore necessary in order for there to be new
experiences and happiness in the present. An individual who cannot actively
forget cannot be happy and instead may resent the past which in turn may
lead to a future dominated by resentment. A selection like the Platonic model
still has to occur where an individual has to affirm and exclude as there has to
be a singular choice made in order to combat the prevailing of the simulacrum
of difference. In contrast to this Platonic selection, selection is based on all the
113
See previous example at p.30
114
Deleuze again appropriates his own usage of Nietzsche’s ressentiment, in On the Genealogy of
Morality Nietzsche describes ressentiment as “those beings who, denied their proper response of
action, compensate it only with imaginary revenge” Nietzsche (1994), p.21. In simple terms,
resentiment is where ‘slaves’ would resent their masters, thus transforming the slaves to be like the
masters through their own resentment.
50
procedures opposed to selection, that is to say, to provide a model which
orders the chaos, presupposes the same and similar and that which is based
on fixity or not made to return like Plato’s use of recollection. What matters is
the decentring of circles thus creating a ‘monstrosity’ for the Deleuzian model.
Unlike Plato, Deleuze does not have a clear guideline for moral actions
instead it is left up to the individual to choose their own path through an event.
This does not lead to a hedonistic or chaotic ethics where the ethical individual
is made into a libertine or serial killer. An individual becomes like an artist
through their own personal struggles with life itself; not to sense the negative
but the positive in life. The bodily wants and desires are transformed and
reinvented when a counter-actualisation of an event occurs that alters its
sense. The counter-actualisation of events is therefore, a positive
intensification and a positive affirmation115 of an event. Deleuze gives the
example of Joë Bousquet, a First World War poet who was paralysed by a
bullet in the third battle of Aisne May 1918. For Deleuze his poems show the
counter-actualisation of Bousquet’s wound. He does not deny the event of the
shot, as Williams argues, “[Bousquet returns] to it through his books in surreal
ways, mixing times and characters to the point where wartime nurses and
contemporary companions merge.”116 The wound becomes counter-actualised
into a positive event where it becomes an artistic event as well as a physical
115
Deleuze’s use of affirmation is similar to Nietzsche’s amor fati. For Nietzsche amor fati is an
affirmation of life which overcomes nihilism where it actively selects what to say yes to. In this
selection it wipes out all resentiment but at the same time retains an element of resentment in Thus
Spoke Zarathustra, Zarathustra feels a complete satisfaction with life since all things are
interconnected; joy and suffering are both inseparable from each other. “… for all joy wants itself,
therefore it also wants heart’s agony! ... joy wants the eternity of all things, wants deep, deep, deep
eternity!” Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. by R.J. Hollingdale, (Harmondsworth;
Penguin, 1969) p.332
116
James Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Logic of Sense: a critical Introduction and guide, (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 2008) p.248
51
one, the artistic sensibility and acuteness of the world arising out of Bousquet
being physically bedridden and in deep pain.
Returning to Japan, Murakami Haruki analyses the Tokyo Gas attack on 20th
March 1995 through a series of interviews in Underground: The Tokyo Gas
Attack and the Japanese Psyche. The attack itself can be seen as a wound
upon the commuters who were at the train stations that suffered from the gas.
Some individual’s showed signs that they had overcome the attack such as
Toshiaki Toyoda117, a subway attendant, who does not resent the Aum group
who was responsible for the attack. “I try not to hate Aum … I’ve no interest in
the verdict or the punishment. That’s for the judge to decide.”118 He also
shows signs of overcoming the attack as he is greeted everyday by a man
around his fifties. “Yesterday … he said ’Alive and well means you’ve still got
things to do. Don’t give up the fight!’ Its such an encouragement just to get a
cheerful greeting. Nothing comes of hatred.”119 Masaru Yuasa120 , another
subway attendant, also showed signs of overcoming the event “The gas
attack didn’t upset me to the point where I thought: ‘I can’t take it, I have to
change jobs.’ Not at all … [I] can’t compare it with [other jobs], but I really like
it here.”121 However, other individuals still carried resentment towards the
attack such as Kei’ichi Ishikura122, a commuter, who has succumbed to
alcohol, “I...drink more now. Before I used to drink only sake but I’m on
117
See Toshiaki Toyoda, ‘I’m not a sarin victim. I’m a survivor’ in Murakami Haruki, Underground:
The Tokyo Gas Attack and the Japanese Psyche trans. Alfred Birnbaum and Philip Gabriel (London:
Vintage, 2002) pp.28 -35
118
Ibid, p. 35
119
Ibid
120
See Masaru Yuasa, ‘I’ve been here since I first joined’ in Murakami (2002) pp.18-23
121
Ibid, p.23
122
See Kei’ichi Ishikura, ‘The day of the gas attack was my sixty-fifth birthday’ in Murakami (2002)
pp.154-158
52
whiskey now.”123 Also Ikuko Nakayama124, another commuter, still has not
used the train to travel on same route where one of the gassing took place,
the Marunouchi line, since the attack. As she states “…thinking back on it, I
