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Abstract
& Research on political judgment and decision-making has formation threatening to their own candidate, the opposing
converged with decades of research in clinical and social psy- candidate, or neutral control targets. Motivated reasoning was
chology suggesting the ubiquity of emotion-biased motivated associated with activations of the ventromedial prefrontal cor-
reasoning. Motivated reasoning is a form of implicit emotion tex, anterior cingulate cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, in-
regulation in which the brain converges on judgments that sular cortex, and lateral orbital cortex. As predicted, motivated
minimize negative and maximize positive affect states associ- reasoning was not associated with neural activity in regions
ated with threat to or attainment of motives. To what extent previously linked to cold reasoning tasks and conscious
motivated reasoning engages neural circuits involved in ‘‘cold’’ (explicit) emotion regulation. The findings provide the first
reasoning and conscious emotion regulation (e.g., suppres- neuroimaging evidence for phenomena variously described
sion) is, however, unknown. We used functional neuroimag- as motivated reasoning, implicit emotion regulation, and psy-
ing to study the neural responses of 30 committed partisans chological defense. They suggest that motivated reasoning is
during the U.S. Presidential election of 2004. We presented qualitatively distinct from reasoning when people do not have
subjects with reasoning tasks involving judgments about in- a strong emotional stake in the conclusions reached. &
INTRODUCTION
avoid aversive feelings such as anxiety and guilt. We use
In political science, cognitive science, economics, law, the term motivated reasoning here because of its wide-
and business, the predominant models of judgment and spread use (although, strictly speaking, all reasoning is
decision-making today are ‘‘bounded rationality’’ models typically motivated by emotions such as interest, excite-
(Simon, 1990). These models suggest that people are ment, anxiety, etc.; see Marcus, 2002; Westen, 1985).
rational within limits imposed by cognitive shortcuts and Neural network models of motivated reasoning sug-
heuristics (Westen, Weinberger, & Bradley, in press; gest that in affectively relevant situations, the brain
Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; Kahneman & Tversky, 2000). equilibrates to solutions that simultaneously satisfy two
In political science, a long-standing body of research sets of constraints: cognitive constraints, which maxi-
on ‘‘partisan’’ biases in political judgment (e.g., Taber, mize goodness of fit to the data, and emotional con-
Lodge, & Glathar, 2001; Campbell & Converse, 1960) straints, which maximize positive affect and minimize
points to another set of limits to rational judgment im- negative affect (Westen, Feit, Arkowitz, & Blagov, 2005;
posed by emotion-biased or motivated reasoning (i.e., Thagard, 2003; Westen, 1998). Decision theorists have
reasoning biased to produce emotionally preferable con- long argued that people gravitate toward decisions that
clusions; Kunda, 1990; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). maximize expected utility (or in emotional terms, that
Motivated reasoning can be viewed as a form of implicit optimize current or anticipated affect; Simon, Krawczyk,
affect regulation in which the brain converges on solu- & Holyoak, 2004; Mellers, 2000; Westen, 1985). Contem-
tions that minimize negative and maximize positive porary views of motivation similarly emphasize approach
affect states (Westen & Blagov, in press; Westen, 1985, and avoidance systems motivated by positive and nega-
1994, 1998). Freud (1933) described such processes tive affect (Carver, 2001; Davidson, Jackson, & Kalin,
decades ago, using the term ‘‘defense’’ to denote the 2000). The same processes of approach and avoidance,
processes by which people can adjust their cognitions to motivated by affect or anticipated affect, may apply to
motivated reasoning, such that people will implicitly
approach and avoid judgments based on their emotional
Emory University associations.
D 2006 Massachusetts Institute of Technology Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 18:11, pp. 1947–1958
A series of studies involving political crises in the Kerry, Bill Clinton, Dick Cheney, the Democratic Party,
United States spanning the past 8 years (the impeach- and the Republican party using a 0–100 ‘‘feeling ther-
ment of Bill Clinton, the disputed presidential election mometer’’ (from cold to warm); obtained 4-point rat-
of 2000, and the discovery of torture by the United ings of how often Bush and Kerry made them feel angry,
States at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq) supports this model hopeful, afraid, proud, and disgusted; and obtained
(Westen et al., 2005). These studies, along with simu- 4-point ratings of the extent to which they saw the
lations using a connectionist network designed to ad- two candidates as moral, intelligent, dishonest, and out
dress ‘‘hot cognition’’ (Thagard, 2003), suggest that of touch with ordinary people. To be included sub-
political reasoning can be strongly influenced by the jects had to rate themselves as a strong Democrat or
emotional consequences of drawing one conclusion or Republican and to endorse a difference between the
the other. Although research has begun to examine ex- two parties or the two candidates 30 points on the
plicit (conscious) processes used to regulate emotion, feeling thermometer.
