You are on page 1of 29

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/343238541

The Political Economy of Growth in Vietnam: Between States and Markets

Book · July 2020


DOI: 10.4324/9780429321375

CITATIONS READS

2 395

1 author:

Guanie Lim
Nanyang Technological University
58 PUBLICATIONS   250 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:

China's Belt and Road Initiative in Southeast Asia View project

Rising from the Ashes: The Vietnamese Economy in an Era of Globalization View project

All content following this page was uploaded by Guanie Lim on 28 July 2020.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.


The Political Economy of Growth
in Vietnam

Since the doi moi reforms in 1986, Vietnam has experienced a dramatic socio-
economic transformation. Lim examines the role of the state and its interaction
with market forces in bringing this change about.
Taking the motorcycle and banking industries as case studies, this book ex-
plores the dynamics between the state and transnational corporations in shaping
the manufacturing and service sectors, respectively. Vietnam, as one of South-
east Asia’s quintessential latecomer economies with little prior experience of
dealing with transnational corporations, has nevertheless been quite successful
in maintaining some control over the impact of foreign direct investment. Yet,
the learning outcomes remain highly uneven. In addition, Lim argues that Vi-
etnamese advancement in both industries mirrors only partially the more gener-
alized patterns of state-led development in East Asia’s earlier batch of latecomer
economies. Vietnam’s case thus presents practical lessons on how to succeed
in crafting and utilizing policy instruments to achieve domestic economic and
technological upgrading.
This book will be of great interest to scholars of political economy and indus-
trial policy in East Asia, as well as to scholars and policy professionals analyzing
approaches to development strategy more broadly.

Guanie Lim is Research Fellow at the Nanyang Centre for Public Administra-
tion, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. His main research interests
are comparative political economy, value chain analysis, and the Belt and Road
Initiative in Southeast Asia. Guanie is also interested in broader development
issues within Asia, especially those of China, Vietnam, and Malaysia.
In the coming years, he will be conducting comparative research on how and
why China’s capital exports are reshaping development in two key developing
regions – Southeast Asia and the Middle East.
Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asia Series

The aim of this series is to publish original, high-quality work by both new and
established scholars on all aspects of Southeast Asia.

Islam, Blasphemy, and Human Rights in Indonesia


The Trial of Ahok
Daniel Peterson

Agent Orange and Rural Development in Post-War Vietnam


Vu Le Thao Chi

Tourism and Development in Southeast Asia


Edited by Claudia Dolezal, Alexander Trupp and Bui T. Huong

Ethnographies of Development and Globalization in the Philippines


Emergent Socialities and the Governing of Precarity
Edited by Koki Seki

The Political Economy of Growth in Vietnam


Between States and Markets
Guanie Lim

ASEAN and Power in International Relations


ASEAN, the EU, and the Contestation of Human Rights
Jamie D. Stacey

The Army and Ideology in Indonesia


From Dwifungsi to Bela Negara
Muhamad Haripin, Adhi Priamarizki and Keoni Indrabayu Marzuki

For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge.com/


Routledge-Contemporary-Southeast-Asia-Series/book-series/RCSEA
The Political Economy of
Growth in Vietnam
Between States and Markets

Guanie Lim
First published 2021
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa
business
© 2021 Guanie Lim
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced
or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means,
now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording,
or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in
writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks
or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and
explanation without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Lim, Guanie, author.
Title: The political economy of growth in Vietnam: between states and
markets / Guanie Lim.
Description: New York : Routledge, [2021] |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2020017831 (print) | LCCN 2020017832 (ebook) |
ISBN 9780367333867 (hardcover) | ISBN 9780429321375 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Economic development—Government policy—
Vietnam. | Economic development—Vietnam—20th century. | Economic
development—Vietnam—21st century. | International business
enterprises—Government policy—Vietnam. | Motorcycle industry—
Government policy—Vietnam. | Banks and banking—Government
policy—Vietnam.
Classification: LCC HC444.L55 2021 (print) |
LCC HC444 (ebook) | DDC 330.9597—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020017831
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020017832

ISBN: 978-0-367-33386-7 (hbk)


ISBN: 978-0-429-32137-5 (ebk)
Typeset in Galliard
by codeMantra
Contents

List of figures vii


List of tables ix

1 Introduction 1

2 Background information 8

3 Theoretical survey 22

4 Progress amidst confusion: the Vietnamese motorcycle


industry 35

5 Control under dirigisme: the Vietnamese banking industry 60

6 Comparison and analysis 77

7 Conclusion 85

Index 93
Figures

2.1 Gross domestic product per capita of Vietnam, 1985–2018 11


2.2 Vietnam’s inward flow of foreign direct investment, 1986–2018 12
2.3 Value added measured as a percentage of gross domestic
product, 1986–2015 13
2.4 Number of state-owned enterprises and their share of
economic output, 1990–2014 14
2.5 Structure of investment by ownership, 1995–2014 15
2.6 Structure of profit before taxes (%) by types of enterprise in
Vietnam, 2009–2015 16
2.7 Net turnover (%) of enterprises in Vietnam, 2000–2015 16
4.1 Sales of motorcycles in Vietnam, 1992–2017 41
4.2 Market share of the Vietnamese motorcycle industry, 1998–2017 42
5.1 Banking industry assets by types of banks (%), 2014 63
5.2 Banking industry chartered capital by types of banks (%), 2014 63
5.3 Credit market share by types of banks (%), 2005–2013 64
Tables

2.1 Selected indicators of economic change in Vietnam, 1981–1993 10


2.2 Exports, imports, and total trade measured as a percentage of
gross domestic product, 1986–2018 13
4.1 Major motorcycle transnational corporations and their
domestic collaborators in Vietnam 37
4.2 Top five motorcycle producing countries, 2017 37
4.3 Localization of the Vietnamese motorcycle industry, 2001–2005 43
5.1 Vietnam’s incremental capital–output ratio and incremental
savings–output ratio, 1996–2016 72
5.2 Vietnam’s average incremental capital–output ratio and
incremental savings–output ratio, 1996–2016 73
1 Introduction