realize I haven’t travelled on that route since … not that I’m scared … it’s just
a problem for me.”125
This shows the importance of turning the event into an artistic event as this
manages to overcome the dialectics of moral judgments in order to go
'beyond good and evil'. The artistic event occurs in Murakami’s own
section126. Even though he was living in his house at Oiso which was two
hours south of Tokyo, the after effects of the event fascinated him. These
were the experiences of the commuters, the motives of the Aum group, the
inadequate response of the emergency services and the media’s treatment of
the Aum group as otherness to Japanese society. He does not think that the
Aum group should be forgiven as he comments “…they should never have
done what they did. For whatever reasons.” 127 Despite this, his personal
judgement of seeing the attack as having a negative effect upon the
individuals is healed through interviewing some of those directly involved. As
he remarks “…hearing all these people tell their ‘narratives’ – told from ‘our’
side … had a certain healing power. Eventually I stopped making judgements
altogether. ‘Right’ or ‘wrong’ … these questions no longer mattered.”128
Rather than just overcoming this effect it is turned into a positive affirmation
123
Ibid, p.158
124
See Ikuko Nakayama, ‘I knew it was sarin’ in Murakami (2002) pp.97-101
125
Ibid, p.101
126
See Murakami Haruki, ‘Blind Nightmare: Where are we Japanese Going?’ in Murakami (2002)
pp.195-209
127
Ibid, p.209
128
Ibid, p.205
53
through a counter-actualisation. This is where those who carried out the
attack unleash ‘INKlings’, creatures from a previous novel129. “The five Aum ‘
agents’ who punctured those bags of sarin with sharpened tips of their
umbrellas unleashed swarms of INKlings beneath the streets of Tokyo. The
mere thought fills me with dread.”130 This shows the actions of the Aum
members being turned into an artistic event which counter actualises any
negativity attributed to the effects caused by the gas. Therefore morality does
not become chaotic through the loss of the Platonic forms as the counter
actualisation of an event allows for a positive affirmation by the individual
working through the wound that they suffered in order to constantly overcome
it. Individuals in this instance would be counter-actualising effects caused by
the gas such as loss of sight, memory loss, and insomnia. This would be
different from resentment or revenge as the individuals have to constantly deal
with effects of the gas. This constant interaction allows for them to overcome
the effects, as shown in the examples of Toshiaki Toyoda and Masaru Yuasa,
they had managed to overcome the negative effects of the gas and had
become stronger individuals through constantly overcoming the ordeal
through their everyday work as subway attendants.
Overcoming the simulation of the soul
In order to combat the simulacrum of the same Deleuze and Guattari suggest
pedagogy as an alternative where conceptual difference can occur again.
129
These creatures are from Murakami’s novel Hard Boiled Wonderland And The End of The World
described by Murakami as “[having] lived beneath us since time immemorial. Horrible creatures, they
have no eyes and feed upon rotting flesh. They have dug a vast underground network of tunnels
beneath Tokyo, linking their ’nests’.” Ibid, p.208
130
Ibid, p. 209
54
As they state “only [pedagogy] can safeguard us from falling from the heights
of [a universal encyclopaedia of a concept] into the disaster of
[commercialisation].”131 For Deleuze and Guattari, individuals should
creatively interact with the simulation of the sign as this would make the
simulacrum of difference prevail over the form and copy model. Sign no
longer meaning like a ‘stop’ sign harbouring a singular definition but an
invitation for experimentation and creativity. Sign’s prompt and indicate
habitual repetitions which are working through it. As Deleuze remarks,
“simulation designates the power of an effect. It is intended rather in
the sense of a ‘sign’ issued from a process of signalization; it is in the
sense of a ‘costume’, or rather a mask, expressing a process of
disguising, where, behind each mask, there is yet another …
Simulation understood in this way is inseparable from the eternal
return, for it is in the eternal return that the reversal of the icons or the
subversion of the world of representation takes place.”132
That is, in mass production there are no real objects only masks of an object.
Similar to Baudrillard’s hyperreal, when a model is produced it is in a process
of production based on model of the same. Each model is a mask as the
original object is lost due to its excessive reproduction. This is not negative as
the eternal return reverses the effect of the dominant signifier. For instance,
131
Deleuze and Guattari (1994), p.12 – The words are used instead of the numbers in the original text.
The numbers highlight Deleuze and Guattari’s three ages of the concept. First, a universal
encyclopaedia of the concept, second pedagogy and third commercialisation of the concept which is
called commercial professional training
132
Deleuze (2004B), p.300
55
when each individual drinks Coca-Cola they may not find it pleasurable every
time they drink it even though it is advertised that way.
There cannot be a universal sign due to repetition as there would always be a
different interaction in drinking it each time. When an individual drinks Coca-
Cola one day they may enjoy it, then another they dislike it and the next they
