Philosophy a guide through the subject edited by A. C. GRAYLING O Xx F O R DThis is an introduction to and guide through philosophy. It is intended to orientate, assist, and stimulate the reader at every stage in the study of the subject. Eleven extended essays have been specially commissioned from leading philosophers; each surveys a major area of the subject and offers an accessible but sophisticated account of the main debates. The editor’s introduction maps out the philosophical terrain and explains how the different areas relate to each other. The first part of the book deals with the foundations of philosophical enquiry. The second part offers four historical chapters, introducing great thinkers from the past, explaining and discussing their ideas, and showing the value of studying them today. The third part comprises two chapters devoted to questions of value. Full annotated bibliographies are provided at the ends of chapters to serve as guides to further reading. ‘This is real philosophy, not simplified philosophy: it will be accessible for the beginner but equally valuable for the third-year student. Deep and challenging questions are not shirked; the reader will be given a sense of involvement in the practice of philosophy today. CONTENTS Epistemology Scott Sturgeon, M. G. F. Martin, and A. C. Grayling Philosophical Logic Mark Sainsbury Methodology: The Elements of the Philosophy of Science David Papineau Metaphysics ‘Tim Crane and David Wiggins The Philosophy of Mind Martin Davies Ancient Greek Philosophy I: The Pre-Socratics and Plato Christopher Janaway Ancient Greek Philosophy II: Aristotle Hugh Lawson-Tancred Modern Philosophy I: The Rationalists Roger Scruton Modern Philosophy II: The Empiricists A.C, Grayling Ethics ISBN 0-19-875157-5 Bernard Williams Aesthetics £12.99 net in UK Sebastian Gardner Caverllutation: Pynamic ofa Head 1994, by Paul Kee: 206 (U ce ton 65 50cm privatecolletion, © DACS 1996, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 9EPOOTSE'TO197| GRAYLING OXFORDPHILOSOPHYPHILOSOPHY A GUIDE THROUGH THE SUBJECT EDITED BY A. C. GRAYLING OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 1995Oxford University Press, Welton Stree, Oxford ox2 60P Oxford New York Athens Auckland Bangkok Bombay Calewta Cape Town Dares Salaam Delhi ‘lorence Hong Kong litanbul Karachi ‘Kuala Lumpur Madras Madrid Melbourne ‘Mexico Cty Nairobi Pans Singapore Taipet Tokyo Toronto and associated companies sn Bevin thadan Orford i a trade mark of Oxford University Press Published inthe Unite States by Oxford University Press Inc, New York © The University of London 1995, All rights reserved. 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Enquiries concerning reproduction outside these terms and in other countries should be sent tothe Rights Deparment, Oxford University Press, atthe adaress above This book is sold subject to the condition thai shal ot, by way oftrade or otherwise, be len, r-sld, hited out or otherwise circulated ‘without the publisher's pric consent in any form of binding or cover ‘other than that in which tis published and without a similar condition including this condition being impos onthe subsequent purchaser ‘The moral rights ofthe editor and contributors tobe identified ‘as the authors oftheir contributions have been assed ‘This work was originally produced forthe use of students ofthe ‘External Programme ofthe University of Landon British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Daa available ISBN 0-19-975156-7 ISBN 0-19-875157-5 (Pbk) 13579108642 Set by Hope Serncescabongdon) La, Printed in Great Britain co acid fe paper by Booker (Bath) Led Midsomer Nein, AvonPreface If you intend a journey, you do well to consult a map. And if the terrain to be crossed promises forests and mountains, rivers and ravines—wonderful to behold, but demanding more than an afternoon’s stroll—then the map should be detailed enough, and of the right kind. With a suitable map one always trav- els more hopefully, and arrives sooner. This book is a map of the central provinces of philosophy. It is an introduc- tion, a guide, a companion, and a survey all in one, and it aspires to be so by addressing philosophy’s chief questions clearly and in some detail. It consists of eleven extended essays, each providing an account of the main topics in the field of philosophy it covers. The essays, although introductory, are not elementary, because they are aimed at those who wish to take more than a superficial look at philosophy. They therefore seek to give the full character of inquiry into its most important questions. Nor do the essays try to be comprehensive. The fields they cover are large, so they aim instead to identify and discuss the core questions, so that readers will be well equipped to continue their cxploration of those fields independently. The eleven essays are self-contained discussions of the philosophical subjects they introduce. But philosophy is a pursuit in which there are many overlaps and interconnections, and therefore the chapters cross each other's territory frequently; as the reader reads more of them, so their internal connections become apparent. (More is said of this in the Introduction.) Different authors take different views of the same matter; the reader will at times see those con- trasts here, and is invited to reflect on them. This volume originated in work done on behalf of the University of London in commissioning material to accompany undergraduate studies in philosophy. London has arguably one of the best single-subject degrees in philosophy offered by any university in the world. When the opportunity arose to put together a collection of essays to serve as a companion to London’s philosophy degree, the missionary possibility immediately suggested itself of promoting the university's conception of what is central to philosophical study. This vol- ume is the result. Almost all the contributors to this volume either teach at or have taught