Since the doi moi (renovation) reforms in 1986, Vietnam has experienced a dra-
matic socioeconomic transformation. Market forces were introduced, while in-
struments of control were curtailed considerably in order to reform Vietnam’s
command and control economy. In spite of some challenges along the way, there
is little doubt that the doi moi has yielded results as a large section of Vietnam’s
population has witnessed a noticeable increase in their living standard, in addi-
tion to the country’s growing sophistication in several industries (see Masina
2006; Rana 1995). The doi moi has since been hailed as one of the most suc-
cessful economic reforms undertaken by a transition economy. It is especially re-
markable given the dramatic socioeconomic collapse in various centrally planned
economies in the years following the dissolution of the Soviet Union (see Sachs
and Woo 1994; Jo 1999; Beattie 2010). Unlike the ‘big bang’ reforms that took
place very quickly in various countries of the former Soviet Union, the doi moi is
known for its more gradual and piecemeal approach to reforming the economy.1
Indeed, Vietnam has become Southeast Asia’s fastest growing economy since the
mid-1990s, closing in on its more mature East Asian peers such as the first-tier
(i.e. Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong) and second-tier tiger econo-
mies (i.e. Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines). In addition, there
is China, a late developer with its own unique socio-historical circumstances,
which does not fall easily into either of the two aforementioned categories (See
Chapter 2).
The Political Economy of Growth in Vietnam offers a fresh view into the re-
alities of this transformation process by focusing on two of Vietnam’s leading
­industries – motorcycle and banking. They are important because of their sub-
stantial linkages to the rest of the domestic and international economy. For ex-
ample, much of Vietnam’s motorcycles and their components are exported – after
considerable domestic value-added is injected into their production cycles – as
the country has been earmarked as a regional motorcycle production and export
hub by global lead firms. In banking, both established and budding Vietnamese
firms draw much of their capital (both short term and long term) from the large
state-owned banks that dominate the credit supply market. Put another way,
their survival and growth owes much to the vitality of the banking industry
(and, by extension, the state-owned banks) (See Chapter 5).
2 Introduction
In view of the impressive industrial transformation, how – and to what ­extent –
is it driven by the state or market forces? In addition, is Vietnam following the
pathways of the more mature East Asian economies? These are important ques-
tions as Vietnam’s nation-building process cannot be decoupled from the role
of the state, especially if one considers its deep socialist roots and the resilience
of its ruling regime. Nevertheless, facing severe economic hardships, Vietnam-
ese policymakers, by the 1980s, were forced to open up the economy to attract
transnational corporations (TNCs) from the advanced economies and their ex-
pertise. Since the doi moi, Vietnam’s cohort of state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
(a remnant of its socialist roots), its poorly designed state structure, and the
savviness of the capital-intensive TNCs have combined in a constantly evolving
assemblage, generating often uneven results. As a key member of East Asia and
an emerging economic powerhouse in the Greater Mekong Subregion, Viet-
nam’s intimate socioeconomic linkages and historical roots to the region means
that it is bound to influence (and be influenced by) the policies and practices
of its East Asian peers (See Chapter 2). The rapid growth of the first-tier and
second-tier tiger economies as well as that of China must also not have escaped
the attention of Vietnamese policymakers in the latter’s reform agenda. How-
ever, when transposed into the place-specific setting of Vietnam, the resultant
power contestation and its shifting dynamic will likely make policy planning and
industrial transformation more unpredictable than what is commonly expected.
Such a constantly shifting power dynamic in turn circumscribes opportunities
for growth and policy options available to the Vietnamese.
With the aforementioned as a backdrop, The Political Economy of Growth in
Vietnam brings together a series of careful comparative analysis, first explor-
ing the state versus TNC dynamic in the Vietnamese motorcycle and banking
industries. To this end, the commonalities and differences between the two
industries will be examined. The book subsequently compares and contrasts
the Vietnamese experience of dealing with TNCs vis-à-vis that of more ad-
vanced Asian economies, especially Korea, China, Malaysia, and Thailand. The
main theme is how Vietnam, one of Southeast Asia’s quintessential latecomer
economies with little prior experience in dealing with TNCs, manages to push
industrial transformation and arrive (either fully or partially) at its desired path-
way. The Political Economy of Growth in Vietnam argues that Hanoi has enticed
various well-­capitalized TNCs to invest into its previously derelict motorcycle
and banking industries, ensuring that some value resulting from their foreign
direct investment (FDI) is retained and redistributed accordingly. However,
one cannot say that the path towards the gains made in these two industries
was a bed of roses. The reality reveals a struggle. While the TNCs enjoy more
operational freedom in the motorcycle industry, they have not been granted
such autonomy in the banking industry as Hanoi and its cohort of SOEs retain
considerably more clout in the latter. Notwithstanding the shifting power rela-
tions between the state and the TNCs since the 1986 doi moi reforms, the tra-
jectories of both industries can only be described as qualified cases of progress.
Introduction  3
Overall, Vietnamese advancement in both industries mirrors only partially the
more generalized pattern of state-led development in Asia’s earlier batch of late-
comer economies.

Unpacking the state in East Asia


Surveying East Asian development over the last decades, four points stand out:
(i) Japanese success in achieving dominance in several key industries since the
1950s; (ii) the emergence of Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Korea (the
region’s first-tier tiger economies) in the 1960s; (iii) industrialization of Ma-
laysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines (the region’s second-tier tiger
economies) since the 1970s; and (iv) explosive growth in the region’s transi-
tion economies (mainly China and Vietnam) since the 1980s.2 One of the most
prominent factors undergirding the rise of these economies is the close relation-
ship between the state and commercial interests, with the state playing a key
role in pushing the development agenda. According to Beeson (2007), there is
a region-wide belief in the importance and legitimacy of the state in shaping the
development pathway of these nations, at least in the initial stages of growth.
For instance, one of the key vehicles is the deployment of SOEs, especially in
China, Malaysia, and Singapore. In view of the increasingly competitive global
economy, many of these SOEs have since been privatized, or at least have formed
partnerships with TNCs in their internationalization efforts. A similar situation
has been observed in Vietnam.
Nevertheless, the economic boom resulting from the doi moi does not mean
that the SOEs’ grip on the Vietnamese economy has completely loosened. Ishida
(2013) argues that there remain some industries where SOEs occupy monopo-
listic or oligopolistic positions under (explicit or implicit) state protection. These
industries include but are not limited to electric power, oil and gas exploration,
and rice exports. While it is true that concrete steps have been taken by the Viet-
namese state to discipline the SOEs (especially in the dissolution and consolida-
tion of small and underperforming SOEs, and the equitization of capable SOEs
by converting them into joint stock companies), the objective of the doi moi
reforms has not been simply to abolish the SOEs or to ‘privatize’ them. More
specifically, the SOEs are still expected to play a ‘leading role’ in the ‘socialist-­
oriented market economy’ (Sakata 2013, 7). In other words, the ultimate aim
of SOE reform is to concentrate the state’s resources to enhance the capacity of
large and capable SOEs, which then helps them to compete against other firms
in the domestic and international markets.
However, this effect is likely to play out unevenly across industries, stimu-
lating different outcomes and opportunities for growth. Research on the Vi-
etnamese textile and machining industries reveals the emergence of a group
of ‘reformed SOEs’ after Vietnam liberalized its economy in the post–doi moi
years (Fujita 2017, 126). This includes market-savvy SOEs and/or quasi-private
firms (that have since been partially or fully privatized) that respond positively to
4 Introduction
opportunities opened up since the launch of the doi moi. Notwithstanding their
access to state-related privileges such as easy access to capital and land, these
‘reformed SOEs’ have capitalized on the learning opportunities brought about
through their integration into the investment and trade network of the TNCs,
deepening their know-how and growing their income.

Research significance
Studying the evolution of the Vietnamese motorcycle and banking industries
and their comparative dynamic will thus offer scholars and policymakers prag-
matic lessons in approaching economic development, a seemingly elusive yet
crucial task. This also implies that state intervention remains critically impor-
tant, even in this era of supposedly accelerated globalization, in which states
(and earnest scholars and policymakers) are commonly advised not to intervene
in the market economy. The Political Economy of Growth in Vietnam offers prac-
tical lessons on how to succeed in crafting and utilizing policy instruments to
achieve domestic economic and technological upgrading. It does so by unrav-
elling Vietnam’s development since the doi moi was announced, focusing on
two of the country’s more critical industries (i.e. motorcycle and banking) and
the reasons behind their progress. Further, it will shed light on some of the
stumbling blocks and the political contestation that have impeded the growth
of the two industries. As the fastest growing economy of the region since the
mid-1990s, Vietnamese advancement holds a wider comparative significance
for other developing economies aspiring to catch up to the rest of the industri-
alized world.
Given the increasingly complex economic environment, one needs a more in-
tegrative and context-sensitive study to make well-informed decisions. The Po-
litical Economy of Growth in Vietnam represents one such avenue. In engaging
with and bolstering the existing literature, this book revitalizes and enhances
the debate on the role of the state in social and economic transformation in the
21st century. It will especially appeal to students and scholars in the fields of
International Business, Economic Geography, International Political Economy,
Development Studies, Southeast Asian Studies, and Public Policy, as well as pol-
icymakers whose work involves international investment and trade.