completely hate it. This shows that the eternal return removes the basis for a
universal grounding which the commodity is signified to do in an advert as
each repetition ensures difference to return and not the same. Even if an
individual enjoyed the drink repeatedly they would not be enjoying it the same
every day as their taste buds would be constantly changing the flavour of the
drink and the drink’s flavour itself would be constantly changing due to the
continual loss of carbon dioxide. This again shows the importance of the
reversal of Platonism as recollection would attach a singular sensation
towards a brand of soft drink. However, the constant interaction by the
individual would always lead to a different signification.
In relation to the soul, an individual would be told of a specific definition. This
concept would then be in a state of becoming as it would be discussed and
interacted with differently each time. This shows the constant becoming of the
conception of the soul and the importance of pedagogy. As each discussion of
the soul would be different and not the same as there would be a constant
variation of intensities in an individual’s tone of their voice and expression
they use to convey their opinion. This would completely change the meaning
attached to the definition. For instance, a discussion may begin about the
56
soul’s attachment to the body then an individual’s tone may change in order to
emphasise a particular point. This tonal change would have a different
meaning attached to the concept in emphasising that point such as a
statement the soul is NOT attached to the body would have a different
meaning if it was stated as the soul is not attached to the body. This emphasis
on the not, in the first instance, would force a conception which would not be
permissive of other arguments than the second instance, where no emphasis
is given to the not.
As different meanings can be attached through pedagogy to a particular
definition of the soul this would allow for an individual’s creative interpretation
and manipulation of the concept. Each individual would attribute a different
meaning to the concept depending on what was emphasised. This would
affect the individual’s interpretation of the soul and allow for their own
personal interaction with what they had listened to such as writing their
thoughts in a journal or talking to another individual about it. This interaction
would be the beginning of the individual’s own conception of the soul as the
interaction itself would allow for different points to be emphasised than what
had been previously. This shows how pedagogy is again at work, as the
individual teaches themselves through their interaction with a specific
definition of the soul133.
133
An example of this is from the writings of Kierkegaard who stated “the whole undertaking [of
writing] is for my own discipline and education … I am who is being educated.” Søren Kierkegaard,
Journals and Papers VI 6533 (Pap. X A 196) in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, Kierkegaard's
Writings, Vol. V, ed. and trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton; Princeton
University Press, 1992) p.x
57
For Deleuze and Guattari, when an individual writes about a concept this
would be a in a state of becoming as it has to be constantly interacted with.
This constant interaction ensures a becoming as it lacks any finality. Even if
an individual attempted to state that the soul was X, this would only be
temporal and not final, as the individual would return to discuss their definition
which would then make them interact with it. However, this becoming itself is
limited when a temporary conception takes place as the possible world (the
virtual becoming of the concept) is expressed through real language or
speech. The concept which had previously only existed virtually exists in an
actual conception134.
Therefore the creation of concepts is cyclical as Deleuze and Guattari argue
“producing a product: a producing/product identity … an enormous
undifferentiated object. Everything stops dead for a moment, everything
freezes in its place – and then the whole process will begin over again.”135
This cyclical process is represented in Figure 1:
Figure 1: The creation of concepts for Deleuze and Guattari
134
See previous section, the actual and the virtual p.31
135
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti Oedipus trans. by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R.
Lane (London: Continuum, 2004) p.8
58
As shown, the creation of a concept itself must be singular and not chaotic, X
is X, yet can be connected to the various other definitions, X is connected to
Y, Z, A, and B. This singularity has the possibility of being burdened by its
consideration as a viable commodity. If it is accepted and deemed marketable
then commoditisation of the concept takes place which only allows for a
simulacrum of the same to take place. This is where a search for singularity is
needed in order to overcome the ‘enormous undifferentiated object’ to allow
for conceptual difference to occur again. Deleuze and Guattari present
pedagogy as one way to reintroduce the simulacrum of difference. As shown
in Baudrillard, he presents an individual’s thought as another way of finding
singularity in order to combat the simulacrum of the same. This shows that
Deleuze and Guattari are not alone in their search for singularity but also that
pedagogy should not be taken as the only absolute answer as there exists
many others.
59
Conclusion
Baudrillard and Deleuze: Similarities and Differences on Simulacra