notably suppression and distraction (Anderson et al.,
2004; Hariri, Mattay, Tessitore, Fera, & Weinberger, 2003;
Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002), no studies
Measures and Procedures
have yet examined the neural processes involved in
motivated reasoning or implicit affect regulation. The To simulate the constraint satisfaction processes that
present study is also among the first to explore the occur as citizens confront political information, we
neural basis of any form of political decision-making. devised six sets of statements regarding each of the
In this study, conducted during the U.S. Presidential following targets: George Bush, John Kerry, and polit-
election of 2004, we observed the reasoning processes ically neutral male targets (e.g., Tom Hanks, Hank
of committed partisans as they were presented with Aaron, William Styron). (We tried to generate well-
threatening information about their own candidate, the known targets who were emotionally neutral but ulti-
opposing candidate, and neutral control individuals. We mately selected politically neutral but largely mildly
hypothesized that reasoning about threatening informa- positive targets because of the difficulty identifying
tion about one’s own candidate would activate regions well-known figures of any kind about whom people
likely to be involved in implicit emotion regulation, nota- have no feelings.) Although many of the statements
bly the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) and and quotations were edited or fictionalized, we maxi-
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), as well as regions mized their believability by embedding them in actual
reflecting elicitation of negative emotion (the insula, quotes or descriptions of actual events. Subjects were
lateral orbital frontal cortex, and amygdala) (see, e.g., given detailed instructions prior to scanning and a
Ochsner & Gross, 2005). practice run to familiarize them with procedure prior
to imaging trials.
Each statement set consisted of seven slides present-
METHODS ing verbal material, designed to present a clear contra-
diction between the target person’s words and actions
Participants and then to resolve that contradiction (Figure 1). Pre-
We recruited subjects (n = 30, 15 Democrats and sentation duration of the slides ranged from 5 to 15 sec,
15 Republicans) by placing flyers at local political party depending on the length and demands of the material
offices, public places, and cars and houses with po- or task, and reflected pretesting on pilot subjects. Slide
litical endorsements (e.g., bumper stickers); posting 1 (15 sec) presented an initial statement, typically a
information on Internet political discussion groups quote from the target individual. Slide 2 (12 sec) pre-
and local political and party listservs; and placing sented a contradictory statement suggesting that the
newspaper and radio advertisements. Recruitment ma- target’s words and actions were inconsistent. Slide 3
terials requested right-handed men, ages 22–55 years, (7 sec) asked subjects to consider whether the target’s
who were ‘‘committed Republicans or Democrats.’’ ‘‘statements and actions are inconsistent with each
We conducted all screening and scanning from late other,’’ and Slide 4 (5 sec) asked them to rate the extent
August through early October 2004. Subjects received to which they agreed that the target’s words and deeds
$50 compensation. were contradictory, from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4
Potential subjects were screened by phone using a (strongly agree) by using a four-button pad. Slide 5
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) screener (to rule out (12 sec) presented an exculpatory statement that logi-
safety risks, neurological conditions, etc.) and a political cally explained away the inconsistency. Slide 6 (7 sec)
attitudes questionnaire, using items from the National then asked subjects to consider whether the target’s
Election Studies (NES, www.umich.edu/nes) to mea- ‘‘statements and actions are not quite as inconsistent as
sure partisanship. Using NES item wording, we asked they first appeared.’’ The seventh and final slide (5 sec)
about nature and strength of party affiliation; obtained asked them once again to rate the extent to which they
ratings on their feelings toward George W. Bush, John agreed with this statement, using the same 4-point scale.
Planned Comparisons
RESULTS
We tested hypotheses using planned comparisons (con-
trast analysis), using all six statement sets per experi- Behavioral Ratings
mental condition (same party, other party, neutral Subjects’ ratings during image acquisition of the extent
target). Because the focus of this report is on partisans’ to which targets’ statements and actions were incon-
responses to threatening information about their candi- sistent provided strong evidence of motivated reason-
date (rather than on differences in neural processing ing (Figure 2). As can be seen from Figure 2, mean
between Democrats and Republicans), and because ratings on the six Bush contradiction phases were 3.79
Democrats’ neural and behavioral responses to Kerry for Democrats versus 2.16 for Republicans, t(27) =
contradictions resembled Republicans’ responses to 12.82, p < .0001, with small SEs (indicated by the error
Bush contradictions, we aggregated the data across bars). Mean ratings on the six Kerry contradictions were
parties.1 No subjects’ data were excluded for data anal- 2.60 (± 0.15) for Democrats versus 3.55 (± 0.12) for
ysis. We tested three primary contrasts. The first com- Republicans, t(27) = 5.25, p < .0001. The patterns
pared neural responses in the same-party condition were similar (and statistically significant) for the post-
(i.e., Republicans evaluating Bush and Democrats eval- exculpatory-phase ratings (i.e., partisans were substan-
uating Kerry) to responses in the neutral condition (i.e., tially more likely to accept the exculpatory statements
the neutral targets) during the contradiction phase, for their own candidate vs. the opposing candidate).
when subjects were confronted with a cognitive contra- Mean ratings on the six Bush exculpatory phases were
to a neutral target would activate the amygdala, but contradictory statements associated with a relatively
we did not observe amygdala activation in our primary neutral individual.
