Discuss a roadmap to permanent peace in the Korean Peninsula

Introduction

Permanent peace in the Korean Peninsula has long been regarded as a highly desirable but
elusive goal. Despite early misgivings by both Kim Il Sung and Syngman Rhee that peaceful
coexistence without reunification was “dangerous”,1 various roadmaps towards permanent
peace (and often with the goal of reunification) have been suggested over the years – from a
‘one-state, two-system approach’ proposed by North Korea to a ‘three-stage approach’ touted
by South Korea.2 Most recently, Trump’s presidency saw a rekindling of this desire, with the
2018 US-DPRK Joint Statement in Singapore committing the US and North Korea to
“establish new US-DPRK relations” and “build a lasting and stable peace regime on the
Korean Peninsula”.3

Despite a general sense among the two Koreas and the wider international community that
permanent peace in the Korean Peninsula is in each country’s respective security interests,
both as a goal in its own right as well as a springboard to reunification, fundamental
differences exist between each Korea’s conception of unification which directly poses
significant difficulties in forging a sustainable and successful roadmap to permanent peace in
the Korean Peninsula: South Korea seeks to unify Korea based on a “free and basic
democratic order”, while North Korea seeks to maintain its socialist system without US
interference.4

This essay shall seek to outline the main security, economic and human rights obstacles that
any successful roadmap to permanent peace in the Korean Peninsula would need to
overcome, even if the implicit end goal of unification is to be discounted. The three linchpins
of the roadmap – denuclearisation, sanctions relief and human rights – must be guided by a
spirit of mutual respect and proportionate bargaining.

What do we mean by ‘permanent peace’?

Before discussing any such roadmap, it is first necessary to consider what ‘permanent peace’
would look like in the Korean Peninsula. Indeed, it is clear that ‘permanent peace’ should not
merely be taken to entail an absence of conflict. At the same time, it is submitted that given
the diametrically opposing political systems of each of the two Koreas, with North Korea
being authoritarian and South Korea democratic, ‘permanent peace’ should not require
reunification. As Jannuzi aptly puts it the two Koreas “must not content themselves with the
negative peace of avoiding war, but seek to build self-reinforcing positive peace structures”.5

The consensus, therefore, seems to define a peace regime that involves, at the bare minimum,
an end-of-war declaration (as the thin veil of protection the Korean Armistice Agreement of

1
Chong-Sik Lee, ‘Korean Partition and Unification’, Journal of International Affairs 18, no. 2 (1964): 230-31
2
United States Institute of Peace, 'A Peace Regime for the Korean Peninsula' (United States Institute of
Peace, February 2020) <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/pw_157-
a_peace_regime_for_the_korean_peninsula-pw_0.pdf> accessed 8 July 2021
3
BBC News, 'Trump Kim summit: Full text of the signed statement' (BBC.com, 12 June
2018) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-44453330> accessed 12 July 2021
4
ibid.
5
Frank Jannuzi, 'Peace Building on the Korean Peninsula' (Ritsumeikan University, 15 February
2021) <http://en.ritsumei.ac.jp/research/ceapc/report/detail/?id=77> accessed 10 July 2021
1953 affords still means that the US and North Korea, 71 years on, are still technically at
war) with the ‘solemnisation’ conferred by a peace treaty.6

Denuclearisation as priority

Central to the roadmap towards permanent peace in the Korean Peninsula is, and has always
been, denuclearisation. As D’Ambrogio argues, “The Korean peace process currently hinges
mainly on North Korea’s nuclear programme and the international community’s demand that
Pyongyang abandon it”.7 Not only is this a prevalent thought in the academic discourse
around achieving permanent peace in the Korean Peninsula, it is also a cornerstone of
President Moon Jae-in’s Policy on the Korean Peninsula with the resolution of the “nuclear
issue” identified as key to achieving his first goal of “ensur(ing) peace in a practical and
institutional manner”.8

The issue with this is that despite much fanfare in the 2018 US-DPRK Joint Statement in
Singapore regarding ‘working towards’ denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, it is clear
that the two parties are not ad idem regarding the definition of denuclearisation. While the
US (in representing South Korea’s interests) demands complete, verifiable and irreversible
dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities,9 North Korea appears to conceptualise
denuclearisation as “a process relating to the entire Korean peninsula, which would imply
removing all elements of nuclear threat from both North and South Korean territory –
including the US military presence in the South”.10