and the Soul.
Baudrillard and Deleuze’s similarities and differences on simulacra and the
soul so far discussed are represented in the following table:
1. With the simulacrum there is a loss of an original

2. This loss entails a loss of dialectics, teleology, and a teleological end
3. Commoditisation of an object replaces the loss of the original
4. With an object turned into a commodity it is no longer a Real object but
a simulation of an object
5. There is a search for singularity in order to combat this
commoditisation
6. This singularity allows for an individual to create without the oppression
of a norm or form
7. The soul cannot be fully differentiated from the body
8. The soul must resist any bodily identity being attributed to it
9. Difference is only in a modulated form

10. The soul must not be lost by becoming a simulacrum through cloning
11. The eternal return of difference ensures a constant becoming and
temporal identities in experience
12. Difference is at a molecular level constantly affecting everything in
experience (the molar level)
13. The soul is a simulacrum as it remains in state of becoming with the
eternal return of difference allowing the soul’s constant interaction with the
body itself
60
The similarities are from numbers one to eight whilst their differences are
separated by the line. Baudrillard’s differences from Deleuze are numbers
nine and ten whilst Deleuze’s differences from Baudrillard are the remainder.
As the table shows their differences differ on difference in itself. Nevertheless,
in their interpretations of Nietzsche’s eternal return there is a similarity
between their affirmations of difference in itself which cannot be categorised.
One of Nietzsche’s most famous statements about the eternal return is from
The Gay Science:
“What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you into your
loneliest loneliness and say to you: ‘This life as you now live it and have
lived it, you will have to live it once more and innumerable times more …
there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every
thought will have to return to you, all in the same succession and
sequence.’”136
Baudrillard interprets the eternal return as a metamorphosis that has been
turned into a metastasis as he states “For [Nietzsche], it was the idea of the
Eternal Return, the idea of a singularity linked to the integral becoming and
the Eternal Return.”137 However, in modernity “the eternal return is now the
return of the infinitely small, the fractal – the repetition of the microscopic, the
inhuman scale.”138 That is, for Baudrillard, the eternal return is linked to the
136
Freidrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science trans. by Walter Kaufman (New York: Vintage Books, 1974)
p.273
137
Jean Baudrillard, Impossible Exchange trans. by Chris Turner (London: Verso, 2001) p.79
138
Ibid, p.77-8
61
notion of becoming within singularity. This singularity itself is never fulfilled or
final as it is always constantly changing. As discussed for the definition of the
soul, in the history of philosophy, each philosopher interprets the soul
differently and thus ensures that the concept of the soul is constantly
becoming. This becoming of a singularity is jeopardised by the categorisation
of the becoming into a molecular scale which inhibits becoming by being
identified at a microscopic level. The microscopic becoming “[is a] plurality,
multiplicity, a being merely exchanges itself for itself or for one of its many
avatars. It produces metastases; it does not metamorphose.”139 By being
identified, the becoming can merely can be exchanged with another where
one category can be made into a Universal. For instance, the becoming of
blue would be categorised into a particular shade when it is identified like navy
blue this can be exchanged with sky blue as both shades are different but still
both are part of the universal concept of blue. This creates a metastasis of one
particular shade of blue that is always going to be this shade; this means that
the categorisation of a particular shade is negative as it does not allow for the
metamorphosis or continual becoming of a particular shade of blue.
Baudrillard argues,
“[in relation to the eternal return] I would recover the influence of
Nietzsche in terms of metamorphosis … possibilities of the entwining of
forms without causes or effects … or again the possibility on the plane of
disappearance: something which disappears, the traces of which are
139
Ibid, p.78
62
effaced, origin and end are effaced. So things are no longer understood
in terms of a linear order.”140
This metamorphosis of the eternal return is preferred as it allows difference in
itself to reverse a created Universal which presupposes an eternal return of
the same. In order to combat this ‘hell of the same’, singularities need to be
found in order to affirm the becoming of difference rather than try to absorb it
in a Universal. This is where Baudrillard affirms the singularity of thought (as
previously discussed) in order to affirm this becoming of difference where
each individual’s thought allows for constant change. As Hegarty argues, “the