at the University of London; and almost all have also had experience of teaching elsewhere—at Oxford, Cambridge, and universities elsewhere in Britain, North Amcrica, and Australasia. The resulting combination of philosophical interest with pedagogical experience drawn from this wide range finds expression invi Preface this book in two forms—in the choice of subjects considered to be the ground- work of philosophy, and in the level at which the subjects are introduced. ‘The choice of subjects regarded as the basis of a philosophical education is: epistemology, metaphysics, philosophical logic, elementary philosophy of sci- ence (here called ‘methodology’), ethics, the history of ancient Greek philoso- phy, and the history of modern philosophy from Descartes to Kant. These form the basis for further studies, of such subjects as philosophy of mind, aesthetics, political philosophy, philosophy of language, medieval philosophy, continental philosophy from Hegel, twentieth-century analytic philosophy, and a number of others. This volume covers all the core subjects, and two of the more widely studied additional subjects, namely philosophy of mind and aesthetics. A second vol- ume will cover the remaining fields of philosophy. Much might be said about the doubtful value of too simple or too pedago- gical an approach to introductory philosophy. The essays in this volume do not try to simplify what is not an elementary subject. They instead aim at clear but unflinching examination of the central topics. The level at which the volume is pitched is that of a discussion which regards its readers not only as capable of tackling philosophy seriously, but as wishing to do so. It is therefore also a com- panion; the reader can return to it often in the course of his or her study of phi- losophy. And it is also a survey: anyone interested to know what is at the centre of each major area of philosophical inquiry will find these essays thoroughly informative, Apart from the contributors themselves, whom I warmly thank for their endeavours, a number of others were also helpful in the preparation of this vol- ume: I especially thank my colleagues in the Department of Philosophy at Birkbeck College, University of London; Alex Orenstein and Jonathan Dancy; Jude Brooks, Jane van der Ban, and M. C. Black at Senate House, University of London; Peter Momtchiloff and the readers of Oxford University Press; and Elizabeth Cotton and Marylois Chan. ACG.Contents List of Contributors Editor's Introduction 1, EPISTEMOLOGY Scott Sturgeon, M. G. F. Martin, and A. C. Grayling . PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC Mark Sainsbury 3. METHODOLOGY: THE ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE David Papineau 4, METAPHYSICS Tim Crane and David Wiggins 5. THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND Martin Davies x I 6. ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHY I: THE PRE-SOCRATICS AND PLATO Christopher Janaway 7. ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHY II: ARISTOTLE Hugh Lawson-Tancred 8. MODERN PHILOSOPHY I: THE RATIONALISTS AND KANT Roger Scruton 9. MODERN PHILOSOPHY II: THE EMPIRICISTS A.C. Grayling ml 10. ETHICS Bernard Williams 11. AESTHETICS Sebastian Gardner Index 61 123 250 336 398 440 484 545, 583 629List of Contributors TM cRanz is Lecturer in Philosophy, University College, London. MARTIN DAViES is Wilde Reader in Mental Philosophy in the University of Oxford. SEBASTIAN GARDNER is Lecturer in Philosophy, Birkbeck College, London A. C. GRAYLING is Lecturer in Philosophy, Birkbeck College, London, and Senior Research Fellow, St Anne's College, Oxford. CHRISTOPHER JaNaway is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, Birkbeck College, London. HUGH LAWSON-TANCRED is Departmental Fellow in Philosophy, Birkbeck College, London. M. G. F. MARTIN is Lecturer in Philosophy, University College, London. DAVID PAPINEAU is Professor of the History and Philosophy of Science, King’s College, London. MARK SAINSBURY is Stebbing Professor of Philosophy, King’s College, London. ROGER SCRUTON is Professor of Philosophy, Boston University, and Visiting Professor of Philosophy, Birkbeck College, London. SCOTT STURGEON is Lecturer in Philosophy, Birkbeck College, London. Davip wiccins is Wykeham Professor of Logic in the University of Oxford, and Visiting Professor of Philosophy, Birkbeck College, London. BERNARD WILLIAMS is White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Oxford, and Deutsch Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley.EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION A.C, Grayling The aim of philosophical inquiry is to gain insight into questions about knowl- cdge, truth, reason, reality, meaning, mind, and value. Other human endeav- ours, not least art and literature, explore aspects of these same questions, but it is philosophy that mounts a direct assault on them, in the hope of clarifying them and, where possible, answering them. ‘Philosophy’ is derived from a Greek word literally meaning ‘love of wis- dom’, But it is better and more accurately defined as ‘inquiry’ or ‘inquiry and reflection’, allowing these expressions their widest scope to denote thought about general features of the world and human experience within it. In its earliest days, at a time when few distinctions were drawn between the pursuits we now label ‘natural science’, ‘social science’, the ‘humanities’, and the ‘arts’, philosophy was the study of almost everything. The Greeks of the classical period are credited with the beginnings of Western philosophy, in this sense, because they inquired freely into all aspects of the world and humankind, starting not from religious or mystical principles, but from the belief that human reason is competent on its own account to formulate the right ques- tions, and to seek answers to them, concerning every matter of interest or importance to humanity. The Greeks speculated about the origins, composition, and