This means that in order to achieve meaningful headway towards denuclearisation of the
Korean Peninsula the US needs to seriously consider the prospect of explicitly committing,
by way of treaty, to not attacking North Korea by the use of conventional or nuclear
weapons.11 This is because Pyongyang regards its nuclear capabilities as “life insurance for
the regime and a way to gain standing within the international community”, a sentiment
emboldened by the demise of Colonel Gaddafi following implementation of the ‘Libya
model’.12

As such, only a genuine commitment towards guaranteeing North Korea regime security,
which may entail the politically thorny issue of partial or complete withdrawal of US troops
from the Korean Peninsula,13 has the potential to kick-starting a roadmap towards permanent
peace in the Korean Peninsula (although South Korean National Security Advisor Chun Eui-
yong does reveal that North Korea may be amenable to allowing continued US military
presence if it could be assured that all threats to the regime would be dissolved).14
6
Enrico D'Ambrogio, 'Korean peninsula: State of play' (European Parliament, July
2020) <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/652022/EPRS_BRI(2020)652022_EN.pdf>
accessed 10 July 2021
7
ibid.
8
Ministry of Unification, 'Moon Jae-in’s Policy on the Korean Peninsula' (Ministry of
Unification) <https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/policylssues/koreanpeninsula/goals/> accessed 10 July
2021
9
D’Ambrogio (n 6)
10
ibid (emphasis added)
11
United States Institute of Peace (n 2)
12
D’Ambrogio (n 6)
13
Congressional Research Service, 'A Peace Treaty with North Korea?' (CRS Report, 19 April
2018) <https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R45169.html> accessed 10 July 2021
14
Choe Sang-Hun and Jane Perlez, "Treaty to Formally End Korean War Is Being Discussed, South
Confirms," New York Times, April 18, 2018
Sanctions relief

Though denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula is undoubtedly a prerequisite for a

successful roadmap to permanent peace in the Korean Peninsula, it needs to be backed up by
a phased approach of sanctions relief – both as an incentive towards denuclearisation as well
as paving the way to reintroduce North Korea to the wider international community, the latter
of which would further underline the irrevocability of the roadmap to permanent peace.
Indeed, Dr Jina Kim makes the compelling argument that the tactic of “internationali(sing)
the problem of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and the solution of economic development;
and minimi(sing) the chances of cheating by Pyongyang” is one that has a proven track
record of success in post-Soviet states.15

Furthermore, the importance of appropriate and proportionate sanctions relief (synchronised

with sincere North Korean commitments towards denuclearisation) is key in not only
persuading the Kim family that the US, South Korea and the rest of the international
community are sincere in their commitment towards North Korea’s regime security but also it
can operate, as Dr Yoon argues, to help the Kim family achieve high rates of economic
growth which will insulate the family from domestic as well as international threats to the
regime.16 Indeed, these broad sentiments appear to be reflected in President Moon Jae-in’s
Policy on the Korean Peninsula, with his vision for “peace and prosperity” by the
“Realization of a New Economic Community on the Korean Peninsula”.17

However, despite the theoretical strength of the argument towards working towards a
roadmap to permanent peace in the Korean Peninsula through economic incentives, there are
valid reasons to suggest why one should be sceptical of whether sanctions in general have
much strength in practice. For instance, it is well known that North Korea has the notorious
propensity to ‘rotating’ through ‘donors’ (all with different foreign policy priorities) in
securing its much-needed economic assistance,18 strongly suggesting that it may be difficult
for South Korea to be reassured of any promises North Korea may make when it assists
Pyongyang – especially with the recent example of North Korea rejecting South Korea’s
offer of 50,000 tons of rice in 2019 because it had already secured 1 million tons of rice and
corn from China.19

Therefore, for economic incentives to be successful it is imperative that the US and South
Korea work with their allies and other key stakeholder states to the Korean peninsula such as
China to coordinate the enforcement and lifting up of any existing sanctions, as this is what

15
Hudson Institute, 'Pathways to Peace: Achieving the Stable Transformation of the Korean Peninsula' (Hudson
Institute, April 2020) <https://www.hudson.org/research/15845-pathways-to-peace-achieving-the-stable-
transformation-of-the-korean-peninsula> accessed 9 July 2021
16
ibid.
17
Ministry of Unification (n 8)
18
The National Committee on North Korea, 'Kim Jong Un's 2019 New Year Address' (The National Committee
on North Korea, 1 January
2019) <https://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/kimjongun_2019_newyearaddress.pdf/file_view> accessed
9 July 2021
19
United States Institute of Peace (n 2)
the strength of any economic incentives in bringing about permanent peace will ultimately
hinge on.20