reason singularity eludes simulation … is because it can never be, never
realize its becoming … and is only possible in the cool light of those objects
that present themselves in and after simulation.”141
Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche’s eternal return is the eternal return of
difference as he argues “[the eternal return] must not be interpreted as the
return of something that is ‘one’ or the ‘same’ … the eternal return does not
describe the nature of that which returns but, on the contrary, the fact of
returning for that which differs.”142 If an individual thinks an object is the same
as another or can be exchanged then they would have confused resemblance
with repetition. If an individual perceived that two reds were similar such as
cherry red and blood red making them into a general Red then they would be
mistaken as each particular shade of red would itself be constantly changing.
140
Jean Baudrillard, ‘The Revenge of the Crystal’ in Baudrillard live: selected interviews ed. by Mike
Gane (London: Routledge, 1993) p.54
141
Hegarty (2004) p.163
142
Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy trans. Hugh Tomlinson (London: Continuum, 2006C)
p.45
63
Any categorisation made of a particular red would only be temporary and not
universal due to the shades constant becoming of brightness, darkness and
light within each colour. The importance of Deleuze’s work with Guattari and
his influence on Deleuze must be stressed as; Guattari highlights the
importance of models based on difference in itself in order to combat
Capitalist forms of identification and categorisation which assume an eternal
return of the same. Otherwise there may be a problem of conservatism within
Deleuze as the return of difference would always ensure a constant becoming
yet there would be no way to change the overall dominant form of
representation if models were not supplied.
Baudrillard and Deleuze’s differences therefore occur not on difference in
itself but how difference in itself is actualised within reality. This actualisation
of difference in itself is negative for both philosophers as the categories used
have a danger of becoming universal and not a temporary singularity. For
Baudrillard, this is occurs when the universal itself is made into a hyperreal
and simulation through its surplus reproduction of one product such as the
surplus reproduction of Nintendo’s Dsi removes the basis for any other
singular models within the company to emerge since each model would only
based on modulated differences of version 1.0, 2.0 and so forth. All singular
models created for the creation of a new model are discarded once the
universal model was updated. Also the singularities within each universal
model would be ‘fixed’ as Nintendo expect all their Dsi’s to be of the same
quality and efficiency as any differences spotted in quality testing would be
eradicated.
64
For Deleuze and Guattari, the singular is made into a universal through
surplus reproduction of one sign; For instance, Kettle foods argue whilst
promoting their Classic Barbeque crisps that “a backyard barbeque
is the gathering everyone feels good about … so go ahead and let your hair
down; these chips make you feel good.”143 Here Kettle foods are arguing that
each time an individual eats their Classic Barbeque crisps not only will they
feel good but also everyone around them who eats them too. This creates a
dominant sign of feeling good whilst eating those specific crisps when, for
Deleuze and Guattari, this is not the case at all. As each time an individual
selects the crisps it will always be different. They may prefer a different flavour
when choosing a flavour, have ate something which affects their taste buds
causing their dislike of the flavour, or an individual may be allergic to one of
the ingredients. With these constant variables in selecting and eating the
specific packet of crisps, the company cannot possibly assert a universal that
every single individual will feel good and like their flavour.
In relation to the soul, cloning for Baudrillard rids the need of a soul as an
individual can be reproduced by cloning which ensures the immortality of their
identity. Previously, an individual needed a minister or priest to cleanse their
sins in order to gain an entry into heaven and avoid damnation. This raises a
problem for ethics as an individual does not need to act morally good in order
to be immortal but only in relation to a constructed goodness which might be
problematical. This would be part of the cloning process itself as it attempts to
eradicate genetic defects as Baudrillard argues “…it won’t be the sheep with
143
Unknown Author, http://www.kettlefoods.com/our-all-natural-products/chips [accessed 4th July
2009]
65
staggers or the African with AIDS that will be cloned. It is obvious that cloning,
if it is to develop, will be automatically discriminatory.”144 In order to combat
this ethical problem of scientific cloning, Baudrillard emphasises the use of
thought. Thought would allow for openness and discussion of the ethical
problems and keep the soul as a concept rather than have it overthrown by a