functioning of the physical universe. They discussed the ethical and political circumstances of mankind, and proposed views about their best arrangement. They investigated human reason itself, and the nature of truth and knowledge. In doing so they touched upon almost every major philosophical question, and their legacy to subsequent thought is vast. For a very long period—roughly from the fourth to the seventeenth cen- turies av—thought in the West was dominated by Christianity. This does not mean that there was no philosophy; far from it; but much of it served theology, or at least (except in such cases as logic) it was constrained by theological con- siderations. In the seventeenth century, as a result of the complex events which for convenience are collected under the labels ‘Renaissance’ and ‘Reformation’2 A.C. Grayling and which took place during the preceding two centuries, there occurred a powerful renewal of philosophical inquiry. It was connected with the rise of modern science, and began by asking fundamentally important questions about the nature of knowledge. This same freedom of thought prompted renewal of debate about moral and political questions also. According to a certain view of recent intellectual history, one can see philo- sophy as having given birth in the seventeenth century to natural science, in the eighteenth century to psychology, and in the nineteenth to sociology and lin- guistics; while in the twentieth century it has played a large part in the devel- opment of computer science, cognitive science, and research into artificial intelligence. No doubt this oversimplifies the role of philosophical reflection, but it does not much exaggerate it, because in effect philosophy consists in inquiry into anything not yet well enough understood to constitute a self- standing branch of knowledge. When the right questions and the right meth- ods for answering them have been identified, the field of inquiry in question becomes an independent pursuit. For example: in the suppositious history just sketched, as soon as philosophical reflection on the nature and properties of the physical universe identified appropriate ways of asking and answering ques- tions—chiefly, in this case, by empirical and mathematical means—it ceased to be philosophy and became scicnce. Philosophy accordingly remains a pursuit which—to put the point as a seem- ing paradox—tries to bring itself to an end either by solving its problems or by finding ways of transforming them into special inquiries like physics, psycho- logy, or history. On the ‘divide and conquer’ principle, the systematic study of philosophy has come to organize itself into fields of philosophical inquiry: ‘ethics’, ‘political philosophy’, and ‘logic’ are more or less self-explanatory as to their subject-matter, while ‘epistemology’ (inquiry into the nature of knowl- edge) and ‘metaphysics’ (inquiry into the ultimate nature of reality) need more explanation on first mention. (There are also philosophical inquiries into par- ticular subjects—the philosophy of science, the philosophy of law, the philoso- phy of history, and so forth—in which philosophers reflect on the assumptions, methods, aims, and claims of the special pursuits.) It is the aim of what follows to introduce philosophy’s central fields of inquiry. There are so many connections and overlaps between them that to sep- arate them under different labels in the way just indicated is somewhat artificial. But not entirely so; for there are problems distinctive to each, and a preliminary grasp of what they concern offers a first step towards understanding them. Bach of the chapters that follow is devoted to a major area of philosophical endeavour. They are their own introductions to the questions they discuss, and therefore need little supplementary introduction here. But a preliminary note about what each chapter contains will help with orientation, as follows.Editor's Introduction 3 Chapter 1: Epistemology. Epistemology—sometimes called ‘theory of knowl- edge’—concerns the nature and sources of knowledge. The questions asked by epistemologists are, What is knowledge? How do we get it? Are all our means of seeking it equally good? To answer these questions we need to define knowl- edge if we can, examine the means we employ in seeking it, and confront scep- tical challenges to our claims to have it. Each of the three parts of Chapter 1 takes up one of these tasks. The first con- siders the problem of giving an adequate definition. The second examines one major means to knowledge—sensory perception—and the third surveys scepti- cal arguments and efforts to counter them. Chapter 2: Philosophical Logic. Philosophical logic is in many respects the work- shop of philosophy, where a set of related and highly important concepts come in for scrutiny, among them reference, truth, existence, identity, necessity, and quantification. These concepts are fundamental not just to philosophical inquiry but to thought in general. This chapter examines these concepts by focusing upon the question of reference. The first two sections look at what seem to be the most obvious examples of referring devices, names and descriptions. The third concerns a problem about existence; the fourth examines identity state- ments and the fifth considers the question whether, when true, such statements are ‘necessarily’ true. The final section examines some views about truth. Chapter 3: Methodology. Epistemological discussions of the kind pursued in Chapter 1 concern the concept of knowledge in general. A more particular application of it concerns science, one of the major fields of knowledge- acquiring endeavour. Philosophical investigation into the assumptions, claims, concepts, and methods of science raises questions of great philosophical impor- tance. The elementary part of this inquiry, here called Methodology, focuses largely on questions about the concepts and methods used in investigating the physical