Book structure
The Political Economy of Growth in Vietnam begins by providing background
information regarding the Southeast Asian economy. It sheds light on the polit-
ical economy of Vietnam, delineating its development with respect to the 1986
doi moi reforms. More specifically, Chapter 2 assesses Vietnamese development
over the last three decades, covering changes in key industries and the main
players involved. Particular focus will be trained on SOEs, which have long
been at the centre of Vietnam’s industrialization strategy, even if the country
has liberalized its economy to market forces. It also provides information on
Introduction  5
the state versus market dynamic, illustrating how Vietnam’s supposedly market-­
driven transformation is a multidimensional process simultaneously shaped by
and shaping Hanoi.
Chapter 3 introduces the ‘obligated embeddedness’ conceptual framework
that helps explain how countries negotiate and interact with TNCs to advance
their development goals. This framework was first proposed by Liu and Dicken
(2006) in their study of the Chinese automobile industry and has since influ-
enced various social scientists in their research. Chapter 3 updates the existing
literature, placing the discussion in the context of Vietnam and in a cross-­
industrial perspective. Moreover, Vietnamese progress shall be reviewed vis-à-vis
the industrialization strategies of Asia’s earlier batch of latecomer economies,
offering a systematic and critical analysis of various state-led catching-up models.
This chapter will also present and discuss several hypotheses.
Chapter 4 discusses the evolution of the Vietnamese motorcycle industry since
the doi moi was announced. Classifying the industry’s development into four
distinct stages, it examines the role of the state in instituting a competitive pol-
icy environment to attract and deepen the localization efforts of the motorcycle
TNCs. Particular attention will be trained on the Japanese TNCs as they are one
of the most important players in the shaping of the global motorcycle production
network. This chapter will illustrate that, in spite of some progress, Vietnam
has not been entirely effective in extracting as much leverage as it theoretically
should from the motorcycle TNCs.
Subsequently, Chapter 5 focuses on the Vietnamese banking industry. Through
an analysis of continuity and change in the Vietnamese banking industry in the
years post doi moi, the chapter argues that the influence of foreign TNCs and
liberalization measures on the working of the Vietnamese state has been relatively
small. In other words, Hanoi has maintained considerable control over the bank-
ing industry. Unlike the motorcycle industry, which has witnessed more foreign
participation, the state has retained significantly more policy autonomy in the
banking industry. However, Vietnamese dirigisme (i.e. lack of TNC involvement)
also means that the industry is relatively backward (at least compared with the
motorcycle industry), resulting in less efficiency.
Chapter 6 consists of two parts. It first compares the manner in which the
state has dealt with welcoming FDI in the motorcycle and banking industries.
It also seeks to explain the different approaches undertaken by Hanoi in the
modernization of the two industries. This approach enriches the obligated em-
beddedness framework as most studies have often focused on a single case study
in a particular economic setting (see Havice and Reed 2012; Lim 2014). In other
words, a comparative perspective is not commonly utilized. The second part of
the chapter situates the Vietnamese development story (especially in dealing with
TNCs) within the broader industrialization experience of the more mature Asian
economies. While it acknowledges Vietnam’s unique socio-historical context
and route to industrialization, the ambition is to demonstrate how catching-up
strategies, while driven by the state, exhibit certain similarities and differences.
The depiction of the diversity of industrialization of Vietnam as well as that of
6 Introduction
the more advanced Asian economies is useful in updating and extending the
findings of the existing research on economic development and public policy.
Chapter 7 summarizes the main findings of The Political Economy of Growth
in Vietnam and outlines the conclusions to be drawn from it. It then draws out
the implications of the findings for both theory and policy. The goal is not only
to nestle the Vietnamese development story within the context of East Asia,
but also to tease out lessons for scholars and policymakers aiming to support
the progress of fellow developing economies in catching up to the rest of the
industrialized world. Finally, Chapter 7 builds upon the findings of the book by
putting forward potential areas for future research.