scientific norm or universal of individual which creates a discriminatory
judgment and disregards Otherness.
For Deleuze, the soul can be argued as the virtual in a reciprocal relation
within the actual body. The soul would be the body without organs, the
molecular processes working within the body which are constantly at work.
This does not mean that Deleuze wants a philosophy of the molecular which
can be categorised, as the molecular cannot be categorised due to its
constant becoming and each molar perception in itself would always be
different. The soul therefore would always be working with and in the body.
Similar to Aristotle, the soul would be a principle of animation within the body.
This means that the body and soul are inseparable processes working with
each other as the virtual is always part of the actual. Despite this, the soul
must still be differentiated from the body in order for the soul not to retain a
bodily identity. As shown with Guattari this identification is negative as the
soul’s categorisation could lead to a dominance of one specific signification.
The soul is X and only ever X. In order to combat this dominant signifier
Deleuze and Guattari argue for the use of pedagogy. The use of pedagogy
allows for difference in itself to occur as each interaction with the sign would
144
Jean Baudrillard, Screened Out, trans. Chris Turner (London: Verso, 2002) p.197
66
be different which would change its signification. Similar to Baudrillard, they
want openness and discussion of the definition of the soul in order to keep
constant different interpretations, through pedagogy, to prevent any
domination of a sign.
A similarity can be shown as both are concerned with mass production and
communication of a universal which in itself becomes a simulation, an object
posing itself as the only real object. Therefore in order to combat this
simulation both search for singularities. This search for singularity does not
mean that they are searching for the Real or a Reality within objects as this
would be impossible for Baudrillard as everything has become hyperreal or
within Deleuze as he supports the reversal of Platonism. To a certain extent
singularities are one way to fight the current modern state of simulation
caused by surplus reproduction of objects and signs in order to maintain
discussion and openness.
Baudrillard and Deleuze also differ in their affirmation of a singularity in order
to affirm difference in itself as Baudrillard advocates thought and Deleuze and
Guattari advocate pedagogy. One reason why Deleuze does not present
thought as a singularity like Baudrillard is that thought for him is based on the
image of thought which resists and negates becoming. However, underlying
this image of thought would be the becoming of thought which cannot be
represented in an image as the virtual thought would constantly change the
actual expression. Singularity which takes place in Baudrillard is similar to
Deleuze as there would always be pluralities of singularities due to difference
in itself. There may be many other differences between Baudrillard and
67
Deleuze and singularities that they present in order to combat simulation. Due
to the constraints on the dissertation it is impossible to give a full analysis of
their differences and proposed singularities which allow for difference in
itself145.
These singularities which allow for difference in itself should always remain
open for discussion and debate. Privileging of one specific or a collaboration
of philosophers would have a danger of only using their singularities and no
other. This would stop the search for other singularities as their preferred
philosopher(s) would have the correct singularities therefore the answer to the
problem. Their specific singularities would then have the possibility of
becoming commodities (dominant signifier) and not a singularity based on
difference in itself any longer.
Hopefully, by showing that singularities must always remain open and not
biased toward any specific interpretation then it will allow for a continual
search for new singularities and different interpretations and in showing some
of Baudrillard and Deleuze’s similarities and differences. This will turn the soul
itself into a simulacrum due to the different pragmatic situations that a scholar
encounters.
145
One particular example is in their interpretations on desire. For Baudrillard, castration creates a lack
of desire within an individual, See Jean Baudrillard, For a critique of the political economy of the sign
trans. by Charles Levin, (New York: Telos press, 1981) pp.88-101. In contrast, for Deleuze and
Guattari, desire is not positive or negative but is in a continual production of production, where an
individual is part of desiring production see Deleuze and Guattari (2004) pp.1-42. Another singularity
of difference in itself which is affirmed by Baudrillard is ‘pataphysics See Baudrillard (1994) pp.108-9
and pp.149-154 and for Deleuze, similarly, humour see Deleuze (2004B) pp. 153-161.
68
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Baudrillard and Deleuze On Simulacra and