world. Each of the sections concerns a major topic: induction and its problems; the concept of laws of nature; realism, instrumentalism, and under- determination of theory by evidence; confirmation and probability; and the concept of explanation. Chapter 4: Metaphysics, All the foregoing branches of philosophy share certain problems about what ultimately exists in the universe. These problems are the province of Metaphysics. Its primary questions are, What is there, and what is its nature? These questions immediately prompt others, so many indeed—and so important—that some of them have now come to constitute branches of phi- losophy in their own right, for example, philosophy of mind and philosophical theology.4 A.C. Grayling In addressing questions about the nature of reality, the metaphysician has to examine concepts of time, free will, appearance and reality, causality, universals, substance, and a number of others besides. Here four of these topics are con- sidered: causation, time, universals, and substance. Note that questions about causality also come up in the chapters on Methodology and Mind, and the discussion of substance connects with the dis- cussion of Aristotle in the chapter on Greek philosophy (see below)—thus exemplifying the interconnectedness of philosophical inquiry. Chapter 5: The Philosophy of Mind, Questions about the nature of mind were once usually included in metaphysics, but their great importance has led to so much debate, and to such significant use of materials from the neighbouring fields of psychology and brain physiology, that the philosophy of mind is now treated separately. Chief among the points requiring discussion are the relation of mind and brain, the nature of intentionality and consciousness, and the question whether mental phenomena have causal powers or are merely in some sense by-products of brain activity. The sections in this chapter take up each point in turn. Chapters 6-9: The History of Philosophy. Because the problems of philosophy are ancient and persistent, studying the history of philosophy is an important part of a philosophical education, It is not simply, or even very largely, that this study is interesting for its own sake—although it certainly is—but rather, it is that the outstanding philosophers of the past made contributions to philosophy which we must grasp in the interests of our current work. To study the history of phi- losophy is to study philosophy, for almost all the great questions were formu- lated and explored by our predecessors. Two main periods of the history of Western thought are discussed in this vol- ume: Greek philosophy from about 600 ac until 322 ac (the date of Aristotle’s death), and Modern philosophy from Descartes to Kant (the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries ap). The Greeks initiated all of philosophy’s major fields, and identified their basic questions. Two of them, Plato and Aristotle, are especially important. They and their forerunners, known as the Pre-Socratics, are the subject of Chapters 6 and 7. ‘The philosophers of the Modern period who have done so much to shape philosophical discussion since their day are Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant (discussed in Chapter 8) and Locke, Berkeley, and Hume (discussed in Chapter 9). They are grouped in this way because the first three are usually described as ‘Rationalists’ and the last three ‘Empiricists’ (Kant occupies a posi- tion apart), some important differences between rationalism and empiricism being at stake. But perhaps the best order in which to read them, and to read about them, is: Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant.Editor's Introduction 5 Chapter 10: Ethics. The supreme importance of critical reflection on the values by which we live is unquestionable. Our values are the basis of our judgements about others, and of our decisions about how to act and live. Ethics is the study of theories about moral values, and of the concepts we use in identifying and asserting them. An important distinction is required here: a theory which pre- scribes how we should live is called a ‘first-order’ or ‘normative’ morality. Reflective enquiry into the assumptions, concepts, and claims of such first-order moralities is often called ‘metaethics’. Both are of crucial interest in the study of ethics, as this chapter shows. It discusses theories of ethics, examines some of the most important ethical concepts, and investigates aspects of ‘moral psy- chology’. Chapter 11: Aesthetics. Aesthetics in contemporary philosophy concentrates upon discussion of the experience of appreciating artistic and natural beauty, and investigates whether there is an underlying unity in the nature of such expe- rience. In this chapter the three sections successively examine aesthetic experi- ence and judgement, fundamental concepts of the philosophy of art, and theories about the nature of art. The kind of philosophy introduced in these chapters is often called ‘Analytic Philosophy’. Analytic philosophy is not so much a school of thought as a style or method. It is a style of philosophizing which seeks to be rigorous and care- ful, which at times makes use of ideas and techniques from logic, and which is aware of what is happening in science. It is, in particular, alert to linguistic con- siderations, not because of an interest in language for its own sake, but because it is through language that we grasp the concepts we use, and it is by means of language that we express our beliefs and assumptions. One of the principal methods of analytic philosophy is analysis of the concepts we employ in think- ing about ourselves and the world: not surprisingly, this is called “conceptual analysis’. Most philosophy done in the English-speaking world is analytic philosophy. The chapters in this book well display both its character and its methods. The name ‘analytic philosophy’ is sometimes used to distinguish the rigorous style of philosophizing