Notes
1 Another transition economy that has an excellent record of reform is China (see Rana
1995; Vu 2015).
2 See Wade (2003), Amsden (1989), Ferchen (2013), Fforde (1999), Masina (2006),
Gomez (2009), Johnson (1982), Landes (1999), Robison (1986), Shin (2005),
Studwell (2014), and Suehiro (2008) for a more in-depth discussion of these
economies.
1 It was only in March 1945 (six months before the conclusion of the war) that the
Japanese overthrew French rule. However, this coup did not significantly affect the
outcome of World War II as the tide was already turning against the Axis forces.
2 Saigon was later renamed Ho Chi Minh City after North Vietnam’s revolutionary
leader Ho Chi Minh. However, the name Saigon is still widely used on an unofficial
basis.
3 Chinese–North Vietnamese cooperation was withdrawn in the latter phase of the
war because of political differences.
4 A total of 3.5 million Vietnamese were resettled overseas by the 1990s, with the
ethnic Chinese overrepresented in this group (Tran 2012).
5 The United States lifted its trade embargo on Vietnam only in 1994.
6 The trade openness ratio is the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP (right-
hand column of Table 2.2). Other studies have defined it as an arithmetic average
of exports and imports divided by GDP (see Chang 2014). Within Southeast Asia,
Singapore is the most dependent on international trade as it has consistently achieved
a ratio in excess of 300% of national GDP.
7 Despite drawing inspiration from the renowned business models of East Asia (e.g.
anchored by the keiretsu and the chaebol in Japan and Korea respectively), it is evident
that Vietnam’s industrial policy is not as well designed as those of the East Asian
countries that it is trying to emulate. While some Vietnamese SOEs have tightened
their grip on modern technology and grown their businesses (to be illustrated in the
subsequent paragraphs), many of them are still plagued by inefficiency and misman-
agement (see Painter 2005; Masina 2006; Pincus 2015).
8 In contrast, the younger and more open-minded group of leaders are generally more
progressive and willing to undertake more aggressive reforms.
1 Espoused principally by the Washington-based International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and World Bank, the consensus was originally designed to resuscitate the crisis-
stricken developing economies of South America and Africa during the 1980s.
Despite its generally ineffectual impact, the consensus remains popular among main-
stream economists and policymakers (Stiglitz 2002).
2 This does not mean that China can now produce automobile firms that can rival the
more advanced Western and Japanese TNCs. Despite their rapid catching-up, Chi-
nese firms are still lacking in new technologies and independent design capability.
See Thun (2004), Bruche and Wäldchen (2013), and Li, Kong, and Zhang (2016) for
insightful critique on this perspective.
3 Business process outsourcing is one of the most prominent industries of the Philip-
pines, largely because of its relatively low cost of living and a workforce comprising
mainly young and educated Filipinos with good spoken English language skills.
4 Under what is formally known as the New Economic Policy (NEP), Malaysia provides
preferential treatment to the majority Bumiputera (essentially Malay) population in
almost all aspects of the economy, such as employment opportunities and home own-
ership, often at the expense of the ethnic minorities. Despite its lopsided nature, the
NEP has arguably contributed to political stability in the country (Chin 2009).
5 It is more common to situate Vietnam’s experience with that of China, its large north-
ern neighbour (see, for example, McCormick 1998; Malesky and London 2014; Vu
2015).
6 Some of the more noteworthy works taking on a comparative perspective are Wong
and Cheong (2014), detailing the catch-up models of Korea, Taiwan, China, and Ma-
laysia, respectively, and Yeung (2016), who analyzes the experience of Korea, Taiwan,
and Singapore. In both studies, the Vietnamese perspective is lacking.
7 His discussion focuses primarily on the development experience of Japan, Korea,
Thailand, and Malaysia. Other notable absentees (or briefly discussed economies) in-
clude Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.
8 Chang (2011) argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, even supposedly
free-market proponents such as the United States and the United Kingdom have de-
ployed interventionist means to steer their respective economies. In addition, there
also exists substantial variation in what a minimalist economic model should look
like. In their analysis of the advanced Western and Japanese economies, Hall and
Soskice (2001) broadly separate them into two blocs: liberal market economy and
coordinated market economy. As their names suggest, the latter utilizes more inter-
ventionist measures than the former in cultivating its economy.
9 In 2001, it was reorganized into the newly created Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry (METI).
10 Although Park was assassinated in 1979, his successors did not alter the policymaking
process drastically. At least for the EPB, only in 1994 was it abolished and consoli-
dated with the Ministry of Finance to become the Ministry of Finance and Economy
(Han 2014).
11 This is perhaps partially attributable to Thaksin’s own experience as a businessman
prior to entering politics.
12 In May 2018, Mahathir re-ascended the premiership. However, he was then ousted
from the position in March 2020.
13 The EPU has since May 2018 been moved out of the Prime Minister’s Office, becom-
ing a separate line ministry.
14 This is, to some extent, a result of Malaysia’s semi-liberal political structure, in which
power has been systematically centralized towards the Prime Minister’s Office. Much
of this centralization exercise took place during Mahathir’s first tenure. A notable
feature of this system is the practice of the prime minister simultaneously serving as
minister of finance – first occurring towards the end of Mahathir’s reign and per-
sisting until May 2018. This removed an important institutional check and balance
on the prime minister (Ostwald 2017).
15 As Vietnam is a single-party state, the general secretary of the VCP wields significant
(but not absolute) power over state affairs, although much of the machinations are
conducted behind the scenes. While the powers and prestige of the president (head
of state), prime minister (head of government), and National Assembly chairperson
(speaker of parliament) have fluctuated over the years, it must be noted that they can
hold office only with sufficient support from the VCP. To further reduce the likeli-
hood of the emergence of a strong leader, the general secretary, president, and prime
minister are selected on the basis of another informal criterion – each of them, as
much as possible, is to originate from the southern, central, or the northern parts of
Vietnam in a mutually exclusive manner. This is to ensure equal representation of the
country’s three core administration regions.
1 A CBU is a motorcycle fully assembled abroad before being imported as a complete
unit into the target market. Unlike the CBU, the completely knockdown (CKD)
motorcycle involves a kit containing some pre-manufactured components needed to
assemble a complete motorcycle. The CKD is usually only assembled at the final des-
tination as TNCs typically sell CKD units to their foreign affiliates or licensees for the
latter to avoid import taxes and/or to exploit other incentives.
2 In addition to the VMEP and Japanese TNCs, this period saw the entry of the GMN
Automobile and Motorcycle Parts Manufacture Joint Venture Co. Ltd., a Thai-led
joint venture that left the market after a few years. Sufat, a Vietnamese private sector
company, also emerged during this period. Sufat remains among the very few domes-
tic private sector firms operating in the market, although it is only competitive in a
niche segment of the market.
3 In spite of a small total sales volume, the TNCs still extracted supernormal profit as
the margin per unit of their motorcycles was sufficiently high (see Ministry of Indus-
try 2007).
4 Although many of the Chinese motorcycles were assembled by the Vietnamese as-
semblers, often with the advice of Chinese engineers and technicians from their
kit suppliers, the China shock era also drew in some renowned Chinese motorcycle
TNCs. For example, Chongqing Lifan, one of the largest motorcycle players in China,
established its Vietnamese operations in 2002.
5 The motorcycle assemblers are expected to maintain at least 60% of local content in
their production (see Ngo 2017).
6 This was more of a pre-emptive measure by the Japanese TNCs to check the advances
of the Chinese motorcycles in Thailand (see Intarakumnerd and Fujita 2008).
7 The latter ran into financial difficulties and eventually exited the industry in 2008.
Since its exit from the motorcycle industry, Hoa Lam Group has moved into services,
focusing especially on property development.
8 Some of the more prominent ones shall be described in the next subsections.
9 As of 2018, two motorcycle TNCs have established their respective R&D centres
in Vietnam. VMEP established its R&D centre in 2010 while Piaggio followed suit
in 2012.
10 It must be noted that some of its earlier models, such as the Win Sufat, bear a close
resemblance to motorcycles made by the Japanese TNCs. The crucial difference be-
tween Sufat and its peers is that the former quickly realized the need to utilize pro-
prietary designs and better components while the latter relied exclusively on the old
strategy of assembling Chinese motorcycles with little value and using homogenous
components.
11 According to a political analyst, the market share of Sufat motorcycles is rather small.
While he did not provide an absolute number on the market share of Sufat motor-
cycles, he commented that it was rare to see a Sufat motorcycle at the time of this
particular interview in 2013. In the past, the analyst could quite easily spot Sufat mo-
torcycles in the areas where he frequented (personal communication, Ho Chi Minh
City, 29 January 2013).
12 Fujita (2017, 126) terms such firms ‘reformed SOEs’, which includes market-savvy
SOEs and/or quasi-private firms that respond positively to opportunities opened up
since the launch of the doi moi.
13 VMEP’s establishment of its R&D centre in 2010 has a similar impact in both dilut-
ing the dominance of the Japanese TNCs as well as cultivating domestic know-how.
14 This does not mean that China (and other more successful Asian economies) does
not suffer from local–central bureaucratic infighting. The point made here is that
Vietnam still has room to improve in mediating such infighting and bureaucratic
tussles, taking a cue from China and other more successful Asian economies. China’s
case is especially noteworthy for it has experimented with both centralizing and de-
centralizing measures, although it is seemingly tilting towards the former following
Xi Jinping’s rise to the presidency in 2013.
1 Equitization refers to the process of converting SOEs into joint stock companies. It
is a de facto privatization process, although the Vietnamese have a clear preference to
use the term ‘equitization’.
2 Like the definition for SOEs, SOCBs are economic entities that are 100% or majority
owned by the state.
3 The implicit understanding of much of the contemporary scholarship takes the
Anglo-American banking model as its benchmark, in which commercial banking
functions are almost entirely carried out by private firms. However, there is a signifi-
cant variation of this model in other developed economies such as France, Germany,
and Japan (see Hall and Soskice 2001; Carney and Zheng 2009).
4 Dung subsequently became prime minister from 2006 to 2016.
5 Credit Suisse was chosen because it is highly ranked internationally in mergers and ac-
quisitions and has served successfully as consultant to the equitization of major banks
in China, Indonesia, and South Korea. Prior to this deal with the Vietcombank,
Credit Suisse has also provided consultation to the Vietnamese state in successfully
issuing bonds worth USD 750 million to overseas markets (Viet Nam News 2020).
6 The Vietnamese state divided the IPO into two rounds in a cautious attempt to better
manage the equitization process. In the first round, Vietcombank would sell only 6.5%
of its equity (equivalent to 97.5 million shares). In the second round, progressively more
shares would be sold off, with a planned eventual shareholding of SBV (65%), foreign
strategic investor (20%), domestic strategic investor (5%), and general public (10%).
7 Some of the technical support that Credit Suisse would provide Vietcombank with
were solutions to convert bonds into shares, management techniques of financial
groups, solutions to deal with bad debts, and risk and asset management (Viet Nam
News 2020).
8 In accordance with the SBV’s regulation, foreign investors are not allowed to own
more than 30% of shares offered. In addition, no single foreign shareholder can own
more than a 20% stake in a Vietnamese bank.
9 According to Tudor (2020), Vietcombank was about to strike an agreement with US-
based General Electric prior to the onset of the crisis.
10 Originally, Mizuho had intended to purchase a 20% stake in Vietcombank. How-
ever, this was eventually diluted down to 15% (see Reuters 2011; Japan Times
2020).
11 Although Vietcombank (2018) showcases the equity stake of the SBV (77.11%) and
its foreign strategic investor (Mizuho with 15%), it does not specify who its domestic
strategic investor and general public are. What it shows instead is domestic individu-
als (1.61%), domestic organizations (0.54%), foreign individuals (0.23%), and foreign
organizations (5.51%). These four groups of ‘small’ investors collectively control only
7.88% of Vietcombank’s equity.
12 This chapter conceptualizes effective pressure in relative, rather than absolute, terms.
Put differently, the state versus TNC dynamic in the banking industry is compared
and contrasted with that of the motorcycle industry.
1 It is only since May 2018 that the EPU has been moved out of the Prime Minister’s
Office, becoming a line ministry in itself. The EPU has also changed its name to the
Ministry of Economic Affairs.
2 Korea and Thailand rely predominantly on private firms (rather than SOEs) to take
part in industrialization efforts, especially in heavy industries. Unlike the Koreans
who push domestic private firms to partake in such industries, Thailand has been
happy to bring in FDI to drive progress. See Amsden (1989), Thurbon and Weiss
(2019), Shin (2005), Hewison (1989), Siriprachai (2012), and Intarakumnerd,
Chairatana, and Chaiyanajit (2016) for a fuller discussion on Korean and Thai indus-
trial policies.
1 This estimation was based on the market capitalization data between 2008 and 2013
(Tan, Puchniak, and Varottil 2015).