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Baudrillard and

Dissertation Submitted for the

and enables an emphasis on multiplicity and plurality in its place. Firstly,

Baudrillard’s interpretation of simulacra will be analysed in ‘The three orders

Imaginary’ in Simulacra and Simulation. Secondly, his conception of simulacra

Thirdly, Deleuze’s interpretation of simulacra will be analysed focusing on

Sense and the sections on Plato in Difference and Repetition. In conclusion

argument analyses works by Baudrillard and Deleuze in order to suggest

definition of the soul is not burdened with a particular universality.

List of Figures ..................................................................................................... iv

1. Baudrillard and simulacra ......................................................................... 5

2. Simulacra and Cloning ............................................................................. 15

3. Deleuze and simulacra ............................................................................ 26

4. Deleuze and the soul ................................................................................ 41

Figure 1: The creation of concepts for Deleuze and Guattari .........................58

The concept of simulacra, a copy of a copy without an original in the

philosophies of Baudrillard and Deleuze, following a Nietzschean influence,

transcendental influence. The concept of simulacra is central to their

philosophies, for Baudrillard it creates a hyperreal and simulation of reality.

For Deleuze, through repetition, it allows for the virtual (becoming) to

simulacrum also creates a simulation of reality. Therefore central to their

philosophies are the ways in which difference in itself (becoming) is used by

commoditisation in order to create an illusion of the same; the way in which

return. A full analysis of this will be discussed further in the proceeding

Exploration of Postmodern theories of Architecture and Identity studies

Baudrillard’s use of the simulacra through a discussion of the body and

Simulacra: Fatal Theories for Postmodernity analyses in depth the

postmodern experience which he describes as a “simulated experience.”2 Out

the questions of reality. Also in contemporary rock music the concept of

In contrast to simulacra, the soul has always had a strong philosophical

interest, from Ancient Greek philosophies of Aristotle, Anaxagoras,

Democritus, Lucretius and Plato to contemporary philosophies of Baudrillard,

Derrida and Deleuze. Despite Anthony Quinton’s remark in 1962 that

soul has remained a debated topic within contemporary philosophy. In the

fundamentalists were argued to be dying for their promise of seventy two

virgins. As Nicholas Kristof argues “Christoph Luxenberg [a scholar’s

‘grapes’ … but suicide bombers presumably would be in for disappointment if

of providence and a future state to martyrs demonstrates issues concerning

God, transcendence, immanence, immortality and personal identity.

between Baudrillard and Deleuze. This can be seen in Benjamin D. Carson’s

‘Towards a Postmodern Political Art: Deleuze, Guattari, and the Anti-Culture

Book’6, Jacque Donzelot‘s ‘An antisociology’7, Brian Massumi’s ‘Realer than

Real: The simulacra according to Deleuze and Guattari’8, Steven Mara’s

‘Baudrillard and Deleuze: Re-viewing the postmodern scene’9 and Gary

Genosko’s Baudrillard and Signs: signification ablaze.10 Despite this interest

dissertation will therefore contribute to furthering interest in this area and

The dissertation proceeds as follows. In Chapter One there is an exposition of

Two will build on the previous explanation of Baudrillard’s simulacra and

there will be an exposition of Deleuze’s conception of the simulacra; this will

discuss the use of simulacra in Difference and Repetition. In Chapter Four

of Sense will be used in order to show how a Deleuzian conception of the

soul can emerge from his reversal of Platonism. In conclusion, there is a

review of Baudrillard and Deleuze’s positions on simulacra and its relation to

1. Baudrillard and simulacra

Baudrillard first introduces the term simulacra in Symbolic, Exchange and

production schemas11. As he remarks, “the counterfeit is the dominant

schema in the ‘classical’ period, from the Renaissance to the Industrial

Revolution. [Whilst] production is the dominant schema in the industrial era.”12

Counterfeiting does not mean to resemble a copy of the original, rather,

completely altering and changing a material which is reliant upon a limitation.

substance …”13 In this way, stucco would be a counterfeit as it resembles an

appearance of an object like velvet curtains but in itself is a new object as it is

Martina in Rome by Pietro da Cortona, 1635-50] helped further to equalize