just described from other styles of philosophizing, for exam- ple from so-called ‘Continental Philosophy’, by which is meant—variously— the philosophical work done in France, Germany, and elsewhere in continental Europe since the beginning of the twentieth century. Thus the thought of Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, the Frankfurt School, Foucault, Derrida, and others (a highly various assortment which it is not at all helpful to collect under a single label) is so named. There are indeed substantial differ- ences both of interest and method between analytic and ‘Continental’ philoso- phy, but there is also some overlap. In just the same way as a certain amount of6 A. C. Grayling ‘Continental’ philosophy is done in the English-speaking world, so there is increasing interest in analytic philosophy in continental Europe. The order of the chapters is intended to aid the reader who is making a sys- tematic study of philosophy. A recommended approach is to read the essays in each of Parts I and II sequentially, and to read Parts I and II simultaneously. Upon turning to the two essays in Part Ill the reader should again, for prefer- ence, read them in sequence. But this is a suggestion for systematic students; the ordering is not intended to be coercive.EPISTEMOLOGY Scott Sturgeon, M. G. F Martin, and A. C. Grayling Introduction A.C. Grayling 9 Knowledge Scott Sturgeon 10 1.1, Introduction 10 1.2. Structuring the Task 10 1.3. Decomposing Knowledge 12 1.4. The Strength of Justification 14 1.5, The Nature of Justification 17 1,6. Internalist Theories of Justification 18 1.6.1, Foundationalism 19 1.6.2, Coherentism a 1.7. Problems for Internalist Theories of Justification 23 1.7.1. The Input Problem 23 1.7.2, The Essence Problem 24 1,8. Reliabilism 24 1.9. Conclusion 26 Perception M.G. F, Martin 26 2.1, Introduction 26 2.2. The Objects of Perception 27 2.3. Perceptual Experience 30 2.3.1. The Problem of Perception 30 2.3.2. ‘The Sense-Datum Theory of Perception 31 2.3.3. The Intentional Theory of Perception 34 2.3.4. Disjunctive Theories 37 2.4. Perceptual Knowledge 39 Scepticism A.C. Grayling a3 3.1. Introduction 43 3.2, A Historical Sketch 45 3.3. The Nature of Sceptical Arguments 458 S. Sturgeon, M. G. F. Martin, and A. C. Grayling 3.4. Sceptical Arguments: Error, Delusion, and Dreams 3.5. Sceptical Arguments: Perception and Perceptual Relativities 3.6. Methodological and Problematic Scepticism 3.7, Some Responses to Scepticism: The ‘Gap’ 3.8, Kant and Transcendental Arguments 3.9. Idealism and Phenomenalism 3.10. Sceptical Epistemology versus Anti-Cartesianism 3.11. Concluding Remarks BibliographyEpistemology 9 INTRODUCTION A.C. Grayling Epistemology, or theory of knowledge, is the branch of philosophy which examines questions about the nature of knowledge and how we get it. It attempts to answer the questions “What is knowledge?’ and ‘What are the best and most secure ways of acquiring knowledge?’ These questions, as the follow- ing discussions show, are connected, but attempts to answer them can be made in different ways. One helpful approach to answering the first question is to consider a sug- gested definition of knowledge. In the tradition of debate on these matters knowledge is standardly defined as justified true belief, because at very least it seems that to know something one must believe it, one’s belief must be true, and one’s reason for believing it must be satisfactory in the light of some stan- dard, because one could not be said to know something if one had, say, arbi- trarily or haphazardly decided to believe it. So each of the three parts of the definition appears to express a necessary condition for knowledge. The claim is that taken together they are sufficient for knowledge. But as the first of the following discussions shows, there are difficulties with this idea, especially about the kind of justification required for a true belief to count as knowledge. Competing theories have been put forward to deal with this difficulty, and the first discussion explores them. While the debate about how to define ‘knowledge’ goes on, another flour- ishes about how we get knowledge. In the history of epistemology there have been (speaking, for convenience, very roughly) two principal schools of thought: the ‘rationalist’ school, which holds that the chief route to knowl- edge is the exercise of reason; and the ‘empiricist’ school, which holds that the chief route to knowledge is perception (the use of the five senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch, and their extension by means of such instru- ments as telescopes, microscopes, and the like). The model for the rationalists is mathematics and logic, where necessary truths are arrived at by rational inference. The model for empiricists is any of the natural sciences where observation and experiment are the chief motor of inquiry. The history of sci- ence in the last few centuries has lent strength to the empiricist case; but for that very reason philosophical questions about perception have become more important, and the second discussion below examines the problems that arise in that connection. For both traditions in epistemology, however, one of the central concerns is to investigate whether our means of getting knowledge are trustworthy. A sharp way to identify the problems that require to be addressed in this connec- tion is to examine the challenge posed by scepticism. The third and final10 Scott Sturgeon discussion below surveys the nature and point of sceptical arguments, and some of the responses to them which epistemologists have suggested. Together these three discussions give an introduction to the chief concerns of epistemology. There are other debates in epistemology besides—e.g. mem- ory, judgement, introspection, reasoning, the ‘a priori-a posteriori’ distinction, scientific method—but a grasp of the three central topics discussed below con- stitutes a basis for understanding these