References
Amsden, Alice. 1989. Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Beattie, Alan. 2010. False Economy: A Surprising Economic History of the World. London:
Penguin.
Beeson, Mark. 2007. Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia: Politics, Security, and
Economic Development. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Ferchen, Matt. 2013. “Whose China Model is it Anyway? The Contentious Search for
Consensus.” Review of International Political Economy 20 (2):390–420.
Fforde, Adam. 1999. “From Plan to Market: The Economic Transition in Vietnam and
China Compared.” In Transforming Asian Socialism: China and Vietnam Compared,
edited by Anita Chan and Benedict Kerkvliet, 43–72. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
Fujita, Mai. 2017. “Vietnam’s Post-WTO Industrial Development: Strategies and Re-
alities.” In Southeast Asia beyond Crises and Traps: Economic Growth and Upgrading,
edited by Boo Teik Khoo, Keiichi Tsunekawa and Motoko Kawano, 101–130. Cham:
Springer.
Gomez, Edmund Terence. 2009. “The Rise and Fall of Capital: Corporate Malaysia in
Historical Perspective.” Journal of Contemporary Asia 39 (3):345–381.
Havice, Elizabeth, and Kristin Reed. 2012. “Fishing for Development? Tuna Resource
Access and Industrial Change in Papua New Guinea.” Journal of Agrarian Change 12
(2–3):413–435.
Ishida, Akie. 2013. “State Enterprise Groups in Vietnam Following Accession to the
WTO.” In Vietnam’s Economic Entities in Transition, edited by Shozo Sakata, 23–58.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Jo, Gab-Je. 1999. “The Speed and Order of Economic Liberalization in China and its
Comparison with Russia and Vietnam.” Global Economic Review 28 (1):105–116.
Johnson, Chalmers. 1982. MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Pol-
icy, 1925–1975. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Landes, David. 1999. The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some
So Poor. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
Lim, Guanie. 2014. “The Internationalisation of Mainland Chinese Firms into Malaysia:
From Obligated Embeddedness to Active Embeddedness.” Journal of Current South-
east Asian Affairs 33 (2):59–90.
Liu, Weidong, and Peter Dicken. 2006. “Transnational Corporations and ‘Obligated
Embeddedness’: Foreign Direct Investment in China’s Automobile Industry.” Envi-
ronment and Planning A: Economy and Space 38 (7):1229–1247.
Masina, Pietro. 2006. Vietnam’s Development Strategies. New York: Routledge.
Rana, Pradumna. 1995. “Reform Strategies in Transitional Economies: Lessons from
Asia.” World Development 23 (7):1157–1169.
Robison, Richard. 1986. Indonesia: The Rise of Capital. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
Sachs, Jeffrey, and Wing Thye Woo. 1994. “Structural Factors in the Economic Re-
forms of China, Eastern Europe, and the Former Soviet Union.” Economic Policy 9
(18):101–145.
Sakata, Shozo. 2013. “Introduction: The Changing Status of Economic Entities in Vi-
etnam.” In Vietnam’s Economic Entities in Transition, edited by Shozo Sakata, 1–22.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Shin, Jang-Sup. 2005. “Substituting and Complementing Models of Economic Develop-
ment in East Asia.” Global Economic Review 34 (1):99–118.
Studwell, Joe. 2014. How Asia Works: Success and Failure in the World’s Most Dynamic
Region. London: Profile Books.
Suehiro, Akira. 2008. Catch-Up Industrialization: The Trajectory and Prospects of East
Asian Economies. Singapore: NUS Press.
Vu, Minh Khuong. 2015. “Can Vietnam Achieve More Robust Economic Growth? In-
sights from a Comparative Analysis of Economic Reforms in Vietnam and China.”
Journal of Southeast Asian Economies 32 (1):52–83.
Wade, Robert. 2003. Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government
in East Asian Industrialization. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Amer, Ramses. 1996. “Vietnam’s Policies and the Ethnic Chinese since 1975.” SOJOURN:
Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia 11 (1):76–104.
Beattie, Alan. 2010. False Economy: A Surprising Economic History of the World. London:
Penguin.
Booth, Anne. 2007. Colonial Legacies: Economic and Social Development in East and
Southeast Asia. Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press.
Chan, Yuk Wah. 2013. Vietnamese-Chinese Relationships at the Borderlands: Trade, Tour-
ism and Cultural Politics. New York: Routledge.
Chang, Ha-Joon. 2014. Economics: The User’s Guide. London: Penguin.
Doyle, Kevin. 2014. “Vietnam’s Forgotten Cambodian War.” BBC, Accessed 19 June
2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-29106034.
Fforde, Adam. 1999. “From Plan to Market: The Economic Transition in Vietnam and
China Compared.” In Transforming Asian Socialism: China and Vietnam Compared,
edited by Anita Chan and Benedict Kerkvliet, 43–72. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
Freeman, Donald. 1996. “Doi Moi Policy and the Small-Enterprise Boom in Ho Chi
Minh City, Vietnam.” Geographical Review 86 (2):178–197.
General Statistics Office. 2015. Statistical Handbook of Vietnam 2014. Hanoi: Statistical
Publishing House.
———. 2016. Efficiency of Business of Domestic Enterprises in the Period 2005–2014. Ha-
noi: Statistical Publishing House.
Kohli, Atul. 2004. State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in
the Global Periphery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lamb, David. 1998. “Vietnam’s Open Door Now Exit for Investors.” In Los Angeles
Times. Accessed on 19 June 2020: https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1998-
dec-25-mn-57555-story.html
Landes, David. 1999. The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some
So Poor. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
Lee, Joonkoo, and Gary Gereffi. 2013. “The Co-Evolution of Concentration in Mobile
Phone Global Value Chains and its Impact on Social Upgrading in Developing Coun-
tries.” Capturing the Gains Working Paper. No.2013/25. 1–25.
Lim, Guanie. 2016a. “Firm Entry Modes and Chinese Business Networks: Malaysian
Investments in Vietnam.” Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 37 (2):176–194.
———. 2016b. “Managing Technological Development: A Study of Vietnam’s Tele-
communication Goods Industry.” Journal of Comparative Asian Development 15
(2):276–299.
Masina, Pietro. 2006. Vietnam’s Development Strategies. New York: Routledge.
Ngo, Ngoc Thai Hong. 2013. “Technology Adoption in Rent Seeking Economies: The
Case of Vietnam.” PhD Dissertation. London: School of Oriental and African Studies.
Nguyen, Manh Hai, and Michael O’Donnell. 2017. “Reforming State-Owned Enter-
prises in Vietnam: The Contrasting Cases of Vinashin and Viettel.” Asian Perspective
41 (2):215–237.
Painter, Martin. 2005. “The Politics of State Sector Reforms in Vietnam: Contested
Agendas and Uncertain Trajectories.” Journal of Development Studies 41 (2):261–283.
Pincus, Jonathan. 2015. “Why Doesn’t Vietnam Grow Faster? State Fragmentation and