contrasts. Because the amygdala has been characterized
as often exhibiting a transient, rapidly habituating re-
Same-party Condition: Contradictory >
sponse to emotional stimuli (Breiter et al., 1996), we
Exculpatory Information
examined whether amygdala activation might be present
only during the earlier part of the session, focusing again Our second primary contrast subtracted processing
on the contradiction phase. For each condition (same- during the exculpatory phase from the contradiction
party, other-party, and neutral target), we separately phase for same-party conditions only. This allowed us to
contrasted the responses observed in the first half of examine two phases in which subjects had to make
the session with those in the latter half (i.e., the judgments about new information that contradicted
contradiction phase of the first three statement sets prior information, isolating processes involved when
for each target vs. the last three) to assess whether the emotionally desired conclusion did not coincide
habituation of amygdala response occurred across the with the conclusion likely to be drawn based on unbi-
session. ased assessment of the data (Figure 5). The contrast
For this exploratory analysis, we set a statistical signif- analysis showed activations in the left lateral inferior
icance threshold of p < .005 and an extent threshold of frontal cortex (at 28, 24, 24; size = 31 voxels; Z =
five contiguous voxels, given the lower power of these 4.51) and left insula (not shown: at 36, 18, 18; size =
contrasts. Supporting the habituation hypothesis, for 190 voxels; Z = 4.47), both consistent with processing of
the same-party condition, we observed greater amygdala negative affect (Wright, He, Shapira, Goodman, & Liu,
activation during the first half of the session relative to 2004). Also seen were activations in the inferior orbital
the second half, in the left amygdala (at 22, 4, 12; frontal cortex (gyrus rectus) bilaterally (at 2, 42, 24;
size = 13 voxels; Z = 3.19). This effect was also observed size = 230 voxels; Z = 4.15), indicative of emotion pro-
for the other-party condition, also in the left amygdala cessing (Ballmaier et al., 2004; Kilts, Egan, Glideon, Ely, &
(at 22, 4, 22; size = 8 voxels; Z = 2.84), perhaps Hoffman, 2002; O’Doherty, Kringelbach, Rolls, Hornak,
reflecting arousal associated with the detection of a & Andrews, 2001; Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000)
contradiction associated with a disliked opponent (i.e., as well as the precuneus (suggesting evaluative judg-
schadenfreude). More importantly, this habituation ef- ments, as above) (at 6, 56, 18; size = 278 voxels;
fect was absent for the neutral-target condition, in line Z = 3.98). Because the orbitofrontal cortex has been
with the hypothesized weak emotional response to proposed to be crucially involved in emotional in-
fluences on reasoning (Damasio, 1994), we examined (contradiction vs. exculpatory). Consistent with the
whether this orbitofrontal activation was specific to the expectation that same-party contradictions would elicit
same-party condition by performing the same contra- negative affect, the contrast yielded activations in the
dictory > exculpatory contrast with the neutral target right lateral orbital frontal cortex (not shown: maximum
condition. Only a single, small activation was observed at 38, 52, 8; size = 130 voxels; Z = 4.16). Also
in the orbitofrontal cortex, in the gyrus rectus (at 2, 28, consistent with affect processing and regulation were
24; size = 17 voxels; Z = 3.60), consistent with the multiple activations throughout the ACC, medial and
lower hypothesized involvement of emotion processing orbital PFC (at 2, 40, 10; size = 952; Z = 4.74), and left
in this condition (Figure 6). The only other prominent superior frontal gyrus (at 24, 56, 12; size 90; Z = 4.11)
activations for the same-party condition contrasts were associated in previous studies with moral reasoning and
bilateral activations in the parahippocampal gyrus and evaluation of self-generated information (Farrow et al.,
extending to the hippocampus (at 36, 34, 18; size = 2001). The contrast also showed large activations in the
126 voxels; Z = 4.03 and 26, 26, 18; size = 190; Z = posterior cingulate/precuneus (at 8, 50, 8; size =
4.47), perhaps indicative of efforts to generate solutions 3114; Z = 6.27).
(rationalizations) based on memory retrieval. As in the
first primary contrast, in this second primary contrast we
Postdecision Judgment: Consider1 > Consider2
observed no differential activation of the dorsolateral
for Same-party Targets
PFC (DLPFC), suggesting that motivated reasoning did
not differentially engage regions previously linked with We performed a fourth, more exploratory analysis to
conscious attempts to reason, suppress information, or isolate the neural information processing related to
regulate affect. equilibrated, emotionally constrained solutions (i.e.,
solutions biased by emotional considerations). We hy-
pothesized that neural processing indices of negative
Testing the Interaction: Contradictory >
affect would be diminished or absent following moti-
Exculpatory Information for Same-party >
vated reasoning (because the function of motivated
Neutral Target
reasoning is hypothesized to be the elimination of the
The third primary contrast (Figure 7) tested the inter- aversive affect states associated with threatening infor-
action between target (same-party vs. neutral) and phase mation). An inherent limitation of the study design was
REFERENCES
Limitations
Abramowitz, A. I. (2004). When good forecasts go bad: The
The study has several limitations. First, because this is time-for-change model and the 2004 Presidential Election.
the first study to examine the neural correlates of both Political Science and Politics, 37, 745–746.