other debates, and serves as a preface to them. KNOWLEDGE Scott Sturgeon 1.1. Introduction Consider the following sentences: (1) John knows London. (2) John knows how to get to London from Manchester. (3) John knows that London is south of Manchester. Sentence (1) captures what philosophers call ‘acquaintance knowledge’. Intuitively, this consists in first-hand acquaintance with a person, a place, an event, and so on. We gain acquaintance knowledge of people by meeting them; we gain acquaintance knowledge of places by going there; and we gain acquain- tance knowledge of events by witnessing them. Sentence (2) captures what philosophers call ‘ability knowledge’. Intuitively, this consists in knowing how to perform various actions, For example, we gain ability knowledge by learning how to speak a language, by learning how to ride a bicycle, and by learning how to prepare a meal. Sentence (3) captures what philosophers call ‘propositional knowledge’. This will be the subject of our inquiry. Suppose there are three cups on a table in front of you. This would be a situ- ation you might know about. The question we shall address is this: what is it to know about situations like this? Or more generally: what are the conditions in virtue of which someone knows such situations?" 1.2. Structuring the Task Situations in the world are described by true propositions. Returning to our cups: the proposition asserting that there are three cups on the table describes ' We shall restrict our attention to empirical situations, and thus to empirical knowledge. Ethical knowl- ‘edge, mathematical knowledge, and logical knowledge raise further problems which are beyond the scope of this essay. See Bonjour (1985), Dancy (1987), and Pollock (1986) for further discussion.Epistemology uM the situation accurately. It is thus a true proposition. The reason philosophers call knowledge of situations ‘propositional knowledge’ is because situations are described by true propositions, So, whatever it comes to precisely, propositional knowledge is a special relationship between a person and a true proposition. Our task is to determine what that relationship is. We may structure this task by asking how to complete the following schema: (K) S knows P iff (if and only if) $ and P have features F,, Fa, By completing (K) we uncover the essence of propositional knowledge. To see how this works notice that (K) is a biconditional. This means (K) is two claims asserted in tandem, The word ‘and’ signals that (K) is a conjunction of two claims. Specifically, (K) is a conjunction of two if-then statements, or condition- als. There is a left-to-right direction of (K), and a right-to-left direction of (K). ‘The left-to-right direction of (K) asserts this: If S knows P, then S and P have features F,, F,, ... The important idea here is that features F,, Fz, etc. are each necessary for proposi- tional knowledge. In general, when you find something on the end of an if—then statement, it is necessary for whatever is at the beginning of the statement. End conditions are what philosophers call ‘necessary conditions’. Just as one might think sugar necessary for a proper cup of tea, the left-to-right direction of (K) asserts that F;, Fp, etc. are each necessary for propositional knowledge. On the other hand, the right-to-left direction of (K) asserts this: If S and P have features F), Fo, ... , then S knows P. Here we have the previous claim turned around. Now the idea is that features F,, F,, etc. are together sufficient for propositional knowledge. In general when you find something at the beginning of an if-then statement, it is sufficient for what- ever is at the end of the statement. Beginning conditions are what philosophers call ‘sufficient conditions’. Just as one might think love sufficient for happiness, the right-to-left direction of (K) asserts that Fy, F, etc. are jointly sufficient for propositional knowledge. Now, (K) is the conjunction of its left-to-right direction and its right-to-left direction. (K) therefore claims that features F,, Fp, etc. are separately necessary and jointly sufficient for propositional knowledge. This is why completing (K) is important. If we can do so, we will have found the conditions which are indi- vidually necessary for propositional knowledge, and which together are suffi- cient for propositional knowledge. Here is how we proceed:? first, we look for conditions to complete (K). Next 2 The method of looking for necessary and/or sufficient conditions is standard in analytic philosophy. But it should not be presupposed, however, that every philosophical problem can be usefully addressed in this way.12 Scott Sturgeon ‘we test a proposed completion by checking whether it agrees with our firmly held intuitions about knowledge. This is done by constructing thought experi- ments. A thought experiment is a fictional story we compose. We shall use thought experiments to see whether completions of (K) are adequate. We do this by constructing a fictional scenario, judging whether knowledge is present in the scenario, and then checking to see whether the proposed completion of (K) agrees with us. There are two ways a completion of (K) could fail such a test: 1. Ifa completion of (K) implies that knowledge is present in a thought-exper- iment scenario, when we are sure that it is absent, then the completion is inad- equate. In such a case we discover that the right-hand side of the completion is not sufficient for the left-hand side. For a completion of (K) will imply that knowledge is present because its right-hand side is fulfilled, and because its right-to-left direction says that its right-hand side is sufficient for knowledge. Thus, ifa completion of (K) implies that knowledge is present, when we are sure that it is not, this means that its right-hand side is not sufficient for knowledge. 