the Limits of Vent for Surplus Growth.” Journal of Southeast Asian Economies 32
(1):26–51.
Rana, Pradumna. 1995. “Reform Strategies in Transitional Economies: Lessons from
Asia.” World Development 23 (7):1157–1169.
Sakata, Shozo. 2013. “Introduction: The Changing Status of Economic Entities in Vi-
etnam.” In Vietnam’s Economic Entities in Transition, edited by Shozo Sakata, 1–22.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Schaumburg-Müller, Henrik, and Hong Chuong, Pham (Eds.). 2010. “The New Asian
Dragon: Internationalization of Firms in Vietnam.” Copenhagen: Copenhagen Busi-
ness School Press.
Straszheim, Donald. 2008. “Is Vietnam The Next China?” Forbes. Accessed on 19 June
2020: https://www.forbes.com/2008/06/12/vietnam-china-inflation-oped-cx_dhs_
0612viet.html#1b7adceb36af
Studwell, Joe. 2014. How Asia Works: Success and Failure in the World’s Most Dynamic
Region. London: Profile Books.
Thayer, Carlyle. 2007. “Vietnam: The Tenth Party Congress and After.” Southeast Asian
Affairs:381–397.
Thomsen, Lotte. 2007. “Accessing Global Value Chains? The Role of Business-State Re-
lations in the Private Clothing Industry in Vietnam.” Journal of Economic Geography
7 (6):753–776.
Tran, Quan Tue. 2012. “Remembering the Boat People Exodus: A Tale of Two Memori-
als.” Journal of Vietnamese Studies 7 (3):80–121.
Van Arkadie, Brian, and Raymond Mallon. 2003. Vietnam: A Transition Tiger? Can-
berra: Asia Pacific Press.
Viet Nam News. 2017. “Two Executions, One Life Sentence in Vinashin Case.” Viet
Nam News, Accessed 21 February. http://vietnamnews.vn/politics-laws/351702/two-
executions-one-life-sentence-in-vinashin-case.html#i0HIZioTib9FjyVl.97.
Vu, Tuan Anh. 1994. Development in Vietnam: Policy Reforms and Economic Growth.
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Vu, Tuong. 2010. Paths to Development in Asia: South Korea, Vietnam, China, and Indo-
nesia. New York: Cambridge University Press.
World Bank. 1993. The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
———. 2012. Well Begun, Not Yet Done: Vietnam’s Remarkable Progress on Poverty Re-
duction and the Emerging Challenges. Hanoi: World Bank.
———. 2020. “World Bank Open Data.” World Bank, Accessed 19 June 2020. https://
data.worldbank.org/.
Xinhua. 2018. “Vietnam Expected to Drop Poverty Rate.” Xinhua, Accessed 19 June
2020. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-09/18/c_137476157.htm.
Akamatsu, Kaname. 1962. “A Historical Pattern of Economic Growth in Developing
Countries.” Journal of Developing Economies 1 (1):3–25.
Amsden, Alice. 2003. The Rise of “The Rest”: Challenges to the West from Late-
Industrializing Economies. New York: Oxford University Press.
Beeson, Mark. 2007. Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia: Politics, Security, and
Economic Development. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Beeson, Mark, and Hung Hung Pham. 2012. “Developmentalism with Vietnamese
Characteristics: The Persistence of State-led Development in East Asia.” Journal of
Contemporary Asia 42 (4):539–559.
Beeson, Mark, and Iyanatul Islam. 2005. “Neo-Liberalism and East Asia: Resisting the
Washington Consensus.” Journal of Development Studies 41 (2):197–219.
Bonanno, Alessandro, and Douglas Constance. 2006. “Corporations and the State in the
Global Era: The Case of Seaboard Farms and Texas.” Rural Sociology 71 (1):59–84.
Bruche, Gert, and Daniel Wäldchen. 2013. “Racing to the Top? Catch-Up Strategies of
Chinese and Indian Independent Car Manufacturers.” International Journal of Auto-
motive Technology and Management 13 (1):36–54.
Busser, Rogier. 2008. “‘Detroit of the East’? Industrial Upgrading, Japanese Car Pro-
ducers and the Development of the Automotive Industry in Thailand.” Asia Pacific
Business Review 14 (1):29–45.
Chang, Ha-Joon. 2011. 23 Things They Don’t Tell You about Capitalism. London: Penguin.
Cherry, Judith. 2005. “‘Big Deal’ or Big Disappointment? The Continuing Evolution of
the South Korean Developmental State.” The Pacific Review 18 (3):327–354.
Cheung, Anthony. 2013. “Can There Be an Asian Model of Public Administration?”
Public Administration and Development 33 (4):249–261.
Chin, James. 2009. “The Malaysian Chinese Dilemma: The Never Ending Policy (NEP).”
Chinese Southern Diaspora Studies 3:167–182.
Deane, Phyllis. 1989. The State and the Economic System: An Introduction to the History
of Political Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Evans, Peter. 1995. Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Gainsborough, Martin. 2003. Changing Political Economy of Vietnam: The Case of Ho
Chi Minh City. London: Routledge.
———. 2007. “Globalisation and the State Revisited: A View from Provincial Vietnam.”
Journal of Contemporary Asia 37 (1):1–18.
Gomez, Edmund Terence, and Kwame Sundaram Jomo. 1999. Malaysia’s Political Econ-
omy: Politics, Patronage and Profits. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Grindle, Merilee. 2011. “Good Enough Governance Revisited.” Development Policy Re-
view 29 (s1):s199–s221.
Hall, Peter, and David Soskice (Eds). 2001. “Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional
Foundations of Comparative Advantage.”. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Han, Seunghee. 2014. Operation of the Economic Planning Board in the Era of High Eco-
nomic Growth in Korea. Seoul: Ministry of Strategy and Finance.
Held, David, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton. 2000. Global
Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hewison, Kevin. 1989. Bankers and Bureaucrats: Capital and the Role of the State in
Thailand. Yale, NH: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies.
Hill, Hal. 2012. “Malaysian Economic Development: Looking Backward and For-
ward.” In Malaysia’s Development Challenges: Graduating from the Middle, edited
by Hal Hill, Siew Yean Tham Tham and Haji Mat Zin Ragayah, 1–42. Oxford:
Routledge.
Hundt, David. 2005. “A Legitimate Paradox: Neo-liberal Reform and the Return of the
State in Korea.” Journal of Development Studies 41 (2):242–260.
Intarakumnerd, Patarapong, and Meng-Chun Liu. 2019. “Industrial Technology Up-
grading and Innovation Policies: A Comparison of Taiwan and Thailand.” In Emerging
States at Crossroads, edited by Keiichi Tsunekawa and Yasuyuki Todo, 119–143. Singa-
pore: Springer Singapore.
Johnson, Chalmers. 1982. MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Pol-
icy, 1925–1975. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Khan, Mushtaq, and Kwame Sundaram Jomo (Eds). 2000. “Rents, Rent-Seeking and
Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia.” Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Kim, Byung-Kook. 1992. “Economic Policy and the Economic Planning Board (EPB) in
Korea.” Asian Affairs 18 (4):197–213.
Kleibert, Jana. 2015. “Industry-Academe Linkages in the Philippines: Embedding For-
eign Investors, Capturing Institutions?” Geoforum 59:109–118.
Kohli, Atul. 2004. State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in