Human rights

The final dimension of the roadmap to permanent peace in the Korean Peninsula – human
rights – is arguably the most contentious. This is especially because even if North Korea
offered unequivocal nuclear disarmament in return for economic incentives paving the way
for a historic peace treaty, the entire negotiating framework for denuclearisation can be
scuppered by the political and legal difficulty of getting two-thirds of US Senators to override
the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act and consent to such peace treaty if
no steps are made by Pyongyang to improve their poor human rights record, from religious
persecution to the songbun social classification system.21 It appears, therefore, that
addressing human rights concerns will be a prerequisite, even if only from a political and
legal angle.

Internationally, a Helsinki Accords-like breakthrough seems highly optimistic. This is

especially due to the harsh juxtaposition between the high premium placed by the West on
human rights and China’s indifference (and even disregard) for the protection of human
rights. That said, North Korea has to date displayed glimpses of potential in this regard,
having recently agreed to address issues such as women and children’s rights and access to
food and health services under the UN’s Universal Periodic Review process.22

The need for South Korea and the US to bring human rights issues to the negotiating table
when agreeing with North Korea a viable roadmap to permanent peace in the Korean
Peninsula is not only for practical reasons; it is also morally incumbent. As Sissons rightly
argues (albeit in the context of the Middle East under the Bush administration), by treating
human rights as a “form of concession” it not only harms any roadmap towards permanent
peace but it goes directly against the concept of peace: “Security can be gained, by
emphasising the right to life; it can never be gained, by claiming the right to kill”.23

The international community, therefore, resist the temptation to ease their negotiating burden
by conceding on the issue of human rights; rather, it should endeavour to encourage North
Korea to take small step towards human rights reform through economic incentives as well as
putting forward a compelling argument that improvement on domestic human rights will
yield in further regime security. President Moon Jae-in’s “Spirit for ‘Mutual Respect’” should
not extend to respecting North Korea’s disrespect of human rights.24

Conclusion: ‘Mutual respect’ and proportionate bargaining

In conclusion, it is abundantly clear that building a roadmap to permanent peace in the

Korean Peninsula hinges on three distinct but intertwined elements: denuclearisation,
20
Patricia Kim, 'Advancing Denuclearization and Peace Diplomacy With North Korea' (Arms Control
Association, January 2021) <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-01/features/advancing-denuclearization-
peace-diplomacy-north-korea> accessed 10 July 2021
21
United States Institute of Peace (n 2)
22
Roberta Cohen, 'A Serious Human Rights Negotiation with North Korea' (38 North, 1 February
2017) <https://www.38north.org/2017/02/rcohen020117/> accessed 10 July 2021
23
Miranda Sissons, 'No peace without human rights' (The Guardian, 18 May
2003) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/may/18/1> accessed 12 July 2021
24
Ministry of Unification (n 8)
sanctions relief and human rights. However, it appears that the key cornerstone to any
successful roadmap is to overcome the principal obstacle: “the refusal of both Koreas to
recognize the legitimacy of the other”.25 It is for this reason that any negotiation on the three
elements is plagued by suspicion and distrust by either the North or South Korean camp.

Therefore, South Korea and the US must ensure that any negotiation with North Korea on a
roadmap to permanent peace is rooted in the spirit of ‘mutual respect’ and proportionate
bargaining. As rightly argued by Duyeon Kim, the South Korea and the international
community and large must ascertain “how valuable the denuclearisation target is for North
Korea and for the US” while weighing up “how valuable the US concession is for Pyongyang
and for Washington”.26 Only by reassuring North Korea that there will be no underhand
“pursuit of unification by absorption” can there be any hope of meaningful negotiation
leading to a successful roadmap to permanent peace in the Korean Peninsula.27

By Hee-Chan Kang
Postgraduate student at the University of Law

Word Count: 1832 (excluding footnotes)

25
James Dobbins, 'Declaring an End to the Korean War' (The RAND Blog, 28 February
2019) <https://www.rand.org/blog/2019/02/declaring-an-end-to-the-korean-war.html> accessed 10 July 2021
26
Duyeon Kim, 'Negotiating Toward a Denuclearization-Peace Roadmap on the Korean Peninsula' (Center for a
New American Security, June 2019) <https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-
securities-studies/resources/docs/CNAS-Report-Denuclearization-final-1.pdf> accessed 12 July 2021
27
Ministry of Unification (n 8)