2. Ifa completion of (K) fails to imply that knowledge is present in a thought- experiment scenario, when we are sure that it is present, then the completion is also inadequate. In such a case we discover that the right-hand side of the com- pletion is not necessary for the left-hand side. For a completion of (K) will fail to imply that knowledge is present because its right-hand side is not fulfilled. But if we are sure that knowledge is present, then we can be sure that the com- pletion’s right-hand side is not needed for knowledge. Thus, if a completion of (K) fails to imply that knowledge is present, when we are sure that it is, this means its right-hand side is not necessary for knowledge. ‘When, in light of a particular thought experiment, a completion of (K) falls into categories (1) or (2), that completion will be refuted by the thought experiment. Such a thought experiment is known as a ‘counter-example’ to the completion of (K). Obviously, this method for testing theories of knowledge relies on our ability to determine when knowledge is present in thought-experiment scenar- ios. 1.3. Decomposing Knowledge We have already found one condition needed to complete (K), namely, the proposition in question must be true. Thus we have: (K1) S knows P iff (a) Pis true, (b) Sand P have features F,, F,, etc. Further, when we have knowledge, we believe the world to be a specific way, namely, we believe it to be the way a true proposition describes it as being. ThisEpistemology 13 amounts to a second condition needed for our completion of (K): we have knowledge only when we believe the true proposition in question. ‘Together these points generate a very simple theory of knowledge: (K2) Sknows Piff (a) S believes P, (b) Pis true. Unfortunately, (K2) is extremely inadequate. The problem is with its right-to- left direction. Note what this says: If S believes a true proposition P, then S knows P. ‘This cannot be right. Let us construct a thought experiment and use it to refute (K2). Suppose you wake up one morning and find yourself believing something outlandish. Let it be the proposition that Plato and Aristotle were one and the same person. You realize that this is a ridiculous proposition, but you cannot shake your conviction. No matter how hard you try to be reasonable, you find yourself believing that Plato and Aristotle were one, Suppose, further, that you believe this because a friend has hypnotized you and ‘planted’ the idea as a joke. But suppose, finally, that unbeknownst to your friend, Plato and Aristotle really were the same person. In such a case you would believe a true proposi- tion, and thus, by (K2), it would follow that you knew that proposition. But it is obvious that in this case you would not know that Plato and Aristotle were the same person. Therefore, this thought experiment is a counter-example to (K2). Often a thought experiment will not only show that a given theory is unac- ceptable; it will also suggest ways to modify the refuted theory. Our previous thought experiment is good in this respect. For what seems obvious about that thought experiment is this: you fail to have knowledge because your belief about Plato and Aristotle is not based on evidence. For this reason it is what philosophers call an unjustified belief. This suggests a third condition is needed to complete (K): (K3) S knows Piff (a) S believes P, (b) S's belief in P is justified, (c) Pis true. Now, (K3) is a plausible suggestion about knowledge. But it tells us little until we better understand the notion of justification it employs. And there are two questions we need to ask: first, what is the strength of justification needed for knowledge? and second, what is the underlying nature of justification itself? The first question focuses on the relationship between (b) and (c) of (K3). The issue is whether the justification mentioned in (b) must imply the truth mentioned in (c) (i.e. whether (b) implies (c)). Ifso, then (c) is a redundant clause14 Scott Sturgeon in the definition. For if justification implies truth, then knowledge is simply jus- tified belief. On the other hand, if justification does not imply truth, then truth is an extra ingredient needed in addition to belief and justification. We shall address this question in the next section. The second question focuses on justification. The demand is to construct a theory of justification just as we are now constructing a theory of knowledge. We shall address this question in Section 5. 1.4, The Strength of Justification What is the connection between justification and truth? For our purposes we may focus on two options: either justification implies truth or it does not. The view that justification implies truth is known as infallibilism. This view holds that justificd beliefs cannot be mistaken. According to the infallibilis, itis impossible to have a false-but-justified belief. Fallibilism is the view that this sit- uation is possible. According to the fallibilist, justified mistakes are possible. (See BonJour (1985), Dancy (1987), Descartes (1979), and Pollock (1986).) So which position is correct? There is a tempting argument for infallibilism. It begins by noticing the plau- sibility of this claim: (*) If S knows P, then S cannot be mistaken about P. ‘The argument proceeds as follows: (ARG) Since S cannot be mistaken about P when S knows P, this means that $’s justification guarantees that P is true. Thus, (*) implies that justi- fication guarantees truth. In other words, (*) implies infallibilism. Now, this argument is fallacious. The fallacy in question springs from an ambi- guity in (*). Though plausible, (*) can be understood in two different ways. One of them is highly plausible but does not imply infallibilism. The other implies infallibilism but is not very plausible. To uncover the ambiguity in (*) notice that it is a conditional statement of this form: (C) IfX, then it cannot be that Y. Statements of this form admit two readings. ‘They do so because the word ‘cannot’ may be understood to have what logicians call ‘greater or lesser scope within the statement’. This