the Global Periphery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Li, Yan Sheng, Xin Xin Kong, and Miao Zhang. 2016. “Industrial Upgrading in Global
Production Networks: The Case of the Chinese Automotive Industry.” Asia Pacific
Business Review 22 (1):21–37.
Lim, Guanie. 2014. “The Internationalisation of Mainland Chinese Firms into Malaysia:
From Obligated Embeddedness to Active Embeddedness.” Journal of Current South-
east Asian Affairs 33 (2):59–90.
Lin, Justin. 2012. The Quest for Prosperity: How Developing Economies Can Take Off.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Liu, Weidong, and Peter Dicken. 2006. “Transnational Corporations and ‘Obligated
Embeddedness’: Foreign Direct Investment in China’s Automobile Industry.” Envi-
ronment and Planning A: Economy and Space 38 (7):1229–1247.
Malesky, Edmund, and Jonathan London. 2014. “The Political Economy of Develop-
ment in China and Vietnam.” Annual Review of Political Science 17 (1):395–419.
McCormick, Barrett. 1998. “Political Change in China and Vietnam: Coping with the
Consequences of Economic Reform.” The China Journal 40:121–143.
Ohmae, Kenichi. 1990. Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy.
New York: Harper Business.
———. 1995. The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies. New York:
The Free Press.
Ohno, Kenichi. 2009. The Middle Income Trap: Implications for Industrialization Strate-
gies in East Asia and Africa. Tokyo: GRIPS Development Forum.
Ostwald, Kai. 2017. “Federalism without Decentralization: Power Consolidation in
Malaysia.” Journal of Southeast Asian Economies 34 (3):488–506.
Painter, Martin. 2005. “The Politics of State Sector Reforms in Vietnam: Contested
Agendas and Uncertain Trajectories.” Journal of Development Studies 41 (2):261–283.
Pincus, Jonathan. 2015. “Why Doesn’t Vietnam Grow Faster? State Fragmentation and
the Limits of Vent for Surplus Growth.” Journal of Southeast Asian Economies 32
(1):26–51.
Pitakdumrongkit, Kaewkamol, and Guanie Lim. 2020. “Neo-liberalism, the Rise of the
Unelected and Policymaking in Thailand: The Case of the Medical Tourism Industry.”
Journal of Contemporary Asia 1–22. DOI: 10.1080/00472336.2020.1740294
Pua, Tony. 2011. The Tiger that Lost Its Roar: A Tale of Malaysia’s Political Economy.
Kuala Lumpur: Democratic Action Party.
Stiglitz, Joseph. 2002. Globalization and Its Discontents. New York: W W Norton.
Tatarski, Michael. 2018. “Vietnam’s Communist Party Chief Set to Become Presi-
dent.” Al Jazeera. Accessed on: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/10/vietnam-
communist-party-chief-set-president-181018075230534.html
Thun, Eric. 2004. “Industrial Policy, Chinese-Style: FDI, Regulation, and Dreams of
National Champions in the Auto Sector.” Journal of East Asian Studies 4 (3):453–489.
Tsunekawa, Keiichi, and Yasuyuki Todo (Eds). 2019. Emerging States at Crossroads. To-
kyo: Springer.
Tu Anh, Vu Thanh. 2016. “Vietnam: Decentralization Amidst Fragmentation.” Journal
of Southeast Asian Economies 33 (2):188–208.
Van Apeldoorn, Bastian. 1998. “Transnationalization and the Restructuring of Europe’s
Socioeconomic Order.” International Journal of Political Economy 28 (1):12–53.
Vu, Minh Khuong. 2015. “Can Vietnam Achieve More Robust Economic Growth? In-
sights from a Comparative Analysis of Economic Reforms in Vietnam and China.”
Journal of Southeast Asian Economies 32 (1):52–83.
Wedeman, Andrew. 2002. “Development and Corruption: The East Asian Paradox.” In
Political Business in East Asia, edited by Edmund Terence Gomez, 34–61. Oxford:
Routledge.
Wong, Chan-Yuan, and Kee-Cheok Cheong. 2014. “Diffusion of Catching-up Industri-
alization Strategies: The Dynamics of East Asia’s Policy Learning Process.” Journal of
Comparative Asian Development 13 (3):369–404.
Yeung, Henry Wai-Chung. 2016. Strategic Coupling: East Asian Industrial Transforma-
tion in the New Global Economy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Asian Development Bank. 2012. Vietnam: Transport Sector Assessment, Strategy, and
Road Map. Manila: Asian Development Bank.
Business Monitor International. 2015. “Asia Pacific Automotives: Insight.”. London:
Business Monitor International.
Freeman, Donald. 1996. “Doi Moi Policy and the Small-Enterprise Boom in Ho Chi
Minh City, Vietnam.” Geographical Review 86 (2):178–197.
Fujita, Mai. 2013a. Exploiting Linkages for Building Technological Capabilities: Vietnam’s
Motorcycle Component Suppliers under Japanese and Chinese Influence. Tokyo: Springer.
———. 2013b. “The Rise of Local Assemblers in the Vietnamese Motorcycle Industry:
The Dynamics and Diversity of Industrial Organization.” In Vietnam’s Economic Enti-
ties in Transition, edited by Shozo Sakata, 146–166. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
———. 2017. “Vietnam’s Post-WTO Industrial Development: Strategies and Realities.”
In Southeast Asia beyond Crises and Traps: Economic Growth and Upgrading, edited by
Boo Teik Khoo, Keiichi Tsunekawa and Motoko Kawano, 101–130. Cham: Springer.
Indolino, Erasmo. 2016. “Easy Riding – Investment Opportunities in Vietnam’s Motor-
cycle Industry.” Dezan Shira & Associates.
Intarakumnerd, Patarapong, and Mai Fujita. 2008. “Coping with a Giant: Challenges
and Opportunities for Thai and Vietnamese Motorcycle Industry from China.” Sci-
ence, Technology & Society 13 (1):35–60.
Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association. 2017. The Motor Industry of Japan 2017.
Tokyo: Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association.
Lim, Guanie. 2016a. “Firm Entry Modes and Chinese Business Networks: Malaysian
Investments in Vietnam.” Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 37 (2):176–194.
———. 2016b. “Managing Technological Development: A Study of Vietnam’s Telecommu-
nication Goods Industry.” Journal of Comparative Asian Development 15 (2):276–299.
———. 2018. “Public Policy with Vietnamese Characteristics: The Case of the Motorcy-
cle Industry.” Journal of Asian Public Policy 11 (2):226–244.
Liu, Weidong, and Peter Dicken. 2006. “Transnational Corporations and ‘Obligated
Embeddedness’: Foreign Direct Investment in China’s Automobile Industry.” Envi-
ronment and Planning A: Economy and Space 38 (7):1229–1247.
Meichtry, Stacy. 2010. “Buon Giorno, Mumbai: Vespa Woos Asia.” Wall Street Journal.
Accessed 20 June 2020. https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487042490
04575385041066695142
Ministry of Industry. 2007. “Master Plan for the Development of Vietnam’s Motorcycle
Industry in the Period of 2006–2015, with a Vision to 2020.” Hanoi: Ministry of
Industry.
Ngo, Christine Ngoc. 2017. “Local Value Chain Development in Vietnam: Motorcy-
cles, Technical Learning and Rents Management.” Journal of Contemporary Asia 47
(1):1–26.
Nguyen, Duc Tiep. 2007a. “Building External Manufacturing Capability in Emerging
Markets: Honda’s Knowledge Transfer and the Role of Local Suppliers’ Responsive-
ness.” Journal of Asia-Pacific Business 7 (4):77–95.
———. 2007b. “The Honda Motorcycle Business in the Vietnamese Emerging Market.”
International Journal of Emerging Markets 2 (3):298–309.
Nguyen Thi, Thu Ha, and Chengter Ho. 2013. “Localization Strategy of Motorcycle
Industry in Vietnam.” PowerPoint Presentation. International Conference on So-
cial Science and Business. Taipei. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/235988873_Localization_Strategy_of_Motorcycle_Industry_in_Vietnam
Pham, Truong Hoang, and Yoshikazu Shusa. 2006. “Supplier-Assembler Network Struc-
ture and Capability Improvement of Suppliers in Newly Emerging Vietnam’s Motorcy-
cle Industry.” Asian Journal of Technology Innovation 14 (2):143–165.
Piaggio Group. 2012. “Press Release: Piaggio Group: Official Opening of New Viet-
nam Factory.” Accessed 20 June 2020. https://piaggiogroup.com/en/archive/press/
piaggio-group-official-opening-new-vietnam-factory.
PINACO. 2016. Annual Report 2015. Ho Chi Minh City: PINACO.
Pincus, Jonathan. 2015. “Why Doesn’t Vietnam Grow Faster? State Fragmentation and
the Limits of Vent for Surplus Growth.” Journal of Southeast Asian Economies 32
(1):26–51.
Sufat Vietnam Corp. 2016. “Development History.” Accessed 31 October. http://www.
sufatvietnam.com.vn/en/Introduction/Development-History.
Thomsen, Lotte. 2007. “Accessing Global Value Chains? The Role of Business-State Re-
lations in the Private Clothing Industry in Vietnam.” Journal of Economic Geography
7 (6):753–776.
Tran, Van Tho. 2013. “Vietnamese Economy at the Crossroads: New Doi Moi for Sus-
tained Growth.” Asian Economic Policy Review 8 (1):122–143.
Tu Anh, Vu Thanh. 2016. “Vietnam: Decentralization Amidst Fragmentation.” Journal
of Southeast Asian Economies 33 (2):188–208.
Vietnam Investment Review. 2013. “Bike Brands Hitting the Fast Lane.” Vietnam
Investment Review. Accessed 20 June 2020. https://www.vir.com.vn/bike-brands-
hitting-the-fast-lane-18211.html.
Yamaha Motor Group. 2016. “Yamaha Motor to Establish Motorcycle Parts Manufac-
turing Subsidiary in Vietnam.” Yamaha Motor Group, Accessed 31 October. http://
global.yamaha-motor.com/news/2005/0111/ypmv.html.
Asian Development Bank. 2014. Viet Nam: Financial Sector Assessment, Strategy, and
Road Map. Manila: Asian Development Bank.
Carney, Richard W, and Loh Yi Zheng. 2009. “Institutional (Dis)Incentives to Inno-
vate: An Explanation for Singapore’s Innovation Gap.” Journal of East Asian Studies
9 (2):291–319.
Hall, Peter, and David Soskice (Eds.). 2001. “Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional
Foundations of Comparative Advantage.” Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Huynh, Du The, and Jay Rosengard. 2009. Vietcombank Equitization. Ho Chi Minh
City: Fulbright Economics Teaching Program.
International Monetary Fund. 2017. IMF Country Report No. 17/191: Vietnam: Selected
Issues. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Japan Times. 2020. “Mizuho Said Close to Buying 20% Vietcombank Stake.” Japan
Times, Accessed 21 January. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2011/07/22/
business/mizuho-said-close-to-buying-20-vietcombank-stake/#.XiXS1mgzY2w.
Lim, Guanie, and Thong Tien Nguyen. 2019. “Banking Reform in Vietnam: Persistence
of the State?” In Geofinance between Political and Financial Geographies: A Focus on the
Semi-Periphery of the Global Financial System, edited by Silvia Grandi, Christian Sellar
and Juvaria Jafri, 155–174. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Liu, Weidong, and Peter Dicken. 2006. “Transnational Corporations and ‘Obligated
Embeddedness’: Foreign Direct Investment in China’s Automobile Industry.” Envi-
ronment and Planning A: Economy and Space 38 (7):1229–1247.
Nguyen, Dinh Phan. 2008. “The Impacts of Financial Development on Economic Activ-
ities in Vietnam.” PhD Dissertation. University of Adelaide.
Nguyen, Nhat Lam, and Binh Minh Ho. 2007. “Update 2: Vietcombank IPO Raises
$652 Mln, Market Cautious.” Reuters, Accessed 20 January 2020. https://www.
reuters.com/article/asia-271328-vietnam-vietcombank-ipo/update-2-vietcombank-
ipo-raises-652-mln-market-cautious-idUSHAN2103920071227.
Ogimoto, Yoko. 2013. “Development and Prospects for the Vietnamese Banking Sector:
Before and After Accession to the WTO.” In Vietnam’s Economic Entities in Transi-
tion, edited by Shozo Sakata, 167–203. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Phuc, Hong. 2020. “Japan’s Mizuho Invests US$567 mil. in Vietcombank.” The Sai-
gon Times, Accessed 21 January. https://english.thesaigontimes.vn/19566/Japan%E2
%80%99s-Mizuho-invests-US$567-mil-in-Vietcombank.html.
Reuters. 2007. “Vietcombank Value Seen at $9.3 bln – Paper.” Reuters, Accessed 21 Jan-
uary 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/vietnam-vietcombank-ipo-idUSHAN3
473720071203.
———. 2011b. “UPDATE 2-Japan’s Mizuho nears Vietnam’s Largest ever Inbound
Deal.” Reuters, Accessed 21 January 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/mizuho-
vietcom/update-2-japans-mizuho-nears-vietnams-largest-ever-inbound-deal-idU
SL3E7IK1Z820110720.
———. 2016. “UPDATE 1-GIC Buys 7.7 pct Stake in Vietcombank for about $400
mln-Sources.” Reuters, Accessed 22 January 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/
vietcombank-investment-gic-pte-idUSL3N1BA2RW.
Soon, Weilun. 2020. “GIC Aiming for 7.73% Stake in Vietcombank.” The Business
Times, Accessed 22 January. https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/companies-markets/
gic-aiming-for-773-stake-in-vietcombank.
Tordesillas, Cesar. 2020. “Mizuho Acquires 15% Stake in Vietcombank.” Asian
Banking and Finance, Accessed 21 January. https://asianbankingandfinance.net/
retail-banking/news/mizuho-acquires-15-stake-in-vietcombank.
Tran, Bao, Bernice Ong, and Scott Weldon. 2015. Vietnam Banking Industry Report.
Singapore: Duxton Asset Management.
Tudor, Alison. 2020. “Mizuho to Buy 15% of Vietnamese Bank.” The Wall Street Journal,
Accessed 21 January. https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204138204
576602261666129684.
Vietcombank. 2018. Annual Report. Hanoi: Vietcombank.
Viet Nam News. 2020. “Credit Suisse to Advise Vietcombank.” Viet Nam News,
Accessed 20 January. https://vietnamnews.vn/economy/banking-finance/161926/
credit-suisse-to-advise-vietcombank.html#GMUYZwsHkvAatQpR.97.
Woo, Jacqueline. 2020. “GIC Signs MOU to Buy 7.73% Stake in Vietnam’s Largest
Bank.” Straits Times, Accessed 22 January. https://www.straitstimes.com/business/
gic-signs-mou-to-buy-773-stake-in-vietnams-largest-bank.
World Trade Organization. 2002. Accession of Viet Nam: Initial Offer on Specific Com-
mitments in Services [WT/ACC/SPEC/VNM/2; 7 January 2002]. Geneva: World Trade
Organization.
———. 2006. Working Party on the Accession of Viet Nam: Schedule CLX - Viet Nam:
Part II – Schedule of Specific Commitments in Services: List of Article II MFN Exemp-
tions: Addendum [WT/ACC/VNM/48/Add.2; 27 October 2006] Geneva: World Trade
Organization.

View publication stats

You might also like