means the word ‘cannot’ may be understood to cover the entire conditional, or it may be understood to cover merely the conse- quent of the conditional. The former understanding is known as the ‘wide- scope’ reading of (C), and the latter is known as the ‘narrow-scope’ reading of (C). By explicitly marking the scope of ‘cannot’ with brackets, we may display the wide- and narrow-scope readings of (C):Epistemology 15 (WSC) It cannot be that {if X, then Y}. (NSC) If X, then it cannot be that {Y}. The wide-scope reading asserts the impossibility of the consequence (i.e. the impossibility of the entire conditional). The narrow-scope reading asserts the impossibility of the consequent (i.e. the impossibility of Y by itself ). Now, since (*) is a conditional statement of form (C) it inherits the ambigu- ity of this form. This means (*) has a wide- and narrow-scope reading. Here are the two readings: (WS*) It cannot be that {if S knows P, then S is mistaken about P}. (NS*) If S knows P, then it cannot be that {S is mistaken about P}. (WS*) says that it is impossible to know something false. And this seems right. For propositional knowledge is knowledge of a real situation in the world. It thus involves belief in a true proposition. This trivial point implies the wide- scope reading of (*). On the other hand, (NS"*) says that if one knows something, then one is in a position which rules out the possibility of error. But this is not at all obvious. For example, we take ourselves to know many things about our external envi- ronment. You know, for instance, that you are reading. But your evidence cer- tainly does not rule out the possibility of error. As Descartes famously emphasized, you could be dreaming that you are reading (Descartes 1979). So, if we understand (*) along the lines of (NS*) the claim looks to be false. ‘The point then is this: the narrow-scope reading of (*) is the reading we need to make sense of (ARG). But that reading seems false. The reason (ARG) looks convincing is because (*) has one reading which is trivially true: the wide-scope reading. But (ARG) does not use that reading. Rather, it uses the suspicious narrow-scope reading. So we still need a persuasive argument for or against infallibilism. Infallibilism has several theoretical advantages, Notice, for example, that infallibilism permits a very concise definition of knowledge: (K4) S knows P iff (a) S believes P, (b) S's belief in P is infallibly justified. If justification implies truth then condition (c) of (K3) will be implied by condi- tion (b) of (K4). So there will be no need to add a third condition to (K4) assert- ing that P is true. The truth of P will be guaranteed by the infallible justification of S’s belief in P. Further, infallibilism would explain why the wide-scope read- ing of (*) is true. For if infallible justification is necessary for knowledge, as the left-to-right direction of (K4) asserts, and such justification implies truth, then it follows that one cannot know something false. This latter claim is what the wide-scope reading of (*) asserts.16 Scott Sturgeon But as we began to notice three paragraphs back, infallibilism makes knowl- edge extremely difficult to obtain. The view implies that one is justified in believ- ing P only when one has gained sufficient evidence to rule out the possibility that P is false (Dretske 1971). But for most of our beliefs we have no such evi- dence. Consider once again whether you know you are reading. What is your evidence for this? Well, you seem to be reading. You have certain perceptual evi- dence of a page in front of you. You seem to see a book, and perhaps also to feel pages. This is the evidence which makes you justified in believing that you are reading. Hence this is the evidence on the basis of which you know that you are reading. This much is undeniable. But does your evidence rule out the possibil- ity that you are not reading? Certainly not. Perhaps you are dreaming that you are reading, or perhaps hal- lucinating that you are reading, or perhaps your brain has been placed in a machine by evil scientists and manipulated to make you think you are reading. None of these possibilities is ruled out by the evidence on the basis of which you now believe that you are reading. But this doesn’t mean that you actually fail to know whether you are reading. Of course you know that you are reading. That you know this is one of the most obvious things in the world. Our job, then, is to construct a theory of knowledge consistent with this fact. In other words, we need a theory of knowledge which will explain how you know that you are reading on the basis of your present evidence. Notice that your present situation is a counter-example to (K4). For you know that you are reading despite the fact that your belief is not infallibly justi- fied. Hence your present situation shows that infallible justification is not necessary for knowledge. But the left-to-right direction of (K4) implies that infallible justification is necessary for knowledge. Thus, your present situation shows that (K4) is false. This suggests that we retain the structure of (K3) and employ a fallible notion of justification: (KS) S knows Piff (a) S believes P, (b) S's belief in P is fallibly justified, (©) Pistruc. Notice here that we need condition (c). For condition (b) fails to entail truth, and we know that it is impossible to know something false. This means that truth is an extra ingredient of knowledge in addition to belief and fallible justification. ‘The idea behind (K5) is very simple: knowledge consists in fallible justification for propositions which are in fact true. This is an appealing idea. Unfortunately, there is a well-known problem with this idea. The problem was first made famous by Edmund Gettier, and has become known as the Gettier Problem. (See Dancy (1987), Gettier (1963), Pollock (1986), and Shope (1983).) Let us construct our second thought experiment to expose the Gettier Problem.